FM 90-8/MCRP 3-33A

Counterguerilla Operations

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 144 000023 00

Section II. Considerations

4-3. Guerrilla support.

a. Since a major goal of participants in a conventional conflict is to gain control of territory through the use of regular armed forces, the forms of guerrilla activity change. Guerrilla operations in this case support the main effort of the enemy force by disrupting command, control, communications, and logistical operations of friendly forces. The guerrilla force also serves to cause commitment of friendly forces, best used in the close battle, to the rear battle.

b. The ability of the guerrilla force to operate successfully does not rely on the attainment of popular support. Rather, the guerrilla force relies more on its ability to cause confusion in rear areas.

4-4. Guerrilla objectives.

a. The objectives of a guerrilla force in a conventional conflict are:

(1) **Disruption.** The guerrilla force seeks to disrupt command, control, communications, and logistics operations and facilities. He may accomplish this by attacking key installations such as headquarters, communications sites, supply depots, maintenance facilities, and airfields. The guerrilla force also seeks to cut lines of communication and supply by interdicting supply columns, bridges, highways, and communications lines.

(2) **Confusion.** By destroying key facilities and interdicting lines of communication and supply, the guerrilla force causes confusion within the friendly force rear areas. The greater the amount of confusion created, the greater the ability of the main enemy force to discover and exploit weaknesses of the friendly force.

(3) **Harassment.** The guerrilla force remains a source of harassment as long as it operates in the rear area. It may not have to conduct continuous operations to achieve its goal. The mere knowledge that the guerrilla exists within the rear area, even though undetected, may be enough.

(4) **Support.** By disrupting, confusing, and harassing vital areas, the guerrilla supports the main enemy force by tying up friendly combat units in countering the threat.

b. The guerrilla force may possess weapons, communications, and technology equal to or superior to the rear battle forces. It must be anticipated that nuclear, chemical, and biological, as well as conventional weapons and tactics may be utilized to achieve guerrilla goals.

APPENDIX A

Subsurface Operations

Section 1. General

A-1. Type facilities.

a. This appendix explains how guerrillas may use natural caves or construct underground facilities in the course of their operations. These may be used for command and control centers, logistical staging areas, hospitals, or even fortifications.

b. The larger underground facilities may be complex. Caves may have many large chambers connected by passageways, while tunnel systems may have many large rooms joined by interconnecting tunnels. Underground facilities may be wired for electricity and communications and may even have pumping stations for supplying air to lower levels.

A-2. Tunnel uses.

Tunnels may be dug with zigzags and sumps to lessen the effects of small arms fire, explosives, and gas inside them. Some tunnels and rooms, or passageways and chambers, may contain concealed exits to allow guerrillas to hide or escape if the complex or cave is penetrated while others may be booby-trapped to kill intruders. Tunnels and caves are difficult to detect from the air or ground, and their construction may make them impossible to destroy with conventional ammunition. Tunnel entrances are normally covered by fire from another point in the complex.

a. Guerrillas may use tunnels in penetration operations to gain access to restricted areas. In built-up areas they may infiltrate through sewers, or tunnel from the basement of a nearby building, or subway tunnel, or sewer to their target. When they are below the target, they may either construct an exit and penetrate the target from below or fill the tunnel with explosives and blow up the target.

b. Tunnels may also be dug in the basements of safehouses for use as escape routes if a house is compromised.

c. Tunnels are used for approach and escape. They are used to obtain access to caves and underground bunkers for use as firing positions and protection against indirect fires. They are also used as a common method of storing food and materials in underground caches. Some tunnel complexes are large enough to house underground hopitals and base camps.

Section II. Tunneling

A-3. Categories.

Tunnels vary from the simple to the complex. They are categorized as hiding holes, access and escape routes, underground base areas, fortified base camps, and bunkers.

a. **Hiding holes.** There are three basic types of holes used by guerrillas. They are classified more by their location than by their construction. Methods of construction and dimensions can be expected to vary, depending on the area of operations.

(1) **Bamboo hole.** This is easily and quickly camouflaged (Figure A-1). The entrances to the holes differ as do the techniques of camouflage. Most of the entrances are within the edge of a bamboo clump or dense thicket or just outside the edge. The hole cover, or trapdoor, contains camouflage material. Some have pieces of cut bamboo or other vegetation affixed to the top of the door. The edges of the door fit snugly into the structure of the entrance. Other entrances may be covered by spreading materials over them.



Figure A-1. Under bamboo hole.

(2) **Air hole.**

(a) Another characteristic common to small tunnels is the air hole, which is normally made from a hollow piece of bamboo or pipe 3 to 4 inches in diameter and inserted into the tunnel and camouflaged on the surface.

(b) The air hole is the only telltale indicator in a beach hole or tunnel. It differs from the bamboo hole in that it is constructed in sand or dirt and constructed from cut timbers (Figure A-2). It does not depend on roots to add rigidity to the roof. The entrance is hard to locate as it is often buried under afoot of loose sand or dirt; however, it can be found by first finding the breathing tubes. Some air holes are a continuation of the supports that hold up local buildings. Other air holes may be exposed by pulling up plants that grow nearby.



Figure A-2. Beach hole.

(3) **Water entrance hole.** This hole or tunnel (Figure A-3) is located near a small stream or beside an old bomb crater filled with water. These holes have no door and depend on natural growth to hide the entrance. Sometimes the entrance is completely submerged.



Figure A-3. Water entrance hole.

b. **Access and escape routes.** Guerrillas use tunnels to infiltrate or exfiltrate an area. They may lead to villages, roads, or highly fortified bunker systems (Figure A-4).



Figure A-4. Access and escape routes.

c. **Base area.** This may house a command post, ordnance shop, or hospital. This type of tunnel system is not-as common as the ones found in a fortified village or used as access or escape routes. It is normally deep in guerrilla-controlled areas. This type of tunnel complex may have several rooms, such as a 4- by 6-foot area or a large 10-foot-square area with a 15-foot ceiling. They may also include electric lighting or other comfort features (Figure A-5).



Figure A-5. Underground base area.

d. **Base camps.** These are usually fortified positions. They may consist of a-central bunker, 18 inches above ground, and tunnels 100 to 150 meters long, connecting outer bunkers to the central bunker. All bunkers have overhead cover and camouflaged firing apertures. They are positioned to provide mutual support and deny observation of the entire complex from any one location on the ground (Figure A-6).



Figure A-6. Fortified base camps.

e. **Bunkers.** Entrances are often in a house under a bed or table, and have an outside exit. In many cases, bunkers are constructed with walls up to 3 feet thick. The floor is below ground level. The roof is normally constructed of logs covered with dirt, mud, or rock from 3 to 6 feet thick. Sometimes, small logs (driven 3 to 6 feet into the ground and extending upward to roof level) serve to reinforce the walls. In some cases, the bunker maybe constructed entirely of concrete. Most often, bunkers have one overt entrance and one or more covert exits. The primary use of bunkers is to provide cover and concealment. Firing apertures are just above ground (Figure A-7).



Figure A-7. Bunkers.

A-4. Construction methods.

a. One feature common to almost all tunnel complexes is the method of excavation. The laborers are divided into a number of work units and assigned tunnel sections. The units are placed approximately 20 meters along the axis of the planned tunnel. Each unit then digs a well or shaft to the desired depth where a working area is enlarged. From this point, the units begin digging toward each other. As the tunnel grows, the workers are formed in a line to pass the soil out the excavation shaft. The soil is spead evenly over the ground or a road, or under the forest canopy to prevent detection. Once the main tunnel has been excavated, the shaft is filled and camouflaged.

b. As the tunnel becomes more extensive, lower levels may be constructed to provide additional room and better protection. The degree of sophistication is dependent upon the purpose of the tunnel and frequency of its use. Most of the tunnels constructed by guerrilla forces are hiding places or escape routes; therefore, they may be extensive in length, but not complex in design.

c. Whether their construction is complex or not, care is taken to provide security throughout the tunnels. False corridors are constructed, as are trapdoors and false walls. A U-shaped design is often formed to give the impression that the corridor is a deadend when actually a trapdoor leads to the way out.

d. Most tunnel systems require substantial planning before actual construction. The systems are never haphazard. The tunnel is reinforced by reveting or other means. One common method used to reinforce tunnels is to coat walls with mud 3 to 6 inches thick and build fires throughout the system to bake the mud, turning it into a ceramic texture.

e. Tunnel systems are usually not constructed in a straight line. They will follow a zigzag or serpentine course. This type of construction is used to protect the occupants from small arms fire in the event that tunnel systems are detected and breached.

f. Tools for digging are simple. A bucket and pick or shovel are the main tools. Common methods of illumination include carbide lamps, flashlights, candles, and in larger complexes, small, fuel-driven generators for electric lighting.

g. Secrecy of location is considered of utmost importance. All means are taken to camouflage and conceal tunnel entrances. Often, tunnels are hidden in tombs, walls, floors, or under water.

h. Extensive use of booby traps and mines should be expected in and around tunnel complexes. Some common booby traps are mortar and artillery duds rigged for command detonation. These may be buried or suspended in trees in the immediate vicinity. Hand

grenades and homemade bombs are used to booby-trapdoors and hatches. Poisonous snakes may be placed in tunnels to inflict casualties.

A-5. Detection of tunnels.

a. The first step in detecting or locating tunnels is to reduce a large geographical area of interest to a smaller area of probable locations. This can be accomplished by studying general indications of probable tunnel locations.

b. Some indicators that tunnels are being employed by guerrilla forces are:

(1) Movement of guerrillas in a specific direction after being spotted by aircraft.

(2) Sniper fire occurring from areas where there are no obvious avenues of withdrawal.

(3) Vegetable gardens far from places of habitation.

(4) Operations where guerrillas inflict casualties at relatively long range and disappear without making close contact or being detected by friendly forces.

(5) The smell of burning wood or food cooking in an area lacking habitation.

c. Conventional air photography produces results if the appearance of the surface and vegetation are changed from normal. This requires skilled personnel to interpret photos. In a jungle environment, air photography may be prohibited because dense vegetation, such as double or triple canopy jungle, obscures the ground.

d. Once determined that a specific area may contain a tunnel system, there are several indicators that are helpful in detecting tunnels. Visual inspections often disclose the general area of a tunnel, but not its precise location. The key to finding a tunnel system is the application of common sense to the situation. A platoon or company should be assigned a small search area, never larger than a 1000-meter grid square for a company. These small areas are picked based on intelligence reports or past actions of the guerrilla force. The unit searches every square meter of the area. Some visual indicators usually found are:

(1) Worn places on trees that the guerrilla uses as handholds.

(2) A small trail, much like a game trail, through the brush into a clump of small trees.

(3) Cut trees, although not a sure sign.

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(4) Limbs tied near tree top to conceal the use of a tunnel from aircraft.

(5) Slight depression in or around a group of small trees.

(6) Air holes, a sure indicator.

(7) A lone individual, especially a female, in the area.

(8) Fresh cooked food with no one attending the site.

(9) Fresh human feces in an area.

e. All these indicators are good. However, in different areas they may vary. The places to look for indicators are in the corners of hedgerows, in the corners of village huts, and in the secluded corners of trails and streams. The enemy often hides in these places so he can see while not being seen. Additionally, hiding in these places allows those who put the finishing touches on the camouflage to escape undetected. The guerrilla is aware of the danger of establishing a pattern. However, he must have a location that provides him with observation as well as concealment. So look for observation posts that allow him to move into or out of an area undetected.

f. Occasionally, the specific location of a tunnel can be obtained by interrogating the local populace, or prisoners of war (PW) who may have occupied, or helped in digging, the system. Because of the method of constructing a tunnel system, that of using an excavation shaft to reach the level of the tunnel and then closing this shaft once the tunnel is completed, the individual may not be able to locate an entrance or exit unless he has seen or used the completed tunnel.

A-6. Tunnel search operations.

a. Entering an area where a tunnel complex is located requires a methodical approach. Security to the flanks and rear is imperative.

b. The size of the objective area of operations determines the strength of the unit assigned the search mission. Basically, the unit, company, or platoon is task-organized for tunnel operations.

c. A company is divided into three elements: security, search, and reserve. (The headquarters element remains with the security element.)

(1) Security — one platoon plus headquarters element to cordon search area.

(2) Search — one platoon to search immediate area for tunnels. The search element is subdivided into search and security teams.

(3) Reserve – one platoon to assist in cordon and reinforce as necessary.

d. A platoon is divided into three elements:

(1) Security – one squad plus headquarters element to cordon area.

(2) Search – one squad to search area for tunnels. The search element is subdivided into search and security teams.

(3) Reserve – one squad to assist in cordon and reinforce as necessary.

e. The techniques of deliberate search are centered around the rifle squad. Each squad is divided into a security and a search team.

f. A slow, methodical search is conducted in the area of operations. Once assigned a search area, the squad systematically searches every square meter. The security element move toward the limits of the search area. Once a hole (tunnel) is discovered, the security element surrounds the area while the search team prepares to destroy or neutralize the hole (tunnel).

A-7. Special equipment.

The unit may require the following special items to perform tunnel operations:

a. Mine detector — used to detect ammunition and weapon caches.

b. Grenades – fragmentary, chemical (CS) gas, chemical (HC) smoke, while phosphorus (WP), and concussion types. Grenades should not be used after friendly forces have entered a tunnel.

c. Demolitions — used to destroy tunnel system. Because of the complexity of charges needed to destroy some tunnel complexes, an engineer team should support the search unit. Also, the large amount of demolitions required for some operations may present unique logistical problems, especially in a jungle environment.

d. Air generator — used to force smoke into tunnel complex.

e. Flashlights — to search tunnels.

f. Weapons — caliber .45 pistol should be used inside tunnels. The pistol has good stopping power and is effective at close range.

g. Loudspeaker — used to call enemy from tunnels.

Section III. Destroying Underground Facilities

A-8. Four-step process.

a. The destruction of a tunnel is a four-step process, beginning (1) with a soldier firing one or two magazines from a rifle into the tunnel entrance. This has a tendency to discourage the enemy from staying close to the entrance.

b. After gaining the attention of the guerrillas, they are told to vacate the hole or tunnel or be killed. They may give up without a fight, saving not only the efforts of killing, but of excavating the hole or tunnel for weapons and documents.

c. If this fails, breaching operations are used(2). A grenade is placed on the entrance cover to gain access. The entrance cover is removed in this manner to minimize the effects of any attached booby traps.

d. Once the entrance cover is destroyed, the following measures are used (depending on the mission):

(1) Insert grenades (3), fragmentary or concussion, to kill the guerrillas. Ensure that the grenades are cooked-off prior to throwing them in the hole or tunnel.

(2) Insert a combination of HC smoke and CS chemical grenades. This serves two purposes: HC smoke may reveal the locations of other entrances or exits, and CS may force the guerrillas to evacuate the hole or tunnel. Captured guerrillas become a source of intelligence in finding other holes or tunnels.

e. The last step (4) is the entry of soldiers to ensure that all weapons and documents are recovered and all enemy dead, wounded, and living are removed. The hole or tunnel is thoroughly searched for small compartments built to hide weapons and ammunition. If a tunnel complex proves to be extensive with bunkers and large rooms, it is cleared systematically. Bunkers are destroyed or occupied to prevent the enemy from reoccupying them through another tunnel. **Do not clear more bunkers than friendly forces can hold.**

f. Deliberate search techniques emphasize where to look for the enemy (locations that provide him with observation, cover, concealment, and an escape route). When the soldier learns what to look for (a game trail, worn and cut trees, an air hole, human feces, a depression, fresh food, a lone individual), any of these indicators is likely to trigger a mental alert that the enemy is not far away. After the tunnel is searched, it is destroyed with explosives.

A-9. Neutralization-demolition procedures.

a. **Tunnels.** Since each tunnel system differs in size and construction, a different quantity and placement of explosives is needed for each type.

(1) The use of block explosives to destroy a tunnel system has a disadvantage: all the explosive power is concentrated at one point. Thus, the destruction is localized, and often portions of the tunnel are unaffected. However, a large (10-to 12-pound) block of explosive tamped against the ceiling may cause an entire tunnel to collapse.

(2) Advantages of block-type explosives are the ease of emplacement, ease of procurement, and feasibility of aerial resupply. Also, block or satchel charges are effective in the destruction of bunkers, sunken living quarters, and underground rooms. Cratering charges are also effective for underground rooms. Short tunnels can be destroyed effectively by block explosives.

(3) The shaped charge in tunnel destruction is successful when used in specific circumstances. A shaped charge placed underground in the middle of a tunnel complex, and aimed downward, destroys an area of the tunnel complex around and above the charge. Also, a shaped charge placed in a deep complex and aimed upward results in extensive destruction.

(4) Another effective method of tunnel destruction utilizes bangalore torpedos placed throughout the tunnel length (regardless of depth). The constant length of explosives throughout the tunnel ensures complete destruction. The bangalore (5 feet long) is adaptable to the twists and turns in tunnels. Each tunnel where it can be pushed through). A disadvantage of bangalore torpedoes is the logistical problem arising from their size and weight. There may be a problem with resupply if large quantities are used to completely destroy a tunnel system.

b. **Bunkers.** Underground living quarters, bunkers, and underground hideaways can be destroyed by block or satchel charges placed strategically inside the room. The following are examples of structures and the size and placement of charges.

(1) Bunkers dug into the ground and covered by dense brush (average size 4 by 8 by 4 feet) can be destroyed with 3 pounds of explosives placed next to a wall.

(2) This bunker (8 by 5 by 4 feet) can be destroyed by placing a 5-pound charge against the roof toward the side of the strongest beam (Figure A-8).



(3) This 4-inch-thick concrete wall bunker (6 by 6 by 5 feet) can be destroyed by placing 8 to 9 pounds of explosives at the point where the tunnel enters the bunker, and will also destroy a portion of the tunnel (Figure A-9).



Figure A-9. Reinforced underground bunker.

(4) This bunker depicts an underground hospital capable of holding 10 to 12 persons. It is about 10 feet below the surface. Usually 15 feet long by 8 feet wide by 6 feet high, it is constructed of cement and steel I-beams. The room is completely destroyed by interlacing three bangalore torpedoes in the I-beam rafters (Figure A-10).



Figure A-10. Underground hospital.

(5) This bunker design requires 10 to 12 pounds of explosives to destroy it (Figure A-11).



APPENDIX B

The Urban Guerrilla

Section I. General

B-1. Effects of the urban environment.

a. Cities and towns are vulnerable to urban guerrilla violence because they are the focus of economic and political power. In many cases, public utilities and services can be disrupted. Thus, the government may appear to have lost control of the situation.

b. The concentration of a large number of people in a relatively small area provides cover for the guerrilla. However, the insurgent may find support only in certain areas of a town or city. In any event, the urban guerrilla lives in a community that is friendly to him or, as a minimum, is too frightened to withhold its support or inform on him. He has a close relationship with leaders and other guerrillas, and may have a communication system using women and children who also provide cover for other activities.

c. The urban guerrilla can operate more boldly than his rural counterpart as reflected by his tactics: the sniper complements the more conventional ambush and often replaces it; explosive devices may be used either as instruments against the community or more selectively against individuals or groups.

d. The availability of large numbers of people ensures that crowds can be assembled and demonstrations manipulated with comparative ease. The presence of women and children restricts counterguerrilla force reactions, and a clumsy reaction may ensure a major incident that provides the guerrilla with propaganda. Publicity is easily achieved in an urban area because no major incident can be concealed from the local population even if it is not widely reported by the news media. Terrorist successes may be exploited to discredit the ability of the police, counterguerrilla force, and civil government to provide protection and control the guerrillas.

e. The urban guerrilla cannot, like his rural counterpart, establish bases and recruit large military units. He is an individual, a member of a relatively small group, relying on the cover afforded by the people of the city and on terror to avoid betrayal. Individuals and small groups are effective in an urban environment because it is easier for them to avoid capture; if captured, however, the terrorist may be able to expose only two or three persons to government or counterguerrilla forces.

B-2. Guerrilla tactics.

a. The urban guerrilla works alone or in small cells, and his tactics are different from those of his rural counterpart.

b. They include:

(1) Disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage.

(2) Generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the resources of the counterguerrilla force.

(3) Creating incidents or massing crowds in order to lure the counterguerrilla force into a trap.

(4) Provoking the counterguerrilla force in the hope that it may overreact and provide hostile propaganda.

(5) Fomenting interfactional strife.

(6) Sniping at roadblocks, outposts, and sentries.

(7) Attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars.

(8) Planting explosive devices, either against specific targets or indiscriminately, to cause confusion and destruction, and to lower public morale.

(9) Ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters.

Section II. Techniques to Counter the Urban Guerrilla

B-3. Urban counterguerrilla operations.

a. Operations against urban guerrillas may vary from a passive policy designed to curtail terrorist activities so that community life can continue (under certain constraints), to an active policy which involves the counterguerrilla force seeking out and capturing or killing the enemy. The level of intensity at which operations are conducted will be determined by the civil government.

b. Fighting the urban guerrilla is generally a police mission. However, the military counterguerrilla force commander maybe required to assist the police in this mission or even take it over. The techniques used are similar to the ones used in rural areas. Before operations are conducted, information must be obtained about the enemy, his environment, and operations (Appendix H). The techniques include:

(1) Installation of base defense (Appendix E).

(2) Roadblocks and checkpoints (Chapter 3).

(3) Crowd dispersal (FM 19-15).

(4) Cordon-and-search operations (Chapter 3).

(5) Patrols (Chapter 3 and Appendix D).

B-4. Minimum force.

The principles remain the same, but in an urban environment the principle of minimum force becomes more important and is directly related to the rules of engagement. There is greater danger of injuring or killing innocent civilians in heavily populated centem. Since there are seldom large groups of guerrillas in cities, there are no base camps, only safe houses. Opportunities for deliberate attacks rarely occur. Just as fighting guerrillas in a rural environment, killing or capturing the urban guerrilla is not a mission that is quickly accomplished.

APPENDIX C

Ambush Patrols

Section 1. General

C-1. Purpose of ambushes.

The ambush patrols discussed in this appendix are combat patrols with missions to establish and execute ambushes to harass or destroy targets and/or capture personnel and equipment. Ambushes generally are executed to reduce the guerrilla's overall combat effectiveness. Destruction is the primary purpose of an ambush since guerrillas killed and/or captured, and equipment and/or supplies destroyed or captured, critically affect the guerrilla force. Harassment, the secondary purpose, diverts guerrillas from other missions. A series of successful ambushes causes the guerrilla force to be less aggressive and more defensive; to be apprehensive and overly cautious; and to be reluctant to go on patrols and move in convoys or in small groups.

C-2. Types of ambushes.

a. There are two types of ambushes. A point ambush involves patrol elements deployed to support the attack of a single killing zone. An area ambush involves patrol elements deployed as multiple, related, point ambushes.

b. An ambush is categorized as either hasty or deliberate. A hasty ambush is an immediate action drill, an action of a combat patrol wilth little or no information. When information does not permit detailed planning required for a deliberate ambush, a hasty ambush is planned. In this case, the ambush patrol plans and prepares to attack the first suitable guerrilla force. A deliberate ambush is planned as a specific action against a specific target. Detailed information of the guerrilla force is required: size, nature, organization, armament, equipment, route and direction of movement, and times the force will reach or pass certain points on its route. Deliberate ambushes are planned when:

(1) Reliable information is received on the intended movement of a specific force.

(2) Patrols, convoys, carrying parties, or similar forces establish patterns of size, time, and movement sufficient to permit detailed planning for the ambush.

c. A unit conducting a combat patrol, before departing, plans and rehearses the ambush of the type of guerrilla force it may

encounter. It establishes and executes ambushes as opportunities arise.

Section II. Attack Fundamentals

C-3. Three elements.

Surprise, coordinated fires, and control are basic to a successful ambush.

C-4. Surprise.

Surprise must be achieved or else the attack is not an ambush. Surprise, which distinguishes an ambush from other forms of attack, allows the ambush force to seize and retain control of the situation. Surprise is achieved by careful planning, preparation, and execution. Guerrillas are attacked in a manner they least expect.

C-5. Coordinated fires.

All weapons, including mines and demolitions, are positioned, and all direct and indirect fires are coordinated to achieve:

a. Isolation of the kill zone to prevent escape or reinforcement.

b. Surprise delivery of a large volume of concentrated fires into the kill zone to inflict maximum damage so the target can be assaulted and destroyed.

C-6. Control.

a. Close control is maintained during movement to, occupation of, and withdrawal from the ambush site.

b. The ambush commander's control of all elements is critical at the time of target approach. Control measures provide for

(1) Early warning of target approach.

(2) Withholding fire until the target moves into the kill zone.

(3) Opening fire at the proper time.

(4) Initiating appropriate actions if the ambush is prematurely detected.

(5) Lifting or shifting supporting fires when the ambush includes assault of the target.

(6) Timely and orderly withdrawal to an easily recognized rallying point.

c. Personnel conducting the ambush remain still and quiet while waiting for the target to appear. They may have to forgo smoking; endure insect bites and thirst in silence; and resist sleeping, easing cramped muscles, and performing normal body functions. (Ambushes should have a rest plan and a mess plan.) When the target approaches, they do not open fire before the signal is given.

Section III. Planning

C-7. Flexibility.

a. An ambush is planned and prepared using troop leading procedures. Planning considerations include whether the ambush is to be a deliberate ambush or a hasty ambush. In a deliberate ambush, more target intelligence is available to permit planning for every course of action at the target. Planning for a hasty ambush includes tentative plans both for the types of targets that may be ambushed and for varying situations. Both plans are flexible enough to allow modifying, as appropriate, at the ambush site. All plans are rehearsed in detail.

b. Planning provides for the following:

(1) **Simplicity.** Every soldier must thoroughly understand what he is to do at every stage of the operation. In an ambush, more so than in other operations, the failure of even one soldier to perform exactly as planned can cause failure.

(2) **Type of ambush.** The type of ambush affects the organization, number of men, and amount of equipment and communications required.

(3) **Deployment.** Each possible formation is considered for its advantages and disadvantages.

C-8. Manner of attack.

The attack may be by fire only (harassing ambush) or may include assault of the target (destruction ambush).

C-9. Size of ambush force.

The force is tailored for its mission. Two men may be adequate for a harassing ambush. A destruction ambush may require the entire unit (squad, platoon, company).

a. **Organization.** An ambush patrol is organized in the same manner as other combat patrols to include a headquarters, an assault element, a support element, and a security element. The assault and support elements are the attack force; the security

element is the security force. When appropriate, the attack force is further organized to provide a reserve force. When an ambush site is to be occupied for an extended period, double ambush forces may be organized. One ambush force occupies the site while the other rests, eats, and tends to personal needs at the objective rail ying point or other concealed location. They alternate after a given time, which is usually 8 hours. If the waiting period is over 24 hours, three ambush forces maybe organized.

b. **Equipment.** The selection of equipment and supplies is based on the:

(1) Mission.

(2) Size of the guerrilla force.

(3) Means of transportation.

(4) Distance and terrain.

(5) Weight and bulk of equipment.

c. **Routes.** A primary route is planned which allows the unit to enter the ambush site from the rear. The kill zone is not entered if entry can be avoided. If the kill zone must be entered to place mines or explosives, care is taken to remove any tracks or signs that might alert the guerrillas and compromise the ambush. If mines, mantraps, or explosives are to be placed on the far side, or if the appearance of the site might cause the guerrillas to check it, then a wide detour around the kill zone is made. Here, too, care is taken to remove any traces which might reveal the ambush. Also, an alternate route from the ambush site is planned.

d. **Site.** Maps and aerial photographs are used to analyze the terrain. When possible, anon-the-ground reconnaissance is made. As far as possible, so-called “ideal” ambush sites are avoided. Alert guerrillas are suspicious of these areas, avoid them if possible, and increase vigilance and security when they must be entered; surprise is even more difficult to achieve in these areas. Instead, apparently unlikely sites are chosen, when possible. Considering this, an ambush site must provide:

(1) Fields of fire.

(2) Concealed positions.

(3) Canalization of the guerrillas into the killing zone.

(4) Covered routes of withdrawal (to enable the ambush force to break contact and avoid pursuit).

(5) No exit route for the guerrilla force.

e. **Occupation of the site.** As a rule, the ambush force occupies the ambush site at the latest possible time permitted by the tactical

situation and the amount of site preparation required. This not only reduces the risk of discovery but also reduces the time that soldiers must remain still and quiet in position.

f. **Positions.** The unit moves into the ambush site from the rear. Security elements are positioned first to prevent surprise while the ambush is being established. Automatic weapons are then positioned so that each can fire along the entire killing zone. If this is not possible, they are given overlapping sectors of fire so that the entire killing zone is covered. The unit leader then selects his position, located where he can see when to initiate the ambush. Claymore mines, explosives, and M203 grenade launchers maybe used to cover any dead space left by the automatic weapons. All weapons are assigned sectors of fire to provide mutual support. The unit leader sets a time by which positions are to be prepared. The degree of preparation depends on the time allowed. All men work at top speed during the allotted time.

g. **Camouflage.** Camouflage is important. Each soldier must be hidden from the target. During preparation for the patrol, each soldier camouflages himself and his equipment and secures his equipment to prevent noise. At the ambush site, positions are prepared with minimal change in the natural appearance of the site. All debris resulting from preparation of positions is concealed.

h. **Movement, noise, and light discipline.** Movement is kept to a minimum and the number of men moving at a time is closely controlled. Every man is as quiet as possible, especially at night. Light discipline is rigidly enforced at night. Smoking is forbidden at night and is closely controlled in the day.

C-10. Execution.

a. Three signals, often four, are needed to execute the ambush. Audible and visual signals, such as whistles and pyrotechnics, must be changed often to avoid establishing patterns. Too frequently, use of the same signals may result in their becoming known to the enemy. A guerrilla might recognize a signal and be able to react in time to avoid the full effects of an ambush. For example, if white star cluster is habitually used to signal withdrawal in a night ambush, an alert guerrilla might fire one and cause premature withdrawal.

b. A signal by the security force to alert the patrol leader to the guerrilla's approach may be given by:

(1) Arm-and-hand signals.

(2) Radio, as a quiet voice message, by transmitting a prearranged number of taps, or by signaling with the push-to-talk switch.

(3) Field telephone, when there is no danger that wire between positions will compromise the ambush.

c. A signal to initiate the ambush, given by the patrol leader or a designated individual, may be a shot or the detonation of mines or explosives. The ambush should be initiated with a mass casualty producing weapon (Claymore antipersonnel mine or M60 machine gun).

d. A signal for lifting or shifting fires, if the guerrilla force is to be assaulted, may be given by voice command, whistles, or pyrotechnics. All fire stops immediately so that the assault can be made before the guerrilla can react.

e. A signal for withdrawal may also be by voice command, whistles, or pyrotechnics.

C-11. Fire discipline.

This is a key part of the ambush. Fire is withheld until the signal is given, then immediately delivered with the heaviest, most accurate volume possible. Properly timed and delivered fires contribute to the achievement of surprise as well as to destruction of the guerrilla force. When the guerrillas are to be assaulted, the lifting or shifting of fires is equally precise. Otherwise, the assault is delayed, and the guerrillas have an opportunity to recover and react.

C-12. Withdrawal to the objective rallying point.

a. The objective rallying point is far enough from the ambush site so that it will not be overrun if the guerrilla force attacks the ambush. Routes of withdrawal to the objective rallying point are reconnoitered. If possible, each person walks the route he is to use and picks out checkpoints. When the ambush is to be executed at night, each person must be able to follow his route in the dark.

b. On signal, the unit quickly but quietly withdraws to the objective rallying point, reorganizes, and begins its return march.

c. If the ambush was not successful and the unit is pursued, withdrawal may be by bounds. The last group may arm mines, previously placed along the withdrawal route, to further delay pursuit.

C-13. Four ambush techniques.

a. A *near ambush* is a point ambush with the assault element within reasonable assaulting distance of the kill zone (less than 50 meters). Close terrain, such as jungle and heavy woods, may

require this positioning. It may also be appropriate in open terrain in a "rise from the ground" ambush.

b. A *far ambush* is a point ambush with the assault element beyond reasonable assaulting distance of the kill zone (beyond 50 meters). This location may be appropriate in open terrain offering good fields of fire or when attack is by fire for a harassing ambush.

c. A *harassing ambush* is an ambush in which attack is by fire only.

d. A *destruction ambush* is an ambush which includes assault to close with and decisively engage the guerrilla force.

Section IV. Point Ambush Formations

C-14. Positions.

a. A point ambush, whether independent or part of an area ambush, is positioned along the expected route of approach of the guerrilla force. Formation is important because, to a great extent, it determines whether a point ambush can deliver the heavy volume of highly concentrated fire necessary to isolate, trap, and destroy the guerrillas.

b. The formation to be used is determined by carefully considering possible formations and the advantages and disadvantages of each in relation to terrain; conditions of visibility, forces, weapons, and equipment ease or difficulty of control; force to be attacked; and overall combat situation.

c. This section discusses formations developed for the deployment of point ambushes. The formations are identified with names that correspond to the general pattern formed on the ground by deployment of the attack element. They include:

(1) Line formation (two techniques, Paragraph C-15).

(2) L-formation (two techniques with variations, Paragraph C-16).

(3) Z-formation (Paragraph C-17).

(4) T-formation (two techniques, Paragraph C-18).

(5) V-formation (two techniques, Paragraph C-19).

(6) Triangle formation (closed; open with variations, Paragraph C-20).

(7) Box formation (two techniques, Paragraph C-21).

C-15. Line formation.

a. The attack element is deployed generally parallel to the guerrilla force's route of movement (road, trail, stream). This positions the

attack element parallel to the long axis of the kill zone and subjects the guerrilla force to heavy flanking fire. The size of the force that can be trapped in the kill zone is limited by the area which the attack element can effectively cover with highly concentrated fire. The force is trapped in the kill zone by natural obstacles. mines (Claymore, antivehicular, antipersonnel), demolition's, and direct and indirect fires (Figure C-1).



Figure C-1. Line formation: harassing or destruction ambush.

b. A disadvantage of the line formation is the chance that lateral dispersion of the force maybe too great for effective coverage. The line formation is appropriate in close terrain that restricts guerrilla maneuver and in open terrain where one flank is restricted by mines, demolitions, or mantraps. Similar obstacles can be placed between the attack element and the kill zone to provide protection from guerrilla counterambush measures. When a destruction ambush is deployed in this manner, access lanes are left so that the force in the killing zone can be assaulted. The line formation can be effectively used by a “rise from the ground” ambush in terrain seemingly unsuitable for ambush (Figure C-2).



Figure C-2. Line formation: destruction ambush with access lanes for assault of target.

c. An advantage of the line formation is its relative ease of control under all conditions of visibility.

C-16. L-formation.

a. The L-shaped formation is a variation of the line formation. The long side of the attack element is parallel to the kill zone and delivers flanking fire. The short side of the attack element is at the end of, and at right angles to, the kill zone and delivers enfilading fire that interlocks with fire from the other leg (Figure C-3).



Figure C-3. L-formation: destruction ambush.

b. This formation is flexible. It can be established on a straight stretch of a trail or stream or at a sharp bend in a trail or stream (Figure C-4).



Figure C-4. L-formation: destruction ambush at bend of trail or stream.

c. When appropriate, fire from the short leg can be shifted to parallel the long leg if the guerrilla force attempts to assault or escape in the opposite direction. In addition, the short leg prevents escape in that direction or reinforcement from that direction (Figure C-5).



Figure C-5, L-formation: short leg prevents escape or reinforcement.

C-17. Z-formation.

The Z-shaped formation is another variation of the L-formation. The attack force is deployed as in the L-formation but with an additional side so that the formation resembles the letter Z. The additional side may serve to (Figure C-6):

- Engage a force attempting to relieve or reinforce the guerrillas.
- Restrict a flank.
- Prevent envelopment (of the ambush force).
- Seal the end of the kill zone.



Figure C-6. Z-formation: destruction ambush.

C-18. T-formation.

a. In the T-shaped formation, the attack element is deployed across, and at right angles to, the route of movement of the hostile force so that the attack element and the target form the letter T. This formation can be used day or night to establish a purely harassing ambush, and at night to establish an ambush to interdict movement through open, hard-to-seal areas (such as rice paddies).

b. A small unit can use the T-formation to harass, slow, and disorganize a larger force. When the lead guerrilla elements are engaged, they will normally attempt to maneuver right or left to close with the ambush force. Mines, mantraps, and other obstacles placed to the flanks of the kill zone slow the guerrilla's movement and permit the unit to deliver heavy fire and then withdraw without becoming decisively engaged. (Figure C-7).

c. The T-formation can be used to interdict small groups attempting night movement across open areas. For example, the attack element may be deployed along a rice paddy dike with every second member facing in the opposite direction. The attack of a force approaching from either direction requires only that every second member shift to the opposite side of the dike. Each member fires only to his front and only when the target is at close range. Attack is by fire only, and each member keeps the guerrilla force under fire as long as it remains to his front. If the force attempts to escape in either direction along the dike, each member takes it under fire as it comes into his vicinity. The T-formation is effective at halting infiltration. (Figure C-8).



Figure C-7. T-formation: harassing ambush.

d. It has one chief disadvantage: there is a possibility that while spread out the ambush will engage a superior force. Use of this formation must, therefore, fit the local enemy situation.



Figure C-8. T-formation: rice paddy harassing ambush where guerrilla approach may be from either direction.

C-19. V-formation.

a. The V-shaped attack element is deployed along both sides of the guerrilla route of movement so that it forms a V. Care is taken to ensure that neither group (or leg) fires into the other. This formation subjects the guerrilla to both enfilading and interlocking fire (Figure C-9).



Figure C-9. V-formation.

b. The V-formation is suited for fairly open terrain but can also be used in the jungle. When established in the jungle, the legs of the V close in as the lead elements of the guerrilla force approach the apex of the V; elements then open fire from close range. Here, even more than in open terrain, all movement and fire is carefully coordinated and controlled to ensure that the fire of one leg does not endanger the other. Wider separation of the elements makes this formation difficult to control, and there are fewer sites that favor its use. Its main advantage is that it is difficult for the guerrilla to detect the ambush until well into the kill zone (Figure C-10).



Figure C-10. V-formation (close range).

C-20. Triangle formation.

This is a variation of the V-formation and can be employed in three ways:

a. **Closed triangle.** The attack element is deployed in three groups, positioned so that they form a triangle (or closed V). An automatic weapon is placed at each point of the triangle and positioned so that it can be shifted quickly to interlock with either of the others. Elements are positioned so that their fields of fire overlap. Mortars may be positioned inside the triangle. When deployed in this manner, the triangle ambush becomes a small unit strongpoint which is used to interdict night movement through open areas, when guerrilla approach is likely to be from any direction. The formation provides all-round security, and security elements are deployed only when they can be positioned so that, if detected by an approaching target, they will not compromise the ambush. Attack is by fire only, and the target is allowed to approach within close range before the ambush force opens fire (Figure C-11).



Figure C-11. Closed triangle.

(1) Advantages include ease of control, all-round security, and guerrillas approaching from any direction can be fired on by at least two automatic weapons.

(2) Disadvantages include the requirement for an ambush force of platoon size or larger to reduce the danger of being overrun by a large guerrilla force; one or more legs of the triangle may come under guerrilla enfilade fire; and lack of dispersion, particularly at the points, increases danger from guerrilla mortar fire.

b. **Open triangle (harassing ambush).** This variation of the triangle ambush is designed to enable a small unit to harass, slow, and inflict heavy casualties upon a larger force without being decisively engaged. The attack group is deployed in three elements, positioned so that each element becomes a corner of a triangle containing the kill zone. When the guerrillas enter the kill zone, the element to the guerrillas' front opens fire on the lead guerrillas. When the guerrillas counterattack, the element withdraws and an assault element to the flank opens fire. When this group is attacked, the element to the opposite flank opens fire. This process is repeated until the guerrillas are pulled apart. Each element reoccupies its position, if possible, and continues to inflict maximum damage without becoming decisively engaged (Figure C-12).


GUERRILLA FORCE IS THINLY SURROUNDED. FIRST ELEMENT OPENS FIRE.
GUERRILLA FORCE
AMBUSH ELEMENTS
FORCE ATTACKS. FIRST ELEMENT WITHDRAWS. SECOND ELEMENT OPENS FIRE.
2
FORCE SHIFTS ATTACK. SECOND ELEMENT WITHDRAWS. THIRD ELEMENT OPENS FIRE.
3
FORCE SHIFTS ATTACK. THIRD ELEMENT WITHDRAWS.
FORCE IS PULLED APART. SUFFERS LOSSES BUT AMBUSH ELEMENTS NOT DECISIVELY ENGAGED.

Figure C-12. Open triangle formation: harassing ambush.

c. **Open triangle (destruction ambush).** The attack group is again deployed in three elements, positioned so that each element is a point of the triangle, 200 to 300 meters apart. The kill zone is the area within the triangle. The guerrillas are allowed to enter the killing zone; the nearest element attacks by fire. As the guerrillas attempt to maneuver or withdraw, the other elements open fire. One or more assault elements, as directed, assault or maneuver to envelop or destroy the guerrillas (Figure C-13).


200-300 METERS
BETWEEN ELEMENTS
GUERRILLA FORCE
AMBUSH ELEMENTS
KILL
ZONE
GUERRILLAS ENTER KILL ZONE. NEAREST ELEMENT OPENS FIRE.
GUERRILLAS ATTEMPT TO MANEUVER OR ESCAPE. NEAREST ELEMENT OPENS FIRE.
EACH ELEMENT ATTACKS AS THE GUERRILLAS ATTEMPT TO MANEUVER OR ESCAPE.
ONE OR MORE ELEMENTS MAY ASSAULT TO ENVELOP OR DESTROY THE GUERRILLAS.

Figure C-13. Open triangle formation: destruction ambush.

(1) As a destruction ambush, this formation is suitable for platoon-size or larger units; a unit smaller than a platoon would be in danger of being overrun.

(2) Also, control, in assaulting or maneuvering, is difficult. Close coordination and control are necessary to ensure that assaulting or maneuvering assault elements are not fired on by another party; and the ambush site must be a fairly level, open area that provides (around its border) concealment for the ambush elements (unless it is a "rise from the ground" ambush).

C-21. Box formation.

a. This formation is similar in purpose to the open triangle ambush. The unit is deployed in four elements positioned so that each element becomes a corner of a square or rectangle containing the kill zone (Figure C-14).


GUERRILLAS ARE THINLY SURROUNDED. FIRST ELEMENT OPENS FIRE.
GUERRILLA
AMBUSH ELEMENTS
GUERRILLAS ATTACK. FIRST ELEMENT WITHDRAWS. SECOND ELEMENT OPENS FIRE.
GUERRILLAS SHIFT ATTACK. SECOND ELEMENT WITHDRAWS. THIRD ELEMENT OPENS FIRE.
GUERRILLAS AGAIN SHIFT ATTACK. THIRD ELEMENT WITHDRAWS. FOURTH ELEMENT OPENS FIRE.
GUERRILLAS ATTACK AND ARE PULLED APART. SUFFER LOSSES. AMBUSH ELEMENTS NOT DECISIVELY ENGAGED.

Figure C-14. Box formation: harassing ambush.

b. It can be used as a harassing ambush or a destruction ambush in the same manner as the two variations of the open triangle ambush (Figure C-15).


200-300 METERS
BETWEEN ELEMENTS
GUERRILLA FORCE
AMBUSH ELEMENTS
KILL ZONE
GUERRILLAS ENTER KILL ZONE. FIRST ELEMENT OPENS FIRE.
GUERRILLAS ATTEMPT TO MANEUVER OR ESCAPE. SECOND ELEMENT OPENS FIRE.
THIRD AND FOURTH ELEMENTS JOIN ATTACK AS GUERRILLAS ATTEMPT TO MANEUVER OR ESCAPE.
ONE OR MORE ELEMENTS MAY ASSAULT TO ENVELOP OR DESTROY GUERRILLAS.
1
2
3
4

Figure C-15. Box formation: destruction ambush.

Section V. Area Ambush Formations

C-22. Kill zone.

A point ambush is established at a site having several trails or other escape routes leading away from it. The site may be a water hole, guerrilla campsite, or known rendezvous point, or a frequently traveled trail. This site is the central kill zone.

C-23. Area ambush: multiple point

a. Point ambushes are established along the trails or other escape routes leading away from the central kill zone (Figure C-16).



Figure C-16. Area (multiple point) ambush.

b. The guerrilla force, whether a single group or several parties approaching from different directions, is permitted to move to the central kill zone. Outlying ambushes do not attack (unless discovered).

c. The ambush is initiated when the guerrillas move into the central kill zone.

d. When the guerrillas break contact and attempt to disperse, escaping portions are intercepted and destroyed by the outlying ambushes.

e. The multiple point ambush increases casualties and harassment and produces confusion.

f. This version of the area ambush is best suited in terrain where movement is largely restricted to trails. It provides best results when established as a deliberate ambush. When there is not sufficient intelligence for a deliberate ambush, an area ambush of opportunity (hasty ambush) may be established. The outlying ambushes are permitted to attack guerrillas approaching the central kill zone, if the guerrilla force is small. If it is too large for the particular outlying ambush, the guerrillas are allowed to continue and they are attacked in the central kill zone.

C-24. Area ambush: baited trap

a. A variation of the area ambush is the "baited trap" ambush.

b. A central kill zone is established along the guerrilla's route of approach.

c. Point ambushes are established along the routes over which units relieving or reinforcing the guerrilla will have to approach.

d. The guerrilla force in the central kill zone serves as "bait" to lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the kill zones of the outlying ambushes. A friendly force can also be used as the "bait."

e. The outlying point ambushes need not be strong enough to destroy their targets. They may be small harassing ambushes that delay, disorganize, and cause casualties by successive contacts.

f. This version can be varied by using a fixed installation as "bait" to lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the kill zone of one or more of the outlying ambushes. The installation replaces the central kill zone and is attacked. The attack may intend to overcome the installation or may use it as a ruse.

g. These variations are best suited for situations where routes of approach for relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units are limited to those favorable for ambush (Figure C-17).


1. GUERRILLA COLUMN IS AMBUSHED.
2. GUERRILLA RELIEF COLUMN IS AMBUSHED AS IT ATTEMPTS TO REACH AMBUSHED FORCE.
DESTRUCTION AMBUSH
HARASSING AMBUSH
2
2
2
CENTRAL KILL ZONE
HARASSING AMBUSH
HARASSING AMBUSH
ONE OR MORE SECONDARY AMBUSH SITES DELAY, HARASS, AND INFLICT CASUALTIES ON THE RELIEF FORCE WHICH HAS TAKEN THE "BAIT" BY COMING TO THE AID OF THE AMBUSHED GUERRILLA FORCE.

Figure C-17. Area (baited trap) ambush

Section VI. Unusual Ambush Techniques

C-25. Spider hole ambush.

a. This point ambush is designed for open areas that lack the cover and concealment and other features normally desirable in a "good" ambush site. The attack element is deployed in the formation best suited to the overall situation (Figure C-18).


GUERRILLA FORCE
ATTACK ELEMENT CONCEALED IN SPIDER HOLES
CAMOUFLAGED SPIDER HOLE
SOLDIER RISING OUT OF SPIDER HOLE TO ENGAGE GUERRILLAS

Figure C-18. Spider hole ambush.

b. The attack element is concealed in the "spider hole" type of covered foxhole. Soil is carefully removed and positions expertly camouflaged.

c. When the ambush is initiated, the attack element members throw back the covers and literally "rise from the ground" to attack.

d. This ambush takes advantage of the tendency of patrols, and other units, to relax in areas that do not appear to favor ambush.

e. The chief disadvantage is that the ambush element is vulnerable if detected prematurely.

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C-26. Demolition ambush.

a. Dual primed, electrically detonated mines or demolition charges are planted in an area over which a guerrilla force is expected to pass. This may be a portion of a road or trail, an open field, or any area that can be observed from a distance. Activating wires are run to a concealed observation point sufficiently distant to ensure safety of the ambush element.

b. As large a force as desired or necessary can be used to mine the area. The ambush element remains to fire the charges; other personnel return to the unit.

c. When a guerrilla force enters the mined area (kill zone), the element on site detonates the explosives and withdraws immediately to avoid detection and pursuit (Figure C-19).



Figure C-19. Demolition ambush.

C-27. Special ambush situation.

Attacks against columns protected by armored vehicles depend on the type and location of armored vehicles in a column, and the weapons of the ambush force. If possible, armored vehicles are destroyed or disabled by fire of antitank weapons, landmines, and Molotov cocktails, or by throwing hand grenades into open hatches. An effort is made to immobilize armored vehicles at a point where they are unable to give protection to the rest of the convoy and where they will block the route of other supporting vehicles.

APPENDIX D

Patrolling

Section I. General

D-1. Patrols.

a. This appendix provides guidance on patrolling. It describes various types of patrols and patrolling techniques.

b. A patrol is a mission. The unit that has the mission organizes for the conduct of the patrol. When organizing for the patrol, unit integrity is maintained as much as possible.

c. The requirements of the mission determine the size, organization, and equipment of a patrol. Some missions may require only two or three men, lightly armed with no special equipment; some missions may require a squad or platoon, specially armed and equipped. A unit is always tailored for the mission it is to execute.

d. The effectiveness of a patrol is limited only by the ingenuity of the planner and the skill and aggressiveness of the unit leader. For this reason, they are one of the commander's most valued tools. Patrols are especially valuable in counterguerrilla operations. Aggressive patrolling in an area greatly reduces the guerrillas' freedom of movement, hampers their operations, and weakens their influence on the local population.

e. Patrols are classified according to the nature of the mission assigned.

D-2. Reconnaissance patrols.

They collect information and confirm or disprove the accuracy of information previously received. Reconnaissance patrols are further classified as:

Ž Zone reconnaissance patrols.

Ž Area reconnaissance patrols.

D-3. Combat patrols.

They provide security and harass, destroy, or capture enemy personnel, equipment, and installations. Combat patrols also collect and report information whether it is related to the assigned mission or not.

Section II. Planning

D-4. Five phases.

There are five phases involved in mission planning: patrol steps, reverse planning sequence, the warning order, the time schedule, and the operation order. The patrol leader uses patrol steps (derived from troop leading procedures as discussed in FM 7-10) in planning the mission. The leader considers all steps but executes only those required by the mission. The steps may occur in various sequences, and some are considered and accomplished simultaneously.

D-5. Patrol steps.

(Consider all steps; accomplish those necessary; sequence may vary.)

- Study the mission.
- Plan use of time.
- Study terrain and situation.
- Organize the patrol.
- Select men, weapons, equipment.
- Issue warning order.
- Coordinate (continuous throughout).
- Make reconnaissance.
- Complete detailed plans.
- Issue operation order.
- Supervise (at all times), inspect, rehearse.
- Execute the mission.

D-6. Reverse planning

The unit leader uses reverse planning sequence to allot time for each action of the patrol. He plans this schedule around any critical times specified in his order.

REVERSE PLANNING SEQUENCE	
0300-	— Debrief.
0200-0300	— Return to friendly area.
2330-0200	— Movement en route.
2300-2330	— Accomplish mission, reorganize.
2230-2300	— Leaders' reconnaissance.
2000-2230	— Movement en route.
2000-	— Depart friendly area.
1945-2000	— Movement to departure area.
1930-1945	— Final inspection.
1845-1930	— Night rehearsals.
1800-1845	— Day rehearsals.
1745-1800	— Inspection.
1700-1745	— Supper meal.
1630-1700	— Issue operation order.
1530-1630	— Complete detailed plans.
1430-1530	— Reconnoiter.
1415-1430	— Issue warning order.
1330-1415	— Preliminary planning.
	— Coordinate.
	— Select men, weapons, equipment.
	— Organize the patrol.
	— Study terrain and situation.
	— Plan use of time.
	— Study the mission.
-1330	— Operation order received.

D-7. Warning order.

There are two orders that the unit leader issues: the warning order and the operation order. The warning order is issued as soon as a tentative plan is made so that the men may have maximum time to prepare for the patrol.

WARNING ORDER

A brief statement of the situation.

Mission (who, what, when, where, and why).

General instructions:

- General and special organization.
- Uniform and equipment common to all.
- Weapons, ammunition, and equipment.
- Chain of command.
- A time schedule.
- Time, place, uniform, and equipment for receiving the operation order.
- Times and places for inspections and rehearsals.

Specific instructions:

- To subordinate leaders.
- To special purpose teams or key individuals.

D-8. Time schedule.

When the warning order is issued, a time schedule is given for all activities that must take place.

EXAMPLE OF PATROL TIME SCHEDULE

-0900	— Warning order completed.
0900-1230	— Unit leader reconnoiters (point and compass men and selected subordinates accompany, if situation permits); coordinates; completes detailed plans.
	— Second in command supervises drawing, issue, preparation of equipment, ammunition, rations.
	— Second in command supervises practice of immediate action drills.
	— Special teams rehearse (stream crossing, aerial resupply).
	— Patrol members prepare individual equipment.
	— Subordinate leaders inspect.

1230-1300	—	Noon meal.
1300-1330	—	Operation order.
1330-1430	—	Complete preparation.
	—	Unit leader inspects.
1430-1630	—	Daylight rehearsals.
	—	Element and team rehearsals.
	—	Unit rehearsals.
1630-1730	—	Rest.
1730-1800	—	Evening meal.
1800-1900	—	Night rehearsals.
1900-2000	—	Final inspection.
	—	By subordinate leaders.
	—	Spot checks by unit leader.
	—	Questions on plans, signals, use of equipment.
2000-2030	—	Dark adaptation of eyes.
2030-	—	Depart.

D-9. Operation order.

The second order that the unit leader gives is the operation order. This is issued in a standard (five-paragraph) field order format. The situation determines whether the order is written in detail or prepared in note form. The operation order, as well as the warning order, maybe shortened by reference to unit SOPs. In addition, items unchanged from the warning order are covered by stating "same as warning order."

OPERATION ORDER FORMAT

1. **SITUATION**
   a. Enemy forces.
      (1) Weather (note effects).
      (2) Terrain.
      (3) Identification.
      (4) Location.

(5) Activity.
(6) Strength.

b. Friendly forces.
(1) Mission of next higher unit.
(2) Location and planned actions of units on left, right, front, and rear.
(3) Mission and route of adjacent patrols.
(4) Fire support available.

c. Attachments and detachments.

2. MISSION

A clear, concise statement of the task that must be accomplished. It answers the questions WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHY, and WHERE. In stating the WHERE, terrain features or grid coordinates must be used. Since the mission statement is intended to stand alone without reference to any document (other than a map), using terrain features, such as a hill or a road junction, followed by a grid coordinate, is the correct procedure. (Paragraph 2 **never** has subparagraphs.)

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation.
(1) Scheme of maneuver.
(2) Fire support.

b. Subunit missions.
(1) Squads and/or teams.
(2) Special teams or key individuals.

c. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time of departure and return.
(2) Formations and order of movement (include sketch).
(3) Route (include fire support and suppression targets).
(4) Alternate routes.
(5) Passage of friendly positions (include sketch).
(a) Passage out.
(b) Reentry.
(6) Rallying points.
(7) Actions at rallying points.
(8) Actions on enemy contact.
(9) Actions at danger areas (include sketch).
(10) Actions at objective area (include sketch).

(11) Fire support (if not already covered completely).
(12) Rehearsals.
(13) Inspections.
(14) Debriefing.
(15) Specific information requirements.
(16) Annexes.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Rations.
b. Arms and ammunition.
c. Uniform and equipment patrol members will carry.
d. Method of handling wounded.
e. Prisoners and captured equipment.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command.
(1) Chain of command.
(2) Location of phase line and/or alternate phase line in formation and at the objective.

b. Signal.
(1) CEOI index (do not list information contained in the CEOI).
(2) Alternate signals.
(3) Emergency signals.
(4) Pyrotechnics.

Section III. Reconnaissance Patrols

D-10. Information requirements.

a. Reconnaissance patrols provide the commander with timely, accurate information of guerrillas and the terrain they control. This information is vital in making tactical decisions.

b. The commander may require information of a specific location or small specific area, usually a known or suspected position or activity. An area reconnaissance patrol secures this information by reconnoitering the location or by maintaining surveillance over the location.

c. The commander may require information of an extended area, or may desire information of several locations within an area. A zone reconnaissance patrol secures this information by reconnoitering the area, by maintaining surveillance over the area, or

by making the coordinated area reconnaissance of designated locations within the area.

D-11. Security.

a. In addition to reaching the objective without discovery, if possible, a reconnaissance patrol also tries to conduct its reconnaissance or surveillance without being discovered. Stealth, patience, and maximum use of concealment are mandatory.

b. A reconnaissance patrol fights only to protect itself or, when authorized, to accomplish its mission. The commander dispatching the patrol is responsible for informing tha patrol whether it is to fight, if necessary, to accomplish the mission.

c. Day and night reconnaissance patrols use essentially the same techniques. The principal differences are:

(1) Day reconnaissance requires greater use of concealment. The patrol is more likely to be seen than at night and usually will not be able to move as close to the objective.

(2) Night reconnaissance requires stealth. Sounds carry farther at night, and reduced visibility usually requires a closer approach to the objective.

d. When two or more teams of a patrol are to assembly at a linkup point, one team is designated to secure the linkup point for the arrival of other teams. The route and tasks of this team are arranged so that it can reach the linkup point first and accomplish these tasks.

Section IV. Combat Patrols

D-12. Seek and attack.

a. A combat patrol has the general mission of seeking out and attacking targets of opportunity. An ambush is a combat patrol (Appendix C).

b. In conventional operations, the enemy's general location is usually defined. Specific targets for patrols are not difficult to locate and designate. Missions for patrols can be, and usually are, specific and limited.

c. This situation seldom exists in counterguerrilla operations, however. Specific targets for raids and for other forms of attack are much more limited, because of the characteristics of guerrillas. They are elusive and highly mobile; they avoid decisive engagement; they avoid prepared positions and establish relatively few fixed installations.

d. A combat patrol searches for and, within its capability, engages targets when and where found. Engagement is by raid, ambush, or any form of attack suitable to the situation.

D-13. Flexibility.

a. The combat patrol is one of the commander's most flexible weapons. Uses vary from a two-man patrol executing a harassing ambush of opportunity to a reinforced platoon conducting raids, ambushes, and target-of-opportunity operations. In some instances, a patrol encountering a superior force may maintain contact with the force until reinforcements permit decisive engagement. Effectiveness of the patrol depends, not on size, but on the suitability to a given situation.

b. The use of combat patrols forces guerrillas to engage in decisive combat at unfavorable times and places. They can be used to locate and destroy enemy camps, elements, and supply points. Saturation of an area with patrols forces the guerrillas to either curtail operations or consolidate in larger groups, which are favorable targets for air, artillery, and large-scale attack.

c. Patrols may be inserted by parachute, helicopter, surface or subsurface watercraft, or ground methods. The conduct of the patrol itself remains unchanged, even though the method of insertion changes.

Section V. Motorized Patrols

D-14. Missions, organization.

a. Patrols may be motorized (usually as an economy-of-force measure) to allow them to:

(1) Cover greater distances in less time than dismounted patrols.

(2) Operate in contaminated areas too dangerous for dismounted patrols.

(3) Carry more or heavier equipment, weapons, and ammunition.

b. A motorized patrol is organized into elements and teams in the same manner as a dismounted patrol. Substitution of tracked carriers for wheeled vehicles provides an increased potential for battlefield mobility (Figure D-1).

c. When soldiers are assigned to vehicles, squad or fire team integrity is maintained as far as possible. One soldier is designated commander of each vehicle.



Figure D-1. Organization of a motorized reconnaissance patrol.

d. A motorized patrol is prepared in the same general manner as a dismounted patrol. In addition, however, vehicles must be checked to ensure that they are in good mechanical condition and properly supplied with fuel, oil, and water. Drivers and other personnel are as thoroughly prepared for the mission as regular patrol members.

e. Motorizing enables a patrol to carry heavy and bulky equipment such as:

(1) Antitank weapons and ammunition are placed near the front and rear of the patrol. Personnel are designated to man and support these weapons when they are employed.

(2) Surveillance equipment.

(3) Additional automatic weapons and ammunition.

f. Communication between vehicles and between the patrol and higher headquarters is essential. Within the patrol, radios, voice commands, and visual signals may be used. Vehicular-mounted radios are usually the best means for communication with higher headquarters. Light aircraft may be used to drop messages and to relay radio messages.

D-15. Movement.

A motorized patrol moves by one of three methods: continuous movement, successive bounds, and alternate bounds:

a. In continuous movement, all vehicles travel at a moderate rate of speed, with all personnel alert. The lead vehicles stops to investigate only those areas that appear dangerous. This is the fastest, but least secure, method of movement.

b. In successive bounds, vehicles keep their relative positions in the column. The first and second vehicles operate as a team in moving from one observation point to another. The second vehicle is placed in a concealed position, occupants dismounting if necessary, to cover movement of the first vehicle to an observation point. On reaching this point, occupants of the first vehicle observe and reconnoiter, dismounting if necessary. When the area is determined to be clear, the second vehicle is signaled forward to join the first vehicle. The commander of the first vehicle carefully observes the terrain to the front for signs of guerrillas and selects the next stopping point. The first vehicle then moves out and the process is repeated. Movement distance of the lead vehicle does not exceed the limit of observation or the range of effective fire support from the second vehicle. The lead vehicle and personnel are replaced frequently to ensure constant alertness. The other vehicles in the column move by bounds from one concealed position to the next. Each vehicle maintains visual contact with the vehicle ahead but avoids closing up (Figure D-2).


LEAD VEHICLE MOVES RAPIDLY TO THE NEXT STOPPING POINT.
SELECTED STOPPING POINT
COVERING VEHICLE CLOSELY OBSERVES ALL AREAS WHERE ENEMY MAY BE IN HIDING AND PROTECTS THE LEAD VEHICLE.
THE LEAD VEHICLE MOVES FORWARD TO THE SELECTED STOPPING POINT COVERED BY THE REAR VEHICLE.
AFTER STOPPING POINT IS REACHED AND DETERMINED TO BE CLEAR, THE REAR VEHICLE IS SIGNALED FORWARD.
WHEN THE LEAD VEHICLE ARRIVES AT THE SELECTED STOPPING POINT, A SOLDIER DISMOUNTS AND RECONNOITERS THE AREA TO THE FRONT, KEEPING THE VEHICLE CONCEALED UNTIL THE VEHICLE COMMANDER HAS SIGNALED THE REAR VEHICLE FORWARD AND THE NEXT ROUND HAS BEEN DETERMINED. IF THE REAR VEHICLE NOW LEADS THE NEXT BOUND, THE VEHICLES ARE MOVING BY ALTERNATE BOUNDS. IF THE REAR VEHICLE AGAIN COVERS THE MOVEMENT OF THE SAME LEAD VEHICLE, THE VEHICLES ARE MOVING BY SUCCESSIVE BOUNDS.

Figure D-2. Lead vehicle moves by bounds.

c. In alternate bounds, all except the first two vehicles keep their relative places in the column. The first two vehicles alternate as lead vehicles on each bound. Each covers the bound of the other. This method provides more rapid advance than movement by successive bounds but is less secure; it does not allow soldiers in the second vehicle enough time to thoroughly observe the terrain to the front before passing the first vehicle. Security is obtained by the vehicle commander who assigns each soldier a direction of observation: to the front, flank(s), or rear. This provides each vehicle with some security against surprise fire from every direction and provides visual contact with vehicles to the front and rear. For maximum observation, all canvas is removed from the vehicles.

D-16. Actions at danger areas.

a. The commander of the leading vehicle immediately notifies the unit leader when he encounters an obstacle or other danger area. Designated soldiers reconnoiter these places under cover of the weapons in the vehicle. Obstacles are bypassed, if possible. When they cannot be bypassed, they are cautiously removed.

b. Side roads intersecting the route of advance are investigated. Soldiers from one vehicle secure the road junction; one or two vehicles investigate the side road. The amount of reconnaissance of side roads is determined by the patrol leader's knowledge of the situation. Men investigating side roads do not, however, move past supporting distance of the main body of the patrol.

c. Bridges, road junctions, defiles, and curves (that deny observation beyond the turn) are danger areas. Soldiers dismount and take advantage of available cover and concealment to investigate these areas. The vehicle is moved off the road into a covered or concealed position; weapons from the vehicle cover the advance of the investigating personnel (Figure D-3).

d. When approaching a village, two or three soldiers may go forward on foot to reconnoiter. Other soldiers cover their movement from covered or concealed positions.

e. Actions on contacting guerrillas depend on whether the mission permits or prohibits engaging in combat. For example, if the mission permits or requires the exploitation of opportunities for combat and the lead vehicle detects, or is attacked by, an ambush, then soldiers in the lead vehicle move to positions from which the guerrillas can be brought under fire. The soldiers dismount and maneuver to destroy the ambush. Higher headquarters is notified of the situation.

Figure D-3. Soldiers dismount to investigate danger areas.

f. In any situation where the soldiers dismount, drivers remain with and protect their vehicles. The vehicles are moved off the road, after ensuring that the shoulders of the road are not mined. If possible, they are positioned so that the drivers can support the attack. At least one automatic weapon remains with the vehicles.

g. Higher headquarters is notified when the action is completed and the unit continues the mission.

Section VI. Dismounted Movement

D-17. Techniques.

There are many movement techniques that can be utilized. This section describes basic and linear movements, and combat, zone, and area reconnaissance.

D-18. Basic movements.

a. In all cases, the unit moves from a start point (SP) to an objective rally point (ORP) and then on to its objective (OBJ) area (Figure D-4).



Figure D-4. Basic movement sequence.

b. The unit may then return to the ORP upon mission accomplishment, or it may proceed through the objective area and onto a linkup point (LUP) (Figure D-5). From there the unit continues with a follow-on mission, or returns to base.



Figure D-5. Other basic techniques.

D-19. Linear movement.

a. **Stream and trail.** This technique of movement calls for the unit to use a trail or stream as a navigation guide. The unit may not be traveling on the trail or stream, but only in the vicinity of it for security (1).

b. **Contour.** The unit selects a contour interval and follows that elevation (2).

c. **Cross-compartment.** The unit travels in a generally straight path regardless of terrain features (3). Reference Figure D-6.



Figure D-6. Stream and trail (1), contour (2), and cross-compartment (3).

D-20. Combat and zone reconnaissance patrols.

These techniques are general and illustrate how units operate on sections of terrain in guerrilla territory (Figures D-7).



Figure D-7. Combat and zone reconnaissance patrols.

D-21. Area reconnaissance patrol.

a. This type of patrol differs from the others in that it has a specific location to be observed for intelligence. There are several methods that may be utilized by an area reconnaissance patrol to conduct its mission. Four of the most common are illustrated (Figure D-8).



Figure D-8. Area reconnaissance patrol

b. The movement techniques described in this section are basic methods. Many other techniques may be developed depending upon the terrain, the mission, and the unit leader's initiative. The leader always ensures, however, that no outline or pattern is established that would allow a guerrilla force to ambush his unit.

APPENDIX E

Bases

Section I. General

E-1. Three types.

This appendix explains the three types of bases generally used in a counterinsurgency: patrol bases, operational support bases, and support bases.

E-2. Tactical uses.

Patrol bases are used by a company or smaller units. Operational support bases are used by battalions, and support bases are used by brigades and larger units.

Section II. Patrol Bases

E-3. Planning.

a. When a unit halts for an extended period, it takes active and passive measures to provide maximum security. The leader selects, occupies, and organizes an area so located that it provides passive security from enemy detection. This is a patrol base.

b. Planning a patrol base is usually a part of the patrol's operation; or it may be an on-the-spot decision. The length of time a patrol base is occupied depends on the need for secrecy. In most situations, occupation should not exceed 24 hours except in an emergency. A patrol base is occupied the minimum time necessary to accomplish the mission. The same base is not (usually) used again.

c. In counterguerrilla operations, patrol base secrecy is required; and evacuation (if discovered) depends on the degree of control the guerrilla force has in the base area, their ability to react to the discovery of a base, and their ability to affect the unit's mission. When a guerrilla force is relatively small and weak, patrol base secrecy may not bean overriding consideration; and if the base is discovered, evacuation may not be required. In an area controlled by a large guerrilla force with a high degree of combat capability, patrol base secrecy is mandatory; and if discovered, evacuation is required.

d. Typical situations that require planning for a patrol base include:

(1) A requirement to cease all movement to avoid detection.

(2) A requirement to hide the unit during a lengthy, detailed reconnaissance of the objective area.

(3) A need to prepare food, maintain weapons and equipment, and rest after extended movement.

(4) A need to formulate a final plan and issue orders for actions at the objective.

(5) A requirement for reorganization after a patrol has infiltrated the enemy area in small groups (used in conjunction with a linkup point).

(6) A need for a base from which to conduct several consecutive or concurrent operations such as ambush, raid, reconnaissance, or surveillance patrols.

e. Any unforeseen situation occurring during a patrol mission could lead to an on-the-spot decision to establish a patrol base.

E-4. Selection.

a. The location for a patrol base is usually selected by map reconnaissance during planning. Selection may also be by aerial reconnaissance or based on prior knowledge of a suitable location.

b. A patrol base established as the result of an on-the-spot decision requires reconnoitering, securing, expanding, and organizing the area occupied during a security halt.

c. A patrol base location selected by map or aerial reconnaissance, or by prior knowledge of an area, is tentative. Its suitability is confirmed by ground reconnaissance, and it is secured before occupation.

d. Plans to establish a patrol base include consideration of:

(1) Alternate location. This is used if the initial location proves unsuitable or if the unit is required to evacuate the initial location prematurely. In counterguerrilla operations, reconnaissance and surveillance of an alternate location, until occupied or no longer needed, are desirable.

(2) Linkup point. This is used if the unit evacuates the patrol base by exfiltration in groups. The linkup point does not have to be reconnoitered.

(3) Rallying point. This is used if the unit is dispersed from the patrol base. It is a point over which the unit has previously passed, and it is known to all.

E-5. Considerations.

a. When planning for a patrol base, passive and active security measures are considered, as well as the mission.

b. With regard to passive security measures, base selection includes:

(1) Difficult terrain that impedes foot movement and has little tactical value.

(2) An area with dense vegetation (bushes and trees that spread out close to the ground).

(a) An area remote from human habitation.

(b) An area near a water source.

(c) An area that avoids known or suspected enemy positions; built-up areas; ridgelines and topographic crests (except as necessary for maintaining adequate communications); roads or trails and natural lines of drift; and wet areas, steep slopes, and small valleys that may be lines of drift.

c. With regard to active security measures, base selection includes:

(1) Outpost and listening post systems covering avenues of approach into the area.

(2) Communications with outposts and listening posts.

(3) Defense of the patrol base (if required).

(4) Withdrawal, to include multiple withdrawal routes (if required).

(5) An alert plan.

(6) Enforcement of camouflage, noise, and light discipline.

(7) Conduct of necessary activities with minimum movement and noise.

E-6. Occupation and operation of a patrol base.

a. A patrol base maybe occupied in two ways:

(1) By moving to a selected site and organizing the area in the same manner as an on-the-spot establishment.

(2) By halting near the selected site and sending forward reconnaissance forces.

b. The method is thoroughly planned and rehearsed. The use of patrol base drills (in either method) assists in the swift and efficient establishment of patrol bases.

(1) **Approach.** The unit is halted at a suitable position within 200 meters of the tentative patrol base location. Close-in security is established. Previously designated individuals (preferably leaders of the unit's major subunits) join the unit leader (Figure E-1).



Figure E-1 Approach and reconnaissance.

(2) **Reconnaissance.** The leader designates a point of entry into the patrol base location as 6 o'clock, assigns areas by the clock system, designates the center of the base as headquarters, and moves there. Subordinate leaders then reconnoiter assigned areas for suitability and return to the unit leader. Usually, two men are dispatched to bring the unit forward.

(3) **Occupation.** The unit leaves its line of march at right angles and enters the base in single file, moving to the center of the base. Designated men remove signs of the unit's movement. Each leader peels off his unit and leads it to the left flank of the unit sector. Each unit occupies its portion of the perimeter by moving clockwise to the left flank of the next sector. The unit leader checks the perimeter by meeting each leader at the left flank of his sector, moving clockwise (Figure E-2).



Figure E-2. Occupation, initial phase.

(a) Each leader reconnoiters forward of his sector by moving a designated distance out from the left flank of the sector, moving clockwise to the right limit of the sector, and reentering at the right flank of the sector. He reports indications of the enemy or civilians, suitable observation and listening post positions, rallying points, and withdrawal routes (Figure E-3).



Figure E-3. Occupation, final phase.

(b) The unit leader designates rallying points, positions for OPs and listening posts, and withdrawal routes. Each unit puts out one two-man observation post (OP) (day), and one three-man listening post (LP) (night), and establishes communications (Figure E-4).



Figure E-4. Typical patrol base layout.

(4) **Operation security.** Only one point of base entry and exit is used. It is camouflaged and guarded at all times. Fires are built only when necessary and, as a rule, only in daylight. Whether day or night, only necessary fires are built, and they are kept as small as possible. Where terrain permits, fires are built in pits and, if built at night, are carefully covered and shielded. Building fires in pits reduces the danger of visual detection and facilitates extinguishing the fires and camouflaging the sites. The driest and hardest wood available is used (to reduce smoke). In most areas, the best time for building fires is when the air is thin and smoke dissipates quickly (usually around noon); early morning may be appropriate, however, in areas where there is ground fog. The risk of detection, because of lingering odor, must be weighed against the risk of detection due to visible smoke.

(a) Noisy tasks, such as cutting branches, are accomplished at designated times, as early as possible after occupation but never at night nor during the quiet periods of early morning and late evening. When possible, noisy tasks are performed when other sounds will cover them, such as the sounds of aircraft, artillery, or distant battle noises.

(b) Movement, both inside and outside the patrol base, is restricted to the minimum.

(c) Civilians who discover the location of the patrol base are detained until the base is moved or until they can be evacuated to higher headquarters. Care is taken to prevent detained civilians from learning about base operation and future plans. If necessary, they are tied and blindfolded and their ears are covered.

(d) When sufficient personnel are available, OPs are manned by at least two men so they can alternate and ensure alertness at all times. This also removes the need for traffic between the OP and the patrol base. Listening posts are manned by at least two, preferably three, individuals so they can alternate and remain alert.

(e) A 1-hour stand-to is observed morning and evening: 30 minutes before and 30 minutes after light in the morning, and 30 minutes before and 30 minutes after dark in the evening. This ensures that every man is acclimated to changing light conditions, and is dressed, equipped, and ready for action.

(f) Each man knows the locations of men and positions to his flanks, front, and rear, and knows the times and routes of any expected movement within, into, and out of the patrol base.

(5) **Defense.** Defensive measures are planned, but a patrol base is usually defended only when evacuation is not possible. Elaborate firing positions are not constructed; nonetheless, camouflage and concealment are stressed.

(a) Artillery and mortar fires may be planned, if available. Early warning devices may be placed on avenues of approach. If the base is to be defended, then mines and trip flares may be placed on avenues of approach and in areas that cannot be covered by fire. The value of these devices is weighed against the fact that their discovery automatically compromises the patrol base.

(b) An alert plan includes evacuation and defense. All members know the plans and the signals or orders for their implementation. Plans cover pursuit and destruction of the attacking force.

(6) **Communications.** Communications are established with higher headquarters, subordinate units, OPs, and listening posts. The system provides for every man to be alerted quickly and quietly. Radios, an excellent means of communication, are carefully controlled. Wire can be used within the patrol base if its bulk and weight, and the time required to lay and pick up, are not disadvantages. Tug, or pull, wires may be used for signaling. They are quiet and reduce radio or telephone traffic. Messengers maybe used within the patrol base.

(7) **Maintenance.** Weapons and equipment are cleaned and maintained as required.

(8) **Sanitation and personal hygiene.** In daylight, catholes outside the perimeter are used. The user is guarded. At night, catholes are used inside the perimeter. Men wash, shave, and brush their teeth as needed, consistent with the situation (including availability of water). Cans, food, and other trash are taken with the departing patrol for security.

(9) **Messing.** Men eat at staggered times, as planned and controlled. Preparation of meals is planned (if required).

(10) **Water.** Guarded water parties provide water. Lone individuals do not visit the water source. No more than

two visits to the source are made in a 24-hour period. Use of water is controlled (as required).

(11) **Rest.** Rest and sleep are permitted after all work is done. Rest periods are staggered to maintain security. Consistent with work and security requirements, as much sleep and rest as possible are scheduled for each man.

(12) **Resupply.** If the unit is to be resupplied by air, the flight path, drop zone or landing zone, and cache are located so that neither the base nor possible objectives are compromised.

(13) **Planning and conduct of operations.** Details of operations are passed to all unit members. Members are not assembled atone time as this would endanger base security. Rehearsals are limited to terrain models, with part of the unit rehearsing while the remainder provides security. Weapons are not test fired. If part of the unit is absent on an operation, the perimeter is adjusted, if necessary, to ensure security. Orders are as brief as possible. Maximum practical use is made of fragmentary orders and references to SOPs.

(14) **Departure.** All signs of the unit's presence are removed or concealed. This may prevent the enemy from learning that the unit is in the area, prevent pursuit, or prevent the enemy from learning how the patrol base is operated. Night evacuation (in case of attack) is avoided if possible. Evacuation is conducted as a unit when possible.

Section III. Battalion Operational Support Bases

E-7. Purpose.

When engaged in counterguerrilla operations, battalion elements often establish a base for command and control and fire support resources, protected by a perimeter defense. These resources are called the battalion operational support base.

E-8. Perimeter defense.

a. The OSB perimeter defense location depends upon:

(1) Forces available to defend the combat base.

(2) Ability to support subordinate units with indirect fire.

(3) Defensibility of terrain.

(4) Ability to communicate with subordinate units.

b. Before establishing the battalion OSB, the commander reconnoiters to determine terrain defensibility. He also plans the defense force.

c. While the defense is designed to defeat the heaviest attack the enemy is likely to conduct, it uses minimal forces. Essential elements (reinforced as necessary) of the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) compose the force available to prepare and defend the perimeter.

E-9. OSB commander.

a. The battalion commander normally designates the HHC commander as battalion OSB commander in charge of perimeter defense. Forces normally under control of the OSB commander include:

(1) An antitank platoon.

(2) An air defense section, if attached (to man the perimeter and provide antiaircraft fire).

(3) A heavy mortar platoon (to man the perimeter and provide fire support).

(4) A rifle platoon (if provided for perimeter defense or as a reaction force).

b. The scout platoon is normally used for patrolling or screening missions, rather than perimeter defense. Use of specialty unit personnel (air defense and mortar) for manning the perimeter will reduce the responsiveness of those systems. An element of risk is involved.

c. During defense works construction, the perimeter is vulnerable to attack, so it is completed as quickly as possible. Maximum security is provided during construction.

E-10. Infiltration.

a. Guerrillas may be able to conduct large-scale attacks on fortified positions, but they may disrupt operations by infiltrating one or two men through the perimeter to place explosive devices on command and control facilities, artillery pieces or mortars, or ammunition storage areas.

b. This infiltration often follows a deceptive attack or probe. The perimeter defense force maintains constant security, using early warning systems and continuous patrolling. Starlight scopes, OPs, unattended ground sensors, ground surveillance radars, and trip flares are also used. Wire obstacles should be used to keep infiltrators out of critical facilities.

c. A battalion OSB may have to remain in place for an extended period, but it is not a permanent base. Continuous firing of mortars and landing of helicopters make concealing its location difficult. These factors require that the perimeter defense be hardened. Overhead cover and sandbagged bunkers are provided for all fighting positions. The tactical operations center and command post (CP) require similar protection (or they maybe dug underground). Mortars and artillery pieces are dug in or fortified with sandbags.

E-11. Reserves.

a. A reserve for the defense is made up from attachments (engineers, if available, or from off-shift personnel from tactical operation center [TOC] and CP elements).

b. The reserve reacts to enemy attacks and reinforces the defense or counterattack. It is rehearsed on signals and actions. Mortars are employed to provide close-in fire support. Artillery pieces maybe able to provide direct fire but may not be able to provide indirect fire in support of the perimeter. Hence, the perimeter should be within range of other artillery and mortar units for additional protection.

E-12. Work priorities.

a. A priority of work is scheduled to construct the battalion OSB. The priority placed on actions is dependent upon the tactical situation and the availability of resources. Work is accomplished in the following sequence, consistent with the tactical situation and the availability of resources.

(1) **Step 1.** Air assault and/or ground assault seizes the site; immediate security is established to include OPs; area is swept for booby traps; and mortars are laid.

(2) **Step 2.** Communications are established; CP is set up; TOC position is dug in; and selected TOC personnel are displaced to perimeter defense.

(3) **Step 3.** Perimeter positions are established; fields of fire are cleared; reserve force is established; and wire is laid to all positions.

(4) **Step 4.** Barriers and obstacles are placed around perimeter defense; early warning devices are emplaced; security and ambush patrol plans are established; and final protective fire (FPF) is called in.

(5) **Step 5.** Positions are sustained; positions are hardened with overhead cover; all other positions are improved; more

fields of fire are cleared; the landing zone is enlarged; and the latrine, generators, and ammunition supply point are established.

NOTE: Camouflage is applied throughout base preparations.

b. The size of the base is dependent upon the situation and the terrain available. When artillery is within the perimeter, then the OSB is larger to accommodate the guns and supporting equipment (Figure E-5).



Figure E-5. Example of OSB.

Section IV. Brigade, Division Support Base

E-13. Permanent-type base.

a. A brigade or division support base is larger and more permanent. It is usually near an airfield and/or generally in consolidation

areas. This section describes the responsibilities and organization found in the defense of more permanent installations.

b. An area command is composed of those organized elements of one or more of the armed services designated to operate in a specific geographical area; these armed services are placed under a single commander. The area command may range in size from an area (theater) of operations to a small urban complex. The purpose of such area assignment is to:

(1) Secure unity of effort in such operational missions as may be assigned to commanders.

(2) Coordinate defense, logistics, and the use of available facilities.

c. To provide for the effective defense of a base within his command or for joint planning within his area of responsibility, the commander must:

(1) Assign the responsibility for defense of the base and surrounding local defense areas.

(2) Establish the method of command or coordination to be exercised.

(3) Ensure the establishment of appropriate command relationships between subordinate area and base commanders.

d. Command relationships, security, and defense responsibilities vary at the base command level because of the possible multinational and multiservice force combinations involved in the overall defense effort of a given base. In most cases, base ownership, national-level agreements, and mutual agreements among senior commanders determine relationships and responsibilities. The relationship between US service components and host country forces is included in the directive of the US establishing authority. This relationship is generally one of mutual coordination and cooperation. Relationships among US service components using the same base are also outlined in the directive of the establishing authority. These relationships follow the principles designated for joint operations, attachment, or support given in JCS Publication 2.

E-14. Organization of forces.

The overall organization for base defense includes three basic elements: permanent, as required, and as available.

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a. **Permanent.** Permanently assigned elements for base defense and/or security responsibilities are:

(1) *Provisional-type base defense forces* which have been assigned a primary mission to defend the base. This force includes personnel and equipment for command and control; conduct of patrols; manning of outposts, listening posts, and the base perimeter; and reserve and/or reaction force activities.

(2) *Component police and security elements* make up the internal security force. Although not normally a part of the BDF, these forces perform their routine security duties in close coordination with the defense force commander to ensure complete protection and integration of defensive planning.

(3) *Combat support and combat service support units* are relatively static support units, such as communications and maintenance elements, which exercise their support capabilities from within the perimeter of the base.

b. As required. Elements assigned base defense responsibilities on an "as required" basis include units, or elements of units, normally occupying or operating in the base area whose primary mission is not base defense. These elements, referred to as the emergency augmentation force, supplement the capabilities of the BDF when the degree of threat or intensity of guerrilla attack dictates that they cease their primary functions and assist in base defense. The emergency augmentation force may consists of US, host country, or allied ground, naval, or air forces.

c. As available. Elements assigned base defense responsibilities on an "as available" basis include:

(1) Transient units of US, host country, or allied military forces temporarily in the base area.

(2) Tenant units on the base between operations.

(3) Host units or units of other nation(s) normally in areas adjacent to the base perimeter that have been designated, by their commanders, to provide assistance to the base when their own operations do not require total effort.

E-15. Operational concepts.

a. Base defense includes all actions that units occupying the base must take to protect themselves from enemy acts. Such actions

inevitably interfere to some degree with the primary mission of some of the elements involved. To reduce this interference, the following principles apply:

(1) Tenant units not assigned primarily for base defense are normally used in the role or configuration for which they are organized and trained — except when required for duty as emergency augmentation forces during an all-out attack on the base.

(2) Combat, combat support, and combat service support elements are specifically allocated for base defense missions when guerrilla actions are frequent, prolonged, or severe.

(3) When emergency augmentation forces are used in base defense situations, they must be returned to their primary functions as soon as the situation permits.

(4) Base tenant unit personnel are responsible for local security. The organization of a provisional defense force or the assignment of a combat unit to provide security for the base does not relieve them of this responsibility.

b. The overall concept of base defense includes all actions required to preseve the operating integrity of the base.

c. Regardless of the military measures applied, there is no defense that prevents guerrillas from attacking and damaging a base if they are willing to pay the price in manpower and materiel. Making them pay a high price holds down the number of attacks.

d. Defense of the critical areas is a primary consideration. The critical areas are facilities and installations whose continued operation is essential for the accomplishment of the primary mission. These facilities and installations are designated by the base commander or higher authority and include power stations; petroleum, oils, and lubricants storage sites; ammunition storage sites; aircraft facilities; and artillery emplacements.

e. Defense of a military base involves a combination of area denial actions, aggressive offensive operations, and immediate reaction to guerrilla threat or attack. While hardening of facilities and maintaining an immediate reaction force are the responsibility of the base commander, area denial actions and major offensive operations are the responsibility of the area commander. Use of barriers, field expedient flame weapons, natural obstacles, and aggressive offensive actions deny guerrillas access to the area immediately surrounding the base. If they are kept at a distance, they cannot launch damaging rocket attacks on the base. If they

penetrate far enough to use rockets or other long-range weapons, hardening and dispersal of base resources may reduce the damage.

f. Plans are prepared to counter the threat or attack, and reaction forces are kept ready to immediately implement these plans. This preparation includes plans by area commanders to commit other forces to base defense. Base defense plans are coordinated with host country officials and other allied forces through use of the area coordination center.

g. Responsive, rapid fire support is required for base defense operations. Artillery and mortar fire can provide quick reaction to the infiltration and standoff attack threats. If in range, naval gunfire is used the same as artillery fire. In base defense operations, base-positioned fire support units follow normal fire support procedures. Fire support units positioned outside the base area, but within support range, are included in the overall base defense fire support plan. Also included are the fire support capabilities of host country and other allied forces.

h. The fire support coordination center is operational 24 hours a day. It must have immediate access to host country officials who can autho rize fire within areas not predesignated as free fire zones.

E-16. Base commander.

a. The mission of the base commander is to exercise command, control, and administration of the base and also to exercise necessary control of resident and transient units not a part of the base command.

b. A base commander may also be the area commander. At the same time, he may also be the component Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force commander; or he may be designated separately.

c. The base commander's responsibilities include establishing the overall defense organization as well as planning, preparing, and executing all defense measures. If the base mounts or supports operations of two or more services that occupy and operate separate nonadjoining facilities within the base area, the base commander, as base defense coordinating authority, plans and directs the employment of these forces in base defense roles. The base commander normally appoints a base defense force commander to assist him in executing base defense functions (Figure E-6).



Figure E-6. Organization of base defense.

E-17. Base defense force commander.

a. The base defense force commanders normally appointed to supervise the preparation of detailed defense plans to include establishing defense sectors, conducting required training, providing for or coordinating logistical support, and controlling base defense operations. As the base commander's special representative, the BDF commander coordinates the planning efforts of all elements scheduled to participate in the base defense. During the defense, he exercises command authority over these elements.

b. Commanders of base elements maybe given responsibility for the defense training of their forces or for making their forces available to the BDF commander for training. Additional requirements such as procurement and storage of essential supplies, construction of defense installations, medical support, and communications assistance may also be levied against these commanders, consistent with overall requirements.

E-18. Base defense force.

a. The mission of the BDF, whether it be an assigned or a provisional force, is to prevent or resist an enemy attack by destroy in the enemy force, reducing the enemy capacity for offensive action, and denying the enemy entry into the base area. Detecting and destroying enemy forces (organized in strength) are responsibilities of the area commander; however, the BDF commander may initiate offensive action in areas over which he has operational control.

b. The accomplishment of this basic mission requires thorough planning for an aggressive defense fully supported by other forces of the area command.

E-19. Major tenant units.

a. All units assigned to the base constitute elements of the overall defense force of the base. During an enemy attack or threat, some elements maybe required to continue their primary function longer than others. In this respect, all local unit defenses are coordinated by the BDF commander to ensure that each contributes to the overall defense of the base as well as to the local security of the areas in which the unit is quartered or employed.

b. Since all tenant units may not be organized and equipped for base defense tasks, they must be provided with appropriate weapons, ammunition, and equipment, as well as combat and logistical support.

E-20. Transient units.

Transient units, or other units not a part of the base command, maybe placed under operational control of the base commander, or the BDF commander, for emergency defense. Transient units may be elements of US components, host country, or other allied military forces.

E-21. Employment of forces.

Forces whose primary mission is base defense patrol aggressively, develop and occupy defensive positions within their assigned sectors, and prepare immediate reaction forces to counter any guerrilla action. These forces may be uniservice, joint, or combined, depending on the composition of base area forces.

E-22. Defensive construction.

a. Shelters. Construction of personnel shelters throughout the billeting, administrative, and maintenance areas provides

individual protection against standoff attacks. Depending on resources available, these shelters vary in construction. Shipping containers, dugouts, and double-walled plywood shelters with sand or gravel fill, all with sandbag reinforcement and overhead cover, provide acceptable protection. These shelters are close to the billets and work areas to permit rapid access.

b. **Bunkers.** Fighting bunkers may be constructed on position or prefabricated and moved to position for assembly. These bunkers should be strong enough to withstand direct hit by recoilless rifle fire on the front and sides and a direct hit by a mortar round on the top.

c. **Revetments.** Construction of revetments for critical resources provides additional protection against mortar and rocket fragmentation. These revetments may be of sand-filled, double-walled construction, with either plywood or steel plate sides. Overhead cover is provided when possible.

d. **Wire.** Tactical wire barriers should be used within the perimeter to limit and canalize penetrations by enemy groups or individuals. Initially, these barriers can be as simple as a single strand of wire 3 to 4 feet high. Generally, they should be placed to prevent a direct approach to vital installations, and they should be covered by automatic weapons fire. The barriers are constructed as inconspicuously as possible and relocated periodically to disrupt enemy plans. Further, the barriers must not preclude freedom of movement by the reaction or reserve forces. These forces, and other personnel, become thoroughly familiar with the location of all barriers during the course of daylight and night drills.

E-23. Defense positions.

a. The key base defense positions consist primarily of bunkers and towers in the base perimeter area. The positioning of bunkers and towers affords maximum observation and mutually supporting fires over the area forward of the perimeter to include the perimeter barrier and sensor system.

(1) **Bunkers.** Full-time observation and all-round defense of the base are essential. To reduce the number of personnel conducting static defense missions, however, it may be possible to designate key bunkers around the perimeter to be manned at all times and the remainder to be fully manned during darkness, reduced visibility, and increased enemy threat. Individual fighting positions are prepared near the bunkers to provide covering fires. Night and day vision devices, automatic weapons, grenade launchers, and hand grenades are common to the positions. Antitank weapons cover possible vehicle approaches.

(2) **Towers.** When coupled with night and day vision aids, sensors, and flash-ranging devices, elevated platforms enhance the capability of detecting perimeter infiltration and the location of guerrilla mortar and/or rocket firing positions. Either standard military towers or towers constructed from local materials can be used. The installation of sandbags or steel plating around observation platforms provides protection against automatic weapons and small arms fire. Construction of a ground-level bunker provides additional protection when fires are directed against the tower. Access to the bunker maybe by means of a fireman's pole or a ladder arrangement. Tower safety measures for consideration include:

(a) Lightning arresters.

(b) Construction to withstand strong winds and to support two observers and their equipment.

(c) Enclosed mounting ladder.

(d) Provision of safety nets round the tower when warranted by tower height.

(e) Painting it a dark color to reduce reflection from moonlight.

(f) Installation of a suitable roof to shield personnel from the elements without interference to observation. A double-roof design could cause mortar rounds to detonate at a height that affords some protection to observers.

b. Control is the key to a successful base defense. To achieve the necessary control, a communication capability must be established between the base defense operations center and commanders of sectors of responsibility, and between the sector commander and his bunkers, towers, and reserve. Additionally, bunkers within each section can communicate laterally within the sector, and flank bunkers of one sector can communicate with flank bunkers of adjacent sectors.

E-24. Training considerations.

a. **Individual and collective training.** Most of the training required in support of base defense operations is currently a part of individual and collective training programs. Individuals designated to take any part in base defense operations will probably require additional training in areas applicable to their roles in the base defense effort. Training may be on:

(1) Techniques of ambushes and raids and defensive measures against these types of operations.

(2) Use of hearing, sight, and smell as detection means.

(3) Police-type patrolling and the operation of roadblocks and checkpoints.

(4) Night operations to include use of night observation devices and sensors and special challenge, sign, and countersign techniques.

(5) Individual and crew-served weapons cross-training within the unit.

(6) Marksmanship, especially night firing.

(7) Observation post operations with emphasis on security, sound and light discipline, and reporting procedures.

(8) Operation and operator maintenance of special devices such as radars, sensors, and night observation devices (if employed).

(9) Familiarization with all communications equipment available within the unit and communication techniques.

(10) Barrier construction, mines, and booby traps.

(11) Patrolling of all types.

(12) Counterattack.

(13) Fire control.

b. **Area orientation.** All individuals require an orientation on the guerrilla and his tactics, local customs, social values, and the civilian population in the area. The capabilities and procedures of civil police and indigenous forces are explained, since elements of the base and base defense force may operate in conjunction with them. Status-of-forces agreements and rules of engagement concerning use of weapons must be covered.

c. **Technical training.** The most up-to-date surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation (STANO) equipment should be used in base defense operations. Its installation and operation require special training. If enough specialists are not available, the scope of training is expanded. Additional maintenance specialists are also required to keep equipment operational and to advise and assist operators on their maintenance responsibilities. Maintenance and operator training is scheduled periodically to ensure a current capability to use the equipment.

d. **Morale and psychological factors.** The morale and psychological pressures on troops employed in base defense operations differ from those normally found in regular combat operations. Many of these pressures are caused by infrequent contact with

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guerrillas and the requirement for constant vigilance. Other factors include:

(1) Boredom caused by recurring routine tasks, which tends to lead to laxity.

(2) The tendency to become inattentive, which occurs because little physical activity is required in operating or monitoring observation devices or sensor equipment.

(3) The disruption of normal sleep and eating routines, which occurs when operations continue day and night.

(4) Long periods of relative inactivity, which may result if training is not pursued vigorously.

e. **Leader participation.** Leaders at all echelons must carry out a continuing indoctrination and motivation program to offset psychological pressures. This is an important part of the training program. Physical training and athletic and recreation programs are essential to maintaining high morale.

E-25. Defense exercises.

a. Defense exercises provide a means for rehearsing the BDF defense plans, to include testing of the base defense alarm and communication systems, and for training and diverse elements of the defense force to act in a coordinated effort.

b. Defense exercises are the final and most important step in the training cycle. These exercises familiarize all elements of the defense force, and the base tenant units, with their assignments in base defense. The exercises are conducted frequently, under various weather conditions, and during both daylight and darkness.

c. Exercises include, but are not limited to:

(1) Defense of sectors of responsibility to include rehearsing counterattacks and manning defense positions.

(2) Employment of the reserve for counterattacking and for reinforcing the defense positions.

(3) Coordination of supporting fires and other means of support.

(4) Integration of the emergency augmentation force with other units of the defense force.

(5) Coordination with other forces of the base, such as the air defense units that may be used in a ground defense role.

d. Command post exercises should be held frequently to:

(1) Train the staffs of all headquarters involved in base defense.

(2) Train fire support coordination agencies.

(3) Test communications.

(4) Obtain the necessary coordination and liaison between the base defense headquarters and the headquarters of base tenant forces.

APPENDIX G

Operations and Techniques

Section I. General

G-1. Tactical variations.

a. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the most common types of tactical counterguerrilla operations conducted in an insurgency. This appendix presents techniques that may be employed when conducting those operations.

b. Chart G-1 presents some of the most common operations and techniques that a counterguerrilla force employs. Generally, large-scale operations are more suited to the later stages of an insurgency while small unit tactics are more suited to the whole spectrum (see page G-2).

G-2. Standard operations.

With minor adaptations (Chapter 3), some operations discussed in FM 7-10 and FM 7-20 can be used for counterguerrilla warfare. These operations include raids, movements to contact, hasty attacks, deliberate attacks, reconnaissance in force, exploitations, and pursuits.

Section II. Operations.

G-3. Encirclement.

a. Encirclement is designed to cut off all ground routes for escape and reinforcement of the encircled guerrilla force. It offers the best possibility for fixing guerrilla forces in position and achieving decisive results. Battalion and larger units may conduct encirclements.

b. The company and smaller units normally lack enough men and command and control capability to conduct encirclements (except against small, concentrated guerrilla forces). All units of the brigade may participate in encirclements conducted by a larger force.

c. Planning, preparation, and execution are aimed at complete encirclement of the guerrilla force. Maximum security and surprise can be gained by completing the encirclement during darkness.

d. Encircling movements are executed rapidly. Use of air assault and airborne troops can contribute speed and surprise to the early

OPERATION	SIZE	REQUIRED * ≥ INTELL	SUIT PHASE	** MODE	PURPOSE	TARGETS
ROADBLOCKS	≥ PLT	1	I, II, III	1 & 2	P & RC	INDIVIDUALS CONTROL
CHECKPOINTS	≥ PLT	1	I, II, III	1 & 2	P & RC	INDIVIDUALS CONTROL
CORDON AND SEARCH	≥ CO	2	II, III	2	P & RC	AREAS (URBAN) LOG. PERS. INFO
RAID	≥ PLT	3	II, III	1	SECURE INFORMATION DESTROY ENEMY LIBERATE PERSONNEL	SPECIFIC TARGETS
PATROLLING	≥ PLT	1 2	I, II, III	1 & 2	RECON COMBAT DENIAL OF AREAS	AREA UNITS FACILITIES
AMBUSH	≥ CO	1 2	I, II, III	1 & 2	HARASS DESTROY INTERDICT MOVEMENT	INTERDICTION OF MOVEMENT
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT	BN	2 3	III	1	RECON CLEARING DRIVING	ENEMY UNITS
RECON IN FORCE	≥ BN	2 3	III	1	RECON TEST	ENEMY STRENGTH, DISPOSITION, AND LOCATIONS
HASTY ATTACK	CO	1 2	II, III	1 & 2	DESTROY ENEMY	ENEMY UNITS
DELIBERATE ATTACK	CO	2 3	II, III	1	DESTROY ENEMY	ENEMY UNITS FACILITIES
EXPLOITATION	BN	3	III	1	DISRUPT ENEMY FACILITIES	ENEMY FACILITIES
PURSUIT	BN	3	III	1	DESTROY WITHDRAWING FORCES	ENEMY UNITS
OSB	BN	2 3	II, III	2	SUPPORT OP LIMITED LOG BASE	ESTABLISH PRESENCE LIMIT ENEMY MOBILITY
PATROL BASES	≥ CO	2 3	II, III	2	COMMAND AND CONTROL RECON SITES	LIMITED TO DEFENSE
IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS	≥ BN	1 2	I, II, III	1 & 2	DESTRUCTION DEFENSE	ENEMY UNITS
ENCIRCLEMENT	≥ BN	3	II, III	1	DESTRUCTION	LARGER UNITS BASE COMPLEXES

(See Glossary for acronyms and abbreviations.)

* 1. NO INTELLIGENCE
2. LIMITED INTELLIGENCE
3. COMPREHENSIVE

** 1. OFFENSIVE
2. DEFENSIVE

Chart G-1. Comparison of operations.

phases of an encirclement. Positions are occupied simultaneously in order to block escape. If simultaneous occupation is not possible, escape routes most likely to be used are covered first.

Initial occupation is the most critical period of an encirclement. If large guerrilla formations realize that they are being encircled, they can be expected to react immediately to probe for gaps or attack weak points to force a gap.

e. Units occupying the encircling positions provide strong combat patrols well to their front to give early warning of attempted breakouts and to block escape routes. Mobile reserves are positioned for immediate movement to counter any threat of a breakout, and to reinforce difficult areas such as deep ravines or areas containing cave or tunnel complexes.

f. Indirect fire support can cloak an impending encirclement by gaining and maintaining the guerrilla's attention while encircling units move into position. Fires, including field artillery, should be planned in detail to support the encirclement after it is discovered.

G-4. Contraction.

a. Following the initial encirclement, the capture or destruction of the guerrilla force is methodical and thorough. Fire and maneuver are used in a simultaneous, controlled contraction of the encirclement.

b. As the line of encirclement is contracted, and depending on terrain, units may be removed from the line and added to the reserve. Against small guerrilla forces, the entire encircled area may be cleared by contraction; however, against larger guerrilla forces, it is probable that, at some point, some action other than further contraction will be required (Figure G-l).



Figure G-1. Contraction technique.

c. One technique, employed after some degree of contraction, is to employ a blocking force on one or more sides of the perimeter while part of the encirclement forces the guerrillas against the blocking force by offensive action. Either element may accomplish the actual destruction, but it is usually accomplished by the attacking element. This technique is most effective when the blocking force is located on, or immediately to the rear of, a natural terrain obstacle.

G-5. Hammer and anvil.

In this method, one or more units in the encirclement remain stationary while the others drive the guerrilla unit against it (Figure G-2).



Figure G-2. Hammer and anvil technique.

G-6. The wedge.

This method is used after some contraction. A unit is used to divide the enemy while the encircling elements remain in place. After the guerrilla force has been broken up into smaller elements, either contraction or the hammer and anvil technique is used (Figure G-3).



Figure G-3. Wedge technique.

Section III. Civil Disturbances and Searches

G-7. US involvement.

While it is preferable to have host country forces control civil disturbances, US forces may be forced by circumstances to conduct them and be involved in search operations. (The type of civil disturbance provides the necessary counteraction guidelines; for detailed information refer to FM 19-15.)

G-8. Search techniques.

Searches are commonly used in population and resources control operations. They include use of checkpoints and roadblocks to control traffic and to reduce the capability of the guerrilla to move personnel and materiel freely.

a. **Special equipment required.** For a checkpoint to achieve maximum results, special equipment is required. Portable signs in the native language and in English should be available. Signs should denote the speed limit of approach, vehicle search area, vehicle parking area, male and female search areas, and dismount point. Lighting is needed for the search area at night. Communication is required between the various troop units supporting the checkpoint operation. Barbed-wire obstacles

across the road and around the search area should be provided. Troops must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or to halt a vehicle attempting to flee or crash through the checkpoint.

b. **Method.** The checkpoint is established by placing two parallel obstacles (each with a gap) across the road. The distance (in meters) between obstacles depends on the amount of traffic that is held in the search area. The blocked section of road can be used as the search area. If possible, there should be a place (adjacent to the road) where large vehicles can be searched without delaying the flow of other traffic (which can be dealt with more quickly). Areas are required for searching female suspects and detaining persons for further interrogation. If possible, the personnel manning a checkpoint should include a member of the civil police, an interpreter, and a trained female searcher. When searching a vehicle, all occupants are made to get out and stand clear of the vehicle. The driver should be made to observe the search of his vehicle. The searcher is always covered by an assistant. When searching, politeness and consideration are shown at all times. The occupants of the vehicle can be searched simultaneously, if sufficient searchers are available (Figure G-4).



Figure G-4. Area search technique.

G-9. Search of persons, areas.

Searches can be classified as searches of individuals and searches of populated areas.

a. **Searching individuals.**

(1) **Frisk search.** The frisk is a quick search of an individual for weapons, evidence, or contraband. It is conducted preferably in the presence of an assistant and a witness. In conducting the frisk, the searcher stands behind the suspect. The searcher's assistant takes a position from which he can cover the suspect with his weapon. The suspect is required to raise his arms. The searcher then slides his hands over the individual's entire body, crushing the clothing to locate concealed objects.

(2) **Wall search.** Based on the principle of rendering the suspect harmless by placing him in a strained, awkward position, the wall search affords the searcher a degree of safety. It is particularly useful when two searchers must search several suspects. Any upright surface, such as a wall, vehicle, or a tree, may be utilized.

(a) **Position of suspect.** The suspect is required to face the wall (or other object) and lean against it, supporting himself with his upraised hands placed far apart and fingers spread. His feet are placed well apart, turned out, parallel to the wall, and as far from the wall as possible. His head is kept down.

(b) **Position of searcher's assistant.** The searcher's assistant stands on the opposite side of the suspect (from the searcher) and to the rear. He covers the suspect with his weapon. When the searcher moves from his original position to the opposite side of the suspect, the assistant also changes position. The searcher walks around his assistant during this change to avoid coming between his assistant and the suspect.

(c) **Position of searcher.** The searcher approaches the suspect from the right side. The searcher's weapon must not be in such a position that the suspect can grab it. When searching from the right side, the searcher places his right foot in front of the suspect's right foot and makes and maintains ankle-to-ankle contact. From this position, if the suspect offers resistance, the suspect's right foot can be pushed back from under him. When searching from the left side of the suspect

the searcher places his left foot in front of the suspect's left foot and again maintains ankle-to-ankle contact.

(d) **Initial position.** In taking his initial position, the searcher should be alert to prevent the suspect from suddenly attempting to disarm or injure him. The searcher first searches the suspect's headgear. The searcher then checks the suspect's hands, arms, right side of the body, and right leg, in sequence. The searcher repeats the procedure in searching the suspect's left side. He crushes the suspect's clothing between his fingers; he does not merely pat it. He pays close attention to armpits, back, waist, legs and tops of boots or shoes. Any item found that is not considered a weapon or evidence is replaced in the suspect's pocket. If the suspect resists or attempts escape and has to be thrown down prior to completing the search, the search is started over from the beginning.

(e) **Switch of multiple suspects.** When two or more suspects are to be searched, they must assume a position against the same wall or object but far enough apart so that they cannot reach one another. The searcher's assistant takes his position a few paces to the rear of the line with his weapon ready. The search is begun with the suspect on the right of the line. On completing the search of one suspect, he is moved to the left of the line and resumes the positon against the wall. Thus, in approaching and searching the next suspect, the searcher is not between his assistant and a suspect.

(3) **Strip search.** This type of search is usually necessary when the individual is suspected of being a guerrilla leader or important messenger. The search is conducted preferably in an enclosed space, such as a room or tent. The searching technique can be varied. One method is to use two unarmed searchers while an assistant, who is armed, stands guard. The suspect's clothing and shoes are removed and searched carefully. A search is then made of his person, including his mouth, nose, ears, hair, armpits, crotch, and other areas of possible concealment.

(4) **Search of females.** The guerrilla force will make maximum use of females for all types of tasks where search may be a threat. Counterguerrilla forces must make maximum use of female searchers. If female searchers cannot be provided, a doctor or aidman should be considered for use in searching female suspects. The search of females is an extremely

delicate matter. When male soldiers must search females, every possible measure must be taken to prevent even the slightest inference of sexual molestation or assault.

b. **Searching populated areas.** There are four fundamentals used when conducting a search.

(1) **Approach.** On some operations, the situation may allow mounted movement directly into the area to be searched. On others, the situation may dictate dismounted movement into the area. Emphasis is placed on rapid and coordinated entrance into the area.

(2) **Surrounding the area.** During darkness, troops approach silently by as many different routes as possible. At first daylight, the area can be occupied by a chain of observation posts with gaps covered by patrols. Normally, a large area cannot be completely surrounded for any length of time because of the number of troops required. If necessary, troops dig in, take advantage of natural cover, and use barbed wire to help maintain their line.

(3) **Reserves.** If there is a chance that hostile elements from outside the area could interfere, measures are taken to prevent them from joining the inhabitants of the area under search. Air observers can assist by detecting and giving early warning of any large-scale movement toward the occupied area.

(4) **Search parties.**

(a) The officer in command of the operation informs the inhabitants that the area is to be searched, that a house curfew is in force, and that all inhabitants must remain indoors. Or, he may require the inhabitants to gather at a central point and then have the search party move in and begin the search. Search parties are usually composed of search teams.

(b) When a decision is made to gather inhabitants at a central point, the head of the house should accompany the search party when his house is searched. If this is not done, he can deny knowledge of anything incriminating that is found, or he can accuse the troops of theft and looting. In small searches, it may be practical to ask the head of each household to sign a certificate stating that nothing has been illegally removed, but in a large search this may be impractical. In order to avoid accusations of theft, witnesses should be present during the search. A prominent member of the com-

munity should accompany each search team, if possible.

(c) Buildings are searched from top to bottom, if possible. Mine detectors are used to search for arms and ammunition. Every effort is made to avoid unnecessary damage. Each house or building searched is marked with a coded designation. This same designation can be used to list occupants who must be accounted for in subsequent searches, and the designation helps ensure that no building is overlooked in the search.

(d) If a house is vacant, or if an occupant refuses entry, it may be necessary to force entry. If a house containing property is searched while its occupants are away, it should be secured to prevent looting. Before troops depart, the commander should make arrangements with the community to protect such houses until the occupants return.

(5) **Search teams.**

(a) Special teams may be formed for search operations. In searching small areas (a few buildings), small units can conduct a search without special teams for each function.

(b) Search teams may require these capabilities:

- Reconnaissance.
- Physical or visual search.
- Fire support.
- Control.
- Prisoner detection.
- Mine detection.
- Scout dogs.
- Riot control agents, flame weapons, and demolitions.
- Tunnel reconnaissance team.
- Interrogation.
- Documentation.
- Psychological/civil affairs operations.

(6) **House search.** Each search party assigned to search an occupied building should consist of at least one local policeman, a protective escort, and a female searcher, if appropriate. The search party must first assemble everyone. The civil police may give the necessary orders and do the actual searching. The object of this search is to screen for suspected persons. Apprehended persons are evacuated as soon as possible. Troops may perform this task. Escort parties and transportation must be planned in advance.

(7) **Village search.**

(a) Prior to conducting search operations in a village, a reconnaissance patrol is sent out to gain information about the village and its inhabitants. The patrol avoids detection. A portion of the patrol maintains surveillance over the village while the remainder of the patrol returns with information. This is done to detect any changes which may take place prior to the security element going into position. Information of value to a commander includes:

- Size and exact location of the village.
- Fortifications (mantraps, spiketraps).
- Warning systems.
- Tunnel systems.
- Where does the insurgent live? Does he live in the forest at night and inhabit the village during the day, or does he stay in the village night and day? Does he inhabit one or more huts?
- How many people are there in the village?

(b) The security and search elements use one of two general methods of movement.

- If aviation support is available, a quick-strike air assault operation is employed. This type of operation is characterized by speed.
- If the elements conduct a dismounted operation, they normally use designated routes. This type of operation is characterized by secure and rapid movement.
- A village may be searched as follows:
- First method – assemble inhabitants in a central location (if they appear to be hostile). This method provides maximum control, facilitates a thorough search, denies insurgents an opportunity to conceal

evidence, and allows for detailed interrogation. It has the disadvantage of taking the inhabitants away from their dwellings, thus encouraging looting which, in turn, engenders ill feelings.

- Second method — restrict inhabitants to their homes. This method prohibits movement of civilians, allows them to stay in their dwellings, and discourages looting. The disadvantages are that it makes control and interrogation difficult and gives inhabitants time to conceal evidence in their homes.
- Third method — control head of household. The head of each household is told to remain in front of his house while all others are brought to a central location. During the search, the head of each household accompanies the search team through his house. Looting is minimized, and the head of the household can see that the search team did not steal property. This is the best method for controlling the population.

(d) Search teams must search thoroughly for insurgent personnel, equipment, escape tunnels, or caches. Cattle pens, wells, haystacks, gardens, fence lines, and cemeteries should be investigated. Search teams are constantly alert for booby traps.

(e) After the house search is completed, the perimeter and area between the security element and the village is searched. There are two methods:

- One — if the security element has not been discovered, the search element may be formed into sections, each section searching a portion of the perimeter. Should any section flush an insurgent out of the vegetation or tunnel exit, the security element captures the person, or shoots at him, if he attempts to escape.
- Two — if the security element has been discovered, it conducts the perimeter search. Part of this element keeps the village isolated, while the remainder conducts the search. Such a search could take hours if the terrain is extremely dense. Regardless of the terrain, the search unit checks possible locations for caches of materiel or insurgents in hiding.

(f) In areas where tunnels have been reported, it is imperative that the search unit have a tunnel recon-

naissance team attached. This team should be composed of volunteers trained for this type of operation. They should have special equipment such as flashlights or miner helmets, protective masks, communication with the surface, and silencer-equipped pistols. They should know how to sketch a tunnel system, and they should recover all items of intelligence interest.

Section IV. Movement Security

G-10. Two categories.

Movement security can be divided into two categories: security of convoys with strong security detachments, and security of convoys with weak security detachments.

G-11. Strong convoy security.

a. Special combined-arms teams may be organized and trained to accompany and protect convoys. The security detachment is organized with adequate combat power to suppress guerrilla ambushes. Its size and composition depend upon the physical characteristics of the area, the capability of the enemy force, and the size and composition of the convoy.

b. In any case, the security detachment should have the following subordinate elements:

(1) A headquarters element to provide command, control, and communication.

(2) A medical support element.

(3) An armored element to provide firepower and shock effect.

(4) A mechanized or motorized infantry element.

(5) A combat engineer element to make minor repairs to bridges and roads and to detect and remove mines and obstacles.

c. For large convoys, the security detachment should include field artillery. Ideally, half of the artillery would be placed well forward in the column and half near the rear of the column. The artillery command and control element would move in the vicinity of the security detachment headquarters. This arrangement allows the most flexibility for providing artillery fire support to elements of the column in the event of ambush.

d. The combined-arms security detachment is usually interspersed throughout the convoy so that the various elements can be employed either as a fixing element or attacking element, as required.

e. The formation of a security detachment and its integration into a convoy varies because the enemy may be expected to observe

convoy patterns and prepare their ambushes to cope with expected formations. Tanks lead the convoy to gain maximum advantage from their mobility and firepower. If no tanks are available, a heavy vehicle with sandbags placed to protect personnel from mines should lead the convoy.

f. A strong attack element is placed at the rear of the convoy formation where it has maximum flexibility in moving forward to attack any force attempting to ambush the head or center of the convoy.

g. The enemy force may allow the advance guard to pass the site of the main ambush and then block the road and attack the main body and the advance guard separately.

h. At the first indication of an ambush, vehicles attempt to move out of the kill zone. If necessary to halt, vehicles stop in place; they do not drive to the roadsides or shoulders, which may be mined.

i. Specified individuals (following the unit SOP) immediately return fire from inside vehicles to cover dismounting personnel. These individuals dismount last under cover of fire by those who dismounted first. Upon dismounting, personnel caught in the kill zone open fire and immediately assault toward the ambush force and then establish a base of fire. Tanks open fire and maneuver toward the ambush force or to the most favorable ground in the immediate vicinity.

j. While the engaged element continues its action to protect the convoy, the commander rapidly surveys the situation and issues orders to the designated attack elements to begin predrilled offensive maneuvers against the guerrilla force. The fire of the engaged security element is used to fix the ambush force and is coordinated with that of the attacking element.

k. After the guerrilla force is destroyed or neutralized, security details are posted to cover convoy reorganization. The convoy commander, using the fastest communication available, briefs his commander on the engagement. Captured guerrilla personnel are interrogated as to where they planned to reassemble, and this information is reported immediately to higher headquarters.

l. After an ambush, patrols maybe sent to interrogate and, if necessary, apprehend suspected civilians living near or along the routes of approach to the ambush positions.

G-12. Weak convoy security.

a. If the security detachment accompanying a convoy is too weak for decisive action against a guerrilla attack or ambush, the following principles apply:

(1) Some of the troops are placed well forward in the convoy, and the remainder are placed a short distance to the rear.

(2) Radio contact is maintained between the two groups.

(3) Sharp curves, steep grades, or other areas where slow speeds are necessary are reconnoitered by foot troops before passage.

b. At the first indication of ambush, leading vehicles, if the road appears clear, increase speed to the safe maximum in an effort to smash through the ambush area. Troops from vehicles halted in the ambush area dismount and immediately return fire. Troops from vehicles breaking through the ambush dismount and assault the flanks of the ambush position. Both attacking groups must exercise care that they do not fire on each other.

c. If the enemy force allows the main convoy to pass through and then ambushes the rear guard, troops from the main body return and attack the flanks of the ambush position.

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No. 7-27

Headquarters
Department of the Army
The Marine Corps
Washington, DC, 24 August 1993

DESERT OPERATIONS

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information on the location, identification, and movement of friendly forces. The PLRS is based on synchronized radio transmissions in a network of users controlled by a master station. The major elements of a PLRS community include the airborne, surface vehicular, and man-pack users; the PLRS master station; and an alternate master station. The system can handle 370 user units in a division-size deployment per master station with a typical location accuracy at 15 meters. The man-pack unit weighs 23 pounds and includes the basic user unit, user readout, antenna, backpack, and two batteries.

Dead Reckoning

The simplest system of navigation is known as dead reckoning. This is a means of finding where an individual is located by a continuous plotting of where he has been. More exactly, dead reckoning consists of recording and plotting a series of courses, each measured as to the distance and direction horn a known point, to provide a plot from which the position can be determined at any time. In the desert, the direction traveled is determined with a compass and the distance is measured by counting paces or reading the odometer of a vehicle. Detailed information on navigation by dead reckoning is contained in FM 21-26.

Shadow-Tip Method

This method provides orientation by reading the way the sun casts shadows. To use the shadow-tip method, find a fairly straight stick about 1 meter long and follow these steps:

- Step 1. Push the stick into the ground at a fairly level, brush-free spot where a distinct shadow will be cast. The stick need not be vertical; inclining it to obtain a more convenient shadow, in size or direction, does not impair the accuracy of the shadow-tip method.
- Step 2. Mark the tip of the shadow with a small peg, stick, stone, twig, your finger, hole in the sand, or other means. Wait until the shadow's tip moves a few inches (if you use a l-meter stick, 10 to 15 minutes should be enough time),
- Step 3. Mark the new position of the shadow's tip.
- Step 4. Draw a straight line from the first mark to the second mark and extend it about a foot past the second mark.
- Step 5. Stand with the toe of the left foot at the first mark and the toe of the right foot past the line you drew.

You are now facing true north. Find other directions by recalling their relation to north. To mark directions on the ground (to orient others), draw a line at right angles to the first line, forming a cross and mark the directions.

If you cannot remember which foot to place on the first rock (see step 5), remember this basic rule for telling east from west: the sun rises in the east and

sets in the west (but rarely due east or due west). The shadow's tip moves just the opposite. Therefore, the first shadow-tip mark is always in the west direction and the second mark in the east direction, everywhere on earth. Figure 2-1 depicts finding your direction by using the shadow-tip method.



Figure 2-1. Finding direction using shadow-tip method.

Watch/Sun Method

An ordinary analog watch (with hands) can be used to determine the approximate true north in the North and South Temperate Zones. The North Temperate Zone is north of the equator and the South Temperate Zone is south of the equator. The temperate zones extend from latitude 23-1/2 degrees to 66-1/2 degrees in both hemispheres. In the North Temperate Zone only, the hour hand is pointed toward the sun (see Figure 2-2). A north-south line can be found midway between the hour hand and 12 o'clock. This applies to standard time. For daylight savings time, the north-south line is found midway between the hour hand and 1 o'clock. If there is any doubt as to which end of the line is north, remember that the sun is in the north, and remember that the sun is in the eastern part of the sky before noon and in the western part in the afternoon.

The watch may also be used to determine direction in the South Temperate Zone (see Figure 2-2). However, it is used a bit differently. Twelve o'clock is pointed toward the sun, and the north-south line will be halfway between 12 o'clock and the hour hand. If on daylight savings time, the north-south line lies midway between the hour hand and 1 o'clock.

On cloudy days, place a stick at the center of the watch and hold it so that the shadow of the stick falls along the hour hand in the North Temperate Zone. In the South Temperate Zone, the shadow falls along a line from the center of the watch through 12 o'clock. Direction is then determined using the appropriate technique.



Figure 2-2. Using a watch to find north.

Celestial Navigation Method

North of the equator, locating your direction at night can be determined by locating the North Star. To find the North Star, look for the Big Dipper. The two stars at the end of the bowl are called pointers. In a straight line out from the pointers is the North Star (at about five times the distance between the pointer stars). The Big Dipper rotates slowly around the North Star and does not always appear in the same position (see Figure 2-3).

The constellation Cassiopeia can also be used. This group of five bright stars is shaped like a lopsided M (or W when it is low in the sky). The North Star is straight out from the center star, about the same distance as from the Big Dipper. Cassiopeia also rotates slowly around the North Star and is always almost directly opposite the Big Dipper. Its position, opposite the Big Dipper, makes it a valuable aid when the Big Dipper is low in the sky, possibly out of sight because of vegetation or high terrain features.

South of the equator, the constellation Southern Cross will help you locate the general direction of the south and, from this base, any other direction. This group of four bright stars is shaped like a cross that is tilted to one side. The two stars forming the long axis, or stern, of the cross are called the pointers. From the foot of the cross, extend the stem five times its length to an imaginary point (see Figure 2-4). This point is the general direction of south. From this point, look straight down to the horizon and select a landmark.



Figure 2-3. Big Dipper.



Figure 2-4. Southern Cross.

COMBAT SUPPORT

A force operating in the desert must be a balanced force with combat support and combat service support--it must be a combined arms team. While principles of combat support operations are found in doctrinal manuals dealing with a specific arm of service, there are some techniques that must be modified or emphasized in the desert.

INTELLIGENCE

The relative importance of intelligence sources may vary from that expected in more conventional areas. Enemy prisoners of war require immediate interrogation as the flexibility of operations will rapidly make their information outdated. Information given by civilians encountered in desert operations should be treated with caution unless corroborated. Military intelligence teams located in the area of operations can determine if these EPWs and civilians are in fact what they say they are, or infiltrators sent to harass the rear area and commit acts of sabotage. Electronic support measures are a major source of intelligence in desert warfare. Enemy activity, or the lack of it, is a good source of information; so punctual, accurate reports by all sources, both positive and negative, are necessary.

FIRE SUPPORT

The Allies in North Africa in 1942 found that placing small field artillery units in support of small maneuver units gave the units a sense of security, but produced limited results, Field artillery was effective only when massed (battalion or higher) and only when continued for some time because of the protective posture and mobility of the target. Typically, the controI of massed fires was the responsibility of the division artillery.

The Allies in North Africa in 1942 experienced heavy casualties from Axis units overrunning the artillery positions after penetrating the armor and infantry positions. Often, the Axis units would attack from the east at one time, from the west later, and from several directions simultaneously. At first, the Allies simply emphasized direct fire. Later, the Allies attached antitank gun units to the artillery battalions to increase the artillery's antitank ability.

When armor and infantry units move, the artillery must move with them. The most useful technique is for the artillery to move in a formation with a lead vehicle so that, immediately upon stopping, the artillery is in a position or formation to deliver fire in any direction and simultaneously defend the position from any direction. The Allies in North Africa in 1942 and units in Desert Shield/Storm found that the armor and infantry units would outdistance the artillery unless the artillery moved with them. The artillery moved within 2-3 kilometers of the leading troops to provide responsive fires. The armor and infantry provided protection for the artillery. The whole group moved in one cohesive formation, sometimes in a large box or diamond formation.

Due to the fluid nature of desert operations and the possibilities for excellent enemy observation, close and continuous field-artillery support for all levels of the force is necessary. Field-artillery pieces should be at least as mobile as the force they are supporting. Crews must be proficient in direct fire and prepared to defend against a ground attack.

Due to the threat of immediate counterbattery fire, field artillery units must be prepared to move into position, fire, and rapidly displace to another position. A battery should be prepared to displace several times a day.

Field artillery units employed in desert operations should be equipped with the most sophisticated survey devices available. Manual systems are slower and not necessarily as accurate, thus affecting tactical employment and reducing response time.

Aerial observation may often be extremely difficult due to enemy air defense, so most adjustment is by ground observers. How the environment affects observation of fires was described previously in this chapter in the paragraph, "Observation and Fields of Fire." Recompute weather conditions frequently as weather conditions can change rapidly from the morning to the evening, and thus affect the accuracy of fires.

Fires are planned as in temperate climates. When there are no significant terrain features along a route of advance, targets are planned using coordinates.

A moving force in a desert is at a disadvantage in comparison with a stationary unit due to lack of concealment and the presence of dust clouds. The defender may engage with missiles from an unexpected direction or from terrain features of no apparent significance. The attacker must be prepared to rapidly shift fires to suppress unforeseen targets. Tactical aircraft may be used to suppress or destroy targets. Targets for aircraft can be marked with indirect- or direct-fire smoke. White phosphorus or illuminating rounds set for low-air burst are also effective.

Indirect fires are used to slow the enemy advance, to suppress enemy weapons and observers, and to conceal movement between positions using smoke. Defensive operations in deserts are characterized by long-range engagement with tanks and ATGMs.

AIR DEFENSE

Identification of friend or foe is difficult. Throughout the entire theater of operations there will be numerous weapon systems that are common to both sides of the conflict. The individual soldier/marine is going to be faced with the monumental task of separating friend from foe by more than just from the recognition of the manufacturer or silhouette of a piece of equipment. This will

Survivability

Desert terrain varies from region to region. Generally, however, observation is excellent and concealment is difficult. Deserts provide little cover and concealment from ground-based observers and even less from aircraft. These conditions make modem weapon systems more lethal in deserts than in any other environment.

In the desert, hull and turret defilades for tactical vehicles are essential. This allows the defending force to take advantage of their long-range weapon systems in the face of enemy fires. Dispersion and frequent moves are other survivability techniques that can be used.

The preparation of fortifications in the desert is difficult. Fortifications in sandy soil often require revetments. In rocky plains or plateaus it may be impossible to dig. To counter this problem, build up emplacements with rocks and use depressions.

Camouflage is very effective when properly employed; however, patterns and techniques must be carefully selected to match the local desert environment. Camouflage nets should be provided for all equipment. See Appendix E for additional comments on desert concealment and camouflage.

Desert Survivability Positions

Defensive positions are very vulnerable to offensive fire due to long-range observation and fields of fire in the desert. This, coupled with a lack of natural obstacles, may lead the commander to invest the bulk of his engineer effort into survivability positions. Survivability positions enhance the ability of all direct-fire elements to survive indirect-fire and to return fire on the enemy. Survivability positions are normally more important than antitank ditches, especially in open terrain. See Figures 3-1 through 3-6 on pages 3-19 through 3-22 for examples of survivability positions. The following are some things you should or should not do when preparing survivability positions:

DO—

- Ensure adequate material is available.
- Dig down as much as possible.
- Maintain, repair, and improve positions continuously.
- Inspect and test position safety daily, after heavy rain, and after receiving direct and indirect fires.

DO NOT—

- Fail to supervise.
- Use sand for structural support.
- Forget to camouflage.
- Drive vehicles within 6 feet of a position.
- Overfill sandbags.
- Put troops in marginally safe bunkers.

DO—
Continued

- Revet excavations in sandy soil.
- Interlock sandbags for double-walled constructions and corners.
- Check stabilization of wall bases.
- Fill sandbags approximately 75 percent.
- Construct to standard.
- Use common sense.

DO NOT—
Continued

- Take shortcuts.
- Build above ground unless absolutely necessary.
- Forget lateral bracing on stringers.

The commander's responsibilities during construction of survivability positions are to-

- Protect troops.
- Continuously improve and maintain unit survivability.
- Provide materials.
- Periodically inspect.
- Plan and select fighting position sites.
- Get technical advice from engineers, as required.

In a combat situation, it may be necessary to improvise construction of a survivability position by using materials not normally associated with the construction. Some examples of field-expedient materiel are-

Wall Revetment

- Sheet metal.
- Corrugated sheet metal.
- Plastic sheeting.
- Plywood.
- Air mat panels.
- Air Force air-load pallets.

Wall Construction (Building up)

- Sand-grid material.
- 55-gallon drums filled with sand.
- Expended artillery shells filled with sand.
- Shipping boxes/packing material.
- Prefabricated concrete panels.
- Prefabricated concrete traffic barriers.

Overhead Cover Stringers

- Single pickets.
- Double pickets.
- Railroad rails.

Stand-Alone Positions

- Prefab concrete catch basins, valve pits, and utility boxes.
- Military vans.

Overhead Cover Stringers Continued

- 'T' beams.
- Two-inch diameter pipe or larger.
- Timbers 2" x 4", 4 " x 4 ", and larger.
- Reinforced concrete beams.
- 55-gallon drums cut in half longitudinally.
- Large diameter pipe/culvert, cut in half.
- Precast concrete panels, 6-8 inches thick.
- Airfield panels.
- Air Force air-load pallets.
- Shipping pallets.

Stand-Alone Positions Continued

- Connexes or shipping containers.
- Large diameter pipe/culvert.
- Steel water tanks.
- Other storage tanks (cleaned and ventilated).
- Vehicle hulks.

The following is a suggested inspection checklist to follow when preparing survivability positions:

- Location is sited tactically sound.
- Low profile is maintained.
- Materials are of structural quality (standard construction material).
- Excavation-walls are sloped.
- The setback for overhead is a minimum of 1 foot or 1/4 the depth of cut.
- Stringers—
  - Are firmly on a structural support.
  - Have lateral bracing emplaced along supports.
- 2" x 4" or 2" x 6" stringers are used on the edge; the strength is on the depth of the lumber.
- Supports—
  - Stringers are firmly on supports,
  - Supports extend past the excavation by 1/2 the depth of cut.
- Revetments—
  - Quality of construction is checked.
  - Sheeting is supported by pickets.
  - Pickets are tied back.

- Overhead cover—
  - Quality of structural layer is inspected.
  - Quality of dust layer—plywood or panels-is inspected.
  - Layer is cushioned at least 18 inches deep.

The one-man fighting position is the individual's basic defensive position. The one-man fighting position with overhead cover (see Figure 3-1) provides protection from airburst weapon fragments. A good position has overhead cover that allows the soldier/marine to fire from beneath it. Stringers extend at least 1 foot on each side of the position to provide a good load-bearing surface for overhead cover.



Figure 3-1. One-man fighting position with overhead cover.

Generally, the two-man fighting position is preferred over a one-man position since one soldier/marine can provide security while the other is digging or resting. The position can be effectively manned for longer periods of time; if one soldier/marine becomes a casualty, the position is still occupied. Further, the psychological effect of two men working together permits occupation of the position for longer periods. Overhead cover also improves the position's effectiveness; it is made as described for the one-man position (see Figure 3-2).



Figure 3-2. Two-man fighting position with overhead cover.

Fighting positions for machine guns are constructed so the fires are to the front or oblique; the primary sector of fire is usually oblique so the gun can fire across the unit's front. The position is shaped so the gunner and assistant gunner can get to the gun and fire it to either side of the frontal direction. Overhead cover is built over the middle of the position (see Figure 3-3). It is constructed as described for the one-man position.



Figure 3-3. Machine-gun position with overhead cover.

Protective shelters and fighting bunkers are usually constructed using a combination of the components of positions mentioned thus far. Protective shelters are primarily used as command posts, observation posts, medical aid stations, supply and ammunition shelters, and sleeping or resting shelters. Figure 3-4 shows an example of a command bunker.



Figure 3-4. Command bunker.

The Dragon position requires some unique considerations. The soldier/marine must consider the Dragon's extensive backblast and muzzle blast, as well as cleared fields of fire. When a Dragon is fired, the muzzle extends 6 inches beyond the front of the position, and the rear of the launcher extends out over the rear of the position. As the missile leaves the launcher, stabilizing fins unfold. Therefore, the soldier keeps the weapon at least 6 inches above the ground when firing to leave room for the fins. A waist-deep position will allow the gunner to move while tracking a target. Because of the Dragon's above ground height, soldiers/marines should construct frontal cover high enough to hide the soldier's/marine's head and, if possible, the Dragon's backblast. The soldier/marine must dig a hole in the front of the position for the biped legs. If cover is built on the flanks of a Dragon position, it must cover the tracker, missiles, and the gunner. Overhead cover that would allow firing from beneath it is usually built if the backblast area is clear (see Figure 3-5).



Figure 3-5. Dragon position.

A fighting position for the dismounted TOW must not interfere with the launch or tracking operations of the weapon. As with Dragon and LAW positions allowances for backblast effects are necessary. Backblast and deflection requirements restrict the size of overhead cover for the weapon. See Figure 3-6.



Figure 3-6. Dismounted TOW position.

Designers of fighting positions and protective positions in desert areas must consider the lack of available cover and concealment. Fighting positions should have the lowest profile possible, but mountain and plateau deserts have rocky soil or "surface chalk" soil which makes digging difficult. In these areas, rocks and boulders are used for cover. Because target acquisition and observation are relatively easy in desert terrain, camouflage and concealment, as well as light and noise discipline, are important considerations during position construction.

Indigenous materials are usually used in desert position construction. However, prefabricated structures and revetments, if available, are ideal for excavations. Metal culvert revetments can be quickly emplaced in easily excavated sand. Sandbags and sand-filled ammunition boxes are also used to prevent side walk of positions from collapsing.

FM 5-103 discusses vehicle fighting positions in detail and should be consulted for more information. Figure 3-7 provides specifications for vehicle survivability defilade positions that can be dug by the D-7 dozer.



HULL DOWN TURRET DOWN

VEHICLE	L	D_H	D_T	WIDTH
M1 Tank	2 Dozer lengths	Top of battery box	Top of your head	1 1/2Blade widths
M60 Tank	2 Dozer lengths	One fist above battery box	Top of smoke stack	1 1/2 Blade widths
M2 BFV M3 CFV	1 1/2 Dozer lengths	Top of engine housing	Top of smoke stack	1 1/2 Blade widths
M113 APC	1 1/2 Dozer lengths	One fist above battery box	Top of air intake cover	1 1/4 Blade widths
M901 ITV /FISTV	1 1/2 Dozer lengths	Top of engine housing	Top of your head	1 1/4 Blade widths
M109 155 Howitzer	6 1/2 Dozer lengths	One fist above battery box	Not required	1 1/2 Blade widths
M110 8" Howitzer	6 Dozer lengths	Top of blade tip crown	Not required	1 1/2 Blade widths
M577 Command Post Vehicle	1 1/2 Dozer lengths	Top of your head	Not required	1 1/4 Blade widths

These dimensions are described with respect to you and your dozer. Techniques for construction of survivability positions are described in FM5-34, ENGINEER FIELD DATA.

Figure 3-7. Survivability defilade positions.

Logistics areas (BSA/DSA) require additional survivability support. Desert operations require that logistics concentrations such as BSAs and DSAs be given additional considerations for survivability support. These sites are large, datively static, and difficult to camouflage. As a result, these support areas are vulnerable to enemy interdiction. Military vans or connexes should be covered with sandbags to improve protection. Additionally, if they are covered with heavy plastic, with plastic drapes over the entrances, protection against NBC effects can be improved.

Engineer digging assets, such as bulldozers, should be tasked to provide survivability support to these sites with particular emphasis placed on hardening ammunition and fuel storage locations. Caution should be used when digging foxholes and tank hide positions since some areas have a tendency to cave in.

Water Supply

Water supply is the most important mission of engineers in the desert. The search for water sources requires continuous, intensive reconnaissance. Water may be obtained by drilling beds of dry water courses, or by deepening dry wells. Once found, water must be made potable and stored or transported. Since water purification trucks may be high-priority targets and barely sufficient for the task, any force operating in the desert must be augmented with water supply units (including well drilling), water purification and water distillation teams, and transportation teams. Another possible water source is the reverse osmosis water purification unit (ROWPU). This unit is an IS0 frame-mounted, portable water purification system capable of purifying water from almost any shallow well, deep well, and surface water or raw water source. The ROWPU is capable of removing NBC contaminants, minerals, and biological impurities. The single greatest benefit of the reverse osmosis process is the ability to desalinate sea water, The ROWPU is capable of producing potable water at a rate of 600 gph. The ROWPU is powered by a 30-kilowatt generator set.

Topographic Support (Map-making)

Large areas of the world's deserts are not covered by maps of any useful tactical scale. Existing maps are frequently inaccurate and increase the difficulties of navigation. Therefore, engineer topographic companies must augment the force by preparing, printing, and distributing up-to-date maps of the operational area. USAF, Arm y, and Marine aviation support can be used to produce gridded maps from aerial photography of the area forward of the line of contact.

MILITARY POLICE

Combat support provided well forward by military police will continue in desert operations, although over increasingly extended distances. MP tactical and physical security will be of special importance over extended lines of communication, such as petroleum pipelines and viaducts transporting water

anywhere else, the commander must ensure that he has support that is capable of maintaining his unit for a specified period of time, even if the logistic line of communication is temporarily broken.

The mobility and freedom of tactical maneuver are tied to the ability of the logistic chain to supply maneuver units. Two alternatives are available: increase the rate of supply, probably requiring more vehicles, or prestock, which ties units to the stocked area. Some important supply considerations are outlined below:

- Class I. It is often impractical to supply hot rations from mess trucks, especially when the unit is subject to enemy air reconnaissance or target acquisition devices. T rations and B rations are the usual method of troop feeding.
- Class III. Daily requirements for POL in desert operations can be expected to be high. Estimates for POL requirements should take into consideration large-scale maneuver inherent in desert operations.
- Class V. Estimates of ammunition requirements should reflect the high level of commitment that can be anticipated in desert operations.

Maintenance

Disabled vehicles are vulnerable targets. Both disabled vehicles and the maintenance vehicles used in working on them must be concealed during the day, and strict light and sound discipline imposed at night. Maintenance contact teams should carry Class IX supplies that have a quick turnover.

Section II. Offensive Operations

This section discusses offensive operations as they are modified by desert terrain.

GENERAL

The main purpose of offensive operations in desert terrain is to destroy the enemy, Operations may be undertaken to secure key or decisive terrain, to deprive the enemy of resources or decisive terrain, to deceive and divert the enemy, to develop intelligence, and to hold the enemy in position. Destruction of the enemy can be accomplished by concentrating friendly forces at a weak point in the enemy's defense and destroying enemy combat units, or by driving deep into the enemy's rear to destroy his combat service support and cut his lines of communication. No force can survive in the desert for long without combat service support.

An imaginative commander is not bound by terrain constraints in seeking and destroying the enemy, Due to the scarcity of key terrain in the desert, normally the only constraints placed upon a maneuvering force is its ability to maintain

the only constraints placed upon a maneuvering force is its ability to maintain responsive combat service support and to protect its combat service support from enemy attack. The longer the lines of communication become, the more susceptible they are to being cut.

In most deserts, the scarcity of large areas of defensible terrain means that an enemy force has at least one flank open to attack, The attacking force must seek this flank and attempt to maneuver around it into the enemy's rear before the enemy can react and block the envelopment with mobile reserves.

Successful offensive operations depend on rapid, responsive, and violent maneuver, seeking a vulnerable enemy flank while exposing none to the enemy. The enemy, realizing the danger of remaining stationary in this terrain, may choose to conduct spoiling attacks or to counterattack. The resulting meeting engagement between the two attacking forces will often be a series of flanking actions and reactions with success going to the one who can find the other's unguarded flank first.

Attacking forces may conduct or participate in movement to contacts or hasty or deliberate attacks. Within a division, lead elements of forward units may be conducting a deliberate attack on the enemy's weak point or flank to open a gap for following units to move through and exploit success. Lead units of the exploiting force will be conducting a movement to contact and hasty attacks to overcome pockets of enemy resistance. Regardless of the type of operation being conducted, attacking units use the fundamentals for offensive operations described in FM 100-5/FMFM 6-1 and other tactical manuals, modified to suit the terrain.

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OFFENSE

The attacker must conduct active and aggressive reconnaissance to the front, flanks, and rear, not only to locate and identify enemy obstacles, units, weak points, and flanks, but also to give early warning of threats to his flanks and combat service support elements. A moving force is at a disadvantage in the desert due to a lack of concealment. Therefore, it is necessary to push reconnaissance units as far out from the main body as possible to allow early warning and to deny the enemy close-in observation.

Information gathered by this reconnaissance must be passed promptly to all units. In the desert, a negative report may be as important as an enemy sighting. Commanders and staffs must avoid the two extremes of either passing too little information or overwhelming their subordinates with useless trivia. Similarly, reconnaissance units must also avoid extremes. There is a very real possibility that extensive reconnaissance in one area will alert the enemy of intended operations in that area. Therefore, the need for reconnaissance must be tempered with the need for deception. In fact, reconnaissance may even serve as a deceptive measure to draw the enemy's attention away from the real objective or area of operations.

Concentrate on overwhelming combat power. Mass is achieved in both time and space. Units must be able to rapidly concentrate at a given time and place, and then disperse just as rapidly to avoid offering a lucrative target to the enemy. Concentration does not necessarily mean that vehicles and men are massed in a small area, but that units have the ability to place an overwhelming concentration of fires on the enemy.

Mutual support is as important in the desert as in temperate climates. Due to the large distances covered by maneuver in the desert, mutual support does not mean that any one unit is always in position to fire against an enemy threatening another unit. However, units must be capable of maneuvering in support of one another without disrupting the scheme of maneuver.

Concentration requires movement, and possibly weakening of forces facing the enemy in another part of the zone. Due to the enemy's observation capabilities, movement should take place at night or in conditions of limited visibility whenever possible. Deception measures play an important part in concentration, either to mislead the enemy as to the strength or true intentions of the opposing forces, or their avenues of approach. In this environment of negligible concealment, deception cannot be overemphasized.

The enemy's objective is to stop and destroy the attacking force by direct and indirect fires, obstacles, and counterattacks. The attacker must in turn suppress enemy weapon and surveillance systems to degrade their effects and their intelligence-gathering capability.

Attack helicopters and high-performance aircraft are extremely useful due to their ability to maneuver and apply firepower over a large battlefield in a short time. So, suppression of enemy air defense has a high priority during offensive operations. The destruction of enemy antitank capabilities must also have a high priority due to the shock potential of armor in the desert. No target that has a long-range antitank capability should be disregarded. Good gunnery and well-planned fire distribution are preeminent.

In featureless desert terrain, the requirement to shock, overwhelm, and destroy the enemy demands accurate reconnaissance to identify actual positions from false positions, and excellent navigation so that a commander may be certain of the deployment of his forces. Reconnoiter to find a gap or assailable flank (without alerting the enemy that the area is being reconnoitered) and concentrate the main body to go through or around it with suppressive fires on the flank(s). A gap must be wide enough to allow one unit to bypass another unit that could be stalled. Obstacles are likely to be placed so that attempts to go around them will often lead the attacker into a tire sack. Equipment capable of breaching obstacles must be located well forward.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

As a general rule, a force attacking in daylight should try to wait until the sun is comparatively low and position behind it. This enables enemy targets to be plainly seen without their shadows, while the defenders are handicapped by glare, mirages, and haze. It is not always possible (nor essential) for the sun to be directly behind the attackers. To rely on this leads to a stereotyped method of attack which could become evident to the defenders. The commander of a maneuver force should attempt to keep the sun somewhere on a 3,200-mil arc to his flanks or rear, giving a wide choice of angle of attack.

Dust is an observational hazard to a maneuvering force, especially where there is little or no wind. Teams should move in echelon with overmatching elements on the upwind side, and observers and attack helicopters should operate well to the flank. Since it is impossible to disguise movement during daylight, the assault should be as rapid as possible to minimize enemy reaction time.

The decision to move through a sandstorm will depend on the unit's distance from the enemy, trafficability, the presence of minefield, and the direction and density of the storm. If the advancing unit is caught in a storm blowing from the enemy's direction, the safest alternative is to halt until it abates, although this may not always be possible. In some situations it may be possible for platoons to form close column, using taillights only, and continue movement. When the storm is blowing toward the enemy it is possible (and extremely effective) to conduct an attack immediately behind the storm.

In certain circumstances equipment or positions that are camouflaged and are less than 1 meter from the ground are invisible to an observer at the same height out to approximately 2,000 meters. At the same time, mirages allow observation of objects below the horizon, although these maybe distorted, enlarged, or fuzzy to the point of being unrecognizable. These effects often depend entirely on the angle of the sun to the observer and are best combated by—

- Maintaining observers as high above the desert floor as possible, even if only in hull-down positions behind sand dunes.
- Allowing a vehicle's crew on one side of a position to warn a crew on the other side of a possible threat to his front by crews observing over wide areas.

Many offensive operations take place at night. Observation in these conditions varies according to the amount of ambient light. During nights when the moon is full or almost full, the clear desert sky and ample ambient light allow good observation, both with the naked eye and with night observation devices. Maneuvering units using night-vision devices must continually scan the surrounding terrain to pickup enemy activity that normally would be acquired by peripheral vision in the daylight.

The desert night is extremely dark when there is little or no moon. Under these conditions passive-vision devices, with the exception of thermal imagery, are of little value unless artificial light is used. Active light sources will have to be relied upon. Employment of artificial light must be strictly controlled by the headquarters directing the operation to maintain surprise. As a general rule, direct-fire weapons should not illuminate their target themselves, as their vision will be obscured by debris kicked up due to muzzle blast. Following contact, when some targets should be on fire, passive devices can be used.

MANEUVER

If the terrain permits masking of maneuvering units, and trafficability is good, normal fundamentals of fire and maneuver are used. Trafficability may be restricted by rocky terrain as in the Golan Heights, or the ground may be so flat that the defender has total observation of the area. Movement in these circumstances requires speed of maneuver, deception, and considerable suppression to degrade enemy observation and fires. Frontal attacks should be avoided, especially in conditions of restricted trafficability. It is preferable to maintain pressure on enemy units in unfavorable terrain, while other forces find enemy weaknesses in terrain that is more favorable for an attack.

Lack of clearly defined terrain features complicates navigation and phased operations. Units conducting an enveloping maneuver are apt to lose direction unless routes have been carefully reconnoitered by the maximum number of leaders.

Section III. Defensive Operations

This section discusses defensive operations as they are modified by desert terrain.

GENERAL

It is unlikely that a US force will be fully deployed in a desert country before an enemy attack. The more probable situation, assuming a secure lodgement area, will be that part of the force will be in position supporting an allied force, while the remainder is moving in by air and sea. Tactically, the allied force will be outnumbered, so the initial mission will be to gain time until the entire force is present in the operational area. This will require a defensive posture initially, but a defense undertaken so aggressively as to convince the enemy that his offensive action will be too costly in personnel and equipment to be worth maintaining. The enemy will be well aware that US forces are arriving in the area, and will make every effort to conclude his operation successfully before the force is fully prepared for combat operations.

The force may conduct defensive operations during subsequent stages of the operation for any of the reasons described in FM 100-5/FMFM 6-1. Portions of

the force may be required to defend the important types of terrain described below:

- Man-made features such as ports, key logistic installations, roads, railroads, water pumping stations, airfields, and wells.
- Natural features, such as mountain passes, or dominating ground, such as Mount Hermon on the border of Syria and Israel, or the Sollum escarpment near the sea between Libya and Egypt.
- Key or decisive terrain that need not necessarily be a major feature, but one whose loss will inhibit the force in some manner. For example, the loss of terrain relatively close to a lodgement area may hinder the planned rate of buildup.

With the exception of the above cases, the retention of desert terrain normally makes little difference to the final outcome of battle. This does not mean that a commander has complete discretion to move his force wherever and whenever he wishes, as this movement will affect the dispositions of other US forces or allies. It means that possession of terrain is less important than the destruction of enemy forces. Although it will be necessary to dominate certain terrain or retain freedom to maneuver in large areas of the desert, there is no more sense in permanently occupying such areas than occupying a patch of sea. Assuming equal equipment capabilities for both opposing forces, the critical factor in defense will be the force ratios involved and the state of morale and training of the opposing forces.

A defense using aggressive maneuver at all levels is the best way to destroy large numbers of enemy without being destroyed in the process. If the defending force fails to remain mobile and active, the enemy will easily outflank it and strike directly at vital targets, such as the lodgement area. It is almost certain that one flank or the other will be open as were the south flanks of the British and German forces in Egypt and Libya in 1940-43. Since it will not be possible to maintain an unbroken line between strategic obstacles, air and ground security forces must be positioned in width and depth to guard against an enemy trying to outflank the defender.

Obstacles, both natural and artificial, are used to slow, contain, or isolate enemy units in order to defeat and destroy his units one at a time. Forward units block the enemy and canalize him into one or two avenues where he can be engaged from the flank. A reserve can then counterattack to destroy any remaining enemy.

Mutual support is normally a factor of time rather than weapon range due to the large areas to be covered. Gaps in initial positions may have to be accepted between and within task forces; although the ideal is to site units in such a manner that forces in at least two positions can engage an enemy maneuvering on any one of them. This greatly reduces any possibility of defeat in detail. When gaps exist they must be kept under surveillance. The defensive plan must include provisions for maneuvering to fire on any part of a gap before the enemy

can move through it. A unit's area of responsibility must be defined by higher headquarters and should be clearly identifiable on the ground, which, due to the absence of significant terrain features, may require marking by artificial means.

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE

The fundamentals of defense are described in FM 100-5/FMFM 6-1 and in doctrinal manuals appropriate to each level of command. The following paragraphs discuss some points to remember in desert operations as they apply to the fundamentals of defense.

Reconnaissance and security units and force surveillance systems must focus on-

- What is the enemy's short-term objective?
- What are the enemy's avenues of approach, and what force is employed on each of them?
- Are the apparent movements real or feints?

As soon as these questions have been answered the commander will be able to maneuver to destroy the enemy. Until they are confirmed he can do nothing more than react to enemy initiatives, This is dangerous in any circumstance and doubly so in the desert as the side with the greatest potential for maneuver is more likely to win.

Direct-fire weapons must be used to their maximum effective range both by day and night. Limitations in night-vision equipment cannot be allowed to reduce depth or frontages; so plans for field artillery or mortar illumination are made for defense during limited visibility.

It is essential that all elements of a force retain their tactical mobility and efficient communications so that they can immediately react to changes in the commander's plans. Each individual weapon must be sited in a number of firing positions, even though vehicular movement may be exposed to air attack. Infantry fighting vehicles must remain in positions where they are concealed, capable of giving fire support to the dismounted squad, and available for immediate remounting.

Combined arms teams are essential to give the commander the capability he requires to fight the defensive battle. Defending forces orient on primary enemy approaches but units must also be prepared for attack from any other direction. It is neither possible nor necessary to have maximum firepower in all directions, provided weapons can be moved to threatened areas before the enemy reaches them. Air cover or an air defense umbrella is necessary for a successful defense.

It is rare to find positions where any substantial part of the unit area of operations can be protected by natural obstacles. This require extensive use of artificial

obstacles, depending on time, personnel, and combat service support available. Obstacles are used to divide the enemy force to improve local force ratios, and to slow the enemy's advance, thus permitting a flank attack. Conventional minefield must be clearly marked on the friendly side and recorded to avoid unnecessary losses if friendly forces later maneuver over the area.

STRONG POINTS

Strongpoints are rare in desert warfare; however, they may be necessary to defend an oasis, mountain pass, or other key terrain essential to the defender's scheme of maneuver. When it is necessary to deny terrain to an enemy force, it is far better to initiate the defense well forward of the terrain feature, conduct the defense in depth, and destroy the enemy or force him to break off his attack before he reaches the critical feature.

In some cases the level of fortification and the deployment of the enemy maybe a function of time, or the enemy's intention and his understanding of what our forces are intending to do, The effectiveness of these strongpoints depends on the range of fires, the level of fortifications, and the decision of the opponent to attack them.

Deeply dug and well-prepared strongpoints surrounded by a minefield and having underground accommodations are usually used in the desert. Although these strongpoints may be neutralized by air or artillery fire and bypassed, eventually they will have to be assaulted. If they have been carefully sited and are well defended they can be quite effective. Variations of the strongpoint defense are used in rear operations. Combat service support units will use this method in perimeter defenses or base-cluster defenses. See Figure 3-8 for an example of a strongpoint and Figure 3-9 for an example of a strongpoint holding key terrain.



Figure 3-8. Strongpoint.



Figure 3-9. Strongpoint holding key terrain.

REVERSE SLOPE DEFENSE

The use of the reverse slope defense takes on added importance in the desert. Concealment is hard to achieve in the open desert. Detection of a unit's location invites both direct and indirect fires in abundance. The use of reverse slope positions will deny the enemy direct observation of positions until he is within the range of direct-fire weapons. Reverse slopes can even be found on seemingly flat desert floors; an intervisibility line will provide the reference for the establishment of engagement areas to support a reverse slope defense. A

common misconception is that the desert is flat, when in fact, deserts are normally very uneven, with large breaks in the terrain.

Desert environments give special significance to the terrain aspect of METT-T. Commanders at all levels should place emphasis on the impact of desert terrain as it relates to the other factors of METT-T. The reverse slope defense in desert terrain warrants special considerations.

Direct-fire positions should be placed at the maximum effective ranges from the intervisibility line. This is where the enemy cannot see or engage a force with direct fire until he is within its engagement area. He can only deploy limited forces at a time. This allows the defender to mass fires on one portion of the enemy force at a time. The attacking force will have difficulty in observing and adjusting indirect fires. Obstacles may not be seen by the enemy until he is upon them and force him to breach under massed frees. Observation posts (OPs) positioned forward to see the advance of the enemy can influence the fight through indirect fires. The OPs can direct indirect fires on enemy forces that are slowed or stopped outside direct-fire ranges.

This defensive technique may be used in all defensive missions. Light infantry units use the reverse slope for protection against enemy long-range fires and to reduce the effects of massive indirect fires (artillery and close air support). The reverse slope defense brings the battle into the defender's weapons' ranges. Use of the reverse slope provides an opportunity to gain surprise.

The goal is to cause the enemy to commit his forces against the forward slope of the defense, resulting in his force attacking in an uncoordinated fashion across the crest. A reverse slope defense is organized on the portion of a terrain feature or slope that is masked from enemy direct fires and observation by the topographical crest, and extends rearward from the crest to maximize the range of the defender's weapon systems. See Figure 3-10 for an example of a reverse slope defense and Figure 3-11 for the organization of the reverse slope defense.



Figure 3-10. Reverse slope defense.



Figure 3-11. Organization of the reverse slope defense.

A disadvantage maybe that the maximum ranges of weapon systems may not be employed due to the terrain available. The desert may be the best environment for the reverse slope defense. It may allow the use of weapons at maximum ranges as well as facilitating advantages. The following are advantages of a reverse slope defense:

- It hinders or prevents enemy observation of the defensive position.
- Attacking forces will not be able to receive direct-fire support from following forces.
- Enemy long-range antitank fires will be degraded.
- Attacking enemy forces will be silhouetted on the crest of the hill.
- Engineer work can be conducted away from direct-fire and observation from the enemy.

Reverse slope defense is not one concept, but a series of concepts that produce the potential for success. The concepts are-

- Pursue offensive opportunities through surprise and deceptive actions, with the intent of stealing the initiative, imposing the commander's will on the enemy, and breaking the enemy's morale.

- Afford the defender a variety of options in positioning his troops, with each option designed to draw the enemy into unfamiliar terrain.
- Enhance light infantry effectiveness and survivability.

A hasty or deliberate reverse slope defense may be considered when any of the following conditions exist:

- When the forward slope lacks cover and concealment, and effective enemy fire makes that position untenable.
- When the terrain on the reverse slope affords appreciably better fields of fire than those available on the forward slope.
- When it is desirable to avoid creating a distortion or dangerous salient in friendly lines by relying on forward slope positions.
- When it is essential to surprise and deceive the enemy as to the unit's true defensive positions or main effort.
- When seeking to gain protection from the enemy as he is massing fires.

DELAY OR WITHDRAWAL

When it is necessary to delay or withdraw, a desert offers many advantages to the defender. Long-range fields of fire allow engagements at maximum effective range of direct-fire weapon systems, and disengagement before the defender's position. However, dust clouds created by a moving force make it necessary to disengage under cover of smoke or darkness. Even a sandstorm can be used to the advantage. Field artillery, US Air Force fighter bombers, and attack helicopters can also be used to allow a ground maneuver unit to disengage and move rapidly to the next position.

When it is necessary to trade space for time, often a counterattack to destroy enemy advance units will do more good than trying to defend longer from an intermediate position.

Commanders at all levels should clearly understand the scheme of maneuver concept of the operation, and what it is they are expected to do, especially if communications should fail. Plans must include provisions for alternate means of communication. Routes should be clearly marked and reconnoitered to the maximum extent practical.

Due to the distances involved and constantly changing task organization, passage of lines is more difficult to coordinate and control. Pay extra attention to the identification of vehicles, routes of passage, signals, and coordination of movements.

Deception should be a part of all desert retrograde operations. The object of deception is to conceal the fact that a retrograde operation is taking place and that

units are thinning out. Smoke and dummy positions can be used, false radio messages transmitted, and even dust clouds used to deceive the enemy.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the desert it is necessary to modify the techniques of defense as described in doctrinal manuals applicable to each level of command and according to the mission, the fundamentals described in the preceding paragraph, and to the environmental considerations that are described in the following paragraphs.

Observation

The enemy will try to attack when the sun is low and behind him so as to dazzle the defender. The defender's observers must be as high as possible above the desert floor to see the advancing enemy as soon as possible.

Active light sources can be detected from great distances, especially during nights with low ambient light. Positive control of active light sources must be maintained until the battle is joined. Even then, the force equipped with passive devices will have the advantage over the force that is not equipped with these devices.

Heat from combat vehicles can give an enemy using thermal imagery devices a complete picture of the defensive scheme. So, combat vehicles should not prematurely occupy battle positions at night.

Sandstorms

Sandstorms may be used by the enemy to hide an offensive operation especially if the storm is blowing from the enemy's direction. When this is the case, units should immediately occupy their battle positions before the storm arrives. The unit should remain there until it ends, ready to fire and maneuver against the attacker after the storm abates. If vehicle patrolling is possible, a scout platoon or similar unit should cover all gaps, preferably moving in pairs, and on straight lines in view of navigational difficulties.

Terrain

From the point of view of a defending brigade or battalion task force commander, avenues of approach will often seem unlimited. Long-range observation must be maximized and scouts employed well forward to offset this problem. Radars should also be used extensively to provide early warning. It is necessary to identify the enemy's main effort early in order to move to concentrate.

Lack of concealment, especially from the aerial detection, prohibits units from occupying firing positions until just before engaging the enemy. Combat vehicles must displace immediately after engagement or risk destruction. Because of frequent displacement, mutes between battle positions should be reconnoitered and marked when possible, without revealing the scheme of defense. Smoke must be used frequently to conceal movement.

TACTICAL DECEPTION OPERATIONS

Analysis of desert operations from World War II to the present day indicates that tactical deception and surprise are clearly linked to the ability to move and mass forces during periods of limited visibility.

Operational planning should emphasize night movement of units. To minimize the problems of dust and to enhance deception, movement should be accomplished using multiple routes. Place priority on training to support this requirement. Associated with night movement is the requirement for night passage through lanes in minefield and forward passage through friendly forces.

In every modem desert war, deception has played a major role. The lack of concealment leads commanders to believe that with a reasonable reconnaissance effort they can gain an accurate picture of the enemy's dispositions. Reconnaissance by German, British, Israeli, Egyptian, and Syrian forces in modern desert warfare has been sufficient to detect the presence of combat forces in the desert. Deception has been successfully used in each of the modem desert conflicts to mislead commanders.

Since the desert environment makes it difficult to hide forces, the alternative is to make them look like something else--trucks and plywood made to look like tanks, and tanks made to look like trucks.

The movement of personnel and equipment and the placement of logistic support installations are normally indicators of a force's intent. The movement of empty boxes or pallets of ammunition and the establishment of fuel storage areas with real or dummy assets can deceive the enemy as to planned offensive actions. Use minimal actual transportation assets and make numerous, visible trips to simulate a large effort.

There are many examples of successful deception efforts by US forces from World War II In September 1944, the 43rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Reinforced) occupied a 23-mile fronton the left flank of XX (US) Corps on the Metz Front. This squadron portrayed an armored division for several weeks and was so successful that the German Order of Battle Maps showed the 14th (US) Armored Division (AD) to be in the area. The 14th AD was not even in Europe at the time. Expertise in deception operations is critical to success.

Deception plays a key part in offensive operations and has two objectives: the first objective is to weaken the local defense by drawing reserves to another part

of the battlefield. This may be done by making a small force seem larger than it is. The second objective is to conceal the avenue of approach and timing of the main attack. Some deception methods that can be used in offensive operations are-

- Using dummy units and installations.
- Using phony radio traffic.
- Using movement and suppressive fires in other areas timed to coincide with the real attack.
- Using small convoys to generate dust clouds.
- Filling ration boxes with sand and stacking them at landfills.
- Moving trucks into and out of the area giving it the appearance of being a storage facility or logistic base.
- Emulating damage to induce the enemy to leave important targets alone. For example, ragged patterns can be painted on the walls and roof of a building with tar and coal dust, and covers placed over them.
- Stacking debris nearby and wiring any unused portions for demolition. During an attack, covers are removed under cover of smoke generators, debris scattered, and demolitions blown. Subsequent enemy air photography will disclose a building that is too badly damaged to be used. Troops using the building after an attack must guard against heat emissions after dark and care must be taken to control electromagnetic emissions.
- Using phony minefield to simulate live minefields. For example, disturb the ground so that it appears that mines have been emplaced and mark boundaries with appropriate warnings.
- Making a real minefield to appear as phony or camouflaging it. For example, once a real minefield is settled, a wheel or a specially made circular wooden tank track marker can be run through the field, leaving track or tire marks to lure the enemy onto live mines. Antipersonnel mines should not be sown in such a field until the track marks have been laid. Another method is to leave gaps in the mechanically laid field, run vehicles through the gaps, and then close them with hand-laid mines without disturbing the track marks.
- Using decoys to confuse the enemy as to the strength of friendly forces and the unit's identity, or to conceal unit movement by being sited in a position after the real unit has moved. For more information on deception operations, see FM 90-2.

LONG-RANGE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS

Desert characteristics affecting LRS operations are: lack of water (a major problem), scarcity of vegetation, extensive sand areas, extreme temperature ranges, brilliant sunlight, and usually excellent observation. Movement using

animals, vehicles, or by foot may be considered and is generally restricted to darkness. More training in land or air navigation and terrain orientation procedures may be necessary.

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

An air assault task force provides commanders with truly unique capabilities. They can extend the battlefield, move, and rapidly concentrate combat power like no other forces.

An air assault task force uses the helicopter to move to and close with the enemy. Initial assault elements must be light and mobile. They are often separated from weapon systems, equipment, and materiel that provide protection and survivability on the battlefield. Thus, an air assault task force may be particularly vulnerable in a desert environment to enemy—

- Attack by aircraft and air defense weapon systems during the movement phase due to differences in desert effects on observation and fields of fire.
- Attacks (ground, air, artillery) during the loading and unloading phases and at other times when the infantry is not dug in.
- Small arms fire that presents a significant threat to helicopters.
- Artillery or other fires that may destroy helicopters and air assault forces during PZ (pickup zone) or LZ (landing zone) operations.

Air assault operations are discussed in greater detail in FM 90-4. Marine Corps assault support ensures the rapid buildup of combat power and facilitates the quick maneuver of ground forces. See FMFM 5-35 for more information.

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

The airborne division is organized to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world. It is the only US Army division with a rapid, strategic, combined arms, forced-entry capability. It will most likely be the initial force deployed for contingency operations. It is ideally suited and primarily designed to seize, secure, and repair airfields in order to provide an airhead for follow-on forces and to delay, disrupt, and reduce enemy forces.

Airborne operations can be adversely affected by various environmental considerations of the desert. High winds, sandstorms, and heavy rainfall or thunderstorms may impact on mission accomplishment. Planning considerations for combat service support are complicated by the fact that airborne forces will be the first Army forces in an immature and austere desert theater. For more information on airborne operations, see FM 90-26.

Sandy Deserts

Sandy deserts may be relatively flat or interspersed with windblown dunes. When driving in sand, the following techniques should be applied:

- The best time to drive on sand is at night or early morning when the sand is damp and traction is better. However, this is not always the case especially with the newer type military tires with closer tread design. Damp sand packs between the tread in the grooves of these tires resulting in virtually no surface traction.
- Drivers of track vehicles must be wary of a lack of steering response, which indicates sand is building up between the rear sprockets and treads. If the buildup of sand is allowed to continue, it will force the tread off. "Shaking" the vehicle with the steering or backing up will remove the sand.
- Wheel vehicles may gain some traction by reducing the air pressure in the tires. However, prolonged driving on partially deflated bias ply tires will overheat the tires and break down the sidewalls. Vehicles equipped with radial tires or central tire inflation system (CTIS) are not affected by the lower tire pressure if the maximum speed listed in the operator's manual is not exceeded.
- Vehicle loads must be evenly distributed. Rear-wheel drive should be used where possible to prevent the front wheels from digging into the sand and becoming mired.
- Drivers must switch to all-wheel drive or change gears before a vehicle bogs down in the sand.
- Before entering the sand drivers should select a gear that will allow the vehicle to maintain as much torque as possible without causing the wheels to spin and to minimize changing gears.
- Large-wheeled vehicles, such as 5,000-gallon tankers, should have a designated "puller". The designated vehicle should be preconfigured to assist these vehicles when they become bogged down in loose sand.

Some sand areas will be covered by a surface crust. This is caused by chemicals in the ground cementing sand particles together, In many cases it will be possible to drive on top of this crust and minimize dust signature and the chance of bogging down. Consider the following techniques when driving on a crust:

- Use staggered columns to facilitate movement. As a general rule vehicles should not follow one behind the other.
- Ensure vehicles maintain a minimum speed (determined from experience) below which they will break through the crust.
- Avoid sharp turns and abrupt starts or stops that could cause a vehicle to break through the crust.
- Reconnoiter patches of the crust that are a different shade to ensure they are not softer than the surrounding crust.

Crossing Dunes

Crossing dunes requires careful reconnaissance. Normally, the upwind side of the dune will be covered with a crust and have a fairly gradual slope. The downwind side will be steeper and have no crust. Prior to crossing a dune, the driver should climb it on foot checking crust thickness, the angle at the crest to ensure the vehicle will not become bellied at the top, and the degree of slope and softness of the downwind side. If he is satisfied his vehicle can climb the dune, he should drive the vehicle straight up it at the best speed, crest it, and maintain a controlled descent on the other side.

Little hills may be formed by the wind blowing sand around small shrubs. Wheel vehicles should not attempt to move through areas where this has occurred without engineer assistance.

Cacti or thorn bushes will cause frequent tire punctures. Increase the number of tires carried in the unit's PLL when operating in areas covered with this type of vegetation.

Rocky Areas

Rock and boulder-strewn areas, including lava beds, may extend for many miles. Desert rocks, eroded and sharp-edged, vary in size and are so numerous that it is almost impossible to avoid any but the largest. The subsequent harsh jolting fatigues individuals and causes extreme wear on tracks, wheels, springs, and shock absorbers. Rocks and stones can become lodged between the tires on vehicles equipped with dusk that can cause severe damage to tires and brake components. Vehicles can follow one another in this type of terrain and it may be feasible to reconnoiter and mark a route. Drivers should achieve a "rolling" effect as they cross large rocks by braking as the vehicle's wheels ride over a rock so the axle settles relatively gently on the far side.

Salt Marshes

Salt marshes (called sebkha) are normally impassable, the worst type being those with a dry crust of silt on top. Marsh mud used on desert sand will, however, produce an excellent temporary road. Many desert areas have salt marshes either in the center of a drainage basin or near the seacoast. Old trails or paths may cross the marsh, which are visible during the dry season but not in the wet season. In the wet season standing water indicates trails due to the crust being too hard or too thick for the water to penetrate. However, such routes should not be tried by load-carrying vehicles without prior reconnaissance and marking.

RECOVERY

Track vehicle recovery methods are the same in the desert as in temperate climates. The techniques described in the following paragraphs will assist wheel

vehicle recovery operations in sand crusts or salt marshes. To assist in recovery, wheel vehicles should carry the following items:

- Steel or aluminum channels, at least for the driving wheels. These are pierced to reduce weight and ribbed for strength. Pierced steel planking (PSP) or galvanized iron maybe used as a substitute.
- Sand mats made of canvas, preferably with lateral strips of metal to give strength and increase the traction of the wheels.
- Jacks and jack blocks.
- Tow rope(s).
- Shovels.

Once a vehicle becomes mired, excavate the ground under the vehicle in a gradual slope towards the direction of recovery to a point where no part of the underside is touching the ground. Channels or spurs and mats are laid under or against the wheels facing the direction of recovery. Tire pressure may be reduced to increase traction, but this also lowers the vehicle. It maybe necessary to lift the wheels with a jack if the vehicle is resting on its frame or axles.

When the vehicle begins to move, any faltering will cause it to sink again. Once out, the driver must maintain speed until the vehicle has reached the nearest hard area. At this point the tires are reinflated, the vehicle inspected for damage, and recovery equipment collected.

Vehicles equipped with winches can winch themselves out using ground anchors. The ground anchor may consist of a tarpaulin full of sand placed in a hole and the winch cable attached to it, or it may be one, or preferably two spare wheels well dug in.

A rubberized fabric balloon may be used on light vehicles to lift them free of broken crust. The balloon is placed under the vehicle and blown up with the vehicle exhaust.

If a lone vehicle breaks or bogs down in the desert, the crew must stay with it. A vehicle is much easier to find than a lone man.

MAINTENANCE

Equipment directly affected by heat, such as aircraft and radios, are equally affected by all deserts. However, power trains and suspension systems are affected in proportion to trafficability and soil texture. Most damage to equipment can be avoided by careful driving and by careful observation by vehicle commanders.

Track tension must be correct as constant driving on rocky plateau deserts will reduce the life of the track. Suspension units will require frequent replacement

of torsion bars and suspension arms. To prevent damage to internal parts of the idler and suspension arms caused by the terrain, direct-support maintenance units must be provided with equipment capable of tapping and removing the sheared bolts.

To prevent problems that can result when desert vegetation clogs engine oil coolers and cylinder cooling pins, place a small-mesh wire screen over the top grille doors. It may still be necessary to remove packs about every 10 days to clean the engine cooling fins. The wire screening should be periodically checked, removed, and cleaned.

Maintenance personnel must inspect and adjust transmission bands frequently, especially on vehicles operating in hot, barren mountains. This will help reduce transmission oveheating.

Extra stocks of air-cooled generators are necessary because high-ambient temperatures limit their ability to maintain the proper operating temperature and contribute to premature failure.

NOTE: The Ml13A1 is especially susceptible to overheating problems in desert conditions. This includes the transmission and the solid-state voltage regulator, which is more prone to overheating and early failure than the older mechanical type.

WHEELED VEHICLES

Wheeled vehicles are subject to brake system component failures and power steering leaks on rocky deserts. Vehicles equipped with manual transmissions are prone to clutch failure caused by drivers slipping the clutch. Vehicles with automatic transmissions tend to overheat; therefore, stop frequently to allow the transmission time to cool. The M54 5-ton truck is prone to air hydraulic cylinder failure and power steering seal leaks on rocky deserts. All vehicles of the 1/4- to 5-ton range are prone to clutch failure caused by drivers "riding" the clutch pedal. Tire consumption is very high, so all vehicles must carry one, or preferably two spare tires, and the unit's PLL of tires should be considerably increased. Approximately one vehicle in every three to four should carry slave cables to provide for battery failure.

Vehicles should be equipped with the following:

- Extra fan belts,
- Two spare tires.
- Extra oil.
- Extra radiator hoses.
- Heavy duty tape.
- Extra air and fuel filters.
- Jack stand support plate.
- Sand ladders (fabricated) and matting.

- Towrope/cable.
- Extra water cans.
- Siphoning hose and funnel.
- Slave cables.

RADIOS

Radios, regardless of type, must be kept cool and clean. They must be in the shade whenever possible and should be located in a ventilated area (or even in an air-conditioned can). If water is available, wrap the radio in a damp towel, ensuring that the air vents are not blocked. Additional radios should be available in vital communications centers, such as tactical operations centers, to allow immediate replacement if the set in use shows signs of overheating.

It is essential that antennas be cut or adjusted to the length of the operating frequency. Directional antennas must be faced exactly in the required direction; approximate azimuth produced by guesswork will not do. A basic whip antenna relies on the capacitor effect between itself and the ground for efficient propagation. The electrical ground may be very poor, and the antenna performance alone may be degraded by as much as one-third if the surface soil lacks moisture, which is normally the case in the desert. If a ground-mounted antenna is not fitted with a counterpoise, the ground around it should be dampened using any fluid available. Vehicle-mounted antennas are more efficient if the mass of the vehicle is forward of the antennas and is oriented towards the distant station.

Desert operations require dispersion, yet the environment is likely to degrade the transmission range of radios, particularly VHF (FM) fitted with secure equipment. This degradation is most likely to recur in the hottest part of the day, approximately 1200 to 1700 hours.

If stations start to lose contact, especially if the hotter part of the day is approaching, alternative communication plans must be ready. Alternatives include the following:

- Using relay stations, including an airborne relay station (the aircraft must remain at least 4,000 meters behind the line of contact). Ground relay stations or RETRANS are also useful and should be planned in conjunction with the scheme of maneuver.
- Deploying any unemployed vehicle with a radio as a relay between stations.
- Using alternative radio links such as VHF multichannel telephones at higher levels, or HF (SSB) voice.
- Using wire. Normally wire will not be used as operations will be fluid, but it maybe of some value in some static defensive situations.

- Using a unit such as all or part of the task force scout platoon for messenger service, Although it is undesirable to use such a unit in this manner, it may be necessary to maintain communications.

GENERAL TIPS

General tips for operating equipment in the desert include the following:

- Check track tension daily.
- Check drive belt adjustment frequently.
- Lubricate suspension items daily, and clean grease fittings.
- Reduce sand ingestion by stretching nylon stockings over air cleaners.
- Emphasize proper engine cooldown and shutdown procedures, especially diesels.
- Adjust battery specific gravity to the environment (refer to TMs).
- Set voltage regulators at lower end of specifications.
- Start up vehicles regularly to prevent discharge of batteries.
- Increase stocks of oils and lubricants.
- Use high-grade 20W-50 oil; it serves well under desert conditions.
- Compensate for increased pressure due to severe heat in closed pressurized systems.
- Check lubrication orders and TMs for the correct viscosity of lubricants for higher temperatures.
- Keep lubrication to the absolute minimum on exposed or semiexposed moving parts; this includes working parts of weapons.
- Erect screens against blowing sand in maintenance areas.
- Cover the gap between the fuel nozzle and the fuel tank filler neck opening during refueling operations.
- Protect exposed electrical cables and wires with electrical tape.
- Keep optics covered; clean them with a soft paintbrush or a low-pressure air system (this works well for weapons also).
- Clean sand and dirt from hulls of armored vehicles.
- Check tire pressures and fuel levels at the midpoint of the temperature range during the day.
- Ground all refueling equipment—STATIC ELECTRICITY KILLS.
- Replenish radiators with potable water whenever possible.
- Determine battery shortages early and requisition early.
- Drain fuel lines at night and in the morning due to condensation.

- Increase PLLs for the following parts due to high failure rates:
  - Tires.
  - All track components.
  - All suspension components for both wheel and track vehicles.
  - Brake shoes.
  - Bearings and bushings.

    Plastic and rubber parts, including seals.
  - All filters.
  - Generator components.
- Deploy with plastic bags to cover weapons and protect other equipment during maintenance or when not in use.
- Bring muzzle plugs.
- Prepare all vehicles for desert operations in accordance with the appropriate TMs.
- Issue small paintbrushes to all soldiers/marines for weapons cleaning and other equipment maintenance. The paintbrush is one of the more valuable tools available to the soldier/marine for maintenance.

APPENDIX E

DESERT CONCEALMENT AND CAMOUFLAGE

In the desert, camouflage problems are encountered that require imagination, ingenuity, and intelligence. The lack of natural overhead cover, the increased range of vision, and the bright tones of the desert terrain place emphasis upon siting, dispersion discipline, and the skillful employment of decoys to achieve deception and surprise. Total concealment is rarely achieved, yet proper camouflage measures can reduce the effectiveness of enemy observation, and consequently enemy operations.

Cover from enemy direct fire may be afforded by dunes, hills, and other irregularities in the desert terrain. Camouflage is an essential part of all operations in the desert and the importance of the concept must be impressed upon fresh units and individual replacements upon their arrival in theater. Poor camouflage may also compromise a high-level plan and lead to an operational failure. One poorly concealed vehicle can compromise an entire task force. Improvisation of available assets is just as important as being able to properly use camouflage systems. As previously described, deserts generally do not offer much natural concealment or means for camouflage; therefore, make maximum use of any artificial means available.

VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT

Movement of vehicles produces dust, diesel plumes, and distinctive track marks. The slower the speed, the less dust that is produced; however, the need for speed must be balanced against the amount of dust that may be produced. Drivers must avoid harsh use of accelerators, the main cause of diesel plumes.

Shine from optical instruments (which should be kept shaded), and matte paint that has been polished by continual wear, or from tracks, particularly if rubber blocks have been removed, are difficult to camouflage during the desert day. See Figure E-1 for shading optics. Running gear on tracks that has been polished by wear should be covered with burlap when stationary. Windscreens and windows should be removed or lowered to prevent reflection of the sun and heat. Vehicle silhouettes can be reduced in the forward areas by removing cabs and tops.

Disruptive pattern painting for vehicles and aircraft is described in FM 20-3. Local materials can also be used. The color and texture of the local terrain is best represented by placing dirt on vehicles and using a little water to make it stick.

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COUNTERMOBILITY

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OBSTACLE PLANS



Effective employment of obstacles is a key element in any tactical plan. Obstacles that are sited properly provide the commander a significant advantage in both the offense and defense. Planning and emplacing obstacles cannot be approached haphazardly. The obstacle planning process must be systematic, coordinated, and fully integrated with the tactical plan. The logistic demands of obstacle employment must also be planned for and available at the proper place and time. All elements of the combined arms team must be involved in the obstacle planning and employment process in order to extract the greatest cost from the enemy. This chapter outlines the sequence and basic considerations for planning and coordinating countermobility activities in various operations.

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SUMMARY

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Obstacle planning is serious business, and involves all elements of the combined arms team. Obstacles must support present and future tactical plans, be logistically supportable, and fully coordinated. Some important factors to be considered are listed below.

MISSION

The mission is the primary consideration in obstacle planning. The employment of obstacles in support of a DEFEND mission would be significantly different from obstacle employment in support of a DELAY or an offensive mission. The obstacle plan should be tailored to support the mission of the organization and accomplish the objectives of the command.

DIRECTED AND RESERVE OBSTACLES

Directed and reserve obstacles are of prime importance to the overall mission and should be planned first. Authority and time of execution must be known.

FUTURE PLANS

While obstacle employment is supporting the current mission, it should not impede future plans or missions. This may not be completely possible in every instance. Emplacing an artillery delivered minefield upon an attacking enemy may be the right thing to do, even though an attack through the area was planned prior to self-destruction of the minefield. Pros and cons must both be considered.

ENEMY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

The obstacle plan should exploit the weaknesses of the enemy. If the enemy is short of rapid bridging capability, a tank ditch may be a more effective obstacle than a minefield. If the enemy is low on diesel fuel or ammunition, attacking their trains and supply lines may be the most effective use of obstacles such as scatterable mines.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER

These factors and their effects are critical in answering the following questions: Where are good existing obstacles? Are they within the enemy's avenue of approach? Are they effective when tied in with reinforcing obstacles? Are they within range and fields of fire of friendly weapons? What are the anticipated weather conditions? Is the soil frozen? Is digging possible? Can mines be buried?

AVAILABLE TIME, MATERIALS, MANPOWER, AND EQUIPMENT

Answers to these questions will dictate to a large degree the type and extent of the obstacle system, and also provide information on additional resources required and task organization. How much time is available to spend on battlefield preparation? Have the required materials been ordered? Are they on hand? Is the manpower available for labor-intensive obstacles? Is earthmoving equipment available for tank ditches and other equipment-intensive obstacles? Has the high diesel fuel consumption rate been planned for?

EFFECTS ON THE LOCAL POPULATION

Cultural features are not destroyed unless the mission makes it absolutely necessary. These considerations are not inclusive. There may be many other important factors. Each mission, operation, or battle phase will pose distinct requirements that must be considered and planned for. Obstacles can be the difference between winning and losing. Their employment must be carefully planned and fully coordinated.

Obstacles should be emplaced according to these general guidelines:

> Obstacles should support weapon systems by slowing the enemy at the maximum effective ranges of our weapons systems, as limited by fields of fire available.
> Obstacles should not impede our own mobility; or, if they do, they should be reserved targets or scatterable mines with a self-destruct time coordinated to future maneuver plans.
> Obstacles must hinder enemy movement as we move from battle positions.
> Obstacles are emplaced in as much depth as is feasible after considering the time, manpower, and logistical constraints. These in-depth obstacles are integrated into the battle position fire support plans, assist the commander in stopping the enemy within the MBA, and then assume the offense.

THE PLANNING PROCESS

Developing an obstacle plan that is effective and supports the tactical plan requires coordinated sequential planning. The following sequence should be used to develop such an obstacle plan. This sequence is equally effective in both offensive and defensive operations.

1 Analyze the mission.

2 Analyze avenues of approach.

3 Analyze engagement areas, battle positions, and locations of weapon systems.

4 Determine possible obstacle locations and types.

5 Determine the commander's obstacle priorities.

6 Determine resources.

7 Determine actual work sequence.

8 Determine task organization required.

9 Determine coordination required.

1 Analyze the mission. The mission is a clear, concise statement and purpose of the task to be accomplished by the command. It tells the command the "who," "what," "where," and "when" of an operation. Analysis of the mission is a critical item in planning obstacles. The "who" portion and accompanying task organization allocates resources to do the job. The "what" specifies the type operation such as "defend," "attack," or "delay." "Where" outlines the area of operations, and "when" specifies the time available and

essentially establishes deadlines. During the planning phase, much or all of this information will be verbal based upon commander and staff analysis of the mission received from higher headquarters. The estimate, eventual plan, and execution are based upon tasks contained in the mission.

2 Analyze avenues of approach. Once the mission has been received and analyzed and the basic objectives are known, the next step in obstacle planning is to determine avenues of approach. Terrain analysis techniques and existing obstacle evaluation, as described in chapter 2, are performed. The commander must visualize the avenues of approach under all conditions, and determine the size of friendly or enemy forces those avenues can support.

3 Analyze engagement areas, battle positions, and locations of weapon systems. A good terrain analysis will show where the best areas are for friendly weapons to engage the enemy. In offensive planning, the most likely areas where friendly forces could expect to be engaged by enemy direct fire weapons can also be ascertained. The analysis process is essentially the same in both the defense and the offense. Analysis of existing obstacle areas, fields of fire, and natural cover and concealment are key factors in determining where to best engage the enemy or expect to be engaged.

4 Determine possible obstacle locations and types. Selection of engagement areas and battle positions must be accomplished prior to planning reinforcing obstacles. Once the commander has selected engagement areas and battle positions, then the commander and the engineer select those reinforcing obstacles that accomplish the basic principles. This selection process is unconstrained, meaning that the commander and engineer will select and site all the reinforcing obstacles necessary without regard for manpower, time, and logistics. This selection process will determine what "needs" to be done in order for the obstacle system to be most effective. What "needs" to be done will usually require more effort than resources available. The process provides the commander and the engineer with a method to establish priorities if resources are constrained.

5 Determine the commander's obstacle priorities. Once the unconstrained obstacle estimate has been accomplished, the commander can establish priorities for obstacles. By seeing what "needs" to be done, the commander can choose those obstacles that must be emplaced. Through this process, the engineer is given direction to employ resources knowing the effort is expended on those obstacles most critical for accomplishing the command's objectives. The type, proposed location, and purpose of the obstacles will depend on an offensive or defensive plan. However, the basic thought process remains constant.

6 Determine resources. The commander and the engineer consider the assets available to construct, guard, and execute the obstacle plan. Engineer assets are limited, and the priority of work maybe given to only a portion of the planned area of operations. The engineer takes the commander's priorities and makes an estimate based upon time, manpower, equipment, and logistics. The engineer must know how much of each resource is required to emplace and execute a given obstacle. This estimate is based upon type of obstacle, soldier experience, state of training, and condition of equipment.

Standard obstacles (appendix D) may be used to assist in the estimating process. They are only a guide and should be altered according to existing conditions at the time of the estimate.

Another factor in the engineer estimate is the commander's decision on who will guard and detonate preliminary demolition obstacles not detonated immediately after emplacement. Essentially, the commander has two choices--either use engineer soldiers, or soldiers from maneuver units. If engineers are used, then engineer assets are used up quickly, thus limiting the number of obstacles that can be emplaced as the battle progresses. The same can be said for using maneuver units to guard and detonate obstacles. This difficult decision must be made early enough for the engineers and maneuver units to properly plan. In any case, the target turnover process must be trained and rehearsed during combined arms training so the commander has some latitude in decision making.

The time available to accomplish the obstacle mission is an important consideration. Lead time is required to gain sufficient obstacle density to obtain tangible benefits from the obstacle plan. Emplacement time will vary with the types of obstacles. For example, it may take more manhours to emplace a conventional tactical minefield than to emplace a road crater or prepare a bridge for demolition. Emplacement lead time is divided into two parts: time required to actually construct the obstacle, and time required to get materials to the obstacle location. The latter may require twice as much time as actual obstacle construction. The loss in productivity due to logistics time can be reduced by allocating additional transportation support to engineer units. In most cases, the engineer squad's truck or APC must serve as both personnel carrier (mobility) and cargo carrier (resupply). Another way to increase production is to work maximum hours, but this pace can be maintained for only a few days before soldiers and equipment begin to fail.

Finally, logistical matters must be considered. The commander must set priorities for the delivery of munitions and material, and must allocate the available haul assets among ammunition, obstacle materials, and other critical supplies. Among obstacle materials, difficult choices must be made. A conventional tactical minefield can take up to a hundred times the haul assets of a point obstacle, yet the minefield may be the only effective obstacle in the situation. To minimize the haul requirements, the engineer must make imaginative use of locally available material. Alternative obstacles should also be considered. Frequently, tank ditches can be substituted for a minefield, using engineer equipment that is available and not in use, instead of placing an additional demand on an overloaded transportation system.

7 Determine actual work sequence. The commander and the engineer now must reconsider the possible obstacles identified earlier. Considering the time available, work force, and logistical assets, they identify those obstacles which can realistically be completed within the allotted time. They also identify obstacle work which may continue during the battle.

The commander's obstacle plan will usually develop through the answers to such questions as:

Does the unit have 4 hours, 2 days, or 2 weeks before the battle is expected?

What are the limits of obstacle logistic assets available?
Is the divisional engineer unit by itself or is it supplemented by corps engineers?
To what extent is the tactical commander able to augment engineer units with other members of the combined arms team?

8 Determine task organization required. The tactical commander and the engineer must balance the comprehensiveness of the obstacle plan with the realities of limited assets. For example, a task force commander's sector may be critical and in need of intensive engineer work in order to complete the plan. The brigade commander, on the other hand, may anticipate that the primary threat will develop in another task force sector. Accordingly, the brigade commander may allocate fewer engineers than desired by the task force commander. The engineer recommends the allocation of engineer units to best support the brigade commander's coordinated obstacle plan. Additional engineer units, if available, may be obtained by coordination with the division engineer and the division commander. These units may come from the organic engineer battalion or corps assets.

9 Determine coordination required. Obstacle planning and employment requires extensive coordination to accomplish its purpose. The G-4/S-4 must receive a materials estimate as early as possible in order to plan logistic support of the obstacle system.

The artillery fire support coordinator, aviation officer, and air liaison officer must also be consulted to integrate scatterable mines with the obstacle system. Missions which require scatterable mines are planned in detail to include the location, the unit delivering the mines, and necessary logistic support. Coordination and responsibilities for scatterable mine employment are outlined in chapter 5.

Obstacles must also be coordinated with follow-on and adjacent units to insure that the location and extent of the obstacle system are known. This coordination will preclude the obstacle impeding movement and maneuver of friendly forces. If followed, this planning sequence is a workable, realistic, and coordinated approach to planning obstacle employment. It will insure that the result is a coordinated and executable plan that extracts the greatest cost from the enemy.

OFFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

In the offense, the priority of the engineer effort is to maintain friendly force mobility. Countermobility activities are also important to halt or slow the enemy's counterattack capability and isolate the battlefield. Such operations assist friendly forces in defeating the enemy in detail. Countermobility operations can be employed in all types of offensive operations. Obstacles and mine warfare in offensive operations have three main purposes:

1 Prevent enemy enforcement.

2 Facilitate economy of force.

3 Provide security.

1 Prevent enemy reinforcement. Offensive operations are conducted to exploit enemy

weaknesses. To prevent the enemy from reinforcing weak areas under friendly attack, critical routes should be interdicted to hinder movement of reserves and logistics. Speed and deep interdiction capabilities are vital, Air-delivered scatterable mines are ideally suited for this mission.

2 Facilitate economy of force. Obstacles and mines can be utilized in selected sectors to allow defense by reduced forces. Relieved maneuver units can then be concentrated in other sectors for the attack. Under other circumstances, easily defended terrain which is reinforced with obstacles and on-call scatterable mines may permit major sectors to be held by a relatively small force. Operations of this type are conducted by armored cavalry units with a screen or a protection mission.

3 Provide security. In offensive operations, mines and obstacles may be emplaced along the flanks of advancing forces in critical areas to halt or slow enemy counterattacks. In planning offensive operations, avenues of approach offering natural flank protection--such as a river or a ridge line--should be carefully evaluated. During the advance, it may be possible to protect a flank by destroying all bridges crossing a river, or by interdicting all roads and trails crossing a ridge line. Swamps, canals, lakes, forests, and escarpments are natural terrain features that can be quickly reinforced for flank security.

During offensive operations, engineer countermobility plans must permit rapid emplacement and flexibility. Time and resources will not permit development of the terrain's total defensive potential. Based upon likely enemy reaction, the most probable counterattack avenues should be closed off with obstacles. Plans should be developed for other possibilities and resources committed when the enemy response becomes apparent. Scatterable mines are excellent for this purpose. Aircraft and artillery delivered scatterable mines could be preplanned on each of several available routes. The mines should be delivered in front of, on top of, or on the flanks of the lead elements of an enemy counterattack after the enemy has committed itself to one of the routes. Rapid cratering devices are another excellent capability.

Speed of countermobility operations is vital and cannot be overemphasized. Engineer support must keep up the pace and emplace obstacles and mines along with advancing maneuver forces. Effort for countermobility during offensive operations must be carefully weighed against the mobility requirements to support the advance. Resources must be planned and used wisely. Under ideal circumstances, plans should be flexible for engineer forces to perform both mobility and countermobility operations as the tactical battlefield situation requires.

Control of mines and obstacles, and accurate reporting to all units are vital. An obstacle or mine in place will hinder either friendly or enemy maneuver. Positive command and control is necessary to insure that minefield and obstacles are not executed until desired. Once executed, they must be reported by the executing unit through operation channels and posted to operational and intelligence maps. Information on obstacles and minefield in place is disseminated with tactical intelligence. The recording and reporting procedures for scatterable mines must be rigidly followed. These procedures are discussed in chapter 5. Key factors for countermobility activities during offensive operations are:

Enemy situation and capabilities.

A good terrain analysis to determine where friendly forces are vulnerable to counterattack.
Speed of obstacle emplacement.
Preplanning and coordination.
Information flow to inform friendly forces of friendly and enemy obstacle locations.

DEFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

PURPOSES OF THE DEFENSE

Defensive operations achieve one or more of the following:

Cause an enemy attack to fail.
Gain time.
Concentrate forces elsewhere.
Wear down enemy forces as a prelude to offensive operations.
Control essential terrain.
Retain tactical, strategic, or political objectives.

The immediate purpose of any defense is to cause an enemy attack to fail. The other reasons listed contribute to purposes beyond the immediate defense.

It may be necessary to gain time for reinforcements to arrive or to economize forces in one sector while concentrating forces for attack in another. In either case, a defense or a delay may achieve these purposes.

In some cases, a force may be defending because it cannot attack. The defender then takes advantage of position and superior knowledge of the terrain. Once the enemy has been committed to the defense and weakened by losses, friendly forces maneuver to destroy the enemy with fires or counterattacks. In other cases, portions of a force may be required to retain key terrain or essential tactical, strategic, or political objectives.

In some instances, these must be first seized by airmobile or airborne forces, and then held until a larger force can link with the defender. An underlying purpose of all defensive operations is to create the opportunity to change to the offensive. All activities of the defense must contribute to that aim.

The defense has been called the stronger form of war because denying success to the enemy is easier than forcing the enemy to do our will. The defender has significant advantages over the attacker. In most cases, the ground is better known, and the defender occupies first and therefore becomes stronger as positions improve and forces mass. Once the battle begins, the defender fights from cover against a more exposed enemy, and uses the terrain to mask movements as forces gather to block and attack the enemy. Finally, the defender can postpone commitment of major forces until the attack has developed, and then strike the extended enemy over carefully selected and prepared terrain within the defensive area. The effects of obstacles, airpower, and conventional weapons on exposed troops, and certain aspects of nuclear, chemical, and electronic warfare, also

favor the defender.

Balanced against the defender's advantages, however, is the attacker's single greatest asset--possession of the initiative. The attacker takes advantage of the opportunities to concentrate first and surprise the defender by chosing ground, direction of approach, and time of attack. Also, this initial advantage is used to mislead or distract the defender, slow recognition of the main attack, and delay implementation of countermeasures. The defender's ultimate task is to overcome the attacker's initial advantages and quickly regain the initiative.

Napoleon summarized the requirements of defensive campaigns when he said in his *Memoirs:* "The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack."

The key terms of AirLand Battle doctrine--**initiative, depth, agility,** and **sychronization**--also outline the requirements for a successful defense at any level.

Initiative

Seize the tactical initiative locally, then generally, as the battle progresses.

Depth

Fight the enemy throughout the depth of its formations to delay and disorganize, and to create opportunities for offensive action. The defender must organize forces and resources in depth to gain the time and space required for flexibility and responsive maneuver.

Agility

Set the terms of battle through flexible use of fire, maneuver, and electronic warfare. Just as the attacker is committed to an action, the defender changes the situation and thereby forces a different countermove. This overloads the enemy's command and control system and renders his reaction uncoordinated and indecisive. Effective use of agility can lead to the enemy's piecemeal destruction.

Synchronization

Synchronize all available tools of battle in. well coordinated combat actions. Violent execution of plans and aggressive exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities can halt the attacking force's momentum.

Initially, the defender will be outnumbered. In the early stages of the battle, the defender must capitalize on the advantage of fighting from stationary, protected positions to halt the enemy. Deep attack on the enemy, the actions of security forces, and detailed fire and obstacle plans facilitate containment of the attack.

Once the attacker has been controlled and the defender has concentrated forces in the area

of the main attack, the defender can then operate against exposed and precisely located segments of the attacking force. Then, by being under the cover of his own field artillery, air defense, and on ground he has reconnoitered and prepared, the defender has the advantage. Once the attacker has extended into the defended area, he is vulnerable to fires from all sides, surprise attacks on flanks and rear, and loss of the initiative.

To succeed, the attacker must shatter the defense quickly and maintain a high pace of operations to prevent its reconstitution. To defeat the attacker, the defender must protract operations, keep the tempo slow enough to allow reaction, and, ultimately, isolate and destroy attacking forces.

The attacker cannot be allowed to focus full strength at one time and place on the battlefield before defensive countermeasures have been prepared. This can be accomplished through skillful use of terrain and by interdiction of following forces through deep attack. The attacker's ability to sustain the momentum of the attack and set the pace of battle must be broken. This will occur if it is difficult to employ fire support assets, reinforce, resupply, and direct attacking echelons.

The attacker must be required to divert energies and efforts into nonproductive ventures and to strike at nonexistent targets through deception, operations security, and maneuver. This dissipates strength and uses resources.

Karl von Clausewitz characterized the ideal defense as a "shield of blows." At the onset, the defender yields the initiative to the attacker. However, the defender has the advantages of prepared positioning and better ground knowledge, and uses them to slow the momentum of the attack and repeatedly strike the enemy. In defeating the attackers' combined arms coordination, strength, and concentration, the defender destroys the attacking force with effective maneuver supported by flexible firepower. It is not necessary to kill every enemy tank, squad, or combat system, but only to destroy the ability to continue fighting.

United States Army defensive doctrine is designed to be applicable anywhere in the world. The form of defense the commander chooses will depend on the mission, nature of the enemy, terrain possibilities, and capabilities of available units. The commander may elect to defend well forward or in considerable depth, if not required to hold a specified area or position. The commander may even choose to preempt the enemy with spoiling attacks if conditions favor such tactics. Depending on the depth available, forces at hand, and the mission, the commander may defend by striking the enemy as it approaches. The commander fights the decisive battle within the main battle area, or draws the enemy deep into the area of operations, and then strikes along enemy flanks and rear. All three methods have been used in the past with decisive results.

DEFENSIVE FRAMEWORK

Corps and divisions fight a unified defensive AirLand Battle within an organizational framework consisting of five elements:

1 The deep battle.

2 Covering force.

3 Main battle area.

4 Rear battle.

5 Reserve operations.

The deep battle, the covering force battle, and the main battle area (MBA) battle are planned as complementary actions which support a unified battle plan. The overall commander delineates areas of interest and influence, the covering force area (CFA), the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), the rear line of the MBA, and the rear area. The forward line of own troops (FLOT) is initially defined by elements of the covering force. After contact with the enemy, FLOT generally defines the line of contact throughout the battle. The commander also establishes an initial ilre support coordination line (FSCL) and any blocking positions, strongpoints, stay-behind forces, or phase lines necessary for executing the plan. The commander decides whether to fight a forward defense or a defense in depth. The commander organizes the overall defensive effort on the basis of the mission, the nature of the enemy force, the terrain, the troops assigned, and the time available. The commander allocates forces and resources within the elements of the organizational framework to support the overall scheme.



1 The deep battle. The deep battle component of the AirLand Battle is designed to support the commander's basic scheme of maneuver by disrupting enemy forces in depth. Its goal is to create opportunities for offensive action against committed enemy forces by delaying the arrival of enemy reserves or follow-on forces, or by destroying key enemy, organizations. Surveillance operations are conducted to identify significant enemy forces in the area of interest while electronic warfare, long-range fire, and maneuver in depth are used to attack enemy forces whose delay or disruption is important to the success of the commander's plan. In the defense, the deep battle aims to prevent the enemy from

concentrating overwhelming combat power. Main objectives are the separation and disruption of attacking echelons, protection of friendly maneuver and degradation of the enemy's fire support, command and control systems, combat and combat service support.

Engineer plans in support of the deep battle will resemble the support given any other offensive operation. Emphasis will be upon speed for ground forces. First priority of engineer effort will be mobility of the maneuver force. Countermobility, in terms of flank security and prevention of counterattack, is the second priority for engineers. Obstacles will, of necessity, be those that can be installed rapidly, such as scatterable mines and road craters. Scatterable mines will be a significant contributor to success of the deep battle. Targets and delivery means must be carefully chosen.



2 Covering force. The covering force generally has three basic tasks to accomplish:

Gain and maintain contact with attacking enemy forces.
Develop the situation.
Delay or defeat the enemy's leading fighting forces.

In the covering force area (CFA), countermobility activities are primarily designed to disorganize enemy movement and enhance friendly fires. The density of obstacles in the CFA will be less than the MBA due to lack of time, depth of the area, and smaller numbers of engaged friendly forces. Siting obstacles will be extremely important. Manpower and equipment-intensive obstacles will not generally be emplaced in the CFA. The commander must make decisions on the amount of limited resources able to be committed to the CFA. Emplacement of obstacles in the CFA and the MBA will be occurring at the same time and competing for the same resources.

Time is a critical factor to consider in planning the battlefield preparation of the CFA. There will be little time for obstacle employment once the enemy attacks. Scatterable mines and quick demolition point targets, such as prechambered road craters, are ideal for use in the CFA. Obstacles should assist the covering force commander by accomplishing the following:

Enable CFA units to fire and maneuver without becoming decisively engaged.
Inflict casualties and force the enemy to deploy repeatedly, thus gaining time for MBA preparation.
Force the enemy to expend breaching and bridging assets that he will need later when encountering the MBA.
Deceive the enemy as to our MBA locations and intentions.

The majority of the engineer effort in the CFA will be accomplished by divisional and corps combat battalions. Selection of the proper command or support relationships will be critical due to the rapidity of the battle.

3 Main battle area. The main battle area (MBA) is bounded by corps-designated coordination points that establish the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and division-designated rear boundaries of the forward defending brigades. It is anticipated that the decisive battle will be fought by the forward committed brigades in this area. Therefore, the bulk of the defending force is deployed in the MBA. They are prepared to concentrate where necessary to defeat the enemy's main thrust. For control purposes, the MBA is subdivided by division, brigade, and task force boundaries. It contains a multitude of predetermined (and in some cases, prepared) battle positions from which the battle will be fought. The use of battle positions facilitates control of the combat elements during the flow of battle. They allow the commander to concentrate forces in critical areas with minimal confusion. The use of obstacles in the MBA is the key to gaining time for the commander to concentrate forces by slowing the enemy rate of advance. Existing obstacles will place certain restrictions on enemy maneuver and speed. To complement this, reinforcing obstacles are sited to--

Take advantage of existing obstacles.
Slow and destroy tanks and BMPs.
Hold the target in the firing window of direct fire weapons.
Gain time for the defender.
Disrupt the integrity of the enemy formations.
Channelize the enemy into other areas where we want him to go.

Most of the obstacle effort is concentrated in the MBA. In addition to the divisional units, corps combat engineer battalions will be available to work in the MBA. Elements of corps combat heavy engineer battalions will be employed in MBA on a task basis.

4 Rear battle. The rear area is organized to provide for efficient combat service activities. Because most combat forces are forward, support elements must be trained and prepared for self-defense. Obstacles in the rear area are usually limited to protective minefield and command priority point obstacles. These obstacles will normally be concentrated in areas that could be used by the enemy as helicopter landing zones or drop

zones for airborne forces. Scatterable mines, especially antipersonnel mines, could be used on targets of opportunity in the rear area. The rear battle commander will be competing with maneuver forces for scarce countermobility resources. The overall commander will establish priorities for effort and expenditure of materials throughout the depth of the battlefield.

5 Reserve operations. The reserve force, regardless of size, will require engineer support in order to accomplish its mission of counterattack, defensive reinforcement, or reaction to a rear area threat. If the reserve force is primarily made up of aviation assets, then the engineer support required will be significantly reduced. Engineers supporting the reserve force can possibly be employed in the MBA with anon-order mission to support the reserve force. This method requires timing and mobility if the engineer unit is to join up and deploy with the reserve force. Engineer forces can also be located with the reserve force to provide survivability and countermobility support. This insures the unit will remain intact and capable of performing its mission.

RETROGRADE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

A retrograde operation is an organized movement toward the rear or away from the enemy. It may be forced or voluntary, but must be approved by the appropriate higher commander. Forces conduct retrograde operations to harass, exhaust, resist, delay, and damage the enemy. Such operations gain time, avoid combat under unfavorable conditions, or draw the enemy into unfavorable positions. They are also useful in maneuver to reposition forces, shorten lines of communications, or permit the use of a force elsewhere.

TYPES OF RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

The three types of retrograde actions are **delays, withdrawals,** and **retirements.** In delays, units give up space to gain time. They do not lose freedom to maneuver, and they inflict the greatest possible punishment on the enemy. In withdrawals, all or part of a deployed force voluntarily disengages from the enemy to free itself for a new mission. Withdrawals may occur with or without enemy pressure and assistance by other units.

In retirements, a force not in contact with the enemy conducts an administrative movement to the rear.

All retrograde operations are difficult, and delays and withdrawals are inherently risky. To succeed, they must be well organized and executed.

DELAYING OPERATIONS

Delaying operations occur when forces are insufficient to attack or defend, and when the defensive plan calls for drawing the attacker into an unfavorable situation. These operations normally gain time to--

Reestablish the defense.

Cover a defending or withdrawing unit.
Protect a friendly unit's flank.
Participate in an economy of force effort.

Delays gain time by forcing the enemy to concentrate repeatedly against successive battle positions. As enemy units begin to deploy for the attack, the delaying force withdraws to new battle positions. The enemy must repeat the same time-consuming deployment at the next position. At the same time, deep attack slows the enemy's advance and prevents him from massing overwhelming combat power against the delaying force. A delaying force **must--**

Maintain contact with the enemy to avoid being outmaneuvered.
Cause the enemy to plan and conduct successive attacks.
Preserve its freedom to maneuver.
Maintain operational coherence.
Preserve the force.

A delaying force **can--**

Harass, exhaust, weaken, and delay enemy forces.
Expose or discover enemy weaknesses.
Avoid undesirable combat.
Gain time for the remainder of the force.
Conform to movements of other friendly troops or shorten lines of communications.
Cover the deployment, movement, retirement, or withdrawal of friendly units.

Although the delaying force will likely be outnumbered, it must seize the initiative whenever possible to conceal a weakness or disrupt enemy plans. To provide the required time, units with a delay mission may attack, defend, screen, ambush, raid, or feint. A commander who is delaying may defend initially and then shift to the delay only after the enemy has concentrated overwhelming combat power against initial positions. The commander then gains time by occupying succeeding battle positions and conducting short counterattacks until space runs out. If space is limited, the commander may have to accept greater risks to accomplish the mission. A commander's orders may require delaying the enemy forward of a certain line until a certain time. To do so, the commander would have to accept a decisive engagement.

Cavalry units train and organize especially for delaying operations. When available, they should execute the delay.

Delay from successive positions

Delay from successive positions occurs when the sector is so wide that available forces cannot occupy more than a single tier of positions. Maneuver units continuously delay on and between positions throughout their sectors. This method is simple to control. Delay from successive positions is useful in less dangerous sectors, but is easier to penetrate than a delay from alternate positions because the force has less depth and time to prepare.

Delay from alternate positions

Delay from alternate positions involves two maneuver units in a single sector. While the first is fighting, the second occupies the next position in depth and prepares to assume responsibility for the operation. The first force disengages and passes through or around the second force. It then prepares to resume the delay from a position in greater depth, while the second force takes up the fight. Delay from alternate positions is useful in particularly dangerous avenues. This method offers greater security than delay from successive positions, but requires more forces, continuous coordination of fire and manuever, and is less certain to maintain contact with the enemy.


Delay from successive positions
INITIAL DELAY POSITION
SECOND DELAY POSITION
STEP 1 Elements of the delaying force disengage and move to the rear to organize the next position.
STEP 2 Elements remaining in contact fight to the rear while maintaining continuous contact.
STEP 3 Elements rejoin parent organizations at the next delay position and continue the delay.

As the enemy's main effort becomes clear, commanders may add forces to threatened sectors and withdraw them from uncontested areas. But any delay maneuver must be alert for opportunities to damage the enemy with short, sharp offensive actions. Such actions keep the enemy on guard and lengthen the delay.

Delay Preparations

Orders

The time available determines the extent of preparations. It is not always possible to complete preparations before the delay starts. Consequently, commanders prepare continuously and adapt plans as situations develop.


Delay from alternate positions
INITIAL DELAY POSITION
SECOND DELAY POSITION
THIRD DELAY POSITION
A
B
STEP 1 Elements of the brigade organize the initial and second delay positions.
STEP 2 Elements from the initial position delay back through the second position to the third delay position.
STEP 3 Elements at the second position pick up the delay. The third delay position is occupied.

The order for the delay outlines the entire operation and describes its initial phase in detail. The commander issues supplementary orders during the battle to adjust and coordinate the delay. Missions assigned to subordinate elements and their sequence of execution are often more restrictive than other types of operations. Sufficient initial guidance will permit a subordinate commander to fight effectively even if contact is lost with the commander. Each subordinate commander, however, needs enough freedom to exploit any advantage which may develop.

Planning

The delaying force commander usually organizes the operation by identifying delay positions in depth throughout the area of responsibility. These positions normally follow

natural lines of defensible terrain across the sector. Times may be assigned to delay positions indicating the minimum acceptable delay in each area. Commanders must carefully weigh the implied risks when imposing time limits on the delay.

Because sectors in a delay are usually wide, commanders must organize maneuver forces for independent operations. Every subordinate delaying force commander must understand the tasks and restrictions. Artillery and engineer support will usually be provided to the battalion or squadron level. Attack helicopter units are also valuable reserves in a delay because they are fast and effective against tanks.

The commander plans for offensive action as part of the basic delaying maneuver, and assigns responsibility to specific units for contemplated counterattacks. Unless reserves are prepared to strike, and preliminary plans for air, artillery, and engineer support are ready, the delaying force will miss opportunities.

Delay command and control

The dynamic nature of the delay places a premium on the commander's ability to stay abreast of the situation and understand the options as the operation progresses. Each commander must be aggressive in obtaining and reporting information. Even during active combat, staffs must actively seek information and immediately report essential information to the commander. Division and corps commanders must pass gathered information to the delaying unit.

Commanders must know the status and location of their own units, flanking units, and enemy units. To enhance coordination, each commander will use prominent terrain features, redundant communications, rehearsals, simple maneuver schemes, and liaison parties. Wide frontages and multiple attacks will make it impossible for the commander to be present at every significant action. The intensity of combat will limit mobility, the condition of forces, and logistic posture. The obstacle plan must be known well enough to control the operation. Commanders must closely monitor and control radio communications during the delay. They should use wire communications between command posts, to reserves, and to delay positions that are particularly important. They should also set up dummy stations to deceive the enemy regarding strength and missions.

Delay execution

Divisions and smaller units delay from successive positions, delay from alternate positions, or a combination of both. At least a portion of the delaying force maintains constant contact with the enemy. Long-range fire, maneuver, and direct fire cause the enemy to deploy, reconnoiter, maneuver, or even halt. Nuclear or chemical fires, and short, violent counterattacks or ambushes disorganize and inflict casualties on him. Spoiling attacks as the enemy prepares to attack can also substantially delay his advance.

Effective use of obstacles will be a key element in executing a successful delay. Regardless of the type delay tactics used, obstacles enable the commander to effectively trade space for time. Obstacles which can be rapidly emplaced such as scatterable mines, bridge destruction, and road craters, are ideal to support the delay. Timely and proper

placement of obstacles enable a commander to break contact, utilize economy of force, and provide valuable time to forces preparing the primary defensive area. Obstacles also weaken the enemy and his use of breaching assets, and cause him to be more vulnerable when encountering the main defensive area.

Beginning the delay

If no enemy contact occurs, reconnaissance forces will aggressively seek it on a wide front. They will repel enemy reconnaissance forces and determine the direction of enemy movement. At this point the delay begins.

A delaying force maintains continuous contact with the enemy, but avoids a decisive engagement unless the mission demands it. The delaying operation, which requires careful planning, should resemble a dynamic defense, yet it must be flexible enough to adjust to enemy maneuver. When the enemy discovers he is facing a delay, he will normally attempt to close and to penetrate. Early intelligence of enemy movements permits the defense to adjust, and also minimizes enemy success.

Maintaining control and coherence

Control and security during a delay derives from planning. The commander must insure continued coherence by--

Using well-planned and coordinated obstacles.
Minimizing gaps between forces.
Maintaining surveillance of gaps.
Insuring that displacing forces occupy intended positions.
Maintaining unit integrity, especially of smaller units.
Properly executing all elements of the obstacle plan.
Insuring that reports are timely and accurate.
Maintaining contact with the enemy.
Continuously and aggressively acquiring intelligence about the area of interest.
Maintaining a reserve.

Contesting the initiative

A successful delay requires commanders to take the initiative whenever possible, throwing the enemy off stride and disorganizing him with--

Timely and effective use of obstacles.
Direct and indirect fires which are violent and coordinated.
Counterattacks and spoiling attacks.
Timely nuclear and chemical fires.
Skillful deception.
Aggressiveness.
Effective offensive air support.

Concluding the delay

The delay can be concluded under several conditions, most probably when enemy forces have halted the attack or when the delaying force has achieved its mission and passed through another force. If the attacking force has halted because of attrition or logistic

considerations, the commander of a delaying force can withdraw for another mission or maintain contact. The higher commander may choose to attack through a delaying force. In this kind of operation, timing for such an attack is usually critical. To facilitate it, the delaying force must assist in the forward passage of lines and provide knowledge of the enemy and terrain.

Passing lines under pressure

If the delaying force withdraws through a defending force, it must pass through lines to the rear and hand off the battle to the defending force. The success of the delay's final stage requires--

Using obstacles to assist in breaking contact.
Planning routes.
Coordinating passage points.
Recognizing signals.
Exchanging liaison parties.
Supporting with fires.

Passage of lines is especially difficult in limited visibility. Transition should therefore occur just forward of the new defense in such a way that location and organization are not revealed.

In many instances, it will be preferable to pass delaying units to the rear in sectors not under direct attack. Commanders may do so by maneuvering delay forces away from the enemy's front just before it reaches the main defense. If the delaying force can lead an aggressive enemy into the defense, it can cause heavy damage.

WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS

When the commander finds it necessary to reposition all or a part of the force, a withdrawal is conducted. The deployed force voluntarily disengages from the enemy. The operation may occur with or without enemy pressure and assistance by other units.

Without enemy pressure, withdrawing requires effective security and depends primarily on speed and deception. Stealth or a nuclear or ground attack may be necessary to divert the enemy's attention. Commanders must have contingency plans in case the enemy detects the withdrawal and attacks. Successful withdrawals normally occur at night or during poor visibility conditions. They also occur in difficult terrain under friendly air superiority, even though poor visibility and difficult terrain complicate friendly control. Smoke and concealed routes can reduce the enemy's ability to observe friendly movements, but commanders must anticipate enemy interference by fires and maneuver in depth.

Under enemy pressure, withdrawing depends on maneuver, firepower, and control. All available fires, perhaps even nuclear fires, support the withdrawal of closely engaged friendly forces. Forward elements move to the rear by aggressive small-unit delaying tactics. Rearward movement must be tightly coordinated and controlled.

When simultaneous withdrawal is not practicable, the commander must determine an

order of withdrawal. If the most heavily engaged units are withdrawn from the areas of greatest enemy pressure first, the enemy may encircle or destroy major elements of the command. If the least heavily engaged units are withdrawn first, all or a major portion of the most heavily engaged units may be lost. Commanders must decide what action best preserves force integrity while accomplishing the mission.


Withdrawal operations
USING MULTIPLE ROUTES
UNDER ENEMY PRESSURE
PL SPEAR
PL ARROW
PL SWORD
DIVISION COVERING FORCE
INITIAL DELAY POSITION
SECOND DELAY POSITION
NEW DEFENSIVE POSITION
PLANS AND ORDERS FOR A WITHDRAWAL SHOULD INCLUDE:
New positions to be occupied and new missions.
Organization for combat.
Zones or routes of withdrawal.
Provisions for security.
Comprehensive obstacle plan.
Plans for fire support.
Provisions for breaking contact when the withdrawal is under enemy pressure.
Deception measures.
Times and priorities for withdrawing units.

Reserves deploy well forward to assist withdrawing units by fire or ground attack. While units are withdrawing under pressure, reserves can launch spoiling attacks to disorganize,

disrupt, and delay the enemy. Reserves may also cover the withdrawal or extricate encircled or heavily engaged forces. Army aviation units secure flanks, delay enemy armor, maintain command and control, and transport troops and materiel.

RETIREMENT OPERATIONS

A retirement is a rearward movement by a force not in contact with the enemy. It is administrative in nature and execution, but commanders should have contingency plans if there is any chance of a meeting engagement.

EMPLOYMENT OF OBSTACLES IN RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

The use of obstacles in retrograde operations varies widely depending upon the nature of the operation. In the delay, planning and executing obstacles is much the same as in the defense. At the other end of the scale, obstacles will rarely be employed to support retirements, except for those that are part of denial operations. Obstacle use in the withdrawal falls between these extremes.

Obstacles are used in both the defense and retrograde, but some significant differences are:

> Friendly forces will be even less numerous relative to the attacker, and will be more widely dispersed. With both time and troops to emplace obstacles at a premium, there will be fewer obstacles. Because of this and the greater need for them by friendly forces, each obstacle assumes greater importance.
> Extensive obstacle systems will be rare in retrograde operations. Single or small groups of mutually supporting obstacles will be sited at the most critical locations.
> Obstacles coordinated with antitank fires will be located in depth on likely avenues of approach and along each delay position.
> Thorough knowledge of the terrain is even more important in retrograde than in other operations. It is essential to find the most suitable locations for reinforcing obstacles, and to take the greatest advantage of the pattern of existing obstacles because of the severely limited time and effort available.

These considerations lead to emphasis upon reinforcing obstacles that can be emplaced and executed rapidly, and offer the greatest delay effect for the preparation effort such as bridge demolitions, point obstacles (including point minefield), and scatterable mines. In the delay, obstacles are used primarily to enhance antiarmor direct fire weapons. They also are placed in depth to assist delaying forces in breaking contact.

The delay provided by the second set of obstacles is vital if our forces are to succeed in breaking away to move to the next delay positions. In the withdrawal, obstacles are placed to slow the enemy's pursuit and disrupt his plans, and also to assist friendly forces in avoiding decisive engagement.

Because the attacker seeks rapidity of movement, he will attempt to use the road net. The first priority for obstacles is to those that block key avenues of approach, especially at major choke points (including bridges) and sites suitable for hasty river crossings. The next consideration is developing obstacles directly assisting planned withdrawals to

successive delay positions, generally along the delay positions.

Because uncertainty is a large factor in the retrograde, obstacles that assist in preventing surprise to the friendly force are important. They give the delay force commander time to shift fires and move reserves to threatened areas. Special attention must be paid to obstacles that cover the flanks, and to lightly-held areas to counter the Threat doctrine of outdistancing and enveloping withdrawing forces. Potential airlanding or air drop zones also rate special attention in planning obstacles. Because the enemy can readily identify key choke points from maps, nearby landing or drop zone sites are especially important, and are best covered by planned scatterable mines.


Phase line and obstacle coordination
PL MARK
PL PAUL
PL GEORGE
PL THOMAS
PL MIKE
PL HENRY
Eel Lake Dam
Dam is a denial target; execution is coordinated with tactical situation
Shaded areas show general location of existing and reinforcing obstacles. They are organized in depth along principal avenues of approach and each delay position. Execution is delegated to lowest possible command level (except for reserved demolitions).



In retrograde operations, engineers normally accompany all units. Security forces normally have engineers attached. The basic load of obstacle materials carried by engineers will provide a limited capability to create obstacles. In addition, the retrograde facilitates stockpiling of obstacle materiel to support rapid placement of planned obstacles.



Distributing engineer units throughout the force also places counterobstacle equipment and facilities where they will be able to immediately breach interdictory obstacles (those the attacker might place behind withdrawing forces).

To the maximum extent possible, obstacles are sited to enhance the kill probabilities of antitank weapons. However, if necessary, the general principle that obstacles must be covered by direct fire or observed indirect fire can be relaxed in retrograde operations. Remote electronic sensors or other devices can be used to trigger planned artillery fire or mines, and make breaching very costly if observed fire is not possible.

Obstacle planning

In retrograde operations, obstacle planning must be done in as much detail as time will allow, but execution is closely controlled to assure that the effort is invested where it is most needed as the situation develops. Scatterable mines are particularly well-suited for use in retrograde operations because they can be placed where, when, and as needed.

Their use is carefully planned to reduce delivery time. Planned sites include choke points not readily closed by demolitions, likely routes of advance, areas suitable for enemy artillery positions, likely landing or drop zones, and river crossing sites. Where availability of force permits, selected engineer units can be specially trained, reinforced, and employed under centralized control to emplace obstacles rapidly after the enemy's main effort is identified, or to respond to sudden changes in the situation.

Reserved demolitions

Common in the retrograde, reserved demolitions must be tightly controlled by the lowest commander responsible for all units involved in passage of the obstacle. Other critical demolitions, such as bridges, should be executed as soon as prepared to preclude the possibility of capture and the requirement for demolition guards.

Deception

Deception is important in all retrograde operations and critical to withdrawal. Friendly forces must keep the attacker confused--uncertain of our plans and the location and disposition of our forces. Obstacles must be so planned that their execution will not inadvertently reveal friendly plans or positions. Concealed obstacles, use of dummy obstacles, and varied, expedient obstacles will assist in deception. Obstacle emplacement will frequently have to be carried out at night and under cover of smoke.

Denial targets

Denial targets are common in retrograde operations. In addition to those assigned by higher headquarters, division and brigade will frequently wish to add to their own "tactical" denial targets, such as those designed to destroy the usefulness of the road net. Disabled equipment and supplies, or other materials that cannot be evacuated, will also have to be destroyed.

Coordination

Coordinating obstacle planning and preparation takes on the greatest importance in retrograde operations. Corps or theater army engineer units may be tasked to construct positions and obstacle systems well to the rear of the forces who will eventually fight there. In this instance, coordination arrangements between the preparing and final using units becomes vital.

SUMMARY

Planning considerations

Mission.

Directed and reserve obstacles.

Future plans.

Enemy strengths and weaknesses.

Terrain and weather.

Available resources.

Effects on local population.

Obstacles should support weapon systems, not impede future mobility, support movement from battle position to battle position, and be placed in depth.

Retrograde operations

Retrograde operations include the **delay** (to trade space for time), the **withdrawal** (to disengage from enemy contact), and the **retirement** (to move away without contact).

Retrograde operations are planned by corps and division, but may be carried out by brigade. They feature centralized planning and decentralized execution.

Threat forces seek to penetrate, bypass, and cut off friendly forces in the retrograde.

The best possible use must be made of existing obstacles; reinforcing obstacles must offer the best return for the effort invested.

Obstacles priorities are to key choke points, delay positions (with priority to the most forward delay position), and flanks. Among positions, priority is always to the initial delay position.

In the **delay,** obstacles assist in inflicting losses and breaking contact. In the **withdrawal,** obstacles assist in slowing the attacker, disrupting his plans, and avoiding decisive engagement. In the **retirement,** obstacles may be planned for security.

Scatterable mines are ideal for retrograde use.

Careful planning and tight control of reserved demolitions is necessary to preclude premature demolition or capture by the enemy before detonation.

Chapter 7

DENIAL OPERATIONS



Throughout history, denial operations have been an integral part of military operations. This chapter describes the authority and responsibilities for denial operations, and identifies denial targets and methods in the overall planning process.

AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

DENIAL TARGETS

DENIAL METHODS

DENIAL PLANNING

SUMMARY

AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

A denial measure is an action to deny the enemy the use of space, personnel, or facilities. It may include destruction, removal, contamination, or obstacle construction. Denial operations have always been an important facet that, in many cases, determined the outcome of wars. Denial operations over the years have ranged from the siege of forts or castles to the destruction of ball bearing plants.

There is a reasonably fine line that distinguishes denial operations from obstacle

emplacement. Obstacles are normally emplaced to assist in destroying the enemy in the immediate vicinity of the obstacle. Denial operations normally are not focused upon immediate enemy destruction, but are designed to accomplish a more strategic purpose. If planned and conducted properly, denial operations contribute to future operations and have a far reaching impact on the battlefield. By their strategic nature, they also may have a much greater impact upon the civilian population. Flooding a valley or strategically bombing an industrial complex are examples of denial operations that impact immediately upon civilian population with a delayed effect upon military operations.

AUTHORITY

Denial targets have as their object the prevention of the enemy's beneficial use of some area, facility, or resource. The targets frequently involve civil objects, and a judgment must be carefully made regarding the balance of military importance and the civil impact of destruction or evacuation. Evacuation or destruction must be made in full accord with the Law of War. Accordingly, execution authority for denial targets must be centralized.

The theater commander, subject to national policies and limitations, is authorized to conduct denial operations as a part of the overall campaign. The theater commander establishes the policies governing denial operations in the theater, and delegates planning and execution to service component commanders and subordinate joint force commanders. In developing denial policies, the theater commander will consider national and multinational policies and limitations, and possible reciprocal action by the enemy. Extensive consideration must be given to those facilities and areas required to support civilization in the post-hostility period regardless of the outcome of the conflict. The long-range social, economic, political, and psychological effects of excessive destruction of civil properties and material must be weighed against the military advantages gained.

RESPONSIBILITY

Corps commanders are responsible for translating the theater commander's policy into operational plans and missions. Corps planners must perform a detailed analysis of the areas of operation. Specific targets are selected and assigned to subordinates for execution. Prohibited targets must also be identified. Corps commanders will specify conditions for execution. Any discretionary areas for subordinate commanders must also be specified, as well as any conditions or planning guidance.

Division commanders are responsible for executing denial operations within their area. In accordance with the denial policy of the theater and mission assignments of the corps, the division plan provides for the denial of both military and civilian supplies, equipment, and installations with clearly identified military value. Division denial operations are generally a major task, requiring a high degree of technical skill and considerable time for detailed planning, careful preparation, and execution.

Brigade, battalion, and other commanders plan and execute denial targets as they are assigned missions in combat plans and orders. Denial operations are the responsibility of all elements of the combined arms team. Although combat engineers are particularly

suited for executing denial operations with heavy equipment and demolitions, troops of other arms and services can also help extensively. Transportation and other logistic units can conduct denial by evacuation of strategic equipment and materials. Air Force aircraft can also contribute.

To be successful, denial operations must be comprehensive. Thus, in warfare conducted in a modern state, denial operations will probably exceed the capability for engineer execution alone. All available effort should be used.

DENIAL TARGETS

The most frequently selected denial targets and methods of destruction are discussed in this section. Some of the reinforcing obstacles that have been discussed in previous chapters may also be used in denial operations.

DENIAL OF AREAS

Areas can be denied to the enemy; however, the length of the denial period may vary widely depending upon the type of denial method used and enemy capability and desire. Areas can be denied by:

Demolitions that deny access to the area.
Chemical or radiological contamination.
Floods.
Delayed-action explosives.
Construction of obstacles.
Isolation through interdiction or destruction.
Weapons fire.
Maneuver.

DENIAL OF INSTALLATIONS OR FACILITIES

For both strategic and tactical reasons, denial of key installations and facilities is desirable inmost situations. Selected denial targets are integrated into the overall strategic and tactical concepts of the theater.

Railways

Effective denial of the railway system disrupts one of the enemy's principal transportation means. It necessitates a systematic denial of major structures, facilities, locomotives, and rolling stock essential to the system's operation. To deny a rail net, it is necessary to cut all rail lines running generally parallel to the axis of enemy advance. The number of complete cuts required depends on the length of delay desired. The best specific targets are major bridges, tunnels, and defiles. The most important supporting targets are railway terminal facilities such as roundhouses, shops, and marshaling yards, locomotives, and rolling stock. When friendly forces desire to reuse facilities with a limited rebuilding

effort, the railway system may be effectively denied to the enemy by removing or destroying special-type rail sections such as frogs, switches, or guardrails.

Highways

If the railway system is successfully denied, the enemy must depend on other transportation. Highway system denial complements railway system denial and is of considerable significance. It should be noted, however, that restoration of the highway system by replacement or repair of bridges and other structures is generally easier and faster than restoration of the railway system. Denial of the highway system, therefore, is not effective for as long a time as denial of the railway system. Specific targets best suited for denial of a highway system are major bridges, tunnels, and defiles.

Airways

The airway system is highly important to the enemy for tactical and strategic operations, as well as for limited combat service support. Other than aircraft (which are evacuated or destroyed), the specific targets are the airfields. Airfields can be denied by cratering the runways and destroying key supporting facilities. Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM) are particularly suitable for this mission.

Petroleum, oils, and lubricants

Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) system denial includes, in addition to the destruction of bulk POL, the destruction of terminal storage, producing, refining, and dispensing facilities, as well as facilities for transporting bulk POL. The amount of destruction required varies, depending on the particular area under consideration, since destruction of a single key facility may eliminate the need for other destruction. For example, in an area lacking in oil production but having refineries, the enemy would be unable to use the refineries if all bulk POL handling and storage facilities were destroyed.

Electric power

Denial of major electric power systems impairs the operation of heavy industries. Denial should provide for the systematic destruction of key generating plants. Since transformer stations form the heart of transmission systems, they are usually the most suitable denial targets for disrupting power service with the least effort. The destruction of electric power systems has a considerable impact on the local civilian population, and this factor must also be considered.

Communications

Disruption of major communications systems should provide for the destruction of telephone and telegraph exchanges, repeater stations, and radio stations only. More complete denial has a greater effect on the civilian population than on the enemy military

effort.

Inland waterways

In well-developed areas, particularly in Western Europe, inland waterways are highly developed and carry a large part of total freight traffic. The waterways system can be denied by destroying the dams, siphons, aqueducts, embankment or levee walls, locks and gates, barges, and other floating craft, as well as by obstructing the waterways. Drawdown of reservoirs can deny the enemy waterway use, and it can also be a means of flooding.

Utilities

The destruction of water, gas, and sewage systems ordinarily has little or no military effect on the enemy, but has a most harmful effect on the local population. Unless a marked military advantage accrues, such as in the denial of water to the enemy in a desert or riverine area, utility systems should not be impaired.

Ports

Ports can be destroyed by nuclear or conventional demolitions; scuttling ships in harbors, across bars, alongside quays, piers, and docks; removing or destroying cranes, lighters, tugs, rail facilities, channel markers, and communications equipment; removing pilots and key navigational personnel; and destroying bulk POL-handling equipment.

Potable water

The denial of potable water is feasible in areas of the world where water is scarce. Storage containers and water sources such as wells or pipelines can be destroyed or the water made unfit to drink. The possible adverse effect on the command and the local population, however, must also be taken into account. Consideration should also be given to patrolling lines of communication to prevent water resupply from sources outside the immediate area.

DENIAL OF MATERIAL

The destruction of material is a command decision and, except in extreme cases, is done only on authority of a division or higher unit commander. The general policy is maximum evacuation and minimum destruction. Local civilian material of strategic or tactical value should be denied the enemy, particularly if he is critically short of some items and requires the local items for further operations. The following items are among those which normally are denied to the enemy:

Nuclear energy facilities and related equipment.
Bulk POL stocks.

Locomotives and rolling stock.
Critical industrial components such as industrial diamonds, electronic equipment, ball and roller bearings, and aircraft engines.
Highway transport equipment.
Floating equipment and all harbor facilities such as hoists, cranes, locks, and ship repair facilities.

SELECTION OF DENIAL TARGETS

A denial operation carried to an extreme would remove or destroy everything that could aid the enemy in any way. Because military assets are always limited, however, denial operations must be planned and coordinated carefully to insure the military value of the target, and to determine the priority of destruction. Coordination with civil affairs personnel is particular important. Effective denial operations will be targeted against objectives with high military value and full consideration will be given to the needs for particular facilities in the post hostility period. Whenever possible, denial targets should be selected to aggravate enemy strategic weaknesses and limitations. In selecting denial targets, commanders should insure that they meet one of the following criteria. If this denial target is executed, loss of this capability to the enemy should:

Disrupt logistical support capabilities.
Prevent the use of local materials, supplies, and equipment to reinforce or augment offensive capabilities.
Require the diversion of significant engineer and operational efforts for repair, reconstruction, or rehabilitation to support military operations.
Delay the movement and distribution of replacements, supplies, equipment, and reserve units by forcing them to use secondary and low speed routes of advance and movement.
Restrict tactical or strategic mobility.

Denial targets must meet the test of one of the above criteria. They must meet those criteria in a substantial--not incidental--manner.

Furthermore, the means selected to deny the intended object should be one reasonably available and capable of producing the least damage to civil property.

For example, while it may not be appropriate to rubble a large portion of a town to temporarily close a major route, it could be justified to destroy a major bridge to close that same roadway. However, such determinations must be made at appropriate levels of command based on the circumstances at the time. Using the same example, if a rapidly advancing enemy force can be stopped most effectively by blocking a major route with rubble from destroyed buildings, such action would not be prohibited by the Law of War.

DENIAL METHODS

REMOVAL

Evacuation of material is as much a part of denial operations as destruction and should always be considered first. Evacuation must be started early and conducted in accordance with prepared priority lists. Selective removal can be quite useful; however, the capability of the enemy to replace missing components or complete items must be accurately assessed. Selective removal is most profitable when the item removed is already critical to the enemy. All like items (or selected components), including spares, must be removed. Technicians may be required for meticulous selective removal.

DESTRUCTION

Explosives are generally used for destruction; however, other means can also be used.

Fire

Destruction by burning is a valuable technique; however, some materials that are considered to be capable of burning will not burn. The advice of engineers should be secured before planning destruction by burning. The security of the tactical operation must also be considered; intentions to withdraw may be given away by the burning.

Machinery

Rotating or reciprocating machinery usually requires lubrication to prevent damage from friction. Such machinery can be damaged or destroyed by removing or contaminating the lubricants. The operator of the machinery or a technician is the best source of advice on rapid destruction methods of machinery items.

Water

Water can damage many items beyond repair. The effectiveness of water as a destructive means should be checked with a specialist on the item or material. Destruction by water can usually be done quietly and without disclosing future plans or intentions.

Mechanical

Mechanical methods (such as breaking with a sledgehammer) can also cause destruction. An informed operator can achieve maximum damage with a minimum of effort.

Cutting

Destruction by cutting vital metallic members of a structure with welding torches is simple, easily learned, and a positive technique, but the equipment required is heavy.

Grenades

Thermate grenades are useful in denying certain targets; the intense heat produced fuses the metallic portions of the target or distorts them beyond usefulness. The use of thermate grenades must be planned in advance so that they, and the experts who use them, are available.

Acid

Strong acids (such as nitric and sulfuric) properly applied can destroy many mechanisms and materials beyond economical repair; however, they are of marginal utility and of such special or limited application that their extensive use is not practical.

Industrial

Many industrial items can be made unusable with a small amount of a contaminating or adulterating substance. No one substance is universally applicable therefore, technical familiarity with the target is required.

CONTAMINATION

Contamination by chemical or radiological agents increases the denial effect by forcing the enemy to decontaminate or to wait until the contaminants have decayed to a safe level. Contaminants also can render an item temporarily unusable; however, items can be decontaminated. Further, the contaminating agents deteriorate and lose their effectiveness unless periodically refreshed. Contamination is most effective when used with other denial methods.

ADM

Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM) can destroy targets considered difficult or impossible to destroy by other means. Normally, the theater commander publishes separate instructions governing the employment of ADM. Subordinate commands expand these separate instructions to fit their area of operations. Atomic Demolition Munitions can destroy targets and accomplish missions that might normally be prohibitive for conventional explosives because of the logistic effort involved.

Selection of an ADM target involves the consideration of several factors. Some targets, such as bridges and locks, usually can be quickly and adequately destroyed by conventional explosives; some, such as dams, may be suitable for demolition by either

conventional explosives or nuclear weapons. Other targets may require excessive amounts of conventional explosives and emplacement time, such as tunnels and underground installations, or they may require rapid and positive destruction, such as airfields. Targets that require an excessive amount of labor or time for emplacement of conventional explosives, because of their size or type of construction, are considered to be hard targets and are particularly well suited for the use of ADM. The military significance of a target is evaluated based on the effect that denial of the target will have on the enemy's combat effectiveness. If the reduction in the enemy's combat effectiveness is such that a major advantage is gained, the target has high military significance. Targets located in or near large urban areas in friendly territory normally should not be attacked with nuclear weapons; however, the advantages of destroying the target, particularly a hard target, must be weighed against the possible effects on the local population. Types of ADM targets are listed below.

Defiles and tunnels

Defiles and tunnels are frequent ADM targets because they have high military significance, are hard targets, lend themselves to effective blocking, and are seldom located near areas of dense population.

Bridges

Bridges are infrequent ADM targets since, with the possible exception of some heavy masonry and concrete structures, they can be sufficiently destroyed by conventional explosives. Complete destruction is seldom required.

Stream cratering

The use of ADM for stream cratering is infrequent; however, the great cratering capability of ADM makes stream diversion possible to create obstacles where the enemy least expects them. The crater lip can form a temporary dam, create a lake, cause overbank flooding, and produce an effective water obstacle.

Dams and dikes

Dams and dikes are infrequent ADM targets since a reasonable amount of conventional explosives can normally accomplish the desired destruction.

Area contamination

It is possible to employ ADM in surface or shallow subsurface to create radiologically contaminated areas as a part of an obstacle system; however, the requirement for optimum meteorological conditions and the temporary nature of the contamination make the use of ADM for this purpose infrequent. Unless contamination is renewed, the obstacle created is effective for only a few days.

Airfields

Airfields are frequent ADM targets since the demolition of an airfield's runway complex is the most effective way to destroy the operational capability of an airfield.

DENIAL PLANNING

When denial policies are established, detailed planning must be accomplished at all levels. Initial planning and policy guidance will be published, at theater level. Operations plans and orders based on this guidance will assign denial targets and mission responsibilities at corps and subordinate levels. A formal denial plan will be prepared by each corps and division. Engineer terrain analysis teams will provide information on the use of terrain in denial operations such as defining flood boundaries. Combat engineers will be assigned a major role as they have the equipment, special knowledge, and skills to perform such work.

CONSIDERATIONS

The following items should be considered when establishing policy, formulating plans, or selecting targets:

Specific target areas (facilities) and items to be denied.
Degree of denial (denial or evacuation).
Priority for preparation and execution.
Command channels that will apply for the specific target.
Assignment of planning and execution responsibility.
Assistance to be provided or desired for protecting the targets from enemy interference.
Availability of special denial teams.
Limitations on the means of destructive denial.
Use of contaminants and/or nuclear devices.
Safety and security measures to be followed.
National policy restrictions (if any) of US or host nations.
Coordination required between US elements, joint commands, and allied forces.
Timing of planning and execution of the denial mission(s).
Allocations of available and local resources.

REQUIREMENTS

The initial requirement in the formulation of plans for denial operations is a detailed assimilation of all available maps and intelligence pertaining to the area of operations. Pertinent intelligence is studied to determine the enemy's vulnerability to denial operations. The planner must analyze the area of operations, the military objectives, and the location, characteristics, and optimum denial period of specific denial targets. Targets must be selected with care to insure that the enemy cannot readily compensate for their

denial. The planner then selects those key elements of each target that should be attacked to make it inoperative for the predetermined optimum denial period. The planner's goal is to select those industrial, logistic, and communications systems that are most vital to the enemy's long-term operations. In addition, the systems selected should--

Disrupt enemy logistic support.
Require the diversion of major effort to reconstruction and rehabilitation.
Prevent the use of local materials, supplies, or facilities necessary for continued operations.
Force all necessary supplies, especially heavy or bulky items such as POL and ammunition, to be transported over long and frequently disrupted lines of communications.

OBJECTIVES

The destructive work required for denial operations must not be confused with that required for an obstacle system. Both involve extensive destruction and both may require destruction of the same facility.

Consequently, there is an overlapping of objectives in the two plans. Normally, tactical targets of interest to a tactical commander in mission accomplishment are included in the obstacle plans of division, corps, and field army, unless restricted by specific orders or policies of higher commanders. Responsibility for destruction of these obstacle targets flows through command channels.

COORDINATION

Responsibility for some significant tactical and strategic denial targets requires coordination at all levels of command, since specific targets may be of such overwhelming importance to the theater and the theater commander's mission that the commander is unwilling to delegate authority for destruction. For example, highway and railway bridges crossing a major unfordable river may be of such strategic importance that a high commander is willing to isolate some troops, perhaps a brigade, on the enemy side of the river rather than to risk capture of the bridge intact. On the other hand, a division commander probably would consider blowing the same bridges only after the bulk of the division was safely across.

EXECUTION

In the denial plan, the theater commander includes instructions for the execution of specific denial missions. The commander may employ and control specially trained teams or task forces to destroy all significant strategic targets, and make corps and their subordinate commands responsible for destruction of significant tactical targets. Thus, with primary interest in each type of target, the commander directs the preparation and destruction of the target and overlapping of responsibility does not occur. On the other hand, the commander may assign responsibility for executing all denial target missions to

the subordinate commanders in whose areas the targets are located. When the responsibility is assigned to subordinate commands, the commander may also provide specially-trained denial teams to each echelon of command concerned to execute, advise, or assist in the destruction of technical targets.

The actual organization and method for conducting denial operations are governed by the technology of the targets. Some denial targets are so highly technical that special units must be organized and trained for the task. Other targets are so simple that any military unit can accomplish the required task with no more preparation than receipt of an order. In general, however, execution of denial target missions requires some technical or special training. The decision on the organization and method adopted is made only after a careful analysis of the factors involved, including the adequacy of communications. When adequate communications are not available, authority for execution of all denial target missions must be delegated either to the tactical commanders in the area concerned, or to liaison personnel stationed at the target site.

OVERALL PRIORITIES

Because of the magnitude of denial operations and the limited time and means normally available, missions are given priority in the order in which they contribute to the overall operation. Those with the greatest immediate effect in reducing the enemy's combat effectiveness in the battle area generally have priority over those that have delayed or long-range effects. For example, the denial of major airfields, bridges, or bulk POL, when tactically essential to the enemy, takes priority over the denial of major industrial facilities.

SUMMARY

Denial operations are an important facet of modern warfare. The following guidelines apply with regard to denial authority, methods, and planning.

The theater commander establishes denial policy.

Corps and division commanders plan and execute denial operations.

Denial targets can be varied based upon METT-T.

Denial methods range the spectrum.

Denial targets must deny the most vital system to the enemy and should accomplish one or all of the following:

Disrupt enemy logistic support.
Require the diversion of major effort to reconstruction and rehabilitation.
Prevent the use of local materials, supplies, or facilities necessary for continued operations.
Force all necessary supplies, especially heavy or bulky items such as POL ammunition, to be transported over long and frequently disrupted lines of communication.

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e. **After-Action Review**. Leaders conduct an after-action review (AAR) after each training event to help soldiers and units improve their skills by providing immediate feedback. An AAR increases the benefits gained from each training exercise by allowing the leader and soldiers to work together to analyze the performance of each task. Being involved in this analysis enables the soldiers to learn and retain more than they would if they were simply critiqued. An AAR improves the performance of soldiers, leaders, and unit tasks and provides the commander with information and insight that he needs to evaluate training.

1-3. PREREQUISITE TRAINING

Prerequisite training teaches individuals, crews, units, leaders, and command and staff what they need to know before they can perform a task. Prerequisite training builds teamwork at all levels.

a. **Command and Staff Training**. The battalion battle staff and leadership must train themselves before the execution of battalion collective training. The battalion command and staff culminates their prerequisite training with UO tactical exercise without troops (TEWTs) and UO command post exercises (CPXs). This procedure helps develop urban operations TTPs and unit standing operating procedure (SOP).

b. **Leader Training**. A comprehensive leader's training program is the key to successful UO training. Time spent teaching battalion leaders (trainers) during the planning and preparation phase pays dividends during the intermediate and culminating phases of training. Leader's training compliments institutional instruction (Basic and Career Officer Course, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course [BNCOC], or Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course [ANCOC], of current UO doctrine [FM 90-10 and FM 90-10-1], and unit knowledge based on experience and prior training events). Recommended subject areas include threat analysis, urban area and building analysis, weapons effects on urban structures, urban attack and defense, UO TTP, STP, and SOP development.

c. **Individual Training**. Many urban-specific tasks and skills can be trained, sustained, and maintained in a barracks environment. Other tasks can be trained at local UO facilities, and weapons ranges. The unit should focus on three general areas for preliminary training; urban combat skills, urban marksmanship skills, and physical fitness.

(1) The following are examples of preliminary training tasks and or TTPs:

- Individual movement techniques.
- Battle drills.
- Weapon positioning in an urban area.
- Roadblock and vehicle search procedures.
- Dismounted and mounted urban navigation.
- Urban scanning techniques.
- Quick fire techniques.
- Assault fire techniques.
- Hasty urban firing positions.
- Prepared urban firing positions.

(2) Prior to urban collective training cycle, trainers can develop urban-specific firing conditions in conjunction with weapons firing ranges. Build facades on existing ranges, or use the unit's local UAC (if available). Urban combat skills include:

- Firing positions behind rubble, around corners, from windows or rooftops.
- Urban targets behind rubble, in windows and doorways.
- Fire commands.
- Lifting and shifting fires from lower to upper story windows.
- Fire control and fire discipline.
- Rapid firing engagements.
- ROE firing scenarios.

(3) Urban physical fitness skills include:

- Endurance runs and upper body conditioning.
- Vaulting exercises.
- Urban-Specific Obstacle Course negotiation.
- Leadership Reaction Course (LRC) negotiation.

1-4. INDIVIDUAL TASK TRAINING

Urban operations require the soldier to be proficient in several individual tasks unique to urban fighting. Additional urban fighting techniques have been developed based on combat lessons learned and on evolving technology.

a. Army doctrine includes three individual urban-specific tasks: ***STP 7-11BCHM14-SM-TG***.

- 071-326-0541, Perform Movement Techniques During MOUT.
- 071-326-0550, Prepare Positions for Individual and Crew-Served Weapons During MOUT.
- 071-326-0557, Select Hasty Firing Positions During MOUT.

b. FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas:

(1) ***Movement Techniques***.

- Crossing of a wall.
- Movement around corners.
- Movement past windows.
- Use of doorways.
- Movement parallel to buildings.
- Crossing of open areas.
- Fire team employment.
- Movement between positions.
- Movement inside a building.

(2) ***Entry Techniques***.

- Upper building levels.
- Use of ladders.
- Scaling of walls.
- Entry at lower levels.
- Hand grenades.

(3) ***Firing Positions***:

- Hasty firing position.

- Prepared firing position.
- Target acquisition.
- Employment of snipers.

1-5. COLLECTIVE TASK TRAINING

Squads, platoons, and companies train on collective tasks IAW ARTEP MTPs. However, only a few of these tasks specifically address UO; the others must be adapted for the urban environment.

a. Urban-specific tasks at squad and platoon level include the following tasks:

(1) ***ARTEP 7-8-MTP***.

- 07-3-1134, Conduct Tactical Movement (Mech Infantry Platoon).
- 07-3-4141, Clear Built-up Area/Building (Infantry/Mech Infantry Platoon).
- 07-3-1123, Defend Built-up Area/Building (Infantry Platoon/Squad).

(2) ***ARTEP 7-7J-MTP***.

- 71-2-0331.07-3126, Conduct Tactical Movement (Infantry Platoon Mounted).
- 71-3-1110, Clear a Building.
- 71-2-2026.07-3418, Defend Built-up Area/Building (Infantry Platoon Mounted).
- 07-3-4141Clear Built-up Area/Building (Infantry/Mech Infantry Platoon).

b. Urban-specific tasks for the infantry company are as follows:

(1) ***ARTEP 7-10-MTP***.

- 07-2-1134, Conduct Tactical Movement (Infantry Company).
- 07-2-1109, Assault Built-up Area/Building.
- 07-2-1118, Defend Built-up Area/Building (Infantry Company).
- 07-2-1401, Establish a Roadblock/Checkpoint (Infantry Company).

(2) ***ARTEP 71-1-MTP***.

- 71-2-1016.17-00KC, Conduct Tactical Movement.
- 07-5-1097, Clear a Building.
- 71-2-2026.17-00KC, Defend Built-up Area.
- 71-2-2025.17-00KC, Clear Built-up Area.
- 71-2-2027.17-00KC, Cordon and Search.

c. Urban-specific tasks for the company team and infantry battalions are as follows:

- ***ARTEP 7-20-MTP***.
  -- 07-1-3004, Conduct Tactical Movement (Battalion).
  -- 71-1-2025.07-1164, Clear a Built-up Area.
  -- 71-1-9220.07-1162, Traverse a Built-up Area (Battalion).
  -- 71-1-9262.07-1163, Defend in a Built-up Area (Battalion).

d. Urban-specific tasks for stability and support operations. The following tasks are samples that are listed in *TC 7-98-1*:

- Perform Cordon and Search.
- Search and Attach.
- Checkpoints.
- Disturbance.
- Control Civilian Movement.
- Conduct Platoon Riot Control Formation.



Figure 2-3. Example Scenario 1,
Execute Battle Drill 6, Varied Entry Positions.

(2) ***Example 2***: Assault Teams, Battle Drill 6. The team leader trains soldiers to execute Battle Drill 6 using targets in a multiple room scenario. This technique is the walk phase of the training. The trainer has the assault teams enters the room and engage targets using precision marksmanship techniques with the tactical engagement system (TES) and or SESAMS (Figure 2-4). The assault team enters the first room and engages the targets. As the number two man clears his area of responsibility, he sees and engages the target in the second room, but remains in place until the assault teams finishes clearing the first room. Once the room is clear, the assault team moves to the second room and continues clearing or lets the next team move through.



Figure 2-4. Example Scenario 2,
Multiple Room Clearing Techniques.

(1) The squad is clearing Station 2 as if it is a single building, and the street is a hallway.

(a) Fire Team A moves down the left side, throws the appropriate grenade IAW ROE, enters, engages the target and clears the room on that side. The last man remains outside and secures the rear. Fire Team B prepares to enter the next room (Figure 2-6).



Figure 2-6. Move tactically.

(b) Fire Team B throws the appropriate grenade, enters, engages the targets, and clears the room on the right while the last man secures the rear. Fire Team A prepares to continue movement to the next room (Figure 2-7).



Figure 2-7. Team B clearing a building.

(c) Fire Team A moves across the hall, throws the appropriate grenade, enters, engages the target, and clears the next room. Three team members enter the room, the fourth remains in the doorway and secures the hallway (Figure 2-8).



Figure 2-8. Team moving across the hall.

(d) Fire Team B moves in a cross-cover formation down the hallway to the next room, throws the appropriate grenade, and clears the room. As Fire Team B passes the security man of Team A, he turns and picks up rear security. The last man in Fire Team B remains in the vicinity of the doorway and secures the hallway (Figure 2-9).



Figure 2-9. Team B in cross cover formation.

(e) Fire Team A clears the hallway intersection while Team B uses the Rolling-T technique to pass through Team A in route to the next room (Figure 2-10).



Figure 2-10. Team A clearing a hallway intersection.

(f) Fire Team B throws the appropriate grenade, enters, engages the targets, and clears the room. Only three men enter while the forth man picks up rear security. Fire Team A prepares to move (Figure 2-11).



Figure 2-11. Team B clearing a room.

(g) Fire Team A moves from the intersection, throws the appropriate grenade, enters, then engages the targets, and clears the next room. All team members enter because of the size of the room. Fire Team B prepares to move (Figure 2-12).



Figure 2-12. Team A clearing room by room.

(h) Fire Team B throws the appropriate grenade, enters, engages the target, and clears the next room using three men, the fourth man remains in the doorway and secures the rear. Fire Team A prepares to move up the stairs (Figure 2-13).



Figure 2-13. Team B clearing the next room.

(i) Fire Team A begins movement up the stairs and onto the landing. The team prepares to enter the room off the landing. Fire Team B splits and two members move around the corner and secure the area across from the stairs on the lower level. The other two members of Team B secure back down the hallway from where the squad moved from (Figure 2-14).



Figure 2-14. Securing the stairs and hallway.

(j) Fire Team A throws the appropriate grenade, enters, engages the target, and clears the room finding another set of stairs and prepares to continue clearing up the stairs. Fire Team B continues to secure the rear while the other team members move down to the end of the short hallway and secure both directions (Figure 2-15).



Figure 2-15. Preparing to clear more stairs.

(k) Fire Team A clears the stairs and the landing. Fire team B continues to secure the ground level ready to assist the other team, if necessary (Figure 2-16).



Figure 2-16. Team A clearing stairs and landing.

(2) The example was without noncombatant targets using blanks/SESAMS and TES. This technique is the crawl phase for this station. Once the squad is ready to move on to more challenging exercises the platoon leader/sergeant can add targets into the scenario. As proficiency increases, mixing both combatant and noncombatant targets can be added. At any point, the platoon leader/sergeant can include multiple squads on the station, which increases the complexity of the scenarios until the platoon has achieved proficiency.

(3) The following is an example of a platoon scenario. There are noncombatants on the battlefield. The platoon has decided to clear through the buildings without using the streets for movement from building to building whenever possible. The platoon is using two squads to assault and one squad in support/reserve.

(a) The support element isolates the buildings while the assault team for each squad prepares and executes the breach of each building to be able to gain a foothold (Figure 2-17).



Figure 2-17. Preparing to gain a foothold.

(b) The assault teams throw a grenade into the breach and follows, engaging enemy targets, securing and moving noncombatants to the collection point (CP) (Figure 2-18).



Figure 2-18. Secure and move noncombatants to the CP.

(c) The teams prepare and detonate wall breaches to continue movement through the building. Once the charges are ready for detonation, the assault teams move to a covered position and execute the breach (Figure 2-19).



Figure 2-19. Execute breach.

(d) The assault teams lead into the next room with a grenade. Upon entering the teams engage any enemy targets and secure and move noncombatants to the CP. At the same time, the next assault team moves into the foothold. (Figure 2-20).



Figure 2-20. Move to the foothold.

(e) With the second room secured, the next assault team moves forward and prepares to breach the next wall. Once the charges are placed, the teams move back to a covered position and execute the breach. At the time the breach is executed, the first non-precision target is exposed and engaged by the support element (Figure 2-21).



Figure 2-21. Breach the wall.

(f) Upon inspecting the breach, the assault teams find that they have an alley with another wall to breach. Smoke is employed to obscure the teams placing the breaching charge. The first assault teams take up securing positions throughout the already cleared areas while the follow-on assault teams move to a covered position and execute the breach (Figure 2-22).



Figure 2-22. Secure a wall in an alley.

(g) Once the breach is executed, the assault teams must determine if there is still enough smoke to cover their movement, or if more smoke must be deployed. When obscurity is obtained, the assault teams throw in a grenade, then enter, engage any enemy targets, and clear the rooms (Figure 2-23).



Figure 2-23. Obtain obscurity.

(h) While one team finds itself at the end of the building in their sector, the other team is faced with another wall and more clearing. While one team prepares to breach the wall, the other team takes up a hasty position and prepares for any counterattack. When the breach is executed, the next non-precision target is presented and is engaged by the support element (Figure 2-24).



Figure 2-24. Clear the wall.

(i) A grenade is thrown through the breach and the assault team enters and secures the room. When the grenade explodes in the room, the final non-precision target is presented and engaged by the support element (Figure 2-25).



Figure 2-25. Secure a room.

(j) With the first squad reaching its limit of advance and the second squad reaching the end of the building, the platoon leader calls forward another assault team from the reserve. The reserve assault team moves forward through the buildings and positions to clear up the outside stairs of the two-story structure. The second squad places and detonates loophole charges on the far wall of the building so they can support the clearing of the last building (Figure 2-26).



Figure 2-26. Reserve assault team.

(k) Team B of the second squad moves into supporting fire positions and the new assault teams move up the outside stairs to the second floor of the final structure and clear the balcony and the first room on the second floor. The support by fire position shift fires to the lower floor of the same structure that is being cleared (Figure 2-27).



Figure 2-27. Team B, second squad, moves into the supporting fire position.

(l) Once the floor is secure, the assault team moves down the stairs and clears the remaining floor (Figure 2-28). During this time, the platoon repositions its soldiers and conducts consolidation and reorganization.



Figure 2-28. Consolidation and reorganization.

EVENT	ACTION	ESTIMATED TIME
1	Clear a Building	2 Hours Crawl
		1 Hour Walk
		30 Minutes Run
2	Defend Built-up Area/Building	1 Hours Crawl
		1 Hour Walk
		2. Hour Run
3	Conduct AAR	1 Hour

Table 2-9. Sequence of training.



Figure 2-32. Event 1, Clear a building.



Figure 2-33. Event 2, Defend A Building.

2-6. STATION 5: UNDERGROUND TRAINER

Station 5 is designed to train up to a squad on clear and move tactically in a subterranean environment.

a. **Description**. This station is a sewer system built in an irregular pattern, with four manhole covers. Two access tunnels lead from the outside tunnel to the underground loop, and the station is completely covered by dirt, only the manholes and ground level entrances are exposed (Figure 2-34).



Figure 2-34. Underground trainer.

b. **Targetry**. Station 5 is a force-on-force training station and has no targetry.

c. **Controller Requirements**. As required by unit.

d. **Safety Requirements**.

(1) Soldiers should wear their helmets at all times when in the sewer system to avoid head injuries.

(2) Smoke grenades or M84 stun grenades *WILL NOT* be used in the underground trainer.

DANGER

TO AVOID ASPHYXIATION WHEN IN THE TRAINER, NEVER DETONATE SMOKE GRENADES IN THE SEWER. USING ANY TYPE OF EXPLOSIVE SIMULATOR IS DANGEROUS IN AN ENCLOSED SPACE. THE PROTECTIVE MASK IS NOT EFFECTIVE IN OXYGEN-DEFICIENT ATMOSPHERES.

e. **Individual or Collective Tasks Trained**.

(1) ***Collective Task***.

- Move Tactically in a Subterranean Environment.
- Reconnoiter Area.

(2) ***Related Collective Tasks***.

- 07-3-1137, Perform Infiltration/Exfiltration.
- 08-2-0003.07-3104, Treat and Evacuate Casualties.

(3) ***Supporting Individual Tasks***.

- 071-311-2007, Engage Targets with M16A1/2 Rifle.
- 071-315-2308, Engage Targets with M16A1/2 Rifle Using a Night Vision Sight AN/PVS-4.
- 071-010-0006, Engage Targets with M249 Machine Gun.
- 113-571-1022, Perform Voice Communications.
- 071-326-0600, Use Visual Signaling Techniques While Dismounted.
- 071-326-0503, Move Over, Through, or Around Obstacles (Except Minefields).
- 051-193-1013, Neutralize Booby Traps.
- 191-377-5250, Handle Enemy Personnel and Equipment.
- 071-326-0501, Move as a Member of a Fire Team.
- 071-326-0541, Perform Movement Techniques During MOUT.
- 071-326-0557, Select Hasty Firing Positions During MOUT.
- 071-326-5605, Control Movement of a Fire Team.
- 071-326-5611, Conduct the Maneuver of a Squad.
- 071-710-0008, Operate Night Vision Goggles AN/PVS-7B.

(4) ***Related Tactics, Techniques and Procedure***.

(a) FM 3-06.11 (FM 90-10-1), Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain.

- Chapter 3, Offensive Operations.
- Chapter 5, Fundamental Combat Skills.
- Appendix M, Field Expedient Breaching of Common Urban Barriers.

(b) FM 3-23.9, M16A1/2 Rifle Marksmanship minimum ammunition required to train at this station.

AMMUNITION	ROUNDS FOR EACH WEAPON
5.56-mm Blank	20
5.55-mm Blank (Linked)	40

Table 2-10. Ammunition requirements.

f. **Conduct of Training**. Table 2-11 depicts the sequence of training that can be conducted at this station. This training is only an example, and the unit should develop their training events based on their METL and training needs.

EVENT	ACTION	ESTIMATED TIME
1	Reconnoiter	30 minutes (Crawl)
		30 minutes (Walk)
		30 minutes (Run)
2	Perform Infiltration/Exfiltration	30minutes (Crawl)
		30 minutes (Walk)
		30 minutes (Run)
3	Conduct AAR	30 minutes

Table 2-11. Sequence of training.

CHAPTER 3
SHOOT HOUSE

This chapter describes the live-fire shoot house and provides layouts and training scenarios. Fighting in built-up areas is fragmented; gains are often small. Therefore, units depend on the initiative, skill, and discipline of small-unit leaders and individual soldiers. Leaders must be competent and confident in their urban operations skills and must have the courage to accomplish their missions while isolated from their parent units. Soldiers and leaders require mission-type orders that allow for decentralized execution.

3-1. PURPOSE

To provide the leader with a facility to train and evaluate the unit during a live-fire exercise. Units are trained and evaluated on their ability to move tactically, engage targets, conduct breaches, and practice target discrimination in an urban environment.

3-2. DESCRIPTION

This facility has two parts, the live-fire facility and the AAR room. The live-fire facility is a single-level structure with a barn roof, catwalk, and eight adjoining rooms with video capture capability that should be used for AARs. The walls are bullet proof and prevent ricochets. There are four entrances, one on each side of the facility. Replaceable blow panels that can accommodate reduced DES are located throughout the facility for entry into the building by means other than through doors. The shoot house has a crane system in the roof that allows for removal of doorways and blow panels not needed for training and replace those panels with solid wall sections. This gives the unit the ability to vary the training scenarios. Unit's can conduct explosive and mechanical breaches. For safety reasons, there are no windows in the structure (Figure 3-1, page 3-2). The AAR building has a conference/AAR room that can accommodate up to a platoon size element, an instrumentation and targetry control room, and an AAR edit and projection room that can facilitate a formal AAR (Figure 3-2, page 3-2).



Figure 3-1. Shoot house.



Figure 3-2. Command and control building and AAR room.

3-3. TRAINING AUDIENCE

The facility provides leaders the ability to train and evaluate the unit during a live-fire exercise. However, the unit's training requirements determine the size of the unit and the tasks to be trained at this facility. The unit develops its own organization and the steps for conducting the exercise based on its METL and training needs.

3-4. TRAINING INFORMATION

Tactical operations in an urban environment may range from combat missions to stability and support missions. Commanders should note that the shoot house *is not* suited for the employment of live-fragmentation/concussion grenades, 40-mm HE/HEDP, antiarmor weapons, mortars, artillery, or air delivered munitions. Crew-served weapon systems, M2 and M1 tanks, and machine guns can be employed against supplemental targetry that is exterior to the shoot house. The shoot house has specially constructed areas that are used to conduct either mechanical and or explosive breaching techniques. When conducting explosive breaching, units should consult with local Engineers for appropriate DES charges and consult Appendix A before conducting the training.

3-5. CONDUCT OF TRAINING

The unit develops realistic time frames for each operation or task. The times are based on the crawl, walk, and run concept. The training event or STX can be arranged in any order as long as they follow a tactical scenario. ARTEP 7-8-MTP, Assault a Building and ARTEP 7-8-Drill, Battle Drill 7-4-9109, Enter a Building and Clear a Room (Squad), ARTEP 7-7J-MTP, 07-3-1110, Clear a Building, and ARTEP 7-7J-Drill, Battle Drill 7-4-9109, Enter a Building and Clear a Room (Squad), are the primary collective tasks trained at this facility.

a. **Execution**. Tables 3-1 through 3-5, pages 3-4 through 3-7, depicts sequence of events and Figure 3-3 through Figure 3-6, pages 3-6 through 3-9, provides example scenarios. This table is only an example and the unit should develop its training events based on METL tasks and training needs. However, the leader should do the following when conducting training at the live-fire shoot house:

(1) Identify the unit’s critical missions (see commander’s training guidance) and select those tasks that support specific tasks related to urban operations.

(2) Arrange the related tasks in the order of their importance to mission accomplishment.

(3) Assess the unit’s current level of proficiency (strengths and weaknesses) and determine the degree of difficulty of each task. The training events and scenarios should start from the least difficult to the most difficult tasks to instill confidence in the soldiers conducting the training.

(4) Identify the individual and leader tasks that are to be trained.

(5) Conduct individual training first, because it is the first step in the building-block approach and is the basis for unit or collective task training. The mastery of individual skills is an essential precondition for effective training.

(6) Set up training conditions based on unit proficiency. At first, conditions are basic until proficiency is attained. Increased difficulty and realism are incorporated as training progresses (limited visibility, NBC factors, and live fires with service or SRTA).

(7) Understand that the live-fire shoot house is a live-fire training facility; however, this facility is designed to accommodate any level of training proficiency (blank, TES, SESAM, SRTA, and ball). The leader must make an assessment of the unit's proficiency.

ELEMENT	EVENT ACTION	ESTIMATED TIME
All 1st Squad 2d Squad 3rd Squad	1. Conduct precombat checks (for example; install, align, and trouble shoot MILES equipment; conduct inspection; draw equipment). 2. Support Operations. 3. Conduct Rehearsals. 4. Conduct Event 1 (Crawl).	2 Hours
3rd Squad 1st Squad 2d Squad	5. Support Operations. 6. Conduct Rehearsals. 7. Conduct Event 1 (Crawl).	2 Hours
2d Squad 3rd Squad 1st Squad	8. Support Operations. 9. Conduct Rehearsals. 10. Conduct Event 1 (Crawl).	2 Hours
1st Squad 2d Squad 3rd Squad	11. Support Operations. 12. Conduct Rehearsals. 13. Conduct Event 1 (Walk).	2 Hours
3rd Squad 1st Squad 2d Squad	14. Support Operations. 15. Conduct Rehearsals. 16. Conduct Event 1 (walk).	2 Hours
2d Squad 3rd Squad 1st Squad	17. Support Operations. 18. Conduct Rehearsals. 19. Conduct Event 1 (walk).	2 Hours
1st Squad 2d Squad 3rd Squad	20. Support Operations. 21. Conduct Rehearsals. 22. Conduct Event 1 (Run).	1 Hours
1st Squad 2d Squad 3rd Squad	23. Support Operations. 24. Conduct Rehearsals. 25. Conduct Event 1 (Run).	1 Hours
1st Squad 2d Squad	26. Support Operations. 27. Conduct Event 1 (Run).	1 Hours

Table 3-1. Sequence of events for the platoon.

EVENT	EVENT ACTION	ESTIMATED TIME
1 (CRAWL)	**Terminal Learning Objective** Refamiliarize the squad on how to enter and clear a room during the crawl phase of training. Enter and Clear a Room (Squad). • Perform Movement Technique. • Select Hasty Firing Position. Conduct a Breach (Mechanical). • Employ Hand Grenades. • Engage Targets with M16A2/M4. • Engage Targets with M249 Machine Gun. **NOTES**: 1. Should perform controlled pairs/target discrimination techniques outlined in FM 3-23.9 2. Should include techniques outlined in FM 90-10-1 and performance measures in ARTEP 7-8-MTP, ARTEP 7-7J-MTP	2 Hours

Table 3-2. Event one, squad sequence (crawl).



Figure 3-3. Event one, squad scenario (crawl) force on targetry.

EVENT	EVENT ACTION	ESTIMATED TIME
2 (WALK)	**Terminal Learning Objective** Refamiliarize the squad on how to enter and clear multiple rooms during the walk phase of training. Enter and Clear a Building (Squad). • Perform Movement Technique. • Select Hasty Firing Position. Conduct a Breach (Explosive DES). • Engage Targets with M16A2/M4. • Engage Targets with M249 Machine Gun. Conduct AAR. **NOTES**: 1. Should perform controlled pairs/target discrimination techniques as outlined in FM 3-23.9 2. Should include techniques outlined in FM 90-10-1 and performance measures in FM 7-8-MTP, ARTEP 7-7J-MTP.	2 Hours

Table 3-3. Event two, squad sequence (walk).



Figure 3-4. Event two, squad scenario (walk) force-on-force.

EVENT	EVENT ACTION	ESTIMATED TIME
3 (RUN)	**Terminal Learning Objective** Refamiliarize squad on how to enter and clear multiple rooms during the run phase of training. Enter and Clear a Building (Squad). • Perform Movement Technique. • Select Hasty Firing Position. Conduct a Breach (Mechanical). • Engage Targets with M16A2/M4. • Engage Targets with M249 Machine Gun. Clear a Hallway. • Engage Targets with M16A2/M4. • Engage Targets with M249 Machine Gun. Conduct a Breach (Explosive DES) • Engage Targets with M16A2/M4. • Engage Targets with M249 Machine Gun. Conduct AAR.	1 Hour

Table 3-4. Event three, squad sequence (run).



Figure 3-5. Event three, squad scenario (run) force-on-targetry.

EVENT (STX)	ACTION	ESTIMATED TIME
4 (RUN)	Occupy Assembly Area. Develop and Communicate a Plan. Prepare for Combat. Perform Passage of Line. Move Tactically. Break Contact. Intermediate AAR. Move Tactically. Perform Overwatch/Support by Fire. Assault a Building. Consolidate and Reorganize. Final AAR.	1 Hour 2 Hours 30 minutes 1 Hour 5 minutes 20 minutes 1 Hours 1 Hours 2 Hours 1 Hours

Table 3-5. Event four, platoon evaluation sequence (run).



Figure 3-6. Sample platoon tactical scenario (run).

b. **Operation Order**. Table 3-6, page 3-10, provides a sample operation order for conduct of training.

b. The buildings have other features that enhance the CACTF's training value.

(1) Constructed mouse-holes permit movement between rooms and floors.

(2) Loopholes in roofs and outside walls allow observation and fields of fire.

(3) Roof hatchways lead to the top floors of multiple story buildings.

(4) Rooms vary in size and in quantity of doorways and windows. These variations require soldiers to identify rooms that provide suitable indoor fighting positions for TOW, Javelin, Dragon, and AT4 antitank weapon systems.



Figure 5-1. Example CACTF schematic.

c. Buildings are arranged in a realistic urban pattern. The CACTF represents an area consisting mainly of residential, commercial, public institutional, and light industrial buildings. Buildings and streets are arrayed with sufficient dispersion to allow up to nine platoon-size STX sectors (Figure 5-2) or three company/team STX sectors (Figure 5-3).



Figure 5-2. Platoon ODSS STX sectors.



Figure 5-3. Company/team STX sectors.

page 5-18, provides a recommended sequence for performance of ARTEP 7-8-MTP T&EOs and the time allotted for each portion of the STX, including AARs.



Figure 5-8. Attack FTX scenario.



Figure 5-11. Graphic scenario of task performance for FTX defend.



Figure 5-14. Urban battle space.

a. **Transporting Infantry**. At times, the tank platoon is required to transport infantrymen on its tanks (as illustrated in Figure 5-15). This technique is done only when contact is not expected. If the platoon is moving as part of a larger force and is tasked to provide security for the move, the lead section or element should not carry infantry.



Figure 5-15. Sample positions for infantry riding on a tank.

Infantry and armor leaders must observe the following procedures, precautions, and considerations when infantrymen ride on tanks:

a. Infantry should thoroughly practice mounting and dismounting procedures and actions on contact.

b. Infantry must always alert the TC before mounting or dismounting. They must follow the commands of the TC.

c. Infantry platoons should be broken down into squad-size groups, similar to air assault chalks, with the infantry platoon leader on the armor platoon leader's vehicle and the infantry PSG on the armor PSG's vehicle.

d. Platoon leaders, PSGs, and team leaders should position themselves near the TC's hatch, using the external phone (if available) to talk to the TC and relay signals to the unit.

e. If possible, the lead vehicle should not carry infantrymen. Riders restrict turret movement and are more likely to be injured or killed on initial contact.

f. Whenever possible, Infantrymen should mount and dismount over the left front slope of the vehicle. This procedure ensures that the driver can see the infantrymen and that the Infantrymen do not pass in front of the coax machine gun. Infantrymen must ensure that they remain behind the vehicle's smoke grenade launchers. This will automatically keep them clear of all weapon systems.

g. Infantrymen must always have three points of contact with the vehicle; they must watch for low-hanging objects such as tree branches.

h. All Infantrymen should wear hearing protection.

i. Infantrymen should not ride with anything more than their battle gear. Rucksacks and B-bags should be transported by other means.

j. Infantrymen should scan in all directions. They may be able to spot a target the vehicle crew does not see.

k. Passengers should be prepared to take the following actions on contact:

- Wait for the vehicle to stop.
- At the TC's command, dismount **IMMEDIATELY** (one fire team on each side). **DO NOT** move forward of the turret.
- Move at least 5 meters to the sides of the vehicle. **DO NOT** move behind or forward of the vehicle.
- **DO NOT** move in front of vehicles unless ordered to do so. Main gun discharge overpressure can inflict sever injury or death to forward dismounts. See Figure 5-16 and warning below.
- **DO NOT** move in front of vehicles unless ordered to do so. Main gun discharge overpressure can inflict sever injury or death to forward dismounts.
- **DO NOT** dismount a vehicle unless ordered or given permission to do so.
- **DO NOT** dangle arms or legs, equipment, or anything else off the side of a vehicle; they could get caught in the tracks, causing death, injury, or damage to the equipment or vehicle.
- **DO NOT** place too many riders on the vehicle.
- **DO NOT** fall asleep when riding. The warm engine may induce drowsiness; a fall could be fatal.

- **DO NOT** smoke when mounted on a vehicle.
- **DO NOT** stand near a moving or turning vehicle at any time. Tanks have a deceptively short turning radius.

DANGERS

1. The overpressure from the tank 120-mm cannon can kill a dismounted infantryman within a 90-degree arc extending from the muzzle of the gun tube out to 200 meters.

2. From 200 to 1,000 meters along the line of fire, on a frontage of about 400 meters dismounted infantry must be aware of the danger from discarding sabot petals, which can kill or seriously injure soldiers.



Figure 5-16. Danger areas around a tank when firing the 120-mm main gun.

b. **Additional Considerations.** Additional considerations and preparations for transporting infantrymen include the following.

(1) The armor:

(a) Uses main-gun fire to reduce obstacles or entrenched positions for the infantry.

(b) Takes directions from the infantry ground commander (platoon leader/PSG/squad leader) to support their fire and maneuver.

(c) Provides reconnaissance by fire for the infantry.

(d) Should know and understand how the infantry clears buildings, how they mark cleared buildings, casualty evacuation plan, signal methods, engagement criteria for tank

main gun, front line trace reporting, ground communication from the tank with the dismounted Infantry.

(e) Uses its night vision capability to augment and supplement the Infantry's night vision capability.

(2) The Infantry:

(a) Provides real time information for the tank crewmen to help them overcome tank noise and the lack of ground situational understanding.

(b) Provides reconnaissance and fire direction of enemy positions for main gun attack.

(3) Considerations for dismounted tank security include the following:

(a) Tank crewman should rehearse the mounting and dismounting of Infantry from their vehicle, briefing the Infantrymen on safety procedures for the vehicle and weapon systems.

(b) Tank commanders need to rehearse communicating with dismounted soldiers by way of TA-1 and DR-8 in the bustle rack.

(4) Vehicle preparation for combat in urban terrain should cover these procedures:

(a) Keep at least one ballistic shield to the “Dog House” closed (most engagements will be under boresight range and the battlesight technique will suffice).

(b) Place sandbags around antenna connections and electrical wiring on the turret top.

(c) Place extra coax ammunition inside the turret.

(d) Remove any highly flammable products from the outside of the vehicle and from the sponson boxes.

c. **Vehicles, Weapons, and Munitions.** Numerous factors related to vehicles and their organic weapons and munitions affect the tank platoon’s urban operation planning and execution, including the following:

(1) The preferred main gun rounds in the urban environment are HEAT, MPAT (ground mode), and MPAT-OR (XM908). These all perform much better than sabot rounds against bunkers and buildings.

(2) HEAT ammunition will open a larger hole in reinforced concrete or masonry structures than MPAT or MPAT-OR (XM908). Both MPAT and MPAT-OR, however, offer greater incapacitation capability inside the structure.

(3) HEAT ammunition arms approximately 60 feet from the gun muzzle. It loses most of its effectiveness against urban targets at ranges of less than 60 feet.

(4) MPAT and MPAT-OR rounds arm approximately 100 feet from the muzzle of the gun. Because of the shape and metal components of the projectiles, however, this ammunition remains effective at ranges of less than 100 feet.

(5) Sabot petals, including those on MPAT and MPAT-OR, endanger accompanying infantry elements. They create a hazard area extending 70 meters on either side of the gun-target line out to a range of 1 kilometer.

(6) The tank’s main gun can depress only to -10 degrees and can elevate only to +20 degrees. This creates considerable dead space for the crew at the close ranges that are typical in the urban environment.

(7) The external M2 HB machine gun can deliver a heavy volume of suppressive fire and penetrate light construction, buildings and most barricades. The M2 HB MG can elevate to +36 degrees; however, the TC must be unbuttoned to fire the M2 on the M1A2 or M1A2 SEP.

(8) The M240 coax machine gun can effectively deliver suppressive fires against enemy personnel and against enemy positions that are behind light cover.

(9) The loader's M240 machine gun can effectively deliver suppressive fire against enemy personnel and against enemy positions that are behind light cover; however, the loader must be unbuttoned to operate it. This weapon may be dismounted and used in a ground role if units are equipped with the M240 dismount kit.

(10) When buttoned up, the tank crew has limited visibility to the sides and rear and no visibility to the top. Figures 5-17 and 5-18 illustrate the dead space associated with tank operations in an urban environment.

(11) FM 3-20.12 (FM 17-12-1-1) explains special uses for tank-mounted machine guns in the urban environment.



Figure 5-17. Tank weapon dead space at street level.



Figure 5-18. Tank main gun and coax dead space above street level.

d. **Tank Platoon Command and Control in Urban Operations.** The following command and control considerations affect the tank platoon's urban operations planning and execution:

FM 3-90

TACTICS

JULY 2001

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Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 4 July 2001

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Preface

Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language, a purpose, and unity of effort. Tactics is the art and science of employing all available means to win battles and engagements. Specifically, it comprises the actions taken by a commander to arrange units and activities in relation to each other and the enemy.

PURPOSE

FM 3-90 introduces the basic concepts and control measures associated with the art of tactics. It cannot be read in isolation. To understand FM 3-90, the reader must understand the operational art, principles of war, and links between the operational and tactical levels of war described in FM 3-0, *Operations*. He should understand how the activities described in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, carry over and affect offensive and defensive operations and vice versa. He should understand the operations (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) process described in FM 6-0, *Command and Control*, and how that process relates to the military decision making process and troop-leading procedures described in FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*. FM 3-90 also refers to joint publications (JPs). Reviewing referenced JPs will also aid in understanding FM 3-90.

FM 3-90 focuses on the tactics used to employ available means to win in combat. Those tactics require judgment in application. The ability to seize and secure terrain, with its populations and productive capacity, distinguishes land forces conducting decisive offensive and defensive operations. FM 3-90 provides a common discussion of how commanders from the battalion task force level through the corps echelon conduct tactical offensive and defensive operations and their supporting tactical enabling operations. It is not prescriptive, but authoritative.

Tactical fundamentals do not change with the fielding of each new piece of equipment. However, the integration of new equipment and organizations usually requires changes in related techniques and procedures. FM 3-90 provides guidance in the form of combat-tested concepts and ideas modified to exploit emerging Army and joint capabilities.

SCOPE

FM 3-90 focuses on the organization of forces, minimum essential control measures, and general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for each type and form of combat operation. It is the common reference for all students of the tactical art, both in the field and the Army school system. A family of subordinate manuals address the techniques and procedures used by tactical combat forces at each echelon. Assessment concepts described in FM 6-0 and FM 6-22, *Army Leadership,* also apply. All operations process considerations are modified as necessary to account for the specific factors of METT-TC existing during each operation.

Tactical enabling operations and special environments discussed in other manuals are not repeated in FM 3-90. That is why FM 3-90 does not discuss why information operations (FM 3-13), river-crossing operations (FM 3-97.13), and combined arms breaching operations (FM 3-34.2).

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

Readers of FM 3-90 should be aware that the rules regarding the use of land mines are evolving. A commander should seek legal guidance concerning currently applicable rules and policies regarding land mines before directing their employment. The rules of engagement he provides to his subordinates should reflect those guidelines.

The historical examples used in FM 3-90 were deliberately chosen to illustrate the fact that American tacticians should widen their areas of study of the military profession to include other armies and other times.

In FM 3-90, the term *heavy* applies to armored, aviation, cavalry, mechanized infantry and their associated combined arms elements. The term *light* applies to airborne, air assault, and light infantry and their associated combined arms elements. The term *special operations forces* applies to rangers, special forces, special operations aviation, civil affairs, and psychological operations elements. The *initial brigade combat teams* (IBCTs) are the prototypes of a medium force and are included in the discussion of heavy and light forces as appropriate.

In FM 3-90, the term *battalion* applies to a battalion, battalion task force, or a cavalry squadron unless differences in capabilities requires that a specific organization be named. The term *company* refers to a company, company team, battery, or troop size organization.

FM 3-90 uses *planning process* to indicate both the military decision making process and troop leading procedures. Battalion-sized and larger units use the military decision making process. Company-sized and smaller units follow troop leading procedures.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever FM 3-90 uses the singular form of decisive operation or shaping operation; both the singular and plural forms are included.

The glossary lists most terms used in FM 3-90 that have joint or Army definitions. Terms for which FM 3-90 is the proponent manual (the authority) are indicated with an asterisk. Definitions for which FM 3-90 is the proponent manual are printed in boldface in the text. For other definitions the term is italicized and the number of the proponent manual follows the definition.

Cross-references use the new field manual numbering system. The bibliography lists field manuals by new number followed by old number.

Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command is the proponent for this publication. Send comments and recommended changes and the rational for those changes to: Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-SWW, 1 Reynolds Road, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352.

PART ONE

Tactical Fundamentals

Chapter 1

The Art of Tactics

War is, above all things, an art, employing science in all its branches as its servant, but depending first and chiefly upon the skill of the artisan. It has its own rules, but not one of them is rigid and invariable. As new implements are devised new methods result in its mechanical execution; but over and above all its mechanical appliances, it rests upon the complex factors of human nature, which cannot be reduced to formulas and rules. The proper use of these thinking and animate parts of the great machine can be divined only by the genius and instinct of the commanders. No books can teach this, and no rules define it.

Captain Francis V. Greene, 1883

Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements (FM 3-0).

1-1. This is the capstone manual for offensive and defensive operations at the tactical level. This is a manual for professionals and requires dedication and study to master. It is authoritative and provides guidance in the form of combat-tested concepts and ideas modified to take advantage of emerging Army and joint capabilities, focusing on the tactics used to employ available means to win in combat. Those tactics are not prescriptive in nature but require judgment in application.

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1-2. The tactics and supporting techniques and procedures described in this manual are only starting points for the tactician, who must understand the difference between tactics and techniques and procedures. Tactics always require judgment and adaptation to the unique circumstances of a specific situation. Techniques and procedures are established patterns that can be applied repeatedly with little or no judgment in a variety of circumstances. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide the tactician with a set of tools to use in developing the solution to a tactical problem. The solution to any specific problem is a unique combination of these TTP or the creation of new ones based on a critical evaluation of the situation. The tactician determines his solution by a thorough mastery of doctrine and existing TTP, tempered and honed by experience gained through training and operations. He uses his creativity to develop solutions for which the enemy is neither prepared, nor able to cope.

Tactics **is the employment of units in combat.**

Techniques **are the general and detailed methods used by troops and commanders to perform assigned missions and functions, specifically the methods of using equipment and personnel.**

Procedures **are standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to perform tasks.**

THE TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR

1-3. The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply to all types of military operations.

1-4. The *tactical level of war* is the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives (JP 1-02). It is important to understand tactics within the context of the levels of war. The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are reduced to a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Engagements are linked to battles. One or more battles are linked to winning major operations and campaigns, leading to operational success, which can lead to strategic success. (FM 3-0 discusses major operations and campaigns.)

1-5. A *battle* consists of a set of related engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an engagement (FM 3-0). Battles can affect the course of the campaign or major operation. A battle occurs when a division, corps, or army commander fights for one or more significant objectives. Battles are usually operationally significant, if not operationally decisive.

1-6. An *engagement* is a small, tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces, usually conducted at brigade level and below (FM 3-0). An engagement normally lasts only a short time—minutes, hours, or a day. It can result from one side's deliberate offensive movement against an opponent or from a

chance encounter between two opponents, such as a meeting engagement. An engagement can be a stand-alone event or one of several related engagements comprising a battle.

1-7. Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types of forces or components are not associated with a particular level of war. National assets, such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical operations. Actions are strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. Many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical studies.

1-8. Advances in technology, information-age media reporting, and the compression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing interrelationships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels (see FM 3-0).

THE SCIENCE AND ART OF TACTICS

1-9. The tactician must understand and master the science and the art of tactics, two distinctly different yet inseparable concepts. **A *tactician* is an individual devoted to mastering the science and art of tactics.** Commanders and leaders at all echelons and supporting commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned staff officers must be tacticians to lead their soldiers in the conduct of full spectrum operations.

THE SCIENCE

1-10. **The *science of tactics* encompasses the understanding of those military aspects of tactics—capabilities, techniques, and procedures—that can be measured and codified.** The science of tactics includes the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organizations and systems, such as determining how long it takes a division to move a certain distance. It also includes techniques and procedures used to accomplish specific tasks, such as the tactical terms and control graphics that comprise the language of tactics. While not easy, the science of tactics is fairly straightforward. Much of what is contained in this manual is the science of tactics—techniques and procedures for employing the various elements of the combined arms team to achieve greater effects.

1-11. Mastery of the science of tactics is necessary for the tactician to understand the physical and procedural constraints under which he must work. These constraints include the effects of terrain, time, space, and weather on friendly and enemy forces. However—because combat is an intensely human activity—the solution to tactical problems cannot be reduced to a formula. This realization necessitates the study of the art of tactics.

THE ART

1-12. **The *art of tactics* consists of three interrelated aspects: the creative and flexible array of means to accomplish assigned missions, decision making under conditions of uncertainty when faced with an intelligent enemy, and understanding the human dimension—the effects of combat on soldiers.** An art, as opposed to a science, requires exercising intuitive faculties that cannot be learned solely by study. The tactician must temper his study and evolve his skill through a variety of relevant, practical experiences. The more experience the tactician gains from practice under a variety of circumstances, the greater his mastery of the art of tactics.

1-13. The tactician invokes the art of tactics to solve tactical problems within his commander's intent by choosing from interrelated options, including—

- Types and forms of operations, forms of maneuver, and tactical mission tasks.
- Task organization of available forces, to include allocating scarce resources.
- Arrangement and choice of control measures.
- Tempo of the operation.
- Risks the commander is willing to take.

1-14. These options represent a starting point for the tactician to create a unique solution to a specific tactical problem. Each decision represents a choice among a range of options; each balances competing demands requiring judgment at every turn. While there may be checklists for techniques and procedures, there are no checklists for solving tactical problems. The commander must not look for a checklist approach to tactics; instead, he must use his experience and creativity to outthink his enemy.

1-15. There are three aspects to the art of tactics that define a competent tactician. The first is the creative and flexible application of the tools available to the commander, such as doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, training, organizations, materiel, and soldiers in an attempt to render the enemy's situational tactics ineffective. The tactician must understand how to train and employ his forces in full spectrum operations. The factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) are variables whose infinite mutations always combine to form a new tactical pattern. (FM 6-0 discusses the factors of METT-TC in detail.) They never produce exactly the same situation; thus there can be no checklists that adequately address each unique situation. Because the enemy changes and adapts to friendly moves during the planning, preparation, and execution of an operation, there is no guarantee that a technique which worked in one situation will work again. Each tactical problem is unique and must be solved on its own merits.

1-16. The second aspect of the art of tactics is decision making under conditions of uncertainty in a time-constrained environment and demonstrated by the clash of opposing wills—a violent struggle between two hostile, thinking, and independent opposing commanders with irreconcilable goals. Each commander wants to impose his will on his opponent, defeat his opponent's plans,

and destroy his opponent's forces. Combat consists of the interplay between these two opposing commanders, with each commander seeking to accomplish his mission while preventing the other from doing the same. Every commander needs a high degree of creativity and clarity of thought to outwit a willing and able opponent. He must quickly apply his judgment to a less than omniscient common operational picture provided by his command and control (C2) system to understand the implications and opportunities afforded him by the situation. The commander always uses the most current intelligence in order to facilitate his visualization of the enemy and environment. That same C2 system transmits the decisions resulting from his situational understanding to those individuals and units required to engage and destroy the enemy force.

1-17. The third and final aspect of the art of tactics is understanding the human dimension—what differentiates actual combat from the problems encountered during training and in a classroom. Combat is one of the most complex human activities, characterized by violent death, friction, uncertainty, and chance. Success depends at least as much on this human aspect as it does on any numerical and technological superiority.

The Human Dimension—Combat at Han-sur-Nied

When only [300] yards from the bridge, the [1-317th IN] skirmish line was hit by high explosive shells from a detachment of sixteen 40-mm. antiaircraft guns…. The armored infantry froze in their places or tried to reach the shelter of the ditches alongside the road…, while projectiles…, fired with almost sniperlike accuracy, swept…their ranks. The 231st Armored [FA BN] turned its howitzers on the enemy…, but as the German gunners were blasted—arms and legs flying into the air—others ran forward to serve the weapons.

…[1LT Vernon L.] Edwards' [platoon of the 68th Tank BN] started across the bridge. The first tank crossed successfully. The second stalled on the bridge when the platoon commander was hit; for a brief while the tank stood there, [1LT] Edwards' body dangling from the open turret. The third received a direct hit and burst into flame, but was backed off the wooden bridge by its commander after he had ordered his crew to leave the blazing tank. During this effort…[1LT] Daniel Nutter and [CPL] Charles Cunningham, B Company 25th Armored [EN BN], ran forward to cut the wires leading to the demolition charges. [1LT] Nutter, at the enemy end of the bridge, was killed just as he completed his task. [CPL] Cunningham, who had cut the wires at the western end…raced across the bridge, and returned with the body of his commander.

Who [ordered] the final charge probably never will be known. Perhaps it was [LTC Sterling S.] Burnette, who had been standing erect in the open urging his lead company on and…was mortally wounded. [CPT James A.] Craig and a few men rushed the bridge, crossing the 100-foot span "faster than they knew how" amidst a hail of shell fragments and tracer bullets.… [CPT] Craig disposed his little force…and through the afternoon held the approach to the bridge against German tanks and riflemen.

1-18. The tactician cannot ignore the human aspect. He seeks to recognize and exploit indicators of fear and weakness in his enemy, and to defeat the enemy's will, since soldiers remain key to generating combat power. More than any other human activity, continuous combat operations against an intelligent enemy takes a toll on soldiers, severely straining their physical and mental stamina. This creates in soldiers the tangible and intangible effects of courage, fear, combat experience, exhaustion, isolation, confidence, thirst, and anger. If left unchecked these effects can result in decreased vigilance, slowed perception, inability to concentrate, communication difficulties, and an inability to accomplish manual tasks.

1-19. Leaders must be alert to indicators of fatigue, fear, lapses in discipline standards, and reduced morale in friendly and enemy soldiers. They must work to counteract the effects on the friendly force while taking measures to enhance these effects on the enemy. When the friendly force has the initiative, it can force the enemy to conduct continuous operations to react to friendly actions and then exploit the effects of continuous operations on the enemy. These conditions can have a cumulative effect on units that can lead to collapse. The tactician must understand how they affect human endurance and factor them into his plans. He must understand the limits of human endurance in combat. This is the subtle difference between pushing soldiers beyond their limits to exploit success versus resting them to prevent the collapse of unit cohesion. (FM 6-22.5 discusses the effects of continuous combat operations.)

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

1-20. The following vignette discusses the Battle of Cowpens fought during the American Revolution. It illustrates the need for the tactician to combine the effects of the science of tactics with his application of the tactical art.

Cowpens, 17 January 1781

On 17 January 1781, American BG Daniel Morgan defeated British LTC Tarleton at the Cowpens in South Carolina in a battle that captures the essence of the art of tactics—the use of intuitive faculties that cannot be learned solely by study. Although outnumbered, Morgan's troops fought and won against a previously unbeaten opponent. The battle achieved decisive results with strategic significance.

In December 1780, Morgan was sent with 600 men into the South Carolina highlands under orders to protect Americans, forage, and threaten British control of the highlands. Tarleton's British Legion—numbering nearly 1,000 men and consisting of a combined cavalry-infantry force reinforced with additional infantry and two, three-pounder guns—was sent to pursue Morgan. By 16 January 1781, Tarleton had closed to within six miles of Morgan's force.

Having known of Tarleton's mission since 14 January, Morgan obtained information on Tarleton's tactical style while he began to retreat. With Tarleton so close on 16 January and his own camp nearly six miles from the Broad River, Morgan decided to fight at the Cowpens. While the two forces were now roughly the same size, Morgan had only about one-third the cavalry, one-third the regular line

infantry, and no artillery. However, his militia force's rifles had a longer range than the British muskets, and the terrain allowed him to mask his reserves from view. Morgan deployed his forces on the battlefield, confident that Tarleton would not attempt to flank his position. Rather, Morgan believed that Tarleton would initially attack him with part of his cavalry supported by infantry, wait for confusion, and then exploit those vulnerabilities with his cavalry reserve. This had been his pattern of operations in previous engagements with the Americans.

In the main line of battle, Morgan placed his Continentals and Virginia militia, who were former Continentals, on the military crest of the rise under COL Howard's command. They numbered 450. About 150 meters downhill, toward the expected reaction of the enemy, he stationed the bulk of his militia under the command of COL Pickens. Another 150 meters down the hill, he positioned a skirmisher line of 150 militia riflemen. Behind the hill, he placed LTC Washington's 120-strong cavalry force in reserve. Each line was within rifle range but out of musket range of the line behind it. As explained the night before, skirmishers only needed to fire one or two shots and then retire to the second line. In turn, the militia in the second line only needed to fire two volleys. Then they could retire to their left around to the rear of the hill and, protected by the cavalry, reform. The cavalry would counterattack British cavalry as the situation allowed, guard the militia horses, or cover a retreat if necessary. (See Figure 1-1.)



Figure 1-1. Initial Situation

Tarleton deployed his forces from their march formation into a line, with three light infantry companies on the right, the Legion infantry in the center, and one regular British battalion on the left of this main line. He stationed one troop of cavalry on each flank of the main line and one three-pounder gun on either side of the Legion infantry. He kept the other regular British battalion and the remainder of his Legion cavalry in reserve. The British immediately came under fire from the skirmishers. Tarleton sent a troop of dragoons to disperse them while his main forces deployed. The dragoons lost 15 of 50 men. The skirmishers retired to the American second line.

Tarleton then assaulted the second line. His artillery opened fire, but apparently on the third line. The American rifle fire disrupted his formation. When his forces closed to within 50 meters of the second line, they received a volley from the

militia that staggered and further disrupted them. The militia's expected second volley was more ragged as it began to withdraw. Seeing this movement, Tarleton ordered his right-hand troop of dragoons to charge the militia as it withdrew. The American cavalry charged this troop and overwhelmed it, driving the dragoons off the field in accordance with Morgan's plan. (See Figure 1-2.)

As the British moved hastily forward to assault the main American position, they further lost their cohesion as a firefight between the two forces ensued. Tarleton ordered his reserve infantry battalion up to the left of his line for this assault, and the cavalry troop on his left to encircle the American line. This move outflanked the American line. Morgan and the third-line commander recognized the danger to their right flank and ordered the right flank units to "refuse" the flank. However, the American units adjoining those right flank units also commenced moving to the rear. This situation could have crumbled the American line except for Morgan's personal order for the rest of the American line to move to the rear with those right flank units.

Seeing this apparent general withdrawal, Tarleton ordered his forces to close with the Americans. They did, but suffered further disorganization. Just as the British attempted to close, the Americans turned and fired a volley, followed by a bayonet charge



Figure 1-2. British Moves



Figure 1-3. Final Battle Stage

into the British lines. Simultaneously, Morgan's cavalry attacked the British right from the rear. Meanwhile, the militia, having reformed, returned to the field on the American right and attacked the British left flank units. (See Figure 1-3.) The battle was over within an hour of Tarleton's first assault. The British losses were 110 killed, 200 wounded, and 700 prisoners, although Tarleton personally escaped with about 140 of his cavalry. The British could not replace the mobile forces that Tarleton lost at the Cowpens. Without a mobile force, the British no longer had an effective counter to American partisans and light forces. The British later won at Guilford Court House, but suffered such heavy losses that they had to abandon their operations in the interior of the Carolinas.

Morgan combined the science of tactics with his application of the tactical art to defeat superior numbers of British forces under Tarleton. Morgan arrived at a unique and creative solution to his tactical problems. Trusted information about Tarleton's style was a crucial part of his deployment plan. Morgan understood the diverse military and social elements of his force (untried militia, Continentals, and volunteers). He asked no more of any element than it could deliver and used the strengths of each to the fullest. Daniel Morgan used tactical art to convert his understanding of American troops, knowledge of human nature, and rapport with his soldiers into the vital components of a brilliant tactical victory.

HASTY VERSUS DELIBERATE OPERATIONS

1-21. **A *hasty operation* is an operation in which a commander directs his immediately available forces, using fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), to perform activities with minimal preparation, trading planning and preparation time for speed of execution. A *deliberate operation* is an operation in which a commander's detailed intelligence concerning the situation allows him to develop and coordinate detailed plans, including multiple branches and sequels. He task organizes his forces specifically for the operation to provide a fully synchronized combined arms team. He conducts extensive rehearsals while conducting shaping operations to set the conditions for the conduct of his decisive operation.**

1-22. Most operations lie somewhere along a continuum between these two extremes. The 9th Armored Division's seizure of the bridge at Remagen in March 1945 illustrates one end, a hasty operation conducted with the forces immediately available. At the other end of the continuum is a deliberate operation, such as the 1st Infantry Division's breach operation during the opening hours of Operation Desert Storm. Ongoing improvements in information and C2 systems continue to assist in the development of a common operational picture of friendly and enemy forces while facilitating decision making and communicating decisions to friendly forces. These improvements can help diminish the distinction between hasty and deliberate operations; they cannot make that distinction irrelevant.

CHOICES AND TRADEOFFS

1-23. The commander must choose the right point along the continuum to operate. His choice involves balancing several competing factors. He bases his decision to conduct a hasty or deliberate operation on his current knowledge

of the enemy situation, and his assessment of whether the assets available (to include time), and the means to coordinate and synchronize those assets, are adequate to accomplish the mission. If they are not he takes additional time to plan and prepare for the operation or bring additional forces to bear on the problem. The commander makes that choice in an environment of uncertainty, which always entails some risk.

1-24. The commander may have to act based only on his available combat information in a time-constrained environment. *Combat information* is unevaluated data gathered by or provided to a commander that, due to its highly perishable nature or the critical nature of the tactical situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence or other staff products in time to meet the commander's information requirements (FM 6-0). The commander must understand the inherent risk of acting only on combat information since it is vulnerable to enemy deception operations and can be misinterpreted at any stage up through reporting channels. The unit intelligence staff helps the commander assign a level of confidence to combat information he uses in decision making.

1-25. Uncertainty and risk are inherent in tactical operations and cannot be eliminated. A commander cannot be successful without the capability of acting under conditions of uncertainty while balancing various risks and taking advantage of opportunities. Although the commander strives to maximize his knowledge about his forces, the terrain and weather, civil considerations, and the enemy, he cannot let a lack of information paralyze him. The more intelligence on the enemy, the better able the commander is to make his assessment. Less information means that the commander has a greater risk of making a poor decision for the specific situation. A commander never has perfect intelligence, but knowing when he has enough information to make a decision within the higher commander's intent and constraints is part of the art of tactics and is a critical skill for a commander.

1-26. The commander should take the minimum time necessary in planning and preparing to ensure a reasonable chance of success. Reduced coordination at the start of the operation results in less than optimum combat power brought to bear on the enemy, but often allows for increased speed and momentum while possibly achieving surprise. The commander must balance the effects of reduced coordination against the risk that the effects of increased coordination will not match the enemy's improved posture over time. The more time the commander takes to prepare for the operation, including improving his situational understanding, the more time the enemy has to prepare and move additional units within supporting range or distance. Additionally, it reduces the time his subordinates have to conduct their own planning and preparations. If the enemy can improve his disposition faster than the friendly force can, the delays in execution decrease the commander's chances of success.

1-27. It is better to err on the side of speed, audacity, and momentum than on the side of caution when conducting military operations, all else being equal. Bold decisions give the best promise of success; however, one must differentiate between calculated risks and a military gamble. A *calculated risk* is an operation in which success is not a certainty but which, in case of failure, leaves sufficient forces to cope with whatever situations arise (FM 6-0). The

willingness to take calculated risks requires military judgment to reduce risk by foresight and careful planning and to determine whether the risk is worth taking to grasp fleeting opportunities. MG Wood's decision to advance east toward the German border with his 4th Armored Division after the breakout from the Normandy beachhead is an example of a justifiable calculated risk. A *military gamble* is an operation that can lead either to victory or to complete destruction of one's force (FM 6-0). Rare situations can arise where even a gamble may be justified; for example, when defeat is merely a matter of time and the only chance lies in an operation of great risk. LTC Chamberlain's decision to conduct a bayonet charge with what was left of the 20th Maine on the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg is an example of a military gamble.

1-28. The commander can be less deliberate in planning and preparing for an operation when facing a clearly less-capable and less-prepared enemy force. In these circumstances, the commander can forego detailed planning, extensive rehearsals, and significant changes in task organization. For example, an attacking battalion task force encountering enemy security outposts just moving into position will conduct actions on contact to immediately destroy the outposts without the loss of momentum. It then follows that against a larger and more prepared enemy, the commander needs more preparation time and a larger force to succeed. If the commander determines that he cannot defeat the enemy with the forces immediately at hand, he must determine what additional measures he must take to be successful. The measures can include any or all of the factors along the continuum.

1-29. This does not imply that a commander conducting a hasty operation foregoes the advantages provided by his combined arms team. A commander who chooses to conduct hasty operations synchronizes the employment of his forces in his head as he issues FRAGOs. He uses tangible and intangible factors, such as the training level and experience of his subordinates, his own experience, perception of how the enemy will react, understanding of time-distance factors, and knowledge of the strengths of each subordinate and supporting unit to achieve the required degree of synchronization.

RISK REDUCTION

1-30. An important factor in reducing a commander's risk is how much intelligence he has about the enemy. As intelligence becomes available, the commander determines where along the continuum of hasty versus deliberate operations he will operate to accomplish his mission. There is no set of rules to determine this point—any choice entails risk. If the commander decides to execute a hasty operation based on limited intelligence, he risks an uncoordinated operation against an enemy about which he knows little. Moreover his forces may not be strong enough to accomplish their mission with minimum casualties. This could lead to piecemeal commitment and potential defeat in detail. He must balance this option against the risk of waiting to attack, which allows the enemy time to reinforce or conduct additional preparation.

1-31. When higher headquarters determines the time to start an operation, or in a defense when the enemy initiates the operation, the commander has little flexibility regarding where to operate along the continuum of hasty versus deliberate operations. In these situations he must use all the time

available to conduct planning and preparation. While the military decision making process tasks used in a time-constrained environment are the same as in the full process, many are done mentally by the commander or with less staff involvement. Each commander decides how to shorten the process. A commander may use the complete process to develop the plan, while a subordinate headquarters abbreviates the process. (See FM 5-0 for a discussion of decision making in a time-constrained environment.)

1-32. The commander can reduce the risk associated with any situation by increasing his knowledge of the terrain and friendly, neutral, and enemy forces. He has a greater risk of making a poor decision if his situational understanding is incomplete or faulty. If the commander lacks sufficient information to make an informed choice, his first priority must be to gain the required information to support his decision making while at the same time taking precautions to protect his force from surprise. During an unexpected encounter with the enemy, often an acceptable way to gain that intelligence is to conduct a hasty attack to determine the size and disposition of the enemy force. The commander adapts his reconnaissance and intelligence efforts to the existing situation and picks the appropriate tools to answer his critical information requirements. For example, the commander can retask his reconnaissance assets or increase the size of his reconnaissance effort.

1-33. A commander—supported by a digital C2 system that can access accurate, real-time information—takes advantage of a different operational environment than that facing a commander with an analog C2 system. Greatly improved knowledge of the enemy and friendly situations facilitates his employment of precision fires, his conduct of decisive maneuver at extended ranges, and his provision of responsive and flexible support of his forces. The integration of advanced information technologies, highly capable leaders, and agile organizational systems reduces risk and facilitates the conduct of full spectrum operations.

1-34. Risk reduction does not always mean increasing knowledge of the enemy at the expense of time. A commander can partially compensate for a lack of intelligence by being flexible in his troop dispositions through an increase in the depth of the security area, size and number of security units, and size of the reserve. The commander's choices of combat and movement formations provide the versatility to allow for initial enemy contact with the smallest possible friendly force. This allows the greatest flexibility in meeting unforeseen enemy dispositions. Another way to compensate for increased risk is to allow time and resources for subordinate elements to develop the situation.

1-35. Because uncertainty exists in all military operations, every military decision contains risk. The commander exercises tactical art when he decides how much risk to accept. As shown in Figure 1-4, the commander has several techniques available to reduce the risk associated in a specific operation. Some of these techniques for reducing risk take resources from the decisive operation, which reduces the concentration of effects at the decisive point.

1-36. The commander has the option to redirect the efforts of forces previously used to reduce his risk toward strengthening his decisive operation as more information becomes available. In any operation, the relationship between information, uncertainty, risk, size of reserves and security forces, and

the disposition of the main body may change frequently. The commander must continually weigh this balance and make adjustments as needed.

1-37. These adjustments can create problems. Too many changes or changes made too rapidly in task organization, mission, and priorities can have negative effects on the operations process. For example, if a commander changes the task organization of his force too frequently, the force fails to develop the flexibility provided by teamwork. On the other hand, if he fails to change the task organization when dictated by circumstances, the force lacks flexibility to adapt to those changing circumstances. It is then unable to react effectively to enemy moves or act with the concentration of effects that lead to mission success.



Figure 1-4. Risk Reduction Factors

SOLVING TACTICAL PROBLEMS

1-38. Success in tactical problem solving results from the aggressive, intelligent, and decisive use of combat power in an environment of uncertainty, disorder, violence, and danger. A commander wins by being on the offense, initiating combat on his own terms—at a time and place of his choosing. He never surrenders the initiative once he gains it. He builds momentum quickly to win decisively through the rapid application of available combat power, operating inside the enemy's decision making cycle, and mastering the transitions between the defense to the offensive and vice versa. These rules of thumb allow the commander to maximize friendly and minimize enemy combat power by preventing the enemy from fighting as a combined arms force.

1-39. Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results. Tactical commanders conduct offensive operations to achieve their assigned missions and objectives—destroying enemy forces or seizing terrain—that cumulatively produce the theater-level effects required by the operational commander.

Circumstances may require defending; however, tactical success normally requires shifting to the offense as soon as possible. The offense ends when the forces conducting it accomplish their missions, reach their limits of advance, or approach culmination. Those forces then consolidate, resume the attack, or prepare for other operations.

1-40. A commander wants to initiate combat on his own terms to give himself important advantages. This allows him to mass the effects of his combat power against selected inferior and isolated enemy units in vulnerable locations. Possession of the initiative allows a commander to continually seek vulnerable spots and shift his decisive operation when opportunities occur. A commander seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative by—

- Maneuvering more rapidly than the enemy to gain positional advantage (the place where the effects of fires are most destructive) over the enemy.
- Employing firepower to facilitate and exploit positional advantage.
- Sustaining his forces before, during, and after the engagement with the enemy.
- Achieving and maintaining information superiority.
- Planning beyond the initial operation and anticipating possible events.

A commander never surrenders the initiative once he gains it. He presses the fight tenaciously and aggressively. He accepts risk while leading soldiers and pushing systems to their limits.

1-41. The tactician, notwithstanding his status as a commander or a staff officer, seeks ways to build momentum quickly by seizing the initiative and executing shaping, sustaining, and decisive operations at a high tempo. Momentum helps to retain and complements the initiative. Concentrating the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time overwhelms an enemy and gains control of the situation. Rapid maneuver to place the enemy in a disadvantageous position also builds momentum. Momentum allows the tactician to create opportunities to engage the enemy from unexpected directions with unanticipated capabilities. Having seized the initiative, the tactician continues to control the relative momentum by taking action to maintain focus and pressure, controlling the tempo of operations, and creating and exploiting opportunities, while always assessing the situation and taking calculated risks.

1-42. The commander's C2 system assists the rapid building of momentum by allowing him to see and understand the situation so quickly that his forces can act before the enemy forces can react to the initial situation. His operations process focuses on executing rather than planning. Modern information systems allow compressed planning and effective incremental adjustments to the plan during execution. This allows the commander's forces to adapt more quickly to emerging threats and opportunities as they are identified. Units whose commanders can make and implement decisions faster, even to a small degree, gain an accruing advantage that becomes significant over time; making decisions quickly—even with incomplete information—is crucial.

1-43. The tactician chooses from a number of tactical options to create the solution to the tactical problem facing him. (Chapter 2 lists these options as the types and forms of military operations and forms of maneuver.) Although he

solves the specific tactical problem facing him by following the general principles outlined in this manual, there is no single, doctrinally correct, procedurally derived solution to any problem. The tactician who employs the more appropriate tactics given the existing situation has a distinct advantage over his opponent, even if their forces have equal combat power.

1-44. The tactician uses his mastery of the art and science of tactics, his understanding of the situation, and his judgment to create unique solutions appropriate to the mission and the other specific factors of METT-TC. There are usually several solutions that might work, although some will be more effective. He seeks a solution that defeats the enemy in the time available at the least cost in men and materiel. It should be a decisive solution that postures the unit for future missions and provides for the greatest flexibility to account for unexpected enemy actions or reactions. The solution must be in accordance with the higher commander's intent. A thorough understanding of the enemy greatly assists the commander in his development of workable solutions. Commander's visualization is the doctrinal term for this process. (FM 6-0 describes commander's visualization.)

1-45. The tactician learns to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its important elements, and base his decisions on those important elements as he masters his profession. The ability to do this cannot be acquired overnight. A tactician develops this capability after years of schooling, self-study, and practical training experiences, which eventually develop the intuitive faculties required to solve tactical problems. He rarely gets the opportunity to practice the science and art of tactics under actual combat conditions.

1-46. Doctrine requires human judgment when applied to a specific situation. In choosing a solution to a tactical problem, applicable laws and regulations, the mission, the laws of physics, human behavior, and logistic realities constrain the tactician, not standardized techniques and procedures. The true test of the tactician's solution is not whether it uses the specific techniques or procedures contained in this manual, but whether the techniques and procedures used were appropriate to the situation. Tactical proficiency is not defined by mastery of written doctrine, but by the ability to employ available means to win battles and engagements. A solution may not match any previous doctrinal example; however, the language used to communicate that concept must be technically precise and doctrinally consistent, using commonly understood and accepted doctrinal terms and concepts.

1-47. Transitions between the types and forms of operations are difficult and, during execution, may create unexpected opportunities for Army or enemy forces. The tactician must quickly recognize such opportunities. He develops transitions as branches during the planning process and acts on them immediately as they occur. Transition between one type or form of an operation to another is a complex operational consideration.

1-48. Tactical victory occurs when the opposing enemy force can no longer prevent the friendly force from accomplishing its mission. That is the end goal of all military operations. Decisive tactical victory occurs when the enemy no longer has the means to oppose the friendly force. It also occurs when the enemy admits defeat and agrees to a negotiated end of hostilities. Historically, a rapid tactical victory results in fewer friendly casualties and reduced

resource expenditures. However, the tactician avoids gambling his forces and losing his combined arms synchronization in search of rapid victory.

1-49. In closing, solutions to tactical problems are a collective effort. Success results from the commander's plan and the ability of subordinates to execute it. The commander must have full confidence in his subordinates' mastery of the art and science of tactics and in their ability to execute the chosen solution. (See FM 6-0 for a full discussion of this concept.)

Chapter 2

Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

In war, obscurity and confusion are normal. Late, exaggerated or misleading information, surprise situations, and counterorders are to be expected.

Infantry in Battle, 1939

The tactician must understand the common tactical concepts and definitions used by the military profession in the conduct of offensive and defensive operations. This chapter introduces the doctrinal hierarchy that forms the framework by which this manual is organized. The concepts and terms in this chapter are common to most operations. This manual discusses those concepts and terms specific to a type or form of operations in the corresponding chapter. For example, Chapter 4 discusses the objective as a control measure.

DOCTRINAL HIERARCHY

2-1. Figure 2-1 on page 2-2 shows the doctrinal hierarchy and relationship between the types and subordinate forms of operations. While an operation's

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predominant characteristic labels it as an offensive, defensive, stability, or support operation, different units involved in that operation may be conducting different types and subordinate forms of operations, and often transition rapidly from one type or subordinate form to another. The commander rapidly shifts from one type or form of operation to another to continually keep the enemy off balance while positioning his forces for maximum effectiveness. Flexibility in transitioning contributes to a successful operation. A good tactician chooses the right combinations of combined arms to place the enemy at the maximum disadvantage.



Figure 2-1. Doctrinal Hierarchy of Operations

2-2. The commander conducts tactical enabling operations to assist the planning, preparation, and execution of any of the four types of military operations (offense, defense, stability, and support). Tactical enabling operations are never decisive operations in the context of offensive and defensive operations; they are either shaping or sustaining operations. Part IV of this manual discusses tactical enabling operations that are not the subject of a separate field manual. The commander uses tactical enabling operations to help him conduct military actions with minimal risk.

2-3. This hierarchy does not describe discrete, mutually exclusive operations. All tactical missions can contain elements of several different types and subordinate forms. For example, an attacking commander may have one subordinate conducting an envelopment, with another subordinate conducting a frontal attack to fix the enemy. The enveloping force usually attacks once the direct-pressure force makes a movement to contact while repeatedly attacking to keep pressure on the fleeing enemy. The encircling force uses an envelopment to conduct a series of attacks to destroy or clear enemy forces in its path on the way to its blocking position. Once it occupies the blocking position, the unit may transition to a defense as it blocks the retreat of the fleeing enemy force.

THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

2-4. The *operational framework* consists of the arrangement of friendly forces and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and the enemy or situation. It consists of the area of operations, battlespace, and the battlefield organization (FM 3-0). The framework establishes an area of geographic and operational responsibility for commanders and provides a way for them to visualize how they will employ forces against the enemy. Army commanders design an operational framework to accomplish their mission by defining and arranging its three components. The commander uses the operational framework to focus combat power. *Combat power* is the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time (JP 1-02).

2-5. As part of the military decision making process, the commander visualizes his battlespace and determines how to arrange his forces. The *battlefield organization* is the allocation of forces in the area of operations by purpose. It consists of three all-encompassing categories of operations: decisive, shaping, and sustaining (FM 3-0). Purpose unifies all elements of the battlefield organization by providing the common focus for all actions. The commander organizes his forces according to purpose by determining whether each unit's operation will be decisive, shaping, or sustaining. Those decisions form the basis of his concept of operations. He describes the area of operations (AO) in terms of deep, close, and rear areas when the factors of METT-TC require the use of a spatial reference. FM 3-0 explains the operational framework and battlefield organization.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

2-6. The nine principles of war defined in FM 3-0 provide general guidance for conducting war and military operations other than war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are fundamental truths governing combat operations. The principles are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine. First published in 1923 as general principles in *Field Service Regulations United States Army*, they have stood the tests of analysis, experimentation, and practice. They are not a checklist and their degree of application varies with the situation. Blind adherence to these principles does not guarantee success, but each deviation may increase the risk of failure. The principles of war lend rigor and focus to the purely creative aspects of tactics and provide a crucial link between pure theory and actual application.

TENETS OF ARMY OPERATIONS

2-7. The tenets of Army operations—initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility—build on the principles of war. They further describe the characteristics of successful operations. While they do not guarantee success, their absence risks failure. FM 3-0 defines the tenets.

Principles of War

- Objective
- Offensive
- Mass
- Economy of force
- Maneuver
- Unity of command
- Security
- Surprise
- Simplicity

Tenets of Army Operations

- Initiative
- Agility
- Depth
- Synchronization
- Versatility

THE FACTORS OF METT-TC

2-8. The six factors of METT-TC—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations—describe the unique situation in which a tactician executes the science and art of tactics. An analysis of the factors of METT-TC is critical during the military decision making process. The METT-TC analytical framework is useful in assessing operations planning, preparing, and executing. The tactician considers these six factors for any type of operation. Their impact on an operation will differ, but each must be considered as factors during the commander's visualization process. That consideration involves both the science and art of tactics. For example, terrain and weather effects on movement rates and fuel consumption are quantifiable and, therefore, part of the science of war. Terrain and weather effects on soldier morale are not totally quantifiable and are part of the art of war. FM 6-0 provides a detailed discussion of the factors of METT-TC.

Factors of METT-TC

- Mission
- Enemy
- Terrain and weather
- Troops and support available
- Time available
- Civil considerations

ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN

2-9. A major operation begins with a design—an idea that guides the conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) of the operation. The operational design provides a conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means. The elements of operational design are tools to aid the commander in visualizing major operations and shaping his intent. They help the commander clarify and refine his vision by providing a framework for him to describe the operation in terms of task and purpose. FM 3-0 defines each of these elements. Their utility diminishes with each succeeding tactical echelon. What is envisioned as a decisive point by the land component commander becomes a clearly delineated objective for a battalion task force.

Elements of Operational Design

- End state and military conditions
- Center of gravity
- Decisive points and objectives
- Lines of operation
- Culminating point
- Operational reach, approach, and pauses
- Simultaneous and sequential operations
- Linear and nonlinear operations
- Tempo

BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS

2-10. There are seven battlefield operating systems (BOS). The seven BOS definitions from FM 7-15 are—

Battlefield Operating Systems

- Intelligence
- Maneuver
- Fire support
- Air defense
- Mobility/countermobility/ survivability
- Combat service support
- Command and control

- The *intelligence system* is the activity to generate knowledge of and products portraying the enemy and the environmental features required by a command planning, preparing, and executing operations.
- The *maneuver system* is the movement of forces to achieve a position of advantage with respect to enemy forces. This system includes the employment of forces on the battlefield in combination with direct fire or fire potential. This system also includes the conduct of tactical tasks associated with force projection.
- The *fire support system* encompasses the collective and coordinated use of target-acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons, fixed-wing aircraft, offensive information operations, and other lethal and nonlethal means against targets located throughout an AO.
- The *air defense system* is the employment of all active measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile aircraft and missiles after they are airborne.
- The *mobility, countermobility, and survivability system*.
  - *Mobility operations* preserve the freedom of maneuver of friendly forces.
  - *Countermobility operations* deny mobility to enemy forces.
  - *Survivability operations* protect friendly forces from the effects of enemy weapon systems.
- The *combat service support system* is the support and services provided to sustain forces during war and military operations other than war.
- The *command and control system* includes all collective tasks associated with supporting the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and available forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

The BOS provide the Army a common taxonomy of critical tactical activities. They provide the commander and his staff a means of assessing the planning, preparation, and execution of an operation in discrete subsets.

BASIC TACTICAL CONCEPTS

2-11. The following paragraphs contain basic tactical concepts common to both offensive and defensive operations. They are listed in alphabetical order, not in order of importance. These concepts, along with the principles of war, tenets of Army operations, factors of METT-TC, estimates, input from other commanders, and the commander's experience and judgment allow him to visualize the conduct of operations as he accomplishes his assigned mission.

COMBINED ARMS

2-12. *Combined arms* is the synchronized or simultaneous application of several arms—such as infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, air defense, and aviation—to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm was used against the enemy separately or in sequence (FM 3-0). Weapons and units are more effective when they operate in concert. No single action, weapon, branch, or arm of service generates sufficient power to achieve the effects required to dominate an opponent.

2-13. Combined arms is more than the combat arms working together. Each branch of the Army provides unique capabilities that complement the other branches. A combined arms team consists of two or more arms supporting one another. The commander takes his available combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) elements and forms them into a combined arms team focused on mission accomplishment. The proper combination of actions and systems by the combined arms team is the essence of combined arms. The use of combined arms provides complementary and reinforcing effects and may have asymmetrical effects on an enemy force. (See FM 3-0 for more information on symmetrical and asymmetrical effects.)

2-14. Armor, attack helicopter, and infantry units are normally the nucleus of the combined arms team. However, emerging capabilities allow the commander to use any combat arms unit, such as artillery and aviation, to form that nucleus. The commander uses his combat arms forces in different combinations to provide flexibility in conducting different types of operations in varied terrain. For example, a commander may have his infantry lead in mountains and cities when moving dismounted, while his armor leads in open terrain. Attack helicopters can deliver large quantities of precision munitions throughout the AO. A commander can conduct decisive operations using field artillery Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and cannons augmented by the effects of fixed-wing aviation, given the correct conditions. Air defense artillery destroys enemy aerial assets to assist the free movement of the friendly force. Engineers enhance the friendly force's mobility, degrade the enemy's mobility, and assist in providing for survivability of the friendly force. Combat support and CSS members of the combined arms team support the combined arms nucleus by combining capabilities in an appropriate manner to support and sustain the combined arms force.

DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT

2-15. A *decisive engagement* is an engagement in which a unit is considered fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate itself. In the absence of outside assistance, the action must be fought to a conclusion and either won or lost with the forces at hand (JP 1-02). The unit's mission is what usually results in the acceptance of decisive engagement rather than the unit's physical ability to extricate itself. For example, a unit might become decisively engaged to hold key terrain, defeat a specific enemy force, or secure a specific objective. Less common is a defender's decisive engagement as a result of being placed in a position of disadvantage by an attacker.

DEFEAT IN DETAIL

2-16. ***Defeat in detail*** **is achieved by concentrating overwhelming combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating the entire force at once.** A smaller force can use this technique to achieve success against a larger enemy. Defeat in detail can occur sequentially (defeat of separate elements one at a time in succession). For example, a commander can mass overwhelming combat power effects against an enemy element outside the supporting distance of the rest of the enemy force. This allows the commander to destroy the targeted enemy element before it can be effectively reinforced.

FLANKS

2-17. ***Flanks*** **are the right or left limits of a unit.** For a stationary unit, they are designated in terms of an enemy's actual or expected location. (See Figure 2-2.) For a moving unit, they are defined by the direction of movement. (See Figure 2-3.) The commanders tries to deny the enemy opportunities to engage his flanks because a force cannot concentrate as much direct fire on the flanks as it can to the front. Commanders seek to engage enemy flanks for the same reason.



Figure 2-2. Flanks of a Stationary Unit

2-18. **An** ***assailable flank*** **is exposed to attack or envelopment.** It usually results from the terrain, the weakness of forces, technical capability of the opponent (vertical envelopment), or a gap between adjacent units. If one flank rests on highly restrictive terrain and the other flank is on open terrain, the latter is immediately recognized as the assailable flank for a heavy ground force. The flank on the restrictive terrain may be assailable for a light force. Sufficient room must exist for the attacking force to maneuver for the flank to be assailable. A unit may not have an assailable flank if both flanks



Figure 2-3. Flanks of an Armor-Heavy Team Moving in an Echelon Right Formation

link into other forces. When a commander has an assailable flank, he may attempt to refuse it by using various techniques, such as supplementary positions.

2-19. **A *flanking position* is a geographical location on the flank of a force from which effective fires can be placed on that flank.** An attacking commander maneuvers to occupy flanking positions against a defending force to place destructive fires directly against enemy vulnerabilities. A defending commander maneuvers to occupy flanking positions on the flanks of a hostile route of advance for the same reason. A flanking position that an advancing enemy can readily avoid has little value to the defender unless the enemy does not realize it is occupied.

MANEUVER

2-20. *Maneuver* is the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission (JP 1-02). Maneuver creates and exposes enemy vulnerabilities to the massed effects of friendly combat power. A commander employs his elements of combat power in symmetrical and asymmetrical ways so as to attain positional advantage over an enemy and be capable of applying those massed effects.

MUTUAL SUPPORT

2-21. *Mutual support* is that support which units render to each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities (JP 1-02). Mutual support exists between two or more positions when they support one another by direct or indirect fire, thus preventing the enemy from attacking one position without being fired on from one or more adjacent positions. That same relationship applies to units moving with relation to each other, except they can maneuver to obtain positional advantage to achieve that support. It is normally associated with fire and movement (maneuver), although it can also relate to the provision of CS and CSS.

2-22. In the defense, the commander selects tactical positions to achieve the maximum degree of mutual support. Mutual support increases the strength of defensive positions, prevents the enemy from attempting to defeat the attacking friendly forces in detail, and helps prevent infiltration. In the offense, the commander maneuvers his forces to ensure a similar degree of support between attacking elements.

OPERATION

2-23. An *operation* is a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission (JP 1-02). It includes the process of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing those offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations needed to gain the objectives of any engagement, battle, major action, or campaign. It also includes activities that enable the performance of full spectrum operations, such as security, reconnaissance, and troop movement.

PIECEMEAL COMMITMENT

2-24. ***Piecemeal commitment*** **is the immediate employment of units in combat as they become available instead of waiting for larger aggregations of units to ensure mass, or the unsynchronized employment of available forces so that their combat power is not employed effectively.** Piecemeal commitment subjects the smaller committed forces to defeat in detail and prevents the massing and synchronizing of combat power with following combat and CS elements. However, piecemeal commitment may be advantageous to maintain momentum and to retain or exploit the initiative. A commander may require piecemeal commitment of a unit to reinforce a faltering operation, especially if the commitment of small units provide all of the combat power needed to avert disaster. The "pile-on" technique associated with search and attack operations employs the piecemeal commitment of troops. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of search and attack operations.)

RECONSTITUITON

2-25. *Reconstitution* is those actions that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. Reconstitution operations include regeneration and reorganization (FM 4-100.9). Reconstitution is a total process. It is not solely a CSS operation, though CSS plays an integral role. The commander conducts reconstitution when one of his subordinate units becomes combat ineffective or when he can raise its combat effectiveness closer to the desired level by shifting available resources. Besides normal support actions, reconstitution may include—

- Removing the unit from combat.
- Assessing it with external assets.
- Reestablishing the chain of command.
- Training the unit for future operations.
- Reestablishing unit cohesion.

2-26. Reconstitution transcends normal day-to-day force sustainment actions. However, it uses existing systems and units to do so. No resources exist solely to perform reconstitution. (See FM 4-100.9.)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

2-27. *Rules of engagement* (ROE) are directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-02). Operational requirements, policy, and law define the commander's ROE. Rules of engagement impact on how a commander conducts his operations in all four types of military operations by imposing political, practical, operational, and legal limitations on his actions. They may extend to criteria for initiating engagements with certain weapon systems, such as employing unobserved indirect fires within the echelon rear area, or reacting to an attack. They always recognize the right of self-defense and the commander's right and obligation to protect assigned personnel. CJCSI 3121.01A establishes the Joint Chiefs of Staff's standing ROE.

Operational level commanders modify those standing ROE as necessary in response to the factors of METT-TC.

SUPPORTING DISTANCE

2-28. *Supporting distance* is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other. For small units, it is the distance between two units that can be covered effectively by their fires (FM 3-0). Supporting distance is a factor of combat power, dispositions, communications capability, and tactical mobility of friendly and enemy forces.

SUPPORTING RANGE

2-29. *Supporting range* is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit, yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit's indirect fire weapons systems. (FM 3-0). Major factors that affect supporting range are terrain relief, the range of the supporting unit's weapon systems, and their locations in relation to the supported unit's position.

TACTICAL MOBILITY

2-30. ***Tactical mobility* is the ability to move rapidly from one part of the battlefield to another, relative to the enemy.** Tactical mobility is a function of cross-country mobility, firepower, and protection. The terrain, soil conditions, and weather affect cross-country mobility. Heavy ground maneuver units have good tactical mobility—except in restrictive terrain—combined with firepower and protection. They can move on the battlefield against most enemy forces unless faced with an enemy who can defeat their protection and cannot be suppressed by friendly fires. Light ground maneuver units have a tactical mobility advantage against enemy heavy forces in restrictive terrain, but limited firepower and protection. Army aviation maneuver units have good tactical mobility in most types of terrain, good firepower, but limited protection. Extreme weather conditions can restrict the tactical mobility of Army aviation units.

BASIC TACTICAL GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES

2-31. This section establishes basic tactical graphic control measures common to offensive and defensive operations. The appropriate chapters of this manual discuss those graphic control measures that apply to only one type of military operation. For example, Chapter 3 discusses the objective as a basic offensive control measure since an objective is a graphic control measure that applies only to offensive operations. These graphics apply to both automated and hand-drawn graphic displays or overlays. This section portrays control measures for use on situation maps, overlays, and annotated aerial photographs. They are also the standard for all simulations, to include those used in live, virtual, and constructive environments.

2-32. Units conducting tactical operations must have clearly defined tasks and responsibilities. The commander uses control measures to establish specific responsibilities that prevent units from impeding one another and impose necessary restrictions. Control measures can be permissive (which allows

something to happen) or restrictive (which limits how something is done). Control measures may be graphical, such as boundaries, or procedural, such as target engagement priorities. A commander should establish only the minimum control measures necessary to provide essential coordination and deconfliction between units. Control measures must not unduly restrict subordinates in accomplishing their missions. The commander removes restrictive control measures as soon as possible. FM 1-02 discusses the rules for drawing control measures on overlays and maps.

Basic Tactical Graphic Control Measures

- Air corridor and air control points
- Area of operations and boundaries
- Assembly areas
- Checkpoint
- Contact point
- Critical friendly zones
- Direct fire control measures
- Deep, close, and rear areas
- Engagement area
- Fire support coordination measures
- Fire support targets
- Forward line of own troops
- Line of contact
- Named area of interest
- Obstacle control measures
- Phase lines
- Position areas for artillery
- Routes
- Targeted area of interest

2-33. Well-conceived control measures facilitate the conduct of current and future operations. The commander adjusts his control measures as necessary to maintain synchronization and ensure mission accomplishment as the tactical situation evolves. He balances the risk of introducing additional friction into the operation with the benefits gained by changing them if all of his subordinate elements do not receive the new control measures when contemplating changes to previously established control measures.

2-34. Control measures apply to all forces: combat, CS, and CSS. The commander ensures all higher-echelon control measures, such as phase lines (PLs) and checkpoints, are incorporated into his graphic control measures. When he reports to higher headquarters, he references only the control measures established by that headquarters.

AIR CORRIDOR AND AIR CONTROL POINTS

2-35. An *air corridor* is a restricted air route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and established for the purpose of preventing friendly aircraft from being fired on by friendly forces (JP 1-02). It is used to deconflict artillery firing positions with aviation traffic. Low-level transit routes, minimum-risk routes, standard use army aircraft flight routes, and UAV routes are types of air corridors. An air corridor always includes air control points. An *air control point* (ACP) is an easily identifiable point on the terrain or an electronic navigational aid used to provide necessary control during air movement. ACPs are generally designated at each point where the flight route or air corridor makes a definite change in direction and at any other point deemed necessary for timing or control of the operation (FM 3-52). (Figure 2-4 on page 2-12 depicts a generic air corridor and ACPs. See FM 3-52 for more information on aerial control measures.)

AREA OF OPERATIONS AND BOUNDARIES

2-36. An AO is the basic control measure for all types of operations. An *area of operations* is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operations do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 1-02). The joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or the Army service component command (ASCC) commander will in turn assign their subordinates their own AOs. Those subordinates will further assign their subordinates AOs down to the battalion or company level based on the factors of METT-TC. A unit assigned an AO, the owning unit, may not change control measures imposed by a higher headquarters within their AO. However, it may establish additional control measures to coordinate and synchronize its operations.



Figure 2-4. Generic Air Corridor

2-37. Assigning an AO to a subordinate headquarters maximizes decentralized execution by empowering subordinate commanders to use their own initiative to accomplish their assigned missions. This encourages the use of mission command. (See FM 6-0 for a discussion of mission command.) At the same time it adds the responsibilities listed in Paragraph 2-40 below to the lower headquarters. Conversely, failure to designate subordinate AOs maximizes centralized execution and limits the subordinates' tactical options. The latter choice should be made only when mandated by the factors of METT-TC. For example, a brigade commander responsible for blocking an enemy advance along a single avenue of approach may assign his subordinate battalions battle positions to support a brigade engagement area (EA) instead of subdividing his AO and the avenue of approach into battalion AOs.

An *avenue of approach* is the air or ground route leading to an objective (or key terrain in its path) that an attacking force can use.

2-38. A higher headquarters designates an AO using boundaries. It normally assigns an AO to a maneuver unit, but it may also assign one to CS or CSS units. Having an AO assigned both restricts and facilitates the movement of units and use of fires. It restricts units not assigned responsibility for the AO from moving through the AO. It also restricts outside units from firing into or allowing the effects of its fires to affect the AO. Both of these restrictions can be relaxed through coordination with the owning unit. It facilitates the movement and fires of the unit assigned responsibility for, or owning, the AO. The assigned AO must encompass enough terrain for the commander to accomplish his mission and protect his forces.

2-39. Ideally, the AO is smaller than the commander's area of influence. An *area of influence* is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control (JP 1-02). If the commander's area of influence is smaller than his AO, he must consider his options for extending the size of his area of influence. His options include the following techniques:

- Changing the geographical dispositions of his current systems to increase the size of his area of influence and ensure coverage of key areas, installations, and systems.
- Requesting additional assets.
- Requesting boundary adjustments to reduce the size of his AO.
- Accepting the increased risk associated with being unable to provide security throughout the AO.
- Moving his area of influence by phases to sequentially encompass the entire AO.

2-40. All units assigned an AO have the following responsibilities:

- Terrain management.
- Movement control.
- Fires.
- Security.

Selected echelons have an additional responsibility to provide airspace command and control.

Terrain Management

2-41. The commander assigned an AO is responsible for terrain management within its boundaries. A higher headquarters may dictate that another unit position itself within a subordinate unit's AO, but the commander assigned the AO retains final approval authority for the exact placement. This ensures the unit commander controlling the AO knows what units are in his AO and where they are located so that he can deconflict operations, control movement, and prevent fratricide. Only the owning commander assigns subordinate unit boundaries within the AO.

Movement Control

2-42. Units may not move across boundaries into another unit's AO without receiving clearance from the unit owning the AO. Once assigned an AO, the owning unit controls movement throughout the AO. The designation, maintenance, route security, and control of movement along routes within an AO are the responsibility of the owning unit unless the higher echelon's coordinating instructions direct otherwise. The commander may designate movement routes as open, supervised, dispatch, reserved, or prohibited. Each route's designation varies based on the factors of METT-TC. FM 4-01.30 discusses movement planning and control measures.

Fires

2-43. Within its AO, the owning unit may employ any direct or indirect fire system without receiving further clearance from superior headquarters. There are three exceptions: The first and most common is that a unit may not use munitions within its own AO without receiving appropriate clearance if the effects of those munitions extend beyond its AO. For example, if a unit wants to use smoke, its effects cannot cross boundaries into another AO unless cleared with the adjacent owning unit. Second, higher headquarters may explicitly restrict the use of certain munitions within an AO or parts of an AO, such as long-duration scatterable mines. Third, higher headquarters may impose a restrictive fire support coordinating measure (FSCM) within an AO to protect some asset or facility, such as a no-fire area around a camp housing dislocated civilians. These FSCM tend to be linear in nature in a contiguous AO while they are more likely areas in a noncontiguous AO.

2-44. The commander may not employ indirect fires across boundaries without receiving clearance from the unit into whose AO the fires will impact. He may employ direct fires across boundaries without clearance at specific point targets that are clearly and positively identified as enemy.

Security

2-45. The security of all units operating within the AO is the responsibility of the owning commander. This fact does not require that commander to conduct area security operations throughout his AO. (See Chapter 12 for a discussion of area security responsibilities.) He must prevent surprise and provide the amount of time necessary for all units located within the AO to effectively respond to enemy actions by employing security forces around those units. If the commander cannot or chooses not to provide security throughout his AO, he must clearly inform all concerned individuals of when, where, and under what conditions he is not going to exercise this function. The commander generally depicts these locations using permissive FSCM. Each unit commander remains responsible for his unit's local security.

Airspace Command and Control

2-46. *Army airspace command and control* (A2C2) are those actions that ensure the synchronized use of airspace and enhanced command and control of forces using airspace (FM 3-52). The ground maneuver commander manages the airspace below the coordinating altitude, using procedural control measures and positive control measures implemented by his air traffic service organization. Corps and divisions are the echelons that routinely have A2C2 responsibilities, although a commander may provide the resources to accomplish this function to a brigade operating independently.

2-47. Communications, standardized procedures, and liaison normally provide the commander with his required connectivity with the theater airspace control authority. The commander ensures reliable communications through his area communications network. He supervises airspace activities through standardized procedures to prevent real-time conflicts among the various airspace users while achieving the necessary flexibility to ensure the greatest combat effectiveness. The A2C2 section of the battlefield coordination detachment, co-located with the joint air operations center, provides the commander

that liaison capability with the airspace control authority (ACA). (See FM 3-52 and JP 3-52 for additional information regarding airspace control doctrine.)

2-48. The vertical dimension, or airspace, of the AO is inherently permissive because all branches and services require the use of airspace. There are procedural and positive airspace control measures (ACM) available to synchronize military operations in the airspace above the AO. Among the procedural ACM is the coordinating altitude, which separates fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft will normally not fly and above which rotary-wing aircraft will normally not fly. It allows the ground commander to use the airspace above his AO for his organic aviation assets to complement ground maneuver forces, but it is not a boundary for which he has responsibility. The ACA, normally the joint force air component commander, must establish the coordinating altitude, promulgate it through the airspace control plan, address it in the airspace control order, and include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations. Coordinating altitudes are permissive ACM.

Boundaries

2-49. A *boundary* is a line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas (JP 0-2). The commander uses graphic control measures to define the limits of an AO and, as such, establish ground forces' responsibilities. He uses ACM to control the vertical dimension. The commander bases his subordinates' boundaries on clearly defined terrain features. This requirement is less important if all units in the AO have precision navigation capabilities. Boundaries should not split roads, rivers, or railways. Responsibility for an avenue of approach and key terrain should belong to only one unit. The commander adjusts his boundaries as necessary in response to the evolving tactical situation. Any areas not delegated to a subordinate remain the responsibility of the commander.

Contiguous and Noncontiguous AOs

2-50. **A commander has a *contiguous AO* when all of his subordinate forces' areas of operations share one or more common boundaries. A commander has a *noncontiguous AO* when one or more of his subordinate forces' areas of operations do not share a common boundary.** The intervening area between noncontiguous AOs remains the responsibility of the higher headquarters. The commander can choose to organize his AO so that his subordinates have contiguous or noncontiguous areas of operations.

2-51. The forward boundary of an echelon is primarily designated to divide responsibilities between it and its next higher echelon. Decisive or shaping operations directed against enemy forces beyond an echelon's forward boundary are the responsibility of the next higher echelon. The higher echelon headquarters normally assigns the lower echelon a forward boundary based on the higher echelon's scheme of maneuver. The ability to acquire and attack targets in the area between the forward boundary of its subordinates and the echelon's forward boundary determines the exact position of that forward

boundary. For example, if a division assigns a forward boundary to a brigade, then the division conducts operations beyond the brigade's forward boundary. That area between the brigade's forward boundary and the division's forward boundary is the division's deep area. The rear boundary defines the rearward limits of the unit's area. It usually also defines the start of the next echelon's rear area. Lateral boundaries extend from the rear boundary to the unit's forward boundary. (See Figure 2-5.)



Figure 2-5. Corps with Contiguous Areas of Operations

2-52. The commander bases his decision to establish contiguous AOs on his analysis of the factors of METT-TC. Units with contiguous AOs are normally within supporting distance of one another and may be within supporting range. Other reasons why a commander establishes contiguous AOs include—

- Limited size of the AO in relation to the number of friendly forces.
- Decisive points in close physical proximity to each other.
- Political boundaries or enemy force concentrations require establishing contiguous AOs.
- Reduced risk of being defeated in detail because of an incomplete operational picture or when the friendly force is significantly outnumbered.
- Greater concentration of combat power along a single avenue of approach or movement corridor.

2-53. A noncontiguous AO does not have distinctive forward, rear, and lateral boundaries. It is established by a boundary that encloses the entire area. Subordinate boundaries will be continuous, 360-degree arcs that closely approximate the subordinate unit's area of influence. For example, the commander would normally place a noncontiguous brigade boundary at the limit of observed fires for its security forces. Because noncontiguous boundaries must provide all-around security, they generally allow for less concentration of combat power along a single axis. A brigade, division, or corps commander who establishes noncontiguous AOs for his subordinates still designates an echelon rear area. Battle positions are not AOs since a unit is not restricted from operating outside its battle position. A commander who deploys his subordinates into battle positions is not conducting noncontiguous operations. Chapter 8 defines a battle position.

2-54. Operations directed against enemy forces and systems outside a noncontiguous AO are the responsibility of the organization that owns that location. For example, in Figure 2-6 the middle enemy division is the corps' responsibility since it is not within either of the corps' two divisions' AOs.



Figure 2-6. Corps with Noncontiguous Areas of Operations

2-55. The commander bases his decision to establish noncontiguous AOs on his analysis of the factors of METT-TC. There is a risk associated with establishing noncontiguous AOs since units with noncontiguous AOs are normally out of supporting range from each other. Overcoming this risk places a premium on situational understanding and tactical mobility. Reasons why a commander establishes noncontiguous AOs include—

- Encompassing key and decisive terrain within his area of influence when he has limited numbers of friendly forces for the size of the AO. ***Key terrain*** **is any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.**

***Decisive terrain*, when present, is key terrain whose seizure and retention is mandatory for successful mission accomplishment.**

- Comparative weakness of the enemy means that subordinates do not have to remain within supporting range or distance of one another and can take advantage of superior situational understanding and tactical mobility.
- Enemy concentrated in dispersed areas requires a corresponding concentration of friendly forces.
- Existence of large contaminated areas within his AO.

2-56. Using noncontiguous AOs place a premium on the use of innovative means to conduct sustaining operations, including aerial resupply. A commander whose subordinates have noncontiguous AOs has three basic choices for establishing intermittent ground lines of communications (LOCs) with his subordinates:

- Assign a subordinate the mission of providing convoy security for each convoy. For the situation depicted in Figure 2-7, the corps could assign the corps military police brigade the mission of providing convoy security for critical ground convoys traveling between the corps rear area and each division's rear area.
- Assign a subordinate the mission of providing route security for each sustainment route. For the situation depicted in Figure 2-7 the corps could assign the corps armored cavalry regiment an AO that extends four kilometers on either side of LOCs LEWIS and CLARK. The regiment would be assigned the mission of route security within that AO for the period required for sustainment convoys to travel to and from the two subordinate divisions.
- Assume risk by having the corps support command run convoys with only their organic self-defense capabilities, while assigning another unit the mission of responding to enemy contacts beyond a convoy's self-defense capability.

ASSEMBLY AREAS

2-57. **An *assembly area* (AA) is an area a unit occupies to prepare for an operation.** Ideally, an assembly area provides—

- Concealment from air and ground observation.
- Cover from direct fire.
- Space for dispersion; separate each AA by enough distance from other AAs to preclude mutual interference.
- Adequate entrances, exits, and internal routes.
- Good drainage and soil conditions that can sustain the movement of the unit's vehicles and individual soldiers.
- Terrain masking of electromagnetic signatures.
- Terrain allowing observation of ground and air avenues into the AA.
- Sanctuary from enemy medium-range artillery fires because of its location outside the enemy's range.

2-58. The commander assigns each unit its own AA. In Figure 2-7, the example of multiple units occupying one AA is a graphical shortcut taken when the map scale would make depiction of multiple assembly areas unreadable. In reality, the commander would subdivide AA Thomas into two smaller AAs, one for each unit. A unit AA is normally within the AO of another unit. An AA area is usually treated as a noncontiguous AO. This means that a unit has the same responsibilities within its assigned AA as it has for any other AO.



Figure 2-7. Assembly Areas

2-59. The proper location of AAs contributes significantly to both security and flexibility. It should facilitate future operations so movement to subsequent positions can take place smoothly and quickly by concealed routes. Because of their smaller signature, light units can use AAs closer to the enemy than heavy units without excessive risk of enemy detection. The tactical mobility of heavy units allows them to occupy AAs at a greater distance from the line of departure (LD) than light units.

CHECKPOINT

2-60. **A *checkpoint* is a predetermined point on the ground used to control movement, tactical maneuver, and orientation.** Units can also use a checkpoint as a fire control measure in lieu of the preferred control measure, a target reference point. Checkpoints are useful for orientation. Units may use checkpoints to supplement or as substitutes for phase lines (PLs). They are also used in the conduct of CSS. Figure 2-8 depicts Checkpoint 13.



Figure 2-8. Checkpoint 13

CONTACT POINT

2-61. **A *contact point* is an easily identifiable point on the terrain where two or more ground units are required to make physical contact.** A commander establishes a contact point where a PL crosses a lateral boundary or on other identifiable terrain as a technique to ensure coordination between two units. He provides a date-time group to indicate when to make that physical contact. Figure 2-9 depicts Contact Point 8.



Figure 2-9. Contact Point 8

2-62. The mutual higher commander of two moving units normally designates the location of contact points and times of contact. When one unit is stationary, its commander normally designates the location of the contact point and the meeting time, and transmits this information to the commander of the moving unit.

CRITICAL FRIENDLY ZONE

2-63. **A *critical friendly zone* (CFZ) is an area, usually a friendly unit or location, that the maneuver commander designates as critical to the protection of an asset whose loss would seriously jeopardize the mission.** The exact size and shape of the CFZ reflects the technical characteristics of the sensor coverage and varies in accordance with the terrain. There is no specific graphic for a CFZ. The designation of a CFZ requires the availability of a target acquisition sensor to cover that area and fire support weapon systems to conduct counterfire. The supporting field artillery unit's automated fire support system is tied to that sensor to place the location of a weapon firing into the CFZ ahead of all other targets in priority for counterfire. This results in an immediate call for fire unless the system operator manually overrides the automated request for fire. (For additional information on the employment of a CFZ, see FM 3-09.12.)

DIRECT FIRE CONTROL MEASURES

2-64. The small unit commander communicates to his subordinates the manner, method, and time to initiate, shift, and mass fires, and when to disengage by using direct fire control measures. The commander should control his unit's fires so he can direct the engagement of enemy systems to gain the greatest effect. The commander uses intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and reconnaissance to determine the most advantageous way to use direct fire control measures to mass the effects on the enemy and reduce fratricide from direct fire systems. He must understand the characteristics of weapon systems and available munitions (such as the danger to unprotected soldiers when tanks fire discarding sabot ammunition over their heads or near them). Direct fire control measures defined in this manual include engagement criteria, engagement priorities, sectors of fire, and target reference points. Platoon and company maneuver manuals address other direct fire control measures, such as frontal, cross, or depth fire patterns and simultaneous, alternating, or observed techniques of fire.

Engagement Area

2-65. **An *engagement area* (EA) is an area where the commander intends to contain and destroy an enemy force with the massed effects of all available weapons and supporting systems.** This includes organic direct fire systems and supporting systems, such as close air support. Figure 2-10 depicts several EAs used within the context of a battalion defense. The commander determines the size and shape of the EA by the relatively unobstructed intervisibility from the weapon systems in their firing positions and the maximum range of those weapons. The commander designates EAs to cover each enemy avenue of approach into his position. He also can use them to designate known or suspected enemy locations. Once the commander selects his EA, he arrays his forces in positions to concentrate overwhelming effects into these areas. He routinely subdivides his EA into smaller EAs for his subordinates using one or more target reference points or by prominent terrain features. The commander assigns sectors of fires to subordinates to prevent fratricide, but responsibility for an avenue of approach or key terrain is never split. These sectors normally do not affect friendly maneuver. Commanders of units up to battalion task force size normally use this control measure.



Figure 2-10. Engagement Areas

Engagement Criteria

2-66. ***Engagement criteria* are protocols that specify those circumstances for initiating engagement with an enemy force.** They may be restrictive or permissive. For example, a company commander could tell his 1st Platoon to wait until three enemy tanks reach a target reference point

within its EA before initiating fire. Another example is a battalion commander telling one of his company commanders not to engage an approaching enemy unit until it commits itself to an avenue of approach. The commander establishes his engagement criteria in the direct fire plan. Commanders and leaders of small tactical units use engagement criteria in conjunction with engagement priorities and other direct fire control measures to mass fires and control fire distribution.

Engagement Priority

2-67. ***Engagement priority*** **specifies the order in which the unit engages enemy systems or functions.** The commander assigns engagement priorities based on the type or level of threat at different ranges to match organic weapon systems capabilities against enemy vulnerabilities. Engagement priorities are situationally dependent. The commander uses engagement priorities to distribute fires rapidly and effectively. Subordinate elements can have different engagement priorities. For example, the commander establishes his engagement priorities so that his M2 Bradley fighting vehicles engage enemy infantry fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers while his M1 Abrams tanks engage enemy tanks. Normally, units engage the most dangerous targets first, followed by targets in depth.

Sector of Fire

2-68. **A *sector of fire* is that area assigned to a unit, a crew-served weapon, or an individual weapon within which it will engage targets as they appear in accordance with established engagement priorities.** (See Figure 2-11.) Battalions and smaller echelons primarily use this direct fire control measure. Each sector of fire can extend from a firing position to the maximum engagement range of the weapon, or it can be an enclosed area at a distance from the firing position. To increase the commander's ability to concentrate fires in a certain area, he should assign each unit or weapon system a primary sector of fire and a secondary sector of fire. The primary sector of fire is that area in which the assigned unit, individual, or crew-served weapon is initially responsible for engaging and defeating the enemy. Fire shifts to the secondary sector, on order, when there are no targets in the primary sector, or when the commander needs to cover the movement of another friendly element. This secondary sector of fire should correspond to another element's primary sector of fire to obtain mutual support. Subordinate commanders may impose additional fire control measures as required.


ENCLOSED SECTOR OF FIRE
PRIMARY SECTOR OF FIRE
SECONDARY SECTOR OF FIRE
SECTORS OF FIRE EXTENDING FROM FIRING POSITION

Figure 2-11. Sectors of Fire

Target Reference Point

2-69. **A *target reference point* (TRP) is an easily recognizable point on the ground, such as a building or a road junction, used in conjunction with engagement areas and sectors of fire to initiate, distribute, and control fires.** A TRP may be a natural terrain feature, a manmade artifact, such as a building, or a marker emplaced by the unit. Maneuver leaders at battalion and below designate TRPs to define unit or individual sectors of fire and observation, usually within an EA. A TRP can also designate the center of an area where the commander plans to rapidly distribute or converge fires. A task force commander designates TRPs for his company teams. Company commanders designate TRPs for their platoons, sections, and, in some cases, individual weapons. Platoon leaders or subordinate leaders may designate additional TRPs for their elements as necessary to control direct and indirect fires. The echelon fire support officer can also designate TRPs as indirect fire targets by using the standard target symbol with letters and numbers. Figure 2-12 depicts the symbol for TRP 032.



Figure 2-12.
Target Reference Point

Trigger Line

2-70. **A *trigger line* is a phase line used to initiate and mass fires into an engagement area or an objective at a predetermined range for all or like weapon systems.** It is located on identifiable terrain—like all phase lines—that crosses an EA, a direction of attack, or an axis of advance. The commander can designate one trigger line for all weapon systems or separate trigger lines for each weapon or type of weapon system. The commander specifies the engagement criteria for this specific situation. The criteria may be either time- or event-driven, such as a certain number or certain types of vehicles to cross the trigger line before initiating engagement. He may reserve to himself the authority to initiate engagement by firing his own weapon or giving the command to fire.


DIRECT-FIRE TRIGGER LINE
FIRE SUPPORT TRIGGER LINE
ENY
ENY
DISTANCE THAT CAN BE CROSSED BY THE ENEMY BETWEEN THE TIME THAT INDIRECT FIRES ARE CALLED FOR AND WHEN INDIRECT FIRES IMPACT

Figure 2-13. Trigger Lines

2-71. The commander designates a PL as the trigger line for his fire support systems. He bases the trigger line's location on the factors of METT-TC, including such variables as the time of flight for artillery shells, positioning of the guns, and the existence of quick-fire links. Its location varies from situation to situation. Its position reflects the distance that the enemy force is

likely to traverse in the time it takes from when fires are requested to when artillery rounds impact. (See Figure 2-13.) This gives time for the fire support systems to respond to the initial call for fire. For example, in a desert environment—a battalion task force commander's fire support trigger line is approximately four kilometers beyond the point where he wants to engage the enemy with indirect fires when he has M109A6 howitzers in direct support. It is approximately six kilometers when he has M109A3 howitzers in direct support. The shorter distance reflects the more rapid response capabilities of the M109A6 compared to the M109A3, all other factors being equal.

2-72. The commander can establish another trigger line for his most accurate long-range weapon system in the vicinity of the area where the fire support impacts to capitalize on the asymmetric attack. However, dust and debris resulting from the artillery fire may prevent his direct-fire systems from engaging the enemy. He establishes other trigger lines and TRPs for shorter-range systems. He may give guidance to extremely proficient crews to engage the enemy at longer than normal ranges or give them different engagement priorities than the rest of the force, such as giving priority to engaging air defense or engineer-breaching systems. This could result in losing the effect that the sudden application of massed fires has on an enemy.

2-73. When the enemy reaches these closer trigger lines, the commander establishes a decision point to help him determine if he wants his longer-range systems to continue to fire in depth or to concentrate his fires on a single point. Many factors impact his decision, most of which concern the enemy and how he maneuvers and the effects of the defending force's fires.

DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR AREAS

2-74. There are times when the factors of METT-TC favor a spatial organization of the entire AO. Korea is an example of large numbers of enemy units concentrated in numerous echelons on a contiguous front across the peninsula. The terrain and the capabilities and doctrine of allied units require the use of a spatial organization. The commander conducts simultaneous decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations within a context of deep, close, and rear areas when this occurs. (See Figure 2-14.)

Deep Area

2-75. When designated, the *deep area* is an area forward of the close area that commanders use to shape enemy forces before they are encountered or engaged in the close area (FM 3-0). It extends from the subordinate's forward boundary to the forward boundary of the controlling echelon. Thus, the deep area relates to the close area not only in terms of geography but also in terms of purpose and time. The extent of the deep area depends on how far out the force can acquire information and strike targets. Commanders may place forces or employ effects in the deep area to conduct shaping operations. Some of these operations may involve close combat. However, most ground maneuver forces stay in the close area.

2-76. New weapon systems and advanced information technology continue to increase the capability of Army forces to engage enemy forces in depth. In the past, deep attacks aimed to slow and disrupt the advance of enemy forces.

Today, Army forces may engage enemy formations with precision fires at substantial distances from the close area. This capability allows the commander to employ greater depth and simultaneity of action than ever before when conducting operations.



Figure 2-14. Deep, Close, and Rear Areas

Close Area

2-77. When designated, the *close area* is where forces are in immediate contact with the enemy and the fighting between the committed forces and readily available tactical reserves of both combatants is occurring, or where commanders envision close combat taking place. Typically, the close area assigned to a maneuver force extends from its subordinates' rear boundaries to its own forward boundary (FM 3-0). Typically, the close area is where the majority of close combat occurs. It also includes the activities of forces directly supporting the fighting elements, such as direct support field artillery and logistics elements. The close area is historically the only location where the commander could conduct his decisive operation. One unit may conduct the decisive operation, while another conducts shaping operations within a close area. Division commanders whose AOs constitute the corps close area have the option of designating their own deep, close, and rear areas. Figure 2-14 illustrates this option.

Rear Area

2-78. Unlike close and deep areas, a rear area can be designated by the commander regardless of the organization of his AO into contiguous or

noncontiguous subordinate AOs. When designated in the context of contiguous AOs, the *rear area* for any command extends from its rear boundary forward to the rear boundary of the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of support functions and is where the majority of the echelon's sustaining operations occur (FM 3-0). The commander designates an individual responsible for conducting his sustaining operations within the rear area after considering the factors of METT-TC. He provides that individual the necessary command and control resources to direct the echelon's sustaining operations. At the corps and division echelons, this is the rear command post. Those operations include the following functions that assure his command's freedom of action and continuity of operations:

- Combat service support.
- Rear area and base security.
- Movement control throughout the AO.
- Terrain management throughout the AO.
- Infrastructure development.

That individual may be the corps deputy commander, assistant division commander (support), or the forward support battalion commander depending on the echelon.

2-79. Regardless of the specific sustaining operations performed by an organization occupying the rear area, its focus on other-than-combat operations leaves it more vulnerable than combat organizations in close areas. Commanders may protect CS and CSS units and facilities in rear areas with combat forces. Geography or other circumstances may cause the commander to designate a noncontiguous rear area. This increases the challenge associated with providing rear area security due to the physical separation from combat units that would otherwise occupy a contiguous close area.

2-80. Between contiguous and noncontiguous AOs, the commander chooses the battlefield organization best suited to the tactical situation. For example, in an area defense the proximity of the enemy, the array and density of friendly forces, and the requirement to protect sustaining functions allows the commander to visualize decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations in terms of discrete areas. In contrast, within the context of a search and attack operation, the lack of information about the enemy, the need to block enemy escape, the existence of noncontiguous rear areas, and the nature of the AO may preclude organization of the battlefield into discrete close, deep, and rear areas.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATING MEASURES

2-81. Commanders assigned an AO employ FSCM to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Fire support coordinating measures are either permissive or restrictive. Boundaries are the basic FSCM. The fire support coordinator recommends FSCM to the commander based on the commander's guidance, location of friendly forces, scheme of maneuver, and anticipated enemy actions. Once the commander establishes FSCM, they are entered into or posted on all the command's displays and databases. (FM 3-09 explains the use of all FSCM in more detail).

Permissive FSCM

2-82. The primary purpose of permissive measures is to facilitate the attack of targets. Once they are established, further coordination is not required to engage targets affected by the measures. Permissive FSCM include a coordinated fire line, fire support coordination line, and free-fire area.

2-83. **Coordinated Fire Line.** A *coordinated fire line* (CFL) is a line beyond which conventional, direct, and indirect surface fire support means may fire at any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination. The purpose of the CFL is to expedite the surface-to-surface attack of targets beyond the CFL without coordination with the ground commander in whose area the targets are located (JP 3-09). Brigades or divisions usually establish a CFL, although a maneuver battalion may establish one. It is located as close as possible to the establishing unit without interfering with maneuver forces to open up the area beyond to fire support. A higher echelon may consolidate subordinate unit CFLs. If this occurs, any changes to the subordinate CFLs are coordinated with the subordinate headquarters. (See Figure 2-15.)



Figure 2-15. Coordinated Fire Line

2-84. **Fire Support Coordination Line.** The *fire support coordination line* (FSCL) is a FSCM that is established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. [See Figure 2-16.] The FSCL facilitates the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. A FSCL does not divide an area of operations by defining a boundary between close and deep operations or a distinct area [JP 3-09 uses *zone*] for close air support. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack



Figure 2-16. Fire Support Coordination Line

of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources (JP 3-09).

2-85. The commander designating a FSCL remains responsible for establishing the priority, effects, and timing of fires impacting beyond the FSCL. Coordination for attacks beyond the FSCL is through the air tasking order. The appropriate land or amphibious commander controls attacks short of the FSCL. That commander uses the tactical air control system or the Army air-ground system to control the execution of close air support (CAS).

2-86. **Free-Fire Area.** A *free-fire area* (FFA) is a specific area into which any weapon system may fire without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters (JP 3-09). Normally, division or higher headquarters establish a FFA on identifiable terrain. (See Figure 2-17.)



Figure 2-17. Free-Fire Area

Restrictive FSCM

2-87. A restrictive FSCM prevents fires into or beyond the control measure without detailed coordination. The primary purpose of restrictive measures is to provide safeguards for friendly forces. Restrictive FSCM include an airspace coordination area, no-fire area, restrictive fire area, and restrictive fire line. Establishing a restrictive measure imposes certain requirements for specific coordination before the engagement of those targets affected by the measure.

2-88. **Airspace Coordination Area.** The *airspace coordination area* (ACA) is a three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, established by the appropriate ground commander, in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. The airspace coordination area may be formal or informal (JP 3-09.3). Time, space, or altitude separates aircraft and indirect fire. The purpose of the ACA is to allow the simultaneous attack of targets near each other by fixed-wing aircraft and other fire support means. Several techniques may be used in this role. The technique selected depends on the time available, tactical situation, unit SOPs, and state of training. (FM 3-52 defines ACM.)

2-89. The airspace control authority establishes formal ACAs at the request of the appropriate ground commander. This is normally a separate brigade or higher-echelon commander. Formal ACAs require detailed planning. The design of the ACA's vertical and lateral limits allows freedom of action for air and surface fire support for the greatest number of foreseeable targets.

2-90. The echelon fire support cell coordinates the location and extent of the ACM with the A2C2) element and the fire direction center. It is located above the target area as recommended by the air liaison element to the fire support cell. The type of aircraft and the ordnance dictate the size of the area. Vital information defining the formal ACA includes minimum and maximum altitudes, a baseline designated by grid coordinates at each end, the width of the ACA from either side of the baseline, and effective times. (See Figure 2-18.)



Figure 2-18. A Formal Airspace Coordination Measure

2-91. The maneuver commander may establish informal ACAs. He may separate aircraft and surface fires by distance (lateral, altitude, or a combination) or by time. Lateral separation is effective for coordinating fires against targets that are adequately separated by at least one kilometer from flight routes to ensure aircraft protection from the effects of friendly fires. An example of a lateral separation technique is: "Aircraft stay west of grid line 62." Altitude separation is effective for coordinating fires when aircraft remain above indirect fire trajectories and their effects. This technique is effective when aircrews and firing units engage the same or nearby targets. An example of altitude separation is: "Aircraft remain above 3000 feet mean sea level in quadrant northwest of grid PK7325."

2-92. A combination of lateral and altitude separation is the most restrictive technique for aircraft and may be required when aircraft must cross the gun target line of a firing unit. Time separation requires the most detailed coordination and may be required when aircraft must fly near indirect-fire trajectories or ordnance effects. The commander must coordinate the timing of surface fires with aircraft routing. This ensures that even though aircraft and surface fires may occupy the same space, they do not do so at the same time. Surface and air-to-ground fires should be synchronized. All timing for surface fires will be based on a specific aircraft event time. Fire support personnel and tactical air controllers should select the separation technique that requires the least coordination without adversely affecting timely fires or the aircrew's ability to safely complete the mission.

2-93. **No-Fire Area.** A *no-fire area* (NFA) is a land area designated by the appropriate commander into which fires or their effects are prohibited (JP 3-09). (See Figure 2-19.) A commander uses a NFA to protect independently operating elements, such as forward observers and special operating forces. He can also use it to protect friendly forces in the rear area and for humanitarian reasons, such as preventing the inadvertent engagement of displaced civilian concentrations, or to protect sensitive areas, such as cultural monuments. There are two exceptions to this rule:



Figure 2-19. No-Fire Area

- The establishing headquarters may approve fires within the NFA on a case-by-case mission basis.
- When an enemy force within a NFA engages a friendly force, the friendly force may engage a positively identified enemy force to defend itself.

2-94. **Restrictive Fire Area.** A *restrictive fire area* (RFA) is an area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters (JP 3-09). (See Figure 2-20.) The purpose of the RFA is to regulate fires into an area according to the stated restrictions, such as no unguided conventional or dud-producing munitions. Maneuver battalion or larger ground forces normally establish RFAs. On occasion, a company operating independently may establish a RFA. Usually, it is located on identifiable terrain, by grid or by a radius (in meters) from a center point. The restrictions on a RFA may be shown on a map or overlay, or reference can be made to an operation order that contains the restrictions.



Figure 2-20. Restrictive Fire Area

2-95. **Restrictive Fire Line.** A *restrictive fire line* (RFL) is a line established between converging friendly surface forces that prohibits fires or their effects across that line (JP 3-09). Both or only one of those converging may be moving. Fires and their effects can cross a RFL when the event has been coordinated with the establishing and affected organizations. The purpose of the line is to prevent interference between converging friendly forces, such as what occurs during a linkup operation. The next higher common commander of the converging forces establishes the RFL. Located on identifiable terrain, it is usually located closer to the stationary force—if there is one—than to the moving force. Alternatively, the commander can use a RFL to protect sensitive areas, such as cultural monuments. (See Figure 2-21.)

FIRE SUPPORT TARGETS

2-96. In the fire support context, a *target* is an area designated and numbered for future firing (JP 1-02). There are graphic control measures for point targets, circular targets, rectangular targets, and linear targets. Figure 2-22 depicts these symbols. The commander designates fire support targets using a two-letter and four-digit code established in field artillery doctrine. He may group two or more targets for simultaneous engagement. He may also attack individual targets and groups of targets in series or in a predetermined sequence. When this occurs, it is referred to as a series of targets.



Figure 2-21. Restrictive Fire Line



Figure 2-22. Targets

2-97. Doctrine classifies each fire support target as either a planned target or a target of opportunity. Targets of opportunity are not planned in advance and are engaged as they present themselves in accordance with established engagement criteria and rules of engagement. Planned targets are ones on which fires are prearranged, although the degree of this prearrangement may vary.

2-98. Individually planned fire support targets may be further subdivided into scheduled and on-call fires. Scheduled targets are planned targets on

which field artillery and other fire support assets deliver their fires in accordance with a pre-established time schedule and sequence. On-call targets are planned targets engaged in response to a request for fires rather than in accordance with an established time schedule. An on-call target requires less reaction time than a target of opportunity. The degree of prearrangement for the on-call target influences the reaction time from request to execution–the greater the prearrangement, the faster the reaction time. Priority targets are an example of on-call targets that have short reaction times since each priority target has a fire unit placed on it when it is not engaged in other fire missions. The final protective fires (FPF) of A Battery, 1st Battalion 16th Field Artillery in Figure 2-22 is an example of a priority target. (See FM 3-09 for additional information regarding fire support.)

FORWARD LINE OF OWN TROOPS

2-99. The *forward line of own troops* (FLOT) is a line which indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The forward line of own troops normally identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces (JP 1-02). In the defense, it may be beyond, at, or short of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), depending on the tactical situation. (Chapter 9 defines the FEBA with other defensive control measures.) It does not include small, long-range reconnaissance assets and similar stay-behind forces. Friendly forces forward of the FLOT may have a restrictive fire coordination measure, such as an RFA, placed around them to preclude fratricide. Figure 2-23 depicts the symbol for the FLOT.



Figure 2-23. Forward Line of Own Troops

LINE OF CONTACT

2-100. **The *line of contact* (LC) is a general trace delineating the location where friendly and enemy forces are engaged.** The commander designates the enemy side of the LC by the abbreviation "ENY." In the defense, a LC is often synonymous with the FLOT. In the offense, a LC is often combined with the LD. Chapter 4 discusses the LD. Figure 2-24 depicts the symbol for the LC.



Figure 2-24. Line of Contact

NAMED AREA OF INTEREST

2-101. **A *named area of interest* (NAI) is the geographical area where information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected.** NAIs are usually selected to capture indications of enemy courses of action but also may be related to battlefield and environment conditions. The commander tailors the shape of the NAI symbol to the actual area he wants observed, rather than using a prescribed shape. It is possible to redesignate a NAI as a targeted area of interest on confirmation of enemy activity within the area, allowing a commander to mass the effects of his combat power on that area. Figure 2-25 depicts NAI Augusta.



Figure 2-25. Named Area of Interest

OBSTACLE CONTROL MEASURES

2-102. *Obstacles* are any obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force. Obstacles can exist naturally or can be manmade, or can be a combination of both (JP 1-02). ***Obstacle control measures* are specific measures that simplify the granting of obstacle-emplacing authority while providing obstacle control.** They consist of—

- Zones.
- Belts.
- Groups.
- Restrictions.

Figure 2-26 on page 2-34 summarizes these graphic control measures. Unless he is the senior land component commander within a theater of operations, a commander assigned an AO does not have emplacement authority for other than protective obstacles unless specifically granted the authority by a higher headquarters.

2-103. Procedural measures include restricting specific obstacles by type, munitions, or point locations in a verbal or written order. They also include higher commanders tasking subordinate units to construct or execute specific obstacles. These are known as directed or reserve obstacles and are specified tasks found in the unit order. FM 3-34.1 discusses the detailed procedural methods to both restrict and direct obstacle construction.

Obstacle Zones

2-104. An *obstacle zone* is a division-level command and control measure, normally done graphically, to designate specific land areas where lower echelons

are allowed to employ tactical obstacles (JP 1-02). Corps and division commanders use them to grant obstacle-emplacement authority to brigades (including armored cavalry regiments and other major subordinate units). Obstacle zones are permissive, allowing brigades to place reinforcing obstacles to support their scheme of maneuver without interfering with future operations.

OBSTACLE CONTROL MEASURE	EMPLACEMENT AUTHORITY FROM	EMPLACEMENT AUTHORITY TO	GRAPHIC	EXAMPLE
ZONE	CORPS DIV	DIV BDE	Letter Designation Effect Graphic Optional	
BELT	CORPS DIV BDE	BDE[1] BDE[1] TF	Number Designation Effect Graphic Normal	
GROUP	DIV BDE TF	BDE[2] TF[2] CO TRP	Letter Designation Effect Symbol is the Graphic	Obstacle Groups in a Belt
OBSTACLE RESTRICTED AREA (ORA)	ANY		52ID 120900-162400SepXX	

1 - Rarely done by corps and divisions, but possible.

2 - Done only when directed and integrated with corps or division fire plans.

Graphic Effects Symbols	Disrupt	Fix	Turn	Block

Figure 2-26. Obstacle Control Measure Graphics

2-105. If the obstacle zone encompasses the entire brigade AO, another graphic is unnecessary. Commanders may designate the entire AO as an obstacle zone, with the unit boundaries defining the geographical limits of the zone. Obstacle zones do not cross brigade boundaries. Commanders assign obstacle zones to a single subordinate unit to ensure unity of effort, just as they would when assigning defensive AOs or battle positions. This keeps tactical obstacle responsibility along the same lines as control of direct and indirect fires. This does not normally create vulnerabilities on the boundary between units since the commander bases his assignment of both subordinate AOs and obstacle zones on defined avenues of approach.

2-106. A commander does not normally assign an obstacle effect (block, fix, turn, or disrupt) to an obstacle zone. This allows his subordinate commanders flexibility in using obstacles. The commander should establish construction and resourcing priorities between different obstacle zones.

Obstacle Belts

2-107. An *obstacle belt* is a brigade-level command and control measure, normally given graphically, to show where within an obstacle zone the ground tactical commander plans to limit friendly obstacle employment and focus the defense (JP 1-02). It assigns an intent to the obstacle plan and provides the necessary guidance on the overall effect of obstacles within a belt. They plan obstacle belts within assigned obstacle zones to grant obstacle-emplacement authority to their major subordinate units. Obstacle belts also focus obstacles to support the brigade scheme of maneuver and ensure that obstacles do not interfere with the maneuver of any higher headquarters.

2-108. Obstacle belts are restrictive, but also direct a subordinate unit to construct one or more obstacles to achieve an effect in the area. They do not specify the type or number of obstacles. Obstacle belts do not cross unit boundaries for the same reasons as discussed in obstacle zones. A single unit is responsible for a belt; however, a commander may assign more than one belt to a unit.

2-109. A brigade commander normally assigns an obstacle effect and priority to each obstacle belt. As with the obstacle zone, the target and relative location are apparent. Adding a specific obstacle effect gives purpose and direction to battalion task force obstacle planning. When brigade commanders assign an obstacle effect, they ensure that obstacles within the belt complement the brigade fire plan.

2-110. A corps, division, or brigade commander may authorize emplacement authority for certain types of protective obstacles outside of obstacle zones or belts. Normally, the commander authorizes company team and base commanders to emplace protective obstacles within 500 meters of their positions, depending on the factors of METT-TC. The commander usually limits the types of obstacles a unit may use for protective obstacles that are outside of obstacle-control measures. For example, he may allow only wire- and command-detonated mines outside of control measures for protective obstacles. Furthermore, he may require that minefields be fenced on all sides to

prevent fratricide, after obtaining legal guidance concerning current rules and policies.

Obstacle Groups

2-111. ***Obstacle groups*** **are one or more individual obstacles grouped to provide a specific obstacle effect.** Task forces use obstacle groups to ensure that company teams emplace individual obstacles supporting the task force's scheme of maneuver. In rare cases, brigades, divisions, or even corps may use obstacle groups for specific tactical obstacles. Also, units integrate obstacle groups with their direct- and indirect-fire plans. Brigade and task force commanders can plan their placement anywhere in the obstacle zones or belts, respectively.

2-112. Unlike obstacle zones or belts, obstacle groups are not areas but relative locations for actual obstacles. Commanders normally show obstacle groups using the obstacle-effect graphics. When detailed planning is possible (to include detailed on-the-ground reconnaissance), commanders may show obstacle groups using individual obstacle graphics.

2-113. The company team commander and the engineer can adjust obstacles in the group if the intent and link to the fire plan remain intact. Company team commanders make minor changes to obstacles and fire-control measures based on terrain realities. For example, a commander may move a fixing obstacle group and direct-fire TRPs a hundred meters to avoid having them masked by rolling terrain. A major change to the obstacle group location requires the approval of the commander who ordered the obstacle group emplacement.

Individual Obstacles

2-114. Each type of individual obstacle, such as abatis, antitank ditch, booby traps, mines and minefields, roadblocks, craters, and wire obstacles has its associated graphic. Once a unit constructs an individual obstacle, the obstacle's location is recorded and reported through the chain of command. Commanders must report individual obstacles in sufficient detail so any unit moving through the area can bypass or reduce the obstacle without excessive risk. Each headquarters is responsible to ensure exact obstacle locations are disseminated throughout its organization. Individual obstacle graphics are rarely shown on maps above the battalion echelon and are not depicted in this manual. (FM 3-34.1 defines individual obstacles and establishes the graphics for them.)

Obstacle Restrictions

2-115. Commanders may use obstacle restrictions to provide additional obstacle control and to limit the specific types of obstacles used, such as no buried mines. These restrictions ensure that subordinates do not use obstacles with characteristics that impair future operations. It also allows commanders to focus the use of limited resources for the decisive operation by restricting their use elsewhere. An *obstacle restricted area* (ORA) is a command and control measure used to limit the type or number of obstacles within an area (JP 1-02). The commander with emplacement authority uses ORAs to restrict

obstacle placement. The ORA graphic depicts the area effected, the unit imposing the restriction, and the restrictions in effect.

PHASE LINE

2-116. A *phase line* (PL) is a line utilized for control and coordination of military operations, usually a terrain feature extending across the operational area [JP 1-02 uses *zone of action*] (JP 1-02). (See Figure 2-27.) A commander establishes PLs to control the maneuver of his units. Phase lines are not boundaries unless designated as such and do not establish any specific responsibilities between units, unless the operations order so specifies. When possible, the commander places them along easily recognizable terrain features—such as roads, railroad tracks, rivers, and ridgelines—to ensure easy identification. As with boundaries, this is less important if all units are equipped with precision navigation devices. Some PLs have additional designations for specific purposes, such as a LD or a probable line of deployment (PLD). Chapter 5 discusses these specific purposes.



Figure 2-27. Phase Lines Used with Other Control Measures

POSITION AREA FOR ARTILLERY

2-117. **A *position area for artillery* (PAA) is an area assigned to an artillery unit where individual artillery systems can maneuver to increase their survivability. A PAA is not an AO for the artillery unit occupying it.** The commander assigns PAAs for terrain management purposes. Establishing a PAA lets other subordinate units know they should avoid occupying that same terrain, thus avoiding enemy counterfire. While the exact size of a PAA depends on the factors of METT-TC, a Paladin platoon

normally requires a PAA encompassing two square kilometers, and a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) platoon requires nine square kilometers. (See Figure 2-28.)



Figure 2-28. Position Area for Artillery

2-118. The maneuver echelon operations officer (G3 or S3) of the unit that owns the terrain establishes the PAA. The occupying artillery unit does not have the same authority and responsibilities toward the PAA that are associated with a unit assigned an AO. For example, other units can move through a PAA without clearing that movement with the artillery unit. The artillery unit occupying a PAA establishes liaison with the unit that owns the AO where the PAA is located. The echelon fire support officer usually conducts this liaison in accordance with standard command and support relationships. (For a discussion of common command and control relationships, see FM 6-0. For a discussion of artillery missions, see FM 3-09.*)*

2-119. The decision to establish a PAA affects A2C2 for rotary and fixed-wing integration. A PAA is a base upon which to establish future grid-target lines for lateral deconfliction and areas for rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft to avoid depending on high- or low-angle artillery fires.

ROUTE

2-120. A *route* is the prescribed course to be traveled from a specific point of origin to a specific destination (JP 1-02). (See Route Iron in Figure 2-29.) Routes can have different purposes. Those purposes can be added as adjectives to specify different types of routes. Examples of such routes include passing route and main supply route (MSR). The commander can further designate MSRs as open, supervised, dispatch, reserved, or prohibited. The commander can assign names, numbers, or alphanumeric designations to routes within his AO. (See FM 4-01.30 for additional information concerning route classification and marking.)



Figure 2-29. Routes

TARGETED AREA OF INTEREST

2-121. **A *targeted area of interest* (TAI) is the geographical area or point along a mobility corridor where successful interdiction will cause the enemy to abandon a particular course of action or requires him to use specialized engineer support to continue. It is where he**



Figure 2-30.
Targeted Area of Interest

can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. The commander designates TAIs where he believes his unit can best attack high-payoff targets. The unit staff develops TAIs during the targeting process, based on the currently available products resulting from the IPB process. These TAIs are further refined during wargaming and finally approved by the commander during COA approval. The shape of a TAI reflects the type of target and the weapon system intended to engage that target. They are normally cued by surveillance assets, which include UAVs, combat observation and lasing teams (COLTs), long-range surveillance units (LSUs), fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft using a variety of sensors, and special operations forces. A commander can designate a TAI for any of his organic or supporting systems, including CAS. Figure 2-30 depicts TAI Whitetail.

PART TWO

Offensive Operations

Chapter 3

The Basics of the Offense

To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits of victory, is the secret of successful war.

Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, 1863

Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to impose US will on the enemy and achieve decisive victory (FM 3-0). A commander may also conduct offensive operations to deprive the enemy of resources, seize decisive terrain, deceive or divert the enemy, develop intelligence, or hold an enemy in position. This chapter discusses the basics of the offense. The basics discussed in this chapter apply to all types of offensive operations.

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3-1. The commander seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative when conducting offensive operations. Even in the defense, wresting the initiative from the enemy requires offensive operations.

3-2. Offensive operations are either force- or terrain-oriented. Force-oriented operations focus on the enemy. Terrain-oriented operations focus on seizing and retaining control of terrain and facilities.

CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Characteristics of Offensive Operations

- Surprise
- Concentration
- Tempo
- Audacity

3-3. Surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity characterize the offense. Effective offensive operations capitalize on accurate intelligence and other relevant information regarding enemy forces, weather, and terrain. The commander maneuvers his forces to advantageous positions before contact. Security operations and defensive information operations keep or inhibit the enemy from acquiring accurate information about friendly forces. Contact with enemy forces before the decisive operation is deliberate, designed to shape the optimum situation for the decisive operation. The decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action that capitalizes on subordinate initiative and a common operational picture (COP) to expand throughout the area of operations (AO). The commander executes violently without hesitation to break the enemy's will or destroy him. FM 3-0 discusses the four characteristics of offensive operations.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

3-4. The following vignette discusses the offensive operations of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) during OPERATION DESERT STORM. The actions of the 101st Airborne Division between 24 and 28 February 1991 were a shaping operation for the XVIII Airborne Corps.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 24–28 February 1991

The 101st attacked on 24 February 1991 to interdict, block, and defeat enemy forces operating in or moving through AO Eagle. On order, they were to attack to the east to assist in defeating the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). As part of that attack, the 101st conducted an air assault to establish forward operating base (FOB) Cobra. The FOB was approximately halfway between tactical assembly area (TAA) Campbell and the Euphrates River and Highway 8 (the main road between Basrah and Baghdad). In the FOB, the 101st would build up supplies and forces by both land and air. That FOB would support a further air assault by the division's remaining uncommitted brigade into AO Eagle. This second air assault would cut both Iraqi lines of communication (LOC) and retreat routes of Iraqi forces in Kuwait. From FOB Cobra, the 101st, with two brigades, could launch air assault operations to support other operations.

The operation was scheduled to begin at 0400 on 24 February. The 1st Brigade's ground column departed the TAA at 0700. However, weather delayed the air assault into FOB Cobra, approximately 150 kilometers north of the TAA, until

0730. The assault elements of the brigade cleared the area within the FOB of Iraqi soldiers by 1030, making it secure enough for AH-64 operations. Attack helicopter operations from FOB Cobra into AO Eagle began by 1330 with patrols along Highway 8. The CG, MG J.H. Binford Peay III, decided to bring in 2nd Brigade to FOB Cobra that day while the weather permitted. However, he delayed 3rd Brigade's assault into AO Eagle until 25 February.

That night, reconnaissance assets found an alternative route for the vehicles to use from LZ Sand, in AO Eagle, to Highway 8. The first air assault on 25 February landed three antiarmor companies, two infantry companies, and an artillery battalion into the LZ, but these units were unable to link up with their parent battalions until the next day. The 3rd Brigade's main body cut Highway 8 at 1508 and secured the area by 1848. This later air assault covered 156 miles and cut Highway 8 only 145 miles from Baghdad. Meanwhile, the buildup of FOB Cobra continued, with 3rd Brigade's second lift spending the night there due to weather. The 101st also established contact with 24th Infantry Division (ID) to its east. Farther north in AO Eagle, 3rd Brigade made sporadic contact with Iraqi forces along Highway 8 during the night. With this, the 101st Airborne achieved all of its initial objectives and began planning for subsequent missions. It had pressed the fight, never let the enemy recover from the initial blow, and exploited success at FOB Cobra and AO Eagle. (See Figure 3-1.)



Figure 3-1. Initial Objectives

A continuing sandstorm intensified on 26 February, limiting aerial operations. However, the remaining 3rd Brigade lifts were ferried from FOB Cobra to AO Eagle, and 2nd Brigade closed into FOB Cobra and began planning for subsequent operations. Although the sandstorm curtailed aerial operations, the division continued ground operations. The 3rd Brigade kept Highway 8 closed from ground battle positions supported by DS artillery despite Iraqi attempts to bypass. The 1st Brigade continued the buildup of FOB Cobra by ground transport and established contact with the 82nd Airborne Division. The 24th ID reached the Euphrates that night and cut Highway 8 farther to the east with heavy forces. The tempo was such that planned contingencies were overtaken by events; XVIII Corps had accomplished its initial objectives and issued new orders orienting the corps' main effort eastward. As part of this reorientation, MG Peay decided to establish FOB Viper, 150 kilometers to the east of Cobra, for aerial operations

against EA Thomas, 200 kilometers northeast of Viper, to destroy Iraqi forces fleeing north from Basrah. Corps assets, including the 12th Aviation Brigade and the 5th Battalion, 8th Artillery (155, T), reinforced the 101st Division.

The 101st launched its third major air assault at 0830, 27 February. The 2nd Brigade assaulted into FOB Viper with an infantry battalion and a reinforced artillery battalion augmented by engineers and air defense forces. By 1400, four attack helicopter battalions began operations against EA Thomas. The 2nd Brigade continued to close into FOB Viper. The division's attack helicopters cut the last escape route north out of Kuwait and destroyed 14 APCs, eight BM-21 MRLs, four MI-6 helicopters, and two SA-6 units. The Iraqi forces, unable to escape north, lay in the paths of VII Corps and 24th ID. The 1st Brigade had orders to air assault into EA Thomas on 28 February, but the cease-fire precluded this operation. Although the actions of the 101st during these 100 hours were a shaping operation, they illustrate the tactical application of all of the characteristics of offensive operations.

TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Types of Offensive Operations
- Movement to contact
- Attack
- Exploitation
- Pursuit

3-5. The four types of offensive operations are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Entry operations, while offensive in nature, are one of the six subordinate forms of force-projection operations. Force-projection operations are operational level tasks and fall outside the scope of this manual. Joint doctrine addresses force-projection operations. Appendix C addresses tactical airborne and air assault operations as vertical envelopments.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

3-6. *Movement to contact* is a type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact (FM 3-0). The commander conducts a movement to contact (MTC) when the enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an attack. A search and attack is a specialized technique of conducting a movement to contact in an environment of noncontiguous AOs. Chapter 4 discusses MTC.

ATTACK

Forms of the Attack
- Ambush
- Spoiling attack
- Counterattack
- Raid
- Feint
- Demonstration

3-7. An *attack* is an offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both (FM 3-0). Movement, supported by fires, characterizes the conduct of an attack. However, based on his analysis of the factors of METT-TC, the commander may decide to conduct an attack using only fires. An attack differs from a MTC because enemy main body dispositions are at least partially known,

which allows the commander to achieve greater synchronization. This enables him to mass the effects of the attacking force's combat power more effectively in an attack than in a MTC.

3-8. Special purpose attacks are ambush, spoiling attack, counterattack, raid, feint, and demonstration. The commander's intent and the factors of METT-TC determine which of these forms of attack are employed. He can conduct each of these forms of attack, except for a raid, as either a hasty or a deliberate operation. Chapter 6 discusses the attack and its subordinate forms.

EXPLOITATION

3-9. *Exploitation* is a type of offensive operation that rapidly follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth (FM 3-0). The objective of an exploitation is to complete the enemy's disintegration. Chapter 6 discusses exploitation.

PURSUIT

3-10. A *pursuit* is an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (JP 1-02). A pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation. However, if it is apparent that enemy resistance has broken down entirely and the enemy is fleeing the battlefield, any other type or subordinate form of offensive operation can transition into a pursuit. Chapter 7 discusses the pursuit.

COMMON OFFENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES

3-11. This section defines in alphabetical order those common offensive control measures that a commander uses to synchronize the effects of his combat power. The commander uses the minimum control measures required to successfully complete the mission while providing the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation.

ASSAULT POSITION

3-12. **An *assault position* is a covered and concealed position short of the objective from which final preparations are made to assault the objective.** Ideally, it offers both cover and concealment. These final preparations can involve tactical considerations, such as a short halt to coordinate the final assault, reorganize to adjust to combat losses, or make necessary adjustments in the attacking force's dispositions. These preparations can also involve technical items, such as engineers conducting their final prepare-to-fire checks on obstacle clearing systems and the crews of plow- and roller-equipped tanks removing their locking pins. It may be located near to either a final coordination line (FCL) or a probable line of deployment (PLD). (Paragraphs 3-18 and 3-23 define a FCL and a PLD respectively.)

ASSAULT TIME

3-13. **The *assault time* establishes the moment to attack the initial objectives throughout the geographical scope of the operation.** It is imposed by the higher headquarters in operations to achieve simultaneous

results by several different units. It synchronizes the moment the enemy feels the effects of friendly combat power. It is similar to the time-on-target control method for fire mission processing used by the field artillery. A commander uses it instead of a time of attack (defined in paragraph 3-26) because of the different distances that elements of his force must traverse, known obstacles, and differences in each unit's tactical mobility.

ATTACK-BY-FIRE POSITION

3-14. **An *attack-by-fire position* designates the general position from which a unit conducts the tactical task of attack by fire.** (Appendix B defines the tactical mission task of attack by fire.) The purpose of these positions is to mass the effects of direct fire systems for one or multiple locations toward the enemy. An attack-by-fire position does not indicate the specific site. Attack-by-fire positions are rarely applicable to units larger than company size. Figure 3-2 depicts attack-by-fire position BRANDON.



Figure 3-2. Attack-by-Fire Position BRANDON

ATTACK POSITION

3-15. **The *attack position* is the last position an attacking force occupies or passes through before crossing the line of departure.** An attack position facilitates the deployment and last-minute coordination of the attacking force before it crosses the LD. It is located on the friendly side of the LD and offers cover and concealment for the attacking force. It is used primarily at battalion level and below. Whenever possible, units move through the attack position without stopping. An attacking unit occupies an attack position for a variety of reasons; for example, when the unit is waiting for specific results from preparatory fires or when it is necessary to conduct additional coordination, such as a forward passage of lines. If the attacking unit occupies the attack position, it stays there for the shortest amount of time possible to avoid offering the enemy a lucrative target. (Figure 3-3 on page 3-6 shows attack positions BLUE and GOLD used in conjunction with other common offensive control measures.)

AXIS OF ADVANCE

3-16. **An *axis of advance* designates the general area through which the bulk of a unit's combat power must move.** There are three primary reasons why a commander uses an axis of advance. First, to direct the bypass of locations that could delay the progress of the advancing force, such as known contaminated areas. Second, to indicate that he does not require the force to clear the AO as it advances. His force will be required to clear the axis in accordance with specified bypass criteria. The third primary reason is to indicate to a unit involved in offensive encirclement, exploitation, or



Figure 3-3. Attack Positions Used with Other Common Offensive Control Measures

pursuit operations the need to move rapidly toward an objective. Figure 3-4 depicts axis of advance DEBRA.

DIRECTION OF ATTACK

3-17. **The *direction of attack* is a specific direction or assigned route a force uses and does not deviate from when attacking.** It is a restrictive control measure. The commander's use of a direction of attack maximizes his control over the movement of his unit, and he often uses it during night attacks, infiltrations, and when attacking through smoke. The commander establishes a direction of attack through a variety of means, such as target reference points, checkpoints, global positioning system (GPS) way points, using ground surveillance radar to track the attack force, and the impact of artillery shells. Target reference points placed on recognizable terrain provide the commander with the capability to rapidly shift fires and reorient his maneuver forces. When using a direction of attack, the commander designates a point of departure (PD). (Figure 3-5 depicts direction of attack JOAN and PD 6.)



Figure 3-4. Axis of Advance

FINAL COORDINATION LINE

3-18. **The *final coordination line* (FCL) is a phase line (PL) close to the enemy position used to coordinate the lifting or shifting of supporting fires with the final deployment of maneuver elements.** Final

adjustments to supporting fires necessary to reflect the actual versus the planned tactical situation take place prior to crossing this line. It should be easily recognizable on the ground. The FCL is not a fire support coordinating measure. (Figure 3-6 shows PL ROBERT as the FCL for the 4th Brigade.)



Figure 3-5. Direction of Attack JOAN

LIMIT OF ADVANCE

3-19. **The *limit of advance* (LOA) is a phase line used to control forward progress of the attack. The attacking unit does not advance any of its elements or assets beyond the LOA, but the attacking unit can push its security forces to that limit.** A commander usually selects a linear terrain feature, perpendicular to the direction of attack, on the far side of the objective as the LOA because such a terrain feature is easily identifiable. The commander employs a LOA to prevent overextending the attacking force and reduce the possibility of fratricide by fires supporting the attack. The commander positions a LOA far enough beyond the objective to allow the unit to defend the objective. An LOA prevents units from exploiting success and launching a pursuit; therefore, a commander should only use it if he does not want the unit to conduct an exploitation or pursuit. A forward boundary is always a LOA, but a LOA is not necessarily a forward boundary. In fact, a



Figure 3-6. Final Coordination Line (FCL) ROBERT Used in Conjunction with Other Offensive Control Measures

LOA and the unit's forward boundary should rarely coincide because of the resulting limitations that a forward boundary places on supporting fires beyond the forward boundary. Figure 3-7 shows PL BASIL used as 4th Brigade's LOA.



Figure 3-7. Limit of Advance Used with Other Common Control Measures

LINE OF DEPARTURE

3-20. **The *line of departure* is a phase line crossed at a prescribed time by troops initiating an offensive operation.** The purpose of the LD is to coordinate the advance of the attacking force so that its elements strike the enemy in the order and at the time desired. The LD also marks where the unit transitions from movement to maneuver. The commander can also use it to facilitate the coordination of fires. Generally, it should be perpendicular to the direction the attacking force will take on its way to the objective. Friendly forces should control the LD. The commander analyzes the terrain before designating his LD. Different units have different movement rates on leaving their assembly areas (AAs) based on their inherent mobility characteristics and the terrain being crossed. The commander considers these different characteristics when establishing the LD to prevent these differences from affecting the synchronization of the operation. When possible, the commander selects the LD so that the terrain the attack unit traverses before crossing the LD provides sufficient cover for the attacking unit's final



Figure 3-8. PL DON as a LD

deployment into a combat formation before crossing the LD. In many cases the LD is also the line of contact because the unit in contact is conducting the attack from its current positions. Figure 3-8 depicts PL DON as the LD. (Chapter 2 contains a definition for a line of contact.)

OBJECTIVE

3-21. **An *objective* is a location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort.** An objective can be either terrain- or force-oriented. Terrain objectives should be easily identifiable on the ground to facilitate their recognition. The commander determines his force-oriented objectives based on known enemy positions. The commander normally assigns his subordinate commanders only their final objectives, but can assign intermediate objectives as necessary. Figure 3-9 depicts objective STEVE. Objective STEVE is further broken down into two subordinate objectives, objective JOHN and objective HARRY.



Figure 3-9. Objective STEVE

POINT OF DEPARTURE

3-22. **The *point of departure* is the point where the unit crosses the LD and begins moving along a direction of attack.** Units conducting reconnaissance and security patrols and other operations in a low-visibility environment commonly use a PD as a control measure. Like a LD, it marks the point where the unit transitions from movement to maneuver under conditions of limited visibility. Figure 3-10 depicts PD 7.



Figure 3-10. Point of Departure 7

PROBABLE LINE OF DEPLOYMENT

3-23. **A *probable line of deployment* is a phase line that a commander designates as the location where he intends to completely deploy his unit into assault formation before beginning the assault.** The PLD is used primarily at battalion level and below when the unit does not cross the LD in its assault formation. It is usually a linear terrain feature perpendicular to the direction of attack and recognizable under conditions of limited visibility. The PLD should be located outside the range where the enemy can place the attacking force under effective direct fire. It has no use except as it relates to the enemy. In Figure 3-11, page 3-10, PL ROBERT is also the PLD.



Figure 3-11. Probable Line of Deployment ROBERT Used with Other Control Measures

RALLY POINT



Figure 3-12. Rally Point 14

3-24. **A *rally point* is an easily identifiable point on the ground at which units can reassemble and reorganize if they become dispersed. Alternatively it is an easily identifiable point on the ground at which aircrews and passengers can assemble and reorganize following an incident requiring a forced landing.** Forces conducting a patrol or an infiltration commonly use this control measure. **The *objective rally point* (ORP) is a rally point established on an easily identifiable point on the ground where all elements of the infiltrating unit assemble and prepare to attack the objective.** It is typically near the infiltrating unit's objective; however, there is no standard distance from the objective to the ORP. It should be far enough away from the objective so that the enemy will not detect the infiltrating unit's attack preparations. Figure 3-12 depicts Rally Point 14.

SUPPORT-BY-FIRE POSITION

3-25. **A *support-by-fire position* designates the general position from which a unit conducts the tactical mission task of support by fire.** (Appendix B defines the tactical mission task of support by fire.) The purpose of these positions is to increase the supported force's freedom of maneuver by placing direct fires on an objective that is going to be assaulted by a friendly force. Support-by-fire positions are located within the maximum friendly direct-fire range of the enemy positions. The commander selects them so that the moving assault force does not mask its supporting fires. For this reason,

support-by-fire positions are normally located on the flank of the assault force, elevated above the objective if possible. Support-by-fire positions are rarely applicable to units larger than company size. The support-by-fire position graphic depicted in Figure 3-13 indicates the general location and direction from which the unit provides fires; it does not indicate a specific site.



Figure 3-13. Support-by-Fire Position SCOTT

TIME OF ATTACK

3-26. **The *time of attack* is the moment the leading elements of the main body cross the LD, or in a night attack, the PD.** A commander uses it when conducting simultaneous operation where a shaping operation must accomplish its mission to set the conditions for the success of the decisive operation. When determining the time of attack, the commander considers the time required for his subordinate to—

- Conduct necessary reconnaissance, prepare plans, and issue orders.
- Synchronize plans between all subordinate units.
- Complete attack preparations, such as precombat inspections.
- Move to the LD or PD.

3-27. Orders normally designate the time of attack as H-hour. This is normally when the main body crosses the LD. However, H-hour can also designate the time to implement a phase of an operation, such as an airborne or air assault. The headquarters planning the offensive operation specifies the term's exact meaning. This is usually a part of the unit's standing operating procedures (SOP).

FORMS OF MANEUVER

Forms of Maneuver

- Envelopment
- Turning movement
- Frontal attack
- Penetration
- Infiltration

3-28. The forms of maneuver are envelopment, turning movement, frontal attack, penetration, and infiltration. Combined arms organizations seeking to accomplish their assigned mission synchronize the contributions of all battlefield operating systems (BOS) to execute these forms of maneuver. The commander generally chooses one form on which he builds a course of action (COA). The higher commander rarely specifies the specific form of offensive maneuver. However, his guidance and intent, along with the mission that includes implied tasks, may impose constraints such as time, security, and direction of attack that narrow the forms of offensive maneuver to one alternative. Additionally, the AO's characteristics and the enemy's dispositions also help determine the form of offensive maneuver selected. A single operation may contain several forms of offensive maneuver, such as a frontal attack to clear a security area followed by a penetration to create a gap in enemy defenses. An envelopment would follow to destroy the enemy's first line of defense.

ENVELOPMENT

3-29. An *envelopment* is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy rear to destroy the enemy in his current positions. At the tactical level, envelopments focus on seizing terrain, destroying specific enemy forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes (FM 3-0). Also, at the tactical level, airborne and air assault operations are vertical envelopments. (See Appendix C.) The commander's decisive operation focuses on attacking an assailable flank. It avoids the enemy's strength—his front—where the effects of his fires and obstacles are the greatest. Generally, a commander prefers to conduct an envelopment instead of a penetration or a frontal attack because the attacking force tends to suffer fewer casualties while having the most opportunities to destroy the enemy. An envelopment also produces great psychological shock on the enemy. If no assailable flank is available, the attacking force creates one. The four varieties of envelopment are single envelopment, double envelopment, encirclement, and vertical envelopment. (See Figures 3-14 and 3-15.) For a discussion of the use of vertical envelopments, see Appendix C. For a discussion of encirclement operations, see Appendix D.



Figure 3-14. Single Envelopment

3-30. Single and double envelopments force the enemy to fight in two or more directions simultaneously to meet the converging efforts of the attack. A double envelopment generally requires a preponderance of force and can be difficult to control. A force seeking to execute a double envelopment must also have a substantial mobility advantage over the defender. A unit performs a double envelopment by conducting a frontal attack as a shaping operation in the center to fix the enemy in place while enveloping both hostile flanks. Because of the forces required, normally only divisions and larger organizations have the resources to execute a double envelopment.



Figure 3-15. Double Envelopment

Organization of Forces

3-31. The commander envisioning a single envelopment organizes his forces into the enveloping force and the fixing force. He also allocates forces to conduct reconnaissance, security, reserve, and sustaining operations. The enveloping force, conducting the decisive operation, attacks an assailable enemy flank and avoids his main strength en route to the objective. The fixing force conducts a frontal attack as a shaping operation to fix the enemy in his current positions to prevent his escape and reduce his capability to react against the enveloping force. A commander executing a double envelopment organizes his forces into two enveloping forces and a fixing force in addition to reconnaissance, security, reserve, and sustaining forces. The commander typically designates the more important of the two enveloping forces as the main effort for resources. That enveloping force will also be the commander's decisive operation if its action accomplishes the mission.

Control Measures

3-32. The commander, at a minimum, designates AOs for each unit participating in the envelopment by using boundaries. He also designates PLs, support-by-fire and attack-by-fire positions, contact points, and appropriate fire coordination measures, such as a restricted fire line or boundary between converging forces, and any other control measures he feels are necessary to control the envelopment. Figure 3-16 on page 3-14 is an example of control measures used when conducting a single envelopment.

Planning an Envelopment

3-33. Successful planning for an envelopment depends on knowing and understanding the enemy and his capabilities. The commander wants to maneuver his enveloping force around or over the enemy's main defenses to secure objectives on the enemy's flank or rear. From those objectives the enveloping force can use its positional advantage to employ superior combat power

against a defending enemy oriented in the wrong direction. The commander uses his intelligence assets and personnel to determine the disposition and capabilities of enemy forces to detect and react to their operations.



Figure 3-16. Control Measures for Conducting an Envelopment

3-34. The commander plans for the force conducting the envelopment to remain within supporting distance of the fixing force. (If the enveloping force is going outside of supporting distance, it is probably conducting a turning movement, not an envelopment.)

3-35. Sustaining the enveloping force requires deliberate planning because only intermittent ground lines of communication (LOCs) between the rear area and the enveloping force may exist. A *line of communication* is a route, either land, water, and/or air that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move (JP 1-02).

3-36. The commander plans how he will exploit the success of his envelopment as he encircles the enemy or transitions to a pursuit to complete the destruction of the enemy force. These plans are developed as branches and sequels to the envelopment operation.

Executing an Envelopment

3-37. A successful envelopment depends largely on the degree of surprise the commander achieves against his opponent or the presence of overwhelming combat power. The envelopment's probability of success also increases when the commander's forces have superior tactical mobility, possess air and

information superiority, and his shaping operations fix the bulk of the enemy's forces in their current positions. The commander uses his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems to provide continuous intelligence and combat information to identify changes in enemy COAs throughout the execution of the envelopment.

3-38. Normally, a unit orients the majority of its combat power toward where it expects to engage enemy forces, while placing less combat power on its own flanks. Thus the flanks of most units are more vulnerable to attack. The commander creates an assailable flank using whatever means necessary. The enveloping force then moves rapidly to exploit the situation before the enemy strengthens an assailable flank by preparing positions in depth and by holding mobile forces in reserve. When faced with the threat of envelopment, the enemy commander might move his reserves to meet the enveloping force. Thus, rapid movement around the enemy's flank is essential to prevent him from occupying previously prepared positions. Vigorous shaping operations conducted by ground and air assets aim to prevent him from reconstituting reserves from other portions of his front.

3-39. The enemy may attempt to cut off the enveloping force and extend his flank beyond the area that the enveloping force is attempting to attack through. If the encircling force attempts to outflank such hostile extension, it may become overextended by moving outside of supporting distance from the fixing force. Therefore, it is usually better for the encircling force to take advantage of the enemy's extension and subsequent weakness by penetrating a thinly held area of the enemy's front rather than overextending itself in an attempt to completely outflank the enemy's position.

3-40. The enemy may attempt a frontal counterattack in response to an attempted envelopment. In this case, the fixing force defends itself or conducts a delay while the enveloping force continues the envelopment.

3-41. After the initial envelopment of one flank—which places the enemy at a disadvantage—the commander has many options. He may choose to establish favorable conditions for passing to a double envelopment by using reserves or exploit success by generating additional combat power along the same axis. Alternatively, he can destroy or defeat the enveloped enemy force in place, or transition to another type of operation, such as exploitation or pursuit.

TURNING MOVEMENT

3-42. A *turning movement* is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principle defensive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat (FM 3-0). However, a commander can employ a vertical envelopment using airborne or air assault forces to effect a turning movement. (Appendix C discusses airborne and air assault operations.) A commander uses this form of offensive maneuver to seize vital areas in the enemy's rear before the main enemy force can withdraw or receive support or reinforcements. See Figure 3-17 on page 3-16 for a graphic depiction of a turning movement. This form of offensive maneuver frequently transitions from the attack into an exploitation or pursuit. A turning movement differs from an envelopment because the force conducting a turning

movement seeks to make the enemy displace from his current locations, whereas an enveloping force seeks to engage the enemy in his current location from an unexpected direction.



Figure 3-17. Turning Movement—Turning Force Conducting the Decisive Operation

Organization of Forces

3-43. The commander directing a turning movement task organizes his resources into a turning force, a main body, and a reserve. Each of these forces conducts security and reconnaissance operations. Either the turning force or the main body can conduct the echelon's decisive operation given the appropriate factors of METT-TC. A turning movement is particularly suited for division-size or larger forces possessing a high degree of tactical mobility. It is not until a commander has access to the resources of these echelons that he has the combat power to resource a turning force that can operate outside supporting range of his main body to allow the turning force to force enemy units out of their current positions. He bases the exact task organization of these forces on the factors of METT-TC and his concept of operations for the turning movement.

3-44. The maneuver of the turning force is what causes the enemy to leave his position. A turning force normally conducts the majority of its operations outside of the supporting range of the main body and possibly outside its supporting distance. Thus, the turning force must contain sufficient combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) capabilities to operate independently of the main body for a specific period of time. This normally requires at least a division-size element.

3-45. The commander task organizes his main body to ensure the success of the turning force. The main body conducts operations, such as attacks designed to divert the enemy's attention away from the area where the turning force conducts its operations. The operations of the main body can be either the echelon's decisive or shaping operations. The commander organizes his reserve to exploit success by either the turning force or the main body. The reserve also provides the commander insurance against unexpected enemy actions.

Control Measures

3-46. The commander designates the AOs for each unit participating in the turning movement by establishing boundaries. He also designates additional control measures as necessary to synchronize the operations of his subordinates. These additional control measures include: phase lines (PLs), contact points, objectives, LOA, and appropriate fire coordination measures. Figure 3-18 depicts these control measures used to synchronize a turning movement that employs an airborne division as the turning force. (Appendix C discusses control measures associated with airborne and air assault operations.)



Figure 3-18. Control Measures for a Turning Movement

Planning a Turning Movement

3-47. Selecting the geographic objective of the turning movement is of major importance to the success of the operation. The commander's scheme of maneuver in a turning movement may vary, depending on the specific situation and the factors of METT-TC. In addition to common offensive planning considerations addressed on pages 3-33 through 3-50, the commander conducting

a turning movement pays special attention to planning branches and sequels to the turning movement, including—

- Defensive operations by the turning force.
- Link-up operations between the turning force and the main body.
- Retrograde operations for the turning force.

Essential to the planning of the branches and sequels is the linkage between the branch or sequel and specific decision points supported by situation development.

3-48. After developing his tactical plan, the commander plans how the turning force maneuvers to its objective. The commander develops his movement, loading, and staging plans if outside transportation assets are required. He can plan to occupy key terrain that will threaten the enemy's survival or remain mobile and seek ways to exploit the turning force's success. Before initiating the operation, the commander plans how the turning force can exploit success.

3-49. In a turning movement that envisions an early linkup with the main body, the turning force normally plans to defend only that terrain required to protect itself. Once reinforcement or linkup with the main body occurs, the commander plans how to use the turning force to continue the attack or relieve it so it can prepare for subsequent missions.

3-50. The distances between forces and the existence of intermittent LOCs magnify the problems inherent in providing CSS to a combat force during a turning movement. Therefore, in the planning of a turning movement, the commander emphasizes resupply, equipment maintenance, casualty evacuation, graves registration, and prisoner of war handling to deal with these likely problems. Prepackaging company- and battalion-size resupply sets can ease the execution of sustaining operations during periods when CSS units must push supplies to the combat units.

3-51. Planners must consider the provision of all supplies and equipment required for mission accomplishment as an integral part of tactical planning. The commander plans and organizes his CSS operations to support a rapid tempo of highly mobile and widely dispersed operations. Traditional doctrinal supporting distances and responsibilities do not always apply to turning movements. CSS planners recognize this and adjust their plans using available resources. Only supplies required to meet the force's immediate needs are carried into the operation. Excess supplies and equipment can burden the force. Staffs establish and maintain required supply levels in the objective area by phasing supplies into the objective area on an accompanying, follow-up (automatic and on-call), and routine basis. Medical evacuation, resupply, and reinforcement airlifts may be necessary to sustain the force's combat operations. Ammunition and petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) normally constitute the major tonnage items. Lift restrictions affect what can be supplied using helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

Executing a Turning Movement

3-52. The primary prerequisites of a successful turning movement are moving the turning force to the objective area without incurring unacceptable losses and providing the force with the required combat power and

sustainment. A commander can reduce his losses by operating under conditions of friendly air and information superiority, suppressing enemy fires, and having a mobility advantage over the enemy.

3-53. Major sources of firepower to suppress enemy fires are fixed-wing aircraft, attack helicopters, jammers, and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems that cover the entire route taken by the turning force. Other sources include naval surface fire support and artillery units accompanying the turning force.

3-54. When threatened with a turning movement, the enemy commander is in a dilemma. His original defense is misplaced. He must move forces from their original position in meeting the new threat. Often he must commit his available reserves against the new threat. He exposes those forces to friendly fires as he weakens his defense and moves his forces. He must now engage friendly forces on ground he has not chosen or prepared. Whenever possible, the commander tries to reach the decisive location without encountering the enemy. Techniques to accomplish this include outflanking the enemy or using airborne, air assault, and amphibious means to avoid his prepared positions. Once friendly forces find a way deep into the enemy's rear area, the turning force moves rapidly to exploit the situation. It seeks to achieve its mission before the enemy can reposition his committed or uncommitted forces to react. Rapid movement is essential to prevent the enemy from occupying previously prepared positions in his rear. Vigorous shaping operations prevent the enemy from reconstituting reserves from other portions of the enemy front.

3-55. The enemy may counterattack in an attempt to cut off and destroy the turning force and prevent the successful completion of the turning movement. In this case, the turning force's security elements conduct an area or mobile defense or engage in delaying actions while the rest of the turning force continues its mission. Alternatively, the enemy may try to withdraw his forces to a position where his LOCs are not threatened.

INFILTRATION

3-56. An *infiltration* is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires (FM 3-0). Infiltration is also a march technique used within friendly territory to move forces in small groups at extended or irregular intervals. (See Chapter 14 for a discussion of infiltration as a movement technique.)

3-57. Infiltration occurs by land, water, air, or a combination of means. Moving and assembling forces covertly through enemy positions takes a considerable amount of time. To successfully infiltrate, the force must avoid detection and engagement. Since this requirement limits the size and strength of the infiltrating force—and infiltrated forces alone can rarely defeat an enemy force—infiltration is normally used in conjunction with and in support of the other forms of offensive maneuver. Historically, the scope of the mission for the infiltrating force has been limited.

3-58. The commander orders an infiltration to move all or a portion of a unit through gaps in the enemy's defenses to—

- Reconnoiter known or templated enemy positions and conduct surveillance of named areas of interest and targeted areas of interest.
- Attack enemy-held positions from an unexpected direction.
- Occupy a support-by-fire position to support the decisive operation.
- Secure key terrain.
- Conduct ambushes and raids to destroy vital facilities and disrupt the enemy's defensive structure by attacking his reserves, fire support and air defense systems, communication nodes, and logistic support.
- Conduct a covert breach of an obstacle or obstacle complex.

3-59. Special operations forces and light infantry units up to brigade size are best suited to conduct an infiltration. In some circumstances, heavy forces operating in small units can conduct an infiltration. However, as the proliferation of technology leads to increased situational understanding, this should increase the ability of heavy forces to avoid enemy contact and move undetected through enemy positions. In the future a commander may conduct an infiltration with heavy forces in coordination with precision fires as a prelude to an attack.

Organization of Forces

3-60. Normally, to be successful, the infiltrating force must avoid detection at least until it reaches its ORP. Thus, the infiltrating force's size, strength, and composition is usually limited. The infiltrating unit commander organizes his main body into one or more infiltrating elements. The largest size element possible, compatible with the requirement for stealth and ease of movement, conducts the infiltration. This increases the commander's control, speeds the execution of the infiltration, and provides responsive combat power. The exact size and number of infiltrating elements are situationally dependent.

3-61. The commander considers the following factors when determining how to organize his forces. Smaller infiltrating elements are not as easy to detect and can get through smaller defensive gaps. Even the detection of one or two small elements by the enemy will not prevent the unit from accomplishing its mission in most cases. Larger infiltrating elements are easier to detect and their discovery is more apt to endanger the success of the mission. Also, they require larger gaps to move through. A unit with many smaller infiltrating elements requires more time to complete the infiltration and needs more link-up points than a similar size unit with only a few infiltrating elements. Many infiltrating elements are also harder to control than fewer, larger elements.

3-62. The commander resources a security force that moves ahead of, to the flanks of, and to the rear of each infiltrating element's main body. These security forces can be given either a screen or a guard mission. (Chapter 12 discusses screen and guard missions.) The sizes and orientations of security elements are also situationally dependent. Each infiltrating element is responsible for its own reconnaissance effort.

3-63. Sustainment of an infiltrating force normally depends on the force's basic load of supplies and those medical and maintenance assets accompanying the infiltrating force. After completing the mission, the commander reopens LOCs to conduct normal sustaining operations.

Control Measures

3-64. Control measures for an infiltration include, as a minimum—

- An AO for the infiltrating unit.
- One or more infiltration lanes.
- A LD or point of departure.
- Movement routes with their associated start and release points, or a direction or axis of attack.
- Linkup or rally points, including ORPs.
- Assault positions.
- One or more objectives.
- A LOA.

The commander can impose other measures to control the infiltration including checkpoints, PLs, and assault positions on the flank or rear of enemy positions. If it is not necessary for the entire infiltrating unit to reassemble to accomplish its mission, the objective may be broken into smaller objectives. Each infiltrating element would then move directly to its objective to conduct operations. (Most of these control measures have been previously described.) The following paragraphs describe using an infiltration lane and a linkup point.

3-65. **An *infiltration lane* is a control measure that coordinates forward and lateral movement of infiltrating units and fixes fire planning responsibilities.** The commander selects infiltration lanes that avoid the enemy, provide cover and concealment, and facilitate navigation. Figure 3-19 depicts the graphic for an infiltration lane. Each unit assigned an infiltration lane picks its own routes within the lane and switches routes as necessary. The left and right limits of the infiltration lane act as lateral boundaries for the unit conducting the infiltration. Attacks by rotary- or fixed-wing aircraft, indirect fires, or munitions effects that impact the lane must be coordinated with the infiltrating unit. Units leaving their assigned lane run the risk of being hit by friendly fires. Company-size units are normally assigned a single infiltration lane, although they can use more than one lane. Larger organizations, battalion and above, are always assigned more than one infiltration lane.



Figure 3-19. Infiltration Lane

3-66. **A *linkup point* is where two infiltrating elements in the same or different infiltration lanes are scheduled to meet to consolidate before proceeding on with their missions.** Figure 3-20 depicts Linkup Point 8. A linkup point is normally positioned in the enemy's rear or along one of his flanks. It should be large enough for all infiltrating elements to assemble and should offer cover and concealment for these elements. It should be an easily identifiable point on the ground. The commander should position his linkup points on defensible terrain located away from normal enemy troop movement routes.



Figure 3-20. Linkup Point 8

Planning an Infiltration

3-67. The activities and functions associated with the process of planning an infiltration are the same as with any other combat operation. That planning takes advantage of that unit's stealth capabilities to surprise the enemy. The planning process synchronizes the BOS that support the infiltrating unit, especially precise, high-resolution intelligence. Without precise, detailed intelligence, infiltration maneuvers become high-risk probing operations, that can be costly and time-consuming. Careful planning, full ISR integration, detailed analysis, and aggressive operations security can permit an infiltrating force to avoid an enemy force, minimize direct contact, and maximize surprise according to the commander's intent.

3-68. After identifying gaps or weaknesses in the enemy's defensive positions, the commander assigns infiltration lanes, contact points, and objectives to subordinate units. These objectives afford the infiltrating force positions of greatest advantage over the enemy and are not required to be to the geographic rear of the targeted enemy force. Each subordinate unit commander picks one or more routes within his assigned lane and establishes additional contact points, rally points, assault points, and other control measures as required. The commander wants each of the routes within an infiltration lane to be far enough apart to prevent an infiltrating element on one route from seeing other infiltrating elements, but close enough so that an infiltrating element could switch quickly to another route if required by the situation. The commander wants each route to provide his infiltrating elements cover and concealment while avoiding known enemy and civilian locations and movement routes to the maximum extent possible. If possible, the subordinate unit commander selects his exact routes during the preparation phase after reconnoitering each infiltration lane. He decides whether his unit will infiltrate as a unit, in smaller elements, or even as two-man buddy teams, depending on the density and strength of the enemy.

3-69. The commander may use single or multiple infiltration lanes depending on the infiltrating force's size, the amount of detailed information on enemy dispositions and terrain accessible, time allowed, and number of lanes available. A single infiltration lane—

- Facilitates navigation, control, and reassembly.
- Requires the existence or creation of only one gap in the enemy's position.
- Reduces the area for which detailed intelligence is required.

3-70. Multiple infiltration lanes—

- Require the existence or creation of more gaps in the enemy's security area.
- Reduce the possibility of compromising the entire force.
- Increase difficulty with maintaining control.

3-71. The sizes and numbers of infiltrating elements are major considerations for the commander when he is deciding whether to use a single lane or multiple infiltration lanes. If the infiltration takes place using multiple elements, contingency plans must address the following situations:

- A lead element, possibly the advance guard, makes contact, but the trail elements have not started infiltrating.
- A lead element infiltrates successfully, but compromises one or more trailing elements.
- A compromised linkup point.

3-72. The commander uses available technology to assist in planning the infiltration and avoiding unintended enemy and civilian contact during the infiltration. This can be as simple as all units using the same infiltrating lane being on the same frequency to facilitate the avoidance of enemy contact. An accurate depiction of enemy systems and locations, tied to rapid terrain analysis, can graphically depict dead spots in the enemy's battlefield surveillance. The commander can then plan how to expand those existing dead spots into infiltration lanes through a precision attack of selected enemy elements and systems.

3-73. The plan also addresses the following considerations:

- Availability of supporting fires, including rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft and offensive information operations—especially electronic attack, throughout the operation, during infiltration and the attack on the objective.
- Linkup or extraction of the infiltrating unit after mission completion.
- Sustainment of the infiltrating force during the operation, to include casualty evacuation.
- Deception operations, such as actions by other units designed to divert enemy attention from the area selected for the infiltration.
- Linkup of the various infiltrating elements.
- Command and control (C2), to include recognition signals.
- Positioning of combat vehicles to support the infiltrating elements.
- Using limited visibility and rough terrain to mask movement and reduce the chance of detection.
- Infiltration of the largest elements possible to maintain control.
- Rehearsals.
- Specially required preparations, such as modifying the unit's SOP regarding the soldier's combat load for the mission. When infiltrating on foot, units carry only required equipment. For example, in close terrain and in the absence of an armor threat, heavy antiarmor missile systems may be a liability.
- Abort criteria.
- Critical friendly zones.

3-74. Planned recognition signals and linkup procedures for the infiltration should be simple and quick. If there has not been any firing or any other noises, signals should not violate noise and light discipline. However, if there have already been assaults, artillery, and small-arms fire, signals, such as whistles and flares, can be used as linkup aids. A lack of time and the short distance involved in many infiltration operations may make conducting formal linkup procedures unnecessary.

Preparing an Infiltration

3-75. Once the commander selects the objective, infiltration lanes, and linkup or rally points, he directs ISR operations to update and confirm the details on which he bases his plan. He identifies enemy sensors and surveillance systems. He then revises the plan to reflect current conditions within the AO.

Executing an Infiltration

3-76. Moving undetected during an infiltration requires a considerable amount of time. The infiltrating unit moves from its AA or current position through the start point and then continues moving along the infiltration route to a release point. If buddy teams or small elements are conducting the infiltration, the unit uses a series of linkup points to reassemble into a coherent unit. Units can use a variety of navigation aids, such as GPS, to remain within the planned infiltration lane, which minimizes their chances of detection by the enemy. At the same time, they report their progress and status using communication systems that provide this information automatically to all command nodes which require this information.

3-77. If the complete unit is conducting the infiltration, the forward security force begins its movement first, followed by the main body. The distance between the forward security force and the main body depends on the factors of METT-TC. The advance guard must be far enough ahead of the main body so that it can either deploy or move to another route if the forward security force discovers the enemy. The forward security force in an infiltration must have enough time to move in a stealthy and secure manner. Enemy units should not be able to move undetected in the gap between the forward security force and the main body.

3-78. As the infiltrating unit moves, the advance guard reports to the commander regarding the cover and concealment of each route, enemy activity, location of danger areas and linkup points, enemy activity on the objective, and other combat information. The unit attempts to avoid enemy and civilian contact; however, contact does not always mean the mission is compromised. The infiltrating unit engages targets first with indirect fires to avoid revealing its presence and exact location. These fires include the conduct of offensive information operations designed to blind enemy ISR assets and prevent the enemy from coordinating an effective response to the infiltration.

3-79. If necessary, the forward security force conducts actions on contact while the main body moves to another route, reconstitutes a forward security force, and continues the mission. If the main body makes contact unexpectedly, it either overruns the enemy force, if the enemy has little combat power, or bypasses him and continues the mission. During the infiltration, the unit ignores ineffective enemy fire and continues to move. The commander may use suppressive fires against the enemy to cover the sounds of the infiltration or to divert the enemy's attention to areas other than where the infiltration lanes are located.

3-80. The infiltrating unit's elements move to an AA or an ORP to consolidate its combat power, refine the plan, and conduct any last-minute coordination prior to continuing the mission. The unit then conducts those tasks needed to

accomplish its assigned mission, which could be an attack, raid, ambush, seizing key terrain, capturing prisoners, or collecting specific combat information.

3-81. A commander may need to abort an infiltration operation if the factors of METT-TC change so drastically during the infiltration that the infiltrating force is no longer capable of accomplishing its mission. Examples of changes that might trigger such an action include—

- Significant portions of the infiltrating force's combat power are lost through navigation errors, enemy action, accidents, or maintenance failures.
- Movement or significant reinforcement of a force-oriented objective.
- Detection of the infiltration by the enemy.
- Changes in the tactical situation that make the mission no longer appropriate, such as the initiation of an enemy attack.

The criteria for aborting the operation are developed in the planning process. The decision to abort the infiltration is transmitted to all appropriate headquarters for their action and information.

PENETRATION

3-82. A *penetration* a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system (FM 3-0). Destroying the continuity of that defense allows the enemy's subsequent isolation and defeat in detail by exploiting friendly forces. The penetration extends from the enemy's security area through his main defensive positions into his rear area. A commander employs a penetration when there is no assailable flank, enemy defenses are overextended and weak spots are detected in the enemy's positions, or time pressures do not permit an envelopment.

Organization of Forces

3-83. Penetrating a well-organized position requires overwhelming combat power in the area of penetration and combat superiority to continue the momentum of the attack. (See Figure 3-21, page 3-26.) The commander designates a breach, support, and assault force. He can designate these elements for each defensive position that he is required to penetrate. He should not withhold combat power from the initial penetration to conduct additional penetration unless he has so much combat power that the success of the initial penetration is assured.

3-84. The commander resources a reserve to deal with expected or unexpected contingencies, such as an enemy counterattack, to avoid diverting the assault element from attacking the final objective of the penetration. He designates additional units follow-and-support or follow-and-assume missions to ensure rapid exploitation of initial success. He designates forces to fix enemy reserves in their current locations and isolate enemy forces within the area selected for penetration.



Figure 3-21. Penetration: Relative Combat Power

Control Measures

3-85. A commander assigns, as a minimum, an AO to every maneuver unit, a LD or LC; time of the attack or time of assault; phase lines; objective; and a LOA to control and synchronize the attack. (A commander can use a battle handover line instead of a LOA if he knows where he would like to commit a follow-and-assume force.) The lateral boundaries of the unit making the decisive operation are narrowly drawn to help establish the overwhelming combat power necessary at the area of penetration. The commander locates the LOA beyond the enemy's main defensive position to ensure completing the breach. If the operation results in opportunities to exploit success and pursue a beaten enemy, the commander adjusts existing boundaries to accommodate the new situation. (See Figure 3-22.)

3-86. A commander uses the graphics associated with a breach site, such as gaps and lanes, on the small-scale maps used to control the maneuver of his forces at each point where he penetrates the enemy's defenses. FM 3-34.2 defines the graphics.

3-87. Other control measures available to the commander include checkpoints, support-by-fire and attack-by-fire positions, probable line of deployment, fire support coordinating measures, attack position, assault position, and time of assault. Within the unit's AO, a commander can use either an axis of advance or a direction of attack to further control maneuver.

Planning a Penetration

3-88. The success of the penetration depends primarily on a coordinated and synchronized plan—violently executed at a high tempo to achieve surprise—

against comparatively weak enemy defenses. However, the terrain behind the area selected to penetrate must allow the penetration to proceed from the breach to a decisive objective.



Figure 3-22. Penetration Graphic Control Measures

3-89. The depth of the enemy position and the relative strength of attacking echelons determine the width of the penetration. The availability of artillery, air support, and other combat multipliers for the attacking force helps the commander determine relative combat power. A wider gap allows friendly forces to drive deeper, making it more difficult for the enemy to close the gap. The deeper the penetration, the easier it is for a unit to seize its objective and roll up the enemy's flanks exposed by the breach and the less likely it is that the enemy will be in a position to restore his front by falling back.

3-90. Plans for penetrating a defensive position include isolating, suppressing, and destroying by fire—to include offensive information operations—enemy forces in the area selected for the penetration. These plans should also address how to isolate the area of penetration from support or reinforcement by enemy forces located outside the area. This consideration includes how to fix enemy reserves and long-range weapons in their current locations. Positioning friendly assets so that the commander can mass the effects of their combat power to accomplish these results without giving away the location of the penetration is also a critical part of the plan.

3-91. The commander plans to place the majority of his forces and assets in positions where the effects of their combat power can be felt in the area

selected for penetration. The commander's plan for the penetration normally has three phases:

- Breaching the enemy's main defensive positions.
- Widening the gap created to secure the flanks by enveloping one or both of the newly exposed flanks.
- Seizing the objective with its associated subsequent exploitation.

3-92. Planning the sequence of these phases depends on the specific situation. In some situations, if there are weaknesses or gaps in the enemy's front, it is possible for heavy forces to breach the enemy's defenses and proceed straight to the objective. Simultaneously, light units could conduct local envelopment and exploitation operations. In other situations, the commander uses his light forces to create the breach, holding his heavy forces initially in reserve to exploit gaps in the enemy's defenses created by light forces.

3-93. The commander plans shaping operations outside the area of penetration to contain the enemy on the flanks of the penetration and fix his reserves in their current locations. Synchronizing the effects of rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, artillery fires, and obscuration smoke to delay or disrupt repositioning forces is an example of such shaping operations. These shaping operations will involve the maintenance of operations security and the conduct of deception operations. The commander usually attempts to penetrate the enemy's defensive positions along unit boundaries because defenses tend to be less effective along a boundary.

3-94. The commander plans for the penetration to break through the enemy's defenses so he is unable to reestablish his defense on more rearward positions. Until this event takes place, the commander does not want to divert the strength of his attacking units to widening the gap to secure the flanks of the penetration. However, he must develop plans that address contingencies, such as hostile counterattacks against the flanks of the penetration. The plan should provide assistance to attacking elements as they close with the enemy and support the attack until the enemy's power of resistance is broken.

Executing a Penetration

3-95. After the initial breach of the enemy's main line of resistance, the sequence of the remaining two phases is determined by the factors of METT-TC. If the enemy is in a weak defensive position, it may be possible for the lead attacking force to seize the penetration's final objective while simultaneously widening the initial breach. In other situations, the commander must wait to seize the final objective until the breach is wide enough for other forces, such as reserves and follow-and-assume forces, to be committed. Commanders at all levels must take advantage of success within the commander's intent throughout the penetration.

3-96. **Breaching the Enemy's Main Defensive Positions.** The commander launches the actual penetration on a relatively narrow front. (See Figure 3-23.) He narrows the AO of the unit or units conducting his decisive operation—the penetration—by adjusting unit lateral boundaries to the exact point or points where he wants to penetrate the enemy's defenses. This allows the force conducting the penetration to focus overwhelming combat power. The commander assigns his assault force a close-in objective. His support

force locates where it can support by fire both the breach and the assault forces. Local reserves are held in readiness to conduct a forward passage through or around units whose attacks have slowed or stopped.



Figure 3-23. Penetration: The Breach

3-97. Shaping operations on the remainder of the hostile front fix the enemy in his current positions and prevent him from disengaging to reinforce enemy units opposing the decisive operation. The commander tracks the battle's progress to ensure that his forces penetrate entirely through the enemy's main defensive positions and not just the enemy's security area.

3-98. The enemy normally tries to slow down or stop the breach to gain time to react to the changing situation. Therefore, the attacking commander rapidly exploits and reinforces success. He piles on resources and additional units as necessary to ensure completing the penetration through the enemy's defensive positions. He also conducts offensive information operations to desynchronize the enemy's reaction.

3-99. **Widening the Breach to Secure the Flanks.** Once the attacking force penetrates the main defenses, it begins to widen the penetration of the enemy's defensive positions by conducting a series of shallow envelopments to roll back its shoulders. (See Figure 3-24, page 3-30.) The task of widening the initial gap of the penetration is normally assigned to a follow-and-support force. That task can also be assigned to the reserve as a contingency mission. If the commander commits his reserve to accomplish that task, he must reconstitute his reserve from another part of his force. Alternatively, he may assume the risk of not having a reserve for the time necessary to accomplish this task. The commander makes plans to meet enemy counterattacks by shifting fires or committing his reserves or follow-and-assume forces. Units

can use obstacles on the flanks of the penetration as a combat multiplier to assist in defeating any local enemy counterattack and to provide additional security for the force.



Figure 3-24. Expanding the Penetration

3-100. **Seizing the Objective and Subsequent Exploitation.** The mission of seizing the objective—which may be a specific enemy force—to destroy the continuity of the enemy's defensive position is normally the decisive operation after completing the penetration. Frequently that objective is so far from the area of penetration that the unit or units initially conducting the penetration cannot seize it without a pause. In that case, the commander plans to pass his reserve or follow and assume forces through the initial attacking force early, leaving exploitation beyond the objective to higher echelons. While the exact force mix is METT-TC-dependent, armored, mechanized, and aviation forces are generally suited for subsequent exploitation.

3-101. In large commands, forces may initiate an attack by simultaneously launching two or more convergent penetrations against weak localities on the hostile front. Often this method of attack helps isolate an extremely strong, hostile defense. The commander assigns shaping operations to initially contain any strong localities. When the multiple attacks have advanced sufficiently, the force reduces bypassed enemy forces and unites the penetrating attacks into a single decisive operation.

FRONTAL ATTACK

3-102. A *frontal attack* is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force in place over a broad front (FM 3-0). At the tactical level, an attacking force can use a

frontal attack to rapidly overrun a weak enemy force. A commander commonly uses a frontal attack as a shaping operation in conjunction with other forms of maneuver. He normally employs a frontal attack to—

- Clear enemy security forces.
- Overwhelm a shattered enemy during an exploitation or pursuit.
- Fix enemy forces in place as part of a shaping operation.
- Conduct a reconnaissance in force.

Figure 3-25 depicts a frontal attack.



Figure 3-25. Frontal Attack

3-103. It is also necessary to conduct a frontal attack when assailable flanks do not exist. Where a penetration is a sharp attack designed to rupture the enemy position, the commander designs a frontal attack to maintain continuous pressure along the entire front until either a breach occurs or the attacking forces succeed in pushing the enemy back. Frontal attacks conducted without overwhelming combat power are seldom decisive. Consequently, the commander's choice to conduct a frontal attack in situations where he does not have overwhelming combat power is rarely justified unless the time gained is vital to the operation's success.

Organization of Forces

3-104. There is no unique organization of forces associated with this form of maneuver. A commander conducting a frontal attack organizes his unit into an element to conduct reconnaissance and security operations, a main body, and a reserve. The factors of METT-TC dictate the specific task organization of the unit.

Control Measures

3-105. A commander conducting a frontal attack may not require any additional control measures beyond those established to control the overall

mission. This includes an AO, defined by unit boundaries, and an objective at a minimum. The commander can also use any other control measure he feels is necessary to control the attack, including—

- Attack positions.
- Line of departure.
- Phase lines.
- Assault positions.
- Limit of advance.
- Direction of attack or axis of advance for every maneuver unit.

A unit conducting a frontal attack normally has a wider AO than a unit conducting a penetration.

Planning a Frontal Attack

3-106. It is seldom possible for a commander to exert sufficient pressure to overwhelm an enemy using a frontal attack, since it strikes the enemy along a significant portion of his front. The force's primary objective is to maintain pressure and help fix the enemy force. The commander's planning effort should reflect these two considerations. When considering employing a frontal attack in a shaping operation, the commander should also consider other means for holding the enemy in position, such as feints and demonstrations employing indirect fires to preclude excessive losses.

Executing a Frontal Attack

3-107. The unit conducting a frontal attack advances on a broad front, normally with its subordinate ground maneuver elements abreast (except for the reserve). This clears the enemy's security area of his security forces and reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition assets while advancing the friendly force into the enemy's main defenses. Once the unit makes contact with the enemy, the attacking force's subordinate elements rapidly develop the situation and report enemy dispositions immediately to the commander so he can exploit enemy weaknesses. The attacking force fixes enemy forces in their current locations and seeks to gain a position of advantage to destroy them using fire and movement.

3-108. If the attacking unit discovers a gap in the enemy's defenses, the commander seeks to exploit that weakness and disrupt the integrity of the enemy's defense. After assessing the situation to make sure that it is not a trap, the commander can employ his reserve to exploit the opportunity. He synchronizes the exploitation with the actions of his other combat, CS, and CSS units to prevent counterattacking enemy forces from isolating and destroying successful subordinate elements of his force.

3-109. When the unit conducting the frontal attack can no longer advance, it adopts a defensive posture. The commander may require it to assist the forward passage of lines of other units. It continues to perform reconnaissance of enemy positions to locate gaps or assailable flanks.

COMMON OFFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3-110. Visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders. The tactical commander begins with a designated AO, identified mission, and assigned forces. The commander develops and issues planning guidance based on his visualization in terms of the physical means to accomplish the mission.

3-111. The offense is basic to combat operations. Only by a resolute offense, conducted at a high tempo and to great depth, is total destruction of the enemy attained. The offense has a number of indisputable advantages. The principal advantage enjoyed is its possession of the initiative. Having the initiative allows a commander to select the time, place, and specific tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the attacking force. The attacker has the time and opportunity to develop a plan and to concentrate the effects of his forces and thoroughly prepare conditions for success when he has the initiative. The commander strikes the enemy in unexpected ways at unexpected times and places. He focuses on attacking the right combination of targets, not necessarily the biggest or the closest. These attacks are rapidly executed, violently executed, unpredictable in nature, and disorient the enemy. They enhance the commander's capability to impose his will on his enemy and thus to achieve decisive victory.

3-112. The commander maintains momentum by rapidly following up his attacks to prevent enemy recovery. He denies his enemy any opportunity to adjust to his action in spite of the enemy's desperate attempts to do so. He changes his means and methods before the enemy can adapt to those in current use. The tempo of his operations must be fast enough to prevent effective counteraction. He orchestrates unrelenting pressure by adjusting combinations to meet the offensive's ever-changing demands. He maintains relentless pressure and exploits his gains to make permanent any temporary battlefield success.

3-113. Each battle or engagement, even those occurring simultaneously as a part of the same campaign, has its own unique peculiarities, determined by the actual conditions of the situation. The widespread application of highly accurate and lethal weapons, high degree of tactical mobility, dynamic nature, rapid situational changes, and the noncontiguous and large spatial scope of unit AOs all characterize contemporary combined arms warfare. The commander first able to see the battlefield, understand the implications of existing friendly and enemy operational picture, and take effective action to impose his will on the situation will enjoy tactical success.

3-114. The following discussion uses those physical means—soldiers, organizations, and equipment—that constitute the seven BOS defined in FM 7-15 as the framework for discussing planning considerations that apply to all types and forms of tactical offensive operations. The commander synchronizes the effects of all BOS as part of the visualize, describe, direct, and assess process.

INTELLIGENCE

3-115. A commander uses the products of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process to identify any aspect within his AO or area of interest that will affect how he accomplishes his mission. An *area of interest* is

that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 2-03).

3-116. The entire staff, led by the echelon intelligence staff, uses the IPB process to identify any aspects of the area of operations or area of interest that will affect enemy, friendly, and third party operations. The IPB process is collaborative in nature and requires information from all staff elements and some subordinate units. All staff and subordinate elements use the results and products of the IPB process for planning. FM 2-01.3 describes the IPB process.

3-117. The commander uses his ISR assets to study the terrain and confirm or deny the enemy's strengths, dispositions, and likely intentions, especially where and in what strength the enemy will defend. These assets also gather information concerning the civilian population within the AO to confirm or deny their numbers, locations, and likely intentions, especially with regard to staying put in shelters or fleeing from combat operations.

3-118. By studying the terrain, the commander tries to determine the principal heavy and light avenues of approach to his objective. He also tries to determine the most advantageous area for the enemy's main defense to occupy, routes that the enemy may use to conduct counterattacks, and other factors, such as observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC). (See FM 6-0 for a discussion of the components of OAKOC.) It is unlikely that the commander has complete knowledge of the enemy's intentions; therefore, he must conduct ISR collection continuously during the battle.

3-119. The echelon intelligence and operations officers, in coordination with the rest of the staff, develop an integrated ISR plan that satisfies the commander's maneuver, targeting, and information requirements. A commander's information requirements are dictated by the factors of METT-TC, but commonly include—

- Locations, composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of the defending enemy force, to include high-priority targets and enemy ISR capabilities.
- Locations of possible enemy assembly areas.
- Location of enemy indirect-fire weapon systems and units.
- Location of gaps and assailable flanks.
- Location of areas for friendly and enemy air assaults.
- Location of enemy air defense gun and missile units.
- Location of enemy electronic warfare units.
- Effects of weather and terrain on current and projected operations.
- Numbers, routes, and direction of movement of dislocated civilians.
- Withdrawal routes for enemy forces.
- Anticipated timetable schedules for the enemy's most likely COA and other probable COAs.
- Locations of enemy C2 and ISR systems and the frequencies used by the information systems linking these systems.

If friendly ISR systems cannot answer the commander's information requirements, his intelligence staff can send a request for information to higher and adjacent units, he can commit additional resources, or he can decide to execute his offensive operation with the current information.

MANEUVER

3-120. The commander conducts maneuver to avoid enemy strengths and to create opportunities to increase the effects his fires. He secures surprise by making unexpected maneuvers, rapidly changing the tempo of ongoing operations, avoiding observation, and using deceptive techniques and procedures. He seeks to overwhelm the enemy with one or more unexpected blows before the enemy has time to react in an organized fashion. This occurs when he is able to engage the defending enemy force from positions that place the attacking force in a position of advantage with respect to the defending enemy force, such as engaging the enemy from a flanking position. His security forces prevent the enemy from discovering friendly dispositions, capabilities, and intentions, or interfering with the preparations for the attack. Finally, he maneuvers to close with and destroy the enemy by close combat and shock effect. *Close combat* is combat carried out with direct fire weapons, supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires, and nonlethal engagement means. Close combat defeats or destroys enemy forces, or seizes and retains ground (FM 3-0). Close combat encompasses all actions that place friendly forces in immediate contact with the enemy where the commander uses direct fire and movement in combination to defeat or destroy enemy forces or seize and retain ground.

3-121. A commander can overwhelm an enemy by the early seizing and retaining of key and decisive terrain that provides dominating observation, cover and concealment, and better fields of fire to facilitate the maneuver of his forces. If decisive terrain is present, the commander designates it to communicate its importance in his concept of operations, first to his staff and later to subordinate commanders. The friendly force must control decisive terrain to successfully accomplish its mission.

Combat Formations

3-122. **A *combat formation* is an ordered arrangement of forces for a specific purpose and describes the general configuration of a unit on the ground.** A commander can use seven different combat formations depending on the factors of METT-TC:

- Column.
- Line.
- Echelon (left or right).
- Box.
- Diamond.
- Wedge.
- Vee.

Terrain characteristics and visibility determine the actual arrangement and location of the unit's personnel and vehicles within a given formation.

3-123. Combat formations allow a unit to move on the battlefield in a posture suited to the senior commander's intent and mission. A unit may employ a series of combat formations during the course of an attack; each has its advantages and disadvantages. Subordinate units within a combat formation can also employ their own combat formations, consistent with their particular situation. The commander considers the advantages and disadvantages of each formation in the areas of C2 maintenance, firepower orientation, ability to mass fires, and flexibility when determining the appropriate formation for a given situation. All combat formations use one or more of the three movement techniques: traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. (Chapter 13 describes these three movement techniques.)

3-124. The commander's use of standard formations allows him to rapidly shift his unit from one formation to another, giving him additional flexibility when adjusting to changes in the factors of METT-TC. (This results from a commander rehearsing his unit so that it can change formations using standard responses to changing situations, such as actions on contact.) By designating the combat formation he plans to use, the commander—

- Establishes the geographic relationship between units.
- Indicates how he plans to react once the enemy makes contact with the formation.
- Indicates the level of security desired.
- Establishes the preponderant orientation of his weapon systems.
- Postures his forces for the attack.

The number of maneuver units available makes some formations, such as the box and the diamond, impractical for modernized organizations, including the initial brigade combat team and the limited conversion division, which only have three subordinate maneuver units at the brigade and battalion echelons unless task organization occurs.

3-125. **Column Formation.** The unit moves in column formation when the commander does not anticipate early contact, the objective is distant, and speed and control are critical. (See Figure 3-26.) The location of fire support units within the column reflects the column's length and the range fans of those fire support systems. Normally, the lead element uses a traveling overwatch technique while the following units are in traveling formation. Employing a column formation—



Figure 3-26. Column Formation

- Provides the best formation to move large forces quickly, especially with limited routes and limited visibility.
- Makes enemy contact with a small part of the total force while facilitating control and allowing the commander to quickly generate mass.

- Provides a base for easy transition to other formations.
- Works in restricted terrain.

3-126. A disadvantage of using the column formation is that the majority of the column's firepower can only be immediately applied on the column's flanks. The length of the column impacts movement and terrain management. Additionally, there are the possibilities of inadvertently bypassing enemy units or positions and exposing the unit's flanks or running head on into an enemy deployed perpendicular to the column's direction of movement.

3-127. **Line Formation.** In a line formation, the unit's subordinate ground maneuver elements move abreast of each other. (See Figure 3-27.) A commander employs this formation when he assaults an objective because it concentrates firepower to the front in the direction of movement. A line formation also—



Figure 3-27. Line Formation

- Facilitates speed and shock in closing with an enemy.
- Allows the coverage of wide frontages.
- Facilitates the occupation of attack-by-fire or support-by-fire positions.

3-128. There are also disadvantages of a line formation:

- Provides less flexibility of maneuver than other formations since it does not distribute units in depth.
- Linear deployment allows a unit deployed on line to bring only limited firepower to bear on either flank.
- Provides limited or no reserve.
- Limits overwatch forces.
- Limits control of a unit using a line formation in restricted terrain or under conditions of limited visibility.

3-129. **Echelon Formation.** A commander who has knowledge of potential enemy locations can use an echelon formation to deploy his subordinate ground maneuver units diagonally left or right. (See Figures 3-28 and 3-29, page 3-38.) Units operating on the flank of a larger formation commonly use this formation. Using an echelon formation—



Figure 3-28. Echelon Left Formation

- Facilitates control in open terrain.
- Allows the concentration of

the unit's firepower forward and to the flank in the direction of echelon.

- Allows forces not in contact to maneuver against a known enemy, because all elements probably will not come into contact at the same time.

3-130. The primary disadvantages of the echelon formation are that it is more difficult to maintain control over the unit in restricted terrain than a column formation and the lack of security or firepower available on the opposite side of the echelon.



Figure 3-29. Echelon Right Formation

3-131. **Box Formation.** The box formation arranges the unit with two forward and two trail maneuver elements. (See Figure 3-30.) A unit with only three maneuver elements cannot adopt the box formation. The subordinate elements of the box usually move in a column formation with flank security. It is often used when executing an approach march, an exploitation, or a pursuit when the commander has only general knowledge about the enemy. Employing a box formation—



Figure 3-30. Box Formation

- Allows the unit to change quickly and easily to any other formation.
- Facilitates rapid movement, yet still provides all-around security.
- Provides firepower to the front and flanks.
- Maintains control more easily when compared to a line formation.



Figure 3-31. Diamond Formation

The primary disadvantages of a box formation are that it requires sufficient maneuver space for dispersion and the availability of multiple routes.

3-132. **Diamond Formation.** The diamond formation arranges the unit with one forward and one trail unit and a unit on each flank. (See Figure 3-31.)

The subordinate elements of the diamond usually move in a column formation with flank security. It is most effective during approach marches, exploitations, or pursuits when the commander has only general knowledge about the enemy. Employing a diamond formation—

- Allows the commander to maneuver either left or right immediately, without first repositioning, regardless of which subordinate element makes contact with the enemy. (This is the chief advantage of and the difference between a diamond and a box formation.)
- Facilitates making enemy contact with the smallest possible force, yet provides all-around security.
- Provides firepower to the front and flanks.
- Changes easily and quickly to another formation.
- Facilitates speed of movement while remaining easy to control.
- Provides an uncommitted force for use as a reserve.

3-133. The primary disadvantages of this formation are that it—

- Requires sufficient space for dispersion laterally and in depth.
- Requires four subordinate maneuver elements.
- Requires the availability of multiple routes.

3-134. **Wedge Formation.** The wedge formation arranges forces to attack an enemy appearing to the front and flanks. (See Figure 3-32.) A unit with only three subordinate maneuver elements can adopt the wedge formation. The commander uses the wedge when contact with the enemy is possible or expected, but his location and dispositions are vague. It is the preferred formation for a movement to contact in an organization with three subordinate maneuver units because it initiates contact with one unit while retaining two other subordinate uncommitted units positioned to maneuver and further develop the situation. Within the wedge, subordinate units employ the formation best suited to the terrain, visibility, and likelihood of contact. Employing a wedge formation—



Figure 3-32. Wedge Formation

- Provides maximum firepower forward and allows a large portion of the unit's firepower to be used on the flanks.
- Allows rapid crossing of open terrain when enemy contact is not expected.
- Facilitates control.
- Allows for rapid changes in the orientation of the force.
- Facilitates the rapid change to a line, vee, echelon, or column formation.

3-135. The primary disadvantages to the wedge formation are that it—

- Requires sufficient space for dispersion laterally and in depth.

- Requires the availability of multiple routes.
- Lacks ease of control in restricted terrain or poor visibility.

3-136. **Vee Formation.** The vee formation disposes the unit with two maneuver elements abreast and one or more units trailing. (See Figure 3-33.) This arrangement is well suited for an advance against a known threat to the front. The commander may use this formation when he expects enemy contact and knows the location and disposition of the enemy. Employing a vee formation—



Figure 3-33. Vee Formation

- Provides maximum firepower forward and good firepower to the flanks, but the firepower on the flanks is less than that provided by the wedge.
- Facilitates a continued maneuver after contact is made and a rapid transition to the assault.
- Allows the unit to change quickly to a line, wedge, or column formation.

3-137. The primary disadvantages to this formation are that it—

- Makes reorientation of the direction of movement, such as a 90-degree turn, more difficult than using a wedge.
- Makes control in restricted terrain and under limited-visibility conditions difficult.
- Requires sufficient space for dispersion laterally and in depth.

Limited-Visibility Conditions

3-138. The capability to fight at night and under limited-visibility conditions is an important aspect of conducting maneuver. The commander conducts field training exercises under limited-visibility conditions to ensure that his unit has this capability as part of his standard training program. A commander conducts offensive operations at night or under limited-visibility conditions when a daylight operation continues into the night or when an operation could result in heavy losses if conducted in daylight. Offensive operations conducted in these conditions can achieve surprise, gain terrain required for further operations, and negate enemy visual target acquisition capabilities while taking advantage of the friendly force's night-fighting capabilities.

3-139. All operations conducted in limited visibility or adverse weather require more planning and preparation time than normal. They require designating reference points and establishing navigation aids, such as GPS waypoints. The commander ensures that the night-vision and navigation systems required to maneuver under these conditions are available and functional. The commander rehearses these operations before execution to ensure complete integration and synchronization of the plan. Rehearsals also ensure that

his soldiers have the necessary skills to accomplish the mission. Any problem areas require resolution before beginning the operation.

3-140. Night operations degrade the capabilities of soldiers and units. Cognitive abilities degrade more rapidly than physical strength and endurance. Night-vision devices degrade the user's depth perception. This degradation in performance occurs after as little as 18 hours of sustained work. (Additional information concerning the impact of extended operations on soldiers and unit can be found in FM 6-22.5.) The plan should allow time for both soldiers and units to recuperate after conducting a night attack before being committed to other operations. The weight that soldiers must carry also directly affects their endurance. The commander carefully determines the fighting load of his soldiers, taking into account the factors of METT-TC and limits the fighting load of his soldiers conducting night operations. The equipment carried by a soldier for an extended period should never exceed one-third of his body weight.

FIRE SUPPORT

3-141. Fire superiority must be gained and maintained throughout all offensive operations. Fire support uses a variety of methods and assets that attrit, delay, and disrupt enemy forces and enable friendly maneuver. Using preparatory, counterfire, suppression, and nonlethal fires provides the commander with numerous options for gaining and maintaining fire superiority. The commander uses his long-range artillery systems and air support to engage the enemy throughout the depth of his positions.

3-142. Along with the reserve, attacks by indirect-fire systems and close air support are some of the commander's principal means for influencing ongoing actions. Such support helps establish the conditions required for successful mission accomplishment and is key to the commander's ability to react to unexpected situations. Decentralized execution characterizes the employment of fires when conducting offensive operations. Subordinates must have direct access to sufficient firepower to adequately support their maneuvering elements. Simultaneously, the commander retains control over sufficient fire support assets to enable him to mass their effects at critical times and places to support his decisive operation or to respond to the enemy's counteraction.

3-143. Fire support planning is the continuing process of analyzing, allocating, and scheduling fires. It determines how fires are used, what types of targets to attack, what collection assets are used to acquire and track those targets, what assets are used to attack the target, and what assets verify effects on the target. This planning does not stop at the objective or LOA. The commander gives attention to flanks and potential enemy hide positions. Coordination among echelon fire support elements (FSEs) and the proper use of fire support coordinating measures are critical to prevent fratricide.

3-144. The fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) integrates fire support into the unit's maneuver scheme for the commander. The FSCOORD supports the unit's maneuver by planning preparatory fires, harassing fires, interdiction fires, suppressive fires, and deception fires. These fires can be time- or event-driven. The FSCOORD plans fires on known and likely enemy positions, which may include templated enemy positions. Successful massing of indirect

fires and fixed-wing attacks requires a FSE that is proficient in the tracking of all battery positions and movements and knows the maximum ordinate requirements. It also requires a tactical air control party proficient in the timely execution of close air support. Fire planning reconciles top-down planning and bottom-up refinement.

3-145. As the attacking force moves forward, preparatory fires sequentially neutralize, suppress, or destroy enemy positions. The commander must weigh its probable effects against achieving a greater degree of surprise against the enemy, especially under conditions of limited visibility, in determining whether to fire an artillery preparation. He may decide to employ smart or brilliant munitions to destroy select high-payoff targets or use these munitions in mass against part of the enemy defense to facilitate a breach and negate the requirement for long-duration preparation fires using conventional munitions.

3-146. The commander may choose to make his initial assault without using preparatory fires to achieve tactical surprise. However, fires are always planned to support each unit's operations so that they are available if needed. Preparatory fires are normally high-volume fires delivered over a short period of time to maximize surprise and shock effect. These preparatory fires also include the conduct of offensive information operations. They can continue while ground combat elements are maneuvering. This consideration applies to all types and forms of offensive operations.

3-147. Artillery and mortars must occupy positions that are well forward and still within supporting range of the flanks or maneuver forces to provide responsive indirect fires. The commander considers the effect that movement by echelon or battery has on the amount of fire support provided. The commander should support his unit's decisive operation with priority of fires. His main effort prior to the initiation of the decisive operation will have priority of fires if the operation contains phases. He places coordinated fire lines (CFLs) as close as possible to friendly maneuver forces and plans on-order CFLs on phase lines so that they can be quickly shifted as the force moves. This allows the expeditious engagement of targets beyond the CFL by the maximum number of available systems.

3-148. The effective assignment of forward observers and target acquisition assets to quick-fire or exclusive nets also provides responsive fires. Quick-fire nets allow the lead observers to associate directly with specific field artillery or mortar fire units. These kinds of communication arrangements enhance fire support responsiveness through streamlined net structures and focused priorities. Communications planning should also include the need for communication nets for the clearing of targets for rotary- and fixed-wing attacks.

3-149. Offensive information operations perform several functions to support the offense. As the friendly force moves through the enemy's security area and closes into his main defensive positions, jamming resources concentrate on neutralizing enemy fire control, target acquisition, and intelligence-gathering systems. The commander uses deception to prevent the enemy from determining the location and objective of his decisive operation. In addition, electronic warfare resources continue to provide intelligence and guidance to both friendly jammers and lethal indirect fire weapon systems so attacking

units can destroy enemy C2, ISR, fire support, and other high-value targets. The commander synchronizes the timing and conduct of his offensive operations so they achieve maximum effectiveness.

AIR DEFENSE

3-150. Air defense operations are performed by all members of the combined arms team; however, ground-based air defense artillery units execute the bulk of the Army's air defense tasks. Allocation of air defense artillery assets within a unit depends on the factors of METT-TC. The commander at each echelon establishes his air defense priorities based on his concept of operations, scheme of maneuver, air situation, and the air defense priorities established by higher headquarters. He generally will weight his air defense coverage toward his decisive operation and establish a protective corridor over the terrain traversed by the unit conducting that decisive operation. The commander has the option of retaining all assets under his direct control or allocating assets to subordinate units. Command and control of all air defense assets requires complete and timely communications to ensure proper weapon status for the protection of friendly air support assets.

3-151. Passive air defense measures are an essential part of air and missile defense planning at all levels. All units conduct passive actions in conjunction with their assigned missions. Passive actions reduce the effectiveness of the enemy air threat.

3-152. Targets selected to support echelon tactical air defense efforts include the following—

- Unmanned aerial vehicles with their launchers and control nodes.
- Rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft.
- Facilities supporting enemy air operations, such as airfields, launch sites, logistics support facilities, technical support facilities, forward arming and refueling points, navigation aids, and C2 sites.

These facilities are normally engaged by maneuver and fire support elements and not air defense artillery units. (See FM 3-01 for additional information on using active and passive air defense measures in the offense.)

MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

3-153. This BOS has three basic purposes. It preserves the freedom of maneuver of friendly forces. It obstructs the maneuver of the enemy in areas where fire and movement can destroy him. Finally, it enhances the survivability of friendly forces. Time, equipment, and materials may restrict the amount of work accomplished before, during, and after conducting an offensive operation. The commander's plan must realistically reflect these limitations. The plan must provide the desired balance among these three basic purposes and assign support priorities among subordinate units. Normally, priority of support should be concentrated on the unit or units conducting the decisive operation rather than distributed evenly throughout the force. That support will focus on maintaining the mobility of the force conducting the decisive operation while ensuring the survivability of the C2 system.

Mobility

3-154. Mobility is key to successful offensive operations. Its major focus is to enable friendly forces to maneuver freely on the battlefield. The commander wants the capability to move, exploit, and pursue the enemy across a wide front. When attacking, he wants to concentrate the effects of combat power at selected locations. This may require him to improve or construct combat trails through areas where routes do not exist. The surprise achieved by attacking through an area believed to be impassable may justify the effort expended in constructing these trails. The force bypasses existing obstacles and minefields identified before starting the offensive operation instead of breaching them whenever possible. Units mark bypassed minefields whenever the factors of METT-TC allow.

3-155. Maintaining the momentum of an offensive operation requires the force to quickly pass through obstacles as it encounters them. This translates to a deliberate effort to capture bridges and other enemy reserved obstacles intact. Using air assault and airborne forces is an effective technique to accomplish this goal. The preferred method of fighting through a defended obstacle is employing an in-stride breach, because it avoids the loss of time and momentum associated with conducting a deliberate breach. The commander plans how and where his forces conduct breaching operations. He plans his breaching operations using a reverse planning sequence from the objective back to the assembly area. FM 3-34.2 addresses breaching operations in more detail.

3-156. Rivers remain major obstacles despite advances in high-mobility weapon systems and extensive aviation support. River crossings are among the most critical, complex, and vulnerable combined arms operations. Rivers are crossed in-stride as a continuation of the attack whenever possible. The size of the river, as well as the enemy and friendly situations, will dictate the specific tactics, techniques, and procedures used in conducting the crossing. Corps engineer brigades contain the majority of tactical bridging assets. (See FM 3-97.13 for additional information on conducting hasty and deliberate river crossings.)

Countermobility

3-157. Countermobility operations are vital to help isolate the battlefield and protect the attacking force from enemy counterattack, even though force mobility in offensive operations normally has first priority. Obstacles provide security for friendly forces as the fight progresses into the depth of the enemy's defenses. They provide flank protection and deny the enemy counterattack routes. They assist friendly forces in defeating the enemy in detail and can be vital in reducing the amount of forces required to secure a given area. Further, they can permit the concentration of forces for offensive operations in the first place by allowing a relatively small force to defend a large AO. The commander ensures the use of obstacles is fully synchronized with his concept of operations and does not hinder the mobility of the attacking force.

3-158. During visualization, the commander identifies avenues of approach that offer natural flank protection to an attacking force, such as rivers or ridgelines. Staff estimates support this process. Flanks are protected by

destroying bridges, emplacing minefields, and by using scatterable mines to interdict roads and trails. Swamps, canals, lakes, forests, and escarpments are natural terrain features that can be quickly reinforced for flank security.

3-159. Offensive countermobility plans must stress rapid emplacement and flexibility. Engineer support must keep pace with advancing maneuver forces and be prepared to emplace obstacles alongside them. Time and resources will not permit developing the terrain's full defensive potential. The commander first considers likely enemy reactions, then plans how to block enemy avenues of approach or withdrawal with obstacles. He also plans the use of obstacles to contain bypassed enemy elements and prevent the enemy from withdrawing. The plan includes obstacles to use on identification of the enemy's counterattack. Speed and interdiction capabilities are vital characteristics of the obstacles employed. The commander directs the planning for aircraft- and artillery-delivered mines on enemy counterattack routes. The fire support system delivers these munitions in front of or on top of enemy lead elements once they commit to one of the routes. Rapid cratering devices and surface minefields provide other excellent capabilities.

3-160. Control of mines and obstacles, and accurate reporting to all units are vital. Obstacles will hinder both friendly and enemy maneuver. Positive C2 is necessary to prevent the premature activation of minefields and obstacles. (See FM 3-34.1 for additional information on using countermobility obstacles in the offense.)

Survivability

3-161. Denying the enemy a chance to plan, prepare, and execute an effective response to friendly offensive operations through maintaining a high operational tempo is a key means a commander employs to ensure the survivability of his force. Using multiple routes, dispersion, highly mobile forces, piecemeal destruction of isolated enemy forces, scheduled rotation and relief of forces before they culminate, and wise use of terrain are techniques for maintaining a high tempo of offensive operations. The exact techniques employed in a specific situation must reflect the factors of METT-TC.

3-162. The commander protects his force to deny the enemy the capability to interfere with ongoing operations. That protection also meets his legal and moral obligations to his soldiers. To protect his force, the commander—

- Maintains a high tempo of operations.
- Conducts area security operations.
- Employs operations security (OPSEC) procedures.
- Executes deception operations.
- Conducts defensive information operations.
- Employs camouflage, cover, and concealment.
- Constructs survivability positions for nondisplacing systems and supplies.
- Conducts operations to defend against enemy use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

Although this list is not all-inclusive, it typifies the measures a commander takes to secure his force during offensive operations.

3-163. The echelon's OPSEC program and any deception or survivability efforts should conceal from the enemy or mislead him regarding the location of the friendly objective, decisive operation, the disposition of forces, and the timing of the offensive operation. This tends to prevent the enemy from launching effective spoiling attacks. (See FM 3-13 for additional information on OPSEC, deception, and defensive information operations.)

3-164. The commander normally considers the impact of directing the construction of protective emplacements for artillery, air defense units, and logistics concentrations as part of his planning process. This occurs although units do not employ protective positions in the offense as extensively as they do in the defense. The commander may require the hardening of key C2 facilities, especially those with detectable electronic signatures. Maneuver units construct as many fighting positions as possible whenever they halt or pause during offensive operations. They improve existing terrain by cutting reverse-slope firing shelves or slots when possible. (See FM 3-34.112 for more information on constructing protective positions.) Forces conducting offensive operations will continue to use camouflage, cover, and concealment. (See FM 3-24.3 for additional information on those topics.)

3-165. The IPB process contributes to survivability by developing products that help the commander protect his forces, including intervisibility overlays and situation templates. Intervisibility overlays help protect the force. If an enemy cannot observe the friendly force, he cannot engage the friendly force with direct-fire weapons. Situation templates also help protect the force. If a commander knows how fast an enemy force can respond to his offensive operations, he can sequence his operations at times and places where the enemy can respond least effectively. This occurs through determining enemy artillery range fans, movement times between enemy reserve assembly area locations and advancing friendly forces, and other related intelligence items.

3-166. The commander integrates NBC defensive considerations into his offensive plans. Implementing many NBC defensive measures slows the tempo, degrades combat power, and may also increase logistics requirements. NBC reconnaissance consumes resources, especially time. Personnel in protective gear find it more difficult to work or fight. The key fundamental of all NBC defense activities is to avoid NBC attacks and their effect whenever possible. Avoidance includes passive and active avoidance measures. The other fundamentals of NBC defense are protection and decontamination. Avoidance and protection are closely linked. (See FM 3-11 for additional information on NBC defensive considerations.)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

3-167. The objective of CSS in offensive operations is to assist the tactical commander in maintaining the momentum. The commander wants to take advantage of windows of opportunity and launch offensive operations with minimum advance warning time. Therefore, logistics and personnel planners and operators must anticipate these events and maintain the flexibility to support the offensive plan accordingly. A key to successful offensive operations is the ability to anticipate the requirement to push support forward, specifically in regard to ammunition, fuel, and water. Combat service support

commanders must act, rather than react, to support requirements. The existence of habitual support relationships facilitates the ability to anticipate.

3-168. Combat service support maintains momentum of the attack by delivering supplies as far forward as possible. The commander can use throughput distribution and preplanned and preconfigured packages of essential items to help maintain his momentum and tempo. The commander examines his unit's basic load to determine its adequacy to support the operation. He determines his combat load, the supplies carried by his individual soldiers and combat vehicles. His sustainment load consists of what remains of his basic load once his combat load is subtracted. His tactical vehicles carry the sustainment load. The commander also determines the supplies required for likely contingencies. He determines the amount of cross-loading of supplies required by the situation to prevent all of one type of supply from being destroyed by the loss of a single system.

3-169. CSS units and material remain close to the maneuver force to ensure short turnaround time for supplies and services. This includes uploading as much critical materiel—such as POL and ammunition—as possible and coordinating to preclude attempted occupation of a piece of terrain by more than one unit. The commander makes a decision regarding the possibility that CSS preparation for the attack will be detected by enemy forces and give away his tactical plans.

3-170. The availability of adequate supplies and transportation to sustain the operation becomes more critical as it progresses. Supply LOCs are strained, and requirements for repair and replacement of weapon systems mount. Requirements for POL increase because of the distance the combat vehicles of the maneuver force are likely to travel. CSS units in direct support of maneuver units must be as mobile as the forces they support. One way to provide continuous support is to task organize elements of CSS units or complete CSS units with their supported maneuver formations as required by the factors of METT-TC.

3-171. The variety and complexity of offensive operations requires the Army to establish a flexible and tailorable transportation system. There may be a wide dispersion of forces and lengthening of LOCs. Required capabilities include movement control, in-transit visibility of supplies being carried, terminal operations, and mode operations.

3-172. Maintenance assets move as far forward as consistent with the tactical situation to repair inoperable and damaged equipment and to return it to battle as quickly as possible. Crews continue to perform their preventive maintenance checks and services as modified for the climate and terrain in which they find themselves. Battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) may be critical to sustaining offensive operations. Crews as well as maintenance and recovery teams conduct BDAR to rapidly return disabled equipment for battlefield service by expediently fixing, bypassing, or jury-rigging components. It restores the minimum essential combat capabilities necessary to support a specific combat mission or to enable the equipment to self-recover.

3-173. The burden on medical resources increases due to the intensity of operations and the increased distances over which support is required as the force advances. The commander reallocates medical resources as the tactical

situation changes. Medical units can anticipate large numbers of casualties in a short period of time due to the capabilities of modern conventional weapons and the employment of weapons of mass destruction. These mass casualty situations will probably exceed the capabilities of local medical units and require them to alter their normal scope of operations to provide the greatest good for the greatest number. Key factors for effective mass casualty management are on-site triage, emergency resuscitative care, early surgical intervention, reliable communications, and skillful evacuation by air and ground resources.

3-174. Establishing aerial resupply and forward logistics bases may be necessary to sustain maneuver operations such as exploitation and pursuit conducted at great distance from the unit's sustaining base. The unit or support activity at the airlift's point of origin is responsible for obtaining the required packing, shipping, and sling-load equipment. It prepares the load for aerial transport, prepares the pickup zone, and conducts air-loading operations. The unit located at the airlift destination is responsible for preparing the landing zone to accommodate aerial resupply and for receiving the load.

3-175. Raids conducted by ground maneuver forces within the depths of the enemy's rear area tend to be audacious, high-speed, and of short duration. Logistics support is minimal; units carry as much POL and ammunition as possible, taking advantage of any captured enemy supplies. Once the raiding force crosses its LD, only limited, emergency aerial resupply of critical supplies and medical evacuation are feasible because of the absence of a secure LOC. The commander must thoroughly plan for aerial resupply of the raiding force since it entails greater risk than normal operations. Under these conditions, units destroy damaged equipment that is unable to maintain the pace of the operation.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-176. The commander's mission and intent determine the scheme of maneuver and the allocation of available resources. The commander reduces the scope of the initial mission if only a few resources are available. For example, a commander could tell his subordinates to clear their AOs of all enemy platoon-size and larger forces instead of clearing their areas of operation of all enemy forces if he lacks the time or forces needed to accomplish the latter task.

3-177. All planning for offensive operations address the factors of METT-TC, with special emphasis on—

- Enemy positions, strengths, and capabilities.
- Missions and objectives for each subordinate element and task and purpose for each BOS manager.
- Commander's intent.
- AOs for the use of each subordinate element with associated control graphics.
- Time the operation is to begin.
- Scheme of maneuver.
- Special tasks required to accomplish the mission.

- Risk.
- Options for accomplishing the mission.

The commander and his staff translate the unit's assigned mission into specific objectives for all subordinates, to include the reserve. These objectives can involve any type or form of operations. If the type of operation assigned has associated forms, the commander may specify which form to use, but should minimize restrictions on his subordinates' freedom of action. FM 5-0 addresses the military decision making process and the format for plans and orders.

3-178. Prior planning and preparations that result in synchronizing the seven BOS increase a unit's effectiveness when executing operations. However, the fluid nature of combat requires the commander to guide the actions of his subordinates during the execution phase. The commander locates himself where he can best sense the flow of the operation and influence its critical points by redirecting the effects of committed forces or employing his reserve. This normally means that he is well forward in the combat formation, usually with the force designated to conduct the decisive operation. Once he makes contact with the enemy, he quickly moves to the area of contact, assesses the situation, and takes appropriate aggressive actions to direct the continuation of the offensive operation.

3-179. In addition to assigning objectives, commanders at all echelons consider how to exploit advantages that arise during operations and the seizure of intermediate and final objectives. The commander exploits success by aggressively executing the plan, taking advantage of junior leader initiative, and employing trained units capable of rapidly executing standard drills. His reserve also provides a flexible capability to exploit unforeseen advantages.

3-180. The commander always seeks to surprise his opponent throughout the operation. Information operations, such as deception, and the choice of an unexpected direction or time for conducting an offensive operation can result in the enemy being surprised. Surprise delays enemy reactions, overloads and confuses enemy C2, induces psychological shock, and reduces the coherence of his defenses. Tactical surprise is more difficult to achieve once hostilities begin, but it is still possible. The commander achieves tactical surprise by attacking in bad weather and over seemingly impassible terrain, conducting feints and demonstrations, making rapid changes in tempo, and employing sound OPSEC measures.

3-181. The commander should anticipate any requirements to shift his main effort during the offensive to press the fight and keep the enemy off balance. The commander develops decision points to support these changes using both human and technical means to validate his decision points.

3-182. The commander retains the capability to rapidly concentrate force effects, such as fires, throughout the extent of his AO during offensive operations. This capability is also critical to the commander when his force crosses linear obstacles. Lanes and gaps resulting from combined arms breaching operations or occurring naturally typically are choke points. There is a tendency for each subordinate element to move out independently as it completes its passage through the choke point. This independent movement detracts from the ability of the whole force to rapidly generate combat power on the far side of an obstacle.

3-183. The commander briefs his plan and the plans of adjacent units and higher echelons to his unit's leaders and soldiers. This helps units and soldiers moving into unexpected locations to direct their efforts toward accomplishing the mission. This exchange of information occurs in all operations.

3-184. The free flow of information between all force elements must be maintained throughout the offensive operation. This requires the commander to maintain communications with all elements of his unit. He plans how to position and reposition his information systems to maintain his common operational picture throughout the operation. The commander plans how to expand his communications coverage to accommodate increased distances as his force advances. Accordingly, he provides for redundant communication means—including wire, radio, visible and ultraviolet light, heat, smoke, audible sound, messengers, and event-oriented communications, such as the casualty-producing device that initiates an ambush.

3-185. A unit with advanced information systems and automated decision aids enjoys reduced engagement times and an enhanced planning process. This assists the unit commander's ability to control the operational tempo of the battle and stay within the enemy's decision making cycle. Greatly improved knowledge of the enemy and friendly situations facilitates the tactical employment of precision fires and decisive maneuver at extended ranges. These digital systems also enhance the commander's freedom to move to those battlefield locations where he can best influence the battle at the critical time and place.

TRANSITION

3-186. A transition occurs when the commander makes the assessment that he must change his focus from one type of military operation to another. The following paragraphs explain why a commander primarily conducting offensive operations would transition to the defense and describe techniques that a commander can use to ease the transition.

3-187. A commander halts an offensive operation only when it results in complete victory and the end of hostilities, reaches a culminating point, or the commander receives a change in mission from his higher commander. This change in mission may be a result of the interrelationship of the other elements of national power, such as a political decision.

3-188. All offensive operations that do not achieve complete victory reach a culminating point when the balance of strength shifts from the attacking force to its opponent. Usually, offensive operations lose momentum when friendly forces encounter heavily defended areas that cannot be bypassed. They also reach a culminating point when the resupply of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies fails to keep up with expenditures, soldiers become physically exhausted, casualties and equipment losses mount, and repairs and replacements do not keep pace. Because of enemy surprise movements, offensive operations also stall when reserves are not available to continue the advance, the defender receives reinforcements, or he counterattacks with fresh troops. Several of these causes may combine to halt an offense. In some cases, the unit can regain its momentum, but this only happens after difficult fighting or after an operational pause.

3-189. If the attacker cannot anticipate securing decisive objectives before his force reaches its culminating point, he plans a pause to replenish his combat power and phases his operation accordingly. Simultaneously, he prevents the enemy from knowing when the friendly forces become overextended.

3-190. Once offensive operations begin, the attacking commander tries to sense when he reaches, or is about to reach, his culminating point. Before reaching this point, he must transition to some other type of military operation. The commander has more freedom to choose where and when he wants to halt the attack if he can sense that his forces are approaching culmination. He can plan his future activities to aid the defense, minimize vulnerability to attack, and facilitate renewal of the offense as he transitions to branches or sequels of the operation. For example, to prevent overburdening the extended LOCs resulting from the advances away from his sustaining base, some of the commander's subordinate units may move into assembly areas before he terminates the offense to start preparing for the ensuing defensive operation.

3-191. A lull in combat operations often accompanies transition. Civilians may present themselves to friendly forces during this period. The commander must consider how he will minimize the interference of these civilians with his military operations while protecting the civilians from future hostile actions. He must also consider the threat they pose to his force and its operations if enemy intelligence agents or saboteurs constitute a portion of the civilian population encountered.

3-192. A commander anticipating the termination of his offensive operation prepares orders that include the time or circumstances under which the offense transitions to another type of military operation, such as the defense, the missions and locations of subordinate units, and C2 measures. As he transitions from the offense to the defense, a commander takes the following actions:

- Maintains contact and surveillance of the enemy, using a combination of reconnaissance units and surveillance assets to develop the information required to plan future actions.
- Establishes a security area and local security measures.
- Redeploys fire support assets to ensure the support of security forces.
- Redeploys forces based on probable future employment.
- Maintains or regains contact with adjacent units in a contiguous AO and ensures that his units remain capable of mutual support in a noncontiguous AO.
- Transitions the engineer effort by shifting the emphasis from mobility to countermobility and survivability.
- Consolidates and reorganizes.
- Explains the rationale for transitioning from the offense to his soldiers.

3-193. The commander redeploys his air defense assets to cover the force's defensive position. A transition to the defense may require the commander to change his air defense priorities. For example, his top priority may have been coverage of maneuver units in the offense. This may shift to coverage of his long-range sensors and weapons in the defense.

3-194. The commander conducts any required reorganization and resupply concurrently with the above activities. This requires a transition in the logistics effort, with a shift in emphasis from ensuring the force's ability to move forward (POL and forward repair of maintenance and combat losses) to ensuring the force's ability to defend on its chosen location (forward stockage construction, barrier, and obstacle material, and ammunition). Transition is often a time in which equipment maintenance can be performed. Additional assets may also be available for casualty evacuation and medical treatment because of a reduction in the tempo.

3-195. The commander should not wait too long to transition from the offense to the defense as his forces approach their culminating point. Without prior planning, transitioning to defensive actions after reaching a culminating point is extremely difficult for several reasons. Defensive preparations are hasty, and forces are not adequately disposed for defense. Defensive reorganization requires more time than the enemy will probably allow. Usually, attacking forces are dispersed, extended in depth, and weakened in condition. Moreover, the shift to defense requires a psychological adjustment. Soldiers who have become accustomed to advancing must now halt and fight defensively—sometimes desperately—on new and often unfavorable terms.

3-196. A commander can use two basic techniques when he transitions to the defense. The first technique is for the leading elements to commit forces and push forward to claim enough ground to establish a security area anchored on defensible terrain. The main force moves forward or rearward as necessary to occupy key terrain and institutes a hasty defense that progresses into a deliberate defense as time and resources allow. The second technique is to establish a security area generally along the unit's final positions, moving the main body rearward to defensible terrain. The security force thins out and the remaining force deploys to organize the defense. In both methods, the security area should be deep enough to keep the main force out of the range of enemy medium artillery and rocket systems.

3-197. In the first technique, the security area often lacks depth because the force lacks sufficient combat power to seize required terrain. In the second technique, the enemy force will probably accurately template the forward trace of friendly units and engage with artillery and other fire support systems. These actions often result in the loss of additional friendly soldiers and equipment and the expenditure of more resources.

3-198. If a commander determines that it is necessary to break off an offensive operation and conduct a retrograde, he typically has his units conduct an area defense from their current locations until he can synchronize the retrograde operation. The amount of effort expended in establishing the area defense depends on the specific factors of METT-TC currently prevailing.

Chapter 4

Movement to Contact

When armies approach each other, it makes all the difference which owns only the ground on which it stands or sleeps and which one owns all the rest.

Winston Churchill: *Their Finest Hour*, 1949

Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact (FM 3-0). A commander conducts this type of offensive operation when the tactical situation is not clear or when the enemy has broken contact. A properly executed movement to contact develops the combat situation and maintains the commander's freedom of action after contact is gained. This flexibility is essential in maintaining the initiative. All of the tactical concepts, control measures, and planning considerations introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 apply to the conduct of a movement to contact. Many of the attack preparation consideration introduced in Chapter 5 also apply.

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4-1. Purposeful and aggressive movement, decentralized control, and the hasty deployment of combined arms formations from the march to attack or defend characterize the movement to contact. The fundamentals of a movement to contact are—

- Focus all efforts on finding the enemy.
- Make initial contact with the smallest force possible, consistent with protecting the force.
- Make initial contact with small, mobile, self-contained forces to avoid decisive engagement of the main body on ground chosen by the enemy. This allows the commander maximum flexibility to develop the situation.
- Task-organize the force and use movement formations to deploy and attack rapidly in any direction.

- Keep forces within supporting distances to facilitate a flexible response.
- Maintain contact regardless of the course of action (COA) adopted once contact is gained.

Close air support, air interdiction, and counterair operations are essential to the success of large-scale movements to contact (MTCs). Local air superiority or, as a minimum, air parity is vital to the operation's success.

4-2. The Army's improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities reduce the need for corps and divisions to conduct an MTC since fully modernized units normally have a general idea of the location of significant enemy forces. However, enemy use of complex terrain and offensive information operations designed to degrade the accuracy of the friendly common operational picture will continue to require small tactical units to conduct an MTC.

4-3. A *meeting engagement* is a combat action that occurs when a moving force engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place (JP 3-0). Conducting an MTC results in a meeting engagement. The enemy force may be either stationary or moving. Such encounters often occur in small-unit operations when reconnaissance has been ineffective. The force that reacts first to the unexpected contact generally gains an advantage over its opponent. However, a meeting engagement may also occur when the opponents are aware of each other and both decide to attack immediately to obtain a tactical advantage or seize key or decisive terrain. A meeting engagement may also occur when one force attempts to deploy into a hasty defense while the other force attacks before its opponent can organize an effective defense. Acquisition systems may discover the enemy before the security force can gain contact. No matter how the force makes contact, seizing the initiative is the overriding imperative. Prompt execution of battle drills at platoon level and below, and standard actions on contact for larger units can give that initiative to the friendly force.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

4-4. The following vignette discusses the Soviet Manchurian Campaign in the closing days of World War II and illustrates the idea that tacticians can profit from the lessons learned by other armies in other times. It demonstrates the conduct of an MTC at the operational level.

The Soviet Manchurian Campaign, August 1945

Shortly after midnight on 9 August 1945, Soviet assault troops crossed the Soviet-Manchurian border and attacked Japanese positions. This was the vanguard of a force of more than 1.5 million men that was to advance along multiple axes on a frontage of more than 4,400 kilometers. Soviet offensive tactics were shaped by several factors:

- The necessity for speed to increase the effectiveness of maneuver, thus increasing surprise, overcoming initial defenses, and preempting the establishment of subsequent effective defenses.
- The vast expanse of the area of operations (AO).
- The diversity of the terrain, giving rise to large-scale force tailoring.
- The nature of the opposition.

The Soviets conducted their movement to contact operation at the last possible moment. This reinforced strategic surprise and yielded tactical surprise as well. Units deployed for attack from assembly areas 20 to 80 kilometers behind the border and entered from the march, attacking along every possible axis using small, task-organized assault groups with heavy engineer and firepower support. Conduct of operations under adverse weather conditions and at night went contrary to Japanese expectations. The Soviet tendency to bypass fortified positions confused Japanese commanders.



Figure 4-1. Soviet Moves

The Soviets carefully timed the application of their offensive power by first attacking with forward detachments and advance guards in the first echelon, and then with the main force. See Figure 4-1. This perpetuated the momentum of initial assaults and created a momentum that was imparted to army and front-level operations. Often enemy resistance was eliminated before the main columns had to deploy. Forces massed at the critical point on each axis and maneuvered over what was considered to be impassable terrain. All this resulted in a loss of defense coherence that the defending Japanese *Kwantung* Army was never able to regain. In seven days Soviet forces penetrated between 500 and 950 kilometers into Manchuria from their starting points, securing all the objectives necessary for a complete victory over the Japanese.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

4-5. A movement to contact is organized with an offensive covering force or an advance guard as a forward security element and a main body as a

minimum. A portion of the main body composes the commander's sustaining base. Based on the factors of METT-TC, the commander may increase his security forces by having an offensive covering force and an advance guard for each column, as well as flank and rear security (normally a screen or guard). (See Figure 4-2.) Chapter 12 discusses security operations.



Figure 4-2. Force Organized for a Movement to Contact

4-6. A movement to contact mission requires the commander not to have contact with the enemy main body. However, the commander may still know the location of at least some enemy reserve and follow-on forces. If the corps or division commander has enough intelligence information to target enemy uncommitted forces, reserves, or sustaining operations activities, he normally designates forces, such as long-range artillery systems and attack helicopters, to engage known enemy elements regardless of their geographical location within his AO. At all times the forward security element and the main body perform reconnaissance.

SECURITY FORCES

4-7. A corps or division commander conducting an MTC typically organizes his security element into a covering force to protect the movement of the main body and to develop the situation before committing the main body. A covering force is task-organized to accomplish specific tasks independent of the main body in accordance with the factors of METT-TC, such as conduct mobility and breach operations. This covering force reports directly to the establishing commander.

4-8. If a force conducting an MTC is unable to resource a covering force for independent security operations, it may use an advance guard in the place of a covering force. An advance guard is a task-organized combined arms unit or detachment that precedes a column formation to protect the main body from ground observation or surprise by the enemy. This typically occurs when a brigade or battalion conducts an MTC. In cases where the higher echelon (corps or division) creates a covering force, subordinate elements can establish an advance guard behind the covering force and ahead of the main body. This normally occurs when subordinate units are advancing in multiple parallel columns. In this case, each main body column usually organizes its own advance guard.

4-9. The advance guard operates forward of the main body to ensure its uninterrupted advance by reducing obstacles to create passage lanes, repair roads and bridges, or locate bypasses. The advance guard also protects the main body from surprise attack and fixes the enemy to protect the deployment of the main body when it is committed to action. The elements composing the advance guard should have equal or preferably superior mobility to that of the main body. For this reason, mechanized infantry, cavalry, and armored units are most suitable for use in an advance guard. Engineer mobility assets should also constitute a portion of the advance guard, but the main body can also provide other support.

4-10. The advance guard moves as quickly and as aggressively as possible, but, unlike the covering force, remains within supporting range of the main body's weapon systems. It forces the enemy to withdraw or destroys small enemy groups before they can disrupt the advance of the main body. When the advance guard encounters large enemy forces or heavily defended areas, it takes prompt and aggressive action to develop the situation and, within its capability, defeat the enemy. Its commander reports the location, strength, disposition, and composition of the enemy and tries to find the enemy's flanks and gaps or other weaknesses in his position. The main body may then join the attack. The force commander usually specifies how far in front of his force the advance guard is to operate. He reduces those distances in close terrain and under low-visibility conditions.

4-11. When the command's rear or flanks are not protected by adjacent or following units, it must provide its own flank and rear security. The command can accomplish this by establishing a screen or a guard on its flanks or to its rear. The flank columns of the main body normally provide these flank security elements; for example, the left flank brigade would provide the left flank screen for a division MTC. The rear guard normally comes from one of the subordinate elements of the corps or division and reports directly to the corps or division headquarters. A corps may conduct a flank cover if there is a clearly identified, significant threat from the flank. A flank cover requires significant resources that are unavailable to the main body. Aviation units or intelligence systems may establish a flank screen if the factors of METT-TC allow; however, this increases the risk to the main body. While aviation units can use their combat power to delay enemy forces, intelligence systems can only provide early warning, they cannot trade space for time to "buy" time for the main body to react. (For more specific information concerning reconnaissance

operations see FM 3-55. See Chapter 12 for more detailed information concerning security operations.)

MAIN BODY

4-12. The main body consists of forces not detailed to security duties. The combat elements of the main body prepare to respond to enemy contact with the unit's security forces. Attack helicopter units normally remain under division and corps control until contact is made. If the situation allows, the commander can assign a follow and support mission to one of his subordinate units. This allows that subordinate unit to relieve his security forces from such tasks as observing bypassed enemy forces, handling displaced civilians, and clearing routes. This prevents his security forces from being diverted from their primary mission.

4-13. The commander designates a portion of the main body for use as his reserve. The size of the reserve is based upon the factors of METT-TC and the amount of uncertainty concerning the enemy. The more vague the enemy situation, the larger the size of the reserve. The reserve typically constitutes approximately one-fourth to one-third of the force. On contact with the enemy, the reserve provides the commander flexibility to react to unforeseen circumstances and allows the unit to quickly resume its movement.

4-14. The commander tailors his sustainment assets to the mission. He decentralizes the execution of the sustainment support, but that support must be continuously available to the main body. This includes using preplanned logistics packages (LOGPACs). **A *logistics package* is a grouping of multiple classes of supply and supply vehicles under the control of a single convoy commander.** Daily LOGPACs contain a standardized allocation of supplies. Special LOGPACs can also be dispatched as needed.

4-15. The commander frequently finds that his main supply routes become extended as the operation proceeds. Aerial resupply may also be necessary to support large-scale MTCs or to maintain the momentum of the main body. Combat trains containing fuel, ammunition, medical, and maintenance assets move with their parent battalion or company team. Fuel and ammunition stocks remain loaded on tactical vehicles in the combat trains so they can instantly move when necessary. Battalion field trains move in more depth, with the forward support battalion in the main body of each brigade. Aviation units use forward arming and refuel points (FARPs) to reduce aircraft turnaround time.

CONTROL MEASURES

4-16. A commander uses the minimal number and type of control measures possible in an MTC because of the uncertain enemy situation. These measures include designation of an AO with left, right, front, and rear boundaries, or a separate AO bounded by a continuous boundary (noncontiguous operations). The commander further divides the AO into subordinate unit AOs to facilitate subordinate unit actions.

4-17. The operation usually starts from a line of departure (LD) at the time specified in the operations order (OPORD). The commander controls the MTC by using phase lines, contact points, and checkpoints as required. (See

Figure 4-3.) He controls the depth of the movement to contact by using a limit of advance (LOA) or a forward boundary. Figure 4-3 shows an LOA and not a forward boundary. The commander could designate one or more objectives to limit the extent of the MTC and orient the force. However, these are often terrain-oriented and used only to guide movement. Although an MTC may result in taking a terrain objective, the primary focus should be on the enemy force. If the commander has enough information to locate significant enemy forces, then he should plan some other type of offensive action.



Figure 4-3. Movement to Contact Control Measures

4-18. Corps, division, or brigade commanders use boundaries to separate the various organizational elements of a movement to contact and clearly establish responsibilities between different organizations. Battalion task force commanders use positive control over maneuver units, coupled with battle drills and formation discipline. Company teams are not normally assigned their own areas of operation during the conduct of a movement to contact.

4-19. The commander can designate a series of phase lines that can successively become the new rear boundary of the forward security elements as that force advances. Each rear boundary becomes the forward boundary of the main body and shifts as the security force moves forward. The rear boundary of the main body designates the limit of responsibility of the rear security element. This line also shifts as the main body moves forward. (See Chapter 12 for a discussion of boundaries for a security force.)

4-20. Commanders may use an axis of advance in limited visibility. However, there is the risk of enemy forces outside the axis not being detected, and thus being inadvertently bypassed.

PLANNING A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

4-21. The commander conducts intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations to determine the enemy's location and intent while conducting security operations to protect the main body. This includes the use of available fixed-wing aircraft. This allows the main body to focus its planning and preparation, to include rehearsals, on the conduct of hasty attacks, bypass maneuvers, and hasty defenses. The plan addresses not only actions anticipated by the commander based on available intelligence information but also the conduct of meeting engagements at anticipated times and locations where they might occur.

4-22. The commander wants to gain contact by using the smallest elements possible. These elements are normally ground scouts or aeroscouts performing reconnaissance, but may also be unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or other intelligence systems. He may task organize his scouts to provide them with additional combat power to allow them to develop the situation. The unit's planned movement formation should contribute to the goal of making initial contact with the smallest force possible. It should also provide for efficient movement of the force and adequate reserves. The commander can choose to have all or part of his force conduct an approach march as part of the movement to contact to provide that efficient movement. An approach march can facilitate the commander's decisions by allowing freedom of action and movement of the main body. (See Chapter 14 for a discussion of an approach march.)

4-23. The frontage assigned to a unit in a movement to contact must allow it to generate sufficient combat power to maintain the momentum of the operation. Reducing the frontage covered normally gives the unit adequate combat power to develop the situation on contact while maintaining the required momentum. Both the covering force and advance guard commanders should have uncommitted forces available to develop the situation without requiring the deployment of the main body. The commander relies primarily on fire support assets to weight the lead element's combat power but provides it with the additional combat multipliers it needs to accomplish the mission. The fire support system helps develop fire superiority when organized correctly to fire immediate suppression missions to help maneuver forces get within direct-fire range of the enemy.

4-24. The reconnaissance effort may proceed faster in a movement to contact than in a zone reconnaissance because the emphasis is on making contact with the enemy. However, the commander must recognize that by increasing the speed of the reconnaissance effort, he increases the risk associated with the operation.

4-25. Bypass criteria should be clearly stated and depend on the factors of METT-TC. For example, a brigade commander in an open desert environment could declare that no mounted enemy force larger than a platoon can be bypassed. All other forces will be cleared from the brigade's axis of advance. Any force that bypasses an enemy unit must maintain contact with it until handing it off to another friendly element, usually a force assigned a follow and support mission. The commander tasks his forward security force with conducting route reconnaissance of routes the main body will traverse.

4-26. The echelon intelligence officer (G2 or S2), assisted by the engineer and air defense staff representatives, must carefully analyze the terrain to include air avenues of approach. He identifies the enemy's most dangerous COA in the war gaming portion of the military decision making process. Because of the force's vulnerability, the G2 must not underestimate the enemy during a movement to contact. A thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)—by developing the modified combined obstacle overlay to include intervisibility overlays and other products, such as the event templates—enhances the force's security by indicating danger areas where the force is most likely to make contact with the enemy. It also helps to determine movement times between phase lines and other locations. Potential danger areas are likely enemy defensive locations, engagement areas, observation posts (OPs), and obstacles. The fire support system targets these areas and they become on-order priority targets placed into effect and cancelled as the lead element can confirm or deny enemy presence. The reconnaissance and surveillance plan supporting the movement to contact must provide coverage of these danger areas. If reconnaissance and surveillance forces cannot clear these areas, more deliberate movement techniques are required.

4-27. The commander develops decision points to support changes in the force's movement formation or change from an approach march to a combat formation. Uses both human and technical means to validate his decision points, the commander must determine the degree of risk he is willing to accept based on his mission. The commander's confidence in the products of the IPB process and the risk he is willing to accept determine his combat formation and maneuver scheme. In a high-risk environment, it is usually better to increase the distance between forward elements and the main body than to slow the speed of advance.

4-28. Corps and divisions can execute shaping operations as part of a movement to contact although, by definition, a force conducts a movement to contact when the enemy situation is vague or totally unknown. This occurs when the necessary information regarding enemy reserves and follow-on forces is available, but information regarding those enemy forces in close proximity to the friendly force is not available. As in any other type of operation, the commander plans to focus his operations on finding the enemy and then delaying, disrupting, and destroying each enemy force element as much as possible before it arrives onto the direct-fire battlefield. This allows close combat forces to prepare to engage enemy units on their arrival.

4-29. In a movement to contact, the commander can opt not to designate his decisive operation until his forces make contact with the enemy, unless there is a specific reason to designate it. In this case, he retains resources under his direct control to reinforce his decisive operation. He may designate his decisive operation during the initial stages of a movement to contact because of the presence of a key piece of terrain or avenue of approach.

EXECUTING A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

4-30. Each element of the force synchronizes its actions with adjacent and supporting units, maintaining contact and coordination as prescribed in orders and unit standing operating procedures (SOP). The advance guard

maintains contact with the covering force. The lead elements of the main body maintain contact with the advance guard. The rear guard and flank security elements maintain contact with and orient on the main body's movement. These security forces prevent unnecessary delay of the main body and defer the deployment of the main body as long as possible. Reconnaissance elements operate to the front and flanks of each column's advance guard and maintain contact with the covering force. The commander may instruct each column's advance guard to eliminate small pockets of resistance bypassed by forward security force. (See Figure 4-4.)



Figure 4-4. A Column Advance Guard Attacking to Destroy a Contained Enemy Force

4-31. The commander of the advance guard chooses a combat formation, based on the factors of METT-TC, to make contact with the smallest possible force while providing flexibility for maneuver. Whatever combat formation is chosen, it must be able to deploy appropriately once the commander becomes aware of the enemy's location. He ensures that the route or axis of advance traveled by the main body is free of enemy forces. It may move continuously (traveling and traveling overwatch) or by bounds (bounding overwatch). It moves by bounds when contact with the enemy is imminent and the terrain is favorable. Some indirect-fire assets, such as a mortar platoon or artillery battery and combat observation and lasing teams (COLTs), may be positioned with the formation. The COLTs can help overwatch the advance guard movement, and indirect fires focus on suppressing enemy weapons, obscuring enemy observation posts, and screening friendly movement.

4-32. The main body keeps enough distance between itself and its forward security elements to maintain flexibility for maneuver. This distance varies

with the level of command, the terrain, and the availability of information about the enemy. The main body may execute an approach march for all or part of the movement to contact to efficiently use the available road network or reduce the time needed to move from one location to another. Command posts and trains travel along high-mobility routes within the AO and occupy hasty positions as necessary.

4-33. Behind these forward security elements, the main body advances over multiple parallel routes with numerous lateral branches to remain flexible and reduce the time needed to initiate maneuver. (While it is preferred for a battalion to use multiple routes, battalions and smaller units can move on just one route.) In a movement to contact, the main body's march dispositions must allow maximum flexibility for maneuvering during movement and when establishing contact with the enemy force.

4-34. The commander's fire support systems tend to focus on suppression missions to disrupt enemy forces as they are encountered and smoke missions to obscure or screen exposed friendly forces when conducting a movement to contact. The commander schedules the movements of fire support systems in synchronization with the movement of the rest of the force. Fire support systems that cannot match the cross-country mobility of the combat units cause them to slow their rate of advance. If these units do not slow down, they run the risk of outrunning their fire support. The commander synchronizes the employment of close air support to prevent the enemy from regaining his balance while his ground fire support assets are repositioning. The main body updates its priority target list during a movement to contact operation.

4-35. The same considerations apply to air defense when the enemy possesses aerial capabilities. The commander ensures that his force stays within the air defense umbrella provided by corps and division assets.

4-36. The enemy has a difficult time detecting and targeting the main body when executing a movement to contact until contact is made because of its tempo, momentum, and dispersal; and the attention the commander pays to electromagnetic emission control. Once the force makes contact and concentrates its effects against detected enemy forces, it becomes vulnerable to strikes by enemy conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. It must concentrate its combat effects rapidly and disperse again as soon as it overcomes resistance to avoid enemy counteractions.

4-37. Movement should be as rapid as the terrain, the mobility of the force, and the enemy situation permit. Open terrain provides maneuver space on either side of the line of march and facilitates high-speed movement. It also allows for greater dispersal and usually permits more separation between forward security elements and the main body than restricted terrain allows. The commander should never commit his main body to canalizing terrain before these forward security elements have advanced far enough to ensure that the main body will not become fixed within that terrain. The enemy may have also established fire support control measures that allow him to employ nonobserved harassing and interdiction fires to interdict friendly forces traversing these choke points. As the enemy situation becomes known, the commander may shorten the distance between elements of the force to decrease reaction time or he may deploy to prepare for contact.

4-38. At the battalion and company levels, a moving force should move along covered or concealed routes from one covered or concealed position to another, using terrain to minimize its vulnerability to enemy weapons. Further, an overwatching force should cover the moving force. (Chapter 14 describes movement techniques, such as traveling overwatch.) Regardless of the specific movement technique employed, both forces need to provide mutual support and be knowledgeable about their counterpart's sectors of fire.

4-39. The force must attempt to cross any obstacles it encounters without loss of momentum by conducting in-stride breaches. The commander uses his forward security forces in an attempt to seize intact bridges whenever possible. Lead security elements bypass or breach obstacles as quickly as possible to maintain the momentum of the movement. If these lead elements cannot overcome obstacles, the commander directs subsequent elements of the main body to bypass the obstacle site and take the lead. Following forces can also reduce obstacles that hinder the unit's sustainment flow.

4-40. The commander locates himself well forward in the movement formation. Once the formation makes contact with the enemy, he can move quickly to the area of contact, analyze the situation, and direct aggressively. The commander's security elements conduct actions on contact to develop the situation once they find the enemy. Once they make contact with the enemy, a number of actions occur that have been divided into the following sequence. (Units equipped with a full set of digital command and control systems may be able to combine or skip one or more of the steps in that sequence. Those units will conduct maneuver and remain within supporting distance of each other with a significantly larger AOs than units equipped with analog systems.)

GAIN AND MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

4-41. All ISR assets focus on determining the enemy's dispositions and providing the commander with current intelligence and relevant combat information; this ensures that he can commit friendly forces under optimal conditions. The commander uses all available sources of combat information to find the enemy's location and dispositions in addition to his intelligence systems. Corps and divisions employ long-range surveillance units and detachments in conjunction with data provided by available special operating forces, joint, and multinational assets, in addition to their organic ISR assets. The commander may use his surveillance systems to cue the conduct of aerial and ground reconnaissance.

4-42. The enemy situation becomes clearer as the unit's forward security elements conduct actions on contact to rapidly develop the situation in accordance with the commander's plan and intent. By determining the strength, location, and disposition of enemy forces, these security elements allow the commander to focus the effects of the main body's combat power against the enemy main body. The overall force must remain flexible to exploit both intelligence and combat information. The security force should not allow the enemy force to break contact unless it receives an order from the commander. When a strong covering force has not preceded the advance guard, it should seize terrain that offers essential observation.

4-43. ***Actions on contact*** **are a series of combat actions often conducted simultaneously taken on contact with the enemy to develop the situation.** Actions on contact are:

- Deploy and report.
- Evaluate and develop the situation.
- Choose a course of action.
- Execute selected course of action
- Recommend a course of action to the higher commander.

4-44. Once the lead elements of a force conducting a movement to contact encounter the enemy, they conduct actions on contact. The unit treats obstacles like enemy contact, since it assumes that the obstacles are covered by fire. The unit carries out these actions on contact regardless of whether the enemy has detected its presence. The unit's security force often gains a tactical advantage over an enemy force by using tempo and initiative to conduct these actions on contact, allowing it to gain and maintain contact without becoming decisively engaged. How quickly the unit develops the situation is directly related to its security. This tempo is directly related to the unit's use of well-rehearsed SOP and drills.

Deploy and Report

4-45. When a unit's security element encounters an enemy unit or obstacle, it deploys to a covered position that provides observation and fields of fire. If the security element is under enemy fire, it uses direct and indirect fire to suppress the enemy and restore freedom of maneuver. Simultaneously, the commander of the security element reports the contact using a spot report format to provide all available information on the situation to his higher headquarters. This alerts the commander and allows him to begin necessary actions. (FM 6-99.2 provides the format for a spot report.)

Evaluate and Develop the Situation

4-46. The unit's security force develops the situation rapidly within mission constraints by employing techniques ranging from stealthy, foot-mobile reconnaissance to reconnaissance by fire, which uses both direct and indirect weapons. If possible the commander continues the security mission with other elements not currently in contact with the enemy after evaluating the situation. This helps to develop the situation across the front and provides more maneuver space to execute further actions. As the situation develops, the security force submits additional reports.

Choose a Course of Action

4-47. After the security force makes contact, its commander gathers information, makes an assessment, and chooses a course of action (COA) consistent with his higher commander's intent and within the unit's capability. The unit initiates direct and indirect fires to gain the initiative if it is appropriate to engage the enemy. This allows the security force to resume its mission as soon as possible. The commander cannot allow small enemy forces to delay the movement of the security force. Usually, available intelligence and the concept of the operation indicate the COA to follow. For obstacles not covered

by fire, the unit can either seek a bypass or create the required number of lanes to support its maneuver or the maneuver of a supported unit. Once enemy contact is made, these COAs are normally to conduct an attack, bypass, defend, delay, or withdrawal. For obstacles covered by fire, the unit can either seek a bypass or conduct breaching operations as part of a hasty attack.

Execute Selected Course of Action

4-48. The security force commander should determine quickly whether to bypass the enemy or attack. The security force attacks (see Chapter 5) if it has sufficient, immediately available combat power to overwhelm the enemy and the attack will not detract from mission accomplishment. Such attacks are usually necessary to overcome enemy attempts to slow the movement of the security force. If this initial attack fails to defeat enemy defenses, the security force commander must consider other options, such as making a more deliberate attack or assuming the defense while continuing to find out as much as possible about the enemy's positions.

4-49. The security force may bypass the enemy if it does not have sufficient combat power or an attack would jeopardize mission accomplishment. It must request permission to bypass an enemy force unless the operations order provides bypass criteria. The security force commander must report bypassed enemy forces to the next higher headquarters, which then assumes responsibility for their destruction or containment. Alternatively, the security force could keep a minimum force in contact with the bypassed enemy so that he cannot move freely around the battlefield. (See Appendix B for a discussion of bypass as a tactical task.)

4-50. If the security force cannot conduct either a hasty attack or a bypass, it attempts to establish a defense (see Chapter 8). In the defense, the security force maintains enemy contact, continues to perform reconnaissance, and prepares to support other forces. When the security force commander decides to defend, responsibility for further action rests with his higher commander. In the event other COAs would lead to decisive engagements or destruction, the security force conducts those activities necessary to assure self-preservation, such as delay or withdrawal (see Chapter 11), but maintains enemy contact unless the higher commander orders otherwise.

Recommend a Course of Action to the Higher Commander

4-51. Once the security force commander selects a COA keeping in mind his commander's intent, he reports it to his higher commander, who has the option of disapproving it based on its impact on his mission. To avoid delay, unit SOP may provide automatic approval of certain actions. If the higher commander assumes responsibility for continuing to develop the situation, the security force supports his actions as ordered. The higher commander must be careful to avoid becoming overly focused on initial security fights to the determent of operations directed against the enemy main body.

DISRUPT THE ENEMY

4-52. Once contact is made, the main body commander brings overwhelming fires onto the enemy to prevent him from conducting either a spoiling attack or organizing a coherent defense. The security force commander maneuvers

as quickly as possible to find gaps in the enemy's defenses. The commander uses his ISR assets to gain as much information as possible about the enemy's dispositions, strengths, capabilities, and intentions. As more intelligence becomes available, the main body commander attacks to destroy or disrupt enemy command and control (C2) centers, fire control nodes, and communication nets. The main body commander conducts operations to prevent enemy reserves from moving to counter his actions.

FIX THE ENEMY

4-53. The commander tries to initiate maneuver at a tempo the enemy cannot match, since success in a meeting engagement depends on effective actions on contact. The security force commander does not allow the enemy to maneuver against the main body. The organization, size, and combat power of the security force are the major factors that determine the size of the enemy force it can defeat without deploying the main body.

4-54. The commander uses his aerial maneuver and fire support assets—including offensive information operations—to fix the enemy in his current positions by directly attacking his combat and command systems and emplacing situational obstacles. The priorities are typically to attack enemy forces in contact, C2 and fire control facilities, fire support assets, and moving enemy forces not yet in contact, such as follow-on forces and reserves. These priorities vary with the factors of METT-TC. Attack helicopters and close air support fixed-wing aircraft working in joint air attack teams (JAAT) are ideally suited to engage the enemy throughout the depth of his area of operations.

4-55. The techniques a commander employs to fix the enemy when both forces are moving are different than those employed when the enemy force is stationary during the meeting engagement. In both situations, when the security force cannot overrun the enemy by conducting a hasty frontal attack, he must deploy a portion of the main body. When this occurs the unit is no longer conducting a movement to contact but an attack.

MANEUVER

4-56. If the security force cannot overrun the enemy with a frontal attack, the commander quickly maneuvers his main body to conduct a penetration or an envelopment. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of attack.) He does this to overwhelm the enemy force before it can react effectively or reinforce. The commander attempts to defeat the enemy in detail while still maintaining the momentum of his advance. After a successful attack, the main body commander resumes the movement to contact. If he did not defeat the enemy he has three main options: bypass, transition to a more deliberate attack, or conduct some type of defense. In all cases, he makes every effort to retain the initiative and prevent the enemy from stabilizing the situation by conducting violent and resolute attacks. Simultaneously he must maintain his momentum by synchronizing the actions of his combat, combat support, and combat service support elements.

4-57. Main body elements deploy rapidly to the vicinity of the contact if the commander initiates a frontal attack. Commanders of maneuvering units coordinate forward passage through friendly forces in contact as required. The

intent is to deliver the assault before the enemy can deploy or reinforce his engaged forces. The commander may order an attack from a march column for one of the main body's columns, while the rest of the main body deploys. The commander can also wait to attack until he can bring the bulk of the main body forward. He avoids piecemeal commitment except when rapidity of action is essential and combat superiority at the vital point is present and can be maintained throughout the attack, or when compartmentalized terrain forces such a COA.

4-58. When trying to conduct an envelopment, the commander focuses on attacking the enemy's flanks and rear before he can prepare to counter these actions. The commander uses the security force to fix the enemy while the main body maneuvers to look for an assailable flank or he uses the main body to fix the enemy while the security force finds the assailable flank.

FOLLOW THROUGH

4-59. If the enemy is defeated, the unit transitions back into an MTC and continues to advance. The movement to contact terminates when the unit reaches the final objective or limit of advance, or it must transition to a more deliberate attack, a defense, or retrograde. (For more discussion of these types of operations, see the respective chapters in this manual.)

SEARCH AND ATTACK

4-60. *Search and attack* is a technique for conducting a movement to contact that shares many of the characteristics of an area security mission (FM 3-0). A commander employs this form of a movement to contact, conducted primarily by light forces and often supported by heavy forces, when the enemy is operating as small, dispersed elements, or when the task is to deny the enemy the ability to move within a given area. The battalion is the echelon that normally conducts a search and attack. A brigade will assist its subordinate battalions by ensuring the availability of indirect fires and other support.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

4-61. The commander task organizes his unit into reconnaissance, fixing, and finishing forces, each with a specific purpose and task. The size of the reconnaissance force is based on the available intelligence about the size of enemy forces in the AO. The less known about the situation, the larger the reconnaissance force. The reconnaissance force typically consists of scout, infantry, aviation, and electronic warfare assets. The fixing force must have enough combat power to isolate the enemy once the reconnaissance force finds him. The finishing force must have enough combat power to defeat those enemy forces expected to be located within the AO. The commander can direct each subordinate unit to retain a finishing force, or he can retain the finishing force at his echelon. The commander may rotate his subordinate elements through the reconnaissance, fixing, and finishing roles. However, rotating roles may require a change in task organization and additional time for training and rehearsal.

CONTROL MEASURES

4-62. The commander establishes control measures that allow for decentralized actions and small-unit initiative to the greatest extent possible. The minimum control measures for a search and attack are an AO, target reference points (TRPs), objectives, checkpoints, and contact points. (See Figure 4-5.) The use of TRPs facilitates responsive fire support once the reconnaissance force makes contact with the enemy. The commander uses objectives and checkpoints to guide the movement of subordinate elements. Coordination points indicate a specific location for coordinating fires and movement between adjacent units. The commander uses other control measures, such as phase lines, as necessary. (See Chapters 2 and 3 for definitions of available control measures.)



Figure 4-5. Search and Attack Control Measures

PLANNING A SEARCH AND ATTACK

4-63. A commander conducts a search and attack for one or more of the following purposes:

- Destroy the enemy: render enemy units in the AO combat-ineffective.
- Deny the area: prevent the enemy from operating unhindered in a given area; for example, in any area he is using for a base camp or for logistics support.
- Protect the force: prevent the enemy from massing to disrupt or destroy friendly military or civilian operations, equipment, property, and key facilities.
- Collect information: gain information about the enemy and the terrain to confirm the enemy COA predicted as a result of the IPB process.

4-64. The products of the IPB process are critical to conducting a search and attack. They focus the force's reconnaissance efforts on likely enemy locations.

4-65. The search and attack plan places the finishing force, as the decisive operation, where it can best maneuver to destroy enemy forces or essential facilities once located by reconnaissance assets. Typically, the finishing force occupies a central location in the AO. However, the factors of METT-TC may allow the commander to position the finishing force outside the search and attack area. The commander weights this decisive operation by using priority of fires and assigning priorities of support to his other available combat multipliers, such as engineer elements and helicopter lift support. The commander establishes control measures as necessary to consolidate units and concentrate the combat power of the force before the attack. Once the reconnaissance force locates the enemy, the fixing and finishing forces can fix and destroy him. The commander also develops a contingency plan in the event that the reconnaissance force is compromised.

4-66. Fire support plans must provide for flexible and rapidly delivered fires to achieve the commander’s desired effects throughout the AO. The commander positions his fire support assets so they can support subordinate elements throughout the AO. The commander must establish procedures for rapidly clearing fires. To clear fires rapidly, command posts and small-unit commanders must track and report the locations of all subordinate elements. Because of the uncertain enemy situation, the commander is careful to assign clear fire-support relationships.

EXECUTING A SEARCH AND ATTACK

4-67. Each subordinate element operating in its own AO is tasked to destroy the enemy within its capability. The commander should have in place previously established control measures and communications means between any closing elements to prevent fratricide. The reconnaissance force conducts a zone reconnaissance to reconnoiter identified named areas of interest (NAIs).

4-68. Once the reconnaissance force finds the enemy force, the fixing force develops the situation, then executes one of two options based on the commander's guidance and the factors of METT-TC. The first option is to block identified routes that the detected enemy can use to escape or rush reinforcement over. The fixing force maintains contact with the enemy and positions its forces to isolate and fix him before the finishing force attacks. The second option is to conduct an attack to fix the enemy in his current positions until the finishing force arrives. The fixing force attacks if that action meets the commander's intent and it can generate sufficient combat power against the detected enemy. Depending on the enemy's mobility and the likelihood of the reconnaissance force being compromised, the commander may need to position his fixing force before his reconnaissance force enters the AO.

4-69. Brigades (and possibly battalions) may establish fire-support bases as part of the operations of their fixing force to provide fire-support coverage throughout the area of operations during search and attack operations conducted in restricted terrain. These positions should be mutually supporting and prepared for all-around defense. They are located in positions that

facilitate aerial resupply. The development of these positions depends on the factors of METT-TC because their establishment requires diverting combat power to ensure protecting fire support and other assets located within such bases.

4-70. If conditions are not right to use the finishing force to attack the detected enemy, the reconnaissance or the fixing force can continue to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities to further develop the situation. Whenever this occurs, the force maintaining surveillance must be careful to avoid detection and possible enemy ambushes.

4-71. The finishing force may move behind the reconnaissance and fixing forces, or it may locate at a pickup zone and air assault into a landing zone near the enemy once he is located. The finishing force must be responsive enough to engage the enemy before he can break contact with the reconnaissance force or the fixing force. The echelon intelligence officer provides the commander with an estimate of the time it will take the enemy to displace from his detected location. The commander provides additional mobility assets so the finishing force can respond within that timeframe.

4-72. The commander uses his finishing force to destroy the detected and fixed enemy during a search and attack by conducting hasty or deliberate attacks, maneuvering to block enemy escape routes while another unit conducts the attack, or employing indirect fire or close air support to destroy the enemy. The commander may have his finishing force establish an area ambush and use his reconnaissance and fixing forces to drive the enemy into the ambushes.

Chapter 5

Attack

I approve of all methods of attacking provided they are directed at the point where the enemy's army is weakest and where the terrain favors them the least.

Frederick the Great

An *attack* is an offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both (FM 3-0). When the commander decides to attack or the opportunity to attack occurs during combat operations, the execution of that attack must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions of the enemy force with a tempo and intensity that cannot be matched by the enemy. The resulting combat should not be a contest between near equals. The attacker must be determined to seek decision on the ground of his choosing through the deliberate synchronization and employment of his combined arms team.

5-1. Attacks take place along a continuum defined at one end by fragmentary orders that direct the execution of rapidly executed battle drills by forces immediately available. Published, detailed orders with multiple branches and sequels; detailed knowledge of all aspects of enemy dispositions; a force that has been task organized specifically for the operation; and the conduct of extensive rehearsals define the other end of the continuum. Most attacks fall between the ends of the continuum as opposed to either extreme. (Chapter 1 discusses this continuum between hasty and deliberate operations.)

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

5-2. Once a commander determines his scheme of maneuver, he task organizes his force to give each unit enough combat power to accomplish its

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mission. He normally organizes into a security force, a main body, a reserve, and a sustainment organization. He should complete any changes in task organization in time to allow units to conduct rehearsals with their attached or supported unit. The best place and time for an attacking force to task organize is when it is in an assembly area.

SECURITY FORCES

5-3. Under normal circumstances, a commander resources dedicated security forces during an attack only if the attack uncovers one or more flanks or the rear of the attacking force as it advances. In this case, the commander designates a flank or rear security force and assigns it a guard or screen mission, depending on the factors of METT-TC. Normally an attacking unit does not need extensive forward security forces; most attacks are launched from positions in contact with the enemy, which reduces the usefulness of a separate forward security force. The exception occurs when the attacking unit is transitioning from the defense to an attack and had previously established a security area as part of the defense.

MAIN BODY

5-4. The commander organizes his main body into combined arms formations to conduct his decisive operation and necessary shaping operations. The commander aims his decisive operation toward the immediate and decisive destruction of the enemy force, its will to resist, seizure of a terrain objective, or the defeat of the enemy's plan. His maneuver scheme identifies the focus of the decisive operation. All of the force's available resources operate in concert to assure the success of the decisive operation. The subordinate unit or units designated to conduct the decisive operation can change during the course of the attack. The commander designates an assault, breach, and support force if he expects to conduct a breach operation during his attack.

5-5. If it is impractical to determine initially when or where the echelon's decisive operation will be, such as during a hasty attack, the commander retains flexibility by arranging his forces in depth, holding out strong reserves, and maintaining centralized control of his long-range fire support systems. As soon as the tactical situation clarifies enough to allow the commander to designate his decisive operation, he focuses his resources to support that decisive operation's achievement of its objective. Enemy actions, minor changes in the situation, or the lack of success by other elements cannot be allowed to divert either forces or their effects from the decisive operation.

5-6. The commander may need to designate a unit or units to conduct shaping operations to create windows of opportunity for executing his decisive operation. He allocates the unit or units assigned to conduct shaping operations the minimal combat power necessary to accomplish the missions since he cannot employ overwhelming combat power everywhere. Units conducting shaping operations usually have a wider area of operations (AO) than those conducting a decisive operation. If the commander has sufficient forces as part of his shaping operations, he can assign the tasks of follow and assume or follow and support to subordinate units. (Appendix B defines these two tactical mission tasks.)

RESERVE

5-7. The commander uses his reserve to exploit success, defeat enemy counterattacks, or restore momentum to a stalled attack. Once committed, the reserve's actions normally become or reinforce the echelon's decisive operation, and the commander makes every effort to reconstitute another reserve from units made available by the revised situation. Often a commander's most difficult and important decision concerns the time, place, and circumstances for committing the reserve. The reserve is not a committed force, it is not used as a follow and support force or a follow and assume force.

5-8. In the attack, the combat power allocated to the reserve depends primarily on the level of uncertainty about the enemy, especially the strength of any expected enemy counterattacks. The commander only needs to resource a small reserve to respond to unanticipated enemy reactions when he has detailed information about the enemy. When the situation is relatively clear and enemy capabilities are limited, the reserve may consist of a small fraction of the command. When the situation is vague, the reserve may initially contain the majority of the commander's combat power.

5-9. In addition, the strength and composition of the reserve vary with the reserve's contemplated missions, the forces available, the form of offensive maneuver selected, the terrain, and acceptable risk. For example, in a hasty attack the reserve can contain up to one-third of the force's combat power. Alternatively, in a deliberate attack the reserve is normally sized to defeat the enemy's counterattack forces. The commander should not constitute his reserve by weakening his decisive operation. A reserve must have mobility equal to or greater than the most dangerous enemy ground threat, and be able to fight that threat.

5-10. In an attack the commander generally locates his reserve to the rear of the unit making his decisive operation in a location that provides maximum protection from hostile observation and fire. However, it must be able to move quickly to areas where it is needed in different contingencies. This is most likely to occur if the enemy has strong counterattack forces. For heavy reserve forces, the key factor is cross-country mobility or road networks. For light forces, the key factor is the road network if trucks are available, or the availability of pickup zones (PZs) for air assault forces. The commander prioritizes the positioning of his reserve to reinforce the success of the decisive operation first, then to counter the worst-case enemy counterattack.

SUSTAINMENT ORGANIZATION

5-11. The commander resources his sustaining operations to support the attacking force. A battalion commander organizes his combat service support and other logistics assets into combat and field trains. Higher echelon commanders appoint someone to control sustaining operations within their echelon rear areas. In an attack, the commander tries to position his CSS units well forward. From these forward locations they can sustain the attacking force, providing priority of support to the units conducting the decisive operation. As the attacking force advances, CSS units displace forward as required to shorten the supply lines, using different displacement techniques to ensure uninterrupted support to maneuver units. The size of the force a

commander devotes to rear area security depends on the threat in the attacking force's rear area. A significant enemy threat requires the commander to resource a tactical combat force. (Chapter 12 addresses area security operations in more detail.)

CONTROL MEASURES

5-12. Units conducting offensive operations are assigned an AO within which to operate. Within the AO the commander normally designates the following control measures regardless of whether he operates in a contiguous or non-contiguous environment:

- Areas of operations for subordinate units of battalion size or larger.
- Phase line as the line of departure (LD), which may also be the line of contact (LC).
- Time to initiate the operation.
- Objective.

If necessary, a commander can use either an axis of advance or a direction of attack to further control his maneuver forces. (Figure 5-1 depicts the minimum control measures for an attack.)



Figure 5-1. Minimum Attack Control Measures

5-13. A commander can use any other control measures necessary to control his attack. Short of the LD/LC, the commander may designate assembly areas and attack positions where the unit prepares for offensive operations or waits for the establishment of the required conditions to initiate the attack. Beyond the LD/LC he may designate checkpoints, phase lines (PLs), probable line of deployment (PLD), assault positions, and direct and indirect fire support coordinating measures. Between the PLD and the objective he can use a final coordination line (FCL), assault positions, support-by-fire and attack-by-fire positions, and time of assault to further control the final stage of the attack. Beyond the objective he can impose a limit of advance (LOA) if he does not want the unit to conduct an exploitation or a pursuit. (Chapters 2

and 3 discuss these control measures. They describe how a commander can use attack positions, axis of advance, combat formations, direction of attack, limit of advance, a LD, objectives, PLD, and a time of attack to help control the operation. Chapter 3 describes the use of AOs, assembly areas, line of contact, phase lines, and common direct and indirect fire coordinating measures.)

5-14. In an attack during limited-visibility conditions, the commander wants positive control over the movement of all attacking elements. He typically imposes additional control measures beyond those he would use in a daylight attack. These additional measures may include using a point of departure (PD) and a direction of attack.

PLANNING AN ATTACK

5-15. In an attack, friendly forces seek to place the enemy in a position where he can easily be defeated or destroyed. The commander seeks to keep the enemy off-balance while continually reducing the enemy's options. In an attack the commander focuses the maneuver effects, supported by the other battlefield operating systems (BOS), on those enemy forces that prevent him from accomplishing his mission and seizing his objective. Planning helps a commander synchronize the effects of his combat power through the military decision making process outlined in FM 5-0 and troop leading procedures outlined in FM 6-0.

5-16. This section addresses those considerations unique to an attack by BOS. There are no unique air defense, mobility/countermobility/survivability, or CSS BOS planning considerations that apply only to the attack. Those BOS planning considerations discussed in Chapter 3 continue to apply.

5-17. ***Fire superiority*** **is that degree of dominance in the fires of one force over another that permits that force to conduct maneuver at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the enemy.** The commander plans to focus the effects of friendly systems to achieve fire superiority and allow friendly maneuver forces to breach the enemy's defensive network. The force must gain and maintain fire superiority at critical points during the attack. Having fire superiority allows the commander to maneuver his forces without prohibitive losses. The commander gains fire superiority by using a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures. This includes using counterfires and precision fires, suppressing enemy positions, and destroying key facilities and assets. Achieving fire superiority requires the commander to take advantage of—

- The range and lethality of available weapon systems.
- Offensive information operations to prevent the enemy commander from synchronizing the effects of his available combat power.
- Movement to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage where his weapons can be destroyed, one or more at a time, with little risk to friendly weapon systems.

INTELLIGENCE

5-18. To employ the proper capabilities and tactics, the commander must have detailed knowledge of the enemy's organization, equipment, and tactics.

He must understand the enemy's strengths and weaknesses. Ideally, this knowledge is available during the military decision making process. The commander and his staff develop enemy situational and weapons templates based on analysis of all available combat information and intelligence data. These templates help to determine the feasibility of available courses of action (COAs) designed to achieve a position of advantage.

5-19. Before the attack a unit conducts ISR operations to ascertain those information requirements addressed in paragraph 3-111. Other ISR requirements can include—

- The location and depth of enemy reserves.
- The location and extent of contaminated areas.
- The location and extent of obstacles, possible breach sites, and enemy engagement areas.
- The location of areas where attacking units could become disoriented, such as rough or restrictive terrain.
- The most favorable routes of approach to the attack objective.
- Areas that the attacker can use for flanking fire and maneuver, such as support-by-fire and attack-by-fire positions.
- Suitability of planned friendly assault, support, artillery, and CSS positions.
- Enemy deception operations.

Commanders and leaders at all echelons personally participate in this process.

5-20. The commander takes every opportunity to gain and refine combat information regarding the enemy. He uses his available ISR assets to gather combat information and process it into intelligence. Information gathered during the planning phase of the plan, prepare, and execute cycle is especially useful in determining the viability of each COA developed. Generally, if a commander does not have good intelligence and, therefore, does not know where the overwhelming majority of the enemy's units and systems are located, he cannot conduct a deliberate attack. He must conduct a movement to contact, conduct a hasty attack, or collect more combat information.

5-21. The two fundamental employment techniques for reconnaissance in the attack are: reconnaissance-pull and reconnaissance-push. In reconnaissance-pull, the reconnaissance objective is to find weaknesses in enemy dispositions that can be exploited by the main force. Reconnaissance is launched over a broad area that allows the reconnaissance elements to identify enemy weaknesses to exploit and enemy strengths to avoid. Once these are identified, the commander exploits the situation by choosing a COA that allows his decisive operation to attack enemy weaknesses and penetrate gaps in the enemy's defense. The commander can then commit forces to widen the gap and envelop the enemy. The reconnaissance elements continue to move, seeking paths of least resistance and pulling the main body deep into the enemy's rear.

5-22. In reconnaissance-push, the reconnaissance objective is to identify the obstacles and enemy forces the attack forces must overcome to assault the objective in a previously chosen location in accordance with a COA selected prior to the reconnaissance. Once friendly reconnaissance elements gain

contact with the enemy, they develop the situation within their capabilities. If the objective is an enemy force, the reconnaissance element orients on it to maintain contact and determine as much as possible about its dispositions.

5-23. The commander ensures that reconnaissance and surveillance of the enemy's defensive positions and any terrain critical to the scheme of maneuver continue throughout the attack. If the enemy attempts to modify his defenses, those actions will be detected. In turn, this allows the commander to adjust his scheme of maneuver as the enemy situation becomes clearer. The commander can use human and technological means, acting separately or in combination, to provide the required degree of reconnaissance and surveillance.

5-24. A commander's organic capability to gain information about the enemy and the AO's environment varies by echelon. At the corps echelon these assets include a military intelligence (MI) brigade, an armored cavalry regiment (ACR), and parts of almost every major subordinate command within the corps. Even a company conducts reconnaissance patrols. (For more information on reconnaissance operations, see FM 3-55.)

MANEUVER

5-25. In his plan of attack, the commander seeks to surprise his enemy by choosing an unexpected direction, time, type, or strength for the attack and by exploiting the success of military deception operations. Surprise delays enemy reactions, overloads and confuses enemy C2, induces psychological shock in the enemy, and reduces the coherence of the enemy defense. The commander achieves tactical surprise by attacking in bad weather and over seemingly impassible terrain, conducting feints and demonstrations, maintaining a high tempo, destroying enemy forces, and employing sound operations security (OPSEC). He may plan different attack times for his decisive and shaping operations to mislead the enemy and allow the shifting of supporting fires to successive attacking echelons. However, simultaneous attacks provide a means to maximize the effects of mass in the initial assault. They also prevent the enemy from concentrating his fires against successive attacks.

5-26. In planning the commander and subordinate leaders focus on the routes, formations, and navigational aids they will use to traverse the ground from the LD or PD to the objective. Some terrain locations may require the attacking unit to change its combat formation, direction of movement, or movement technique when it reaches those locations. The unit can post guides at these critical locations to ensure maintaining control over the movement.

5-27. The commander attacks targets throughout the depth of the enemy's defense to keep him off balance and limit his freedom of action. However, at the point of the decisive operation, the commander wants to concentrate the effects of overwhelming combat power against the enemy to shatter the cohesion of his defense. The commander accomplishes this by applying combat power against the enemy at a level of violence and in a manner that he cannot match. For example, the commander could concentrate a tank-heavy battalion task force's shock action and firepower against one enemy rifle

platoon's hastily prepared defensive position. (Field Manual 3-0 discusses symmetric and asymmetric attack in more detail.)

5-28. Another aspect of concentration is the ability to rapidly concentrate force effects such as fires and offensive information operations during movement. This is especially critical when crossing linear obstacles. Each subordinate element tends to move out independently when it completes passage through a choke point. This independent movement detracts from the ability of the whole force to rapidly generate combat power on the far side of the obstacle.

Daylight Attacks

5-29. Daylight attacks allow friendly forces to effectively use their equipment while facilitating command and control (C2). They are the least stressful psychologically and physically on the attacking units. One major disadvantage is that the enemy can effectively use his systems to oppose the attack. Another disadvantage is that it does not take advantage of the Army's superior thermal viewer capabilities.

Limited-Visibility Attacks

5-30. The factors of METT-TC normally require an attack conducted during limited visibility to be more deliberate in nature, except when it occurs as part of the follow-up to a daylight attack or as part of an exploitation or pursuit operation. The commander planning a night attack considers how limited visibility complicates controlling units, soldiers, and fires; identifying and engaging targets; navigating and moving without detection; locating, treating, and evacuating casualties; and locating and bypassing or breaching obstacles.

5-31. Commanders attack in limited-visibility conditions to take advantage of American night-vision and navigational superiority against most potential enemy ground forces. Intensively trained forces equipped for such combat have significant advantages over an enemy who is unprepared for limited-visibility combat. When the friendly force's limited-visibility operations capabilities are significantly greater than the enemy's, limited-visibility attacks may be the norm. Table 5-1 on page 5-8 outlines the advantages and disadvantages of conducting limited-visibility attacks.

5-32. Highly trained units equipped with modern night-vision devices conduct limited-visibility attacks in a manner similar to the way they conduct daylight attacks. Units without extensive night-vision devices can use the darkness to their advantage to conceal their movement, allowing them to get as close to the enemy positions as possible if the enemy also does not have extensive night-vision capabilities. Troops that are well trained for limited-visibility operations and take full advantage of the superiority of their night-vision equipment gain significant tactical and psychological advantages when attacking the enemy at night or in other conditions of reduced visibility. The commander should understand the different night-vision capabilities of all elements participating in the attack, to include the enemy's night-vision capabilities, and make any adjustments necessary to his plan based on these differences. The commander should take advantage of his superior night-fighting capabilities whenever possible.

Table 5-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Limited-Visibility Attacks

ADVANTAGES OF LIMITED-VISIBILITY ATTACKS	DISADVANTAGES OF LIMITED-VISIBILITY ATTACKS
• Defenses are more susceptible to infiltration. • Darkness can conceal the movement of large forces. • Physical and psychological factors favor the attacker, as shock, disorientation, and isolation are easier to achieve. • Air assets can operate more safely because air defenders with only optical sights have greater difficulty acquiring targets at night. • The element of surprise may increase because defenders are more susceptible to deception techniques, such as dummy lights, noise, smoke, and fires. • The defender cannot employ his reserves as quickly at night as he can during daylight conditions.	• Command and control is more difficult. • The defender can react easier to changing situations. • The attacker has difficulty determining the limits of obstacle systems. • Restrictive terrain is more difficult to traverse. • Light, smoke, noise, and fires can deceive the attacker. • The attacker loses momentum because he attacks at a reduced speed to maintain the coherence of his unit. • Land navigation, without GPS, is more difficult at night; units may become separated, cohesion can be lost, and support elements can move to the wrong positions. • The enemy can reposition or emplace obstacles during darkness without being detected by friendly reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence assets. • Attacking units are easier to ambush at night. • Adjusting indirect fire is difficult, even with night-vision devices or illumination. • Units require significantly larger quantities of signal ammunition such as smoke, tracers, flares, and illumination rounds. • The task of locating and evacuating casualties is more difficult to execute. • The risk of fratricide may increase.

5-33. The basic organization of forces for a limited-visibility or night attack is the same as for any other attack. However, changing an existing task organization under limited-visibility conditions requires much more time and effort than it does during daylight. Small tactical organizations, such as combat crews and infantry squads, should be resourced as close as possible to full strength even if it means reducing the total number of these small tactical groups.

5-34. The presence or lack of illumination characterizes the conduct of limited-visibility attacks. Nonilluminated attacks offer the best chance of gaining surprise. Illumination, however, is normally planned for every limited-visibility attack so that it can be readily available if required. The commander can choose to conduct a nonilluminated attack until his forces

make contact with the enemy. At that point, he can illuminate the objective. The enemy can also choose to employ illumination to increase the effectiveness of his defensive efforts. Units generally conduct nonilluminated attacks although they always plan for illumination. All leaders within the attacking unit must understand the time, conditions, and authority required to employ illumination.

5-35. Illuminated, supported attacks are almost like daylight attacks. They are most effective when speed is essential, time for reconnaissance is limited, or the enemy is weak and disorganized. If the commander employs illumination, it should continue until the force secures the objective. The commander should place the illumination beyond the objective to silhouette objects on the objective. This helps the assaulting force see and fire at withdrawing or counterattacking enemy forces. The commander may also employ illumination in several locations to confuse the enemy about the exact place of attack.

5-36. The commander plans for limited-visibility operations in the same manner that he does for daylight operations, with emphasis on—

- Keeping the plan simple.
- Taking additional time for reconnaissance.
- Taking advantage of easily identifiable terrain features, such as roads and railroad tracks, when establishing control measures.
- Using intermediate objectives as necessary to control and maintain the correct movement direction during the attack.
- Concealing preparations.
- Scheduling initial rehearsals during daylight, with the final rehearsal at night.

5-37. To simplify control problems, the commander may weight his support element over the assault force to reduce the number of friendly soldiers moving on the objective in the darkness. Developing a plan that does not require the unit to change its movement azimuth after it crosses the LD/PD helps to simplify the plan execution.

5-38. The commander must assume that the enemy possesses, in at least limited quantities, the same limited-visibility observation capabilities as his own forces—absent positive information to the contrary—when conducting a limited-visibility attack. Using terrain to mask movement and deployment remains critical because limited visibility may create a false sense of protection from enemy observation. During movement, leaders reduce the distances between vehicles or individual soldiers as necessary to allow one system or soldier to observe the other. This decreases the time necessary to react to enemy contact. The attacking force wants to maintain its momentum; therefore, it does not preserve the alignment of units within the selected combat formation at the expense of additional time. However, it must adhere more closely to the plan of attack than under daylight conditions.

FIRE SUPPORT

5-39. The planning process synchronizes the unit's maneuver with the provision of fire support. It must identify critical times and places where the commander needs the maximum effects from his fire-support assets. The

commander combines his maneuver with fires to mass effects, achieve surprise, destroy enemy forces, and obtain decisive results. His guidance gives specified attack criteria for fire support assets, thus focusing the planning and execution efforts on those critical times and events. The specified attack criteria are a compilation of the commander's guidance, desired effects, and high-payoff targets and attack priorities. The amount of time available to plan the operation constrains the commander's ability to synchronize fire-support operations that employ well-matched effects of all available assets against high-payoff targets.

5-40. The goal of the commander's attack criteria is to focus fires on seizing the initiative. The commander emphasizes simple and rapidly integrated fire support plans. This is done using quick-fire planning techniques and good standing operating procedures (SOPs). The commander integrates his fire support assets as far forward as possible in the movement formation to facilitate early emplacement. Fires concentrate (mass) on forward enemy elements to enable maneuver efforts to close with the enemy positions. Fire support isolates forward enemy elements by using long-range fires, air support, and electronic warfare.

5-41. Fires facilitate his unit's maneuver by destroying or neutralizing strong enemy forces and positions. His fire support system must take full advantage of available preparation time to achieve these demanding effects criteria. Fire-support plans feature the following characteristics:

- Targets that are confirmed or denied by ISR efforts.
- Designation of target sensor-to-shooter communication links.
- Possible use of preparation and deception fires to shape the enemy's defense.
- Air support to destroy high-payoff targets on the objective and then shift to reinforcing enemy units, artillery assets, and C2 nodes.
- Proactive suppression of enemy air-defense effort.
- Preparation fires that shift just as the maneuver force arrives on the objective.
- Suppression and obscuration fire plan to support breaching operations.
- Pre-positioned ammunition backed by prepackaged munitions stocks capable of rapid delivery.
- Integration of nonlethal fires, such as electronic attack and PSYOPS, into the attack guidance matrix.
- Integration of primary and backup observers to engage high-priority targets.
- Fire support coordinating measures, accounting for danger close and other technical constraints, to allow maneuver forces to get as close as possible to the objective before lifting fires.
- Signals for lifting and shifting fires on the objective, primarily by combat net radio and by visual signals as a backup means.

These later fire support coordinating measures should also facilitate the massing of fires, including CAS, against high-payoff targets throughout the AO.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

5-42. The commander states the desired effect of fires on the enemy weapon systems, such as suppression or destruction, as part of his planning process. He assigns subordinate units their missions and imposes those control measures necessary to synchronize and maintain control over the operation.

5-43. Using the enemy situational and weapons templates previously developed, the commander determines his probable line of contact and enemy trigger lines. As he arrays his subordinate elements to shape the battlefield, he matches his weapon systems against the enemy's to determine his PLD. Once he determines his PLD, he establishes how long it takes him to move from the LD to the PLD and any support-by-fire positions the attack requires. He establishes when and where his force must maneuver into enemy direct-fire range.

5-44. In addition to accomplishing the mission, every attack plan must contain provisions for exploiting success or any advantages that may arise during the operation. The commander exploits success by aggressively executing the plan, promoting subordinate leader initiative, and using units that can rapidly execute battle drills.

PREPARING AN ATTACK

5-45. Even in fluid situations, attacks are best organized and coordinated in assembly areas. If the commander decides that rapid action is essential to retain a tactical advantage, he may opt not to use an assembly area. Detailed advance planning—combined with digital communications, SOP, and battle drills—may reduce negative impacts of such a decision.

5-46. Unless already in an assembly area, the attacking unit moves into one during the preparation phase. The unit moves with as much secrecy as possible, normally at night and along routes that prevent or degrade the enemy's capabilities to visually observe or otherwise detect the movement. It avoids congesting its assembly area and occupies it for the minimum possible time. While in the assembly area, each unit provides its own local ground security and air defense.

5-47. Units moving to assembly areas send out their quartering parties and link up with their guides at the designated locations. While subordinate units move to and occupy assembly areas, the commander completes the process of planning and coordinating the attack.

5-48. The attacking unit should continue its troop leading procedures and priorities of work to the extent the situation and mission allow prior to moving to attack positions. These preparations include but are not necessarily limited to—

- Protecting the force.
- Conducting task organization.
- Performing reconnaissance.
- Refining the plan.
- Briefing the troops.
- Conducting rehearsals, to include test firing of weapons.

- Moving logistics support forward.
- Promoting adequate rest for both leaders and soldiers.
- Positioning the force for subsequent action.

As part of troop leading procedures, leaders at all levels should conduct a personal reconnaissance of the actual terrain. If a limited-visibility attack is planned, they should also reconnoiter the terrain at night.

5-49. A thorough reconnaissance of the objective, its foreground, and other enemy positions is a critical part of attack preparations. The commander exploits all available ISR assets to provide the necessary information. This includes requesting JSTARS feeds of enemy movements from higher echelons or imagery of enemy obstacles. Reconnaissance forces infiltrate through the enemy security area to conduct an area reconnaissance. They can employ precision munitions and conventional indirect fires to destroy detected enemy outposts while remaining undetected. They locate and attempt to infiltrate the enemy's main defensive positions to confirm his dispositions. When properly task-organized, forces conducting reconnaissance may also be given a mission to conduct covert breaches in the enemy's obstacle complexes to facilitate rapid movement of the decisive or shaping operation.

5-50. During this phase, the commander positions his artillery target-acquisition radars to provide support throughout the AO. Divisions and corps establish quick-fire channels between sensors, such as counterbattery radars and firing units, to rapidly silence enemy indirect fire systems. These channels do not change command relationships or priority of fires.

5-51. The commander exercises and refines his maneuver and fire plans during rehearsals which are an important part of ensuring the plan's coordination and synchronization. As part of the rehearsal process, the commander and his subordinates review the anticipated battle sequence to ensure all units understand the plan, the relationship between fire and movement, and the synchronization of critical events. These critical events include:

- Moving from the assembly area to the line of departure.
- Maneuvering from the line of departure to the probable line of deployment.
- Occupying support-by-fire positions.
- Conducting the breach.
- Assaulting the objective.
- Consolidating on the objective.
- Exploiting success or pursuing a withdrawing enemy.
- Actions of echelon reserves.

The unit should conduct rehearsals under as many types of adverse conditions as possible with time and other restraints to identify and prepare the unit to cope with problems. At lower tactical echelons, the rehearsal includes battle drills, such as creating lanes through minefields.

5-52. From their assembly areas, attacking units move to their respective LDs. (See Figure 5-2.) Units move from assembly areas to the LD in the same way as for any other tactical movement. (Chapter 14 details troop movements.) The number of columns a unit employs in its movement depends on the availability of suitable routes and the friendly and enemy situation.

Primarily the tactical situation and the order in which the commander wants his subordinate units to arrive at their attack positions govern the march formation. Using an LD facilitates the simultaneous initiation of the attack at the prescribed time by all attacking units.



Figure 5-2. Movement from AA to LD

5-53. Light infantry units should move by tactical vehicles to the maximum extent possible to avoid prematurely exhausting their soldiers. However, light infantry forces should not travel too far forward in tactical vehicles. The enemy can detect the noise and other battlefield signatures associated with using tactical vehicles at a greater distance than he can detect dismounted infantry soldiers, and will probably respond to the presence of tactical vehicles with direct- and indirect-fire systems. The commander must weigh the need for security against the time required to conduct a foot march and its resulting effects on soldiers.

5-54. Units move rapidly through their attack positions and across the LD, which should be controlled by friendly forces. A unit uses its designated attack position only by exception, such as when it must refuel prior to crossing the LD to ensure sufficient fuel to reach the objective or the conditions required to ensure the success of the planned maneuver are not yet established. A unit does not occupy its attack positions for more than 10 to 15 minutes without initiating actions to protect itself and increase its survivability, such as deploying local security and camouflage nets and starting the construction of fighting and survivability positions. If necessary, a unit can use guides to assist in occupying the attack position. These guides may come from organic resources or from another unit.

5-55. For units attacking on foot using infiltration and stealth, a commander may designate a point of departure for the attacking units instead of an LD. Armor and mechanized infantry units normally use gaps or lanes through the friendly positions to allow them to deploy into combat formations before they cross the LD.

5-56. Preliminary operations for an attack may include using preparatory fires and the relief of units in contact by executing a relief in place or a forward passage of lines. The relief of units may be desirable to continue the momentum of the attack with fresh troops, change the direction of the attack, exploit a weakness in the enemy position with reserve forces, or initiate an offensive on a stabilized front. (Chapter 15 details a relief in place. Chapter 15 details a forward passage of lines.)

5-57. The commander uses available artillery, mortar, CAS, and offensive information operations to conduct preparatory fires. Preparatory fires are developed from the top down, with bottom-up refinement. The subordinate

commander most affected by the effects of these preparatory fires must strongly emphasize the bottom-up refinement process. Preparatory fires can accomplish the following functions:

- Destroy the enemy.
- Suppress, neutralize, or disrupt high-value or high-priority targets.
- Gain fire superiority.
- Suppress the enemy in his defensive positions.
- Facilitate the attacking force's maneuver.
- Deceive the enemy.

5-58. If the attacking forces are in contact with the enemy's security zone, preparatory fires may initially destroy or disrupt only the enemy's reconnaissance and security forces and positions. In either case, counterfires and counterbattery fires conducted as part of preparatory fires serve to degrade the enemy's fire-support systems and assist in achieving fire superiority.

5-59. The commander ensures that his maneuver forces have the CS and CSS assets necessary to conduct the operation and continue the momentum of the attack as part of the preparation process. That support effort must anticipate future maneuvers to ensure the uninterrupted sustainment of the maneuver force.

EXECUTING AN ATTACK

5-60. A series of advances and assaults by attacking units until they secure the final objective characterizes the attack. Commanders at all levels must use their initiative to rapidly shift their main effort between units as necessary to take advantage of opportunities and momentum to ensure the enemy's rapid destruction. Attacking units move as quickly as possible, following reconnaissance elements or successful probes through gaps in the enemy's defenses. They shift their strength to reinforce success and carry the battle deep into the enemy's rear. A commander does not delay his attack to preserve the alignment of subordinate units or to adhere closely to the preconceived plan of attack. This manual discusses executing the attack in a five-step sequence:

- Gain and maintain enemy contact.
- Disrupt the enemy.
- Fix the enemy.
- Maneuver.
- Follow through.

This sequence is for discussion purposes only and is not the only way of conducting an attack. The reader should understand that these sequences overlap during the conduct of an attack.

5-61. The commander must avoid becoming so committed to the initial plan that he neglects opportunities. He is prepared to abandon failed attacks and to exploit any unanticipated successes or enemy errors by designating another unit to conduct his decisive operation in response to the changing situation.

5-62. When maneuvering his force, the commander strives to retain freedom of action while protecting his force. Although he may have a detailed plan to

defeat the enemy, the commander continually seeks any opportunity to attack to defeat, destroy, or reduce the enemy's combat power or shatter his cohesion and will to fight. The commander avoids dogged adherence to a plan no longer appropriate to current battlefield conditions. The difference between success and failure in combat often depends on the commander's ability to make the plan fit existing circumstances rather than trying to make circumstances fit the plan.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

5-63. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy when he is determined to break that contact is vital to the success of offensive operations. A defending enemy generally establishes a security area around his forces to make early contact with the attacking forces to determine their capabilities, intent, and chosen COA and to delay their approach. The enemy commander wants to use his security area to strip away friendly reconnaissance forces and hide his dispositions, capabilities, and intent. His goal is to compel the attacking force to conduct a movement to contact against his forces that know the exact location of the attacking forces.

5-64. A commander employs his combat power to overwhelm enemy forces in accordance with his situational understanding. However echelons below division do not normally have the detection, tracking, and weapon systems necessary to conduct decisive or shaping operations directed against enemy forces not currently committed to close combat. The manner in which a unit gains and maintains contact depends on whether the unit is in contact with the enemy's security area or the enemy's main line of resistance and the echelon of the unit in the nested layers of reconnaissance and security. For example, the intent of the corps' reconnaissance effort is to determine the dispositions, composition, direction of movement, and rate of movement of the enemy's significant forces. The corps' armored cavalry regiment, acting as a covering force or advance guard, can fight through a security area, develop the situation, confirm information provided by technical means, and force the enemy to reveal more information than could be acquired solely through using intelligence sensors. This additional information includes locating the enemy's reserve. At a lower level, a battalion constituting the advance guard of the main body can use its scout platoon to conduct a zone reconnaissance that focuses on acquiring updates of enemy positions and obstacles.

5-65. The commander's ability to sense the enemy's actions by gaining and maintaining contact with all significant parts of the enemy force, to include tracking enemy reserves, fire support, and follow-on forces, increases the security of the attacking force. The enemy's attempts to shift major elements of his forces or launch a counterattack will be detected. Additionally, by sending out a force to conduct area reconnaissance with an on-order mission to be prepared to conduct a security mission, the commander can prevent enemy reconnaissance assets from detecting the friendly force's major movements and increase the enemy's risk. The risks to the enemy force increase to the extent friendly forces impede or deny success to enemy ISR assets. Combining these factors results in providing the attacking commander with additional time to take advantage of the changing situation. Moving within the enemy's decision cycle allows the commander to take advantage of his successes by

transitioning to the exploitation and pursuit to complete the destruction of the enemy.

5-66. The capabilities of digital C2 systems offer additional techniques a commander can use to gain and maintain enemy contact. The improved common operational picture provided by those systems enhances his situational understanding and ensures rapid, clear communication of orders and intent, thereby reducing the confusion, fog, and friction of battle. Advanced Army and joint intelligence systems feeding those C2 systems enable him to detect and track enemy forces throughout a given AO without having his forces make physical contact with the enemy. The commander's ability to see and understand the situation before the enemy can allows him to act first and maneuver out of contact with the enemy at a high tempo. This allows him to position his forces where they can overwhelm selected elements of the enemy force to disrupt and destroy the enemy's combined arms team. Such attacks—delivered simultaneously with precision by air, ground, and naval systems throughout the width, height, and depth of the battlefield—stun the enemy and rapidly lead to his defeat.

DISRUPT THE ENEMY

5-67. Disrupting one or more parts of the enemy's combined arms team weakens his entire force and allows the friendly commander to attack the remaining enemy force in an asymmetrical manner. The assessment and decisions regarding what to disrupt, when to disrupt, and to what end are critical. For example, the goal of disrupting the enemy's fire-support system is to allow friendly forces to maneuver and mass the effects of their weapon systems against the enemy without being engaged by the enemy's indirect-fire weapons. Attacking forces can accomplish this by attacking enemy forward observers, fire-direction centers, command posts, artillery and rocket systems, or their ammunition supply. Each set of targets requires a different amount of resources. The probability of success, the effectiveness of the attack, and the time necessary to achieve the desired target effects varies with each set of targets.

5-68. Once any type of contact—even sensor contact—is made with the enemy, the commander wants to use the element of surprise to conduct shaping operations that strike at the enemy and disrupt both the enemy's combined arms team and his ability to plan and control his forces. Once this disruption process begins, it continues throughout the attack. The commander uses any existing technological advantage over the enemy in the following areas to aid the disruption process:

- Offensive information operations.
- Lethal firepower effects.
- Range of direct-fire weapons.
- Protection.
- Battlefield mobility.
- Information management.
- C2 systems.

5-69. Whatever form of disruption takes place helps the commander seize, retain, and exploit the initiative; maintain his freedom of action; impose his

will on the enemy; set the terms, and select the place for battle. That disruption also allows the commander to exploit enemy vulnerabilities and react to changing situations and unexpected developments more rapidly than the enemy. This disruption effort usually occurs at division level and above because lower echelons lack the necessary reconnaissance, target acquisition, intelligence analysis, and target attack assets to engage forces not committed to close combat.

5-70. The commander plans his shaping operations to occur at the place and time necessary to establish the conditions for his decisive operation. Targets of a shaping operation may include: enemy C2 facilities, ISR assets, fire-support systems, reserves, and logistics support. If a commander executes a shaping operation too early, the enemy has time to recover and respond before friendly forces conducting the decisive operation can complete their maneuver.

5-71. The commander plans to use harassment, suppressive, or interdiction fires against positions likely to contain high-payoff targets to disrupt enemy reactions to the attacking unit's advance. These fires deny the enemy unrestricted use of the terrain and can prevent his reserves from entering the fight before the unit seizes the objective. Additional benefits may result from these fires over time, including increased psychological pressure on enemy forces and a reduction in their mental and physical capabilities by disrupting their sleep and rest patterns.

5-72. Surprise denies the enemy the opportunity to focus and synchronize his combat power against the attacking force. It prevents the enemy from massing his forces or fires at a critical, possibly decisive, place and time. In place of cohesive resistance, surprise can produce confusion, fear, and piecemeal resistance. Factors that contribute to surprise include: the tempo and intensity in executing the attack plan and employing unexpected factors, such as selecting a less than optimal COA, varying operational tactics and methods, conducting deception operations, and ensuring OPSEC.

FIX THE ENEMY

5-73. A primary purpose in fixing the enemy is to isolate the objective of the force conducting the echelon's decisive operation to prevent the enemy from maneuvering to reinforce the unit targeted for destruction. Since war is a contest between thinking opponents, the enemy will oppose the friendly commander's attempts to fix his forces. Every friendly move causes the enemy to attempt to counter that move. The commander does everything in his power to limit the options available to his opponent. Fixing an enemy into a given position or a COA and controlling his movements limit his options and reduce the amount of uncertainty on the battlefield.

5-74. Reducing uncertainty allows the friendly force to use maneuver to mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against a portion of the enemy. It gives the commander more time to modify his plan as necessary and orchestrate the employment of his forces. It allows him to mass forces in one place by using economy of force measures in other areas. The commander may also try to fix an enemy unit, such as the enemy reserve or follow-on

force, to prevent it from repositioning or maneuvering against the force conducting his decisive operation.

5-75. Fixing the enemy must be done with the minimum amount of force. The commander normally allocates the bulk of his combat power to the force conducting his decisive operation, so fixing operations are, by necessity, shaping operations that illustrate economy of force as a principle of war. Therefore, the commander must carefully consider which enemy elements to fix and target only those that can significantly affect the outcome of the fight. The longer the requirement to fix these forces, the more resources the commander needs to accomplish the mission. Generally, an enemy force only needs to be fixed until it cannot respond to the actions of the unit conducting the decisive operation in time to affect the outcome. This may require a commander to slow down the rate of march of an enemy unit to prevent it from influencing the outcome of the engagement or battle.

5-76. One method of isolating the objective is to conduct a shaping operation using lethal and nonlethal fires. Lethal fires may range from sniper fire to a joint fire plan designed to totally destroy a selected portion of the enemy force. Nonlethal fires, such as electronic jamming, can prevent the enemy from receiving orders or vital intelligence and combat information.

5-77. Severing enemy lines of communication over prolonged periods of time by using interdiction measures is another way to fix the enemy. These measures can range from air interdiction that destroys bridges and rail switching yards to ambushes conducted by infiltrating combat patrols.

5-78. Another method of fixing the enemy is to tie obstacles into the existing terrain to canalize and slow the movement of enemy reserves. At lower tactical echelons, scatterable minefields employed in accordance with the rules of engagement can seal the objectives from possible enemy reinforcement or counterattacks and neutralize enemy actions to the flanks. Deception operations and activities, such as demonstrations and false preparatory fires, can fix the enemy. Using extensive smoke screens and vehicle mock-ups in a deception effort can also assist in fixing an enemy force.

MANEUVER

5-79. The commander maneuvers his forces to gain positional advantage so he can seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. He avoids the enemy's defensive strength. He employs tactics that defeat the enemy by attacking through a point of relative weakness, such as a flank or the rear.

5-80. Offensive maneuver seeks to achieve a decisive massing of effects at the decisive point, or at several decisive points if adequate combat power is available. The commander exploits maneuver by—

- Taking maximum advantage of dead space and covered and concealed routes to close with the enemy.
- Using his advantages in the effective ranges of weapon systems.
- Repositioning friendly forces rapidly.
- Navigating accurately cross-country.
- Obtaining situational understanding of friendly and enemy locations.
- Taking effective security measures.

- Synchronizing the application of all BOS at a time and place on the battlefield to maximize their effects.

5-81. The key to success is to strike hard and fast, overwhelm a portion of the enemy force, and then quickly transition to the next objective or phase, thus maintaining the momentum of the attack without reducing the pressure. The commander must retain freedom of maneuver with multiple COAs throughout the operation and responsive CSS. Additionally, he must make every effort to locate and track enemy reserve and follow-on forces, which prevents friendly forces from being attacked unexpectedly by significant enemy forces. This allows the commander time to delay, disrupt, or destroy these enemy forces before they can interfere with the attack.

5-82. Depending on the conditions of METT-TC, artillery and mortars may advance with the attacking formation or move forward by bounds. The echelon fire support coordinators (FSCOORDs) position direct support and reinforcing artillery in coordination with their maneuver commanders. The force field artillery headquarters, normally a division or corps artillery headquarters, coordinates position areas for general support and general support-reinforcing artillery units through the fire support officers at corps, division, and brigade. The commander considers the maneuver of fire support assets along with maneuver forces to ensure that proper fire support is available at all times.

5-83. The maneuver process normally follows this sequence:

- Movement from the LD to the PLD.
- Actions at the PLD, assault position, or FCL.
- Breaching operations (discussed in FM 3-34.2).
- Actions on the objective.

The movement from the assembly area to the LD that precedes many attacks is troop movement and is discussed in Chapter 14.

Movement from the LD to the PLD

5-84. The unit transitions from troop movement to maneuver once it crosses the LD. It moves aggressively and as quickly as the terrain and enemy situation allow. It moves forward using appropriate movement techniques assisted by the fires of supporting units. Fire and movement are closely integrated and coordinated. Effective suppressive fires facilitate movement, and movement facilitates more effective fires. Whenever possible, the attacking unit uses avenues of approach that avoid strong enemy defensive positions, takes advantage of all available cover and concealment, and places the unit on the flanks and rear of the defending enemy. Where cover and concealment are not available, the unit uses obscurants to conceal its movement. Any delays in establishing obscuration and suppressive fires prior to crossing the PLD may require the attacking unit to occupy its assault positions.

5-85. Artillery and other fire-support assets move as necessary to ensure that the attacking unit remains within supporting range. Previously conducted analysis of the time it takes the maneuver unit to move from the LD to the PLD and the distances involved ensures that their fire support systems are prepared to provide fire support before maneuver units move inside the

effective range of enemy direct-fire weapon systems. The existence of enemy artillery systems that have a longer range than fielded US artillery systems complicates this process. The commander uses fires delivered from fixed- and rotary-wing systems and the autonomous operation capabilities of modernized artillery systems to help counter any enemy range advantage.

5-86. If the commander expects to make enemy contact at or shortly beyond the LD, he deploys his unit so that he can maintain maximum firepower against the enemy's known positions. He chooses the combat formation that best balances firepower, tempo, security, and control in the specific situation. The commander has the option of deploying a security force in front of his attacking unit. He may also employ a flank or rear security force if required by the enemy situation. The commander may not want to change formations during his attack because of the potential loss of momentum resulting from such changes. If the commander finds it necessary to transition from one combat formation to another, he should base the transition on thoroughly trained drills. Once enemy contact is expected, he transitions to the bounding overwatch technique of movement. (Chapter 14 addresses movement techniques.)

5-87. Between the LD and the PLD, the attacking unit secures intermediate objectives only to eliminate enemy positions or bring additional suppressive fires to bear. Fire-support assets engage targets of opportunity. The commander uses CAS and artillery to destroy enemy security forces. As the unit approaches suspected enemy positions or danger areas, the commander directs his forces to occupy predesignated support-by-fire positions. Fire support, suppression, and obscuration are key enablers that allow a force to occupy these positions. Commanders use fires from these positions to suppress enemy forces while the unit continues its advance toward the objective.

5-88. The commander engages known enemy forces with the maximum possible combat power to overwhelm them as quickly as possible. The attacking unit that encounters small enemy units on the way to the objective either quickly overruns or bypasses them if they meet the bypass criteria. The attacking unit then reports the location of bypassed enemy elements to its higher headquarters and maintains contact until they can be handed off to follow and support forces. The commander uses minimal force to maintain that contact to avoid significantly weakening the force conducting his decisive operation.

Actions at the PLD, Assault Position, or FCL

5-89. The attacking unit maintains the pace of its advance as it approaches its PLD. (See Figure 5-3.) The attacking unit splits into one or more assault and support forces once it reaches the PLD if not previously completed. At the PLD infantry soldiers dismount from their infantry fighting vehicles as required by the situation. All forces supporting the assault force should be set in their support-by-fire positions before the assault force crosses the PLD. The commander synchronizes the occupation of these support-by-fire positions with the maneuver of the supported attacking unit to limit the vulnerability of the forces occupying these positions. The commander uses his unit's tactical SOP, prearranged signals, engagement areas (EAs), and target

reference points (TRPs) to control the direct fires from these supporting positions. He employs restricted fire lines between converging forces.

5-90. The PLD can be co-located with the assault position. (See Figure 5-3.) The commander ensures that the final preparations of his breach force in an assault position do not delay its maneuver to the point of breach as soon as the conditions are set. Whenever possible, the assault force rapidly passes through the assault position. It may have to halt in the assault position while fires are lifted and shifted. In this case, if the enemy anticipates the assault, the assault force deploys into covered positions, screens its positions with smoke, and waits for the order to assault. As long as the assault force remains in the assault position, support forces continue their suppressive fires on the objective.



Figure 5-3. PLD and Assault Positions

5-91. Once the support force sets the conditions, the breach force reduces, proofs, and marks the required number of lanes through the enemy's tactical obstacles to support the maneuver of the assault force. The commander must clearly identify the conditions that allow the breach force to proceed to avoid confusion. From the PLD, the assault force maneuvers against or around the enemy to take advantage of the support force's efforts to suppress the targeted enemy positions. The support force employs direct and indirect fires against the selected enemy positions to destroy, suppress, obscure, or neutralize enemy weapons and cover the assault force's movement. The assault force must closely follow these supporting fires to gain ground that offers positional advantage. This COA normally results in the fewest casualties.

5-92. The key to forward movement when the assault force is under enemy direct fire is to return effective fire, which prevents the enemy from firing effectively at the moving assault force. Destructive or suppressive fires are most effective when fired by the stationary support force. These fires prevent the enemy from firing effectively at the moving assault force. Once the support force is in position and the assault force is prepared to move, the support force places a heavy volume of fires on the enemy to destroy, neutralize, or suppress him. The ability of the support force to move to advantageous terrain is critical to accomplishing its purpose of ensuring the assault force's success. Once it suppresses the enemy position, it reduces its rate of fire to sustainable levels to conserve ammunition as the assault force closes on the objective to ensure that it has enough to support the assault. When the assault force nears its objective, the support force increases its rate of fire to ensure the continued suppression of the enemy. This allows the assault force to assault the position before the enemy can react. Either on signal or when the

assault begins, the support force ceases fire, shifts its fire to another target area, or walks its fire across the objective in front of the assault force.

5-93. The commander uses smoke to help conceal units and individual weapons. It degrades enemy laser designators, range finders, and directed energy weapons. When planning to employ smoke, the commander remembers that smoke can have the same effects on friendly and enemy forces. If possible during the assault, the commander uses obscuration to blind the enemy and screen friendly movement onto the objective. Obscuration is placed in front of enemy positions, on the far side of obstacles, and in areas that restrict maneuver. The commander may use a smoke haze over rear areas to limit enemy observation. The defeat of enemy thermal viewers requires the use of multispectral smoke.

Assault on the Objective

5-94. The effects of the overwhelming and simultaneous application of fire, movement, and shock action characterize the final assault. This violent assault destroys or drives the enemy from the objective area. Small units conduct the final assault while operating under the control of the appropriate echelon command post. Heavy forces have the option of conducting this final assault in either a mounted or dismounted configuration.

5-95. The commander employs all fire support means to destroy and suppress the enemy and sustain the momentum of the attack. By carefully synchronizing the effects of his indirect-fire systems and available CAS, the commander improves the likelihood of success. He plans fires in series or groups to support maneuver against enemy forces on or near the geographical objective. As the commander shifts artillery fires and obscurants from the objective to other targets, the assault element moves rapidly across the objective. The support element must not allow its suppressive fires to lapse. These fires isolate the objective and prevent the enemy from reinforcing or counterattacking. They also destroy escaping enemy forces and systems. The commander employs offensive information operations, such as electronic warfare, to attack enemy C2 nodes as part of this effort.

5-96. Supporting artillery may need to displace forward during the attack to ensure maximum support is available for the assault. However, changes in position are held to a minimum because they reduce the volume of available fires. The commander balances the need to maintain that amount of fire support against the enemy's counterbattery capabilities with the need to provide continued coverage as the attacking unit continues to move forward. Fire support assets supporting the unit move into their new positions one subordinate unit at a time, by echelon, to maintain fire support to the attack. The commander can use his available CAS to provide supporting fires while his artillery batteries displace.

5-97. Small enemy units moving toward the penetrated area can disrupt the synchronization of this final assault. As small units and weapon systems crews become engaged, they tend to focus on their immediate opponent rather than the overall situation. Loss of situational understanding, combined with the enemy's more detailed knowledge of the terrain, allows small enemy forces to inflict a great deal of damage on the attacking force. The

attacking unit's leaders must understand the flow of combat and retain the capability to engage these enemy forces before they can alter the outcome of the assault. The commander can commit his reserve to maintain the attack momentum and keep relentless pressure on the enemy. This action also hinders enemy attempts to stabilize the situation.

5-98. Against a well-prepared, integrated enemy defense, the commander must isolate and destroy portions of the enemy defense in sequence. (See Figures 5-4 and 5-5, page 5-24.) His forces must isolate, suppress, obscure, and bypass selected enemy positions. For example, smoke delivered by field artillery and mortars in front of the objective—between the force and the enemy—screens friendly movement and obscures the enemy's weapon systems. Fires placed on and beyond the flanks of the objective serve to isolate the enemy's position. These fires include: smoke, high explosives, improved conventional munitions, and precision-guided munitions delivered by a mix of field artillery, fixed-wing aviation assets, and attack helicopters. In addition, the commander may employ short-duration scatterable mines in accordance with the rules of engagement in conjunction with terminally guided munitions to help isolate and impair the enemy's ability to counterattack. (Their use must not impede the commander's conduct of exploitation and pursuit operations.) Jamming can be used to cut C2 links between the enemy's maneuver force and its supporting artillery. The commander can also use any available CAS to accomplish the desired effects.

5-99. The commander generates overwhelming combat power in sequence against isolated centers of resistance. The assault element can task organize itself to assault one portion of the objective at a time. For example, within the assault company of a task force attack, two platoons may suppress while one platoon seizes a portion of the company objective. This initial platoon, having seized a foothold, then suppresses to allow a second platoon to continue the assault. The third platoon may have a third portion of the objective assigned to it to seize in turn. The enemy may attempt to reinforce its defending forces or counterattack during the friendly force's attack. Once the attacking force reaches the far side of the objective, selected elements clear remaining pockets of resistance while the bulk of the assault force prepares for a possible enemy counterattack. After the assault force reaches the objective, the support force leaves its support-by-fire position and rejoins the assault force or moves to a blocking position to counter possible enemy counterattacks.

5-100. **Mounted Assault.** In determining whether to conduct a mounted or dismounted attack, the commander considers the primary factors of the terrain, obstacles, and the strength of enemy antiarmor defenses. Mounted assaults accelerate the execution of the operation by allowing the greatest speed and shock action and providing the best protection against small arms and indirect fires while conserving the strength of the infantry soldiers conducting the assault.

5-101. When facing weak, hastily prepared, disorganized resistance, or when attacking with overwhelming combat power in relation to enemy forces on the objective, a heavy force commander can conduct a mounted assault. The commander conducting a mounted assault concentrates all of his supporting fires to destroy and neutralize the enemy and fix local reserves. Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles use cannon and machineguns to engage targets for

as long as possible, taking advantage of their accuracy, destructiveness, and small bursting radius of their munitions. As the fires from one type of weapon are lifted or shifted, other weapons increase their rate of fire. The assault force advances close to its objective under the cover of these supporting fires.



Figure 5-4. Attack of an Objective: The Breach



Figure 5-5. Attack of an Objective: The Assault

5-102. The assault force attacks using shock action aided by the firepower of organic systems to rapidly overrun the enemy position as soon as the commander shifts his supporting fires beyond the objective. Mechanized infantry elements move as close as possible to the objective while remaining mounted in their infantry fighting vehicles. When the danger to the mounted infantry elements exceeds the protection offered by their combat vehicle, the commander gives the order for his infantry elements to dismount from their carriers.

5-103. The following technique applies to a heavy force assigned the mission of rapidly clearing an objective against an enemy that does not have a robust antiarmor capability. The heavy force overruns the objective. The accompanying mechanized infantry soldiers dismount from their vehicles on the far side of the objective and sweep the objective from the far side back to the near side to clear any remaining pockets of resistance. The ability of heavy forces to closely follow friendly mortar and artillery fires as they shift across the objective is a major advantage. Any delay in launching the assault after the commander shifts the supporting fires allows the enemy time to move from his protective positions to his firing positions.

5-104. **Dismounted Assault.** A heavy force commander usually conducts a dismounted assault when any of the following conditions apply:

- Terrain favors dismounted operations.
- The enemy is in prepared positions.
- The enemy has a strong antiarmor capability.
- Tanks are not available to lead the assault even though the factors of METT-TC favor their employment.
- Obstacles prevent maneuver across the objective.
- Stealth is required to close on the objective.
- A mounted assault stalls on or short of the objective.

Based on his analysis of the factors of METT-TC and the degree of risk he is willing to accept, the commander determines if, when, and where any mechanized infantry forces in the assault force will dismount from their infantry fighting vehicles.

5-105. **Consolidation. *Consolidation* is the process of organizing and strengthening a newly captured position so that it can be defended.** Normally, the attacking unit tries to exploit its success regardless of the type of the assault. In some situations, however, the unit may have to consolidate its gains. Consolidation may vary from a rapid repositioning of forces and security elements on the objective, to a reorganization of the attacking force, to the organization and detailed improvement of the position for defense. Actions taken to consolidate gains include—

- Conducting reconnaissance.
- Establishing security.
- Eliminating enemy pockets of resistance.
- Positioning forces to enable them to conduct a hasty defense by blocking possible enemy counterattacks.
- Adjusting the fire planning.
- Preparing for potential additional missions.

5-106. Immediately after the assault, the commander must maintain contact with those enemy forces that have abandoned the objective. If he has destroyed all enemy forces on the objective, he takes those actions necessary to regain contact with the enemy. The commander sends out patrols in any direction required to maintain or regain contact with the enemy within his AO. Higher echelons reposition their ISR collection assets and adjust their assigned missions as necessary to maintain that contact.

5-107. The commander also dispatches patrols to ensure contact with any adjacent friendly units. A unit is normally responsible for establishing contact with the units to its front and right as defined by the direction to the enemy. Unless a commander knows that units to his left and rear are preparing to make contact, he takes actions to initiate that contact. Otherwise, a dangerous gap could occur, which the enemy could exploit during a counterattack.

5-108. The task of establishing security is accomplished as soon as the force occupies the objective. Each subordinate element establishes observation posts (OPs) that monitor likely enemy avenues of approach and conduct other security operations. Units must remain aware that the enemy will have defensive fires planned on his former positions, including headquarters bunkers and supply caches.

5-109. Once subordinate units seize the objective, they clear it of enemy forces. They then occupy firing positions to prepare for an enemy counterattack. Normally, an attacking unit does not occupy vacated enemy positions because the enemy is familiar with and normally targets them. Therefore, the attacking unit should position itself away from established enemy positions usually on the next defensible piece of terrain. This positioning is also important because the unit needs to orient on different avenues of approach and in a different direction. The commander positions his armored and antitank systems to cover likely enemy mounted avenues of approach. Mechanized infantry forces normally dismount and orient along likely dismounted and mounted infantry avenues of approach. Overwatching forces, such as antitank systems, orient along likely mounted avenues of approach. Mortars, command posts, and CSS assets move forward to assist in the consolidation.

5-110. The commander should preplan the location and future missions of each element. Artillery and other fire support systems mass fires on enemy assembly areas and troops forming for counterattacks. The commander may alert his reserve to protect the flanks of the attacking units, hold ground seized by them, or counter an enemy counterattack. The commander may use antitank minefields or other obstacles to cover likely enemy avenues of approach. As the unit has time and resources, it improves these obstacles and defensive positions.

5-111. The commander normally designates TRPs, final protective fires, engagement areas, and other direct- and indirect-fire control measures as part of the consolidation process. Once in position, subordinate elements modify preplanned measures and improve the its defensive capabilities as required. As local security is being established, the commander directs subordinate elements to conduct mounted or dismounted patrols along likely enemy avenues of approach. The echelon scout or cavalry unit deploys beyond these local security patrols to conduct its assigned reconnaissance or security mission.

5-112. **Reorganization.** Reorganization includes all measures taken by the commander to maintain the combat effectiveness of his unit or return it to a specified level of combat capability. Commanders of all types of units at each echelon conduct reorganization. Any reorganization actions not completed when conducting the attack are accomplished during consolidation. These actions include—

- Redistributing or cross-leveling supplies, ammunition, and equipment as necessary.
- Matching operational weapon systems with crews.
- Forming composite units by joining two or more attrited units to form a single, mission-capable unit.
- Replacing key personnel lost before or during the battle.
- Reporting unit location and status to keep the next higher commander informed; digitized units can do this automatically.
- Recovering, treating, and evacuating casualties, prisoners of war, and damaged equipment in accordance with its SOP.
- Resupply of its basic loads of ammunition, fuel, and repair parts as time permits.
- Integrating replacement soldiers and systems into the unit.
- Revising communication plans as required. The unit places its C2 facilities in position to conduct further operations and control the consolidation.
- Reestablishing unit cohesion.
- Conducting essential training, such as training replacements on the unit's SOP.

FOLLOW THROUGH

5-113. After seizing the objective, the commander has two alternatives: exploit success and continue the attack or terminate the offensive operation. At brigade echelon and below, the unit maintains contact and attempts to exploit its success. Normally, a division or corps commander makes the decision regarding whether to initiate a general—as opposed to local—exploitation or pursuit or terminate offensive actions.

5-114. After seizing an objective, the most likely on-order mission is to continue the attack. During consolidation, the commander and his staff continue troop leading procedures in preparation for any on-order missions assigned by a higher headquarters. They use available combat information and intelligence products to adjust contingency plans. The commander redirects his ISR collection effort to support his next mission.

5-115. Fire support assets move quickly to take advantage of the natural reduction in support requirements that occur when a position is taken and when the enemy can organize a counterattack to provide depth to a defense. Field artillery units reposition to where they can support a renewed attack when ammunition supply and enemy action permit. Attacks by rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft can provide support while artillery systems reposition. Road conditions, such as destroyed bridges or dislocated civilians, and the unit's existing cross-country mobility abilities given the current environment conditions will also impact on the exact time of the decision to reposition.

5-116. The commander attempts to exploit the deterioration of the enemy position by administering quick and powerful blows before the enemy can reconstitute his defense. Using mass quantities of precision-guided munitions, combined with the action of large, heavy formations and air support, may prove decisive.

5-117. Ordinarily, the enemy attempts to hold his position until nightfall and complete his withdrawal under cover of darkness. The attacking unit maintains relentless pressure, continuing the attack at night. Through these attacks, the unit maintains contact with the enemy, keeps him off balance, and makes his withdrawal from action extremely difficult. If the enemy tries to delay, the unit continues its attack, concentrating its efforts on enveloping or encircling the retrograding enemy force if the enemy is too strong to overrun. An attack aggressively pushed through the hostile front may isolate major elements and force the enemy to evacuate the entire defensive position before he can construct a viable fall-back position.

5-118. When conducting a successful penetration, attacking units penetrate deeper into the hostile position to attack enemy reserves, artillery, C2 centers, and lines of communication. Either the assault or a support unit attacks the enemy's newly exposed flanks to widen the gap. The commander sends forces through the gap that have a high degree of tactical mobility to exploit the advantages gained, attack the enemy from the rear, and prevent his escape. At this time, the commander's force multipliers—such as fixed-wing aviation—concentrate on supporting the ground force exploiting the penetration.

5-119. As part of the follow through to the attack, the commander plans logical sequels to his attack. Attacking forces plan for exploitation. Exploiting forces plan for the pursuit of a defeated enemy. Furthermore, the commander must use his force without overextending its logistics capabilities. The commander must plan to have fresh units pass around or through forward units to sustain the momentum of the attack. He may assign these fresh units the task of follow and support or follow and assume in an effort to maintain the tempo of the attack. (Appendix B discusses both tactical mission tasks in greater detail.) A commander conducting either type of offensive operation envisions how, under what conditions, where, and when he will need to transition to the defense based on possible enemy countermoves and other events.

5-120. If the attacking unit is transitioning to a pursuit or exploitation, it may have to bypass enemy units to maintain the operational tempo. Units bypass enemy forces according to the previously established bypass criteria. As a minimum, the bypassed force is left under observation or fixed in place by other units.

5-121. If the enemy succeeds in withdrawing his major forces from action, the commander intensifies reconnaissance to obtain the information necessary to decide on a COA. Aggressive action may prevent the enemy from reconstituting his defense in a rearward position. The commander may have to delay the renewal of his attack until completing additional reconnaissance so he can formulate a tactically sound plan if the enemy succeeds in occupying new defensive positions.

SPECIAL PURPOSE ATTACKS

5-122. The commander can launch an attack to achieve various results or for special purposes. These subordinate forms of an attack are—

- Ambush.
- Counterattack.
- Demonstration.
- Feint.
- Raid.
- Spoiling attack.

The commander's intent and the factors of METT-TC determine the specific form of attack. As attack forms, they share many of the planning, preparation, and execution considerations of the offense. This section discusses the unique considerations of each form of attack. Demonstrations and feints, while forms of attack, are also associated with military deception operations. (See FM 3-13.)

AMBUSH

5-123. An *ambush* is a form of attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy (FM 3-0). It may include an assault to close with and destroy the engaged enemy force. In an ambush, ground objectives do not have to be seized and held.

5-124. The two types of ambush are point ambush and area ambush. In a point ambush, a unit deploys to attack a single kill zone. In an area ambush, a unit deploys into two or more related point ambushes. A unit smaller than a platoon does not normally conduct an area ambush.

5-125. Ambushes are categorized as either hasty or deliberate but take place along a continuum. A hasty ambush is an immediate reaction to an unexpected opportunity conducted using SOPs and battle drill. A deliberate ambush is planned as a specific action against a specific target. Detailed information about the target, such as size, organization, and weapons and equipment carried; route and direction of movement; and times the target will reach or pass certain points on its route may be available. Heavy or light forces may conduct an ambush. (Figure 5-6 shows the tactical mission graphic for an ambush.) Doctrine categorizes ambushes as near or far ambushes, based on the proximity of the friendly force to the enemy.


THE ARROW SHAFT'S BASE IS THE CENTER OF MASS OF THE AMBUSH UNIT'S POSITION. THE ARROW POINTS IN THE DIRECTION OF FIRE FROM THE AMBUSH UNIT.

Figure 5-6. Ambush Tactical Mission Graphic

5-126. The typical goal of the ambush force is the death or capture of all enemy personnel located within the kill zone. Another goal could be to destroy certain designated vehicles, such as all missile transporter-erector launchers. Ideally, the ambush force can destroy the ambushed enemy so quickly that he is unable to report the engagement while the ambush force accomplishes its mission.

Organization of Forces

5-127. A typical ambush is organized into three elements: assault, support, and security. The assault element fires into the kill zone. Its goal is to destroy the enemy force. When used, the assault force attacks into and clears the kill zone and may be assigned additional tasks, to include searching for items of intelligence value, capturing prisoners, and completing the destruction of enemy equipment to preclude its immediate reuse. The support element supports the assault element by firing into and around the kill zone, and it provides the ambush's primary killing power. The support element attempts to destroy the majority of enemy combat power before the assault element moves into the objective or kill zone. The security element isolates the kill zone, provides early warning of the arrival of any enemy relief force, and provides security for the remaining ambush force. It secures the objective rally point and blocks enemy avenues of approach into and out of the ambush site, which prevents the enemy from entering or leaving.

Planning an Ambush

5-128. Planning considerations for an ambush include—

- A "no-later-than" time to establish the ambush.
- A tentative ambush formation or, for an area ambush, element locations.
- Insertion and exit routes.
- A forward passage of lines and movement to the ambush site in tactical formation.
- Location of a rally point where the ambush force can reassemble and reorganize if required.
- Actions if the ambush is prematurely detected.
- A scheme of maneuver that maximizes engagement of the enemy's flank or rear, provides early warning of target approach, includes assault element actions in the kill zone, and details how the ambush element displaces from the ambush site.
- Actions at the objective,
- Obstacles to augment the effects of the friendly fire.
- A fire support plan that integrates the direct fire and obstacle plans, which results in the enemy's isolation, inflicts maximum damage, and also supports forces in the rally point.
- The criteria for initiating the ambush; for example, only engage enemy formations of the same or smaller size and withhold fire until the target moves into the kill zone.
- Any required changes to the ambushing unit's fire distribution SOP, based on the factors of METT-TC.

- Rear security measures.

5-129. A point ambush usually employs a line or an L-shaped formation. The names of these formations describe deployment of the support element around the kill zone. **The *kill zone* is that part of an ambush site where fires are concentrated to isolate, fix, and destroy the enemy.** The ambush formation is important because it determines whether a point ambush can deliver the heavy volume of fire necessary to isolate and destroy the target. The commander determines the formation to use based on the advantages and disadvantages of each formation in relation to the factors of METT-TC.

5-130. The assault and support elements generally deploy parallel to the target's route of movement—the long axis of the kill zone—which subjects the target to flanking fire in the line formation. (See Figure 5-7.) The size of the target that can be trapped in the kill zone is limited by the size of the area that can be covered by the support element's weapons. Natural, manmade, and military obstacles—reinforced with tactical obstacles integrated with direct and indirect fires—traps the target in the kill zone. A disadvantage of the line formation is that the target may be so dispersed that it is larger than the kill zone.



Figure 5-7. Linear Ambush

5-131. The line formation is effective in close terrain, which restricts the target's movement, and in open terrain where one flank is blocked by existing or reinforcing obstacles. The commander may place similar obstacles between the assault and support elements and the kill zone to protect the ambush force from the target's counterambush drills. When the ambush force deploys in a line formation, it leaves access lanes through these protective obstacles so that it can assault the target. An advantage of the line formation is that it is relatively easy to control under all conditions of visibility.

5-132. The L-shaped formation is a variation of the line formation. (See Figure 5-8, page 3-32.) The long leg of the "L" (assault element) is parallel to the kill zone and provides flanking fire. An advantage of the "L" formation is that the short leg (support element) is at the end of the kill zone and at a right angle to it and blocks the enemy's forward movement. It also provides enfilading fire that interlocks with fire from the other leg. The commander can

employ an L-shaped formation on a straight stretch of trail, road, stream, or at a sharp bend.



Figure 5-8. L-Shaped Ambush

5-133. An area ambush is most effective when enemy movement is largely restricted to trails or roads. The area should offer several suitable point ambush sites. The commander selects a central ambush site around which he can organize outlying ambushes. Once he selects his site, he must determine the enemy's possible avenues of approach and escape routes. He assigns outlying point ambush sites to his subordinates to cover these avenues. Once they occupy these sites, they report all enemy traffic going toward or away from the central ambush site to the commander. These outlying ambushes allow the enemy to pass through their kill zone until the commander initiates the central ambush. Once the central ambush begins, the outlying ambushes prevent enemy troops from escaping or entering the area. (See Figure 5-9.)

5-134. The ambush unit commander normally specifies the signals required to control the ambush. He changes the meaning of audible and visual signals frequently to avoid setting patterns that the enemy can recognize. Otherwise, the enemy might recognize a signal and react in time to avoid the full effects of the ambush. For example, if a white star cluster is always used to signal withdrawal in a night ambush, an alert enemy might fire one and cause the ambush force to withdraw prematurely. The subordinate elements of the ambush unit must receive communications—in the form of signals—that relay the following information:

- Target approaching, normally given by a member of the security team to warn the ambush commander and the ambush elements of the target's progress.
- Initiate the ambush, given by the ambush unit commander. (This signal should be a mass casualty-producing signal, such as a main gun round from a tank, machine gun fire, the detonation of mines or explosives, or other direct fire crew-served weapons.)

- Lift or shift fire, given when the target is to be assaulted; all fires must stop or be shifted at once so that the assault element can attack before the target can react.
- Assault, given when the assault force is to move into the kill zone and complete its activities.
- Cease fire, given to cease all fires.
- Withdraw from the kill zone or ambush site, given when the ambush is completed or an enemy relief force is approaching.



Figure 5-9. Area Ambush

5-135. The commander uses a variety of signals to communicate this information, such as radio transmissions, voice commands, vehicle horns, whistles, or pyrotechnics. All signals must have at least one backup. For example, if the signal to shift fire fails, the assault element should not attack the target unless it receives the backup signal. Signals sent out before initiation of the ambush should not expose the ambush to detection by the enemy. The commander reviews SOP signals to see if they need to be revised or augmented to meet specific situational requirements.

Preparation for an Ambush

5-136. Surprise, coordinated fires, and control are the keys to a successful ambush. Surprise allows the ambush force to seize control of the situation. If total surprise is not possible, it must be so nearly complete that the target does not expect the ambush until it is too late to react effectively. Thorough planning, preparation, and execution help achieve surprise.

5-137. The commander conducts a leader's reconnaissance with key personnel to confirm or modify his plan. This reconnaissance should be undetected by the enemy to preclude alerting him. If necessary, the commander modifies the ambush plan and immediately disseminates those changes to subordinate leaders and other affected organizations. The commander must maintain close control during movement to, occupation of, and withdrawal from the

ambush site. Control is most critical when the ambush unit is approaching the target. Leaders enforce camouflage, noise, and light discipline.

5-138. The ambush unit's security element remains at full alert and uses all available observation devices to detect the enemy's approach to the ambush site. Each soldier's duties within each element are rotated as necessary to maintain alertness.

5-139. All elements of the ambush force reconnoiter their routes of withdrawal to the selected rally point. When possible, soldiers or crews reconnoiter the route they will use.

5-140. The commander positions all his weapons, including mines and demolitions authorized by his rules of engagement, to obtain the maximum effectiveness against the target in the kill zone. He coordinates all fires, including those of supporting artillery and mortars. The goals of the support element are to isolate the kill zone, prevent the target's escape or reinforcement, and deliver a large volume of highly concentrated surprise fire into the kill zone. This fire must inflict maximum damage so the assault element can quickly assault and destroy the target.

Execution of an Ambush

5-141. Fire discipline is a key part of any ambush. Fire must be withheld until the ambush commander gives the signal to initiate the ambush. That signal should be fire from the most deadly weapon in the ambush. Once initiated, the ambush unit delivers its fires at the maximum rate possible given the need for accuracy. Otherwise, the assault could be delayed, giving the target time to react and increasing the possibility of fratricide. Accurate fires help achieve surprise as well as destroy the target. When it is necessary to assault the target, the lifting or shifting of fires must be precise. The assault element does not conduct its assault until enemy fires or resistance has been negated or eliminated.

5-142. If the ambush fails and the enemy pursues the ambush force, it may have to withdraw by bounds. It should use smoke to help conceal its withdrawal. Activating limited-duration minefields along the withdrawal routes after the passage of the withdrawing ambush force can help stop or delay enemy pursuit. The commander positions the support element to assist in the withdrawal of the assault element.

5-143. On the commander's order, the ambush force withdraws to the rally point, reorganizes, and starts its return march. At a previously established location, it halts and disseminates any combat information obtained as a result of the ambush to all elements of the ambush force. However, future information systems should be able to disseminate this information without the need to halt a heavy force.

5-144. The commander or his representative debriefs the ambush force to help identify enemy patterns of response, activities, and procedures, both inside and outside the ambush area once the force returns from conducting the ambush. Patterns should be analyzed and reported to all appropriate organizations through intelligence channels. The commander adjusts his tactics, techniques, and procedures to account for these patterns.

COUNTERATTACK

5-145. A *counterattack* is a form of attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, with the general objective of denying the enemy his goal in attacking (FM 3-0). The commander directs a counterattack—normally conducted from a defensive posture—to defeat or destroy enemy forces, exploit an enemy weakness, such as an exposed flank, or to regain control of terrain and facilities after an enemy success. A unit conducts a counterattack to seize the initiative from the enemy through offensive action. A counterattacking force maneuvers to isolate and destroy a designated enemy force. It can attack by fire into an engagement area to defeat or destroy an enemy force, restore the original position, or block an enemy penetration. Once launched, the counterattack normally becomes a decisive operation for the commander conducting the counterattack.

5-146. The commander plans and conducts a counterattack to attack the enemy when and where he is most vulnerable, while he is attempting to overcome friendly defensive positions. Normally, the commander attempts to retain his reserve or striking force to conduct a decisive counterattack once the enemy commits his main force to the attack. The commander assigns objectives to counterattacking forces when he intends for them to assault the enemy. He normally assigns attack-by-fire positions when he intends to counterattack using primarily direct and indirect fires.

5-147. The two levels of counterattacks are major and local counterattacks. In both cases, waiting for the enemy to act first may reveal the enemy's main effort and create an assailable flank to exploit. A defending unit conducts a major counterattack to seize the initiative from the enemy through offensive action after an enemy launches his attack. A commander also conducts major counterattacks to defeat or block an enemy penetration that endangers the integrity of the entire defense, or to attrit the enemy by the defeat or destruction of an isolated portion of the attacking enemy. (See Figure 5-10.)



Figure 5-10. Major Counterattack

Organization of Forces

5-148. The commander of a major counterattack force typically organizes his combined arms assets into security, reconnaissance, main body, and reserve forces. He uses those defending forces already in contact with the enemy to fix or contain those same enemy forces. The commander may use a force

committed to the counterattack, such as the striking force in a mobile defense, his reserve, another echelon's reserve, or designate any other force he deems appropriate to be the counterattack force. Any changes in task organization should be completed in time to allow units to conduct rehearsals with their attached or supported unit.

5-149. A commander conducts a local counterattack with whatever forces are immediately available to retake positions that have been lost to enemy action or to exploit a target of opportunity. The forces often consist of the reserves of subordinates and defending forces that survive after completing their withdrawal from lost positions. While it is unlikely that the commander changes the task organization of the forces conducting a local counterattack, he organizes the force into a security force and a main body. He may be able to designate an element to conduct reconnaissance.

5-150. The counterattack force is a committed force from the beginning of the defensive operation if the commander's defensive scheme hinges on a counterattack as the defeat mechanism, such as the strike force in a mobile defense. In this case, the commander should designate another force as his reserve.

Planning a Counterattack

5-151. The commander plans the counterattack to strike the enemy when the enemy force is vulnerable. As the enemy force advances, the defense may create gaps between enemy units, exposing the flanks and rear of elements of the attacking force. Immediately after an enemy force occupies a defended position, it is often disorganized and ill prepared to meet a sudden counterattack. Opportunity for effective counterattacks are usually brief; the commander must assess the situation rapidly, and the force must execute the counterattack swiftly. The commander assigns objectives or attack-by-fire positions to counterattacking forces, depending on whether he intends for the counterattacking force to close with and assault the enemy.

5-152. Major counterattack plans are normally developed as a branch or sequel to the main defensive plan. A major counterattack may achieve surprise when it strikes the enemy from an unanticipated direction. For that reason the force directed to conduct a major counterattack, such as the strike force in a mobile defense, should be involved in developing those plans as well as any plans to exploit potential success. Local counterattacks may or may not be the result of previous deliberate planning.

Preparing a Counterattack

5-153. Surprise, coordinated fires, and control are the keys to a successful counterattack. Surprise allows the counterattacking force to seize control of the situation. If total surprise is not possible, it must be so nearly complete that the targeted enemy force does not expect the attack until it is too late to react effectively. Thorough planning and preparation help achieve surprise. The commander adjusts the positioning of his ISR assets and the taskings he gives those assets so he can determine the location and targets for his counterattack.

5-154. The commander conducts a leader's reconnaissance with key personnel to confirm or modify his counterattack plan. If necessary, the commander modifies the plan and disseminates those changes to subordinate leaders and other affected organizations. Each element of the counterattack force reconnoiters its planned axis of advance and routes it will take if possible. The commander maintains close control during movement to and occupation of hide positions and this reconnaissance process so the enemy does not detect the counterattack force prior to initiating the counterattack. Leaders enforce camouflage, noise, and light discipline.

5-155. The commander adjusts the planned positions of his weapon systems to obtain the maximum effectiveness against targets in the planned engagement area. He coordinates all fires, including those of supporting artillery and mortars. He wants his fires to isolate the targeted enemy force in the planned engagement area while preventing the target's escape or reinforcement. These fires must inflict maximum damage quickly before the enemy can respond to the counterattack.

Executing a Counterattack

5-156. A commander should not counterattack unless he has a reasonable chance of success. The commander attempts to retain his reserve for his decisive operation, conducted after the enemy reveals his main effort by committing the majority of his combat power. If the commander orders his reserve to conduct a planned counterattack, the reserve becomes a committed force and the commander should take measures to designate or reconstitute a new reserve.

5-157. The commander conducts the counterattack in the same manner in which he conducts any other attack. He shifts support and priorities of fire, designates targets to be engaged by offensive information operations. The counterattack force also performs those activities discussed in paragraphs 5-61 to 5-122.

5-158. Subordinate commanders initiate local counterattack with the forces on hand when it fits within the higher commander's intent. The conduct of a local counterattack should be swift and violent. It should exploit any disorganization on the part of the enemy, such as the confusion that temporarily exists in an attacking force after it seizes a defended position. A rapidly mounted local counterattack may yield better results than a more deliberate counterattack executed by a higher echelon because of the speed at which it can be launched.

5-159. In the face of a strong enemy penetration, a commander may conduct local counterattacks to retain or seize positions on the shoulders of the enemy's penetration. This prevents the enemy from widening the penetration while forces from other defending units engage the penetrating enemy forces. Holding the shoulders can also prevent the sacrifice of positional depth because the limited gap in the defensive position prevents an attacking enemy from fully exploiting his success.

DEMONSTRATIONS AND FEINTS

5-160. A *demonstration* is a form of attack designed to deceive the enemy as to the location or time of the decisive operation by a display of force. Forces conducting a demonstration do not seek contact with the enemy (FM 3-0). A *feint* is a form of attack used to deceive the enemy as to the location or time of the actual decisive operation. Forces conducting a feint seek direct fire contact with the enemy but avoid decisive engagement (FM 3-0). A commander uses them in conjunction with other military deception activities. They generally attempt to deceive the enemy and induce him to move reserves and shift his fire support to locations where they cannot immediately impact the friendly decisive operation or take other actions not conducive to the enemy's best interests during the defense. Both forms are always shaping operations. The commander must synchronize the conduct of these forms of attack with higher and lower echelon plans and operations to prevent inadvertently placing another unit at risk.

5-161. The principal difference between these forms of attack is that in a feint the commander assigns the force an objective limited in size, scope, or some other measure. Forces conducting a feint make direct fire contact with the enemy but avoid decisive engagement. Forces conducting a demonstration do not seek contact with the enemy. The planning, preparing, and executing considerations for demonstrations and feints are the same as for the other forms of attack.

RAID

5-162. A *raid* is a form of attack, usually small scale, involving a swift entry into hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal from the objective area on mission completion (FM 3-0). A raid can also be used to support operations designed to rescue and recover individuals and equipment in danger of capture.

5-163. A simplified chain of command is an essential organizational requirement. A raid usually requires a force carefully tailored to neutralize specific enemy forces operating in the vicinity of the objective and to perform whatever additional functions are required to accomplish the objective of the raid. These additional functions can consist of the demolition of bridges over major water obstacles or the recovery of an attack helicopter pilot shot down forward of the forward line of own troops (FLOT). The commander incorporates any necessary support specialists during the initial planning stage of the operation.

5-164. When a commander and his staff plan a raid, they develop COAs that meet ethical, legal, political, and technical feasibility criteria. Planners require precise, time-sensitive, all-source intelligence. The planning process determines how C2, sustainment, target acquisition and target servicing will occur during the raid. Techniques and procedures for conducting operations across the FLOT, given the specific factors of METT-TC expected to exist during the conduct of the raid, are also developed. The commander and his staff develop as many alternative COAs as time and the situation permit. They carefully weigh each alternative. In addition to those planning considerations

associated with other offensive operations, they must determine the risks associated with conducting the mission and possible repercussions.

5-165. Time permitting, all elements involved in a raid should be fully rehearsed in their functions. The key elements in determining the level of detail and the opportunities for rehearsal prior to mission execution are time, OPSEC, and deception requirements.

The Raid in Mogadishu, 3–4 October 1993

At 1530 on 3 October 1993, Task Force (TF) RANGER launched another of a series of air assault raids designed to capture key lieutenants of Mohammed Aidid, a clan leader and self-proclaimed general. Aidid and his clan were waging combat operations against UN and US forces and impeding ongoing humanitarian efforts in Somalia. Within 30 minutes TF RANGER had captured several key Aidid lieutenants. The raiding force's HMMWV-equipped ground element was notified to proceed from its assembly area and pick up the prisoners. The ground convoy arrived at the target house, and the prisoners were loaded for the short trip back to the US compound. However, the situation changed drastically during the time it took for the ground convoy to arrive. Two UH-60 Black Hawks had been shot down. In response, TF RANGER attempted to secure the crash sites and was immediately drawn into a series of intense ambushes. The ground convoy with their prisoners could never link up with other task force elements. After several attempts, it arrived with its prisoners back at the US compound at 1818, having suffered almost 70-percent casualties. The commitment of the reaction force was delayed due to the fact that it was not fully briefed (for OPSEC reasons) and was not under direct US control. Failure to maintain a substantial reserve when the situation is not well known and lack of unity of command contributed significantly to TF RANGER's losses that day when the operation quickly transitioned from a raid to a relief of an encircled force.

SPOILING ATTACK

5-166. A *spoiling attack* is a form of attack that preempts or seriously impairs an enemy attack while the enemy is in the process of planning or preparing to attack (FM 3-0). The objective of a spoiling attack is to disrupt the enemy's offensive capabilities and timelines while destroying his personnel and equipment, not to secure terrain and other physical objectives. (See Figure 5-11, page 3-40.) A commander conducts a spoiling attack whenever possible during friendly defensive operations to strike the enemy while he is in assembly areas or attack positions preparing for his own offensive operation or is temporarily stopped. It usually employs heavy, attack helicopter, or fire support elements to attack enemy assembly positions in front of the friendly commander's main line of resistance or battle positions.

5-167. The commander's reasons for conducting a spoiling attack include—

- Disrupt the enemy's offensive preparations.
- Destroy key assets that the enemy requires to attack, such as his fire support systems, fuel and ammunition stocks, and bridging equipment.
- Gain additional time for the defending force to prepare its positions.
- Reduce the enemy's current advantage in the correlation of forces.

The commander synchronizes the conduct of the spoiling attack with his other defensive operations.

5-168. The commander can employ his reserves in a spoiling attack to throw the enemy's offensive preparations off stride. He assumes the risk of not having a reserve or designates another force as his reserve in this case. The following basic considerations affect the spoiling attack:

- The commander may want to limit the size of the force used in executing the spoiling attack.
- Spoiling attacks are not conducted if the loss or destruction of the friendly attacking force would jeopardize the commander's ability to accomplish his defensive mission.
- The mobility of the force available for the spoiling attack should be equal to or greater than that of the targeted enemy force.
- Operations by artillery or aviation systems to prevent enemy elements not in contact from interfering with the spoiling attack are necessary to ensure the success of the operation.



Figure 5-11. Spoiling Attack

5-169. There are two conditions that must be met to conduct a successful and survivable spoiling attack:

- The spoiling attack's objective must be obtainable prior to the enemy being able to respond to the attack in a synchronized and coordinated manner.
- The commander must prevent the force conducting the spoiling attack from becoming overextended.

If the spoiling attack fails to meet both conditions, it will likely fail, with grave consequences to the defense.

Chapter 6

Exploitation

The most important goal of our action is the destruction of the enemy to the last limit of possibility

Field Marshal Prince Mikhail I. Kutuzov

Exploitation is a type of offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth (FM 3-0). Commanders at all echelons exploit successful offensive actions. Attacks that succeed in annihilating a defending enemy are rare. Failure to aggressively exploit success at every turn may give the enemy time to reconstitute an effective defense by shifting his forces or by regaining the initiative through a counterattack. Therefore, every offensive operation not restricted by higher authority or lack of resources should be followed without delay by bold exploitation. The commander designs his exploitation to maintain pressure on the enemy, compound and take advantage of his disorganization, shatter his will to resist, and seize decisive or key terrain.

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6-1. Exploitation is the primary means of translating tactical success into operational advantage. It reinforces enemy force disorganization and confusion in the enemy's command and control (C2) system caused by tactical defeat. It is an integral part of the concept of the offense. The psychological effect of tactical defeat creates confusion and apprehension throughout the enemy C2 structure and reduces the enemy's ability to react. Exploitation takes advantage of this reduction in enemy capabilities to make permanent what would be only a temporary tactical effect if exploitation were not conducted. Exploitation may be decisive.

6-2. Those plan, prepare, and execute concepts introduced previously continue to apply during an exploitation. Assessment concepts described in FM 6-0 and FM 6-22 also apply. The commander modifies these concepts as necessary to reflect the specific existing factors of METT-TC.

6-3. Local exploitation by the committed force follows a successful attack. A unit conducts a local exploitation when it capitalizes on whatever tactical opportunities it creates in the course of accomplishing its assigned offensive mission. Whenever possible, the lead attacking unit transitions directly to the exploitation after accomplishing its mission in a local exploitation. If this is not feasible, the commander can pass fresh forces (follow and assume) into the lead. The commander acts quickly to capitalize on local successes. Although such local exploitations may appear insignificant, their cumulative effects can be decisive. Subordinate commanders, working within a higher commander's intent, can use their initiative to launch an exploitation. When a commander initiates a local exploitation, he informs his higher headquarters to keep that commander informed of his intentions. This prevents the inadvertent disruption of the higher echelon's battle or campaign and allows the higher headquarters to assess the possibility of general collapse and to direct the initiation of pursuit operations.

6-4. Conduct of a major exploitation is a specific contingency mission assigned to a large unit in anticipation of offensive success by another unit of equivalent size. Divisions and brigades are the echelons that conduct a major exploitation although a corps can conduct a major exploitation as part of a multicorps operation.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

6-5. The forces conducting an attack are also the forces that initially exploit that attack's success. Typically, the commander does not assign a subordinate unit the mission of exploitation before starting a movement to contact (MTC) or an attack. The commander reorganizes his unit internally to reflect the existing factors of METT-TC when the opportunity to exploit success occurs. He uses fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to conduct actions on contact. (See Chapter 4 for a discussion of actions on contact.) If a commander needs additional resources to support the exploitation, he requests them from the appropriate headquarters. The additional resources may include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to help identify targets for attack, as well as attack helicopters and controlled munitions, such as the Army tactical missile system, to attack identified targets. Each exploitation force should be large enough to protect itself from those enemy forces it expects to encounter. It should also be a reasonably self-sufficient combined arms force capable of operations beyond the supporting range of the main body.

6-6. The units that create an opportunity to exploit should not be expected to perform the exploitation to an extended depth. If the commander plans to exploit with a specific subordinate unit, he must specify the degree of damage or risk to that force he is willing to accept in the course of the current operation. If the initially attacking units incur significant losses of combat power, the commander should replace them as soon as possible. When the exploiting force's combat power weakens because of fatigue, disorganization, or attrition, or when it must hold ground or resupply, the commander should continue the exploitation with a fresh force. In both cases, the replacement force should have a high degree of tactical mobility so it can conduct the exploitation.

6-7. The exploitation may be more effective if the commander can commit additional forces and assign them the task of either follow and support or follow and assume. The commander assigns follow and support missions to units designated to assist exploiting forces by relieving them of tasks that would slow their advances. The lead unit and any follow and assume or follow and support units exchange liaison teams to facilitate the transfer of responsibilities. Units designated to follow and assume conduct a forward passage of lines and replace the initial exploiting forces when they approach their culminating point. Normally, the next higher commander retains control of the forces performing the tasks of follow and support or follow and assume. (Appendix B expands the discussion of these tasks.) When possible, units assigned these tasks should possess mobility equal to that of the exploiting unit or receive additional engineers and transportation assets to provide the necessary mobility. Once organized, they are committed forces and should receive habitually associated artillery, air defense, engineer, and other combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces in accordance with the factors of METT-TC. In an exploitation operation projected to cross significant distances, the commander may attach elements of a follow and support unit to the exploiting force to ensure unity of command and effort.

6-8. Since an exploitation operation typically covers a wider front than an attacking force, fire support assets may find their supported elements operating outside normal supporting ranges. They must displace forward to ensure the continued provision of fires on and beyond enemy formations, which may cause some difficulty in supporting the exploiting force's flank elements. To provide the required support, these fire support units, as well as independently operating assets, can be attached to subordinate elements of the exploiting force. Otherwise, the commander can move additional reinforcing fire support units and systems forward to fill the void.

6-9. Responsive air defense coverage provides rapid transition to an exploitation without the loss of momentum. The commander plans on repositioning his air defense artillery assets to ensure this responsiveness. Adequate mobile air defense units should accompany exploiting forces. Air defense arrangements for the initial attack are likely to remain effective throughout the exploitation. However, when the commander extends his formations and assets to cover more area, the air defense coverage becomes less effective. The commander needs to consider the risks associated with moving out from under his air defense artillery umbrella. Alternatively, he can request adjustments in the air defense coverage of higher echelons. Counterair operations by the other services (USAF, USN, and USMC) may provide the desired degree of air defense protection. The commander can use available air interdiction and close air support by fixed-wing aircraft to augment or replace Army fire support assets during an exploitation.

6-10. The exploitation mission demands a force with a significant mobility advantage over the enemy. Attack helicopters and air assault assets may constitute a portion of the exploiting force's combat power. They are extremely useful in seizing defiles, crossing obstacles, and otherwise capitalizing on their mobility to attack and cut off disorganized enemy elements. They can also seize or control key terrain such as important river-crossing sites or vital enemy transportation nodes along the exploiting force's route of advance into

and through the enemy's rear area. The commander integrates combat engineers into the exploiting force to help breach obstacles; keep ground forces maneuvering, and provide countermobility protection to the flanks. Typical, problems that degrade an exploiting force's mobility are minefields and other obstacles. The commander also uses engineers to keep his supply routes open.

6-11. The commander retains only those reserves necessary to ensure his flexibility of operation, continued momentum in the advance, and likely enemy responses to the exploitation. (Chapter 5 discusses employment considerations for the reserve.)

RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY

6-12. When a commander initiates an exploitation operation, the exact enemy situation may not be clearly known or understood. The commander establishes a reconnaissance force to gain and maintain enemy contact. He complements his reconnaissance effort with sensors and surveillance assets and intelligence products produced by adjacent, higher, and lower echelons to maintain his situational understanding of the strength, dispositions, capabilities, and intentions of all significant enemy elements within his area of interest. The commander normally emphasizes reconnaissance more than security operations when conducting an exploitation. Nevertheless, since the exploiting force moves independently, he addresses the security needs of that force.

6-13. The commander assigns the appropriate security missions to his designated security forces the same way he would for an MTC. (See Chapter 4.) An exploiting corps or division commander typically organizes his forward-most security element into a covering force to protect the main body's movement and develop the situation before he commits his main body. These security elements respond directly to him.

6-14. If an exploiting force is unable to resource a covering force for independent operations, it may use an advance guard in place of a covering force. This is typical for a brigade conducting an exploitation on its own. In some cases when the higher echelon (corps or division) creates a covering force, a brigade may still push out an advance guard behind the covering force. This normally occurs when subordinate units in an exploitation advance in multiple parallel columns.

COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

6-15. Combat support and combat service support arrangements must be extremely flexible during exploitation operations. In the conduct of exploitation operations directed against uncommitted enemy forces or in exploitation operations directed along diverging lines of advance, the commander commonly attaches CS and CSS units to the exploiting maneuver force. Alternatively, the support assets can follow the exploiting force in an echeloned manner along main supply routes (MSRs). Transportation and supplies to sustain the force become increasingly important as the exploitation progresses. As supply lines lengthen, the condition of lines of communications and the conduct of route and convoy security can become problems. The largest possible stocks of fuel, spare parts, and ammunition should accompany the force so that it does not lose momentum because of a lack of support. The exploitation effort may

be limited more by vehicle mechanical failures and the need for fuel than by combat losses or a lack of ammunition. Therefore, direct support maintenance support teams accompany the exploiting force to assess the problem and repair disabled vehicles within a limited time period or evacuate them to maintenance collection points for repair by general support maintenance units. The commander should consider using his utility and cargo helicopters to move critical supplies forward during the exploitation.

CONTROL MEASURES

6-16. An exploitation uses fewer control measures than many other operations because of the uncertain enemy situation and the need to provide subordinate commanders with the maximum possible flexibility to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. (See Figure 6-1.) Planners develop graphic control measures as part of the planning process. The commander issues these control measures as part of the attack order to facilitate C2 when the force transitions to an exploitation.



Figure 6-1. Exploitation Control Measures in a Contiguous AO

6-17. A unit conducting an exploitation normally operates in the same area of operations (AO) it was assigned for the attack. The exploiting unit assigns subordinate units their own AOs. Boundaries between subordinate units may change often to take advantage of opportunities. Since an exploiting unit deploys both reconnaissance and security forces, the commander must rapidly adjust his boundaries as the exploiting force advances. The commander designates obstacle-restricted areas to prevent friendly obstacles from hindering the movement of the exploiting force. He designates obstacle zones on the flanks of the exploiting force's movement corridors to enhance his security. He uses phase lines and subsequent objectives to control the conduct of the exploitation. The commander uses objectives to orient the movement of exploiting forces. Although an exploitation may result in taking a terrain objective, the primary focus should be on destroying the enemy force. The commander may establish a limit of advance if he can anticipate a culminating

point or some other restriction, such as political considerations regarding an international border, which requires its establishment.

6-18. A commander normally employs permissive fire support control measures during an exploitation. A coordinated fire line (CFL) ensures rapid response. Movement of the CFL is particularly important to provide adequate support as the force continues to advance. Even if the culmination of the exploitation is not anticipated, establishing a forward boundary is important to facilitate operations beyond that boundary by a higher headquarters. The commander can use additional control measures, such as targets and checkpoints, as required.

PLANNING AN EXPLOITATION

6-19. The commander's ability to deny the enemy options by proactive use of his battlefield operating systems is critical to a successful exploitation. He does this by arranging his battlefield operating systems within his opponent's time and space relationship in accordance with the factors of METT-TC.

6-20. The commander must plan for the decentralized execution of an exploitation. His commander's intent is especially important because subordinates must be able to exercise initiative in a rapidly changing, fluid situation. The commander must state the purpose of the exploitation, which may be to force the retrograde of enemy forces from an area, encircle enemy forces so they cannot withdraw, or destroy enemy artillery and other fire support systems. The intent must describe the desired end state. That intent will also determine his decisive and shaping operations and guide the designation of his main effort at any given point.

6-21. A clear commander's intent provides subordinates with guidance on how to integrate their operations into the overall operations of the higher headquarters. Only subordinates who can act quickly can seize all opportunities to damage the enemy or accelerate the tempo of operations. A commander should place minimal restrictions on his subordinates. These may include clear instructions regarding the seizure of key terrain and the size of enemy forces that may be bypassed. Reliable, secure communications between the exploiting force, the follow and support force, and the commander facilitate coordination that can maximize the impact of the exploitation. However, all subordinates should have a clear picture of the desired end state to conduct operations that support it, even if communications are lost.

6-22. Planning for an exploitation begins during the preparation phase of all offensive operations. To avoid losing critical time during the transition from an MTC or an attack to an exploitation, the commander tentatively identifies forces, objectives, and AOs for subordinate units before the offensive operation begins. When the opportunity to exploit occurs, brigade and higher-echelon commanders should initiate the exploitation, either as a branch of or a sequel to the existing operation. The commander's plan should attempt to avoid driving the enemy back in the direction of his own sustaining base.

6-23. During exploitation planning and execution, the commander balances the exploiting force's need for speed and momentum against its need for security as it begins to move beyond supporting range of the rest of the force.

The commander must be careful not to allow an exploiting force to move outside of his main body's supporting distance. Determining the supporting distance requires some knowledge of the enemy's remaining capabilities. Generally, the commander should approach exploitation planning with a sense of guarded optimism. It is an excellent opportunity to shatter enemy cohesion and gain a position of advantage over the enemy. However, the commander cannot allow the exploiting force to fall into an enemy trap where it could be drawn into a salient and destroyed in detail.

6-24. The exploitation may take the form of an MTC with a series of hasty attacks. The commander usually issues a series of FRAGOs that designate—

- Movement formation.
- The position of each major element of the exploiting force within that formation.
- Any required modifications to task organization.
- Bypass criteria.
- Revised or new control measures that assist with the maneuver, such as objectives, boundary changes, a limit of advance (LOA), and FSCM.



Figure 6-2. Brigade Exploitation: Battalions in Column Formation

6-25. Exploiting forces normally maneuver on a wide front and on at least two axes. The forces on each axis are capable of independent action, depending on the mobility of the force, the road net, and other aspects of the terrain. In some cases, rather than assigning subordinates their own AOs, the commander may designate a movement formation for his entire unit so he can concentrate all his combat power against a specific enemy element. In this case, the commander normally adopts a variation of the column, line, or vee formation. (Chapter 3 discusses combat formations.) (Figure 6-2 shows a brigade conduct an exploitation with its battalions in column.) Movement on parallel routes is preferred; however, the terrain and the enemy situation may force the exploiting force to advance in a column formation. Generally, using a column in the exploitation emphasizes flexibility at the expense of placing maximum firepower forward.

6-26. In exceptional circumstances, when the enemy is clearly incapable of effectively resisting, the commander can choose temporarily not to retain a reserve but commit all his forces to the exploitation. He may employ a line formation with two or more elements abreast without a reserve when the approach to the objective must be made on as wide a front as possible. For example, a commander could use this formation when attempting to secure crossing sites over a major river. (See Figure 6-3.) He could also employ this formation against sporadic and weakening resistance when the enemy lacks a significant counterattack capability or when the counterattack can be blocked by means other than employing the reserve. Despite the lack of a constituted reserve, other actions, such as the effective employment of massed indirect fires, can provide the commander with the flexibility usually provided by the reserve for influencing actions during an exploitation.



Figure 6-3. Division Exploitation: Brigades Abreast, No Reserve

6-27. A vee formation with two or more elements abreast and a reserve allows the unit to advance on a reasonably wide front with the bulk of the unit's direct firepower oriented forward. This configuration helps when creating gaps in the enemy's defenses. While the bulk of the unit is committed, the reserve is available to exploit the success of the attacking elements, assume the mission of the attacking elements, or counter enemy threats as they develop. (See Figure 6-4.)

6-28. Because of the need to rapidly transition from an attack to an exploitation, fire support planning for the exploitation must take place as part of the planning for the attack. The commander establishes links between his military intelligence, reconnaissance, attack aviation, field artillery, offensive information operations, and supporting fixed-wing assets to expedite the detection and delivery of effects against situationally dependant high-priority targets. He selects those targets regardless of their location within the enemy's defensive area to support the exploitation. During the exploitation, there is little time to revise target lists. Target considerations are similar in nature to those of an MTC. In addition, the exploitation requires a flexible, responsive, and redundant fire control net that must be planned in advance. Coordination with the echelon intelligence officer is critical as the situation develops

into exploitation. The exploiting force templates known enemy locations within its AO as danger areas and targets them.



Figure 6-4. Brigade Exploitation: Two Battalions Forward, One in Reserve

6-29. The fire support plan includes allocating support for meeting engagements or hasty attacks that occur during the exploitation. The fire support coordinator plans targets beyond the projected locations of the exploiting maneuver force to shield the force from enemy counterattacks. He then addresses how to provide fire support to the force in its movement to the LOA and targets locations beyond the LOA to interdict the enemy's lines of communication (LOCs).

6-30. The commander plans for artillery displacement as an integral part of the exploitation. Artillery assets must displace at a pace that exceeds normal offensive operations, while maintaining the capability to provide accurate and lethal fires. The commander can normally plan on his forces using less ammunition during an exploitation than in an attack because fleeing enemy forces are normally not in prepared positions, and thus more vulnerable. The commander should also consider using close air support in the exploitation, especially to support those units moving beyond supporting range of the main body. Airborne forward air controllers can help identify and track high-payoff targets forward of the exploiting force.

6-31. The commander plans situational obstacles for each phase of the operation. For example, he plans in accordance with his rules of engagement to emplace scatterable minefields in those areas that could be used by an enemy counterattack force as his forces move forward.

6-32. The enemy may be willing to commit his aircraft against a friendly exploitation that endangers the viability of his defense, buying him time to prepare a defense while weakening the friendly force. The commander plans to move his air defense assets with priority of protection to the decisive operation. He also uses them to protect his lines of communication from enemy air

attack, thereby allowing his CS and CSS elements to keep pace with the operation. Planning must address how to rapidly resupply air defense missiles as they are used. It must also allow for adjustments in the priority of protection assigned to different elements during the exploitation.

6-33. The commander must anticipate the exploitation and ensure that his logistics plan supports the force all the way to the LOA. Planning for CSS in the exploitation includes designating future MSRs, logistics release points, unit maintenance collection points, casualty collection points, medical treatment facilities, ambulance exchange points , and the depositing of enemy prisoners of war. In sustaining the exploitation, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) consumption and vehicle maintenance are primary concerns of CSS planners. A significant factor is that an exploiting force tends to travel on a broad front, which may necessitate designating one or more lateral MSRs to handle the dispersion. Logistics operations must be prepared to bound their CSS assets farther forward and move them more often than in an attack.

6-34. Selecting a flexible MSR is critical because it must be able to respond to changes in the direction of the exploitation. Maintaining the MSR is a responsibility of the force engineer. During planning, the commander must specifically address the control of logistics units and convoys. He calls them forward and redirects them as needed. He may have to plan for guides to assist their movement around bypassed enemy positions and obstacles. He may assign some combat elements from the reserve an "on-order" mission to conduct rear area security to help protect CSS elements or secure the MSR. The commander must also ensure adequate plans exist for controlling displaced civilians on the battlefield so that they do not interfere with follow-on maneuver, CS, and CSS assets. This is a critical function of civil-military operations.

EXECUTING AN EXPLOITATION

6-35. Exploitation requires physical and mental aggressiveness to combat the friction of limited visibility, fatigue, bad weather, dangers of fratricide, and extended operations. It requires bold and aggressive reconnaissance, prompt use of firepower, and rapid employment of previously uncommitted units. Exploiting forces maneuver swiftly toward their objectives, sever escape routes, and strike at enemy command posts, communications nodes, reserves, artillery, and CS units to prevent the enemy from reorganizing an effective defense. Well supported by tactical air support, air cavalry, and attack helicopters, exploiting forces should be able to change direction on short notice.

6-36. To maintain sufficient forces to conduct an exploitation, the commander must ensure that his subordinates focus on his intent. They should not dissipate his combat power by seeking minor tactical successes or reducing inconsequential enemy forces. His aim is to reach the final objective with the maximum possible strength as rapidly as possible. The commander must provide his exploiting forces with mobile support, including air resupply, to move emergency lifts of POL and ammunition.

6-37. The transition from attack to exploitation may be so gradual that it is hardly distinguishable; it may also be abrupt. The abrupt transition may occur when a force uses massed quantities of precision munitions, achieves surprise, or overwhelms a much weaker enemy force. Normally, exploitation

occurs after the force secures its objective. With adequate support, the commander can launch the exploitation with his initial assault or at any time after that, depending on the effects of the fires and his desires.

6-38. Since the exploitation takes advantage of previous success, forces previously allocated toward attacking enemy forces normally continue their ongoing activities. These activities include—

- Attrition or defeat of enemy reserves prior to their commitment.
- Destruction of enemy countermobility assets prior to their employment on a friendly avenue of advance for the exploiting force.
- Disruption of enemy units attempting to reestablish a coherent defense.
- Disruption of enemy sustaining operations.

This assumes the commander has accurate intelligence data to target these enemy actions.

6-39. Generally, as one part of the attacking force finishes clearing an objective, the commander orders the remaining elements to exploit that success. To accomplish this with minimal confusion, the commander must know where each of his elements is and what combat formation each has adopted. If the commander has previously trained and rehearsed his force to change rapidly from one combat formation to another, to change missions, and to change the direction of advance, he can time the execution of such changes to maintain the initiative over an enemy.

6-40. The commander can also initiate an exploitation when he realizes that the enemy force is having difficulty maintaining its position or cohesion. Updated intelligence is crucial to the commander since it is difficult to accurately predict the exact conditions required to transition from an attack to an exploitation. Therefore, the commander and his subordinates watch the enemy's defenses for indications of disintegration that may signal the opportunity to transition to exploitation. Such indicators include—

- The threat or use of weapons of mass destruction by enemy forces, despite the probable US retaliation, may signal impending enemy collapse.
- Enemy reconnaissance intensifies.
- Rearward movement increases, especially by fire support and reserves.
- The enemy prepares to demolish or destroy his facilities, installations, equipment, and supply stockpiles.
- Various units intermix their vehicles and personnel in combat formations or march columns.
- Number of prisoners captured increases significantly.
- Enemy fire decreases in intensity and effectiveness.
- Fires increase in one or more individual sectors of the front that do not appear to be synchronized with the developing situation and at a time when the amount of defensive fires appears to be decreasing.
- Enemy resistance decreases considerably, or the enemy lacks any type of organized defense.
- Amount of abandoned enemy war materiel encountered increases significantly.

- Reports confirm the capture or absence of enemy leaders.
- Friendly forces overrun enemy artillery, C2 facilities, and supply points.
- Enemy units disintegrate and friendly companies and battalions can defeat enemy battalion- and brigade-size units, respectively.

In any case, the commander ruthlessly exploits vulnerable enemy forces after weighing and accommodating the risks.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

6-41. The exploiting force must gain and maintain contact with the enemy. This is a critical aspect of the exploitation since the enemy may be trying to break contact and distance himself from the friendly force to give him time to recover. After a successful attack, the exploiting force must perform aggressive reconnaissance to both its front and flanks. Mission and intent of exploitation determine how much enemy contact is required to maintain pressure on him, compound his disorganization, shatter his will, and seize key or decisive terrain. As discussed in Chapter 5, this reconnaissance effort must start almost immediately after an attacking unit secures its objective. If the commander has dedicated reconnaissance assets, he uses them to maintain enemy contact, observe the enemy's movements, and search for weakly defended enemy positions. If those assets are not available, other maneuver units perform those reconnaissance tasks. While maintaining contact with the enemy, the reconnaissance force tries to locate enemy reserves, uncommitted forces, and blocking positions. This effort helps the exploiting force avoid being led into ambushes as the enemy seeks to recover the initiative by counterattacking.

6-42. When the previously assigned offensive mission is accomplished, units at all echelons push out their reconnaissance and security forces to discover whether the opportunity exists to initiate an exploitation. At brigade and battalion echelons, these reconnaissance and security forces must gain and maintain enemy contact while remaining within the supporting range of their parent brigade or battalion.

6-43. The commander uses air reconnaissance to augment his ground reconnaissance. He can employ aerial sensors, such as JSTARS, air cavalry, and unmanned aerial vehicles in advance of ground maneuver reconnaissance. This allows aerial observation of named and targeted areas of interest that facilitate the unit's movement and cue the attack of high-payoff targets. Scout and attack helicopters can locate enemy positions and engage the enemy to disrupt his movement and preparations. Aviation assets surge to maintain constant contact with the enemy and keep pressure on him.

DISRUPT THE ENEMY

6-44. Exploitation presumes the enemy has already been somewhat disrupted. An exploitation seeks to maintain or increase this disruption by preventing the enemy from effectively reconstituting his defenses. At the division and corps levels, the commander combines the effects of his operations against enemy reserves and uncommitted forces with the rapid maneuver of his close combat forces to maintain this disruption. Attack

helicopters can maneuver in front of exploiting ground maneuver forces to destroy high-payoff targets. The commander integrates available fixed-wing aircraft into his plan for attacking these targets. Rapid advances by the exploiting force keep the enemy force off balance and degrade his intelligence and surveillance capabilities, thus providing some security from attack. The commander uses all available resources to maintain pressure on the enemy, using both overwhelming combat power and asymmetric weapon systems. The commander never allows the enemy an opportunity to recover from the initial blow. The exploiting force's fire support system must deliver massed fires quickly to respond to any contingencies that arise during the exploitation.

FIX THE ENEMY

6-45. An exploiting force has three goals in fixing an enemy force. First, it tries to break down the enemy's combined arms organization by fixing enemy units in positions out of supporting distance of each other. This allows the exploiting force to defeat the enemy in detail. Second, the commander attacks out-of-contact enemy forces before they can adversely affect the exploitation. By attacking these enemy forces, the commander seeks to fix them in their current positions or force them to move to locations where they can be harmlessly contained until the exploiting force or a follow and support force can engage and defeat them. Third, it achieves a specific targeting effect—such as causing 15-percent casualties—that disrupts the enemy commander's plan.

MANEUVER

6-46. During an exploitation, the exploiting force maneuvers to maintain pressure on the enemy. The commander can use any heavy and mobile light forces, such as airborne and air assault elements, to secure terrain objectives or choke points critical to the advance and to cut enemy lines of escape. The commander takes advantage of available vertical envelopment capabilities. The exploiting force clears only enough of its AO to permit its advance. It cuts through enemy logistics units and LOCs to seize objectives vital to the enemy's defense. It attacks from the march to overrun weak enemy formations. In accordance with the bypass criteria, the exploiting force can contain and bypass those enemy pockets of resistance too small to jeopardize the mission while its commander reports these enemy forces to adjacent units, following units, and higher headquarters.

6-47. If an enemy unit is too strong for the leading elements of the exploiting force to overrun and destroy, succeeding elements of the force conduct a hasty attack based on the combat information provided by its leading elements. Such enemy forces are rarely attacked frontally. In almost all cases, the commander uses another form of maneuver to produce faster and better results with fewer casualties. While the exploiting force is seeking one or more assailable flanks, available fire support systems continue to engage the enemy to divert attention from the attempted envelopment and destroy as much enemy combat power as possible.

6-48. The exploiting force may face prepared belts of defensive positions in depth when it is exploiting the initial success of the attack. Therefore, the exploiting force must move rapidly to attack and destroy the enemy before he

can settle into his subsequent or supplemental positions. The more rapidly this can be done, the less likely it is that succeeding defensive lines will be fully prepared and the less effort it will take to penetrate each successive defensive position. The exploiting force repeats this process as many times as necessary until it breaks completely through the enemy's defenses.

6-49. The commander's primary concern when initiating an exploitation resulting from a successful attack is to shift his force into the appropriate combat formation and task-organize it with additional capabilities and resources to take advantage of a short window of opportunity. Assuming that the force accomplishes this with relative ease, he must control the formation as it moves and prevent its overextension. The commander must anticipate the enemy's reaction to his actions. The real danger to the exploiting force is not the immediate enemy but the enemy not yet engaged. Overextension is a risk inherent in exploitation. While the commander must be concerned with this, he must also guard against being overcautious.

6-50. Surrender appeals and ultimatums are particularly effective when directed against enemy units that have been surrounded, isolated, or bypassed. JP 3-53 and FM 3-05.30 detail the techniques for communicating with the enemy.

6-51. While the exploiting force is conducting its operations, the follow and support force, if available—

- Widens or secures the shoulders of a penetration.
- Destroys bypassed enemy units.
- Relieves supported units that have halted to contain enemy forces.
- Blocks the movement of enemy reinforcements.
- Opens and secures lines of communications.
- Guards prisoners, key areas, installations, and lines of communication.
- Controls dislocated civilians.

FOLLOW THROUGH

6-52. Once the exploitation begins, forces move to attack enemy forces without any operational pauses. Exploitation continues around the clock so the enemy cannot escape the relentless offensive pressure. The exploiting force retains terrain only as necessary to accomplish its mission. The commander must be careful not to dissipate combat power to achieve minor tactical successes or to reduce small enemy forces. Once he reaches the LOA, the commander quickly shifts his attention to survivability and countermobility because of the possibility of an enemy counterattack.

6-53. At some point a unit conducting an exploitation reaches a culminating point or transitions to a pursuit. Culmination can occur for the variety of reasons, such as friendly losses or the enemy's commitment of his reserve. The commander, when he makes an assessment that his force is approaching culmination, should transition to another type of operation. On the other hand, a pursuit enables the commander to complete his destruction of the enemy.

Chapter 7

Pursuit

In pursuit you must always stretch possibilities to the limit. Troops having beaten the enemy will want to rest. They must be given as objectives, not those that you think they will reach, but the farthest they could possibly reach.

Field Marshal Viscount Allenby of Meggido, Order to XXI Corps, 1917

A *pursuit* is an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (JP 1-02). Pursuit operations begin when an enemy force attempts to conduct retrograde operations. At that point, it becomes most vulnerable to the loss of internal cohesion and complete destruction. A pursuit aggressively executed leaves the enemy trapped, unprepared, and unable to defend, faced with the options of surrendering or complete destruction. The rapid shifting of units, continuous day and night movements, hasty attacks, containment of bypassed enemy forces, large numbers of prisoners, and a willingness to forego some synchronization to maintain contact with and pressure on a fleeing enemy characterize this type of offensive operation. Pursuit requires swift maneuver and attacks by forces to strike the enemy's most vulnerable areas. A successful pursuit requires flexible forces, initiative by commanders at all levels, and the maintenance of a high operational tempo during execution.

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7-1. The enemy may conduct a retrograde when successful friendly offensive operations have shattered his defense. In addition, the enemy may deliberately conduct a retrograde when—

- He is reacting to a threat of envelopment.
- He is adjusting his battlefield dispositions to meet changing situations.
- He is attempting to draw the friendly force into fire sacks, kill zones, or engagement areas.
- He is planning to employ weapons of mass destruction.

Therefore, the friendly force must always consider the enemy's actions whenever it sees an opportunity to conduct a pursuit.

7-2. Division is the lowest echelon equipped with the intelligence assets to determine if the enemy is conducting a retrograde under Army of Excellence tables of organization and equipment. When faced with enemy attempts to break contact, lower echelons act to maintain contact until a division or corps commander directs them to initiate a pursuit operation.

7-3. Unlike an exploitation, which may focus on seizing key or decisive terrain instead of the enemy force, the pursuit always focuses on destroying the fleeing enemy force. This is seldom accomplished by directly pushing back the hostile forces on their lines of communication (LOCs). The commander in a pursuit tries to combine direct pressure against the retreating forces with an enveloping or encircling maneuver to place friendly troops across the enemy's lines of retreat. This fixes the enemy in positions where he can be defeated in detail. If it becomes apparent that enemy resistance has broken down entirely and the enemy is fleeing the battlefield, any type of offensive operation can transition to a pursuit.

7-4. Conducting a pursuit is a calculated risk. Once the pursuit begins, the commander maintains contact with the enemy and pursues retreating enemy forces without further orders. The commander maintains the pursuit as long as the enemy appears disorganized and friendly forces continue to advance. Like exploitation, pursuit tests the audacity and endurance of soldiers and leaders. In both operations, the attacker risks becoming disorganized. Extraordinary physical and mental effort is necessary to sustain the pursuit, transition to other operations, and translate tactical success into operational or strategic victory.

7-5. The commander must be aware of any approaching culmination point. The enemy is usually falling back on his supply base, and potentially on fresh units, while friendly forces become less effective as they expend resources faster than they can be replaced. Reasons to discontinue the pursuit include the presence of fresh enemy forces, greatly increased resistance, fatigue, dwindling supplies, diversion of friendly units to security missions, and the need to contain bypassed enemy units.

7-6. Those plan, prepare, and execute concepts introduced previously continue to apply during a pursuit. Assessment concepts described in FM 6-0 and FM 6-22 also apply. The commander modifies them as necessary to account for the specific existing factors of METT-TC.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

7-7. Normally, the commander does not organize specifically for a pursuit ahead of time, although he may plan for a pursuit as a branch or sequel to his offensive operation. Therefore, he must be flexible to react when the situation presents itself. The commander's maneuver and sustainment forces continue their ongoing activities while he readjusts their priorities to better support the pursuit. He acquires additional support from his higher headquarters in accordance with the factors of METT-TC. For most pursuits, the commander organizes his forces into security, direct-pressure, encircling, follow and

support, and reserve forces. The commander can employ available airborne and air assault units as part of his encircling force because of their ability to conduct vertical envelopments. Given sufficient resources, there can be more than one encircling force. The follow and support force polices the battlefield to prevent the dissipation of the direct-pressure force's combat power. Appendix B addresses the duties of a follow and support force. The reserve allows the commander to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities or respond to enemy counterattacks.

7-8. There are two basic organizational options in conducting a pursuit; each involves a direct-pressure force. The first is a frontal pursuit that employs only a direct-pressure force. The second is a combination that uses a direct-pressure force and an encircling force. The combination pursuit is generally more effective. Either the direct-pressure force or the encircling force can conduct the decisive operation in a combination pursuit.

FRONTAL

7-9. In a frontal pursuit, the commander employs only a direct-pressure force to conduct operations along the same retrograde routes used by the enemy. (See Figure 7-1.) The commander chooses this option in two situations. The first is when he cannot create an encircling force with enough mobility to get behind the enemy force. The second is when he cannot create an encircling force capable of sustaining itself until it links up with the direct-pressure force. Either situation can occur because of restrictive terrain or because an enemy withdraws in a disciplined, cohesive formation and still has significant available combat power.



Figure 7-1. Frontal Pursuit

COMBINATION

7-10. In the pursuit, the most decisive effects result from combining the frontal pursuit with encirclement. (See Figure 7-2.) In the combination pursuit, the direct-pressure force initiates a frontal pursuit immediately on discovering the enemy's initiation of a retrograde operation. This slows the tempo of the enemy's withdrawal (or fixes him in his current position if possible), and may destroy his rear security force. The direct-pressure force's actions help to set the conditions necessary for the success of the encircling force's operation by maintaining constant pressure. The encircling force conducts an envelopment or a turning movement to position itself where it can block the enemy's escape and trap him between the two forces, which leads to complete annihilation.



Figure 7-2. Combination Pursuit

7-11. The direct-pressure force conducts hasty attacks to maintain contact and apply unrelenting pressure until it destroys the enemy force. The direct-pressure force prevents enemy disengagement and subsequent reconstitution of the defense and inflicts maximum casualties. It forces the enemy to deploy frequently to delay the direct-pressure force and restricts his ability to disengage and rapidly move away. The direct-pressure force must be at least as mobile as the enemy. Heavy forces are ideally suited to this role, but the commander can employ light forces if the enemy is also foot-mobile. The direct-pressure force organizes to conduct a movement to contact and must be able to conduct a series of hasty attacks. It must be powerful enough to defeat enemy rear guard actions and maintain pressure on the enemy's main body.

7-12. The mobility of the encircling force must be equal—preferably superior—to the withdrawing enemy. If there is no inherent mobility differential, the commander must create one. This differential can also result from the direct-pressure force forcing the enemy to deploy. The commander can

enhance, and sometimes create, this mobility advantage by conducting countermobility operations against the enemy, specifically targeting locations such as choke points or bridges that will hinder the fleeing enemy's withdrawal. Heavy, air assault, and airborne forces are well suited for this mission. Attack helicopters are also effective when used as part of the encircling force. The encircling force must be strong enough to protect itself from the enemy's main body and slow or stop it until the friendly direct-pressure force can combine with the encircling force to destroy the enemy. It must be capable of mounting a hasty defense without placing itself at risk of annihilation. The encircling force must be self-contained since it normally operates out of supporting range of friendly indirect-fire systems. Therefore, it frequently has its supporting artillery attached. The primary mission of the encircling force is to prevent the enemy's escape by trapping him between the encircling force and the direct-pressure force. The commander can assign other missions to the encircling force, such as—

- Destroying the enemy's weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means.
- Linking up with airborne or air assault forces in their airheads.
- Reporting terrain conditions and other combat information beyond that normally addressed in the unit standing operating procedures.

The commander can assign the encirclement mission, wholly or in part, to available airborne or air assault units because their vertical envelopment capabilities allow friendly forces to be inserted deeper into enemy-controlled territory than would be possible with ground operations. The time required to plan airborne operations and stage airlift platforms impacts on the utility of airborne forces in small-scale pursuit operations.

7-13. The direct-pressure and encircling forces require engineer support to create lanes through obstacles, which enables them to move rapidly and continuously. The commander should place his engineers well forward in his movement formations to quickly breach any obstacles that cannot be bypassed. Engineers accompanying the encircling force must also be prepared to conduct countermobility and survivability tasks.

CONTROL MEASURES

7-14. The commander uses control measures to retain his tactical options to converge on the most important axis or to redirect his pursuit effort on a new axis. These control measures should be flexible and capable of rapid adjustments to reflect changing conditions. This flexibility is also necessary when engaging advancing enemy reserves or counterattack forces.

7-15. Centralized planning and decentralized execution characterize the pursuit. The commander balances the need to prevent fratricide with the need to allow subordinates to take advantage of fleeting opportunities in a pursuit with rapidly moving forces and a rapidly changing situation. The commander designates an area of operations (AO) for each maneuver unit involved in the pursuit. He establishes few control measures for the direct-pressure force other than phase lines and checkpoints because of the pursuit's nature. He uses these phase lines to designate a forward and rearward boundary for the direct-pressure force. The forward boundary relieves the direct-pressure force

of any responsibility beyond the forward boundary. It also gives the higher headquarters flexibility to deal with the encircling force and enemy elements located beyond that forward boundary. The rear boundary becomes the boundary between the direct-pressure force and the follow and support force.

7-16. If the encircling force is a ground element, the control measures are almost identical to those of an envelopment. The commander must designate a route, an axis of advance, or an AO adjacent to that of the direct-pressure force to allow the encircling force to move parallel to and eventually get ahead of the fleeing enemy force. He designates a terrain objective as a guide for the encircling force. (See Objective HAWKE in Figure 7-3.) However, he may change this objective rapidly and frequently, based on the progress of the encircling force and the enemy. The objective should be a piece of ground that provides the encircling force good, defensible terrain that the enemy cannot easily bypass. The commander often selects choke points, such as defiles and bridges, as objectives for his encircling force.



Figure 7-3. Pursuit Control Measures

7-17. The commander establishes a boundary or a restricted fire line between the encircling force and the direct-pressure force before the encircling force reaches its objective. He establishes other fire support coordinating measures (FSCM) around the area currently occupied by the encircling force to relieve it of unnecessary fire support coordination responsibilities. He directs security operations beyond the encircling force, allowing it to engage the withdrawing enemy without devoting resources to flank and rear security. The commander establishes additional control measures to control the convergence of both elements of the friendly force, such as phase lines and contact points.

PLANNING A PURSUIT

7-18. The commander anticipates an enemy retrograde operation as either a branch or a sequel to the plan. The plan should identify possible direct-pressure, encircling, follow and support, and reserve forces and issue on-order or be-prepared missions to these forces. The commander should employ the maximum number of available combat troops in the pursuit. He bases the details of his plan on the enemy's anticipated actions, the combat formation of the attacking troops, and the amount of planning time available. The commander also considers—

- Possible routes the enemy might use to conduct his retrograde operations.
- Availability of his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to detect enemy forces and acquire targets in depth.
- Scheme of maneuver.
- Availability and condition of pursuit routes.
- Availability of forces to keep the pressure on the enemy until his destruction is complete.
- Critical terrain features.
- Use of reconnaissance and security forces.
- Allocation of precision-guided munitions and aviation support.
- Availability of CS and CSS resources.

Pursuit planning must address the possibility of defending temporarily during operational pauses while making preparations to continue the pursuit or to consolidate gains. However, the use of an operational pause generally results in the abandonment of the pursuit because the enemy is able to use that time to organize a coherent defense.

7-19. The commander must specifically address how to detect the enemy retrograde operations; otherwise, the enemy may succeed in breaking contact. The commander relies on active reconnaissance, an understanding of enemy tactics, and knowledge of the current tactical situation. He must watch for signs that indicate the enemy is preparing to conduct a retrograde, such as when the enemy—

- Lacks the capability to maintain his position or cohesion.
- Conducts limited local counterattacks.
- Intensifies his reconnaissance and intelligence efforts.
- Increases the amount of rearward movements and changes the type of elements conducting them, especially by fire support and reserves.
- Prepares his facilities, installations, equipment, and supply stock-piles for demolition and destruction.
- Decreases fire in intensity and effectiveness through the AO.
- Increases his fires in one or more individual sectors of the front, which does not appear to be in accordance with the developing situation, and at a time when the amount of defensive fires seems to be decreasing.

The presence or absence of any of the above signs may not necessarily indicate the start of a retrograde operation. The enemy could be attempting to draw friendly forces into an ambush or setting up a counterattack as part of his defense. The decision of when to start a pursuit is part of the art of tactics.

7-20. When the commander initiates a pursuit, he often creates the encircling force from uncommitted or reserve elements. Normally, these forces do not have fire support assets allocated to them. The commander must plan how to redistribute his fire support assets to properly support the encircling force. Attack helicopters and close air support are well suited to support the encircling force.

7-21. Engineer mobility and countermobility assets are instrumental in sustaining the rate of advance and hindering the enemy's withdrawal. Engineers prepare the route of advance and support the lateral dispersion of units transitioning to the pursuit and the movement of the reserve. During the pursuit, the commander must plan for his engineers to provide assault bridging and emergency road repairs to sustain the tempo of the pursuit. The commander also plans to use his engineer assets to block any bypassed enemy's withdrawal routes by using antitank and command-operated mines, demolitions, and obstacles.

7-22. Logistics units should plan for increases in the demand for fuel and maintenance as the tempo of operations increases. In the pursuit, priority of logistics normally goes to units having the greatest success. Logistics planners need to anticipate success since the depth of the pursuit depends on the capability of logistics assets to support the operation. The logistics elements supporting the pursuing force should be as mobile as possible. Logistics planners are particularly concerned with supporting the encircling force, such as casualty evacuation over possibly unsecured LOCs. The commander may need aerial resupply or heavily guarded convoys to support this force. Security for logistics convoys and LOCs are major planning considerations.

7-23. The commander uses all available logistics assets to provide essential support to the force pursuing the enemy. His pursuit plan must result in a force prepared to conduct wide-ranging operations using all available maneuver assets throughout his AO to complete the destruction and morale collapse of the enemy force.

EXECUTING A PURSUIT

7-24. The decisive operation in a pursuit destroys the withdrawing enemy. This generally occurs as a result of encircling the enemy between the direct-pressure and the encircling forces or a major geographic barrier—such as an unfordable river—and his defeat in detail. The timely and correct decision to initiate a pursuit is critical to its success. If the enemy begins a retrograde undetected, he avoids the constant pressure that results in disrupting that operation. The commander expects the enemy forces to conduct retrograde operations at times advantageous to them—usually at night or during bad weather.

7-25. A pursuit is often conducted as a series of encirclements in which successive portions of the fleeing enemy are intercepted, cut off from outside support, and captured or destroyed. (Appendix D discusses encirclement operations.) The direct-pressure force conducts a series of hasty attacks to destroy the enemy's rear security force, maintain constant pressure on the enemy's main body, and slow the enemy's withdrawal. At every opportunity, the direct-pressure force fixes, slows down, and destroys enemy elements,

provided such actions do not interfere with its primary mission of maintaining constant pressure on the enemy's main body. The direct-pressure force can bypass large enemy forces if it can hand them off to follow and support units, or if they do not pose a risk to the direct-pressure force.

7-26. As soon as the commander designates a unit as the encircling force and directs its actions, the force moves as swiftly as possible by the most advantageous routes to cut off the enemy's retreat. If the encircling force cannot move farther and faster than the enemy, it attacks the enemy's main body from the flank. When this occurs, the commander should constitute and dispatch a new encircling force.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

7-27. At the first indication of an enemy retrograde, the brigade or lower-echelon commander who discovers the enemy's rearward movement acts to maintain contact with the enemy across a wide area without waiting for orders from higher headquarters. This ensures that the enemy does not break contact and conduct an orderly retirement. These forces in contact constitute the nucleus of the direct-pressure force. As the situation permits, they reform into a movement column with reconnaissance and security elements in the lead and, if necessary, to the flank.

7-28. During a pursuit, the reconnaissance effort is intensive. Reconnaissance elements concentrate on all routes the enemy could use when conducting a retrograde operation. These elements provide information on the disposition of retreating enemy formations and on the forward movement of his reserves as the pursuit develops. The tactical situation during a pursuit may become obscure because of its potential depth. Much of the combat information needed during a pursuit is located behind the fleeing enemy force. Therefore, air reconnaissance, backed by technical intelligence systems, is vital to the overall reconnaissance effort. It can determine—

- The beginning of the rearward movement of enemy sustainment forces.
- The composition of retrograding forces and their direction of movement.
- The composition and direction of enemy reserve forces moving forward.
- The nature of obstacles and intermediate defensive positions.

Information about fresh enemy reserves and prepared positions is vital at the stage when a pursuit force may be approaching a culminating point; it may be the basis for terminating the pursuit.

7-29. The primary mission of the encircling force's reconnaissance assets is to find routes for the encircling force to allow it to move behind withdrawing enemy units and establish blocking positions. This mission may force these reconnaissance assets to operate outside the supporting range of the main body as they try to maneuver behind the retrograding enemy force. The encircling force avoids combat when possible until it reaches its assigned objective area. However, en route to its objective, it overruns any small enemy positions while bypassing larger enemy units. Forward security elements of the encircling force conduct activities to prevent the enemy from interfering with the forward movement of the encircling force's main body. These security elements move rapidly along all available roads or routes and overrun or bypass

small enemy pockets of resistance. If they encounter strongly held enemy positions, they attempt to find routes around or through these positions. The encircling force can then avoid these enemy positions and occupy blocking positions before withdrawing enemy forces can reach them. If necessary, the encircling force organizes a hasty defense behind the enemy to block his retreat.

DISRUPT THE ENEMY

7-30. Keeping the enemy from reconstituting an effective defense is critical to success. Constant pressure by direct-pressure forces and echelon fire support systems disrupts and weakens the enemy. The commander uses lethal and nonlethal direct and indirect fires to keep pressure on the enemy. The enemy commander must not be allowed to freely adjust his dispositions to counter the actions of the friendly force. Artillery fire and air strikes harass and disrupt the enemy's attempts to move engaged forces to the rear or bring previously uncommitted forces into action. In a pursuit, decisive operations may include the ground maneuver of the direct-pressure or the encircling force. Fire support targets in a pursuit include fires on enemy columns and troop or vehicle concentrations at road junctions, defiles, bridges, and river crossings. They also include the repulsion of enemy counterattacks, destruction or delay of enemy reserves, and destruction of the enemy's fire support means. The commander conducts offensive information operations against the enemy's command and control (C2) system as an integral part of this disruption process, with emphasis on destroying or degrading the enemy's capability to reconstitute and synchronize an effective defense.

FIX THE ENEMY

7-31. Using movement and fire effects or fire potential, the commander fixes a withdrawing enemy. If the direct-pressure force disrupts the enemy's C2 system, his ability to counter friendly efforts is significantly degraded, and the goal of fixing the enemy is much easier to accomplish.

7-32. The enemy attempts to use his reserves to restore the integrity of his defenses or prevent his withdrawing force from being overrun. Fixing enemy reserves is essential to the pursuit's success and is normally the focus of echelon shaping operations. The direct-pressure force fixes enemy reserves in place or slows them down so that they remain outside supporting distance until the withdrawing enemy force is completely annihilated.

MANEUVER

7-33. To execute the pursuit, the commander normally combines a frontal pursuit with an encirclement. The direct-pressure force conducting the frontal pursuit advances in a column formation as quickly as possible. After a penetration, existing gaps between the different units of the direct-pressure force are likely to increase in size. Aware of the vulnerability of his open flanks in this situation, the commander must deploy his reserves where they can respond to dangers on his flanks. He does not expect a uniform rate of advance on all axes. Some columns may move rapidly while others are still engaged in penetrating the enemy's rear guard defensive positions or meeting enemy counterattacks.

7-34. The actions of the direct-pressure force should facilitate the commitment of an encircling force that moves parallel to the rearward-moving enemy. The depth of the pursuit depends on the size of the forces involved. It takes a division-level or higher commander to make the decision to initiate a pursuit because of the resources necessary to conduct a pursuit. The commander directing the initiation of a pursuit informs his higher commander of his intentions. This allows even greater resources to be devoted to the pursuit and avoids desynchronizing the higher headquarters' major operation or campaign.

7-35. The direct-pressure force normally employs an advance guard to prevent the enemy from ambushing the main body of the direct-pressure force and to overrun or bypass small enemy forces. The security element moves on multiple avenues of advance. If it encounters enemy units beyond its capacity to defeat, it conducts actions on contact to develop the situation. The commander uses combat information provided by these actions on contact to guide the main body of the direct-pressure force to destroy withdrawing enemy forces. These actions of the direct-pressure force may or may not be in conjunction with the actions of any encircling force.

7-36. The commander does everything possible to place his encircling force behind the withdrawing enemy and trap the bulk of that enemy force between the encircling force and the direct-pressure force. The direct-pressure force maintains enough pressure on the withdrawing enemy force so the encircling force can envelop it. To perform this task, the direct-pressure force must be strong enough to overcome any enemy rear guard before the enemy's main body can make a successful withdrawal. Once in position, the encircling force defends or attacks as necessary, responding to the enemy's actions and those of the direct-pressure force to complete the enemy's encirclement.

7-37. The pursuing force must not give the enemy time to reorganize for an all-around defense after it is encircled. If the enemy forms a perimeter, the pursuing commander must repeatedly split it into smaller elements until he destroys the encircled enemy force. If time is not critical, the commander can keep the encirclement closed, defeat enemy breakout attempts, and weaken the enemy by fires alone. He can greatly accelerate the collapse of a large, encircled enemy force by using psychological operations, precision-guided weapons, and improved conventional munitions in mass. (Appendix D addresses the reduction of an encircled enemy force.) If the resulting encirclement does not destroy the withdrawing enemy force, the commander conducts additional pursuit operations until the enemy is destroyed.

FOLLOW THROUGH

7-38. Once the commander initiates a pursuit, he continues pursuing the enemy until a higher commander terminates the pursuit. Conditions under which a higher commander may terminate a pursuit include the following—

- The pursuing force annihilates or captures the enemy and resistance ceases.
- The pursuing force fixes the enemy for follow-on forces.
- The high commander makes an assessment that the pursuing force is about to reach a culminating point.

7-39. A pursuit often transitions into other types of offensive and defensive operations. If the enemy attempts to reorganize, forces conducting a pursuit execute hasty attacks. They conduct an exploitation to capitalize on the success of these attacks and then move back into pursuit. Forces conducting a pursuit may also transition into a defensive operation if the pursuing force reaches a culminating point. This usually occurs when the enemy introduces strong reinforcements to prepare for a counteroffensive.

PART THREE

Defensive Operations

Chapter 8

Basics of Defensive Operations

So the defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832

Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative (FM 3-0). Other reasons for conducting defensive operations include—

- Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to the enemy.
- Attritting or fixing the enemy as a prelude to offensive operations.

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- Surprise action by the enemy.
- Increasing the enemy's vulnerability by forcing him to concentrate his forces.

8-1. While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the defense is the stronger type. The inherent strengths of the defense include the defender's ability to occupy his positions before the attack and use the available time to prepare his defenses. Preparations end only when the defender retrogrades or begins to fight. The defender can study the ground and select defensive positions that mass the effects of his fires on likely approaches. He combines natural and manmade obstacles to canalize the attacking force into his engagement areas (EAs). He can coordinate and rehearse his defensive plan while gaining intimate familiarity with the terrain. The defender does not wait passively to be attacked. He aggressively seeks ways of attriting and weakening attacking enemy forces before the initiation of close combat. He maneuvers to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage and attacks him at every opportunity, using his direct and indirect fires. The fires include the effects of offensive information operations and joint assets, such as close air support. The static and mobile elements of his defense combine to deprive the enemy of the initiative. He contains the enemy while seeking every opportunity to transition to the offense.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

8-2. The following historical example illustrates how conducting a defense can attrit and fix an enemy as a prelude to offensive actions.

The Battle of Kursk, July 1943

Using an area defense, the Red Army defeated the German Army's last Eastern Front operational-level attack at Kursk. The Red Army maximized its defensive advantage using mass, security, objective, and offensive as principles of war.

Soviet intelligence discovered the German offensive objective and concept: a double envelopment of the Kursk salient by panzer-heavy forces. The Red Army massed forces in the most threatened areas. The Soviets reinforced the two fronts defending the salient, prepared defenses, and established a strategic reserve behind the salient. They weighted the forward defenses on the northern and southern shoulders within the salient. They developed their defenses in depth, carefully tying them to the terrain and organizing infantry positions for all-around defense. Above all, they organized an antitank defense, with mutually supporting positions and mobile counterattack forces at all levels. Nearly 6,000 antitank (AT) guns and 3,300 tanks packed the defense.

The German attack in the northern part of the salient would fall on the 13th Army. The 13th Army consisted of 12 rifle divisions (RDs) organized into four rifle corps (RCs) supported by 700 guns, separate tank brigades, assault gun regiments, and antitank regiments. Within 30 kilometers of the front, the 13th Army established three fortification belts. Within each belt there were large numbers of

mutually supporting antitank positions. Each position consisted of four to six AT guns, with protection provided by infantry, machine guns, and obstacles.

The 29th RC occupied the 13th Army's main defensive position in a sector 19 kilometers wide and 15 kilometers deep, with the 15th RC on its right, the 70th Army on its left, and the 17th Guards Rifle Corps (GRC) rearward in the army second echelon. At the start of the battle, the 29th RC consisted of three rifle divisions (the 15th, 81st, and 307th), with supporting tank and artillery units. It deployed the 15th RD and 81st RD, with 12 to 15 antitank positions each, as the corps' first echelon. The 307th RD was the corps' second echelon. Both first-echelon divisions also deployed in two echelons. Each division established a battalion security force to its front.



Figure 8-1. Movements of an Area Defense

During a week of intense defensive combat, the 29th RC conducted an area defense, making the Germans pay so dearly for every gain that they reached their culminating point short of Kursk. See Figure 8-1. Tested by nine German divisions, the 29th RC was able to keep German forces from breaking through its area of operations (AO), despite having its initial three divisions rendered combat-ineffective. In the course of the defense, the 29th RC inflicted 10,700 German casualties and destroyed an estimated 220 tanks and 71 guns. Key to the defense was the construction of those mutually supporting antitank positions, organized for all-around defense, with extensive engineer works to enhance the terrain. The 29th RC employed its attached forces aggressively, creating combined arms teams to hold terrain or maneuver against German forces within the defensive belt. It employed counterattacks to retake key terrain or gain time to develop defenses.

TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

8-3. There are three basic types of defensive operations: the area defense, the mobile defense, and the retrograde. These three types have significantly different concepts and pose significantly different problems. Therefore, each type of defensive operations must be dealt with differently when planning and executing the defense. Although the names of these types of defensive operations convey the overall aim of a selected defensive operation, each typically contains elements of the other and combines static and mobile elements.

8-4. Although on the defense, the commander remains alert for opportunities to attack the enemy whenever resources permit. Within a defensive posture, the defending commander may conduct a spoiling attack or a counterattack, if permitted to do so by the factors of METT-TC. (Chapter 5 discusses these two forms of attack.)

AREA DEFENSE

8-5. The *area defense* a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (FM 3-0). The focus of the area defense is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting, prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and control the terrain between these positions. The decisive operation focuses on fires into EAs possibly supplemented by a counterattack. The reserve may or may not take part in the decisive operation. The commander can use his reserve to reinforce fires; add depth, block, or restore the position by counterattack; seize the initiative; and destroy enemy forces. Units at all echelons can conduct an area defense. (Chapter 9 discusses the area defense.)

MOBILE DEFENSE

8-6. The *mobile defense* is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (FM 3-0). The mobile defense focuses on defeating or destroying the enemy by allowing him to advance to a point where he is exposed to a decisive counterattack by the striking force. The decisive operation is a counterattack conducted by the striking force. The striking force is a dedicated counterattack force constituting the bulk of available combat power. A fixing force supplements the striking force. The commander uses his fixing force to hold attacking enemy forces in position, to help channel attacking enemy forces into ambush areas, and to retain areas from which to launch the striking force.

8-7. A mobile defense requires an AO of considerable depth. The commander must be able to shape the battlefield, causing the enemy to overextend his lines of communication (LOCs), expose his flanks, and dissipate his combat power. Likewise, the commander must be able to move around and behind the enemy force he intends to cut off and destroy. Divisions and larger formations normally execute mobile defenses. However, subordinate echelons may participate as part of the fixing force or the striking force. (Chapter 10 discusses the mobile defense.)

RETROGRADE

8-8. The *retrograde* is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy (FM 3-0). The enemy may force these operations, or a commander may execute them voluntarily. The higher commander of the force executing the retrograde must approve the retrograde operation before its initiation in either case. The retrograde is a transitional operation; it is not conducted in isolation. It is part of a larger scheme of maneuver designed to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy. (Chapter 11 further discusses the retrograde.)

COMMON DEFENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES

8-9. The commander controls the defense by using control measures to provide the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation and allow the defending commander to rapidly concentrate combat power at the decisive point. Defensive control measures within a commander's AO include designating his security area, the battle handover line (BHL), and the main battle area (MBA) with its associated forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). (Chapter 12 discusses security operations.) (Paragraph 8-13 defines the FEBA.) The commander can use battle positions and additional direct fire control and fire support coordinating measures (FSCM) in addition to those control measures introduced in Chapter 2 to further synchronize the employment of his combat power. He can designate disengagement lines to trigger the displacement of his forces.

BATTLE HANDOVER LINE

8-10. **The *battle handover line* (BHL) is a designated phase line on the ground where responsibility transitions from the stationary force to the moving force and vice versa.** The common higher commander of the two forces establishes the BHL after consulting with both commanders. The stationary commander determines the location of the line. The BHL is forward of the FEBA in the defense or the forward line of own troops (FLOT) in the offense. The commander draws it where elements of the passing unit can be effectively supported by the direct fires of the forward combat elements of the stationary unit until passage of lines is complete. The area between the BHL and the stationary force belongs to the stationary force commander. He may employ security forces, obstacles, and fires in the area. (Figure 8-2, page 8-6, depicts a BHL used in conjunction with other control measures for a rearward passage of lines.)

MAIN BATTLE AREA

8-11. **The *main battle area* (MBA) is the area where the commander intends to deploy the bulk of his combat power and conduct his decisive operations to defeat an attacking enemy**. In the defense, the commander's major advantage is that he normally selects the ground on which the battle takes place. He positions his forces in mutually supporting positions in depth to absorb enemy penetrations or canalize them into prepared EAs, defeating the enemy's attack by concentrating the effects of overwhelming combat power. The natural defensive strength of the position has a direct

bearing on the distribution of forces in relation to both frontage and depth. In addition, defending units typically employ field fortifications and obstacles to improve the terrain's natural defensive strength. The MBA also includes the area where the defending force creates an opportunity to deliver a decisive counterattack to defeat or destroy the enemy.



Figure 8-2. Use of a BHL in a Rearward Passage of Lines

8-12. The MBA extends from the FEBA to the unit's rear boundary. The commander locates his subordinate unit boundaries along identifiable terrain features and extends them out beyond the FLOT by establishing forward boundaries. Unit boundaries should not split avenues of approach or key terrain. The commander selects the MBA based on the products of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process and his own analysis using the factors of METT-TC. The IPB process indicates how the enemy will most likely use the available avenues of approach.

FORWARD EDGE OF THE BATTLE AREA

8-13. The *forward edge of the battle area* (FEBA) is the foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screening forces are operating, designated to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units (JP 1-02). The US Army uses a FEBA only in defensive operations. The FEBA is not a boundary, but conveys the commander's intent. It marks the foremost limits of the areas in which the preponderance of ground combat units deploy, excluding the areas in which security forces are operating. MBA forces can temporarily move forward of the FEBA to expedite the retrograde operations of security forces. The commander designates a FEBA to coordinate fire

support and to maneuver his forces. A phase line designating the forward-most point of the MBA indicates the FEBA. The FEBA shows the senior commander's planned limit for the effects of direct fires by defending forces. Defending units must address this area in their scheme of maneuver and exchange information regarding tactical plans at the coordinating points. (Figure 8-3 graphically depicts the current FEBA and a proposed FEBA.)



Figure 8-3. Forward Edge of the Battle Area

BATTLE POSITIONS

8-14. **A *battle position* is a defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach.** The battle position is an intent graphic that depicts the location and general orientation of the majority of the defending forces. A commander's use of a battle position does not direct the position of the subordinate's entire force within its bounds since it is not an AO. (See Figure 8-4, page 8-8.) Units as large as battalion task forces and as small as squads or sections use battle positions. They may occupy the topographical crest of a hill, a forward slope, a reverse slope, or a combination of these areas. The commander selects his positions based on terrain, enemy capabilities, and friendly capabilities. A commander can assign all or some of his subordinates battle positions within his AO. (See Figure 8-5, page 8-8.)

8-15. The commander may assign his subordinates battle positions in situations when he needs to retain a greater degree of control over the maneuver of his subordinate units than what he has with only an AO, as he controls maneuver outside the general location of the battle position. He may assign multiple battle positions to a single unit, which allows that unit to maneuver between battle positions. The commander specifies mission and engagement criteria to the unit assigned to a battle position. Security, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) forces may operate outside a unit's battle position.

8-16. Battle positions are not normally held at all costs. The commander assigning a unit to a battle position should specify when and under what conditions the unit displaces from the position. If a unit is ordered to defend a battle position, its commander has the option of moving off the battle position. If that unit is directed to retain a battle position, its commander needs to know the specific conditions that must exist before his unit can displace.



Figure 8-4. Task Force Battle Position



Figure 8-5. AO and Battle Position Control Measures Used in Combination

8-17. There are five kinds of battle positions—primary, alternate, supplementary, subsequent, and strong point. (See Figure 8-6.) When assigning battle positions, the commander always designates the primary battle position.

He designates and prepares alternate, supplementary, and subsequent positions as time and other resources permit and if the situation, especially terrain, requires them.



Figure 8-6. Five Kinds of Battle Positions

8-18. **The *primary position* is the position that covers the enemy's most likely avenue of approach into the AO.** It is the best position from which to accomplish the assigned mission, such as cover an EA.

8-19. **An *alternate position* is a defensive position that the commander assigns to a unit or weapon for occupation when the primary position becomes untenable or unsuitable for carrying out the assigned task.** It covers the same area as the primary position. He locates alternate positions so the occupant can continue to fulfill his original task, such as covering the same avenue of approach (AA) or EA as the primary position. These positions increase the defender's survivability by allowing him to engage the enemy from multiple positions. For example, a unit moves to its alternate positions when the enemy brings suppressive fires on the primary position.

8-20. **A *supplementary position* is a defensive position located within a unit's assigned AO that provides the best sectors of fire and defensive terrain along an avenue of approach that is not the primary avenue where the enemy is expected to attack.** For example, an AA into a unit's AO from one of its flanks normally requires establishing supplementary positions to allow a unit or weapon system to engage enemy forces traveling along that avenue.

8-21. **A *subsequent position* is a position that a unit expects to move to during the course of battle.** A defending unit may have a series of subsequent positions. Subsequent positions can also have primary, alternate, and supplementary positions associated with them.

8-22. **A *strong point* is a heavily fortified battle position tied to a natural or reinforcing obstacle to create an anchor for the defense or to deny the enemy decisive or key terrain.** The commander prepares a strong point for all-around defense. (See Figure 8-7.) He positions strong points on key or decisive terrain as necessary. The unit occupying the strong point prepares positions for its weapon systems, vehicles, soldiers, and supplies. The commander also establishes a strong point when he anticipates that enemy actions will isolate a defending force retaining terrain critical to the defense.



Figure 8-7. Strong Point Defense

8-23. Before assigning a strong point mission, the commander must ensure that the strong point force has sufficient time and resources to construct the position, which requires significant engineer support. A minimally effective strong point typically requires a one-day effort from an engineer unit the same size as the unit defending the strong point. Normally, companies and battalions occupy strong points, although brigades may construct them. The commander does not normally establish strong points for units smaller than company size. This is because a platoon or squad cannot secure a perimeter large enough to encompass all required assets and supplies.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATING MEASURES

8-24. The commander tries to engage the enemy at extended ranges and attrit him as his attack advances. To control indirect fires in the defense, the commander uses those common FSCM introduced in Chapter 2. He can also employ final protective fires.

8-25. *Final protective fires* (FPFs) are immediately available preplanned barriers of fires designed to impede enemy movement across defensive lines or areas (JP 3-09). Both direct- and indirect- fire weapons can provide FPFs. The commander can only assign each firing battery or platoon a single FPF. A FPF is a priority target for an element or system, and those fire units are laid on that target when they are not engaged in other fire missions. When the enemy initiates his final assault into a defensive position, the defending unit initiates its FPFs to kill enemy infantry soldiers and suppress his armored vehicles. Selected crew-served weapons fire along predesignated final protective lines (FPLs) to break up infantry assaults. (Figure 8-8 depicts a FPF.)



Figure 8-8. Final Protective Fire

DIRECT FIRE CONTROL MEASURES

8-26. The commander engages the enemy force with all available defensive fires when they enter the defending unit's EA. Chapter 2 defines these direct fire control measures, such as target reference points and EAs. (See Figure 8-9.)



Figure 8-9. Direct Fire Control Measures

DISENGAGEMENT LINE

8-27. **A *disengagement line* is a phase line located on identifiable terrain that, when crossed by the enemy, signals to defending elements that it is time to displace to their next positions.** Phase Line JOANN is a disengagement line in Figure 8-9. The commander uses these lines in the

delay and the defense when he does not intend for the defending unit to become decisively engaged. He establishes criteria for the disengagement, such as number of enemy vehicles by type, friendly losses, or enemy movement to flanking locations. Multiple disengagement lines, one for each system in the defense, may exist.

COMMON DEFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

8-28. At the onset of the attack, the defending commander yields the initiative to the enemy. However, he exploits prepared, mutually supporting positions organized for all-around defense and uses his knowledge of the terrain to slow the enemy's momentum. The defending force maintains its security and disrupts the enemy's attack at every opportunity. The defending commander hinders enemy offensive preparations by using long-range fires and deep maneuver to reduce the force of the enemy's initial blows and start the process of wresting the initiative from the enemy. He draws the enemy into EAs where he can initiate combat on his own terms. The commander surprises the enemy as concentrated and integrated fires violently erupt from concealed and protected positions. He then counterattacks the enemy, repeatedly imposing unexpected blows. The widespread application of highly accurate and lethal weapons, high degree of tactical mobility, dynamic situational changes, and extended spatial scope of unit AOs all characterize contemporary combined arms warfare. The commander exploits small tactical success and opportunities to build momentum rapidly. The commander first able to see the battlefield, understand the common operational picture's implications, and take effective action will defeat his opponent's combined arms team, shatter his cohesion, degrade his strength and ability to concentrate, and destroy his exposed forces.

8-29. The defending force does not have to kill every enemy soldier, squad, or combat system to be successful. It only has to destroy the enemy's ability to synchronize his combined arms team or his will to fight. Those events signal a transition period that affords the defending commander the opportunity to seize the initiative and return to the offense.

8-30. A defense is more effective when there is adequate time to thoroughly plan and prepare defensive positions. Lack of preparation time may cause the commander to maintain a larger-than-normal reserve force or accept greater risks than usual. All units must be capable of mounting a defense with minimal preparation, but a strong defense takes time to organize and prepare. If the enemy attack does not take place at the predicted time, the commander should use the additional time to improve his unit's defensive positions. He can increase the effectiveness of the security area, establish additional alternate and supplementary positions, refine the defensive plan to include branches and sequels, conduct defensive rehearsals, and maintain vehicles and personnel. To gain time to organize a defense, the commander may order his security force to conduct a delay while the main body disengages and moves to more advantageous positions. The security force must know how long it needs to delay the enemy for the main body to prepare its defense and be task organized to conduct a delay. (Chapter 11 discusses the delay.)

8-31. The common defensive planning considerations addressed in the following paragraphs apply to all types of defensive operations. In the defense, synchronizing the effects of his combat and supporting systems allows a commander to apply overwhelming combat power against selected advancing enemy forces to unhinge the enemy commander's plan and destroy his combined arms team. Defensive synchronization is normally the result of detailed planning and preparation among the various units participating in an operation. While these activities may be separated in time and space, they are synchronized if their combined consequences are felt at decisive times and places. All defensive operations are a mix of static and dynamic actions. As an operation evolves, the commander knows that he will probably be required to shift his decisive and shaping operations to press the fight and keep the enemy off balance. Synchronized prior planning and preparation bolster the commander's combat power, increasing the effectiveness of the defense. The commander must remain cognizant of the possibility of dislocated civilians attempting to move through his positions in an effort to escape approaching enemy forces throughout the defense.

INTELLIGENCE

8-32. During the planning process, the commander uses intelligence products to identify probable enemy objectives and various approaches. He studies patterns of enemy operations and the enemy's vulnerability to counterattack, interdiction, electronic warfare, air attacks, and canalization by obstacles. The commander must also examine the enemy's capability to conduct air attacks against his force, insert forces behind friendly units, and employ nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. He must determine how soon follow-on forces can join the fight against an enemy attacking in echelons.

8-33. The commander uses his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and engineer assets to study the terrain. By studying the terrain, the commander tries to determine the principal enemy and friendly heavy, light, and air avenues of approach. He wants to determine the most advantageous area for the enemy's main attack, as well as other factors of observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC). (See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion of OAKOC.)

8-34. The commander approves an integrated ISR plan that provides early identification of as many of the following requirements as possible:

- Locations, composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of the advancing enemy force.
- Enemy reconnaissance objectives or goals.
- Locations of possible enemy assembly areas.
- Location of enemy indirect fire weapon systems and units.
- Location of gaps, assailable flanks, and other enemy weaknesses.
- Location of areas for enemy helicopter and parachute assaults.
- Location of artillery and air defense gun and missile units.
- Location of enemy electronic warfare units.
- Location, numbers, and intentions of civilian populations.
- Effects of weather and terrain on current and projected operations.

- Likely withdrawal routes for enemy forces.
- Numbers, routes, and direction of movement of dislocated civilians.
- Anticipated timetable for the enemy's most likely COA.
- Locations of enemy command posts, fire direction control centers, electronic warfare sites, and target acquisition sensor and target fusion sites and the frequencies they are using.

It is unlikely that the commander has complete knowledge of the enemy's intentions; therefore, he must plan to continue his intelligence efforts during the battle. (FM 2-0 provides an overview of the intelligence process and the capabilities of technical surveillance systems. FM 3-55 discusses reconnaissance assets available at each echelon. FMs 3-11.9 and 3-34.170 discuss the specialized tasks associated with NBC and engineer reconnaissance.)

8-35. The commander's ability to see the enemy is critical to the conduct of all defensive operations. Defensive plans must address the sustainment, replacement, and reconstitution of ISR assets throughout the preparation and execution of the defense.

MANEUVER

8-36. The commander's intent is to defeat the enemy force's attack by overwhelming it with repeated, unexpected blows before it conducts its final assault on friendly defensive positions. As the enemy attack fails, the enemy must attempt to withdraw or transition to a defense in the face of friendly counterattacks. If the enemy succeeds in overrunning a key defensive position, the defending force counterattacks to overwhelm the enemy before he can either organize that position for defense or exploit his success.

Exploit the Advantages of Terrain

8-37. The defending commander exploits the defending force's advantages of occupying the terrain where the fight will occur. The defending force engages the attacker from locations that give the defending force an advantage over the attacking enemy. These locations include defiles, rivers, thick woods, swamps, cliffs, canals, built-up areas, and reverse slopes. Defensive positions in the MBA should make use of existing and reinforcing obstacles. The commander may choose to shape the battlefield by defending one area to deny terrain to the enemy while delaying in another area to deceive the enemy commander into believing he has achieved success.

8-38. The defending commander plans how to use key terrain to impede the enemy's movement. He seeks out terrain that allows him to mass the effects of his fires but forces the enemy to commit his force piecemeal into friendly EAs. This exposes portions of the enemy force for destruction without giving up the advantages of fighting from protected positions. Examples of key terrain include terrain that permits the defending force to cover a major obstacle system by fire, and important road junctions and choke points that impact troop movements, such as the movement of reserves and LOCs.

8-39. The commander determines the probable force ratios he will face and arrays his forces accordingly. The terrain impacts how fast the enemy can close on his positions and how much time is available to employ combat multipliers, such as indirect fires. Once the commander arrives at acceptable

force ratios—or the degree of risk he must take is clear—he allocates his available forces and begins planning his EAs.

8-40. On each enemy AA, the commander determines where he wants to destroy the enemy. He arrays forces allocated to that AA around this point to establish an EA. He uses obstacles and fires to canalize enemy forces into this EA. The commander takes actions to increase the kill probabilities of his various weapon systems at different ranges. This includes establishing range markers for direct fire weapons, confirming the zero on his weapons, or clearing obstacles that might snag the cables over which the commands of his wire-guided munitions, like the TOW missile, travel.

8-41. Generally, defending forces have the advantage of preparing the terrain by reinforcing natural obstacles, fortifying positions, and rehearsing operations. First, they prepare the ground to force the piecemeal commitment of enemy forces and their subsequent defeat in detail. Second, they prepare the ground to force the enemy to fight where he does not want to fight, such as in open areas dominated by terrain that offers adequate cover and concealment for the occupying friendly forces. The defending force tries to guide or entice the enemy into prepared EAs. Units employ and continuously strengthen obstacles and fortifications to improve the natural defensive strength of the position, which has a direct bearing on the distribution of forces, frontages, and depth of the defense.

8-42. Terrain features that favor defensive operations include—

- A series of parallel ridges across the line of hostile advance.
- Unfordable streams, swamps, lakes, and other obstacles on the front and flanks.
- High ground with good observation and long-range fields of fire.
- Concealed movement routes immediately behind defensive positions.
- Limited road network in front of the line of contact to confine the enemy to predictable avenues of approach.
- Good road network behind the line of contact that allows the commander to reposition his forces as the battle progresses.

The opposite of the terrain conditions listed above degrades a force's ability to conduct defensive operations. For example, terrain with a limited road net that canalizes the defending force allows the enemy to predict its movement and take steps to interdict that movement.

Maintain Security

8-43. Security operations seek to confuse the enemy about the location of the commander's main battle positions, prevent enemy observation of preparations and positions, and keep the enemy from delivering observed fire on the positions. They also try to force the attacking enemy to deploy prematurely. They can offset the attacker's inherent advantage of initiative regarding the time, place, plan, direction, strength, and composition of his attack by forcing him to attack blind into prepared defenses. The commander must not permit enemy reconnaissance and surveillance assets to determine the precise location and strength of defensive positions, obstacles, EAs, and reserves. First, the defending force conducts reconnaissance to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Second, each echelon normally establishes a security area

forward of its MBA. All units conduct aggressive security operations within their AO, including the rear area, to seek out and repel or kill enemy reconnaissance and other forces. Units implement operations security (OPSEC) measures and other defensive information operations to deny the enemy information about friendly dispositions. (See Chapter 12 for more information on security operations.)

Disrupt the Enemy Attack at Every Opportunity

8-44. The defending force conducts operations throughout the depth of the enemy's formation in time and space to destroy his key units and assets, particularly his artillery and reserves, or disrupt their timely introduction into battle at the point of engagement. This allows the defending force to regain the initiative. It conducts spoiling attacks to disrupt the enemy's troop concentrations and attack preparations. The defending force counterattacks enemy successes rapidly with its reserve, the forces at hand, or a striking force before the enemy can exploit success. It conducts offensive information operations to assist this process.

Mass the Effects of Combat Power

8-45. The defending force must mass the effects of its combat power to overwhelm the enemy and regain the initiative. The commander uses economy of force measures in areas that do not involve his decisive operation to mass the effects of his forces in the area where a decision is sought. This decisive point can be a geographical objective or an enemy force. In an area defense, defending units use EAs to concentrate the effects of overwhelming combat power from mutually supporting positions. In a mobile defense, the commander uses the striking force to generate overwhelming combat power at the decisive point. Another way he can generate the effects of mass is through committing his reserve.

Ensure Mutual Support

8-46. Mutual support exists when positions and units support each other by direct, indirect, lethal, and nonlethal fire, thus preventing the enemy from attacking one position without being subjected to fire from one or more adjacent positions. Mutual support increases the strength of all defensive positions, prevents defeat in detail, and helps prevent infiltration between positions. Tactical positions achieve the maximum degree of mutual support between them when they are located to observe or monitor the ground between them or conduct patrols to prevent any enemy infiltration. At night or during periods of limited visibility, the commander may position small tactical units closer together to retain the advantages of mutual support. Unit leaders must coordinate the nature and extent of their mutual support.

Heavy Forces

8-47. When the majority of a defending force consists of mechanized or armored units, the commander can conduct a defense designed to take advantage of the tactical mobility and protection offered by organic combat vehicles. Heavy forces can maneuver to delay the advance of a strong enemy force and then immediately change from a mobile to a static form of defense or

counterattack. Such forces are well suited for use as security and MBA forces. They are more suited for operations within an NBC contaminated environment than light forces because of their built-in protection.

Light Forces

8-48. When facing enemy light forces, the commander deploys and uses defending light forces in the same manner as heavy forces are used against other heavy forces. Light forces facing a heavy enemy are primarily used in static roles within the MBA or in security roles within the rear area. When facing heavy enemy forces, light infantry forces are most effective when fighting from prepared defenses or in close terrain, such as swamps, woods, hilly and mountainous areas, and urban areas where they can take advantage of their foot mobility and short-range infantry and anti-armor weapons.

8-49. The commander uses an air assault unit in the same manner as other light forces once it deploys into its landing zones (LZs). (See Appendix C for a discussion of air assault operations.) However, there may be more problems in extracting such a force, particularly if it is in direct contact with the enemy. Because of its mobility and potential reaction speed, an air assault force is often well-suited for a reserve role during defensive operations. Its tasks might include—

- Rapid reinforcement of a threatened position.
- Occupation of a blocking position, possibly in conjunction with existing defensive positions.
- Rear area security operations, such as containment of an enemy airborne or helicopter assault.
- Reinforcement of encircled friendly forces.
- Flank protection.

Rotary- and Fixed-Wing Aviation

8-50. Aviation assets are particularly valuable in the defense because of their speed, mobility, and versatility. Their tasks can include—

- Conducting reconnaissance and security operations.
- Conducting shaping operations to establish the necessary conditions for decisive operations by other forces through attritting, disrupting, and delaying the enemy.
- Conducting counterattacks and spoiling attacks.
- Controlling ground for limited periods where a commander does not wish to irrevocably commit ground forces; for example, forward of an executed obstacle.
- Blocking enemy penetrations.
- Closing gaps in a defense plan before the arrival of ground maneuver forces.
- Facilitating the disengagement of ground forces.
- Countering enemy activities in the rear area, in particular enemy airborne or air assault forces.
- Using available utility and cargo helicopters in their normal roles to support the defensive effort, such as resupplying the defending force with Class IV barrier material or facilitating casualty evacuation.

- Assisting in the countermobility effort.
- Providing long-range biological surveillance.

FIRE SUPPORT

8-51. In the defense, the commander uses his fire support systems to neutralize, suppress, or destroy enemy forces; to delay or disrupt the enemy's ability to execute a given COA; and to enhance the effects of massed direct fires. Thus fire support systems support both the commander's decisive and shaping operations.

8-52. The defending force is more effective if it can locate and attack enemy forces while the enemy is stationary and concentrated in assembly areas or advancing along LOCs, as opposed to when he is deployed in combat formations within the MBA. To accomplish this, the defending force must employ its fire support system throughout its AO. It must be closely linked to target acquisition means, including ISR assets.

8-53. As the commander develops his defensive plans, he must visualize how to synchronize, coordinate, and distribute the effects of indirect and direct fire at the decisive time and place. He places permissive FSCM as close as possible to friendly positions to facilitate the rapid engagement of attacking enemy forces. Prior coordination facilitates the massing of the effects of fires before enemy targets concentrated at obstacles and other choke points can disperse. Proper distribution of fire effects ensures the massing of overwhelming combat power at the decisive point. Proper fire distribution also ensures that high-payoff targets are destroyed without wasting assets through repetitive engagement by multiple friendly systems.

8-54. Indirect fires have the greatest impact on the enemy when they are synchronized with direct fires and the use of obstacles, defensive positions, and counterattack plans. The commander must integrate the defensive fire and obstacle plans from the beginning. Indirect fires complement the effects of obstacles and can disrupt enemy attempts to breach or bypass these obstacles. For the plans to work, all elements in the fire support chain—from forward observers in fire support teams to the fire support coordinator including the supporting tactical air control party—must understand the commander's intent, the scheme of maneuver, and the obstacle plan.

8-55. There are various fire support considerations for each phase of the fight. As part of his shaping operations during defense preparations, a commander tries to disrupt the enemy's attack preparations by—

- Conducting harassing fires on choke points and likely enemy assembly areas.
- Employing air support on known, suspected, and likely enemy locations.
- Attritting his resources by continuously engaging high-payoff targets.
- Conducting offensive information operations to degrade the enemy's ability to command and control his forces.
- Employing counterfires to engage and destroy enemy artillery and mortar systems attempting to deliver suppressive fires.

- Providing fires in support of the unit's security operations, such as a unit conducting the tactical mission task of counterreconnaissance.

In some situations it may be better to wait to execute a counterfire mission until the fighting begins in the MBA. However, when defending forces enjoy qualitative advantages in fire support, the advantages accruing from a counterfire battle usually outweigh the risks to the defending maneuver force. The defender's ability to mass fires quickly and then rapidly reposition its forces is a major factor in disrupting the enemy and establishing the required conditions for successful decisive operations.

8-56. The commander employs fires to support his security forces, using precision and other munitions to destroy enemy reconnaissance and other high-payoff targets. This also helps to deceive the enemy about the location of the MBA. He supports the security force by planning the delivery of the effects of fires at appropriate times and places throughout his area of influence to slow and canalize the enemy forces as they approach the security area. This allows the security force to engage the enemy on more favorable terms. To prevent fratricide, he places no fire areas over his security forces. Finally, he uses fires to support the withdrawal of the security force once its shaping mission is complete and the defending unit is prepared to conduct MBA operations.

8-57. Air support can play an important part in delaying enemy forces following or attempting to bypass rearward-moving defending forces. Air operations contribute to overcoming the enemy's initial advantage of freedom of action. Often, only aircraft are available to initially oppose an enemy penetration until ground forces can redeploy to engage it. Close air support (CAS) can be instrumental in disrupting an enemy advance. It can operate with Army helicopters and artillery assets to form a joint air attack team (JAAT). The commander also incorporates artillery fires with electronic warfare and joint systems to suppress enemy air defenses while CAS hits a target. Air interdiction can delay, destroy, or neutralize enemy follow-on forces, thereby providing the commander with additional time to prepare his defensive positions.

8-58. Once the fight moves into the MBA, fire support assets continue to target enemy combat units to force them to deploy. At the same time, fire support assets inflict casualties, disrupt the cohesion of the enemy's attack and impede his ability to mass combat power. Fire support assets continue to attack enemy follow-on forces before they can be committed to the MBA. This further isolates the attacking enemy force. They attack C2 facilities and logistics sites in depth to contribute to isolating the attacking enemy. The commander takes advantage of the range and flexibility of his fire support weapons to mass fires at critical points, such as obstacles and EAs, to slow and canalize the enemy to provide better targets for direct fire systems. Fire support systems cover barriers, gaps, and open areas within the MBA. Tasks assigned to these fire support systems include closing obstacle gaps or reseeding previously breached obstacles in accordance with the rules of engagement. Other tasks include—

- Massing fires to suppress enemy direct and indirect fire systems to facilitate defensive maneuver, especially the counterattack and disengagement.
- Neutralizing or isolating enemy forces that have penetrated the defensive area and impeding the movement of enemy reserves.

- Attacking enemy artillery and forward air defense elements.
- Using jamming to degrade or destroy the enemy's ability to transmit data and information.
- Reallocating fire support assets, after identifying the enemy's main effort, to reinforce fires in the most vulnerable areas.
- Separating attacking enemy combat vehicles from light infantry, disrupting the enemy's combined arms team.

8-59. In response to shallow enemy penetrations, artillery commanders normally reposition their systems laterally, away from that point. This allows artillery systems to provide fire support throughout the area of penetration.

AIR DEFENSE

8-60. Freedom of movement is essential to successful defensive operations. In a hostile air environment, the defending force must establish air defense in depth around critical points, areas, units, and activities. The dedicated air defense artillery resources probably cannot provide adequate cover completely throughout the AO against all possible threats; therefore, the commander must establish priorities for coverage and assume risk.

Active Air Defense

8-61. Normally, the commander's priorities for air defense protection in the defense begin with his C2 facilities. Because they are generally fixed or semi-fixed sites with high-electronic signatures, they are susceptible to attack by enemy aircraft. Air defense coordinators examine air avenues of approach toward C2 facilities and position guns and missiles to prevent enemy aircraft from reaching their targets.

8-62. Logistics support areas, main supply routes (MSRs), and other logistics sites are also relatively fixed and easily identified from the air. Passive air defense measures help prevent detection. However, once the enemy detects them, he will attempt to attack them. Therefore, route and point security missions require air defense units to locate along the MSR and in positions to protect fixed locations. The commander allocates his air defense assets to protect these locations in accordance with the factors of METT-TC.

8-63. The air defense responsibility may be most critical in forward areas since the commander will task air defense artillery (ADA) units along the FEBA to engage enemy aircraft providing CAS or attempting low-level penetration of friendly air defenses en route to a target in the friendly rear area. Air defense assets protecting combat forces in forward battle positions and strong points are more exposed to destruction by enemy direct and indirect systems than air defense systems located elsewhere on the battlefield. The commander must take steps to ensure their survivability, such as placing man-portable air defense missile gunners inside combat vehicles when not actively engaging enemy aircraft.

8-64. The reserve or striking force is initially a stationary hidden force. However, it is easy to observe from the air as it moves on its commitment by the commander. It is especially vulnerable once discovered. Therefore, the

commander positions air defense assets to protect the reserve or striking force, whether it is stationary or moving.

8-65. Air defense systems that protect the reserve and the striking force must be as mobile and protected as the forces they are protecting. The less mobile equipment is usually kept in more static roles. The commander continually coordinates his air defense activities with his air and artillery operations to avoid fratricide. Air defense units and support assets move in support of the defensive effort. If the enemy can disrupt this support from the air, it will affect the defense. Correct assessment of enemy air corridors and tactics is essential to guarantee protection and management of these resources.

8-66. The destruction of key bridges or the closing of choke points interrupts the defender's freedom of movement. The force must protect these positions to sustain the defense and allow the conduct of counterattacks. The commander locates air defense assets to protect these vital locations.

Passive Air Defense

8-67. The commander also uses passive air defense measures to protect his force. *Passive air defense measures* are all measures other than active defense taken to minimize the effects of the hostile air action (FM 3-01.8). Passive defense measures are of two types: attack avoidance and damage-limiting measures. Both include the use of cover, concealment and camouflage, and deception.

8-68. **Attack Avoidance.** Attack avoidance means taking steps to avoid being seen by the enemy. If the force cannot be seen, the probability of it being hit diminishes to near zero. The commander uses the same techniques, procedures, and materials for concealment from aerial observation as for concealment from ground observation. He employs three principles to enhance concealment—

- **Siting.** Siting means selecting the most advantageous position in which to hide a man, an object, or an activity. This is often the shadows provided by woodlines, wadies, and buildings.
- **Discipline.** Success in any concealment effort hinges on strict concealment discipline by units and individual soldiers. The unit should avoid activities that change the appearance of an area or reveal the presence of military equipment. Laxness and carelessness will undoubtedly reveal a position. Tracks, spoil, and debris are the most common signs of military activity, which indicate concealed objects. Ensure that new tracks follow existing paths, roads, fences, or natural lines in the terrain pattern. Do not end exposed routes at a position, but extend them to another logical termination. If practical, the unit should brush out, camouflage, or cover its tracks. It should cover or place spoil and debris to blend with the surroundings. The unit adds artificial camouflage when the terrain and natural vegetation are such that natural concealment is not possible.
- **Construction.** Adding natural materials to blend with the surrounding terrain augments this type of concealment.

8-69. There are three fundamental methods of concealing installations and activities—hiding, blending, and disguising.

- **Hiding.** Hiding is the complete concealment of an object by some form of physical screen. For example, sod placed over mines in a minefield hides the mines; the overhead canopy of trees hides the objects beneath from aerial observation; a net hides objects beneath it; a defilade position hides objects from ground observation. In some cases, the screen may be invisible. In other instances, the screen may be visible, but it hides the activity behind it.
- **Blending.** Blending is arranging or applying camouflage materials on, over, and around the object so that it appears to be part of the background. Examples include applying face paint to the exposed areas of skin, and adding burlap, paint, and live vegetation to helmets and clothing to closely resemble or blend into the background. Units can apply the same technique for equipment or structures.
- **Disguising.** Clever disguises can often mislead the enemy about the friendly force's identity, strength, and intention, and may draw his fire from real assets. Therefore, the simulation of objects, pieces of equipment, or activities may have military significance. Inflatable tanks, tents, and buildings can look like the real thing to an aerial observer.

8-70. In addition to hiding equipment, units can avoid detection by using mud for glassy surfaces and unfilled sandbags over windshields. Camouflage is one of the basic weapons of war. Soldiers must understand the importance, the principles, and the techniques of camouflage. All personnel must ensure the effectiveness of all camouflage measures and maintain strict camouflage discipline.

8-71. **Damage-Limiting Measures.** The other type of passive air defense, damage limiting, is also used for survival. These measures attempt to limit damage if the enemy detects the position. If the enemy is to destroy any equipment, he is forced to do it one piece at a time. Enemy forces should never be able to put a unit out of action with just a single attack. The commander uses the same measures taken to limit damage from field artillery attack—dispersion, protective construction, and cover.

- **Dispersion.** Dispersed troops and vehicles force the attacker to concentrate on a single small target that he will likely miss. The wider the dispersion, the greater the potential for limiting damage.
- **Protective Construction.** Using cover, natural or manmade, acts to reduce damage and casualties. Folds in the earth, natural depressions, trees, buildings, and walls offer damage-limiting cover; individuals and units should seek them out and use them habitually. If deployment is in flat terrain lacking cover, digging in or sandbagging can offer some protection. The unit employs smoke if it is moving and cannot use natural cover or cannot build fortifications. Smoke makes target acquisition much more difficult for the attacker.
- **Cover.** Cover emphasizes the importance of passive defense against an air attack. The unit must do everything it can to avoid an attack in the first place, but if it is attacked, it uses cover and dispersion to limit the amount of damage.

Air Defense Role in Reconnaissance and Surveillance

8-72. A commander can direct his air defense systems to deploy forward with scouts along potential air corridors based on the aerial IPB developed by his intelligence and air defense officers. This provides early warning of enemy air infiltration and allows timely engagement of enemy aerial platforms attempting to insert dismounted reconnaissance, infantry, and antiarmor teams. The air defense systems can report stationary locations of enemy aircraft to assist the supported unit in confirming templated LZs. This allows the unit to quickly react to potential ground threats by calling for indirect fires or employing a quick reaction force to defeat this threat. The commander assigns a clear mission to these systems to ensure that they do not compromise the supported unit's integrated ISR plan by prematurely engaging enemy aerial reconnaissance platforms. He establishes a well-defined trigger event to prevent this from happening. Additionally, he ensures the integration of ADA unique munitions into the supported unit's CSS plan based on the planned time that these assets will be forward.

MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

8-73. An attacking enemy has the initiative in terms of where and when he will attack. A defending commander must take a wide range of actions to protect the mobility of his force while degrading the mobility of the enemy. He takes those steps simultaneously to protect his force from losses due to enemy actions.

Mobility

8-74. During the defense, mobility tasks include maintaining routes, coordinating gaps in existing obstacles, and supporting counterattacks. Engineers also open helicopter LZs and tactical landing strips for fixed-wing aircraft. Maintaining and improving routes and creating bypass or alternate routes at critical points are major engineering tasks because movement routes are subjected to fires from enemy artillery and air support systems. These enemy fires may necessitate deploying engineer equipment, such as assault bridging and bulldozers, forward. The commander can also evacuate dislocated civilians or restrict their movements to routes not required by his forces to enhance his mobility. He can do this provided he coordinates the action with the host nation or the appropriate civil military operations agency and fulfills his responsibilities to displaced civilians under international law.

8-75. Priority of mobility support is first to routes used by counterattacking forces, then to routes used by main body forces displacing to subsequent positions. This mainly involves breaching obstacles and improving combat roads and trails to allow tactical support vehicles to accompany moving combat vehicles. Careful coordination ensures leaving required lanes or gaps in obstacles for repositioning main body units and committing the counterattack force during the defense. Chemical reconnaissance systems also contribute to the force's mobility in a contaminated environment.

Countermobility

8-76. In the defense, the commander normally concentrates his engineer efforts on countering the enemy's mobility. A defending force typically requires

large quantities of Class IV and V material and specialized equipment to construct fighting and survivability positions and obstacles. With limited assets, the commander must establish priorities among countermobility, mobility, and survivability efforts. He ensures that his staff synchronizes these efforts with the echelon's logistic plans.

8-77. The commander may plan to canalize the enemy force into a salient. In this case, he takes advantage of the enemy force's forward orientation by fixing the enemy and then delivering a blow to the enemy's flank or rear. As the enemy's attacking force assumes a protective posture, the defending commander rapidly coordinates and concentrates all effects of his fires against unprepared and unsupported segments of the enemy force in rapid sequence. The unit may deliver these fires simultaneously or sequentially.

8-78. When planning obstacles, commanders and staffs must consider not only current operations but also future operations. The commander should design obstacles for current operations so they do not hinder future operations. Any commander authorized to employ obstacles can designate certain obstacles that are important to his ability to shape the battlefield as high-priority reserve obstacles. He assigns responsibility for preparation to a subordinate unit but retains authority for ordering their execution or final completion. An example of a reserve obstacle is a highway bridge over a major river. Such obstacles receive the highest priority in preparation and, if ordered, execution by the designated subordinate unit.

8-79. A commander integrates reinforcing obstacles with existing obstacles to improve the natural restrictive nature of the terrain to halt or slow enemy movement, canalize enemy movement into EAs, and protect friendly positions and maneuver. He may choose to employ scatterable mines in accordance with the rules of engagement. Direct and indirect fires must cover obstacles to be effective. This requires the ability to deliver effective fires well beyond the obstacle's location. When possible, units conceal obstacles from hostile observation. They coordinate obstacle plans with adjacent units and conform to the obstacle zone or belts of superior echelons.

8-80. Effective obstacles force the enemy to attempt to breach them if he wants to maintain his momentum and retain the initiative. While the defending force is aware that the enemy is going to breach an obstacle, the enemy tries to conceal exactly where and when he will try to breach. The defending force's plan addresses how to counter such a breach, to include reestablishing the obstacle by using scatterable mines and other techniques.

8-81. Given time and resources, the defending force generally constructs additional obstacle systems to its flanks and rear. These systems can provide additional protection from enemy attacks by forcing the enemy to spend time and resources to breach or bypass the obstacle. This, in turn, gives the defending force more time to engage enemy forces attempting to execute breach operations or bypass these obstacles.

8-82. The commander designates the unit responsible for establishing and securing each obstacle. He may retain execution authority for some obstacles or restrict the use of some types of obstacles to allow other battlefield activities to occur. He allows his subordinate commanders some flexibility in selecting the exact positioning of obstacles. However, all units must know which gaps—

through obstacles and crossing sites—to keep open for the unit's use, as well as the firing and self-destruct times of scatterable mines to prevent delays in movement. The commander must be specific and clear in his orders for firing demolitions, emplacing obstacles, and closing lanes. As each lane closes, the closing unit reports the lane's closure to the higher, subordinate, and adjacent headquarters to preclude displacing units from moving into areas with unmarked or abandoned obstacles.

8-83. Tactical and protective obstacles are constructed primarily at company level and below. Small unit commanders ensure that observation and fires cover all obstacles to hinder breaching. Deliberate protective obstacles are common around fixed sites. Protective obstacles are a key component of survivability operations. They are tied in with FPFs and provide the friendly force with close-in protection. Commanders at all echelons track defensive preparations, such as establishing Class IV and V supply points and start or completion times of obstacle belts and groups. The commander plans how he will restore obstacles the enemy has breached. He uses artillery, air, or ground systems to reseed minefields.

8-84. FM 3-34.1 provides additional information about obstacles and obstacle integration, such as planning factors relating to emplacing obstacles and obstacle function versus lethality. It also describes the methods and essential principles for planning protective obstacles.

Survivability

8-85. Since the attacking enemy force usually has the initiative in terms of where and when it will attack, a defending commander must take a wide range of actions to protect his force from losses due to enemy actions. These steps include ensuring all-around defense, NBC defense, and using smoke.

8-86. The survivability effort for the defense must enable units to concentrate firepower from fixed positions. To avoid detection and destruction by the enemy, units move frequently and establish survivability positions quickly. To provide flexibility, units may need primary, alternate, and supplementary positions. This is particularly true of units defending key or decisive terrain. Units enhance their survivability through concealment, deception, dispersion, and field fortifications.

8-87. Survivability tasks include using engineer equipment to assist in preparing and constructing trenches, command post shelters, and artillery firing, radar, and combat vehicle fighting positions. The commander provides guidance on the level of protection—such as hull defilade or overhead cover, system priorities, and early use of specialized engineer systems that can construct survivability positions. He should protect supply stocks against blast, shrapnel, incendiaries, and NBC contamination. Supplies loaded on tactical vehicles can be protected against almost anything but a direct hit by constructing berms large enough to accommodate the vehicles and deep enough to keep supplies below ground level. The force's engineer officer can advise CSS logistics operators about storage area site selection that reduces the requirements for engineer survivability support without reducing the degree of protection provided. FMs 3-34.1 and 3-34.112 provide additional information concerning the construction and maintenance of survivability positions.

8-88. The commander should avoid predictable defensive preparations because an enemy will tend to attack lightly defended areas. Major positions, facilities, and operational logistics sites may require special camouflage. Camouflage measures that provide this protection include constructing dummy positions and decoys. The commander carefully plans the use of such measures within the framework of real positions and ongoing and future operations. The echelon's OPSEC program and any deception efforts conducted in accordance with guidance from higher echelons should conceal from the enemy or mislead him about the location of the MBA and the disposition of friendly forces.

8-89. **Ensure All-Around Defense.** Units employ all-around security at all times although they deploy the bulk of their combat power against likely enemy avenues of approach. This is because the battlefield offers many opportunities for small enemy elements to move undetected.

8-90. **NBC Defense.** Because defending units are often in fixed positions, they increase their vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction. The commander specifies the degree of risk he is willing to accept and establishes priorities for his NBC defense units. He positions forces and installations to avoid congestion, but he must not disperse to the extent that he risks defeat in detail by an enemy employing conventional munitions.

8-91. The commander determines the mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) level assumed by his force if the MOPP level has not already been established by a higher headquarters. Environmental factors determine where he places his NBC detection devices. He ensures that his unit can conduct hasty and deliberate decontamination of its soldiers and equipment. He drills his unit on measures taken in response to the enemy's use of weapons of mass destruction.

8-92. The commander should employ NBC reconnaissance units along movement routes and at potential choke points. Proper use of these assets enables the commander to reduce casualties and complete his mission. (FMs 3-11 and 3-12 detail NBC defense operations.)

8-93. **Smoke and Obscuration.** The commander uses smoke to disrupt the enemy's assault or movement formations and deny his use of target acquisition optics, visual navigation aids, air avenues of approach, LZs, and drop zones (DZs). Smoke creates gaps in enemy formations, separating or isolating attacking units, and disrupting their planned movement. Bispectral obscuration can blind attackers who lack thermal viewers or other enhanced optical systems. It prevents overwatching enemy elements from observing and engaging the defender, whereas defending forces with advanced optical systems can acquire and engage the enemy within the smoke. The commander can use smoke to facilitate friendly target acquisition by highlighting enemy systems against a light background while degrading the enemy's optics. Smoke used to mask obstacles located in low-level flight corridors and on LZs and DZs can prevent an enemy from using them or greatly increase his risk.

8-94. The commander uses his smoke-generation capabilities to mark targets and screen and obscure friendly positions. Modern bispectral obscurants provide protection from thermal as well as visual viewing devices. This generated capability must be carefully sited with regard to enemy systems and

friendly capabilities. Improper use can create an advantage for the enemy. The effectiveness of smoke depends on weather conditions and the quantity of smoke employed. The commander coordinates the use of smoke generators, artillery/mortar smoke, and smoke pot employment. The capabilities of each of these smoke-producing systems are complementary and most effective when used together to achieve synergistic effects. Using smoke can also enhance the effects of deception operations and cover friendly movement to include a river crossing. (FM 3-11.50 provides details on planning, preparing, and executing smoke operations.)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

8-95. The commander addresses several CSS considerations unique to the defense in his plan. Priorities for replenishment are normally ammunition and materials to construct obstacles and defensive positions. There is normally a reduced need for bulk fuel. There may be an increased demand for decontaminants and chemical protective equipment. The defense should consider stockpiling or caching ammunition and limited amounts of petroleum products in centrally located positions within the main battle area. The commander should plan to destroy those stocks if necessary as part of denial operations. The supply of obstacle materials in a defense can be a significant problem that requires detailed coordination and long lead times. The commander should not overlook the transportation and manpower required in obtaining, moving, and uncrating barrier material and associated obstacle creating munitions, such as demolition charges and mines.

8-96. The logistics officer (G4 or S4) and the commanders of the logistics units supporting the defending force must understand the commander's tactical intent. They can then establish service support priorities in accordance with the commander's intent and plan logistics operations to ensure the supportability of the operations. Logistics plans should address the provision of CSS during branches and sequels to the defense plan, such as a counterattack into the flank of an adjacent unit.

8-97. Combat units top off regularly with supplies in case an enemy breakthrough disrupts the replenishment flow. At the battalion and brigade level the commander ensures that his CSS operators deliver combat-configured loads to his combat units on a scheduled basis. Combat-configured loads are packages of potable and nonpotable water, NBC defense supplies, barrier materials, ammunition, POL, medical supplies, and repair parts tailored to a specific size unit. This eliminates the need to request supplies and reduces the chance that a lapse in communications will interrupt the supply flow and jeopardize the integrity of the defense. The supported combat unit is resupplied using this push system until it issues instructions to the contrary. The commander can use utility and cargo helicopters to deliver supplies directly from the rear area to the defending unit. Advances in information systems should allow these combat-configured push packages to be accurately tailored to the demands of the supported combat units.

8-98. As a technique, the defending force conducts resupply during periods of limited visibility if the commander does not expect the enemy to conduct a limited-visibility attack. This tends to reduce the chance for enemy interference with the resupply process but also tends to lengthen the amount of time

it takes to complete the process. Resupply should take place during daylight hours if the commander expects the enemy to conduct a limited visibility attack. The commander may be required to infiltrate resupply vehicles to reduce detection chances when the enemy possesses a significant air, satellite, or unmanned aerial vehicle capability. The commander may also use smoke to help conceal his logistics operations.

8-99. The CSS commander remains responsible for the defense of his unit. Concealment is an important factor in reducing the risk factors of these units. The commander must plan for the reconstitution of CSS capability lost to enemy activities.

8-100. Terrain management is a critical consideration in the rear area. The commander seeks to position each CSS unit where it can best fulfill its support tasks while using minimal resources to maintain security in conjunction with other units located in the rear area. In contiguous operations, the commander positions his CSS facilities farther to the rear in a defense than in the offense to avoid interfering with the movement of units between battle positions or the forward movement of counterattack forces. It also should be located far enough behind friendly lines that likely enemy advances will not compel the relocation of critical CSS at inopportune times. At the same time CSS must be close enough to provide responsive support. In noncontiguous operations, the commander positions his CSS facilities within the perimeters of his combat units to provide security and avoid interrupting support services. The commander distributes his similar functional CSS units throughout his defensive area in both environments. This distribution allows him to designate one support unit to pick up the workload of a displacing second support unit until that unit is operational.

8-101. The defending commander provides maintenance support as far forward as possible to reduce the need to evacuate equipment. The thrust of the maintenance effort is to fix as far forward as possible those systems that can be quickly returned to the unit in combat-ready condition. He must ensure that multifunctional forward logistics elements contain the maximum variety of DS personnel with appropriate equipment, such as repair sets, kits, and outfits to ensure rapid repair of weapon systems.

8-102. The commander must plan to augment his available ambulances if a mass-casualty situation develops. Units should always plan for mass casualties and have an evacuation plan, including air evacuation, that specifies the use of nonstandard air and ground platforms.

8-103. The conduct of troop movements and resupply convoys is critical to a successful defense. Staffs balance terrain management, movement planning, and traffic-circulation control priorities. They plan multiple routes throughout the AO and closely control their use. The commander may allocate mobility resources to maintain MSRs in a functional condition to support units and supplies moving forward and to evacuate personnel and equipment to the rear. Military police ease these movements, prevent congestion, and respond to maneuver plan changes. Civil affairs and host nation agencies are involved as necessary to minimize the impact of displaced civilians on unit and convoy movements. The commander coordinates air and ground movements supporting the commander's maneuver scheme with any other affected

services. Commanders also coordinate such movements with any affected organic and external Army aviation, fire support, air defense units, and ground maneuver units.

8-104. During the preparatory phase of the defense, logistics operators normally pre-position supply stocks, particularly ammunition and barrier materials, in the battle positions of defending forces. They also establish maintenance and medical collection points. Logistics operators must address these and other logistics preparations in the planning process to avoid compromising the operation. These logistics preparations can also be included in military deception plans.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

8-105. A defensive mission generally imposes few restrictions on the defending commander. It allows freedom of maneuver within assigned boundaries, but requires him to prevent enemy penetration of the rear boundary. Defending an AO is a typical mission for battalion and higher-echelon units. This mission allows the commander to distribute forces to suit the terrain and plan an engagement that integrates direct and indirect fires. The commander must ensure that subordinate unit defensive plans are compatible and that control measures, such as contact points and phase lines, are sufficient for flank coordination when assigning AOs. The defensive plan must address what happens when it succeeds and the opportunity exists to transition from defense to offense.

8-106. Defensive operations are often difficult to conduct because they may occur against an enemy who has the initiative and usually superior combat power. The commander must have a clear understanding of the battlefield situation to mass the effects of his forces to disengage committed forces. He takes advantage of war gaming that takes place in the military decision making process to derive his decision points. He bases these decision points on enemy and friendly actions, such as shifting fires, moving between battle positions, and rearming part or all of the defending force. He may require additional signal support to sustain communications across wide frontages characteristic of many defensive operations.

8-107. Because the enemy has the initiative, the commander may have to frequently shift his shaping operations to contain the enemy's attack until he can seize the initiative. This may require him to adjust subordinate unit AOs, repeatedly commit and reconstitute his reserve, and modify the original plan.

8-108. The defending commander may change his task organization to respond to the existing or projected situation, such as forming a detachment left in contact prior to conducting a withdraw. Whenever possible the commander ensures that changes in task organization take place between units that have previously trained or operated together to take advantage of established interpersonal relationships. The commanders of such recently reorganized units place special attention on ensuring that each element directs its efforts toward accomplishing the overall unit's mission, thus obtaining the maximum combat capability provided by combined arms. This requires them to ensure synchronizing objectives, control measures, movement routes, defensive positions, and specifically assigned tasks. It also requires using standing

operating procedures by each element of the task-organized unit. Failure to synchronize the effects of task-organized elements has often resulted in mission failure in training and actual operations.

8-109. To break through the MBA, the enemy often attacks along the boundaries of defending units when he can identify them. Therefore, it is extremely important for commanders at every echelon to ensure that the plan for their part of the defense is properly coordinated not only within their units but also with flanking and supporting units. This coordination is best done by personal visits to subordinate commanders on the ground. The staff should promptly pass on decisions reached during coordination to all concerned. The following planning aspects require attention in the coordination process:

- Understanding the superior commander's intent and concept of operations.
- Understanding the tactics to be applied by flanking and supporting units.
- Selecting boundary locations that do not increase the coordination problem.
- Planning for mutual support.
- Surveillance and target acquisition plans.
- Location and composition of security forces.
- Obstacles and demolition plans.
- Fire plans, to include employing AT systems, illumination, and smoke.
- Air defense coverage areas.
- Employing the reserve in conjunction with information operations and fire support systems, such as artillery and aviation.
- Boundaries and other control measures.
- Communications.

8-110. Because C2 facilities tend to be more stationary in the defense, the commander should place them in hardened areas or protective terrain and reduce their electronic signature. They must remain capable of rapidly relocating to respond to battlefield developments.

COMMON DEFENSIVE SCENARIOS

8-111. Certain common defensive scenarios have their own unique planning considerations. The following section addresses these scenarios and the unique considerations associated with—

- Defense against airborne and air assault attacks.
- Defense of a linear obstacle.
- Perimeter defense.
- Reverse slope defense.

DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE AND AIR ASSAULT ATTACKS

8-112. Defeating an enemy airborne or air assault begins with a good IPB process to determine the enemy's capabilities to conduct vertical envelopment and identify enemy airfields, pickup zones, DZs, and LZs. Armed with an appreciation of the enemy's capability to conduct vertical envelopment, the

commander takes steps to counter the threat before they launch, during their movement to the DZ, or at the LZ. After prioritizing the risk of each potential DZ or LZ to his operation, the commander establishes systematic surveillance of these areas to alert him if the enemy attempts to insert his forces. Units also sight their weapons to cover the most probable DZs and LZs. The fire support plan includes these zones in its target list for conventional munitions and scatterable mines and reflects current rules of engagement and host nation restrictions. Units and engineers emplace obstacles in these locations and block avenues of approach from such areas to critical friendly installations and activities as part of their countermobility and rear area survivability efforts.

8-113. Once enemy forces succeed in landing, the key to a successful defense is speed in containing and counterattacking the inserted enemy force before it becomes organized and reinforced. Field artillery and attack helicopters must commit rapidly to take advantage of the concentration of targets in the insertion area. Affected base and base cluster defense forces and available response forces keep the enemy force under observation at all times, calling in and designating targets for available fire support systems. The commander rapidly musters and commits available heavy units and combat systems to take advantage of enemy light forces' vulnerabilities to attack by armored vehicles while they remain concentrated in the insertion area. If more enemy troops land and succeed in consolidating, local base and base cluster defense forces and the response force try to fix the enemy force in a chosen location to allow a tactical combat force (TCF) to counterattack. If the enemy force is too large for the TCF to reduce, the commander may need to commit his reserve.

DEFENSE OF A LINEAR OBSTACLE

8-114. A commander may conduct either an area or mobile defense along or behind a linear obstacle. An area defense is normally preferred because it accepts less risk by not allowing the enemy to cross the obstacle. Linear obstacles such as mountain ranges or river lines generally favor a forward defense. The defending force seeks to defeat any enemy attempt to secure a bridgehead across the linear obstacle. Local defending units immediately and violently counterattack any enemy bridgeheads established to destroy enemy forces located within the bridgehead, while higher echelons attempt to isolate enemy bridgehead sites. If the enemy secures a bridgehead and strikes out rapidly, it could quickly penetrate the defending force. This requires the commander to conduct retrograde operations, either a delay or a withdrawal.

8-115. It is extremely difficult to deploy in strength along the entire length of a linear obstacle. The defending commander must conduct economy of force measures in some areas. Within an area defense, the commander's use of a defense in depth accepts the possibility that the enemy may force a crossing at a given point. The depth of the defense should prevent the enemy from rapidly exploiting its success. It also defuses the enemy's combat power by forcing him to contain bypassed friendly defensive positions in addition to continuing to attack positions in greater depth. Once the enemy force secures several bridgeheads, the defending force moves to contain them. The defending force commander may choose not to counterattack until he can mass overwhelming combat power. He will probably choose to eliminate the

bridgeheads sequentially in this case. However, he risks allowing the enemy to establish and fortify bridgehead crossing sites sufficiently to prevent the counterattack force from eliminating them.

8-116. The mobile defense gives the enemy an opportunity to cross the obstacle with a portion of his force. The commander conducting a mobile defense along a linear obstacle normally employs minimal forces along the obstacle as his fixing force. This generally allows the enemy to cross in at least one location. Once the enemy has partially crossed and the obstacle divides his forces, the commander conducts shaping operations to isolate the enemy bridgehead. Once the bridgehead is isolated, the defending commander launches a decisive attack by the striking force to destroy that isolated enemy bridgehead. He may also choose this technique when the enemy is likely to use weapons of mass destruction.

8-117. Alternatively, in a mobile defense the commander may take advantage of terrain or smoke to hide a striking force until the enemy's forward elements pass this force. Until committed, the striking force maintains a perimeter defense. This technique closely resembles the use of stay-behind forces. Similarly, the commander may order units inadvertently bypassed by the enemy not to break out immediately so that he may capitalize on their position to destroy the enemy.

PERIMETER DEFENSE

8-118. The commander can employ the perimeter defense as an option when conducting an area or mobile defense. The commander uses it in many other circumstances, such as when his unit is bypassed by the enemy or in base and base cluster defense in the rear area.

8-119. A perimeter defense is oriented in all directions. Aggressive patrolling and security operations outside the perimeter are prerequisites for a successful perimeter defense. These activities can be undertaken by the unit within the perimeter or by another force, such as the territorial defense forces of a host nation. The unit can organize a perimeter defense to accomplish a specific mission, such as protecting a fire base, or providing immediate self-protection, such as during resupply operations when all-around security is required. The commander establishes a perimeter when the unit must hold critical terrain, such as a strong point, or when it must defend itself in areas where the defense is not tied in with adjacent units. This occurs when the unit is operating behind enemy lines or when it is securing an isolated objective, such as a bridge, mountain pass, or airfield. A unit may also form a perimeter when it has been bypassed and isolated by the enemy and it must defend in place, or it is located in the friendly rear area within the confines of a base or base cluster. (See Figure 8-10.) However, divisions and corps can also organize a perimeter defense when necessary.

8-120. A major characteristic of a perimeter defense is a secure inner area with most of the combat power located on the perimeter. Another characteristic is the ease of access for resupply operations. The commander coordinates direct and indirect fire plans to prevent accidentally engaging neighboring friendly units and noncombatants. Normally, the reserve centrally locates to react to a penetration of the perimeter at any point.

8-121. Perimeters vary in shape depending on the terrain and situation. If the commander determines the most probable direction of enemy attack, he may weight that part of the perimeter to cover that approach. The perimeter shape conforms to the terrain features that best use friendly observation and fields of fire. The commander can increase the effectiveness of the perimeter by tying it into a natural obstacle, such as a river, which allows him to concentrate his combat power in more threatened sectors.



Figure 8-10. Perimeter Defense

Organization of Forces

8-122. The commander may employ all of his forces forward along the perimeter or establish a defense in depth within the perimeter. The commander employs patrols, raids, ambushes, air attacks, and supporting fires to harass and destroy enemy forces before they make contact with the perimeter, thus providing defense in depth with both techniques.



Figure 8-11. All Company Teams on the Perimeter

8-123. In the first technique, he places all of his subordinate units in positions along the perimeter. He divides the perimeter into subordinate unit AOs with boundaries and coordinating points. (See Figure 8-11.) This reduces the possibility of fratricide within the perimeter and maximizes combat power on the perimeter.

8-124. Constructing an outer and inner perimeter creates some depth in the defense in the second technique. Using a brigade assembly area as an example, the commander places two companies in each battalion task force along the outer perimeter and one company in reserve along the inner perimeter. (See Figure 8-12.) This configuration gives depth to the battalion task force's positions and facilitates control. It also gives one company from each battalion task force the mission to support frontline platoons. It enables the company commander to locate any indirect fire systems, such as mortars, near the reserve platoon, enhancing control and security. Alternatively, the commander could elect to assign two battalion task forces to the outer perimeter and a third battalion to an inner perimeter, retaining a larger, more cohesive central reserve. (See Figure 8-13.)



Figure 8-12. Three Battalion TFs on Perimeter, Co/Teams Positioned in Depth



Figure 8-13. Two Battalion TFs on the Perimeter, One in Reserve

8-125. The commander positions his forces within the perimeter to decrease the possibility of an enemy simultaneously suppressing his inner and outer perimeter forces with the same fires regardless of the method used. Friendly forces within the perimeter must be capable of providing mutual support. The commander covers gaps on the outer perimeter between units in open terrain with fires. He should allow no gaps between defensive fighting positions when his unit is in restrictive terrain with restricted fields of fire and observation. This may mean that a unit defends along a narrower frontage than on more open terrain. The commander may also have to employ all of his subordinate units on the line formed by the perimeter. The commander ensures that outer perimeter positions have rearward protection from inner perimeter weapons once he establishes the inner perimeter.

8-126. The commander normally assigns combat vehicles supporting the defense firing positions on the perimeter to cover the most likely mounted avenues of approach. He should select and prepare alternate and supplemental firing positions and routes to and from them. If the perimeter has several

mounted avenues of approach leading to it, the commander may elect to hold his combat vehicles in hide positions until the enemy approaches. Units prepare routes, firing positions, and range cards in advance for all positions. Small-unit leaders must ensure that vehicles do not destroy communication wires when they displace from one position to another.

8-127. The need to hold or protect features—such as bridges, airfields, or LZs—from enemy observation and fires may restrict the positioning of units within a perimeter. These factors, as well as the inability to achieve depth, make a perimeter defense vulnerable to penetration by heavy enemy forces. The commander reduces these vulnerabilities by—

- Developing reconnaissance and surveillance plans that provide early warning.
- Positioning antiarmor weapon systems on armor-restrictive terrain to concentrate fires on armor approaches.
- Providing as much depth as the diameter of the perimeter to allow the proper placement of security elements and the reserve and the designation of secondary sectors of fire for antiarmor weapons.
- Constructing obstacles to fix or block enemy forces, so that friendly units can effectively engaged them.
- Using smoke and deception.

8-128. If isolation from other friendly units drives the commander to form a perimeter, such as during rear operations, CS and CSS elements from other units may seek the perimeter's protection. These elements are given defensive missions based on their capabilities. The commander coordinates and integrates any fire support provided from outside the perimeter into the overall defensive plan. This extra fire support conserves the ammunition of units within the perimeter.

8-129. The commander normally employs any reconnaissance assets, such as a scout platoon, outside the perimeter to provide early warning. He may augment security with squad-size or smaller observation posts that are provided and controlled by units on the perimeter. He positions these security elements to observe avenues of approach. Patrols cover areas that cannot be observed by stationary elements. Any security forces operating outside the perimeter must coordinate their passage of lines into and out of the perimeter with the appropriate perimeter units.

8-130. The reserve may be a designated unit or a provisional force organized from available personnel and equipment. The reserve forms a second line of defense behind the perimeter forces. Ideally, the reserve is mobile to react to enemy action along any part of the perimeter. The commander positions the reserve to block the most dangerous AA and assigns on-order positions on other critical avenues. The commander may task available combat vehicles initially occupying firing positions on the perimeter with the mission of reinforcing the reserve.

Control Measures

8-131. The commander in a perimeter defense designates the trace of the perimeter, battle positions, coordinating points, and lateral and forward

boundaries. He can use EAs, target reference points, final protective fires, and principal direction of fire as fire control measures. The commander designates checkpoints, contact points, passage points, and passage routes for use by local reconnaissance, surveillance, and security elements operating outside the boundary of the perimeter. (See Figure 8-14.)



Figure 8-14. Perimeter Defense Control Measures

Planning a Perimeter Defense

8-132. The defending commander positions his forces and plans fire and movement so he can respond to the widest possible range of enemy actions. He prepares plans, including counterattack plans. He rehearses, evaluates, and revises these plans as needed. The availability of LZs and DZs protected from enemy observation and fire is a major consideration when selecting and organizing the perimeter defense. The commander must emphasize supply economy and protect existing supply stocks since aerial resupply is vulnerable to weather and enemy fires. The commander considers the following fundamentals when planning a perimeter defense.

8-133. **Use of Terrain.** Proper evaluation and organization of the area are essential to maximize the effectiveness of a force conducting perimeter defense. Factors considered are—

- Natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
- Using artificial obstacles to enhance the natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
- Existing roads, railways, and waterways used for military LOCs and civilian commerce.

- Controlling land areas surrounding the perimeter to a range beyond that of enemy mortars and rockets and also controlling water approaches.

8-134. **Security.** Early warnings of pending enemy actions ensure the commander time to react to any threat. Combat outposts, patrols, sensors, target acquisition radars, and aerial surveillance provide early warning. Civilian informants and actions of indigenous personnel near the position are excellent indicators of pending enemy actions. Security measures vary with the enemy threat, forces available, and the other factors of METT-TC; however, all-round security is essential.

8-135. **Mutual Support.** The commander positions his defending forces to ensure mutual employment of defensive resources, such as crew-served weapons, observation, and maneuver elements. Mutual support between defensive elements requires careful planning, positioning, and coordination because of the circular aspects of the perimeter defense. He uses surveillance, obstacles, prearranged indirect fires, and the provision for maneuver elements to exploit or reinforce fires to control any gaps in the perimeter. Defensive plans provide for using all available support, including field artillery systems firing danger close, attack helicopters, and close air support.

8-136. **All-Around Defense.** In defensive planning, the commander has to be prepared to defend against enemy attack from any direction. His plans are sufficiently flexible, and he positions his reserve to permit reaction to any threat. The commander commits maneuver elements and available supporting weapons to detect, engage, and destroy the attacking enemy force. He assigns all personnel within the perimeter positions and sectors of fire.

8-137. **Defense in Depth.** Alternate and supplementary positions, combat outposts, and mutually supporting strong points forward of the perimeter extend the depth. The commander plans fires throughout the defensive area up to the maximum range of available weapons. He may place portable obstacles around critical locations within the perimeter during periods of reduced visibility to disrupt the enemy's plan based on visual reconnaissance and add depth to the defense.

8-138. **Responsiveness.** Attacks against a perimeter may range from long-range sniper, mortar, or artillery and rocket fire to attacks by demolition teams or major forces. The enemy has the advantage of deciding when, where, and with what force he will attack. The commander prepares plans, to include counterattack plans, and rehearses, assesses, and revises them as necessary. The defensive plan contains procedures for timely response by fire support teams and maneuver forces.

8-139. **Maximum Use of Offensive Action.** Since the objective of the perimeter defense is to maintain a secure position, the commander uses offensive actions to engage enemy forces outside the base. On initial occupation of the perimeter, friendly forces take offensive actions to destroy enemy forces in the immediate area. Once the perimeter area is clear, a relatively smaller force can defend the perimeter, thereby releasing other forces for their primary operations. The commander employs patrols, raids, ambushes, aerial attacks, and supporting fires to harass and destroy enemy forces to prevent their regaining the capability to threaten the perimeter. The commander

maintains constant communications with his subordinates within the perimeter and provides them the information necessary to maintain a common operational picture among all units located within the perimeter. He directs them to conduct appropriate actions to remove threats located within their AOs and sectors of fire.

Executing a Perimeter Defense

8-140. Attacks against a perimeter may range from long-range sniper, mortar, or rocket fire; to attacks by suicide demolition squads; to attacks by major enemy ground and air forces. Mortars, artillery, tanks, and antiarmor missile systems from within the perimeter engage the enemy at long ranges. As the enemy comes within small arms range, other weapons on the perimeter engage him. If the assault continues, the force employs its available FPFs. If the enemy penetrates the perimeter, the reserve blocks the penetration or counterattacks to restore the perimeter. After committing the initial reserve, the commander must reconstitute another reserve to meet other threats. This force normally comes from an unengaged unit on another portion of the perimeter. If the commander uses an unengaged force to constitute a new reserve, he must retain sufficient forces to defend the vacated sector, unless he is forced to assume that degree of risk.

8-141. Combat service support elements may provide support from within the perimeter or from another location, depending on the mission and the status of the unit forming the defensive perimeter, type of transport available, weather, and terrain. Units in contested areas without secure ground LOC are often resupplied by air.

REVERSE SLOPE DEFENSE

8-142. The commander organizes a reverse slope defense on the portion of a terrain feature or slope with a topographical crest that masks the main defensive positions from enemy observation and direct fire. All or part of the defending force may employ this technique. It is generally useful at lower tactical levels, such as battalion and below.

8-143. The commander bases a successful reverse slope defense on denying the topographical crest to the enemy. Although the defending unit may not occupy the crest in strength, controlling the crest by fire is essential for success. This defensive situation reduces the effects of massive indirect fire (mortar, artillery, and close-air support) and draws the battle into the small-arms range of infantry weapons. Using the reverse slope defense provides the defending force with an opportunity to gain surprise. Its goal is to make the enemy commit his forces against the forward slope of the defense, causing his forces to attack in an uncoordinated fashion across the exposed topographical crest. Firing from covered and concealed positions throughout the battle area, the defending force maintains a distinct advantage over the exposed enemy forces and canalizes them through unfamiliar terrain into kill zones. (Figure 8-15 shows the terminology associated with the reverse slope defense.)

8-144. The commander chooses to conduct a reverse slope defense when—

- The crest and forward slope are untenable because the enemy enjoys a quantative or qualitative advantage in firepower at that point.

- His weapons cannot depress enough to engage.
- The crest and forward slope offer little or no cover and concealment.
- The forward slope has been lost or has not been seized.
- Units on the flanks can adequately cover the forward slope.
- Variance in the force's tactical pattern is advisable to deceive or surprise the enemy.
- The commander is forced to assume a hasty defense while in contact with or in proximity to the enemy.

8-145. The reverse slope defense may deceive the enemy regarding the true location and organization of the main defensive positions. This defense protects the main defensive positions from preparation fires and causes the enemy to deploy into assault formations prematurely. The forward crest of the main defensive positions limits the enemy's observation. It reduces the effectiveness of enemy indirect fires and close air support and renders his direct fire weapons ineffective. The defending force may bring surprise fires to bear on the enemy as he crests the high ground. Units on the reverse slope have more freedom of movement until the crest is lost.



Figure 8-15. A Hill in Cross-Section

8-146. Using the reverse slope defense has several disadvantages:

- The effective range of direct fire weapons may be limited.
- Once security elements withdraw, the enemy can advance largely unimpeded until he has crested the high ground in front of the main defensive positions.
- The enemy has the advantage of attacking downhill.
- Maintaining observation of the enemy is difficult.
- In some cases the best locations for obstacles can only be covered from positions on the forward slope.

Organization of Forces

8-147. The commander places his overwatching elements forward of the topographic crest and on the flanks of the position in a valley or depression. Another variation available to the commander is to organize a system of reverse slope defenses firing to the oblique defilade, each covering the other. A commander uses an oblique defilade to protect his defending systems from enemy frontal and flanking fires and from fires coming from above. For example, in Figure 8-16, the two units defending on the reverse slope cannot engage half of the hill to their direct front because of line of sight restrictions caused by small forests, but they can cover each other using oblique defilade.



Figure 8-16. Oblique Defilade

8-148. The defending force positions its reconnaissance and security elements where it can observe the forward slope, the terrain forward of it, and other approaches to the defending position. Security elements destroy enemy reconnaissance assets, delay the enemy, disorganize his attack, and deceive him regarding the exact location of the main defense. The commander should position his reconnaissance and surveillance assets in observation posts (OPs) located near or forward of the topographical crest to provide long-range observation of both the enemy's flanks and front. Forces manning these OPs, which can be provided by the commander's reserve, may vary in size from a two-man buddy team to a rifle squad or a multiple combat vehicle section in each position. The commander should employ sufficient forces to provide observation and a security screen for the MBA on ground that should be retained. During darkness and periods of reduced visibility, he should strengthen these detachments in size and numbers to provide security against infiltration or surprise attack. Aggressive night combat patrols and ambushes are an essential part of the security process.

8-149. In order to achieve surprise and limit the enemy's ability to maneuver, the commander organizes the main defensive positions to mass the effects of his concentrated fires on the enemy as he crosses the topographical crest. In a reverse slope defense, the key position denies enemy penetration and supports forward elements by fire. The defending force maintains observation

and fires over the entire forward slope as long as possible to destroy enemy forces, thus preventing the enemy from massing for a final assault. From defensive positions on the reverse slope, the close-in battle builds in intensity. The defending force does not fire its direct fire weapons, which are located throughout the MBA (adjacent slope positions, counterslope positions, or reverse slope positions), until suitable targets appear. At the same time, the force shifts the effects of its indirect fires to those areas forward of the crest and forward military slope.

8-150. When possible other units on complementary terrain should support units in reverse slope positions. This is especially desirable when those supporting units can observe and place fires on the crest and forward slope. In a defense on a counterslope (reverse forward slope), fires must cover the area immediately in front of the reverse slope positions to the topographical crest. The commander organizes defensive positions to permit fires on enemy approaches around and over the crest and on the forward slopes of adjacent terrain features if applicable. The key factors that affect the organization of these areas are mutually supporting covered and concealed positions, numerous existing and reinforcing obstacles, the ability to bring devastating fires from all available weapons onto the crest, and a counterattack force. Depending on the terrain, the most desirable location for the reserve may be on the counterslope or the reverse military crest of the counterslope.

Control Measures

8-151. Defensive control measures introduced in previous chapters apply equally to the reverse slope defense. The commander places his EAs and obstacles on the reverse slope. The topographical crest normally marks the far edge of the EA. He must dominate it by fires to prevent the enemy from successfully engaging the defending force.

Executing a Reverse Slope Defense

8-152. When executing a reverse slope defense, the commander places special emphasis on—

- A fire support plan to prevent the enemy's occupation and use of the topographical crest.
- The proper organization of the forward slope to provide observation across the entire front and security to the main battle positions.
- A counterattack plan that specifies measures necessary to clear the creast or regain it from the enemy.
- Fire support to destroy, disrupt, and attrit enemy forces on the forward slope.

8-153. The commander normally places his final protective fires along the topographical crest and employs them as the enemy reaches the first row of defiladed obstacles. He uses his reserve to counterattack and expel the enemy from the topographical crest if massed indirect fires do not defeat the attack. As always, in a reverse slope defense, the commander can employ his designated reserve to conduct rear area security operations, prepare withdrawal routes, provide flank security, and conduct other actions with the understanding that this increases the time required to reassemble the reserve and prepare it to support the defense.

8-154. The reverse slope defense pursues offensive opportunities through surprise and deceptive actions. It is uniquely suited to infantry forces in mountainous terrain. When conducting a reverse slope defense, surprise results from defending in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared. Once this defense is employed successfully to halt an enemy attack, it may have limited further value because the effect of surprise will be difficult to attain. (For additional information on the use of a reverse slope defense, see FM 3-21.30 and other brigade- and lower-echelon field manuals.)

TRANSITION

8-155. If a defense is successful, the commander anticipates and seeks the opportunity to transition to the offense. If the defense is unsuccessful, the commander needs to transition from a defensive posture into retrograde operations. Transition from one type of operation to another requires mental as well as physical agility on the part of the commanders, staffs, and units involved as well as accurate situational assessment capabilities.

8-156. Deliberate contingency planning for either event greatly assists the transition process and allows the commander to set the conditions necessary for a successful transition. Such planning addresses the need to control the tempo of operations, maintain contact with both enemy and friendly forces, and keep the enemy off balance. It establishes the procedures and priorities by which a unit reconstitutes itself for the next mission. In accordance with the factors of METT-TC, it establishes the required organization of forces and control measures necessary for success.

8-157. Such contingency planning decreases the time needed to adjust the tempo of combat operations when a unit transitions from defensive to offensive operations. It does this by allowing subordinate units to simultaneously plan and prepare for subsequent operations. Preparations typically include resupplying unit basic loads and repositioning or reallocating supporting systems. (Chapters 3-7 address the planning, preparation, and execution of all types of offensive operations.)

8-158. Contingency planning also reduces the amount of time and confusion inherent when a unit is unsuccessful in its defensive efforts and must transition to retrograde operations. It does this through designating units to conduct denial operations and early evacuation of casualties and inoperative equipment. The intent of retrograde operations is to preserve the force as a combat-capable formation until the commander can establish those conditions necessary for a successful defense. (Chapter 11 discusses retrograde operations.)

TRANSITION TO THE OFFENSE

8-159. A defending commander transitioning to the offense anticipates when and where the enemy force will reach its culminating point or require an operational pause before it can continue. At those moments, the combat power ratios most favor the defending force. The enemy force will do everything it can to keep the friendly force from knowing when it is becoming overextended. Indicators that the enemy is approaching this point include—

- Enemy forces begin to transition to the defense—this defense may be by forces in or out of contact with friendly forces.
- Enemy forces suffer heavy losses.
- Enemy forces start to deploy before encountering friendly forces.
- Enemy forces are defeated in most engagements.
- Enemy forces are committed piecemeal in continued enemy attacks.
- Enemy reserve forces are identified among attacking forces.
- Examination of captured or killed enemy soldiers and captured or destroyed enemy equipment and supplies shows that the enemy force is unable to adequately sustain itself.
- A noticeable reduction in the tempo of enemy operations.
- Local counterattacks meet with unexpected success.

8-160. The commander must be careful that he is not the target of enemy information operations designed to tempt him to abandon the advantages of fighting from prepared defensive positions. He ensures that his force has the assets necessary to accomplish its assigned offensive mission.

8-161. In a mobile defense, transitioning to the offense generally follows the striking force's attack. In an area defense, the commander designates a portion of his force to conduct the attack, selecting units based on his concept for achieving his mission. However, he allocates available reserves to this effort.

8-162. As the commander transitions his force from the defense to the offense, he takes the following actions—

- Establishes an LD for his offensive operation. This may require him to conduct local, small-scale attacks to secure terrain necessary for the conduct of the offensive operation or destroy enemy forces that could threaten the larger offensive operation.
- Maintains contact with the enemy, using combinations of his available ISR assets to develop the information required to plan future operations and avoid being deceived by enemy information operations.
- Redeploys his combined arms team based on the probable future employment of each element of that team. For example, fire support assets would tend to move forward so that additional enemy forces and terrain would be encompassed within their range fans.
- Maintains or regains contact with adjacent units in a contiguous AO and ensures that his units remain capable of mutual support in a noncontiguous AO.
- Transitions the engineer effort by shifting the emphasis from countermobility and survivability to mobility.
- Provides his intent for transitioning from the defense to the offense to his commanders and soldiers.

8-163. The commander redeploys his air defense assets to provide coverage of combat forces and other assets necessary to conduct offensive operations. This may require him to change or modify his air defense priorities. For example, his top priority in the defense may have been his long-range sensors and weapons. This may shift to providing priority air defense coverage of his ground combat arms units and combat engineers.

8-164. The commander conducts any required reorganization and resupply concurrently with the above activities. This requires a transition in the logistics effort, with a shift in emphasis from ensuring a capability to defend from a chosen location to an emphasis on ensuring the force's ability to advance and maneuver. For example, in the defense, the sustainment effort may have focused on the forward stockage of Class IV and V items and the rapid evacuation of combat-damaged systems. In the offense, the sustainment effort may need to focus on providing POL and forward repair of maintenance and combat losses. Transition is often a time in which deferred equipment maintenance can be performed. Additional assets may also be available on a temporary basis for casualty evacuation and medical treatment because of a reduction in the tempo of operations.

8-165. The commander should not wait too long to transition from the defense to the offense as the enemy force approaches its culminating point. Enemy forces will be dispersed, extended in depth, and weakened in condition. At that time, any enemy defensive preparations will be hasty and enemy forces will not be adequately disposed for defense. The commander wants the enemy in this posture when he transitions to the offense. He does not want to give the enemy force time to prepare for the defense. Additionally, the psychological shock on enemy soldiers will be greater if they suddenly find themselves desperately defending on new and often unfavorable terms while the commander's own soldiers will enjoy a psychological boost by going on the offense.

8-166. A commander can use two basic techniques when he transitions to the offense. The first, and generally preferred, technique is to attack using forces not previously committed to the defense. This is because defending MBA units may still be decisively engaged. These attacking forces may come from his reserve or consist of reinforcements. Since these forces have not recently been actively involved in combat, they are more likely to—

- Be at authorized strength levels.
- Enjoy a higher combat system operationally ready rate.
- Have leaders and soldiers who are more likely to be rested and thus capable of prolonged, continuous operations.
- Have a complete basic load of supplies.
- Have the time and energy to plan and prepare for offensive action.
- Be able to maneuver out of physical contact with the enemy.

8-167. A drawback to the use of this technique is the requirement to conduct a forward passage of lines. Additionally, enemy ISR systems are likely to detect the arrival of significant reinforcements.

8-168. Another consideration of using units not in contact occurs when they are operating in noncontiguous AOs. The commander rapidly masses the effects of overwhelming combat power in his decisive operation. This might require him to adopt economy of force measures in some AOs while temporarily abandoning others in order to generate sufficient combat power. (See Chapters 3 and 5 for offensive planning, preparing, and executing considerations.)

8-169. The second technique is to conduct offensive actions using the currently defending forces. This technique generally has the advantage of being more rapidly executed and thus more likely to catch the enemy by surprise.

Speed of execution in this technique results from not having to conduct an approach or tactical road march from reserve AAs or, in the case of reinforcements, move from other AOs and reception, staging, organization, and integration (RSO&I) locations. Speed also results from not having to conduct a forward passage of lines and perform liaison necessary to establish a common operational picture that includes knowledge of the enemy force's patterns of operation. The primary disadvantage of this technique is that the attacking force generally lacks stamina and must be quickly replaced if friendly offensive operations are not to culminate quickly.

8-170. If units in contact participate in the attack, the commander must retain sufficient forces in contact to fix the enemy. He concentrates the attack by reinforcing select subordinate units so they can execute the attack and, if necessary, maintain the existing defense. He can also adjust the defensive boundaries of subordinate units so entire units can withdraw and concentrate for the attack.

TRANSITION TO THE RETROGRADE

8-171. A defending commander transitions from the defense to the retrograde for those reasons outlined in paragraph 11-1. A retrograde usually involves a combination of delay, withdrawal, and retirement operations. These operations may occur simultaneously or sequentially. As in other operations, the commander's concept of operations and intent drive planning for retrograde operations. Each form of retrograde operation has its unique planning considerations, but considerations common to all retrograde operations are risk, the need for synchronization, and rear operations. The planning, preparing, and executing considerations associated with retrograde operations are found in Chapter 11, but a number of key considerations receive special emphasis during the transition from the defense to the retrograde.

8-172. To accomplish the above purposes, the transition to retrograde operations must be accompanied by efforts designed to—

- Reduce the enemy's strength and combat power.
- Provide friendly reinforcements.
- Concentrate forces elsewhere for the attack.
- Prepare stronger defenses elsewhere within the AO.
- Lure or force part or all of the enemy force into areas where it can be counterattacked.

8-173. The complexity and fluidity of retrograde operations and the absolute need to synchronize the entire operation dictates the need for detailed, centralized planning and decentralized execution. Planning for retrograde operations begins with the preparation of plans for the follow-on mission and is driven by the commander's concept of operation and his intent.

8-174. The nature of retrograde operations involves an inherent risk of degrading the defending force's morale. Therefore, maintaining offensive spirit is essential among subordinate leaders and soldiers. Rearward movements may be seen as a defeat, or as an action that could result in isolation of the force. The commander must be well forward and visible. He must ensure that the leaders and soldiers understand the purpose and intent of the operation

and their role in accomplishing the mission. Thorough planning, effective control, and aggressive leadership will minimize risk during the retrograde or enhance the probability of success.

8-175. The commander's ISR requirements dramatically increase as his forces begin their movement to other locations and the combat capabilities of units in contact are subsequently reduced. It is imperative that an integrated ISR collection plan be in place to identify and locate enemy attempts to pursue, outflank, and isolate the defending force as it transitions to the retrograde.

8-176. As the commander transitions to the retrograde, he makes every effort to conserve his combat power. He considers the need to—

- Balance the risk of conserving combat power while remaining disposed to the intent of the defensive mission.
- Disengage and withdraw units with the least tactical mobility and non-essential elements prior to the retrograde of the main body.
- Use mobile forces to cover the retrograde of less mobile forces.
- Use the minimum essential combat power necessary to provide security for the retrograde of the main body.

Chapter 9

The Area Defense

Regardless of the considerations which dictated the adoption of a defensive attitude, the tactics of defensive combat are essentially to develop the maximum firepower against an advancing enemy, to reduce our own losses by a better knowledge and utilization of the terrain, and thereby to stop the enemy's advance or throw him back by counterattack.

FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations*, May 1941, Para 652

The *area defense* is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (FM 3-0). An area defense capitalizes on the strength inherent in closely integrated defensive organization on the ground. The commander may assign corps, divisions, and separate brigades the task of conducting an area defense as part of their mission. Subordinate echelons defend within their assigned areas of operations (AOs) as part of the larger-echelon's operation.

9-1. A commander should conduct an area defense when the following conditions occur:

- When directed to defend or retain specified terrain.
- When he cannot resource a striking force.
- The forces available have less mobility than the enemy.
- The terrain affords natural lines of resistance and limits the enemy to a few well-defined avenues of approach, thereby restricting the enemy's maneuver.
- There is enough time to organize the position.
- Terrain constraints and lack of friendly air superiority limit the striking force's options in a mobile defense to a few probable employment options.

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9-2. The commander conducting an area defense combines static and mobile actions to accomplish his assigned mission. Static actions usually consist of fires from prepared positions. Mobile actions include using the fires provided by units in prepared positions as a base for counterattacks and repositioning units between defensive positions. The commander can use his reserve and uncommitted forces to conduct counterattacks and spoiling attacks to desynchronize the enemy or prevent him from massing.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

9-3. The commander organizes his force to accomplish reconnaissance, security, main battle area (MBA), reserve, and sustaining operations. He has the option of defending forward or defending in depth. When the commander defends forward within an AO, he organizes his force so that he commits most of his combat power early in the defensive effort. To accomplish this he may deploy forces forward or plan counterattacks well forward in the MBA or even beyond of the MBA. If the commander has the option of conducting a defense in depth, he uses his security forces and forward MBA element to identify, define, and control the depth of the enemy's main effort while holding off secondary thrusts. This allows him to conserve his combat power, strengthen his reserve, and better resource the counterattack.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

9-4. The commander directs his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to determine the locations, strengths, and probable intentions of the attacking enemy force before and throughout the defensive operation. The commander places a high priority on early identification of the enemy's main effort. He may need to complement surveillance with combat actions that test enemy intentions. Fighting for information can have two benefits—it can force the enemy to reveal his intentions and disrupt his preparations.

9-5. In the defense, ISR operations overlap the unit's planning and preparing phases. Leaders performing reconnaissance tasks must understand that they often deploy before the commander fully develops his plan and they must be responsive to changes in orientation and mission. The commander ensures that his staff fully plans, prepares, and executes reconnaissance missions.

SECURITY OPERATIONS

9-6. The commander balances the need to create a strong security force to shape the battle with the resulting diversion of combat power from his main body's decisive operation. The commander usually allocates security forces to provide early warning and protect those forces, systems, and locations necessary to conduct his decisive operation from unexpected enemy contact. On a battlefield where forces are contiguous with one another, the location of security forces is usually in front of the main defensive positions. On a noncontiguous battlefield they are located on avenues of approach between the protected force and known or suspected enemy locations.

9-7. Battalion and brigade security forces normally conduct screen or guard missions. At division level and above, the commander may use a covering

force. A division commander may elect to have his security force conduct a guard mission if a corps covering force exists. Because an area security mission usually ties in closely with flank units, flank security forces are needed if there are gaps on the unit's flanks, which occurs during noncontiguous operations, or if gaps develop during the operation. A flank screen or guard is critical if an enemy avenue of approach into the defended area from the flanks could be uncovered during the defense. A commander does not normally assign a force the mission of conducting rear guard or rear cover during contiguous operations since it is unlikely that his force's rear area will become uncovered during the defense. He resources rear area security forces, to include a tactical combat force (TCF) or accepts the risk to his sustainment effort of not performing this function.

MAIN BATTLE AREA OPERATIONS

9-8. The commander builds his decisive operation around identified decisive points, such as key terrain or high-payoff targets. The commander's decisive operation in an area defense focuses on retaining terrain by using fires from mutually supporting, prepared positions supplemented by one or more counterattacks and the repositioning of forces from one location to another. The commander's decisive operation normally involves close combat since an area defense emphasizes terrain retention.

9-9. The commander normally positions his main body—the bulk of his combat power—within the MBA where he wants to conduct his decisive operation. The commander organizes his main body to halt, defeat, and ultimately destroy attacking enemy forces. The majority of the main body deploys into prepared defensive positions within the MBA. However, mobile elements of the force are ready to deploy where and when needed.

RESERVE OPERATIONS

9-10. The commander's defensive plan should be able to succeed without using his reserve. However, the most likely mission of the reserve is to conduct a counterattack in accordance with previously prepared plans. A lower-echelon commander uses his reserve primarily to conduct local counterattacks to restore his defense's integrity or to exploit an opportunity. A senior commander uses his reserve to seize the initiative from the enemy when the opportunity presents itself. For example, a corps commander may target the effects of his reserve against enemy fire support and follow-on forces to achieve that effect.

9-11. The reserve is not a committed force. The commander can assign it a wide variety of tasks on its commitment, and it must be prepared to perform other missions. In certain situations, it may become necessary to commit the reserve to restore the integrity of the defense by blocking an enemy penetration or reinforcing fires into an engagement area (EA). These secondary tasks include—

- Reinforcing the defense of committed forces.
- Blocking or containing enemy forces that penetrate friendly defensive positions.
- Relieving depleted units and providing for continuous operations.

- Reacting to threats directed against the friendly force's sustainment effort. This includes acting as the echelon TCF when a separate TCF cannot be resourced.
- Extending the flanks of a defending unit to prevent its envelopment.
- Covering a retrograde movement.

9-12. Defending commanders are usually hard-pressed to establish and resource reserve forces because they are normally facing an enemy with superior combat power. Nevertheless, commanders at each echelon down to the battalion task force retain reserves as a means of ensuring mission accomplishment and for exploiting opportunities through offensive action. (Company commanders may retain a reserve based on the factors of METT-TC.) Commanders do not hold artillery and other fire support systems in reserve. (Such systems committed to rear area security operations are not in reserve.) Each echelon's reserve must have the mobility and striking power required to quickly isolate and defeat breakthroughs and flanking attempts. It must be able to seize and exploit fleeting opportunities in a powerful manner to throw the enemy's overall offensive off balance. The commander must resource his reserve so it can repeatedly attack, regroup, move, and attack again.

9-13. The size of the reserve is relative to the commander's uncertainty about the enemy's capabilities and intentions. The more uncertainty that exists, the larger the reserve. The reverse is also true. If the commander knows the size, dispositions, capabilities, and intentions of the enemy, he requires only a comparatively small reserve.

9-14. In some situations, the commander may not be able to resource a separate reserve. Therefore, he may constitute all or a portion of his reserve from his security force after it conducts a rearward passage of lines through MBA units. If the security force is the reserve for an area defense, the commander must withdraw it so it has sufficient time to occupy its reserve position, perform the necessary degree of reconstitution, and prepare plans for its reserve role. However, this is not the preferred option. Before battle handover, the senior commander must state the acceptable risk to the security force or the disengagement criteria in quantifiable terms, such as friendly strength levels, time, or event. In this case, after completing the rearward passage, the security force moves to an assembly area to prepare for its subsequent operations. This area should be free from enemy interference and clear of MBA units, main supply routes (MSRs), and the movements of other portions of the reserve.

9-15. The operations of the reserve usually become the echelon's decisive operation once committed. However, the commander can commit his reserve in a shaping operation to allow his ongoing decisive operation to achieve success. It no longer constitutes the force reserve on its commitment in either case, so the commander should designate another uncommitted force as his reserve. If he does not have that flexibility, he must hold his reserve for commitment at the decisive moment and accept risk.

CONTROL MEASURES

9-16. The commander organizes an area defense by designating his MBA and assigning AOs, battle positions (BPs), or both to subordinate units located within the MBA. He creates a security area in front of the MBA. When possible, the boundaries of the subordinate elements of the security force coincide with those of the major defending units in the MBA. The security area should be deep enough to make the enemy displace as much of his supporting forces as possible, such as cannon artillery, sensors, and air defense artillery gun systems, before carrying his attack into the MBA. The commander also designates his rear area. (See Chapter 12 for a discussion of security operations.)

9-17. Area defense maneuver graphic control measures also include EAs, the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), battle handover line (BHL), strong points, target reference points (TRPs), named areas of interest (NAIs), targeted areas of interest (TAIs), decision points, and various other fire control and countermobility control measures. (Figure 9-1 depicts the most common control measures. Chapters 2 and 8, and Appendix B define these defensive control measures.)



Figure 9-1. Typical Control Measures for an Area Defense

9-18. If the commander assigns a BP and an AO to a subordinate, the subordinate commander has specific guidance on the initial positioning of his forces. The commander ensures the synchronization of each of his subordinate units' defensive plans, and that his control measures, such as contact points and phase lines, are sufficient to ensure the continued control of his subordinates. He is responsible for fire and movement planning between the positions of his

subordinate units. If subordinate unit commanders prepare their defensive plans in isolation, one or more assailable flanks between subordinate units could easily develop. (The organization of forces, control measures, planning, preparation, and execution of a passage of lines—a tactical enabling operation—are the subject of Chapter 16.)

PLANNING AN AREA DEFENSE

9-19. The key to a successful area defense is the integration and synchronization of all available assets. The commander achieves this when he can employ the effects of his combined arms team at the decisive time and place. (The general defensive planning considerations addressed in Chapter 8 apply to the area defense.) The commander assigns missions, allocates forces, and apportions combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) resources within the battlefield organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. He decides where to concentrate his effort and where to take risks. The commander can rapidly redirect attack aviation and artillery systems initially allocated to shaping operations to support decisive operations at the appropriate time. (See Figure 9-2 for a graphical depiction of the organization of forces for an area defense in a contiguous AO. See Figure 9-3 for a graphical depiction of the organization of forces for an area defense in a noncontiguous AO.)



Figure 9-2. Organization of Forces for an Area Defense—Contiguous Area of Operations

9-20. The commander describes his concept of operation in sufficient detail so that his staff and subordinate commanders understand precisely how he intends to fight the battle. He ensures the coordination of maneuver and supporting actions among his subordinates. (FM 5-0 discusses the military decision making process and troop leading procedures.)



Figure 9-3. Organization of Forces for an Area Defense—Noncontiguous Area of Operations

9-21. The commander's keys to a successful area defense are—

- Capability to concentrate effects.
- Depth of the defensive area.
- Security.
- Ability to take full advantage of the terrain, such as intervisibility lines.
- Flexibility of defensive operations.
- Timely resumption of offensive actions.

The crux of the commander's defensive challenge is to gain time to ensure a synchronized, effective defense. The commander organizes his defensive effort based on an analysis of the factors of METT-TC and the higher commander's concept. He decides where to concentrate his efforts and how to economize his forces. He forces the enemy forces to enter his EAs. To succeed in its area defense mission, the unit must also counteract the enemy's initiative. The commander should take advantage of available offensive opportunities that do not risk the integrity of his defense, such as a spoiling attack or counterattack.

9-22. In planning an area defense, the commander may choose between two forms of defensive maneuver. He can organize either a defense in depth or a forward defense. A higher commander may dictate the form of maneuver or impose restrictions that eliminate a subordinate commander's form of maneuver. These restrictions can include time, security concerns, and directed retention of specific terrain. These two deployment choices are not totally exclusionary. Part of a commander's forces can conduct a forward defense while the other part conducts a defense in depth.

9-23. In determining the form of maneuver, the commander decides where the defensible terrain is located within his assigned AO based on its terrain characteristics and his estimate of the enemy's chosen course of action (COA). Those terrain characteristics include terrain relief patterns, avenues of approach into and within the AO, the location of any key or decisive terrain, existing obstacles and choke points, to include rivers and fording sites. The other factors of METT-TC also influence the commander's decision.

POSITION SELECTION

9-24. Attempting to defend everything defends nothing. Therefore, the commander carefully designs his defense plan to ensure his defending force can halt the enemy attack and develop an opportunity to seize the initiative and undertake offensive operations. The cohesion of the defending force has a significant impact on the overall effectiveness of the defense. The commander must be prepared to adjust the defensive dispositions to meet changes in the enemy's dispositions to maintain that cohesion if the defense is to remain viable.

9-25. The area defense concept requires that defensive positions accomplish their mission independently or in combination by defeating the enemy by fire, absorbing the strength of the attack within the position, or destroying the enemy with a local counterattack. The commander combines the advantages of fighting from prepared positions, obstacles, planned fires, and local counterattacks to isolate and overwhelm selected enemy formations. He must be prepared to rapidly shift the nature and location of his main effort throughout his AO. The commander may have to reposition defending units within their defensive positions or reposition between terrain features as he masses overwhelming effects against the attacking enemy. The defensive plan should designate axes of advance and routes for the commitment or movement of reserves, or the forward or rearward passage of one unit through another. It should identify air axes for aerial maneuver by attack helicopters, air assault units, or fixed-wing aircraft. This capability to reposition is dependent on the defending force having superior tactical mobility. Without tactical mobility, defending forces stay in their prepared positions and accept the possibility of becoming decisively engaged.

9-26. The commander assigning the defensive mission defines the area to defend. A commander defending on a broad front is forced to accept gaps and conduct noncontiguous operations. His forward line of own troops (FLOT) will be discontinuous. Defending shallow areas of operations reduces flexibility and requires the commander to fight well forward. Narrow frontages and deep areas of operations increase the elasticity of an area defense by increasing the commander's maneuver options.

9-27. The ideal area defense is where effective mutual support exists throughout the width and depth of the defender's tactical positions. The commander organizes and occupies these positions based on their natural defensive strength; their retention ensures the integrity of his defense whether he employs a defense in an AO, defends by BP, or employs a combination of both. He maintains tactical integrity within each defensive area. A unit conducting an area defense normally addresses the security requirements of each flank

by assigning responsibility to a subordinate element or organizing a security force to specifically execute that mission.

Defense in Depth

9-28. A defense in depth is normally the commander's preferred option. Forces defending in depth absorb the momentum of the enemy's attack by forcing him to attack repeatedly through mutually supporting positions in depth. Depth gives the commander's fire support assets time to generate devastating effects and affords him multiple opportunities to concentrate the effects of overwhelming combat power against the attacking enemy. This also provides more reaction time for the defending force to counter the attack. The commander gathers more information about the attacking enemy's intentions before the enemy commits to a COA. This reduces the risk of the enemy force quickly penetrating the main line of defense.

9-29. The commander also employs a defense in depth when the enemy has the capability to employ large quantities of precision-guided munitions or weapons of mass destruction. Defense in depth results in friendly units and facilities being dispersed throughout the defensive AO. The commander takes area damage-control measures to reduce the effects of weapons of mass destruction on the friendly force and denies the enemy lucrative targets. The degree of dispersal adopted by defending forces is both a function of the enemy's capabilities and the friendly forces' capability to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at decisive points.

9-30. The commander positions his units in successive layers of battle positions along likely enemy avenues of approach when he conducts a defense in depth. (See Figure 9-4, page 9-10.) The commander usually decides to conduct a defense in depth when—

- The mission is not restrictive and allows the commander to fight throughout the depth of the battlefield.
- The terrain does not favor a defense well forward, and there is better defensible terrain deeper within the AO.
- The AO is deep compared to its width, and there is significant depth available.
- The cover and concealment on or near the FEBA is limited.
- The enemy has several times the combat power of the defender.

9-31. Divisions and corps employing a defense in depth can conduct an area defense on a wider frontage than they can if they adopt a forward defense because a forward defense has no time or space to reposition forces. A defense in depth allows the commander to use his security and forward MBA forces to identify the enemy's decisive operation and control the depth of the enemy's penetration into the MBA. By their defensive actions, they provide the commander with time to react to enemy actions and allow him to take offensive steps that eliminate enemy options, such as conducting a counterattack into the flank of an enemy force.



Figure 9-4. Division Conducting a Defense in Depth with Subordinate Brigades Deployed in Noncontiguous Areas of Operations with Enemy Avenues of Approach Depicted

Forward Defense

9-32. The commander conducts his decisive operation from forward defensive positions near the FEBA in a forward defense. (See Figure 9-5.) He concentrates a significant portion of his available combat power into EAs along the FEBA. His intent is to prevent significant enemy penetration into the defensive area. The commander conducting a forward defense fights to retain these positions along the FEBA and violently counterattacks any enemy penetration. However, if the enemy penetrates the main defensive positions, the defender's lack of depth may allow the enemy to rapidly exploit success.

9-33. In general, the commander uses a forward defense when a higher commander directs him to retain forward terrain for political, military, economic, and other reasons. Alternatively, a commander may choose to conduct a forward defense when the terrain in that part of his AO—including natural obstacles—favors the defending force because—

- The best defensive positions are located along the FEBA.
- Strong natural obstacles are located near the FEBA.
- Natural EAs occur near the FEBA.
- Cover and concealment in the rear portion of the AO are limited.

POSITIONING THE RESERVE

9-34. Whatever the commander's choice—forward or in depth—once the enemy commits his forces, the defending commander has the ability to seize the initiative by counterattacking over familiar ground to destroy a halted,

disorganized enemy while protected by overwatching fires from friendly positions. Whenever possible, the commander should direct these counterattacks against the enemy's rear or flanks. The commander's reserve is a key component of the counterattack.



Figure 9-5. Brigade Conducting a Forward Defense in a Contiguous Area of Operations

9-35. When deciding where to place his reserve, the commander decides whether to orient his reserve on its most likely mission or its most important mission. He expends significant effort during the planning process to ensure he can effectively use his reserve when needed. He may locate his reserve within the AO where it can employ the road network to rapidly displace throughout the AO in response to a number of opportunities or contingencies. The commander must consider terrain, MSRs of forward units, enemy avenues of approach, and probable enemy penetrations when determining the exact location for his reserve. He may choose to initially position his reserve in a forward location to deceive the enemy and obscure subordinate unit boundaries, especially those of dissimilar units such as armor and light infantry.

9-36. In restrictive terrain that lacks routes for movement, the commander can task organize his reserve into small elements and position them where they can react quickly to local combat developments. This dispersion improves force protection but reduces the ability of the reserve to mass fires. Covered lateral and forward high-speed deployment routes should be available. The reserve must have movement priority along those routes. He must ensure the maintenance of communication between these dispersed elements. This may require establishing retransmission nodes for combat net radios. In open terrain, the commander maintains a centrally located reserve

positioned somewhat farther from the FLOT. He considers the enemy's potential to employ weapons of mass destruction and conduct air interdiction when deciding where to position his reserve.

9-37. Whenever possible, the commander positions his reserve beyond the enemy's direct fire range. This is easier to achieve at higher echelons than at lower echelons. The reserve takes defensive measures to prevent being acquired and attacked by enemy indirect fire systems. These include camouflage, local security, and control of electronic emissions.

9-38. The commander also plans how to reconstitute his reserve once he commits his original reserve. Forces most easily designated are subordinate unit reserves. If his higher headquarters has not committed its reserve, he has more flexibility and can take greater risk in employing his reserve.

SPOILING ATTACKS AND COUNTERATTACKS

9-39. A spoiling attack preempts or seriously impairs the enemy's ability to launch an attack, while a counterattack prevents the enemy from exploiting his successes. The forces conducting either form of attack must be large and strong enough to develop the situation, protect themselves, and force the enemy to react, placing his plan at risk.

9-40. The commander considers the enemy situation and estimates the time and distance factors of any follow-on enemy forces in planning either a spoiling attack or a counterattack by his reserve and other forces. Then he determines which of his units will attack, where they will be after the attack, and what interdiction is necessary to isolate the targeted enemy element. (See Figure 9-6.) His counterattacking forces plan to avoid enemy strength when possible. The most effective attacks seize strong positions that permit the counterattacking force to deliver fire on an exposed enemy unit's flanks and rear. If it is tasked to stay and defend against enemy follow-on forces, the counterattacking force must establish a viable defensive position before any following enemy units can make contact.

9-41. Counterattack plans include assumptions regarding the size and shape of the anticipated penetration or enemy formation; the strength and composition of the enemy force; and the status of the reserve and forces in the MBA. Other factors that affect the counterattack include the capability to contain the enemy, shaping operations to support the attack, and the strength and responsiveness of the reserve at the time of the counterattack.

9-42. The commander's staff prepares counterattack plans and then allocates subordinate headquarters sufficient time to make their plans. The control measures for a counterattack are the same ones discussed in Chapter 5 for the attack. If possible, the commander distributes his counterattack plans along with the basic defense plan. Reserve unit commanders conduct detailed counterattack planning that includes conducting reconnaissance, selecting multiple routes, determining time and space factors, rehearsing, coordinating with appropriate elements of the forward defending force, and fire planning. The commander adjusts his counterattack plans as necessary based on the lessons learned during rehearsals.

9-43. Enemy movement into an NAI helps the commander determine the enemy's scheme of maneuver and possible objectives. He uses decision points and NAIs throughout his AO to trigger his counterattack. The commander identifies TAIs for attack to support his operations.



Figure 9-6. Division Counterattack

PREPARING AN AREA DEFENSE

9-44. Preparations focus on planning those additional ISR operations required to answer the commander's critical information requirements, refining the plan, increasing coordination and synchronization, and conducting shaping actions within the force's capability and operations security guidelines. If the commander decides that he must conduct a deliberate defense but knows that the enemy will attack before he is prepared, he may have to commit substantial forces to security operations or conduct a spoiling attack. This buys time and space to prepare for a deliberate defense.

9-45. A unit normally transitions to the defense after it completes the deployment process of force projection, completes offensive operations, or is in an assembly area. The commander issues a warning order stating the mission and identifying any special considerations. His staff conducts detailed planning while the rest of the unit completes its current mission. The staff coordinates for the pre-positioning of ammunition and barrier material in a secure area near the unit's defensive positions before starting the operation.

9-46. Before occupying any position, leaders at all echelons conduct some type of reconnaissance. This reconnaissance effort is as detailed as the factors of METT-TC permit. It may consist of a simple map reconnaissance or a more detailed leaders' reconnaissance and initial layout of the new position.

9-47. The defending unit occupies its defensive positions as soon as practical after receiving the mission. It conducts reconnaissance of the defensive area and establishes a forward security area before occupying the positions The unit may pre-position supplies such as ammunition and barrier materiel once it establishes security. The unit can accomplish many defensive tasks simultaneously; the factors of METT-TC are the deciding consideration in establishing priorities of work. Those priorities may be—

- Establishing local security and deploying a security force.
- Identifying EAs where the commander wants to engage and destroy the enemy.
- Planning fire control measures, such as TRPs, trigger lines, and final protective fires to support the EAs.
- Positioning key weapon systems to engage into the EAs and TRPs and develop range cards and sector sketches.
- Positioning observers who can see both targets and trigger lines.
- Siting obstacle groups to support weapon systems.
- Designating and clearing fields of fire.
- Preparing primary fighting positions based on the anticipated fighting conditions, such as the time of day and weather conditions.
- Emplacing obstacles and surveying indirect fire targets to support these obstacles.
- Providing concealment and camouflage for fighting and survivability positions as they are constructed.
- Positioning any available critical friendly zones over friendly positions by establishing sensor coverage and quickfire links between the sensor and shooter.
- Installing night and limited-visibility aids, such as thermal hot spots and chemical lights on TRPs during daylight.
- Updating range cards and sector sketches as required.
- Preparing alternate fighting positions.
- Designating and preparing supplementary positions.
- Designating hide positions and rehearsing movements to and from fighting positions. (Units may place their combat and tactical vehicles in hide positions at any time while preparing the defensive position.)
- Positioning the reserve.
- Establishing contact points with any adjacent units so that the defensive efforts of both units can be tied together.
- Emplacing wire for communications.
- Improving mobility on counterattack routes.
- Prestocking ammunition in revetments or bunkers where it can survive the enemy's preparatory fires.
- Rehearsing movements under daylight and limited-visibility conditions.
- Continuing to improve the defense.

9-48. Survivability positions enhance the strength of a defensive position by providing soldiers and weapon systems with some degree of cover from enemy

fires. Units initiate construction of survivability positions in accordance with their priority of work and continue to build and improve them until the last possible moment. The overhead cover provided varies with the location of the sheltered troops and enemy capabilities. As time and resources allow, the defending unit improves communication routes throughout its defensive positions to ease movement of supplies and forces, particularly the reserve. It quickly establishes wire communications among its various subordinate elements to reduce its electromagnetic signature.

9-49. The defending unit rehearses how to move from its hide positions to its primary positions and how it will occupy alternate and supplementary positions to continue to engage the enemy if he progresses into the unit's defensive positions. These rehearsals establish the time necessary to conduct these movements under different environmental conditions. It modifies existing plans based on the results of rehearsals and changes in the factors of METT-TC. The commander takes steps to ensure that the routes taken during these rehearsals do not show obvious signs of heavy use. These steps can include the conduct of only dismounted rehearsals, only moving one vehicle per platoon, and taking steps to eliminate signs of movement such as sweeping snow back over the tracks made during the rehearsal.

9-50. The commander ensures close coordination among his subordinates. During the preparation phase, he can take his subordinate commanders to a vantage point in the MBA to rehearse the battle and plan coordination among their units if such a site is available. This helps the commander in transmitting his intent and in establishing common control measures for subordinate units.

9-51. The location, composition, and movement of the reserve are essential elements of friendly information. Enemy reconnaissance efforts focus on finding the reserve and reporting when and where it is committed. Avoiding detection by the enemy is vital to the success of the reserve.

9-52. The CSS rehearsal should be integrated into the maneuver rehearsal to verify that routes for support do not cross or conflict with routes used by reserve forces or other maneuver elements. The commander should balance the use of ammunition caches against the defending unit's ability to guard them. The commander should also ensure that alternate MSRs are adequate to accommodate contingency plans and that changing MSRs can be accomplished effectively.

9-53. The commander ensures that his combat multipliers are completely integrated with his intended maneuver. This includes the use of camouflage, deception, and smoke to confuse enemy reconnaissance assets. Having key representatives from each of these multipliers simultaneously rehearse the plan with his subordinate maneuver unit is an effective technique for ensuring integration. After issuing the order and receiving briefbacks from his subordinate commanders and other leaders, the commander verifies that they have a common understanding of the plan and can execute it with minimal guidance.

EXECUTING AN AREA DEFENSE

9-54. A defending unit within the MBA uses a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures to accomplish the mission. At one end of the defensive continuum is a totally static defense oriented on terrain retention. This defense depends on the use of firepower from fixed positions to deny the enemy terrain. At the other end is a dynamic defense focused on the enemy. That defense depends on maneuver to disrupt and destroy the enemy force.

9-55. A commander combines the static element to control, stop, or canalize the attacking enemy and the dynamic element to strike and defeat him. A successful area defense uses forces in relatively fixed positions to create the opportunity for the reserve to strike at the enemy from an unanticipated direction and strength. (See Figure 9-7.) The defending force repeatedly lures the enemy into EAs where it kills selected portions of the enemy force.



Figure 9-7. Area Defense Using Static and Dynamic Elements

9-56. In an area defense, defending forces fight mainly from prepared, protected positions to concentrate combat power effects against attempted enemy breakthroughs and flanking movements. The commander uses mobile forces to cover gaps between defensive positions, reinforce those positions as necessary, and counterattack to seal penetrations or block enemy attempts at flanking movements.

9-57. Conducting shaping operations in an area defense is similar to shaping operations in the offense. The factors of METT-TC determine how closely the commander synchronizes his shaping operations with his decisive operations. The commander conducts shaping operations designed to regain the initiative by limiting the attacker's options and disrupting the enemy's plan. He

conducts shaping operations to prevent enemy forces from massing and creates windows of opportunity for decisive offensive operations, allowing his force to defeat them in detail. The commander also employs shaping operations to disrupt enemy operations by attacking command posts at critical stages in the battle or by striking and eliminating key elements, such as river crossing equipment and supplies in a region that contains numerous unfordable rivers. Reconnaissance and security operations are normally components of the echelon's shaping operations.

9-58. This manual divides execution into five steps:

- Gain and maintain enemy contact.
- Disrupt the enemy.
- Fix the enemy.
- Maneuver.
- Follow through.

This does not imply that these steps occur sequentially; they may occur simultaneously.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

9-59. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy in the face of his determined efforts to destroy friendly ISR assets is vital to the success of defensive operations. As the enemy's attack begins, the defending unit's first concerns are to identify committed enemy units' positions and capabilities, determine the enemy's intent and direction of attack, and gain time to react. Initially, the commander accomplishes these goals in the security area. The sources of this type of intelligence include reconnaissance and security forces, intelligence units, special operations forces, and aviation elements. The commander ensures the distribution of a common operational picture throughout the force during the battle as a basis for subordinate commanders' actions. (See FM 6-0.) The commander uses the information available to him, in conjunction with his military judgment, to determine the point at which the enemy is committed to a COA.

9-60. The security force seeks to strip enemy reconnaissance forces and hide the defending force's dispositions, capabilities, and intent at the same time as friendly ISR assets help to determine the enemy's chosen COA. Ideally, the fight in the security area should force the enemy to conduct a movement to contact against a prepared defense.

9-61. A single force in the security area can perform both reconnaissance and security functions. The security force uses every opportunity for limited offensive action to delay and harass the enemy and to gain information. As the security element displaces, the commander makes preparations to pass it through or around the MBA force as quickly as possible by using multiple passage points, gaps, or lanes along the FEBA. This usually occurs in one location at a time until the security force has completely withdrawn. However, the security force may pass in sequence based on enemy pressure. Transfer of responsibility occurs forward of the FEBA at the BHL. (See Figure 9-8, page 9-18.) Taking advantage of previous liaison and plans, the security force makes any required last-minute coordination with MBA forces at contact points to ensure its rapid passage through the MBA force.



Figure 9-8. Battle Handover Line

9-62. The entire security force should not withdraw automatically as soon as the first enemy units reach the FEBA. The commander can leave in place security elements located in areas where the enemy has not advanced. The security force adjusts to the enemy's advance and continues to conduct security operations as far forward as possible. It continues to resist the enemy's shaping operations, such as the enemy's reconnaissance effort, thereby upsetting his coordination and allowing the MBA commander to fight one engagement or battle at a time. Doing this increases the chances for success even if the enemy attack penetrates into the MBA in some areas. In some cases, the security force can attack the enemy force from its rear, engage high-payoff targets, or drive between echelons to isolate leading enemy units.

9-63. As the enemy force approaches the MBA, the commander may order reconnaissance and surveillance assets within his security force to displace to one or both sides of the enemy penetration and continue to maintain surveillance. By observing and providing access to enemy flanks, reconnaissance and surveillance elements can facilitate the conduct of friendly counterattacks. However, to prevent the encirclement of these assets, the commander may plan to monitor those areas where the enemy has not advanced into the MBA solely by technical means.

9-64. Battle handover between the security force and MBA forces requires close coordination and occurs as quickly and efficiently as possible to minimize their vulnerability to enemy fire. The security force commander must retain freedom to maneuver until he initiates the passage of lines. The commander's fire support assets help cover the withdrawal of security forces.

Combat support and CSS elements of the security force should move to the rear as early as possible to avoid hampering the movement of combat forces. Normally, battalion-size units of the security force hand off the battle to the brigades through which they pass. (See Chapter 16 for a discussion of rearward passage of lines.)

9-65. The commander must consider the security force's next mission prior to battle handover between the security force and the MBA force. Factors that may affect his decision are the status of the security force, its subsequent mission preparation requirements, and the size and nature of the reserve required by the situation. He may decide to employ it immediately as his reserve, which would release his initial reserve for other tasks. Alternately, the commander may decide to use the security force to conduct additional security operations on the flanks of MBA forces as the battle progresses. However, it may be some time before the security force is ready for commitment. Therefore, the commander is more likely to wait until the security force has been reconstituted and the initial reserve committed before designating the former security force as his reserve.

9-66. The commander should base the location of his security force's assembly area on its follow-on mission. The commander wants those assembly areas located to rapidly support ongoing operations yet keep withdrawn security units from interfering with ongoing decisive and shaping operations. After passage, the security force normally moves to these locations to prepare for subsequent operations. At a minimum he must rearm and refuel the security force. Additional CSS concerns include casualty evacuation, maintenance requirements, and resupply of the other classes of supply.

DISRUPT THE ENEMY

9-67. The commander executes his shaping operations to disrupt the enemy regardless of his location within the AO. After making contact with the enemy, the commander seeks to disrupt his plan, his ability to control his forces, and his combined arms team. Ideally, the results of the commander's shaping operations should force a disorganized enemy, whose ability to synchronize its elements has been degraded, to conduct a movement to contact against prepared defenses. Once the process of disrupting the enemy begins, it continues throughout a defensive operation.

9-68. The commander initiates his shaping operations simultaneously with the preparation of his MBA positions. These shaping operations typically focus on high-payoff targets, command and control nodes, engineer, fire support, and air defense assets for destruction or disruption. They can also force the enemy to use avenues of approach covered by friendly EAs. These shaping operations destroy the enemy's cohesion and disrupt the tempo of his approach to the MBA. This, in turn, disrupts the timely introduction of enemy follow-on forces into the engagement. For example, offensive information operations directed against the enemy's C2 nodes and air defense assets increase the enemy's vulnerability to other shaping operations while simultaneously slowing the enemy's reaction to these shaping operations. (FM 3-13 discusses offensive information operations.) Follow-on engagements focus on degrading the enemy's fire support and engineer assets, thereby disrupting the movement of his approaching units.

9-69. Other targets for shaping operations include enemy reconnaissance and intelligence assets. Destroying these assets allows the commander to repeatedly force enemy units to deploy into combat formations on ground of his choosing, thus contributing to the disruption and desynchronization of the enemy's plan. The timing of these shaping operations is important. The enemy cannot be allowed to recover from their effects prior to the decisive operation. The commander may also execute offensive operations to further disrupt the enemy, such as spoiling attacks, raids, ambushes, feints, or demonstrations.

FIX THE ENEMY

9-70. The commander does everything in his power to limit the options available to the enemy when conducting an area defense. In addition to disrupting the enemy, the commander conducts shaping operations to constrain the enemy into a specific COA, control his movements, or fix him in a given location. These actions limit the enemy's options. While executing these operations, the commander continues to find, and delay or attrit enemy follow-on and reserve forces to keep them from entering the MBA.

9-71. The commander has several options to help him fix an attacking force. The commander can design his shaping operations—such as securing the flanks and point of a penetration—to fix the enemy and allow friendly forces to execute decisive maneuver elsewhere. Previously discussed in Chapter 8, combat outposts and strong points can also deny enemy movement to or through a given location. A properly executed military deception operation can constrain the enemy to a given COA.

9-72. The commander uses obstacles covered by fire to fix, turn, block, or disrupt to limit the options available to the enemy. Properly executed obstacles are a result of the synthesis of top-down and bottom-up obstacle planning and emplacement. Blocking forces can also affect enemy movement. A blocking force may achieve its mission from a variety of positions depending on the factors of METT-TC.

MANEUVER

9-73. In an area defense, the decisive operation occurs in the MBA. This is where the effects of shaping operations, coupled with sustaining operations, combine with the decisive operations of the MBA force to defeat the enemy. The commander's goal is to prevent the enemy's further advance through a combination of fires from prepared positions, obstacles, and mobile reserves.

9-74. Generating massed effects is especially critical to the commander conducting the defense of a large area against an enemy with a significant advantage in combat power. The attacker has the ability to select the point and time of the attack. Therefore, the attacking enemy can mass his forces at a specific point, thus dramatically influencing the ratio of forces at the point of attack. An enemy three-to-one advantage in overall combat power can easily turn into a local six-to-one or higher ratio. The defending commander must quickly determine the intent of the enemy commander and the effects of terrain. This allows his units and their weapon systems to use agility and

flexibility to generate the effects of combat power against the enemy at those points and restore a more favorable force ratio.

9-75. Forces in the MBA assume responsibility for the battle at the BHL. As the security force approaches the FEBA, it may be necessary to increase the intensity of fire support from the MBA to allow the security force to break contact. Both direct and indirect fire assets from MBA forces provide support to cover the withdrawal of the security force and to close passage lanes through obstacle complexes. The commander may also employ smoke to assist the security force break contact with the enemy. The security force's withdrawal through the forward positions of the MBA must be carefully planned and coordinated. The commander must guard gaps in obstacles left for the withdrawal of the security force and arrange for closing them after the passage of the security force.

9-76. After the enemy reaches the MBA, he tries to find weak points and attempts to force a passage, possibly by a series of probing attacks. As the attack develops, defending units engage the enemy's lead forces. The enemy advance may slow because of canalization and the increased density of forces resulting from limited maneuver space, presenting good targets for defensive fire and air support. The maximum effects of simultaneous and sequential fires are brought to bear at this stage of the battle.

9-77. The commander's subordinate elements maneuver using massed direct and indirect fire and movement to gain positional advantage over the assaulting enemy force. The commander also directs the engineer obstacle and sustainment effort by his assignment of priorities. The commander must reposition his forces to meet the enemy where he is rather than where the commander would like him to be. The commander directs operations and supports his subordinate elements by providing the necessary CS and CSS. He controls the commitment of the reserve and, at division echelon and above, engages enemy follow-on forces. If enemy follow-on forces can be delayed, the enemy's attack may be defeated in detail, one echelon at a time. If the defending unit can force the enemy to commit follow-on forces sooner than planned, it can disrupt the enemy's timetable, which can lead to the creation of exploitable gaps between the committed and subsequent echelons.

9-78. Gaps between defensive positions may be necessary, but they are not left where the commander expects the enemy's probable main effort. They are kept under surveillance, covered by fire or, where possible, blocked by barriers or repositioned friendly forces. The commander clearly defines the responsibility for dealing with each enemy penetration. He leverages the use of choke points and obstacles to prevent enemy penetration. If the enemy succeeds in penetrating the MBA, the commander blocks the penetration immediately and destroys this enemy force as soon as possible; hence, the need for a mobile reserve. He may extend his actions within the depth of his AO to counter enemy penetrations that cannot be stopped farther forward.

9-79. The commander never allows the attacking enemy to consolidate unless it fits his scheme of maneuver. He conducts a local counterattack with all available local resources to prevent the enemy from consolidating his gains. The lowest possible echelon conducts this local counterattack; however, the commander must be aware of the problem of piecemeal commitment. A unit

does not abandon a position unless it fits within the higher commander's intent or he grants permission to do so. If the defending force is unable to repulse the enemy, it tries to contain the enemy penetration until it can attack in concert with major counterattacking forces. The commander coordinates his counterattacks with the efforts of his fire support system.

9-80. Although the commander plans for the counterattack in his defensive planning, he is aware that his plan may not correspond exactly with the existing situation when he launches the counterattack. As the situation develops, the commander reassesses his plan based on his revised situational understanding that results from an updated common operational picture as new intelligence and combat information becomes available to answer the following basic questions:

- Is a counterattack feasible, or should the commander use the reserve to contain enemy successes?
- When and where should the defending forces counterattack?
- In the case of enemy penetrations, what should the defending forces counterattack and what should they block or contain?
- Is there enough time to complete the counterattack before the arrival of enemy follow-on forces?
- Can he conduct a counterattack using his fire support systems?

9-81. When counterattacking, the commander employs all available resources necessary to ensure success. The reserve usually becomes the echelon's decisive operation on its commitment, so he avoids its premature or piecemeal commitment. One of the commander's most critical decisions is committing the reserve. He may reinforce his reserve force before committing it to give it greater capability to counter enemy action. The commander does not counterattack as an automatic reaction to an enemy penetration, nor does he commit the reserve solely because the enemy has reached a certain phase line or other location. Fire support assets and local counterattacks by forces already defending could destroy, disrupt, or attrit enemy penetrations, thus relieving the commander of the need to commit his reserve. When possible, the commander launches the counterattack when the enemy presents his flank or rear, overextends himself, or his momentum dissipates. Once the commander identifies the flanks of the enemy's main effort, he can target counterattacks to isolate and destroy enemy forces within the MBA.

9-82. Sometimes the commander may determine that he cannot afford to use his reserve to counterattack. Therefore, he must use his resources to block, contain, or delay the enemy to gain time to employ higher-echelon reserves. In these cases, the commander and his staff must plan how to integrate reinforcing companies and battalions into the defensive scheme, adjust boundaries, and place BPs. He plans the routes these units will use, and what adjustments will be necessary in existing C2 arrangements. He can speed the process of positioning and moving reinforcements or the reserve by designating routes and providing traffic-control personnel and guides at contact points to lead and brief them on the situation. Scouts, military police, and divisional cavalry units can provide traffic control.

FOLLOW THROUGH

9-83. The purpose of defensive operations is to retain terrain and create conditions for a counteroffensive that regains the initiative. The area defense does this by causing the enemy to sustain unacceptable losses short of his decisive objectives. A successful area defense allows the commander transition to an attack. An area defense could also result in a stalemate with both forces left in contact with each other. Finally, it could result in the defender being overcome by the enemy attack and needing to transition to a retrograde operation. Any decision to withdraw must take into account the current situation in adjacent defensive areas. Only the commander who ordered the defense can designate a new FEBA or authorize a retrograde operation.

9-84. During this follow-through period, time is critical. Unless the commander has a large, uncommitted reserve prepared to quickly exploit or reverse the situation, he must reset his defense as well as maintain contact with the enemy. Time is also critical to the enemy, because he will use it to reorganize, establish a security area, and fortify his positions.

9-85. There is a difference between local counterattacks designed to restore the defense and a decisive operation designed to wrest the initiative from the enemy and then defeat him. To conduct a decisive counterattack, the defending force must bring the enemy attack to or past its culminating point before it results in an unacceptable level of degradation to the defending force. To do this, the defending force must disrupt the enemy's ability to mass, causing him to disperse his combat power into small groups or attrit his forces to gain a favorable combat power ratio. The defending force must continue to disrupt the enemy's ability to introduce follow-on forces and to destroy his sustainment system. In the defense, the commander must prepare to quickly take advantage of fleeting opportunities, seize the initiative, and assume the offense. Ideally, he already has a counterattack plan appropriate to the existing situation. He must rapidly reorganize and refit selected units, move them to attack positions, and attack. Alternatively, he must conduct an attack using those units already in contact with the enemy, which is normally the least favorable COA.

9-86. It is extremely difficult for the enemy to fight a defensive battle in response to a friendly counterattack after he reaches a culminating point for the following reasons:

- His defensive preparations are hasty.
- His forces are not adequately organized for defense.
- Reorganizing for a defense requires more time than the friendly commander should allow.
- The enemy force is dispersed, extended in depth, and weakened.
- Enemy attacks rarely culminate on ground ideally suited for defense.
- Physical fatigue.

9-87. The shift to defense requires enemy soldiers to make a psychological adjustment. Soldiers who have become accustomed to advancing, and thus winning, must now halt deep in the opposing force's territory and fight defensively, sometimes desperately, on new and often unfavorable terms. If the

enemy commander decides to conduct retrograde operations to more defensible ground, his soldiers find it even harder to adjust psychologically.

9-88. If the defensive battle leads to a stalemate with both forces left in contact with each other, the defending force must seek to retain the initiative and set the conditions for the next encounter. The commander must prepare the defending unit to move rapidly to a subsequent defensive position during a lull in the battle because it is risky to defend from the same position twice. The enemy will know the location of the defending force's position and subject them to his supporting fires unless the defending force moves. Nevertheless the defending unit should normally stay in place and continue to fight unless it can suppress the enemy's approaching forces or take other actions to distract the enemy. This is because of the risk to a unit when it moves out of its prepared positions while still under enemy pressure.

9-89. If the defending unit is unable to maintain the integrity of its defense, it must transition to a retrograde operation or risk destruction. The commander must analyze how to execute this transition and prepare contingency plans. If the situation requires a retrograde movement, the commander conducts the operation according to the retrograde fundamentals and principles addressed in Chapter 11. In the retrograde, if the defending force can trade space for time without sustaining unacceptable losses, the commander can usually reestablish the conditions required for a successful defense.

Chapter 10

The Mobile Defense

A swift and vigorous transition to attack—the flashing sword of vengeance—is the most brilliant point of the defensive.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832

The *mobile defense* is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (FM 3-0). It focuses on destroying the attacking force by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to counterattack and envelopment. The commander holds the majority of his available combat power in a striking force for his decisive operation, a major counterattack. He commits the minimum possible combat power to his fixing force that conducts shaping operations to control the depth and breadth of the enemy's advance. The fixing force also retains the terrain required to conduct the striking force's decisive counterattack. The area defense, on the other hand, focuses on retaining terrain by absorbing the enemy into an interlocked series of positions, where he can be destroyed largely by fires.

10-1. The factors of METT-TC may dictate that a unit conducts a mobile defense when defending against an enemy force with greater combat power but less mobility. A commander may also employ a mobile defense when defending a large area of operations (AO) without well-defined avenues of approach, such as flat, open terrain. The mobile defense is preferred in an environment where the enemy may employ weapons of mass destruction because this type of defense reduces the vulnerability of the force to attack and preserves its freedom of action. Future technology associated with command and control (C2) should improve the ability of the friendly force to gain and maintain a common operational picture, which reduces the risk associated with this type of defense. Among these risks are—

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- The fixing force may be isolated and defeated in detail because of the need to resource the striking force to the detriment of the fixing force.
- Operations in noncontiguous AOs associated with conducting a mobile defense can lead to defeat in detail.
- Enemy operations may impair the ability of the striking force to react at critical points.
- The enemy may not move into the area intended by the defending commander.
- The attacking enemy retains at least some momentum as he approaches the desired engagement areas (EAs).
- The defending force may not gain an accurate picture of the enemy's locations and dispositions required by the striking force to launch decisive operations in time to react.
- The decentralized operations required by the mobile defense increase the potential for fratricide.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

10-2. The concept of a mobile defense did not enter into Army doctrine until it had the chance to review German lessons learned as a result of its World War II experiences in Russia. The following historical example illustrates how conducting a mobile defense can result in recapturing the initiative and accomplishing the mission.

Manstein's Donbas Operation, February 1943

In January 1943, the Soviets launched a number of successful offensives following their Stalingrad counteroffensive. By the end of the month, this culminated in plans to drive German forces back to the Dniepr River. The Soviet high command (STAVKA) approved plans to liberate simultaneously the Donets Basin industrial area, Kharkov, and Kursk, and drive the Germans as far west as possible. The plan required that operations be continued without an operational pause, using forces weakened by previous operations, tenuously sustained by overextended supply lines with virtually no operational reserve.

German Field Marshal Manstein's mission was to preserve the German southern wing in the Donets area. His defensive concept consisted of allowing Soviet forces to advance in some areas, holding tightly to a few critical positions, and deliberately reducing his own forces in other areas to create a striking force capable of mounting a coordinated counterattack. See Figure 10-1. Reinforcements began arriving for his *Army Group Don*. He deployed his *1st Panzer Armee* to defend Voroshilovgrad as a fixing force, *4th Panzer Armee* and *Army Detachment Hollidt* to defend the central and southern parts of Manstein's lines, and the 1st *SS Panzer Korps* to defend Kharkov. The *1st SS Panzer Korps,* consisting of the *1st (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler), 2nd (Das Reich),* and *3rd (Totenkopf) SS Panzer Divisions) (PzDiv),* formed his striking force.

STAVKA continued to pursue its offensive plans. However, the farther west the Soviet forces moved, the more overextended their supply lines became. On 20 February, Manstein's plan went into action. The *2nd SS PzDiv* attacked from south of Krasnograd and struck the Russian 6th Army and linked up with the *15th*

Infantry Division at Novo Moskovsk, thereby severing communications between the Soviet 267th Rifle Division (RD) and the 106th Rifle Brigade and the rear. On 21 February, the German units consolidated their positions and prepared to advance on Pavlograd. Meanwhile, *XL Panzer Korps* attacked the Southwestern Front's mobile group, ultimately routing it. Units of the *3rd SS PzDiv* moved into the Krasnograd area to prepare for their advance on Pavlograd. Despite this new situation, the Soviet front did not deviate from its offensive plans.

On 22 February, the *2nd SS PzDiv* drove through to Pavlograd and cut off the 35th Guards RD's communications with its 6th Army headquarters. The *3rd SS PzDiv* advanced, widening the breach between the Soviet 6th Army's main forces and the 267th RD. On 23 February, the *6th* and *17th PzDivs*, previously the 4th *Panzer Armee* (fixing force) reserve, began their offensive, smashing the 6th Army and 1st Guards Army and cutting the supply lines of and virtually encircling the 25th Tank Corps, which had been ordered to continue its advance. The *2nd SS PzDiv* consolidated positions at Pavlograd. The *3rd SS PzDiv* advanced against the 16th Guards Tank Brigade and the 35th Guards RD. Its southern column reached positions just northeast of Pavlograd. The *6th* and *17th PzDivs* advanced northward from the southeast, both divisions ultimately linking up with the *1st SS Panzer Korps* to advance farther north on 24 February.



Figure 10-1. Donbas Movements

By the evening of 24 February, Vatutin, the Soviet Southwest Front commander, finally recognized the dangerous situation his forces were facing and ordered what remained of the front's right flank to go over to the defensive. The Germans continued their counteroffensive and ultimately recaptured Kharkov on 14 March.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

10-3. Units smaller than a corps do not normally conduct a mobile defense because of their inability to fight multiple engagements throughout the width, depth, and height of the AO, while simultaneously resourcing striking,

fixing, and reserve forces. Typically, the striking force in a mobile defense may consist of one-half to two-thirds of the defender's combat power. (See Figure 10-2.) Division and smaller units generally conduct an area defense or a delay as part of the fixing force as the commander shapes the enemy's penetration or they attack as part of the striking force. Alternatively, they can constitute a portion of the reserve.



Figure 10-2. Mobile Defense

10-4. The commander organizes his main body into two principal groups—the fixing force and the striking force. In the mobile defense, reconnaissance and security, reserve, and sustaining forces accomplish the same tasks as in an area defense. (See Figure 10-3.) The commander completes any required adjustments in task organization before he commits his units to the fight.



Figure 10-3. Organization of Forces for a Mobile Defense

10-5. Organized by the commander with the minimum combat power needed to accomplish its mission, the fixing force turns, blocks, and delays the attacking enemy force. It tries to shape the enemy penetration or contain his advance. Typically, it has most of the countermobility assets of the defending unit. The fixing force may conduct defensive actions over considerable depth within the main battle area (MBA). However, it must be prepared to stop and hold terrain on short notice to assist the striking force on its commitment. The operations of the fixing force establish the conditions for a decisive attack by the striking force at a favorable tactical location. The fixing force executes its portion of the battle essentially as a combination of an area defense and a delaying action. The actions of the fixing force are shaping operations.

10-6. The striking force decisively engages the enemy as he becomes exposed in his attempts to overcome the fixing force. The term "striking force" is used rather than reserve because the term "reserve" indicates an uncommitted force. The striking force is a committed force and has the resources to conduct a decisive counterattack as part of the mobile defense. It is the commander's decisive operation.

10-7. The striking force contains the maximum combat power available to the commander at the time of its counterattack. The striking force is a combined arms force that has greater combat power and mobility than the force it seeks to defeat or destroy. The commander considers the effects of surprise when determining the relative combat power of the striking force and its targeted enemy unit. The striking force is normally fully task organized with all combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) assets before its actual commitment. The commander positions engineer mobility-enhancing assets with the lead elements of the striking force.

10-8. The striking force is the key to a successful mobile defense. All of its contingencies relate to its attack. If the opportunity does not exist to decisively commit the striking force, the defender repositions his forces to establish the conditions for success. The striking force must have mobility equal to or greater than that of its targeted enemy unit. It can obtain this mobility through proper task organization, countermobility operations to slow and disrupt enemy movements, and mobility operations to facilitate the rapid shifting of friendly formations. The striking force requires access to multiple routes because an attacking enemy normally goes to great length to deny the defending force freedom of action.

10-9. The commander responsible for orchestrating the overall mobile defense should retain control of the striking force unless communication difficulties make this impossible. Normally this is the overall defending force commander. The commander's most critical decisions are when, where, and under what conditions he should commit his striking force. The commander normally accompanies the striking force.

10-10. Resourcing a reserve in a mobile defense is difficult and requires the commander to assume risk. He generally uses his reserve to support the fixing force. However, if the reserve is available to the striking force, it exploits the success of the striking force. If the reserve is composed largely of aviation forces and long-range fire support systems, it may have contingencies to support the fixing and striking forces.

CONTROL MEASURES

10-11. A commander conducting a mobile defense uses control measures to synchronize conducting the operation. These control measures include designating the AOs of the fixing and striking forces with their associated boundaries, battle positions, and phase lines. He designates a line of departure or a line of contact as part of the graphic control measures for the striking force. He may designate an axis of advance for the striking force. He can designate attack-by-fire or support-by-fire positions. The commander uses EAs, target reference points, targeted areas of interest, and final protective fires as necessary. He designates named areas of interest to focus the efforts of his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. This allows him to determine the enemy's course of action (COA). He designates checkpoints, contact points, passage points, passage routes, and passage lanes for use by reconnaissance and surveillance assets, security units, and the striking force. (See Figure 10-4.)



Figure 10-4. Mobile Defense Control Measures

10-12. The commander must provide the striking force commander with control measures to focus his force at the decisive time and place and to deconflict fires with the fixing force. As a minimum, the striking force commander needs to know the anticipated objective decision points that could lead to the commitment of his force, limit of advance, and boundaries of his AO. If the overall commander imposes either an axis of attack or a direction of attack as a control measure, he restricts the striking force commander's freedom of maneuver. However, such restrictions may be necessary to avoid contact with enemy forces that could distract the striking force from accomplishing its primary mission. These control measures may have to be drawn "on the fly" while the commander, his staff, and his subordinates move to take advantage

of an opportunity to commit the striking force in a decisive counterattack. They should also help the commander recover the integrity of his defense if the striking force is not successful in its attack. (Chapters 2, 5, and 8 explain these control measures.)

PLANNING A MOBILE DEFENSE

10-13. The key to successful mobile defensive operations is the integration and synchronization of all available assets to maximize the combat power of the defending unit, particularly the striking force. The commander achieves integration and synchronization when he can employ their combined effects at decisive times and places. (The general defensive planning considerations addressed in Chapter 8 apply to the mobile defense.)

MANEUVER

10-14. The commander's ability to maintain the mobility advantage of his forces is an important aspect of the mobile defense. This mobility advantage may result from or be enhanced by countermobility actions directed against the enemy force. In his mobile defense plan, the commander ensures that his forces—including reserves and the striking force—can move freely around the battlefield, while at the same time restricting the enemy's mobility, slowing his momentum, and guiding or forcing him into areas that favor the friendly defensive effort.

FIRE SUPPORT

10-15. The effectiveness of a mobile defense is based on the carefully planned fires of all weapons. The striking force conducts the commander's decisive operation in a mobile defense. It requires continuous and concentrated fire support. The commander weights his decisive operation, in part, by allocating to it field artillery and other fire support weapon systems. He must rapidly shift indirect fire support from the fixing force to the striking force. These fire support systems do not have to move with the striking force if it remains within supporting range.

10-16. If the striking force's planned maneuver places it outside the supporting range of the defending commander's fire support systems, he must either plan the movement of fire support assets to locations where they can support the striking force or incorporate them into the striking force. Fire support assets can partially compensate for a lack of maneuver forces in the striking force. The commander takes precautions to prevent fratricide as the striking force approaches the fixing force's EAs, while supporting air and artillery assets try to interdict enemy movements.

AIR DEFENSE

10-17. In the mobile defense, air defense is normally initially used to cover—

- Security forces and fixing force units in forward areas.
- C2 facilities.
- Critical assets, including fire support systems, reserves, and the striking force.
- Sustainment resources.

- Choke points along movement corridors planned for use by reserves or the striking force.

Once the commander commits the striking force, it receives priority of support as the decisive operation. If the striking force attacks to extended depths, the commander ensures that it and other critical assets remain within the coverage of available air defense systems. This may require him to reposition air defense radars and systems to maintain air defense coverage of the defending force.

MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

10-18. The majority of the commander's countermobility and survivability assets support the operations of the fixing force. The majority of the commander's mobility assets support the operations of the striking force. Situational obstacles provide him a tremendous advantage in the mobile defense. These obstacles are a combat multiplier because they enable the commander to use economy of force measures. He uses situational obstacles to exploit enemy vulnerabilities, exploit success, separate enemy follow-on forces, and provide flank protection.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

10-19. When planning for the mobile defense's sustaining operations, logistics operations planners must look beyond the fixing force's shaping operations to prepare to support the striking force's decisive counterattack. The greater the distance the striking force must cover when moving from its assembly area (AA) to its final objective, the greater the amount of supplies needed to support that move. Once committed, units in the striking force require priority of fuel, ammunition, and maintenance support over comparable units in the fixing force. Casualty evacuation will be a challenge because the fixing force will likely suffer a higher percentage of casualties but the lines of communications to the striking force must also support casualty treatment and evacuation. When the striking force must move a considerable distance from its sustaining base, the commander should consider establishing an intermediate support base (ISB). Before establishing an ISB, he must weigh the benefits of establishing the base against the cost in terms of combat power or effort diverted from the support mission to secure the ISB.

PREPARING A MOBILE DEFENSE

10-20. Preparations for conducting a mobile defense include developing the fixing force's defensive positions and EAs as discussed in Chapter 8. The commander aggressively uses his reconnaissance assets to track enemy units as they approach. Engineers participate in conducting route and area reconnaissance to find and classify existing routes. They improve existing routes and open new routes for use during the battle.

10-21. The striking force assembles in one or more areas depending on the width of the AO, the terrain, enemy capabilities, and the planned manner of employment. Before the enemy attack begins, the striking force may deploy all or some of its elements forward in the MBA to—

- Deceive the enemy regarding the purpose of the force.

- Occupy dummy battle positions.
- Create a false impression of unit boundaries, which is important when operating with a mix of heavy and light forces or multinational forces.
- Conduct reconnaissance of routes between the striking force's AAs and potential EAs.

10-22. The enemy attempts to discover the strength, composition, and location of the units that constitute the fixing force and the striking force. The commander uses security forces and information operations to deny the enemy this information and degrade the collection capabilities of enemy ISR assets. The commander routinely repositions to mislead the enemy and to protect his force. In addition, his plans and preparations incorporate defensive information operations. The commander normally tries to portray an area defense while hiding the existence and location of the striking force.

EXECUTING A MOBILE DEFENSE

10-23. This manual divides the execution of a mobile defense into five phases for discussion purposes. The length and nature of each phase, if it occurs at all, varies from situation to situation according to the factors of METT-TC. The phases of defensive operations are gain and maintain enemy contact, disrupt the enemy, fix the enemy, maneuver, and follow through.

10-24. The commander must have the flexibility to yield terrain and shape the enemy penetration. He may even entice the enemy by appearing to uncover an objective of strategic or operational value to the enemy. The striking force conducts the decisive operation—the attack—once the results of the actions of the fixing force meet the commander's intent.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

10-25. The commander conducting a mobile defense focuses on discovering the exact location of the enemy and his strength to facilitate the effectiveness of the striking force. The security force (guard or cover) or the fixing force confirms the enemy's COA and main avenues of approach. The commander normally tasks other ISR assets to determine the location of enemy reserves and follow-on forces. Early detection of the enemy's decisive operation provides the commander with reaction time to adjust the fixing force's positions and shape the enemy penetration, which, in turn, provides the time necessary to commit the striking force. The striking force commander requires as close to real-time updates of the enemy situation as are possible to ensure that the striking force engages the enemy at the right location and time.

10-26. While conducting operations, the security force determines what routes the enemy is using, where the enemy is strong or weak, and where gaps in and between enemy formations exist. This information aids the commander in his attempt to seize the initiative. That information also increases the striking force's agility by identifying opportunities. Further, it helps pull the striking force along the path of least resistance as it maneuvers to employ its combat power at the critical time and place.

DISRUPT THE ENEMY

10-27. In a mobile defense, the commander conducts shaping operations designed to shape the enemy's penetration into the MBA and disrupt the enemy's introduction of fresh forces into the fight. These shaping operations help establish the preconditions for committing the striking force by isolating the object of the striking force and destroying the enemy's key C2 nodes, logistics resupply units, and reserves. Whenever possible the commander sequences these shaping operations, to include offensive information operations, so that the impact of their effects coincides with the commitment of the striking force. To generate a tempo that temporarily paralyzes enemy C2, the intensity of these shaping operations may increase dramatically on the commitment of the striking force. The commander continues to conduct shaping operations once the striking force commits to prevent enemy forces from outside the objective area from interfering with executing the decisive counterattack.

FIX THE ENEMY

10-28. Fixing the enemy is the second half of shaping operations and results in establishing the conditions necessary for decisive operations by the striking force. Typically, the commander of the defending force allows the enemy force to penetrate into the defensive AO before the striking force attacks. (See Figure 10-5.) The fixing force may employ a combination of area defense, delay, and strong point defensive techniques to shape the enemy penetration. The intent of the fixing force is not necessarily to defeat the enemy but to shape the penetration to facilitate a decisive counterattack by the striking force. The commander ensures that the missions and task organization of subordinate units within the fixing force are consistent with his concept for shaping the enemy penetration. Defensive positions within the fixing force may not be contiguous since the fixing force contains only the minimum-essential combat power to accomplish its mission.



Figure 10-5. Mobile Defense Before Commitment of Striking Force

10-29. The fixing force's extensive use of obstacles supports this shaping effort and helps to gain an overall mobility advantage over the enemy. The commander may want to yield ground quickly to make the enemy think he has been successful or to entice him to a decisive point where the striking force can attack. Normally, in a mobile defense, the commander retains ground only to facilitate the commitment of his striking force.

10-30. When conducting a mobile defense, the commander may need to commit his reserve to reinforce the fixing force and help shape the battlefield. He positions his reserve so it effectively reacts to the most likely contingency and the enemy's most dangerous COA. Without a reserve, the commander assumes significant risk in attempting to shape the enemy penetration. Circumstances may also force the commander to employ elements of the striking force to assist the fixing force. If that occurs, the commander prefers to use his available long-range fire support assets and attack helicopters. They are the best choice because of their ability to rapidly disengage and shift their effects to support the efforts of the rest of the striking force on its commitment.

MANEUVER

10-31. The commander's situational understanding is critical in establishing the conditions that initiate the striking force's movement and in determining the general area that serves as a focus for the counterattack. Situational understanding includes identifying those points in time and space where the counterattack proves decisive. A force-oriented objective or an EA usually indicates the decisive point. The staff synchronizes the unit's activities in time and space to sufficiently mass the effects of the striking force at the right time and place.

10-32. The actions of the striking force are the echelon's decisive operation on its commitment. The commander's ISR systems focus entirely on tracking the enemy's advance. The striking force commander continuously receives intelligence and combat information updates that allow him to adjust his counterattack as necessary to defeat the targeted enemy. Once the enemy starts his attack, any forward-deployed elements of the striking force withdraw to AAs or attack positions and prepare for their commitment in counterattack.

10-33. The defending commander launches his striking force in a counterattack when its offensive power, relative to that of the targeted attacking enemy element, is the greatest. (See Figure 10-6.) Piecemeal commitment of the striking force in support of local objectives jeopardizes the success of the overall operation. The striking force must execute the counterattack rapidly and violently, employing all combat power necessary to ensure success. The striking force may be committed at a time different than anticipated and in an entirely different area than previous contingency plans envisioned. Thus, it must be able to respond to unexpected developments rapidly and decisively.

10-34. Because the striking force normally attacks a moving enemy force, it generally assumes a combat formation with a covering force, an advance guard, a main body, and either a follow-and-support or a follow-and-assume force. The striking force attempts to take advantage of obstacles, such as rivers or obstacle zones that block the enemy's movement. The commander designates flank responsibilities and may even allocate a designated force

against a particularly vulnerable flank. However, the striking force moves quickly and takes risk on its flanks, using its speed of movement and superior situational understanding to provide security.

10-35. The striking force attacks in a formation that provides maximum combat power forward to devastate the targeted enemy force and achieve decisive results. The striking force takes advantage of its mobility and fire power to seize the initiative by overwhelming the enemy force with swift, violent blows that cripple the enemy's command and control system, disrupt his formations, and destroy his combat systems. The commander ensures that his fire support and fixing force capture the enemy's attention and posture the enemy for attack by the striking force. During the counterattack, he may have one element of the striking force occupy support-by-fire positions to suppress the enemy, while another striking force element prepares to assault the objective. Either heavy or light forces may make this assault. (Chapter 5 discusses the actual conduct of an assault on an objective.)

10-36. Engineers should be well forward to enhance the mobility of the striking force. These lead engineers search for existing obstacles and clear the route as much as possible within their capabilities. Follow-on engineers expand breaches, improve routes, and replace assault bridges with more permanent structures. Engineers with flank units focus on countermobility to protect the flanks.



Figure 10-6. Mobile Defense After Commitment of Striking Force

FOLLOW THROUGH

10-37. All defensive operations intend to create the opportunity to transition to the offense. In a mobile defense, that transitional opportunity generally results from the success of the striking force's attack. The commander exploits his success and attempts to establish conditions for a pursuit if his assessment of the striking force's attack is that there are opportunities for future offensive operations. (Chapters 6 and 7 discuss exploitation and pursuit.) If conducting the mobile defense is unsuccessful and the enemy retains the initiative, the commander must either reestablish a viable defense or conduct retrograde operations. (Retrograde operations are the topic of Chapter 11.)

Chapter 11

The Retrograde

The withdrawal should be thought of as an offensive instrument, and exercises framed to teach how the enemy can be lured into a trap, closed by a counter-stroke or a devastating circle of fire.

B.H. Liddell Hart, 1944

The *retrograde* is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy (FM 3-0). The enemy may force these operations or a commander may execute them voluntarily. In either case, the higher commander of the force executing the operation must approve the retrograde. Retrograde operations are transitional operations; they are not considered in isolation.

11-1. The commander executes retrogrades to—

- Disengage from operations.
- Gain time without fighting a decisive engagement.
- Resist, exhaust, and damage an enemy in situations that do not favor a defense.
- Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation or extend his lines of communication (LOCs).
- Preserve the force or avoid combat under undesirable conditions, such as continuing an operation that no longer promises success.
- Reposition forces to more favorable locations or conform to movements of other friendly troops.
- Position the force for use elsewhere in other missions.
- Simplify the logistic sustainment of the force by shortening LOCs.
- Position the force where it can safely conduct reconstitution.
- Adjust the defensive scheme, such as secure more favorable terrain.

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- Deceive the enemy.

11-2. The three forms of retrograde are delay, withdrawal, and retirement. In each form, a force moves to the rear, using combinations of combat formations and marches. (Chapter 3 discusses combat formations; Chapter 14 discusses troop movement.) The commander may use all three forms singularly or in combination with other types and forms of offensive or defensive operations.

11-3. Retrogrades can negatively affect the participating soldiers' attitude more than any other type of operation because they may view the retrograde as a defeat. A commander must not allow retrograde operations to reduce or destroy unit morale. Leaders must maintain unit aggressiveness. By planning and efficiently executing the retrograde and ensuring that soldiers understand the purpose and duration of the operation, the commander can counter any negative effects of the operation on unit morale. After completing a retrograde operation, the commander may reconstitute the force. FM 4-100.9 establishes the basic principles of reconstitution.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

11-4. The following historical example illustrates how conducting a retrograde operation can preserve an army for future operations.

The Atlanta Campaign, 1864

The first two months of the Atlanta campaign illustrate the successful conduct of a delay in the face of superior forces. Between 5 May and 17 July, Johnston held Sherman to an average gain of one mile a day while preserving his freedom of maneuver and his army for future operations. This part of the campaign contains examples of successful delays, withdrawals, and retirements. Confederate actions at Resaca early in the campaign will be used to illustrate an unassisted withdrawal under enemy pressure. See Figure 11-1, page 11-2.

In May 1864, Confederate GEN Joseph E. Johnston and his 55,000-man *Army of Tennessee* had the mission of defending Atlanta. Johnston faced 110,000 Union soldiers, organized into seven corps under MG William T. Sherman's overall command. Johnston's campaign strategy was to force Sherman to culminate before reaching Atlanta, conserving his army's strength until he crippled the Union army in a defensive battle, and then launch a counteroffensive.

Union forces began the campaign on 5 May with an advance from positions southeast of Chattanooga. Forced to withdraw from his initial positions at Dalton because of a turning movement around his left flank by two Union corps, Johnston raced to position his forces to defend Resaca, Georgia. Johnston intended to hold at Resaca until he could cross his entire force over the Oostanaula River to its southern bank. At Resaca were three bridges that supported the Confederate's line of communication with the logistics base at Atlanta.

Johnston positioned the three corps—then constituting his army—to defend Resaca as they arrived on 13 May. May 14th and 15th saw attacks around Resaca, with neither side gaining a marked advantage. However, the right flank of the Union army moved within cannon range of the bridges. Forces that Sherman sent four miles to the southwest on another turning movement crossed

the river on 15 May, although they did not break out from their bridgehead on that day. Sherman intended to follow with his main force and either envelope Johnston or strike his flank during a retreat. Faced with these prospects, Johnston decided to withdraw across the river. A deceptive Confederate attack late on the 15th convinced Sherman that Johnston intended to stay in his current positions. The withdrawal commenced at midnight. Johnston left skirmishers along the line (a detachment left in contact), withdrawing forces in succession from his corps farthest from the bridges, then from his center corps, and finally from the corps closest to the bridges. One division from his right-wing corps constituted the army's rear guard. After the rear guard crossed the bridges, Johnston's engineers commenced their destruction. During the three hours required to withdraw Johnston's army across the river, Union forces did not detect the withdrawal until the Confederates began to destroy the bridges.



Figure 11-1. Withdrawal from Resaca

Johnston's mix of retrograde and defensive operations preserved his army as a constant threat to Sherman. Nevertheless, his strategy was unacceptable to Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Davis replaced him on 17 July 1864 with GEN John B. Hood. Hood attacked Sherman three time in two weeks, suffering heavy casualties and failing to seize the initiative. On 1 September, Sherman seized Atlanta, achieving the Union's strategic objective in the Western Theater before the national elections.

DELAY

11-5. A *delay* is a form of retrograde [JP 1-02 uses *an operation*] in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged (JP 1-02, see delaying operation). The delay is one of the most demanding of all ground combat operations. A delay wears down the enemy so that friendly forces can regain the initiative through offensive action, buy time to establish an effective defense, or

determine enemy intentions as part of a security operation. Normally in a delay, inflicting casualties on the enemy is secondary to gaining time. For example, a flank security force conducts a delay operation to provide time for the protected force to establish a viable defense along its threatened flank. Except when directed to prevent enemy penetration of a phase line (PL) for a specific duration, a force conducting a delay normally does not become decisively engaged.

11-6. A delay operation can occur when the commander does not have enough friendly forces to attack or defend. It may also occur, based on a unit's mission, in conjunction with a higher commander's intent. The decision to conduct a delay may not be based on the unit's combat power, but on the other factors of METT-TC. For example, during security operations, the commander may conduct a delay as a shaping operation to draw the enemy into an area where he is vulnerable to a counterattack. Another example would be a delay instituted as an economy of force effort to allow the commander to conduct an offensive operation elsewhere.

11-7. The ability of a force to trade space for time requires depth within the area of operations (AO) assigned to the delaying force. The amount of depth required depends on several factors, including the—

- Amount of time to be gained.
- Relative combat power of friendly and enemy forces.
- Relative mobility of the forces.
- Nature of the terrain.
- Ability to shape the AO with obstacles and fires.
- Degree of acceptable risk.

Ordinarily, the greater the available depth, the lower the risk involved to the delaying force and the greater the chance for success.

11-8. A delay succeeds by forcing the enemy to repeatedly concentrate his forces to fight through a series of defensive positions. A delaying force must offer a continued threat of serious opposition, forcing the enemy to repeatedly deploy and maneuver. Delaying forces displace to subsequent positions before the enemy is able to concentrate sufficient resources to decisively engage and defeat delaying forces in their current position. The length of time a force can remain in a position without facing the danger of becoming decisively engaged is primarily a function of the factors of METT-TC, such as the relative combat power and the terrain and weather.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

11-9. The commander normally organizes the delaying force into a main body, a security force, and a reserve. The security force usually conducts a screen forward of the initial delay positions. For a divisional cavalry squadron or a corps cavalry regiment conducting a delay, the security force executing the screen mission may consist of scouts or air cavalry. For a brigade or battalion conducting a delay, the security force may consist of the brigade reconnaissance troop, battalion scouts, or another element tasked to conduct security operations.

11-10. The main body, which contains the majority of the delaying force's combat power, may use alternate or subsequent positions to conduct the delay. The commander usually deploys his main body as a complete unit into a forward position when conducting a delay from subsequent positions. He divides his main body into two parts, roughly equal in combat power, to occupy each set of positions when conducting a delay from alternate positions.

11-11. The commander normally retains a reserve to contain enemy penetrations between positions, to reinforce fires into an engagement area (EA), or to help a unit disengage from the enemy. All of these missions require that the reserve has the mobility and strength to strike with such force that an enemy has no option but to face the immediate threat.

11-12. The extended frontages and ranges common to retrograde operations make the provision of fire support difficult and act to limit the commander's ability to mass fires. Therefore, retrograde forces, especially delay forces, often have more than the normal allocation of fire support assets. The commander's risk of losing artillery systems and their ammunition also increases when he is supporting retrograde operations. Therefore, he balances his decision to commit fire support systems forward against anticipated requirements in subsequent battle stages. In particular, he protects his towed artillery systems from being overrun by a mobile enemy. He can use available rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft to augment or replace his artillery systems.

11-13. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) assets are widely dispersed and often attached to the units they support because of the width of the AOs normally assigned in a delay. Engineer priorities are normally countermobility first, then mobility. However, restrictive terrain that impedes friendly movement may require the commander to reverse the priorities. Close coordination is necessary so that engineer obstacles are covered by fire and do not impede the planned withdrawal routes of delaying forces or the commitment of a counterattacking reserve force. The delaying force should have a greater-than-normal allocation of fire support systems.

11-14. The requirement to maintain continuous support during the delay requires CSS organizations to echelon their assets. This echelonment, coupled with the wide dispersion of combat forces that is inherent in a delay, complicates conducting the delay.

CONTROL MEASURES

11-15. The delay consists of a series of independent small-unit actions that occur simultaneously across the front. Subordinate commanders must have freedom of action. The tactical mission graphic for the delay appears in Figure 11-2. It is not a control measure. The control measures used in the delay are the same as those introduced in Chapter 8. Common graphics used in a delay include AOs, PLs, battle positions (BPs), coordination points, checkpoints, EAs, trigger lines, target reference points (TRPs), and disengagement lines. (See Figure 11-3.) The commander designates contact points in front of, between, and behind units to assist coordination, ensure continuity of the delay, and draw attention to enemy avenues of approach into unit flanks. (Chapter 16 addresses passage points with the passage of lines discussion.)



Figure 11-2. Delay Tactical Mission Graphic



Figure 11-3. Control Measures for a Delay

11-16. In planning for a delaying action, the commander assigns an AO to each committed unit down through the company or troop level. The commander assigns each likely enemy avenue of approach to only one subordinate unit when he designates subordinate units' AOs. When the commander draws the boundaries of these subordinate AOs, he includes the terrain that controls fire and observation into those areas.

11-17. The commander designates additional PLs beyond those established by his higher commander as necessary to control movement during the delay. **A *delay line* is a phase line where the date and time before which the enemy is not allowed to cross the phase line is depicted as part of the graphic control measure.** Designating delay lines is a command decision that imposes a high degree of risk on the delaying unit. The delaying unit must do everything in its power—including accepting decisive engagement—to prevent the enemy from crossing that line before the time indicated. A delay line may also be event-driven. For example, a commander can order a delaying unit to prevent penetration of the delay line until his engineers complete construction of a rearward obstacle belt.

PLAN

11-18. Unit commanders and soldiers must understand and exercise the basics of defensive operations outlined in Chapter 8 to conduct a successful delay. However, these defensive basics have unique considerations, and the significance of these considerations varies depending on the factors of METT-TC. In a delay, units operate on extended frontages at great risk from advancing enemy forces. The tactical situation constantly changes with maneuver opportunities existing for only extremely short periods. Subordinate commanders must have the flexibility to take immediate action to retain the integrity of their forces. This helps retain their freedom of maneuver and inflict maximum destruction on the enemy.

11-19. The commander identifies ground and air avenues for enemy attacks and friendly counterattacks. When avenues of approach diverge or pass from one AO to another, adjacent units must coordinate with each other. Using the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, the commander designates initial and subsequent delay positions on key terrain that covers likely enemy avenues of approach throughout the depth of the AO allocated to the delay mission.

11-20. Maintaining a mobility advantage over the attacker by the delaying force is key to successfully conducting a delay. Robust engineering and fire support are critical to this effort. The commander plans to maintain this advantage by taking full advantage of the mobility inherent in the combat and tactical systems available to the delaying force. In addition he takes other steps to enhance friendly mobility and degrade the enemy's mobility, such as building combat trails between delay positions and preparing bridges over major rivers for demolition. The delaying force should be capable of constructing large numbers of obstacles and delivering long-range fires. For example, while the enemy seeks to travel in movement formations that allow him to press his attack at the greatest speed, the delaying force's aim is to engage the enemy as early and often as possible. This forces the enemy out of those formations through a multiple series of time-consuming deployments into an assault formation.

11-21. The air defense portion of the plan has three main considerations—the protection of the force while it is in position, the protection of any forces left in contact, and the protection of the force as it moves to the rear. Priority of protection should be toward maintaining the mobility of the force. Air defense assets remain mobile yet able to engage aerial targets with little advance

warning. These assets should work in teams, able to move to the rear in alternating bounds. This ensures that dedicated air defense assets will always be in position, with the flexibility to keep pace with the operations. These firing points are not obvious positions that an enemy will probably target as part of his preparatory or support fires. Early warning of enemy air attack is provided over combat net radios using the command net at the brigade echelon and below.

11-22. Flanks and gaps between units are always areas of concern for a commander. In a linear deployment, the enemy can bypass or outflank the delaying force if coordination between adjacent friendly units is weak, or if one unit creates a gap by moving rearward too rapidly. Therefore, the commander normally designates BPs to guard approaches into his AO. Adjacent units of different commands must exchange liaison.

11-23. Displacement criteria should specify at what point—either event, or time-driven—the delaying force should begin its displacement. The commander should calculate enemy closure rates for the terrain and compare them to friendly displacement rates between positions. By comparing time and distance factors, he can calculate his movement window of time. By applying the enemy's probable rates of advance and formations to the avenues of approach, the commander can decide what obstacles to use and where to emplace them (covered by fires). It also helps the commander determine if and where decisive engagement is likely or required to achieve the delay objective. Careful consideration of the factors of METT-TC, especially terrain analysis, is an inherent part of delay planning.

Parameters of the Delay Order

11-24. An order for a delay mission must specify certain parameters. First, it must direct one of two alternatives: delay within the AO or delay forward of a specified line or terrain feature for a specified time. That time is usually based on another unit completing its activities, such as establishing rearward defensive positions. A mission of delay within the AO implies that force integrity is a prime consideration. In this case, the delaying force delays the enemy as long as possible while avoiding decisive engagement. Generally, this force displaces once predetermined criteria have been met, such as when the enemy force reaches a disengagement line. The control measures are the same for both alternatives, except that during a delay forward of a specified line for a specified time, the commander annotates the PL with the specified time. (See Figure 11-4.) If the commander establishes a delay line, mission accomplishment outweighs preservation of the force's integrity. It may require the force hold a given position until ordered to displace.

11-25. The second parameter is that the order must specify the acceptable risk. Acceptable risk ranges from accepting decisive engagement in an attempt to hold terrain for a given time to maintaining the integrity of the delaying force. The depth of the AO available for the delay, the time needed by higher headquarters, and subsequent missions for the delaying force determine the amount of acceptable risk. A delay mission that does not specify times, control of key terrain, or other guidance and control measures implies a lower degree of risk.

11-26. Third, the order must specify whether the delaying force may use the entire AO or must delay from specific BPs. A delay using the entire AO is preferable, but a delay from specific positions may be required to coordinate two or more units in the delay. To enhance command and control and to coordinate the battle across a broad front, the commander assigns units down to platoon-level specific BPs. However, he may assign them missions to delay within their AO if that best supports the scheme of maneuver.



Figure 11-4. Delay Forward of a Specified Line for a Specified Time

Alternate and Subsequent Positions

11-27. The commander normally assigns his subordinate units contiguous AOs that are deeper than they are wide. He uses obstacles, fires, and movement throughout the depth of each assigned AO. He may be forced to fight from a single set of positions if the delay is only planned to last a short time or the AO's depth is limited. If the delay is expected to last for a longer period, or if sufficient depth is available, he may delay from either alternate or successive positions.

11-28. In both techniques, delaying forces normally reconnoiter subsequent positions before occupying them and, if possible, post guides on one or two subsequent positions. Additionally, in executing both techniques, it is critical that the delaying force maintains contact with the enemy between delay positions. (The advantages and disadvantages of the two techniques are summarized in Table 11-1, page 11-10.)

11-29. A commander normally prefers to use alternate positions when he has adequate forces and his AO has sufficient depth. In a delay from alternate positions, two or more units in a single AO occupy delaying positions in depth. (See Figure 11-5, page 11-10.) As the first unit engages the enemy, the second occupies the next position in depth and prepares to assume responsibility for

the operation. The first force disengages and passes around or through the second force. It then moves to the next position and prepares to reengage the enemy while the second force takes up the fight. Alternate positions are normally used when the delaying force operates on a narrow front. A delay from alternate positions is particularly useful on the most dangerous avenues of approach because it offers greater security than a delay from successive positions. However, it requires more forces and continuous maneuver coordination. Additionally, the delaying forces risk losing contact with the enemy between delay positions.

Table 11-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Delay Techniques

METHOD OF DELAY	USE WHEN	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Delay from Subsequent Positions	• AO is wide. • Forces available do not allow themselves to be split.	• Masses fires of all available combat elements.	• Limited depth to the delay positions. • Less available time to prepare each position. • Less flexibility.
Delay from Alternate Positions	• AO is narrow. • Forces are adequate to be split between different positions.	• Allows positioning in depth. • Allows more time for equipment and soldier maintenance. • Increases flexibility.	• Requires continuous coordination. • Requires passage of lines. • Engages only part of the force at one time.


STEP 1: Elements of the delaying force disengage and move to the rear to organize the next position.
STEP 2: Elements from the initial position delay back through the second position to the third delay position.
STEP 3: Elements at the second position pick up the delay. The third delay position is occupied.
ENY
ENY
INITIAL DELAY POSITION
SECOND DELAY POSITION
THIRD DELAY POSITION
A
B
D

Figure 11-5. Delay from Alternate Positions

11-30. The commander uses a delay from subsequent positions when the assigned AO is so wide that available forces cannot occupy more than a single tier of positions. (See Figure 11-6.) In a delay from subsequent positions, all delaying units are committed to each of the series of BPs or across the AO on the same PL. Most of the delaying force is located well forward. The mission dictates the delay from one BP or PL to the next. The commander staggers the movement of delaying elements so that not all elements are moving at the same time.


STEP 1: Elements of the delaying force disengage and move to the rear to organize the next position.
STEP 2: Elements remaining in contact fight to the rear while maintaining continuous contact
STEP 3: Delaying elements rejoin parent organizations at the next position and continue the delay.
ENY
ENY
INITIAL DELAY POSITION
(-)
SECOND DELAY POSITION
D

Figure 11-6. Delay from Subsequent Positions

Effects of Terrain

11-31. The commander always takes advantage of the terrain when planning how he positions his forces and conducts operations. He wants the terrain to favor his actions and not be a neutral factor. The terrain dictates where a delaying force can orient on a moving enemy force and ambush it. During a delay, compartmentalized terrain facilitates shorter displacements initiated at closer range to the enemy. The commander conducting operations in such terrain looks for locations that restrict the enemy's movement and prevent him from fully exploiting his combat superiority. On the other hand, flat or open terrain requires earlier displacements at greater distances to stay in front of the advancing enemy. In open terrain, the most important consideration in selecting a position is a good, long-range field of fire. **A *field of fire* is the area that a weapon or group of weapons may cover effectively from a given position.**

11-32. In restricted terrain, where a light force conducts the primary action, positions may be close together, except when conducting a delay using air assault techniques. In open terrain, delay positions are often far apart. In

selecting positions, the commander considers natural and artificial obstacles, particularly when the enemy has numerous armored combat systems.

11-33. The commander identifies routes that reinforcements, artillery units, command posts (CPs), and CSS elements will use and keeps them under his control and free of obstacles. Alternate routes should be available so that a friendly force can bypass choke points if they are closed or contaminated.

11-34. Disengaging from the enemy while displacing from one position to the next is difficult. The unit's disengagement plans include the following:

- The maneuver concept of operations for tactical elements after disengagement, which includes the movement routes for each small unit.
- Fires to suppress the enemy and cover the unit's movement.
- Offensive information operations to disrupt enemy C2 at critical moments.
- Screening smoke to conceal the unit's movement, conduct a deception operation, or cover passage points.
- Contact and passage points if moving through friendly lines.
- Disengagement start times.
- The earliest time for CS and CSS elements to move.
- Designating units responsible for closing lanes through obstacles and executing reserve obstacles.

Intelligence

11-35. When conducting a delay operation, the commander may not get the most effective use of his intelligence assets. The commander echelons his organic and supporting ISR systems rearward to maintain at least partial coverage of the AO during the delay. This increases his need to ensure the effective management of collection assets. However, he must rely on a downward flow of intelligence and combat information, such as unmanned aerial vehicle and joint surveillance target attack radar system data, from higher echelons to make up for the degradation in collection capabilities that occurs when systems displace.

11-36. Initially, intelligence assets attempt to determine if the enemy recognizes the delay. Subsequently, the focus is on how the enemy reacts to the delay. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems monitor and predict enemy attempts to envelop the flanks or strike the rear of the rearward-moving friendly force. They also focus on actions of any enemy airborne, air assault, and attack aviation units that may try to interdict the movement of the friendly force. The delaying commander must detect the enemy's advance early to adjust his maneuver scheme and concentrate sufficient combat power to effectively delay the enemy.

Maneuver

11-37. A delay is one of the most difficult forms of defensive operations to execute. The primary reason is that the delaying force must engage the enemy sufficiently to slow his movement, yet not become decisively engaged. Also, the delaying unit must maintain continuous coordination with any flank units as it displaces rearward.

11-38. There are many similarities in the tactics and techniques of a mobile defense and a delay. However, units conducting a delay normally do not become decisively engaged except to prevent the enemy from prematurely crossing a delay line or to risk a part of the force to prevent the whole delaying force from being jeopardized.

11-39. Heavy forces—armor, mechanized infantry, and armored cavalry elements supported by indirect fires—are highly suitable for delay operations in most terrain. Their organic firepower allows them to engage the enemy effectively at long ranges, and their mobility allows them to move quickly between successive positions or to a flank. Their vehicles provide protection that simplifies battlefield movement. These same characteristics also allow heavy reserve forces to rapidly launch counterattacks to extract delaying forces from untenable situations.

11-40. Light forces are especially suited to conduct delays in broken, close, and built-up terrain. They take advantage of such terrain, reinforced by the extensive use of situational obstacles, to hinder the mobility of enemy combat systems and supporting tactical vehicles. They can also participate in stay-behind operations. (See paragraphs 11-118 to 11-122.) This type of terrain offers cover for the movement of light forces and favors using ambushes against the enemy. Because of the restrictions on organic motorized transportation assets and the limited protection available to light infantry units, the commander must specifically plan for their displacement. While all light forces can move rapidly by air, a delay offers little opportunity for airborne forces to use their unique capability.

11-41. The commander may employ air assault forces in a manner similar to that of other light infantry units in a delay. However, they possess additional useful capabilities in a delay operation. They can rapidly deploy, redeploy, and disperse in open terrain if the weather is suitable and the necessary landing zones and pickup zones exist. The combination of light infantry, attack helicopters, and fire support systems found in air assault units allows the delaying commander to rapidly concentrate combat power at key locations to attrit the enemy through repeated ambushes. The combined arms nature of air assault units also makes them extremely useful for conducting security and reserve operations over large geographical areas against heavy and light enemy forces. However, their extraction is a high-risk activity when pressured by a heavy enemy or in the presence of a significant air defense threat.

11-42. The mobility, lethality, and long range of attack aviation firepower make it invaluable to the force conducting a delay. The commander can also use them to conduct counterattacks and spoiling attacks as part of his combined arms team. Other uses of Army aviation in a delay include the rapid rearward movement of CSS assets, the deployment of light forces, and reconnaissance.

Command and Control

11-43. Centralized planning and decentralized execution characterize command and control in a delay operation. Communications are essential to the success of this type of operation, and the commander ensures that redundancy is built into his communications architecture. Digital command and

control systems help ensure that redundancy through the promulgation of a common operating picture and a distributed database. This allows one CP to temporarily assume the duties of another CP if the latter is destroyed.

11-44. The echelon rear CP is normally the first CP within an echelon to displace during a delay. It displaces by echelon with other CSS assets. The echelon main CP controls the movement of forces not in contact. It displaces by echelon with the main body. The echelon tactical CP usually remains forward to control and support forces in contact.

MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

11-45. Normally, countermobility is the most important engineer task, unless the delaying force must cross one or more major obstacles, in which case the major engineer task is mobility, specifically breach operations. The commander must set realistic and specific priorities for the engineer effort. He monitors its progress to prevent it from dissipating throughout the area. The commander employs his engineers in depth. This is crucial when the commander conducts noncontiguous operations or when the enemy attacks deep into the rear area of a force conducting contiguous operations, or when the enemy has the ability to employ weapons of mass destruction. The maneuver element provides security for the engineers so that they can concentrate their efforts on engineer tasks.

11-46. Because of the importance of mobility and countermobility tasks, a unit conducting a delay probably has few engineer assets to devote to the survivability function. Units should maximize the use of smoke when and where weather conditions allow to provide concealment for movement and assembly. Smoke curtains, blankets, and haze may protect withdrawing columns, critical points, and routes. The commander takes precautions to ensure that the smoke does not provide a screen for the enemy's advance. (See FM 3-11.50.)

PREPARE

11-47. The defensive preparations outlined in Chapter 8 also apply when conducting a delay. As always, resources—including the time available—determine the extent of preparations. The commander assigns a high priority to reconnaissance. Additionally, the preparation of subsequent positions receives a higher priority than it does in either a mobile or an area defense. It is not always possible to complete all preparations before starting the delay operation. Consequently, delaying units continue to prepare and adapt plans as the situation develops.

11-48. In the delay, the commander uses BPs in a manner similar to the defense. However, when organizing his BPs, he places more emphasis on width than depth, as well as reconnaissance and preparing routes for displacement. Within each BP, most of the available firepower is oriented toward the expected enemy avenue of approach. However, the commander must provide adequate flank and rear security since the delaying unit must furnish its own security. Each crew and squad should be familiar with the routes from its primary positions to alternate, supplementary, and sequential positions. In preparing a BP, the commander conducting a delay places less emphasis on installing protective obstacles, final protective fires (FPFs), and ammunition

stockpiling than he would in either an area or a mobile defense. In a delay, BPs are sometimes referred to as delay positions.

EXECUTE

11-49. The complex nature of a delay requires the subordinate elements of a delaying force to execute different yet complementary actions. In a single delaying operation, attacks, area defenses, mobile defenses, and other actions may occur in any sequence or simultaneously. For example, the commander may elect to assign one delaying element the task of holding a key road intersection for a period of time so a reserve force can strike the enemy's flank. Therefore, the enemy must deploy into a hasty defense, which delays his attack.

11-50. The commander deploys his security force well forward of his initial delay position to give early warning of any enemy approach. When the security force detects and reports an approach, the commander reconciles these reports against his decision support and event templates to confirm the enemy's probable course of action. Based on his interpretation of how the battle will unfold, the commander can direct one subordinate element to maneuver in a manner designed to draw the advancing enemy into a position of disadvantage.

11-51. The security force fixes, defeats, and destroys the enemy's reconnaissance and security elements without risking decisive engagement. It directs fires at the approaching enemy force as far forward of the delay positions as possible. Engaging a moving enemy at long ranges tends to inflict far more casualties on him than he can inflict on the delaying force; it also slows his tempo of operations. The more a delaying force can blind an enemy and eliminate his reconnaissance assets, the more likely he is to hesitate and move with caution.

11-52. Once the security force makes contact with the enemy, it maintains contact. As the enemy approaches, it moves by bounds back to the flanks of the defending units, keeping the enemy under constant observation. This helps prevent the enemy from finding gaps between delaying units and attacking the exposed flanks of delaying units. The security force uses covered, concealed, and coordinated routes to avoid enemy and friendly fires.

11-53. Recovering security assets may be more difficult if the security force needs to pass through the range fan of friendly tanks and other direct-fire weapons in their movement. Recovery should be to the flanks of delay positions and not through EAs and TRPs unless necessary. Security forces should move so that they do not reveal the locations of other friendly elements.

11-54. The main body uses a variety of tactics to execute the delay. These include ambushes, counterattacks, spoiling attacks, artillery raids, jamming, and close air support. The commander of the delay force preserves his freedom to maneuver by engaging the enemy with sufficient force to temporarily stop his advance. The delay force uses obstacles and defensive positions in depth to slow and canalize the enemy and exploit the mobility of its combat systems to confuse and defeat the enemy. Once a delay starts, units displace rapidly between positions. Whenever possible, the commander grasps any fleeting opportunity to seize the initiative, even if only temporarily. By

aggressively contesting the enemy's initiative through offensive action, the delaying force avoids passive patterns that favor the attacking enemy. The delaying force may conduct strong counterattacks from unexpected directions to temporarily confuse the enemy commander. Attacking an enemy throws him off stride, disorganizes his forces, confuses his picture of the fight, and helps prolong the delay. In turn, this confusion may affect the enemy's tempo and momentum. It also affects the movement of enemy reserves and other follow-on forces. However, the delaying force seeks to avoid decisive engagement.

11-55. In a delay, the commander uses his fire support assets to delay enemy forces, inflict casualties on them, and assist the friendly force to gain a mobility advantage over them. Indirect fires continue throughout the delay. The effects of the commander's fire support assets can disrupt the enemy's follow-on forces and restrict the immediate battle to his committed forces. Close air support and attack helicopters can engage enemy forces before they come within range of the supporting field artillery systems. The commander should weigh the effects required, however, since attack aviation is a limited resource and CAS aircraft are a fleeting resource. Massing of fires, to include the killing power of the unit in contact, should be the objective. However, this should not delay integration of CAS aircraft, given limited loiter times.

11-56. Artillery and mortar systems support the direct-fire fight to prevent the enemy from conducting a combined arms attack on the delay position. As the enemy encounters each situational obstacle, he is engaged by these fire support systems. These fires should cause enemy armored forces to button up and slow down. Artillery and mortar systems can use fires to separate enemy formations by striking the enemy when he concentrates near choke points and in EAs. Integrating fires and obstacles makes it difficult for the enemy to traverse EAs. The delaying force breaks the enemy's momentum by forcing him to deploy and by inflicting casualties. Fires assist delaying forces by—

- Assisting in disengaging maneuver forces.
- Suppressing the enemy.
- Degrading the enemy's ability to move and communicate.
- Obscuring the enemy's overwatching support by fire positions and degrading his ISR and target acquisition systems.
- Reinforcing or closing breaches or lanes in obstacles.
- Executing FPFs.
- Screening friendly displacements and disengagements by using smoke. (This also degrades the enemy's terminal guidance of his precision-guided munitions.)
- Destroying high-payoff targets.
- Supporting limited counterattacks.

11-57. As the enemy approaches the delay position, he crosses one or more trigger lines and moves into EAs within the range of the delaying force's antiarmor missiles, tank cannons, and small arms. The commander holds his direct fire until the enemy is positioned where the fire plan and scheme of maneuver require their use. He controls these fires from the delaying force in the same manner as in any defensive operation. The more damage the delaying force can inflict on the enemy, the longer it can stay in position.

11-58. As the enemy presses his attack and attempts to maneuver against the delaying force, the commander constantly assesses the action to guide the displacements of the delay force to anticipate possible decisive engagement while accomplishing the delay mission. When the enemy begins to think he is successfully maneuvering against a friendly position, he is engaged by indirect fires while the delaying force disappears behind a cloud of smoke, dust, and exploding munitions. Intense FPFs and fires aimed at and behind recently evacuated friendly delay positions allow the delaying force to disengage from an attacking enemy.

11-59. Division and brigade commanders generally decentralize execution of a delay to battalion and lower levels. Those senior commanders must rely on their subordinates to execute the mission and request help when needed. The commander establishes the acceptable risk and displacement criteria. Subordinates displace once they meet the previously established delay criteria. This displacement may be a preplanned event or time dependent. The senior commander monitors the delay and intervenes when the displacement of one unit threatens the survival of another.

11-60. The delaying force relies heavily on artillery fires and air support to suppress the enemy so the force can disengage, move, and occupy new positions. If a subordinate element cannot maintain separation from the enemy, the commander can shift additional combat multipliers and other resources to that particular AO to counter the enemy's unplanned success. As one subordinate element displaces, the delaying commander may order other subordinate elements to change their orientation to cover the move. Each displacing element travels along its designated route, using reserve demolitions as required and requesting additional fire support if the enemy is able to maintain contact.

11-61. Passing through obstacle lanes during displacement between positions poses significant risks to the delaying force. The unit passing through a linear obstacle becomes more vulnerable to enemy attack because of the danger of the delaying force becoming congested on the far side of the obstacle. Obstacle lanes also increase the amount of time required for a passing unit to transit through a given area. The commander must attempt to prevent the enemy from engaging the passing unit until it can redeploy into a tactical formation.

11-62. The commander retains his reserve for the decisive moment. As with aviation, the reserve should not be committed early in the delay unless its integrity is threatened. Typically, the commander commits his reserve to help a unit disengage and regain its ability to maneuver or to prevent the enemy from exploiting an advantage. The reserve normally uses a support-by-fire position for this task. If the reserve is committed early, the commander's ability to influence the battle is greatly reduced unless he can reconstitute a new reserve. It is possible to commit the reserve several times throughout the battle, but only when it can be extracted, redesignated, or otherwise reconstituted quickly.

11-63. In the delay, the force's CSS elements should be located outside of enemy artillery range but be able to provide adequate support. Artillery ammunition stocks must be capable of sustaining the quantity of fire support required in the delay. Maintenance operations focus on evacuating rather than

returning damaged vehicles to combat. Unless vehicles can be fixed quickly on the spot, the unit should evacuate them to the rear area because vehicles left behind must be destroyed to prevent their capture.

TERMINATION OF A DELAY

11-64. A delay operation terminates when the delaying force conducts a rearward passage of lines through a defending force, the delaying force reaches defensible terrain and transitions to the defense, the advancing enemy force reaches a culminating point, or the delaying force goes on the offense after being reinforced. If the advancing enemy force reaches a culmination point, the delaying force may maintain contact in current positions, withdraw to perform another mission, or transition to the offense. In all cases, the senior commander must plan for the expected outcome of the delay executed by a subordinate. If he expects a friendly counterattack, he plans for the forward passage of the counterattack force, husbands resources to ensure relative combat superiority, and provides for the smooth handoff of appropriate AOs.

WITHDRAWAL

11-65. A *withdrawal*, a form of retrograde, is a planned operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force (FM 3-0). The commander may or may not conduct a withdrawal under enemy pressure. Subordinate units may withdraw without the entire force withdrawing. A unit conducts a withdrawal for a variety of reasons, which are listed at the beginning of this chapter. In addition, a withdrawal may precede a retirement operation.

11-66. Although the commander avoids withdrawing from action under enemy pressure, it is not always possible. He may conduct a withdrawal when the situation requires rapid action to save the command from disaster. This usually occurs after a tactical reverse or after a unit reaches its culminating point. When an aggressive enemy becomes aware of a friendly force's withdrawal or its intention to withdraw, he attempts to exploit the withdrawal, using all his capabilities to try to turn the withdrawal into a rout. He may have ground and air superiority and continuously attempt to pursue, encircle, and destroy the withdrawing force. He will try to use a combination of direct pressure and enveloping forces and fires to isolate the withdrawing friendly force for later destruction.

11-67. Withdrawals are inherently dangerous because they involve moving units to the rear and away from what is usually a stronger enemy force. The heavier the previous fighting and the closer the contact with the enemy, the more difficult the withdrawal. Operations security (OPSEC) is extremely important. A unit usually confines its rearward movement to times and conditions when the enemy cannot observe the activity, so that he cannot easily detect the operation. To help preserve secrecy and freedom of action, for example, the commander must consider visibility conditions and times when enemy reconnaissance satellites can observe friendly movements. Operations security is especially critical during the initial stages of a delay when the majority of CS and CSS elements displace.

11-68. A unit withdraws to an assembly area or a new defensive position. Alternatively, it can withdraw indirectly to either area through one or more

intermediate positions. When preparing the new position, the commander balances the need for security with the need to get an early start on the defensive effort.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

11-69. The commander typically organizes his withdrawing unit into a security force, a main body, and a reserve. He also organizes a detachment left in contact (DLIC) and stay-behind forces if required by his scheme of maneuver. He avoids changing task organization unless his subordinates have sufficient planning time. However, circumstances may dictate rapid task organization changes immediately before the withdrawal, such as when the unit must conduct an immediate withdrawal to prevent encirclement.

11-70. The security force maintains contact with the enemy until ordered to disengage or until another force takes over. It simulates the continued presence of the main body, which requires additional allocation of combat multipliers beyond those normally allocated to a force of its size. The greater its mobility and range advantages over the enemy, the easier for the security force to successfully cover the main body's withdrawal. The commander organizes the majority of available combat power to the security force as a rear guard or a rear-covering force; the most probable threat to a withdrawing force is a pursuing enemy. However, the commander must maintain all-around security of the withdrawing force. When the enemy can infiltrate or insert forces ahead of the withdrawing force, the commander may establish an advance guard to clear the route or AO. He designates a flank guard or screen, if required.

11-71. When a security zone exists between the two main opposing forces, the existing security force can transition on order to a rear guard or rear-covering force. It then conducts delay operations until ordered to disengage and break contact with the enemy. When the withdrawing force is in close contact with the enemy, a security zone does not normally exist. Withdrawals under these conditions require that security forces adopt different techniques. One technique is to establish a DLIC to provide a way to sequentially break contact with the enemy.

11-72. **A *detachment left in contact* is an element left in contact as part of the previously designated (usually rear) security force while the main body conducts its withdrawal.** Its primary purpose is to remain behind to deceive the enemy into believing the parent unit is still in position while the majority of the unit withdraws. It simulates—as nearly as possible—the continued presence of the main body until it is too late for the enemy to react by conducting activities, such as electronic transmissions or attacks. The DLIC must have specific instructions about what to do when the enemy attacks and when and under what circumstances to delay or withdraw. If the DLIC must disengage from the enemy, it uses the same techniques as in the delay. If required, this detachment receives additional recovery, evacuation, and transportation assets to use after disengagement to speed its rearward movement.

11-73. Two methods to resource the DLIC exist. The first is for each major subordinate element of the withdrawing force to leave a subelement in place.

For example, in a brigade withdrawal, each task force leaves a company team in contact. Typically, these teams fall under a senior DLIC commander designated by the brigade commander. Alternatively, one major subordinate command of the withdrawing force can stay behind as the DLIC. For example, a brigade could leave one battalion task force as the DLIC, which then expands its security responsibilities to cover the width of the AO. (See Figure 11-7.)



Figure 11-7. Detachment Left in Contact

11-74. Often when a DLIC is used, the commander creates an additional security force behind the existing main defensive positions to assist in the withdrawal process. The commander can create an additional force from the withdrawing unit or from an assisting unit. The DLIC can delay to this additional security force and join it, or delay back, conduct battle handover, and then conduct a rearward passage of lines. In either case, the additional security force becomes the rear guard.

11-75. The main body of the withdrawing force consists of all elements remaining after the commander resources his security force and his reserve. He generally finds it difficult to resource a reserve, but he makes every attempt to do so. When the complete formation withdraws under pressure, the reserve may take limited offensive action, such as spoiling attacks, to disorganize, disrupt, and delay the enemy. It can counter penetrations between positions, reinforce threatened areas, and protect withdrawal routes. Reserves may also extricate encircled or heavily engaged forces.

CONTROL MEASURES

11-76. Withdrawing forces must apply combat power to protect themselves while simultaneously moving combat power away from the enemy. This

requires careful coordination among all forces. Throughout the operation, the commander must tightly control rearward movement and maintain the ability to generate decisive combat power at key times and places. As shown in Figure 11-8, the control measures used in the withdrawal are the same as those in a delay or a defense. The routes used by each unit in the withdrawal and the block movement times are also withdrawal control measures.



Figure 11-8. Withdrawal Control Measures

PLANNING A WITHDRAWAL

11-77. The commander plans and coordinates a withdrawal in the same manner as a delay. Some factors of METT-TC apply differently because of the differences between a delay and a withdrawal. A withdrawal always begins under the threat of enemy interference. Because the force is most vulnerable if the enemy attacks, the commander always plans for a withdrawal under pressure. He then develops contingencies for a withdrawal without pressure. In both cases, the commander's main considerations are to—

- Plan a deliberate break from the enemy.
- Displace the main body rapidly, free of enemy interference.
- Safeguard the withdrawal routes.
- Retain sufficient combat, CS, and CSS capabilities throughout the operation to support forces in contact with the enemy.

11-78. A withdrawal may be assisted or unassisted. It may or may not take place under enemy pressure. These two factors combined produces the four variations shown in Figure 11-9, page 11-22. That figure also depicts the tactical mission graphic for a withdrawal and a withdrawal under enemy pressure. The withdrawal plan considers which variation the force currently faces. Each variation requires a different blend of the three retrograde options.

11-79. A commander prefers to conduct a withdrawal while not under pressure and without assistance. Actions by the enemy, as well as the additional coordination needed because of the presence of an assisting unit, complicate the operation.



Figure 11-9. Types of Withdrawals

11-80. A withdrawing force can receive assistance from another force in the form of—

- Additional security for the area through which the withdrawing force will pass.
- Information concerning withdrawal routes.
- Forces to secure choke points or key terrain along withdrawal routes.
- Elements to assist in movement control, such as traffic control points.
- Required combat, CS, and CSS, which can involve conducting a counterattack to assist the withdrawing unit in disengaging from the enemy.

11-81. In a withdrawal under enemy pressure, all units withdraw simultaneously when available routes allow, using delaying tactics to fight their way to the rear. In the usual case, when simultaneous withdrawal of all forces is not practical, the commander decides the order of withdrawal. Several factors influence his decision:

- Subsequent missions.
- Availability of transportation assets and routes.
- Disposition of friendly and enemy forces.
- Level and nature of enemy pressure.
- Degree of urgency associated with the withdrawal.

The commander must make three interrelated key decisions: when to start the movement of selected CS and CSS elements, when forward elements should start thinning out, and when the security force should start its disengagement operations. The commander avoids premature actions that lead the enemy to believe a withdrawal is being contemplated. Commanders must anticipate enemy means of interference and plan for employing security forces, attack helicopters, and close air support.

11-82. The commander conducting a withdrawal without enemy pressure can plan when to begin the withdrawal. He has the option of taking calculated risks to increase the displacement capabilities of his force. For example, he may order the main body to conduct a tactical road march instead of moving

in tactical formations. The commander can plan for stay-behind forces as part of the operation. (The stay-behind operations starts on page 11-30.)

PREPARING A WITHDRAWAL

11-83. Before withdrawing, the main body dispatches quartering parties to help it occupy the new position. (Chapter 14 details the responsibilities of a quartering party.)

11-84. In an unassisted withdrawal, the withdrawing unit establishes its own security force and reserve. It reconnoiters and secures the routes it will use in its rearward movement while sustaining itself during the withdrawal. The withdrawing unit must disengage from the enemy.

11-85. By concealing supplies along movement routes, CSS operators can simplify support requirements and reduce the enemy's ability to interfere with logistics operations. This allows CSS units to withdraw earlier than they otherwise could. The commander carefully considers whether to place his supplies in caches. Once cached, supplies are difficult to recover if the operation does not go as planned. Other than medical items, the unit evacuates or destroys all supplies to prevent their capture. The commander establishes his destruction criteria, which is time- or event-driven for each class of supply.

EXECUTING A WITHDRAWAL

11-86. Typically, when under enemy pressure, the less heavily engaged elements of the withdrawing force withdraw first. The more heavily engaged units generally withdraw under the cover of a security force using support provided by available fire support and electronic warfare assets. They take advantage of obstacles to assist in breaking contact with the enemy. The commander conducts night movements and uses obscuration smoke to screen friendly movement while reducing both the accuracy of enemy direct-fire systems and his ability to visually observe friendly movements. The security force continues to use alternate and successive positions until the entire force breaks contact with the enemy.

11-87. The security force may remain in position and maintain a deception. The main body moves rearward to intermediate or final positions as rapidly as possible. After the main body withdraws a safe distance, the security force begins its rearward movement. Once the security force begins moving, it assumes the duties of a rear guard. Even if the enemy does not pursue the withdrawing force, the security force continues to act as the rear guard unless the commander assigns that mission to another element. However, if not pursued by the enemy, the security force may remain in a march column. (Chapter 14 provides a definition of a march column.)

11-88. On order, the main body moves rapidly on multiple routes to reconnoitered positions. It may occupy a series of intermediate positions before completing the withdrawal. Usually CS and CSS units, along with their convoy escorts, move first and precede combat units in the withdrawal movement formation. The commander needs to maintain the disciplined use of routes during a withdrawal. Despite confusion and enemy pressure, subordinate units must follow specified routes and movement times.

11-89. When the main body withdraws, its reserve remains well forward to assist the security force and other units by fire and counterattack. The reserve can launch spoiling attacks to disorganize and delay the enemy and extricate encircled or heavily engaged forces.

11-90. If the security force and the reserve cannot prevent the enemy from closing on the main body, the commander must commit some or all of the main body to prevent the enemy from further interfering with the withdrawal. The main body delays or defends if the security force fails to slow the enemy. In this event, the withdrawal resumes at the earliest possible time. If the enemy blocks movement to the rear, the commander shifts to alternate routes to bypass the interdicted area. Alternatively, he can attack through the enemy.

TERMINATING A WITHDRAWAL

11-91. Once the withdrawing force successfully disengages from the enemy, it has two options. It can rejoin the overall defense under more favorable conditions or transition into a retirement and continue its movement away from the enemy and toward its next mission.

RETIREMENT

11-92. A *retirement* is a form of retrograde in which a force out of contact with the enemy moves away from the enemy (JP 1-02). Figure 11-10, page 11-24 shows the tactical mission graphic for a retirement. A retiring unit organizes for combat but does not anticipate interference by enemy ground forces. Typically, another unit's security force covers the movement of one formation as the unit conducts a retirement. However, mobile enemy forces, unconventional forces, air strikes, air assaults, or long-range fires may attempt to interdict the retiring unit. The commander must plan for enemy actions and organize the unit to fight in self-defense. The commander usually



Figure 11-10. Retirement Tactical Mission Graphic

conducts retirement operations to reposition his forces for future operations or to accommodate the current concept of the operation.

11-93. When a withdrawal from action precedes a retirement, the actual retirement begins after the unit breaks contact and organizes into its march formation organization. (While a force withdrawing without enemy pressure can also use march columns, the difference between the two situations is the probability of enemy interference.) Units conduct retirements as tactical road marches where security and speed are the most important considerations.

11-94. The retiring unit generally moves toward an assembly area, which should support the preparations for the unit's next mission. When determining the routes the retiring force takes to the assembly area, the commander considers the unit's capability to support defensive actions if combat occurs during the retirement.

11-95. The initial action in a retirement is to move CSS units and supplies to the rear. At the designated time, the retiring unit executes a withdrawal from action and forms into a march formation. The unit can first move into an assembly area if this step is necessary before moving into a march formation to reestablish command and control or resupply. Once it forms a march formation, the force is prepared to initiate the retirement. During the initial phase, the force retires in multiple small columns. As the distance from the enemy increases, smaller columns can consolidate into larger ones for ease of movement control. Road nets and the potential for hostile interference influence how and when this consolidation occurs.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

11-96. The commander normally designates security elements and a main body in a retirement. (See Figure 11-11.) The formation and number of columns employed during a retirement depend on the number of available routes and the potential for enemy interference. The commander typically wants to move his major elements to the rear simultaneously. However, a



Figure 11-11. Organization of Forces for a Retirement Operation

limited road net or a flank threat may require echelonment of the movement in terms of time and ground locations.

11-97. The terrain and the enemy threat dictate whether the retiring force establishes a single rear security force, which is usually a rear guard, or whether each column forms a separate rear security force. These security forces protect the rearward moving columns from surprise, harassment, and attack by any pursuing enemy force. Their size and composition depend on the strength and imminence of the enemy threat. These security elements generally remain in march columns unless there is a potential for enemy interference. If the enemy establishes contact, the rear security element conducts a delay.

11-98. The retiring march columns normally require an advance guard augmented by engineers. The commander assigns a flank security element to prevent potential enemy interference with the retiring force's extended columns. The commander may designate flank security responsibilities to subordinate march units.

11-99. The main body organizes in a manner opposite that of an approach march. (Chapter 14 explains the approach march.) The movement of CS and CSS units should precede the movement of combat forces. When necessary, elements of the main body can reinforce the rear guard or any other security element. Because fire support elements and attack helicopter elements of the main body can respond most rapidly, they are usually the first elements tasked for this mission.

CONTROL MEASURES

11-100. The control measures used in a retirement are the same as those in a delay and a withdrawal. As in a withdrawal, thorough planning and strict adherence to routes and movement times facilitate an orderly retirement. Typically, the commander controls movement using movement times, routes, and checkpoints. (Chapter 14 discusses movement control measures.)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

11-101. During retrograde operations, CSS units echelon their movements to maintain adequate support to the committed force. They maintain maximum dispersion consistent with control and local security. Their goal is to provide uninterrupted support and maximum protection during the time it takes to conduct the retrograde operation. By echeloning support, the commander reduces the amount of time each CSS unit spends moving, preventing it from performing its primary support tasks. High-priority assets may require added protection to prevent their loss or capture. To reduce congestion and interference with the operations of combat and combat support units, the commander should displace his CSS assets as early as possible, normally in an environment that provides the enemy limited visibility. The early displacement of CSS units can also prevent revealing friendly future operations to the enemy.

11-102. The commander anticipates the effects of retrograde movements on logistics support to ensure adequate support for the operation and the prompt evacuation of casualties. Retrograde movements generally result in increased distances between CSS and combat units, which makes providing this

support more difficult. Executing retrograde operations generally requires more Class III, and possibly more Class V, supplies than other types of defensive operations. These supplies must be available for emergency issue. These two factors combine to increase the demand for transportation assets and the allocation of space on main supply routes. This, in turn, increases the need for movement management and pre-positioned services and supplies. Combat service support units carry and cache necessary fuel and ammunition stocks as required by the specific situation.

11-103. The logistics support provided must be mobile to cope with demands of the fluid tactical situation that typically occurs during a retrograde operation. The commander prevents unnecessary supplies from accumulating in areas that will be abandoned. Only essential medical and logistics support should be located in the area involved in the retrograde operation.

11-104. The commander establishes his maintenance, recovery, and evacuation priorities and his destruction criteria for inoperable equipment in paragraph 4 of the operations order. Maintenance requirements generally overwhelm the organic capabilities of forward units during a retrograde operation. Forward units place as much maintenance, recovery, and evacuation assets forward as possible to augment or relieve combat elements of the burden of repairing unserviceable equipment. Recovery and evacuation vehicles position themselves at critical locations to keep disabled vehicles from blocking movement routes. Forward units evacuate systems that cannot be repaired within established timelines, using all available means, such as equipment transporters and armored vehicles with inoperative weapon systems. When recovery and evacuation are impossible, units destroy inoperable equipment to prevent capture. When possible, units destroy the same vital components in each type of system to prevent the enemy from rapidly exploiting captured friendly systems through battlefield cannibalization.

11-105. The commander assigns transportation priorities to the movement of combat troops and their supplies, the movement of obstacle materials to impede the enemy, and the evacuation of casualties and repairable equipment. He keeps his main supply routes open and decontaminated as necessary. Units control the back-haul of transportation assets before the retrograde begins, reducing the amount of transportation needed to support the operation.

11-106. Generally, the commander prefers to use many separate supply routes rather than just a few main supply routes. Some routes remain open for traffic moving to the front while the bulk of CS and CSS units displace farther rearward. Routes reserved for evacuating displaced civilians avoid crossing or otherwise interfering with the unit's main supply routes to the maximum extent possible.

11-107. The commander bases his medical evacuation priorities on the availability of transportation assets and the results of casualty triage by medical personnel. Medical elements supporting the retrograding force must provide rapid evacuation of casualties to medical facilities. Medical evacuation requirements are especially demanding in the large AOs common to the retrograde. The commander should consider augmenting the ground ambulance capabilities of his forward medical units.

11-108. Military police elements of the retrograde force are involved primarily in battlefield circulation control to ensure smooth traffic flow. The commander may augment his military police force to establish traffic control points and route and convoy security. They also help control dislocated civilians and enemy prisoners of war.

UNIQUE RETROGRADE SITUATIONS

11-109. Conditions that require conducting denial and stay-behind operations can arise during retrograde operations. These two operations have their own unique planning and execution considerations.

DENIAL OPERATIONS

11-110. ***Denial operations*** **are actions to hinder or deny the enemy the use of space, personnel, supplies, or facilities.** It may include destroying, removing, and contaminating those supplies and facilities or erecting obstacles. It is inevitable that, on occasion, an enemy will be in a position to capture friendly equipment and supplies. This situation often occurs during retrograde or defensive operations. As a result, the defending commander may be required to conduct denial operations. The principles of denial are:

- The commander should deny his enemy the use of military equipment and supplies.
- Steps taken to deny equipment and supplies to the enemy should, if possible, not preclude their later use by friendly forces.
- The commander orders the destruction of military equipment and supplies only when friendly forces cannot prevent them from falling into enemy hands.
- The user is responsible for denying the enemy the use of its military equipment and supplies by means of its destruction, removal, or contamination.
- Deliberately destroying medical equipment and supplies and making food and water unfit for consumption is unlawful under the terms of the Geneva Conventions.

In denial operations, the definition of a unit's military equipment and supplies could expand to include military installations and any civilian equipment and supplies used by the friendly force. Under the law of war the destruction of civilian property is only permitted where required by immediate military necessity. The determination of whether there is sufficient necessity to justify destruction is a complex analysis that requires consideration of moral, political, and legal considerations.

11-111. The commander who orders the denial operation must consider the potential value of the military equipment and supplies to an enemy when determining the priorities and the extent of the denial operation. Examples of high priorities for denial include—

- Classified equipment, material, and documents.
- POL.
- Sophisticated weapon systems or electronic equipment.
- Heavy weapons and associated ammunition.

- Communications equipment.
- Ferrying and bridging equipment.
- Air, sea, and land transport systems.

Of lesser priority for denial would be any other military supplies, equipment, or facilities that may be of use to an enemy.

11-112. The commander must issue detailed instructions to deny military equipment and supplies to prevent the enemy from directly using such assets. Denial must also prevent an enemy from repairing a system through the cannibalization of several systems. The unit must destroy the same parts in each type of system.

11-113. Denial differs from countermobility operations because the commander designs denial operations to deprive the enemy of some or all of the short-term benefits of capturing a geographical region. The impact of denial operations on civilian inhabitants and the environment of the region act as a moral and a legal restraint on their use and scope by US forces. The commander should involve his staff judge advocate and civil-military operations officer in planning denial operations.

11-114. The commander ensures that executing the denial plan does not adversely affect his future operations. This includes carefully considering the force's demolition policy in relation to the purpose of the rearward movement and the contemplated subsequent actions of the force. Widespread demolitions during a retrograde may become a greater hindrance to a friendly force moving back into the area than to the enemy during the friendly retrograde. For example, destroying the transportation infrastructure increases friendly logistics difficulties once the area is recaptured. Removing or destroying militarily significant supplies and equipment, such as fuel, obstacle materials, and rail cars, from an area requires the friendly force to bring similar assets with them when they reoccupy the area.

11-115. The commander can expand a denial operation to prevent the enemy from exploiting resources, such as fuel, minerals, and the indigenous population; routes of communication, such as river locks, railroad switching yards, road interchanges, and bridges; and facilities, such as telephone exchanges, radio and television stations, and the industrial plants of a region. The defending force can assist civil authorities in evacuating the civilian population. The defending force either removes the resources, supplies, and facilities from the geographical area being abandoned to the enemy or destroys them in place. Such denial operations may be either total or limited in nature.

11-116. Total denial operations can produce long-term political, economic, military, and environmental effects. Total denial operations have operational-level, and possibly strategic-level, impact. Total denial operations consume large quantities of transportation and engineer resources and require considerable time to plan and execute.

11-117. Limited or partial denial operations are particularly suitable if the defending force expects to regain control of the geographical area within a short time. The removal or destruction of only a few key components can reduce a facility to limited utility, yet it allows for the facility's quick restoration of all functions once it is returned to friendly control. American forces

only destroy discrete targets of significant military value. Limited denial operations normally do not affect the advance of properly supported enemy combat formations possessing cross-country mobility. However, they can seriously impede an enemy's road-bound and rail-bound logistics support if executed with skill and imagination according to an overall plan.

STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS

11-118. **A *stay-behind operation* is an operation in which the commander leaves a unit in position to conduct a specified mission while the remainder of his forces withdraw or retire from an area.** The force should consist of enough combat, CS, and CSS elements to protect and sustain its fighting capability for the duration of the mission. A stay-behind force may also result from enemy actions that bypass friendly forces.

11-119. The main purpose of a stay-behind force is to destroy, disrupt, and deceive the enemy. This force has a high-risk mission because of the danger that it will be located, encircled, and destroyed by the enemy. Resupply and casualty evacuation are also extremely difficult. A commander considers assigning this mission only after a thorough METT-TC analysis. The stay-behind force attacks enemy combat forces and C2, CS, and CSS elements from unexpected directions. (See Figure 11-12.) These attacks may cause enemy follow-on forces to be more cautious and to slow down to clear possible attack and ambush sites. The stay-behind force may be required to conduct a breakout from encirclement and linkup operations after it completes its mission. (Appendix D discusses the conduct of a breakout from encirclement.)



Figure 11-12. Stay-Behind Force

11-120. A light infantry, stay-behind force surprises an enemy by conducting a series of raids and ambushes. The light infantry force can be inserted via infiltration, air assault, or parachute; it can also be a bypassed force. Attacks in the enemy rear area by heavy forces can cover a larger area than attacks by light infantry forces.

11-121. Stay-behind operations eventually require the force to reenter friendly lines or link up with other elements, often in more than one location. The commander must carefully coordinate this reentry to prevent fratricide. The return routes for the stay-behind force must be the best-covered and concealed routes available. Obstacles along these routes that cannot be bypassed should have guarded lanes or gaps.

11-122. A stay-behind operation is not a suicide mission. The commander conducts this operation only when he has confidence that the stay-behind force will rejoin the main body, extract itself in alternative ways, or the main body will fight its way forward to link up with the stay-behind force.

PART FOUR

Tactical Enabling Operations

Chapter 12

Security Operations

The officers and men who permit themselves to be surprised deserve to die, and the commanding general will spare no efforts to secure them their desserts.

D. H. Hill, 1863

Security operations **are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force.** The ultimate goal of security operations is to protect the force from

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surprise and reduce the unknowns in any situation. A commander may conduct security operations to the front, flanks, or rear of his force. The main difference between security operations and reconnaissance operations is that security operations orient on the force or facility being protected, while reconnaissance is enemy and terrain oriented. Security operations are shaping operations.

12-1. There are five forms of security operations—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security.

- ***Screen*** **is a form of security operations that primarily provides early warning to the protected force.**
- ***Guard*** **is a form of security operations whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and combat support assets of the main body.**
- ***Cover*** **is a form of security operations whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body.**
- ***Area security*** **is a form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area.**
- ***Local security*** **consists of low-level security operations conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy.**

The screen, guard, and cover, respectively, contain increasing levels of combat power and provide increasing levels of security for the main body. However, more combat power in the security force means less for the main body. Area security preserves the commander's freedom to move his reserves, position fire support means, provide for command and control, and conduct sustaining operations. Local security provides immediate protection to his force.

12-2. All maneuver forces are capable of conducting security operations. Ground and air cavalry units and scout platoons are specially trained, equipped, and organized to conduct security missions; however, there are rarely enough of them to meet all the security needs of a force. A commander should ensure that subordinate maneuver units train to perform specific security missions. This allows subordinate units to add these missions to their mission-essential task list (METL) and train for them. Habitual relationships with attachments are required to obtain proficiency in these missions.

12-3. A maneuver force commander normally designates the security area within which his security force operates. In this chapter, the force (or facility) being secured is called the main body. When discussing the forms of security operations, the terms *stationary* and *moving* describe the actions of the main body, not the security force.

12-4. All forces, regardless of whether they are combat, combat support (CS), or combat service support (CSS), have an inherent responsibility to provide for their own local security. Local security consists of observation posts (OPs), local security patrols, perimeter security, and other measures to provide close-in security of a force. This chapter focuses on security operations conducted by one force or a subordinate element of a force that provides security for the larger force. Echelon-specific manuals discuss local security.

FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY OPERATIONS

12-5. Successful security operations depend on properly applying five fundamentals:

- Provide early and accurate warning.
- Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
- Orient on the force or facility to be secured.
- Perform continuous reconnaissance.
- Maintain enemy contact.

PROVIDE EARLY AND ACCURATE WARNING

12-6. The security force provides early warning by detecting the enemy force quickly and reporting information accurately to the main body commander. The security force operates at varying distances from the main body based on the factors of METT-TC. As a minimum, it should operate far enough from the main body to prevent enemy ground forces from observing or engaging the main body with direct fires. The earlier the security force detects the enemy, the more time the main body has to assess the changing situation and react. The commander positions ground security and aeroscouts to provide long-range observation of expected enemy avenues of approach, and he reinforces and integrates them with available intelligence collection systems to maximize warning time.

PROVIDE REACTION TIME AND MANEUVER SPACE

12-7. The security force provides the main body with enough reaction time and maneuver space to effectively respond to likely enemy actions by operating at a distance from the main body and by offering resistance to enemy forces. The commander determines the amount of time and space required to effectively respond from information provided by the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process and the main body commander's guidance regarding time to react to enemy courses of action (COA) based on the factors of METT-TC. The security force that operates farthest from the main body and offers more resistance provides more time and space to the main body. It attempts to hinder the enemy's advance by acting within its capabilities and mission constraints.

ORIENT ON THE FORCE OR FACILITY TO BE SECURED

12-8. The security force focuses all its actions on protecting and providing early warning to the secured force or facility. It operates between the main body and known or suspected enemy units. The security force must move as the main body moves and orient on its movement. The security force commander must know the main body's scheme of maneuver to maneuver his

force to remain between the main body and the enemy. The value of terrain occupied by the security force hinges on the protection it provides to the main body commander.

PERFORM CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE

12-9. The security force aggressively and continuously seeks the enemy and reconnoiters key terrain. It conducts active area or zone reconnaissance to detect enemy movement or enemy preparations for action and to learn as much as possible about the terrain. The ultimate goal is to determine the enemy's COA and assist the main body in countering it. Terrain information focuses on its possible use by the enemy or the friendly force, either for offensive or defensive operations. Stationary security forces use combinations of OPs, aviation, patrols, intelligence collection assets, and battle positions (BPs) to perform reconnaissance. Moving security forces perform zone, area, or route reconnaissance along with using OPs and BPs, to accomplish this fundamental.

MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

12-10. Once the security force makes enemy contact, it does not break contact unless specifically directed by the main force commander. The security asset that first makes contact does not have to maintain that contact if the entire security force maintains contact with the enemy. The security force commander ensures that his subordinate security assets hand off contact with the enemy from one security asset to another in this case. The security force must continuously collect information on the enemy's activities to assist the main body in determining potential and actual enemy COAs and to prevent the enemy from surprising the main body. This requires continuous visual contact, the ability to use direct and indirect fires, freedom to maneuver, and depth in space and time.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

12-11. Military history contains numerous examples of the importance of security operations. The following historical example illustrates the major role of security operations in ensuring the success of an operation. This non-US example illustrates that the study of other armies and other times can contribute toward helping to understand the art and science of tactics.

Operation Bagration, 1944

During Operation Bagration, 22 June to 29 August 1944, the Red Army destroyed the German *Army Group Center* and recaptured the last significant part of the Soviet Union remaining under German control. Soviet security operations played a major role in this operation's success. Soviet field regulations of 1944 specified the purposes of security operations: prevent surprise attack of the main body by enemy ground or air forces, prevent enemy reconnaissance, and give friendly forces time and conditions for deployment against the enemy.

From April through June, the Red Army conducted security operations against German reconnaissance and intelligence activities. During this period, Soviet operations directed against German sustaining operations and facilities, conducted

by partisans, kept the Germans so busy conducting area security operations that they had few resources to devote to ground reconnaissance. The Red Army Air Force kept German aerial reconnaissance from looking deep into the Red Army's rear to operational depths. All the Soviet fronts (army groups) preparing for the summer offensive established a 25-kilometer-deep security area against German ground reconnaissance. Frontline divisions conducted numerous and frequent patrols to counter German reconnaissance efforts and maintain regular physical contact with adjoining divisions.

The Soviets used all available assets to maintain the security of forces involved in the operation. Throughout the operation, the Red Army Air Force provided aerial cover, especially for mobile groups and forward detachments. Because the marshy nature of much of the terrain prevented using large mechanized formations, the Soviets used horse cavalry corps, augmented with tanks, to cover ground unsuitable for heavier forces and maintain contact between separated elements of their forward mobile forces.

On the flanks of Operation Bagration, the Soviet 1st Guards Tank Corps served as a covering force against reinforcements or relief efforts from the German *Army Group North*. A combined horse-cavalry mechanized group served the same role in the south for the 1st Byelorussian Front against the German *Army Group North Ukraine*.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS

12-12. There are a number of general considerations when conducting security operations. These apply to all forms of security operations but are most applicable to screen, guard, and cover missions.

COMMON SECURITY CONTROL MEASURES

12-13. Security operations are depicted on overlays using a lightning bolt on either side of the symbol representing the unit conducting the security operation and are labeled with the letter S, G, or C to denote screen, guard, or cover. The end of the lightning bolt has arrowheads that touch the designated operational graphics, which define the left and right limits of the security operation. (See Figure 12-1.)

12-14. The screen, guard, and cover have many common control measures, starting with boundaries defining the security area. The main body commander establishes the security area. For a security force operating to the front of the main body, the lateral boundaries of the security area are normally an extension of the lateral boundaries of the main body. The security force's rear boundary is normally the battle handover line (BHL).

12-15. To establish a screen to the rear of a force, the lateral boundaries are also an extension of the boundaries of the main body, with the screening force's rear boundary being the rear boundary of the entire force. For a flank screen, the lateral boundaries of the security area are an extension of the rear boundary of the main body and its forward edges of the battle area (FEBA) or forward line of own troops (FLOT). The rear boundary of a flank screen is the lateral boundary of the main body. The rear boundary or another phase line (PL) may serve as a BHL between the security force and the main body to

control the passing of responsibility for the enemy to the main body. Normally, the responsibility of the flank security force begins at the trail element of the advance security force or the lead combat element in the main body. It ends at the rear of the main body or the lead element of the rear security force. The main body commander clarifies responsibilities as necessary.

12-16. Either the main body or the security force commander designates additional PLs to control the operation. These PLs may serve as subsequent screen or delay lines. Each element of the security force must report when crossing or occupying them. Displacement to these subsequent PLs is event-driven. The approach of an enemy force, relief of a friendly unit, or movement of the protected force dictates the movement of the security force. The security force commander normally assigns additional lateral boundaries within the security area to delineate the areas of operations (AOs) for subordinate units.

12-17. The commander uses checkpoints and named areas of interest (NAIs) to indicate specific areas of interest and to coordinate movement and surveillance. He uses contact points to facilitate coordination with flank units during front and rear security missions or between elements of a security force within the security area. Units conducting flank security for a moving force physically contact the main body at contact points. If the security force commander wants to ensure coverage of a specific NAI or avenue of approach, he establishes OPs.



Figure 12-1. Common Security Control Measures

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURITY MISSIONS

12-18. In addition to the planning considerations applicable to other types of operations discussed in this manual, such as control of key terrain and avenues of approach, the commander assigning a security mission and the security force commander must address special considerations:

- Force to be secured.
- Location and orientation of the security area.

- Initial observation post locations.
- Types of OPs.
- Time to establish the security force.
- Criteria for ending the security mission.
- Augmentation of security forces.
- Intelligence support to security operations.
- Special requirements or constraints.
- Fire planning.
- Integration of ground and air operations.
- Planning the engineer effort.
- Reporting.
- Positioning of command and control (C2) and CSS assets.
- Combat service support.

Force to Be Secured

12-19. The main body commander must designate the exact force to secure. This designation determines the limits of the security force's responsibilities. The security force must orient on the force it is securing. If the main body moves, the security force also moves to maintain its position in relation to the main body. Table 12-1 shows the typical size of security forces for a given echelon. The limited capabilities of most maneuver platoons prohibit them from having a mission separate from their parent company. Scout platoons are the exception to this rule.

Table 12-1. Typical Size of Security Forces for a Given Mission and Echelon

	SECURITY MISSION			
ECHELON	Screen	Advance Guard	Flank/Rear Guard	Cover
Battalion/Task Force	PLATOON	CO/TM		
Brigade	CO/TM	BN TF	CO/TM	BN TF(+)
Division	DIV CAV BN TF	DIV CAV (+) BDE	DIV CAV BN TF	DIV CAV (+) BDE
Corps	AR CAV SQD BN TF BDE	ACR	AR CAV SQD(+) or BN TF	ACR (+) or Division
Echelons Above Corps **(JTF/Numbered Army)**	ACR (+)	DIV (+) or Corps	ACR or BDE	DIV (+) or Corps

Location and Orientation of the Security Area

12-20. The main body commander determines the location, orientation, and depth of the security area in which he wants his security force to operate. He identifies specific avenues of approach and NAIs he wants covered. Depth in the security area provides the main body with more time to react to approaching enemy ground units. Occupying a deep security area allows the security force to destroy enemy reconnaissance assets without compromising

critical OPs or positions. It also prevents the enemy from penetrating the security area too easily and prevents gaps from occurring when OPs or units displace or are lost. The wider the area to secure, the less the security force can take advantage of the increased depth because it will have fewer forces to position in depth. A very shallow security area may require a guard to provide needed reaction time.

12-21. The security force commander conducts a detailed analysis of the terrain in the security area. He establishes his initial dispositions (usually a screen line) as far forward as possible on terrain to allow good observation of avenues of approach. Next, he assigns clear responsibility for identified avenues of approach and designated NAIs. For a screen or guard, the initial screen line must be within supporting range of the main body, yet provide the desired amount of early warning.

Initial Observation Post Locations

12-22. The security force commander determines tentative initial OP locations along or behind the screen line to ensure effective surveillance of the sector and designated NAIs. The unit or asset that occupies each OP may shift its exact location to achieve the commander's intent. A commander may place more than one OP along a high-speed avenue of approach to allow an enemy contact to be tracked from one OP to another, thus maintaining enemy contact without requiring security forces to displace. The security force commander tasks subordinate units to perform reconnaissance and combat patrols to cover gaps between OPs. To prevent fratricide, the commander places a restrictive fire support coordinating measure around OP locations.

Types of Observation Posts

12-23. Observation posts may be either mounted or dismounted. Mounted OPs can use their vehicular optics, weapon systems, and speed of displacement. However, an enemy can detect them more readily than dismounted OPs. Dismounted OPs provide maximum stealth but lack the speed of displacement, optics, and weapons of mounted OPs. It takes a minimum of two soldiers to man an OP, and then for no more than 12 hours. Observation posts manned for more than 12 hours require, as a minimum, an infantry squad or scout section to ensure continuous operation. The screening force patrols dead space and the area between OPs, conducts resupply operations, and rests or sustains its personnel.

Time the Security Force Must Be Established

12-24. The main body commander must determine when to establish the security force. He decides this based on the activity of the main body and expected enemy activity. He must allow enough time for the security force to move into and occupy the security area to prevent enemy forces from penetrating the security area undetected. The factors of METT-TC influence how the security force deploys to and occupies the screen line. If the security mission is the result of a current reconnaissance mission, the security force is already positioned to begin its mission. This occurs frequently when a reconnaissance mission halts at a designated PL. Analyzing the factors of METT-TC determines which deployment technique meets mission requirements.

Criteria for Ending the Security Mission

12-25. Security missions are usually time- or event-driven. The criteria for ending a security mission can be an action by the main body (such as completing a specific mission), a fixed-time period (for example, not allowing enemy penetration of a PL for two hours), or criteria based on the enemy force (such as its size). To terminate its security mission, the security force commander normally requires the permission of the main body commander to withdraw behind the rear boundary.

Augmentation of Security Forces

12-26. The main body commander is responsible for reinforcing the security force. When the security area is large, additional combat and CS assets may reinforce the security force's organic combat power. Any unique requirement posed by the mission may require assets not organic to the security force. Ground surveillance radars, engineers, and chemical reconnaissance elements are common attachments at the company or troop level.

Intelligence Support to Security Operations

12-27. Intelligence assets can greatly enhance security operations. These assets can conduct rapid surveillance of large areas to detect enemy presence. Remote sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, battlefield surveillance radars, signal intelligence systems, and downlinks from theater and national assets can expand the area under surveillance and cue the security force. Advanced aircraft, such as the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and the AH-64D Longbow, can detect and report enemy forces at extended ranges with thermal imaging and other advanced detection equipment. This permits a commander to concentrate his security force on likely enemy avenues of approach, NAIs, targeted areas of interest (TAIs), and restrictive terrain that degrades sensor performance. The commander can use his intelligence assets to detect enemy movements. This gains time to reposition his security force and mass other assets to counter enemy actions. The commander increases the size of his security force to reduce his risk if he cannot anticipate sufficient advance warning from his intelligence assets.

Special Requirements or Constraints

12-28. The main body commander may impose special requirements or constraints, including engagement, disengagement, and bypass criteria. He may order the security force not to become decisively engaged or fall below a certain combat strength. He may be willing to accept a lesser degree of security, which results from either the loss of more terrain or reduced preparation time by the main body, to preserve his security force for later use.

Fire Planning

12-29. The main body commander positions his fire support assets to support his screen and guard forces. He allocates additional artillery to support a covering force. If the security force is assigned a wide AO, the commander may have to position his fire support assets to provide effective coverage of only the most likely enemy avenues of approach. This is particularly important for a screen because often the screen force can rely only on indirect fire

to delay or disrupt the enemy. Providing adequate indirect fire support to the security force may require the main body to position its artillery well forward in the formation of the main body.

Integration of Ground and Air Operations

12-30. Integrating ground and air operations is critical to the success of many security missions. Aviation units, especially air cavalry, assist in reconnaissance of the security area as the ground element of the security force moves forward. They can perform the following tasks:

- Extend the screen in front of the flank security element's screen line.
- Screen forward of the ground security force.
- Conduct reconnaissance of areas between ground maneuver units.
- Assist in maintaining contact between the security force and the main body.
- Assist in clearing the area between the flank security element and the main body during moving flank security missions.
- Assist in disengaging ground units, which is especially valuable when conducting battle handover and passage of lines with the main body.
- Monitor terrain that is hard to reach or would require too much time to cover with ground reconnaissance assets.

Planning the Engineer Effort

12-31. Countermobility plays a critical role in the security area. With properly integrated obstacles, the security force can maintain a mobility advantage over the enemy. The commander may mass engineer support in the security area initially and then shift support to the main battle area (MBA) once those units are prepared to begin developing engagement areas. They also enhance the mobility of the security force by identifying repositioning routes and task organizing engineers to provide breaching capability. However, the senior commander must consider the impact of prioritizing the countermobility effort in the security area rather than in the MBA or at the decisive point. In the offense, a commander can employ situational obstacles, covered by fire, on the flanks of an advancing force to provide additional security.

Reporting

12-32. The security force reports enemy activities to the main body. The main body headquarters is responsible for disseminating that information to other affected friendly forces. The main body commander ensures that the security force has access to all pertinent intelligence and combat information obtained by the main body. This supplements the security force's capabilities. By continuously exchanging information, both the security force commander and the main body commander have time to choose a suitable COA. Force digitization greatly assists commanders in maintaining a common operational picture.

Combat Service Support

12-33. The unit logistics staff ensures that security element sustainment requirements are embedded in the unit's logistic chain and CSS orders and annexes. A key component in security element sustainment is developing,

maintaining, and using standing operating procedures (SOP). Logisticians and operators must use the SOP and should be involved in their development. The SOP should be exercised and tested during training and changes made as needed. The commander ensures that his staff includes the sustainment of these security elements in logistics rehearsal.

12-34. The security element commander designates the individual within the security element who is responsible for sustaining the element. This is normally the senior noncommissioned officer within platoons and companies assigned security tasks. For example the platoon sergeant of a scout platoon assigned the mission of establishing a flank screen for a battalion task force would coordinate with the first sergeant of the adjacent company team to include the scout platoons sustainment requirements in the company team's logistics package. Likewise the first sergeant of a brigade reconnaissance troop assigned a screening mission coordinates directly with the brigade logistics and forward support battalion staffs for resupply and medical treatment. This individual must have access to the appropriate nets to coordinate logistic support and casualty evacuation.

12-35. That individual coordinates with the appropriate supporting logistics point of contact as soon as possible after receiving the security mission warning order. Coordination includes such items as the mission of the security element, the AO assigned to the security element, the routes it will take to that area from its current location, and movement times. He gives the exact sustainment requirements for the security element—including any specialized items of supply required by the mission, such as cratering charges—to the supporting logistics element. He ensures the support element establishes communication links with the security element and receives a copy of the support element's CSS overlay.

12-36. The commander must place special attention on treating and evacuating casualties for security elements operating removed from normal medical support because of time, terrain, or distance factors, or a need for the security element to remain undetected by the enemy. For this reason, the security element should include as many soldiers trained as combat lifesavers as is possible. The more combat lifesavers within the security element, the more prepared it is for casualties.

Positioning of C2 and CSS Assets

12-37. The security force commander positions himself where he can best control the operation. This is often where he can observe the most dangerous enemy avenue of approach. He positions his command post to provide continuous control and reporting during initial movements. His combat trains position behind masking terrain but remain close enough to the combat elements of the security force to provide rapid response. They are best sited along routes that provide good mobility laterally and in-depth.

MOVEMENT INTO SECURITY AREAS FOR STATIONARY SECURITY MISSIONS

12-38. All stationary security missions are established in a similar manner. In deploying into the security area, the security force must deal with competing requirements: to establish the security area quickly to meet mission

requirements, and to provide the necessary level of security for itself. The security force moves into the security area using one of three basic methods: tactical road march, movement to contact, or zone reconnaissance.

12-39. The fastest but least secure method of deploying is a tactical road march from the rear boundary of the security area to the initial positions. The security force moves to a release point on the rear boundary. From the release point, subordinate elements deploy to occupy initial positions, moving by the quickest means possible. This method is appropriate when enemy contact is not expected, time is critical, or an aviation unit is conducting a zone reconnaissance forward of the ground element and has found no enemy in the security area.

12-40. In the second method, the security force conducts a movement to contact from a line of departure (usually the rear boundary of the security area) to the initial positions. This method is slower than a tactical road march but more secure. It is appropriate when enemy contact is likely, time is limited, terrain reconnaissance is not needed, or an aviation unit is conducting zone reconnaissance forward of the ground element and enemy forces have been detected in the security area.

12-41. The most secure method for moving to the initial positions is for the security force to conduct a zone reconnaissance from the security area rear boundary to its initial security line positions or the forward limit of the security area. Given adequate time, this method is preferred because it allows the security force to clear the security area and become familiar with the terrain that it may have to defend. The security force can reconnoiter potential subsequent positions and fire support system firing positions as it moves to its initial positions. A zone reconnaissance is appropriate when time is available and information about the enemy or terrain is unknown. While this technique provides information of tactical value on the enemy and terrain in the area, it may also be time consuming. Using air reconnaissance forward of the ground units increases the speed and security of the movement.

MOVEMENT DURING MOVING FLANK SECURITY MISSIONS

12-42. There are three techniques of occupying and moving in a flank security area for moving security missions based on how the security force crosses the line of departure:

- Security force crosses the line of departure (LD) separately from the main body and deploys to perform the mission.
- Security force crosses the LD separately from main body; lead elements conduct a movement to contact.
- Security force crosses the LD with the main body and conducts a zone reconnaissance out to the limit of the security area.

12-43. The security force should not be required to make its own penetration when it faces prepared enemy defenses. This may prevent or significantly delay the security force from assuming its duties. These three techniques are often combined.

12-44. In the first technique, illustrated in Figures 12-2 and 12-3, page 12-12, the security force crosses the LD separately from the main body and deploys

to perform the mission. The security force then conducts a tactical road march, an approach march, or tactical movements parallel to the main body and drops off OPs or occupies BPs along the flank of the main body. This technique keeps the two forces from interfering with each other during deployment. It is appropriate when another force penetrates the line of contact, the main body is not in contact with the enemy and is moving quickly, the LD is uncontested, and the IPB process indicates that enemy contact is not likely in the area through which the security force is moving. It is the fastest but least secure technique.



Figure 12-2. Security Force Crossing the LD Separately from the Main Body to Establish a Flank Screen



Figure 12-3. Security Force Continuing to Cross the LD Separately from the Main Body to Establish a Flank Screen

12-45. In the second technique, the security force crosses the LD separately from the main body, and its lead elements conduct a movement to contact. Follow-on elements occupy positions as they are reached. (See Figure 12-4.) This technique is appropriate to use when the main body is moving slower than in the first method, the LD is uncontested, and the IPB process indicates possible enemy contact. It is slower than the previous technique but provides better security.



Figure 12-4. Second Technique Used by a Moving Flank Security Force to Establish a Moving Flank Screen

12-46. Finally, in the third technique, the security force crosses the LD with the main body and conducts a zone reconnaissance out to the far limit of the security area. (See Figure 12-5, page 12-14.) This technique is appropriate when the LD is also the line of contact, the main body makes its own penetration of the enemy defenses along the line of contact, the main body is moving slowly, and the enemy situation is not clearly understood. The security force may follow the lead element of the main body through the gap and deploy when the situation permits. This technique provides increased security for both the security force and the main body; it is also the most time-consuming.

SCREEN

12-47. A unit performing a screen observes, identifies, and reports enemy actions. Generally, a screening force engages and destroys enemy reconnaissance elements within its capabilities—augmented by indirect fires—but otherwise fights only in self-defense. The screen has the minimum combat power necessary to provide the desired early warning, which allows the commander to retain the bulk of his combat power for commitment at the decisive place and time. A screen provides the least amount of protection of any security mission; it does not have the combat power to develop the situation.



Figure 12-5. Third Technique Used by a Moving Flank Security Force to Establish a Flank Guard or Cover

12-48. A screen is appropriate to cover gaps between forces, exposed flanks, or the rear of stationary and moving forces. The commander can place a screen in front of a stationary formation when the likelihood of enemy action is small, the expected enemy force is small, or the main body needs only limited time, once it is warned, to react effectively. Designed to provide minimum security with minimum forces, a screen is usually an economy-of-force operation based on calculated risk. If a significant enemy force is expected or a significant amount of time and space is needed to provide the required degree of protection, the commander should assign and resource a guard or cover mission instead of a screen. The security element forward of a moving force must conduct a guard or cover because a screen lacks the combat power to defeat or contain the lead elements of an enemy force.

12-49. A security force normally conducts a screen by establishing a series of OPs and patrols to ensure adequate surveillance of the assigned area. The commander uses reconnaissance patrols (mounted, dismounted, and aerial), relocates OPs, and employs technical assets to ensure continuous and overlapping surveillance. The commander also employs terrain data base analytical support systems to ensure the integration of his reconnaissance and surveillance assets to provide that necessary coverage.

CRITICAL TASKS FOR A SCREEN

12-50. Unless the commander orders otherwise, a security force conducting a screen performs certain tasks within the limits of its capabilities. A unit can normally screen an avenue of approach two echelons larger than itself, such as a battalion scout platoon screening a battalion-size avenue of approach or a cavalry troop screening a regimental or brigade-size avenue of approach. If a security force does not have the time or other resources to complete all of these tasks, the security force commander must inform the commander assigning the mission of the shortfall and request guidance on which tasks must be completed and their priority. After starting the screen, if the security unit

commander determines that he cannot complete an assigned task, such as maintain continuous surveillance on all avenues of approach into an AO, he reports and awaits further instructions. Normally, the main force commander does not place a time limit on the duration of the screen, as doing so may force the screening force to accept decisive engagement. Screen tasks are to—

- Allow no enemy ground element to pass through the screen undetected and unreported.
- Maintain continuous surveillance of all avenues of approach larger than a designated size into the area under all visibility conditions.
- Destroy or repel all enemy reconnaissance patrols within its capabilities.
- Locate the lead elements of each enemy advance guard and determine its direction of movement in a defensive screen.
- Maintain contact with enemy forces and report any activity in the AO.
- Maintain contact with the main body and any security forces operating on its flanks.
- Impede and harass the enemy within its capabilities while displacing.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

12-51. A screen normally requires the subordinate elements of the security force to deploy abreast. A screen force normally organizes itself into a number of OPs determined by the number of avenues of approach into the main force and any additional NAIs it must cover, as specified by the main force commander. The screening force may retain a small reaction force or reserve to extract endangered OPs.

12-52. The size of the avenue of approach kept under surveillance varies by echelon. Normally, a unit maintains observation over avenues of approach used by operationally significant enemy forces. These are normally avenues of approach used by enemy forces one echelon smaller than the friendly unit. For example, a battalion maintains surveillance over enemy company-size avenues of approach, while the corps maintains surveillance over division-size avenues of approach. The situation may require the unit to maintain surveillance over mobility corridors that can be used by enemy units two echelons smaller than the friendly force.

SCREEN CONTROL MEASURES

12-53. The control measures necessary to conduct a screen were previously discussed in this chapter under common security control measures in paragraphs 12-13 to 12-17. (Figure 12-6, page 12-16 displays examples of control measures associated with a screen.)

EXECUTING A STATIONARY SCREEN

12-54. In setting up the screen, the screening force establishes OPs with overlapping fields of observation. The screen commander adjusts the location of his screening elements to take advantage of established links with higher-echelon sensors and collection assets. Patrols reconnoiter areas that cannot be observed from an OP. The force retains a small reserve if possible. If forces are available and the depth of the security area allows, the screening force

establishes OPs in-depth on high-speed avenues of approach. The commander plans routes between the initial and subsequent screen lines to facilitate rapid occupation of subsequent screen lines. The screening force reserve deploys in-depth and positions itself to react to contingencies that develop during the screen. The screening force takes advantage of its surveillance, target acquisition, and night-observation equipment and information provided by higher-level systems to expand the area and quality of security provided.



Figure 12-6. Control Measures Used in a Screen Mission

12-55. Observation posts should remain undetected while those manning them report the presence of enemy elements. Prompt, accurate reporting is essential to keep the assets constituting the screen from being overrun or unknowingly bypassed. Once the enemy is detected, the OP uses fire support channels to direct engagement of the enemy at maximum range. This helps the OP avoid detection by the enemy and prevents the enemy from penetrating the screen line. The screening force may destroy enemy reconnaissance assets with direct fire if indirect fire cannot accomplish this task. It also attempts to slow the movement of other enemy elements, primarily using indirect fires and close air support.

12-56. As enemy pressure threatens the security of the OP, the unit reports and requests to move to the next screen line. The commander may have previously established criteria that allow the screening force to displace to subsequent screen lines, based on certain enemy or friendly actions. These criteria should allow subordinates to use their initiative when conducting operations. When displacing from one screen line to another, the screening force emphasizes rapid movement while maintaining contact with the enemy. This ensures that any gaps that occur during movement are quickly closed. The screen's C2 elements displace as required to maintain control and keep from being overrun. The force repeats this procedure as often as necessary.

12-57. The screening force commander decides when to move from one screen line to another. However, the main body commander decides when the

screening force can move behind the PL that designates the rear boundary of the security area and hand off the battle to the main body.

EXECUTING A MOVING SCREEN

12-58. The screening force may use several methods to move the screen as the protected force moves. Table 12-2 summarizes each method's advantages and disadvantages.

12-59. A force maintains a moving screen along the flanks and rear of the protected force. The screen movement is keyed to time and distance factors associated with the main body's movement. (See Figure 12-7.) Responsibilities for a moving flank screen begin at the front of the main body's lead combat element and end at the rear of the protected force. They do not include front and rear security forces. A force executes a moving screen in the same way it conducts a stationary screen, except for the movement techniques.



Figure 12-7. Moving Flank Screen

Table 12-2. Screen Movement Methods

METHOD	CHARACTERISTICS	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Alternate Bounds by OPs	• Main body moves faster • Conducted by platoon or company/ troop • Contact is possible • Conducted from rear to front	• Very secure method • Maintains maximum surveillance over the security area	• Execution takes time • Disrupts unit integrity
Alternate Bounds by Units	• Main body moves faster • Conducted by platoon or company/ troop • Contact is possible • Conducted from rear to front	• Execution does not take a great deal of time • Maintains good surveillance over the security area • Maintains unit integrity	• May leave temporary gaps in coverage
Successive Bounds	• Main body is moving slowly • Conducted by platoon or company/troop • Contact is possible • Conducted simultaneously or in succession • Unit should maintain an air screen during ground movement	• Most secure method • Maintains maximum surveillance • Maintains unit integrity	• Execution takes the most time • Unit is less secure when all elements are moving simultaneously • Simultaneous movement may leave temporary gaps
Continuous Marching	• Main body is moving relatively quickly • Performed as a route reconnaissance • Enemy contact is not likely • Unit should maintain an air screen on the flank	• OPs displace quickly • Maintains unit integrity	• Least secure method

12-60. The commander considers the factors of METT-TC in his decision regarding the movement method employed. Figures 12-8 and 12-9, page 12-18, illustrate four methods of controlling movement along a screen line:

- Alternate bounds by individual OPs from the rear to the front. (This method is usually employed at the company/troop level and below.)
- Alternate bounds by subordinate units from the rear to the front.
- Successive bounds by units along the screen line.
- Continuous marching along the route of advance.



Figure 12-8. Displacement Methods for a Flank Screen



Figure 12-9. More Displacement Methods for a Flank Screen

SCREENING OPERATIONS DURING LIMITED VISIBILITY

12-61. Limited visibility often affects the screening force's ground and air observation capabilities. During limited visibility, the screening force uses all available night and thermal observation devices and depends more on electronic surveillance devices. Although the screening force can use technical reconnaissance and surveillance assets to offset limited visibility, it should also adjust its techniques and procedures to the conditions. For example, the commander of a screening force may need to adjust the number and location of his OPs in limited-visibility conditions. He can establish more OPs to cover avenues of approach that become masked in these conditions. He plans for indirect illumination and uses it when necessary. He closely coordinates his patrols to prevent misidentification and engagement by friendly elements. Rigorous sound and light discipline prevents compromise and potential bypass of OPs by enemy reconnaissance forces. Near OPs and along dismounted avenues of approach, the screening force can use trip flares, protective minefields, and mechanical devices, such as noisemakers integrated into tanglefoot obstacles, to detect the enemy and warn of his approach. Additional OPs along enemy avenues of approach can provide depth to facilitate detecting enemy forces that may have eluded forward security elements.

GUARD

12-62. A guard differs from a screen in that a guard force contains sufficient combat power to defeat, cause the withdrawal of, or fix the lead elements of an enemy ground force before it can engage the main body with direct fire. A guard force routinely engages enemy forces with direct and indirect fires. A screening force, however, primarily uses indirect fires or close air support to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements and slow the movement of other enemy forces. A guard force uses all means at its disposal, including decisive engagement, to prevent the enemy from penetrating to a position were it could observe and engage the main body. It operates within the range of the main body's fire support weapons, deploying over a narrower front than a comparable-size screening force to permit concentrating combat power.

12-63. The three types of guard operations are advance, flank, and rear guard. A commander can assign a guard mission to protect either a stationary or a moving force. (See Figure 12-10.)



Figure 12-10. Guard Locations

12-64. A unit conducting a guard performs certain tasks within its capabilities unless ordered otherwise. If a unit does not have the time or other resources to complete all of these tasks, it must inform the commander assigning the mission of the shortfall and

request guidance on which tasks to complete or the priority of tasks. After starting the guard, if the unit determines that it cannot complete an assigned task, such as cause deployment of the enemy advance guard, it must report this to the commander and await further instructions. Guard tasks—

- Destroy the enemy advance guard.
- Maintain contact with enemy forces and report activity in the AO.
- Maintain continuous surveillance of avenues of approach into the AO under all visibility conditions.
- Impede and harass the enemy within its capabilities while displacing.
- Cause the enemy main body to deploy, and then report its direction of travel.
- Allow no enemy ground element to pass through the security area undetected and unreported.
- Destroy or cause the withdrawal of all enemy reconnaissance patrols.
- Maintain contact with its main body and any other security forces operating on its flanks.

12-65. A commander employs a guard when he expects enemy contact and requires additional security beyond that provided by a screen. The multiple requirements of the guard mission are often performed simultaneously over relatively large areas. While the guard force's exact size is determined by prevailing METT-TC conditions, Table 12-1 provides general guidance on the size of an echelon's guard force.

ORGANIZATION OF A GUARD FORCE

12-66. Whether the guard is for a stationary (defending) or moving (attacking) force, the various types of guard missions and knowledge of the terrain and enemy dictate the specific task organization of the guard force. The guard force commander normally plans to conduct the guard mission as an area defense (Chapter 9), a delay (Chapter 11), a zone reconnaissance (see FM 3-55), or a movement to contact (Chapter 4) mission within the security area.

CONTROL MEASURES

12-67. The commander uses graphic control measures to control the operations of his guard force within the security area. The assigned mission also influences the size of the AO given to subordinate elements. For example, a movement to contact normally takes place across a narrower frontage than if the same unit makes a zone reconnaissance to allow adequate concentration of combat power.

12-68. The guard force may task its subordinate elements to conduct screen missions to the front and flanks of the guard force. This provides early warning of enemy forces and helps maintain contact with flank forces and any higher-echelon security force. An example of the latter would be a corps covering force operating in front of a division advance guard. The presence of a higher-echelon security force also influences how the guard force commander organizes his force and conducts operations. It specifically impacts the areas of fire support and CSS.

ADVANCE GUARD

12-69. An advance guard for a stationary force is defensive in nature. It defends or delays in accordance with the main body commander's intent. An advance guard for a moving force is offensive in nature. (See Figure 12-11.) The advance guard develops the situation so the main body can use its combat power to the greatest effect. The main body's combat power must not be dissipated through piecemeal commitment. The full combat power of the main body must be available immediately to defeat the main enemy force.



Figure 12-11. Advance Guard for a Division Shaping Attack

12-70. An advance guard for a moving force normally conducts a movement to contact. It organizes and uses the graphics of a movement to contact. (See Chapter 4.) Ground subordinate elements of a guard are normally deployed abreast to cover the axis of advance or the main body's AO.

12-71. The advance guard is responsible for clearing the axis of advance or designated portions of the AO of enemy elements. This allows the main body to move unimpeded, prevents the unnecessary delay of the main body, and defers the deployment of the main body for as long as possible.

12-72. The advance guard may operate behind the security force of a higher echelon. For example, a division may use its cavalry squadron (reinforced) as an offensive covering force, while each subordinate brigade column organizes one of its battalion task forces into an advance guard. (See Figure 12-12, page 12-22.) In these situations, the higher-echelon security force will initially develop the situation. A commander may task the advance guard to—

- Coordinate and conduct the rearward passage of lines of the covering force.
- Reduce obstacles to create lanes or improve existing lanes as required to support the maneuver of the main body.

- Eliminate enemy forces bypassed by the covering force.
- Coordinate and conduct a forward passage of lines through the covering force and fix enemy forces in the enemy's main defensive positions to allow the friendly main body to maneuver.

12-73. The movement of multiple security forces and the handoff of a detected enemy force from the higher-echelon security force to the lower-echelon security force is controlled using PLs, checkpoints, contact points, BHLs, and disengagement criteria, in addition to other graphic control measures. As a minimum, the covering force has a rear boundary that is also the forward boundary of the advance guard.



Figure 12-12. Multiple Security Forces

12-74. The advance guard engages in offensive operations when necessary to accomplish the mission. After the guard makes enemy contact, the commander determines whether the guard mission requires an attack, a defense, or a delay based on the factors of METT-TC. For example, if the guard force has sufficient combat power to defeat an enemy, it may conduct a hasty attack or defend from its current location. The guard force will not assault strong enemy positions from the front if this can be avoided. The advance guard then destroys the withdrawing enemy force as it exposes itself by moving to other positions. If the advance guard encounters an enemy force that it cannot stop from interfering with the movement of the main body, the security force reports its presence to the main body. It then establishes a defense, continues reconnaissance operations, and prepares to pass elements of the main body forward while facilitating the deployment of the main body.

12-75. If the guard force does not have enough combat power to defeat an approaching enemy, and the depth of the security area permits, the commander can delay back one or more positions before becoming decisively engaged. This reduces the enemy's combat power. Unless the security force is relieved of the guard mission, it must accept decisive engagement to prevent enemy ground forces from using direct fires to engage the main body.

FLANK GUARD

12-76. A flank guard protects an exposed flank of the main body. A flank guard is similar to a flank screen except that the commander plans defensive positions in addition to OPs.

12-77. The commander of the main body designates the general location of the flank guard's positions. Areas of operation assigned to the flank guard should be sufficiently deep to provide early warning and reaction time. However, flank guards must remain within supporting range of the main body. To determine the guard force's exact initial positions, the flank guard commander considers the front and rear of the flank of the main body, the axis taken by the main body, the enemy's capabilities, and the available avenues of approach.

12-78. The flank guard moves to its initial positions using one of the movement techniques discussed on pages 12-11 to 12-13. On reaching the initial positions, the flank guard establishes defensive positions in assigned BPs or within its assigned AO and establishes a screening element forward of these positions. (See Figure 12-13.) In situations where knowledge about the enemy is vague, the flank guard maintains a larger reserve than in situations where the enemy's actions are more predictable.



Figure 12-13. Stationary Flank Guard

12-79. Once the flank guard makes contact with the enemy, it can attack; defend to defeat or fix enemy ground forces in their current positions before they can engage the main body; or conduct a delay as required by the situation.

12-80. When conducting a moving flank guard, a commander must address additional considerations beyond those applying to conducting a moving flank screen. Instead of occupying a series of OPs, the security force plans a series of BPs. The tasks associated with a guard mission apply to a moving flank guard. However, the number and location of echelon-specific avenues of approach over which the security force maintains continuous surveillance change as the main body moves. The security force monitors potential enemy avenues of approach for as long as they threaten the main body.

12-81. The lead element of a moving flank guard must accomplish three tasks. It must maintain contact with the protected force's main body, reconnoiter the area between that main body and the flank guard's routes of advance, and reconnoiter the flank guard's route. It accomplishes these tasks by conducting a zone reconnaissance. The speed of the main body determines how thoroughly it can carry out the reconnaissance. The exact size of the AO for any given unit conducting a guard is METT-TC dependent. For example, on typical central European terrain, an AO wider than 10 kilometers from the guard line to the boundary of the main body should not be assigned to a company or troop. An organization of this size quickly finds itself unable to match the movement of the main body. When the distance from the guard line to the main body boundary exceeds 10 kilometers, the commander of the flank security element should use two or more company-size elements abreast. This ensures that the element making contact with the main body is not overtasked and can match the tempo of the main body. An air cavalry troop may maintain contact with the main body, or a following ground element may perform route reconnaissance along the flank guard's route of advance. Under these conditions, the lead security element does not reconnoiter BPs or occupy them unless required when making contact.

12-82. The rest of the flank guard marches along the route of advance and occupies BPs as necessary. Criteria for the route are the same as in a moving flank screen. The commander designates company-size BPs parallel to the axis of the main body. He places these BPs outside the flank guard's route of advance and along avenues of approach into the flank guard. The flank guard occupies OPs along a screen line forward of these BPs.

12-83. Since the flank guard is moving in one direction and orienting on providing protection to the secured force in another direction, the flank guard commander plans control measures to facilitate this dual orientation. These control measures are normally associated with the moving screen, as well as PLs that run parallel to the direction of movement of the main body. The commander uses these PLs to control the delay or defense if the enemy attacks from the flank being protected. (See Figure 12-14.) He may also assign the flank guard an objective that secures the flank for the main body's objective or otherwise serves to orient its security efforts.

12-84. The flank guard regulates its movement along the route of advance by the pace of the main body, the distance to the objective, and the enemy situation. The three methods of movement are successive bounds, alternate bounds, or continuous marching. (See Chapter 14.) If the main body stops, the flank guard occupies blocking positions. As the speed of the main body changes, the flank guard changes its movement methods. The guard commander must not allow the force to fall behind the main body or present a lucrative target by remaining stationary along the route.

12-85. If the flank guard becomes overextended, the guard commander informs the main body commander and recommends one of the following COAs:

- Reinforce the flank guard.
- Reduce the size of the flank guard's AO.
- Screen a portion of the area and guard the rest.



Figure 12-14. Moving Flank Guard Control Measures

REAR GUARD

12-86. The rear guard protects the exposed rear of the main body. This occurs during offensive operations when the main body breaks contact with flanking forces or during a retrograde. The commander may deploy a rear guard behind both moving and stationary main bodies. The rear guard for a moving force displaces to successive BPs along PLs or delay lines in depth as the main body moves. The nature of enemy contact determines the exact movement method or combination of methods used in the displacement (successive bounds, alternate bounds, and continuous marching).

12-87. During a retrograde, the rear guard normally deploys its ground maneuver elements abreast, behind the main body's forward maneuver units, generally across the entire AO. After the main body conducts a rearward passage of lines, the rear guard accepts battle handover and then defends or delays. Alternatively, the rear guard may conduct a relief in place as part of a deception plan or to take advantage of the best defensive terrain. In both cases, the rear guard establishes passage points and assists the rearward passage of the main body, if necessary. The rear guard accomplishes its defensive mission in the same way as any other guard operation after the main body clears the security area. As the main body moves, the rear guard moves to subsequent PLs in depth. Contact with the enemy force may eventually be lost if it does not follow the retrograding friendly force. Fighting a defense or a delay is necessary if the enemy detects the movement and attacks. (Chapter 11 discusses retrograde operations.)

COVER

12-88. The covering force's distance forward of the main body depends on the intentions and instructions of the main body commander, the terrain, the location and strength of the enemy, and the rates of march of both the main

body and the covering force. The width of the covering force area is the same as the AO of the main body.

12-89. **A *covering force* is a self-contained force capable of operating independently of the main body, unlike a screening or guard force.** A covering force, or portions of it, often becomes decisively engaged with enemy forces. Therefore, the covering force must have substantial combat power to engage the enemy and accomplish its mission. A covering force develops the situation earlier than a screen or a guard force. It fights longer and more often and defeats larger enemy forces.

12-90. While a covering force provides more security than a screen or guard force, it also requires more resources. Before assigning a cover mission, the main body commander must ensure that he has sufficient combat power to resource a covering force and the decisive operation. When the commander lacks the resources to support both, he must assign his security force a less resource-intensive security mission, either a screen or a guard.

12-91. A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard forces. A covering force for a stationary force performs a defensive mission, while a covering force for a moving force generally conducts offensive actions. A covering force normally operates forward of the main body in the offense or defense, or to the rear for a retrograde operation. Unusual circumstances could dictate a flank covering force, but this is normally a screen or guard mission.

ORGANIZATION OF A COVERING FORCE

12-92. Whether the cover is for a stationary (defending) or moving (attacking) force, the various types of cover missions, as well as knowledge of the terrain and enemy, dictate the specific task organization of the covering force. The covering force commander normally plans to conduct the cover mission as an area defense (Chapter 9), a delay (Chapter 11), a zone reconnaissance (see FM 3-55), or a movement to contact (Chapter 4) mission within the security area.

12-93. The commander normally assigns subordinate units one of these missions or the mission of screen or guard. The covering force uses those organizations and control measures associated with these missions. In addition, the commander establishes those control measures necessary for conducting the covering force's passage of lines (forward and rearward). (See Chapter 16.)

12-94. Although the commander can deploy any mobile force as a covering force, the corps covering force is normally built around the armored cavalry regiment or a division. Both have the C2 structures necessary for the forces involved and the capability to cover the geographical area typically required in a cover security mission. The corps commander tailors this unit to be self-contained by reinforcing it with assets such as attack helicopters, field artillery, engineers, air defense, tank, and infantry units with appropriate CSS to sustain the resulting force. A covering force is usually allocated additional artillery and engineer support beyond that normally given to a force of its size because it is operating beyond the main body's supporting range. The covering force commander normally maintains a sizable reserve to conduct counterattacks in the defense and to defeat enemy counterattacks in the offense.

12-95. A division covering force is normally a reinforced brigade, often with the divisional cavalry squadron as part of the covering force, to perform reconnaissance or other security missions. If the division AO is narrow enough, an adequately reinforced cavalry squadron may perform a cover mission. At both corps and division echelons, the amount of reinforcement provided to the covering force determines the distance and time it can operate away from the main body. These reinforcements typically revert to their parent organizations on passage of the covering force. Brigades and battalions typically organize a guard force instead of a covering force because their resources are limited.

12-96. Since one task of the covering force is to deceive the enemy into thinking he has found the main body, the commander should supply the covering force with combat systems that are representative of the main body. For example, if the main body has organic or reinforcing systems, such as MLRS, available to it, the commander should organize the covering force with the same systems.

OFFENSIVE COVER

12-97. An offensive covering force seizes the initiative early for the main body commander, allowing him to attack decisively. Figure 12-15 shows an attacking main body with an advance covering force and a flank guard.



Figure 12-15. Attack Using a Covering Force

12-98. Unless the commander orders otherwise, an offensive covering force performs specific tasks within its capabilities. If a unit does not have the time or other resources to complete all of these tasks, it must inform the commander assigning the mission of the shortfall and request guidance on which tasks to complete or the priority of tasks. After starting the mission, if the unit determines that it cannot complete an assigned task, such as destroying or repelling enemy reconnaissance and security forces in the enemy security area, it must report this to the commander and await further instructions. Offensive covering force tasks include—

- Performing zone reconnaissance along the main body's axis of advance or within the AO.
- Clearing or bypassing enemy forces within the AO in accordance with bypass criteria.
- Denying the enemy information about the strength, composition, and objective of the main body.

12-99. Covering tasks against a defending enemy include—

- Penetrating the enemy's security area to locate enemy main defensive positions.

- Determining enemy strengths and dispositions.
- Locating gaps or weaknesses in the enemy's defensive scheme.
- Defeating or repelling enemy forces as directed by the higher commander.
- Deceiving the enemy into thinking the main body has been committed and causing him to launch counterattacks prematurely.
- Fixing enemy forces to allow the main body to maneuver around enemy strengths or through weaknesses.

12-100. In a meeting engagement, covering tasks include–

- Destroying enemy reconnaissance, the advance guard, and the lead elements of the main body.
- Determining the location of enemy assailable flanks.
- Fixing enemy forces to allow the main body to maneuver around enemy strengths or through weaknesses.

12-101. Planning for offensive covering force operations is similar to planning for zone reconnaissance or movement to contact. Mission analysis using the products of the IPB process helps determine the width of the area to cover and areas (NAIs and TAIs) or routes of special importance. The commander determines specific missions for subordinate elements and assigns boundaries. The covering force commander retains a reserve, which is ready to deploy anywhere in the covering force area. This reserve may be centrally located; it typically locates itself on the most dangerous or critical avenue of approach in the security area.

12-102. The covering force advances on a broad front, normally with its subordinate ground maneuver elements abreast (except for the reserve). This force should clear the enemy's security area of small combat elements while penetrating into the enemy's main defenses. Air cavalry normally reconnoiters forward of advancing ground covering force elements. On enemy contact, the air cavalry reports the enemy's location to the appropriate ground unit and maintains contact. Once the air cavalry makes contact, the covering force rapidly develops the situation. It reports enemy dispositions immediately to the main body commander so he can exploit enemy weaknesses. The covering force fixes encountered enemy forces and destroys them using fire and movement. The covering force does not bypass enemy forces without the permission of the main body commander.

12-103. If the covering force discovers a gap in the enemy's defenses, it prepares to exploit the weakness and disrupt the integrity of that defense. The covering force commander immediately reports this to the main body commander so he can divert main body follow-on forces to support the penetration. The main body commander synchronizes the penetration by the covering force with the arrival of other maneuver units, CS, and CSS to prevent counterattacking enemy forces from isolating and destroying the penetrating elements of the covering force.

12-104. When the covering force can advance no farther, it defends and prepares to assist the forward passage of lines of main body units. It continues to perform reconnaissance of enemy positions to locate gaps or assailable flanks. The covering force may guide main body units as they attack through or

around the covering force. If the covering force has accomplished its mission, the main body commander will attack the enemy's weak point with previously uncommitted main body forces at the appropriate time.

FLANK COVER

12-105. When the main body commander perceives a significant threat to one of his flanks, he normally establishes a flank covering force. That force conducts its mission in much the same way as a flank guard performs its mission. The main differences between the two missions are the scope of operations and the distance the covering force operates away from the main body.

12-106. Just as in a flank guard, the flank covering force must clear the area between its route of advance and the main body. It must also maintain contact with an element of the main body specified by the main body commander. This element is normally part of the advance guard for the flank unit of the main body.

DEFENSIVE COVER

12-107. A defensive covering force prevents the enemy from attacking at the time, place, and combat strength of his choosing. (See Figure 12-16.) Defensive cover gains time for the main body, enabling it to deploy, move, or prepare defenses in the MBA. It accomplishes this by disrupting the enemy's attack, destroying his initiative, and establishing the conditions for decisive operations. The covering force makes the enemy deploy repeatedly to fight through the covering force and commit his reserve or follow-on forces to sustain momentum.



Figure 12-16. Generic Depiction of a Defensive Cover

12-108. Unless the commander orders otherwise, a defensive covering force performs certain tasks within its capabilities. If a unit does not have the time or other resources to complete all of these tasks, it must inform the

commander assigning the mission of the shortfall and request guidance on which tasks to complete or the priority of tasks. After starting the mission, if the unit determines that it cannot complete an assigned task, such as defeat enemy advance guard formations, it must report this to the commander and await further instructions. A defensive covering force emphasizes the following tasks—

- Prevent the main body from being surprised and becoming engaged by direct-fire weapons.
- Defeat enemy advance guard formations.
- Maintain continuous surveillance of high-speed avenues of approach into the security area.
- Defeat all enemy reconnaissance formations before they can observe the main body.
- Cause the deployment of the enemy main body.
- Determine the size, strength, composition, and direction of the enemy's main effort.
- Destroy, defeat, or attrit enemy forces within its capacity.
- Deprive the enemy of his fire support and air defense umbrellas, or require him to displace them before he attacks the MBA.
- Deceive the enemy regarding the location of main body and main defensive positions.
- Avoid being bypassed.

12-109. The defensive covering force may be required to defend, delay, or counterattack. If the covering force area is not occupied, the force may have to reconnoiter and clear the area before establishing the cover. As in offensive operations, aerial reconnaissance is necessary to extend the area covered. Aviation units can screen less threatened areas and rapidly reinforce with their fires when other elements of the covering force are heavily engaged.

12-110. Whatever the command relationships may be at the outset, as the defensive covering force battle progresses, the covering force will be forced back toward the MBA. At this time, some or all of the covering force units fall under the control of the brigades charged with defending the MBA. Once the defensive covering force completes its mission, ground maneuver task forces reinforcing the covering force can do one of three things, separately or in combination. They can take up positions in the MBA, undergo reconstitution, or become part of the echelon reserve. The commander may use cavalry and other reconnaissance elements from the covering force as flank or rear security forces. Alternatively, he may use them to locate and follow the movement of the enemy's follow-on forces. They only establish BPs in the MBA as a last resort.

12-111. The conduct of a rearward passage of lines is an inherent part of the conduct of a defensive cover with its associated requirement to transfer responsibility for the battle between units. The commander must thoroughly plan this complex task as an integral part of the covering force mission. Passage of lines may not occur simultaneously for all covering force units. As some units begin passage, others may still be taking advantage of offensive opportunities in other parts of the security area. The covering force

commander prepares to continue fighting in those portions of the security area where his forces are successful to set up offensive opportunities for the main body.

12-112. The covering force commander must exercise caution when issuing orders within the covering force. Commanders at each echelon will have a different perspective of the battle. This is never truer than in a covering force action. For example, while the covering force commander may be told to delay forward of a river line for 72 hours, he may tell his task force commanders to defend in certain BPs, perhaps for a specified period of time. Once the period expires, the covering force should not automatically retire from the covering force area. It must create enough resistance to force the enemy to deploy his main forces. Commanders at each echelon must precisely state the mission to their subordinate commanders without telling them how to do it. (This is mission command. See FM 6-0.) All too often, a small-unit commander, when told to delay, yields to an urge to *shoot too little*, *pull back too early*, and *move back too far*. Thus, it is imperative that each commander conveys to his subordinates precisely what their mission is in the context of the overall mission. Within a covering force, company teams and troops are mainly involved in a series of defensive operations.

AREA SECURITY

12-113. Area security operations may be offensive or defensive in nature. They focus on the protected force, installation, route, or area. Forces to protect range from echelon headquarters through artillery and echelon reserves to the sustaining base. Protected installations can also be part of the sustaining base or they can constitute part of the area's infrastructure. Areas to secure range from specific points (bridges and defiles) and terrain features (ridge lines and hills) to large population centers and their adjacent areas.

12-114. Operations in noncontiguous AOs require commanders to emphasize area security. During offensive and retrograde operations, the speed at which the main body moves provides some measure of security. Rapidly moving units in open terrain can rely on technical assets to provide advance warning of enemy forces. In restrictive terrain, security forces focus on key terrain such as potential choke points.

12-115. A commander executes rear area and base security as part of an echelon's sustaining operations responsibilities or as part of stability operations and support operations. (Rear area and base security and route and convoy security operations are the subject of Appendix E.) During conventional operations, area security operations are normally economy-of-force measures designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustaining operations designed to support the echelon's decisive and shaping operations. All area security operations take advantage of the local security measures performed by all units regardless of their location within the AO.

12-116. Since civilians are normally present within the AO, a unit restrains its use of force when conducting area security operations. However, the commander always remains responsible for protecting his force and considers this responsibility when establishing his rules of engagement. Restrictions on conducting operations and using force must be clearly explained and understood

by everyone. Soldiers must understand that their actions, no matter how minor, may have far-reaching positive or negative effects. They must realize that either friendly or hostile media and psychological operations organizations can quickly exploit their actions, especially the manner in which they treat the civilian population.

12-117. Sometimes area security forces must retain readiness over long periods without contact with the enemy. This occurs most often during area security operations when the enemy knows that he is seriously overmatched in terms of available combat power. In this case, he normally tries to avoid engaging friendly forces unless it is on his terms. Forces conducting area security should not develop a false sense of security even if the enemy appears to have ceased operations within the secured area. The commander must assume that the enemy is observing his operations and is seeking routines, weak points, and lax security for the opportunity to strike with minimum risk.

LOCAL SECURITY

12-118. Local security includes any local measure taken by units against enemy actions. It involves avoiding detection by the enemy or deceiving the enemy about friendly positions and intentions. It also includes finding any enemy forces in the immediate vicinity and knowing as much about their positions and intentions as possible. Local security prevents a unit from being surprised and is an important part of maintaining the initiative. The requirement for maintaining local security is an inherent part of all operations. Units perform local security when conducting full spectrum operations, including tactical enabling operations.

12-119. Units use both active and passive measures to provide local security. Active measures include—

- Using OPs and patrols.
- Establishing specific levels of alert within the unit. The commander adjusts those levels based on the factors of METT-TC.
- Establishing stand-to times. The unit SOP should detail the unit's activities during the conduct of stand-to.

12-120. Passive local security measures include using camouflage, movement control, noise and light discipline, and proper communications procedures. It also includes employing available ground sensors, night-vision devices, and daylight sights to maintain surveillance over the area immediately around the unit.

COMBAT OUTPOSTS

12-121. **A *combat outpost* is a reinforced OP capable of conducting limited combat operations.** (See Figure 12-17.) Using combat outposts is a technique for employing security forces in restrictive terrain that precludes mounted security forces from covering the area. They are also used when smaller OPs are in danger of being overrun by enemy forces infiltrating into and through the security area. The commander uses a combat outpost when he wants to extend the depth of his security area, when he wants his forward

OPs to remain in place until they can observe the enemy's main body, or when he anticipates that his forward OPs will be encircled by enemy forces. Both mounted and dismounted forces can employ combat outposts.



Figure 12-17. Combat Outposts

12-122. While the factors of METT-TC determine the size, location, and number of combat outposts established by a unit, a reinforced platoon typically occupies a combat outpost. A combat outpost must have sufficient resources to accomplish its designated missions, but not so much as to seriously deplete the strength of the main body. It is usually located far enough in front of the protected force to preclude enemy ground reconnaissance elements from observing the actions of the protected force.

12-123. The commander organizes a combat outpost to provide an all-around defense to withstand a superior enemy force. When the enemy has significant armored capability, a combat outpost may be given more than a standard allocation of antitank weapons. Forces manning combat outposts can conduct aggressive patrolling, engage and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements, and engage the enemy main body prior to their extraction. The commander should plan to extract his forces from the outpost before the enemy has the opportunity to overrun them.

Chapter 13

Reconnaissance Operations

You can never have too much reconnaissance.

General George S. Patton Jr., *War As I Knew It*, 1947

Reconnaissance operations **are those operations undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical or geographical characteristics and the indigenous population of a particular area.** Reconnaissance primarily relies on the human dynamic rather than technical means. Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort. It is performed before, during, and after other operations to provide information used in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, as well as by the commander in order to formulate, confirm, or modify his course of action (COA). The four forms of reconnaissance are route, zone, area, and reconnaissance in force.

13-1. Reconnaissance identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly obstacles to movement, and the disposition of enemy forces and civilian population so the commander can maneuver his forces freely and rapidly. Reconnaissance prior to unit movements and occupation of assembly areas is critical to protecting the force and preserving combat power. It also keeps the force free from contact as long as possible so that it can concentrate on its decisive operation.

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RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE

13-2. The commander orients his reconnaissance assets by identifying a reconnaissance objective within the area of operation (AO). **The *reconnaissance objective* is a terrain feature, geographic area, or an enemy force about which the commander wants to obtain additional information.** The reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by specifying the most important result to obtain from the reconnaissance effort. Every reconnaissance mission must specify a reconnaissance objective. The commander assigns a reconnaissance objective based on his priority intelligence requirements (PIR) resulting from the IPB process and the reconnaissance asset's capabilities and limitations. The reconnaissance objective can be information about a specific geographical location, such as the cross-country trafficability of a specific area, a specific enemy activity to be confirmed or denied, or a specific enemy unit to be located and tracked. When the reconnaissance unit does not have enough time to complete all the tasks associated with a specific form of reconnaissance, it uses the reconnaissance objective to guide it in setting priorities.

13-3. A commander may need to provide additional detailed instructions beyond the reconnaissance objective, such as the specific tasks he wants accomplished or the priority of tasks. He does this by issuing additional guidance to his reconnaissance unit or by specifying these instructions in his tasks to his subordinate units in the operation order. For example, if, based on all technical and human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, a division G2 concludes that the enemy is not in an area and the terrain appears to be trafficable without obstacles, the division commander may decide he does not need a detailed reconnaissance effort forward of his unit. He may direct his cavalry squadron to conduct a zone reconnaissance mission with guidance to move rapidly and report by exception terrain obstacles that will significantly slow the movement of his subordinate maneuver brigades. Alternatively, when the objective is to locate an enemy force, the reconnaissance objective would be that force, and additional guidance would be to conduct only that terrain reconnaissance necessary to find the enemy and develop the situation.

RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS

13-4. The seven fundamentals of successful reconnaissance operations are as follows:

- Ensure continuous reconnaissance.
- Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.
- Orient on the reconnaissance objective.
- Report information rapidly and accurately.
- Retain freedom of maneuver.
- Gain and maintain enemy contact.
- Develop the situation rapidly.

ENSURE CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE

13-5. Effective reconnaissance is continuous. The commander conducts reconnaissance before, during, and after all operations. Before an operation,

reconnaissance focuses on filling gaps in information about the enemy and the terrain. During an operation, reconnaissance focuses on providing the commander with updated information that verifies the enemy's composition, dispositions, and intentions as the battle progresses. This allows the commander to verify which COA is actually being adopted by the enemy and determine if his plan is still valid based on actual events in the AO. After an operation, reconnaissance focuses on maintaining contact with the enemy to determine his next move and collecting information necessary for planning subsequent operations. When information regarding the current operation is adequate, reconnaissance focuses on gathering information for branches and sequels to current plans. As a minimum, reconnaissance is conducted continuously as an integral part of all security missions, including the conduct of local security for forces not in contact. (See Chapter 12.)

13-6. Reconnaissance operations over extended distances and time may require pacing reconnaissance assets to maintain the effort, or rotating units to maintain continuous coverage. The human and technical assets used in the reconnaissance effort must be allowed time for rest, resupply, troop leading procedures, additional and refresher training, and preventative maintenance checks and services. The commander must determine not only where, but also when he will need his maximum reconnaissance effort and pace his reconnaissance assets to ensure that adequate assets are available at critical times and places.

DO NOT KEEP RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS IN RESERVE

13-7. Reconnaissance assets, like artillery assets, are never kept in reserve. When committed, reconnaissance assets use all of their resources to accomplish the mission. This does not mean that all assets are committed all the time. The commander uses his reconnaissance assets based on their capabilities and METT-TC to achieve the maximum coverage needed to answer the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). At times, this requires the commander to withhold or position reconnaissance assets to ensure that they are available at critical times and places. The rest required by reconnaissance assets to sustain the reconnaissance effort is not to be obtained by placing them in reserve. However, all reconnaissance assets should be treated as committed assets with specific missions assigned at all times. Units with multiple roles, specifically armored and air cavalry, that can conduct reconnaissance, security, and other combat missions in an economy-of-force role may be kept as a reserve for security or combat missions.

ORIENT ON THE RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE

13-8. The commander uses the reconnaissance objective to focus his unit's reconnaissance efforts. Commanders of subordinate reconnaissance elements remain focused on achieving this objective, regardless of what their forces encounter during the mission. When time, limitations of unit capabilities, or enemy action prevents a unit from accomplishing all the tasks normally associated with a particular form of reconnaissance, the unit uses the reconnaissance objective to focus the reconnaissance effort.

REPORT INFORMATION RAPIDLY AND ACCURATELY

13-9. Reconnaissance assets must acquire and report accurate and timely information on the enemy, civil considerations, and the terrain over which operations are to be conducted. Information may quickly lose its value. Reconnaissance units report exactly what they see and, if appropriate, what they do not see. Seemingly unimportant information may be extremely important when combined with other information. Negative reports are as important as reports of enemy activity. Failure to report tells the commander nothing. The unit information management plan ensures that unit reconnaissance assets have the proper communication equipment to support the integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan.

RETAIN FREEDOM OF MANEUVER

13-10. Reconnaissance assets must retain battlefield mobility to successfully complete their missions. If these assets are decisively engaged, reconnaissance stops and a battle for survival begins. Reconnaissance assets must have clear engagement criteria that support the maneuver commander's intent. They must employ proper movement and reconnaissance techniques, use overwatching fires, and standing operating procedures (SOP). Initiative and knowledge of both the terrain and the enemy reduce the likelihood of decisive engagement and help maintain freedom of movement. Prior to initial contact, the reconnaissance unit adopts a combat formation designed to gain contact with the smallest possible friendly element. This provides the unit with the maximum opportunity for maneuver and enables it to avoid having the entire unit become decisively engaged. The IPB process can identify anticipated areas of likely contact to the commander. Using indirect fires to provide suppression and obscuration as well as destroy point targets is a method reconnaissance assets use to retain their freedom of maneuver.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

13-11. Once a unit conducting reconnaissance gains contact with the enemy, it maintains that contact unless the commander directing the reconnaissance orders otherwise or the survival of the unit is at risk. This does not mean that individual scout and reconnaissance teams cannot break contact with the enemy. The commander of the unit conducting reconnaissance is responsible for maintaining contact using all available resources. That contact can range from surveillance to close combat. Surveillance, combined with stealth, is often sufficient to maintain contact and is the preferred method. Units conducting reconnaissance avoid combat unless it is necessary to gain essential information, in which case the units use maneuver (fire and movement) to maintain contact while avoiding decisive engagement.

DEVELOP THE SITUATION RAPIDLY

13-12. When a reconnaissance asset encounters an enemy force or an obstacle, it must quickly determine the threat it faces. For an enemy force, it must determine the enemy's composition, dispositions, activities, and movements and assess the implications of that information. For an obstacle, it must determine the type and extent of the obstacle and whether it is covered by fire. Obstacles can provide the attacker with information concerning the location

of enemy forces, weapon capabilities, and organization of fires. In most cases, the reconnaissance unit developing the situation uses actions on contact. (See Chapter 4 for a discussion of actions on contact.)

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

13-13. Military history contains numerous examples of the importance of reconnaissance operations. The following historical example illustrates the major role of reconnaissance operations in ensuring the success of an operation. This non-US, medieval example illustrates that the study of other armies and other times has a great deal to contribute in helping the tactician understand the art and science of tactics.

The Battle of the Sajo River

Reconnaissance was critical in determining enemy dispositions and taking advantage of the terrain in this and many other Mongol battles. The Mongol army conducted continuous reconnaissance with a definite reconnaissance objective, and a significant part of their success resulted from their reconnaissance operations. During operations, light cavalry preceded each of their army's main columns performing reconnaissance. They reported on terrain and weather conditions as well as the enemy's size, location, and movements. If a Mongol column met an enemy force that it could defeat, it did so. If it could not, its light cavalry maintained contact with the enemy, developed the situation to its advantage, and maintained freedom of movement. The Mongol light cavalry inflicted casualties and disrupted the enemy's movements while the main Mongol army deployed for action.

In March 1241, a Mongol army of some 70,000 crossed the Carpathian Mountains from Russia into the Hungarian Plain. By mid-April, its light cavalry located the 100,000-man Hungarian army near the cities of Buda and Pest on the Danube River. In response, the Mongol army concentrated its previously dispersed columns as it approached the Danube. Once that the Mongols knew that they had been detected by the Hungarians, they deliberately withdrew about 100 miles northeast and led the Hungarians to a previously selected spot, Mohi Heath, on the Sajo River. The Mongols crossed the Sajo using an existing stone bridge and camped east of the river. The Hungarians followed and halted on the west bank, built a camp, took the stone bridge, and left a bridgehead on the east bank. Mongol reconnaissance discovered the location and dispositions within the Hungarian camp as well as a river-crossing site north of the camp. After dark, the main body of the Mongol army moved to cross the river at the crossing site. In addition to using the ford, the Mongols constructed a bridge to aid their crossing.



Figure 13-1. Mongol Army Route

The next morning, the remainder of the Mongol army conducted a supporting attack on the Hungarian force at the stone bridge, drawing the Hungarian army out of its camp to fight. While the supporting Mongol forces succeeded in recrossing the Sajo via the stone bridge, the fighting was hard and they nearly lost their battle while waiting for the main body to come to their support. After 2 hours, the Mongol main body fell on the Hungarian rear and flank, driving the Hungarians back into their camp. As was Mongol practice, they deliberately left an escape route from the enemy camp open. The ensuing Mongol pursuit destroyed the Hungarian army when they tried to withdraw from their camp.



Figure 13-2. Mongol Army Pursuit

CHARACTERISTICS OF RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

13-14. The responsibility for conducting reconnaissance does not reside solely with specifically organized units. Every unit has an implied mission to report information about the terrain, civilian activities, and friendly and enemy dispositions, regardless of its battlefield location and primary function. Frontline troops and reconnaissance patrols of maneuver units at all echelons collect information on enemy units with which they are in contact. In rear areas, reserve maneuver forces, fire support assets, air defense, military police, host nation agencies, combat support, and combat service support elements observe and report civilian and enemy activity. Although all units conduct reconnaissance, those specifically trained in reconnaissance tasks are ground and air cavalry, scouts, long-range reconnaissance units, and Special Forces. Some branches, such as the Corps of Engineers and the Chemical Corps, have specific reconnaissance tasks to perform that complement the force's overall reconnaissance effort. However, the corps and division commanders will primarily use their organic cavalry and intelligence elements to conduct reconnaissance operations.

13-15. At battalion level and above, the commander assigns missions to his ISR assets based on their organization, equipment, and training. The commander must know the capabilities and limitations of his available reconnaissance assets to ensure the employment of these assets within their capabilities and on missions for which they have been trained and equipped. Table 13-1 on page 13-6 shows the typical nesting of ISR assets available at different tactical echelons.

Table 13-1. Typical ISR Assets Available

	Platoon	Co/Tm	BN/TF	Brigade	Division	Corps	EAC
Observation Post	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX
Reconnaissance Patrol	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX
Combat Outpost	AAA	AAA	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX
Scout Platoon	AAA	AAA	XXX	XXX			
Brigade Recon Troop		AAA	AAA	XXX	XXX		
Cavalry Troop (Sep Bde)		AAA	AAA	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX
Chemical Reconnaissance		AAA	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX
FA COLT Team	AAA	AAA	XXX	XXX			
FA Target Acq Systems			AAA	AAA	XXX	XXX	
ADA Target Acq Systems			AAA	AAA	XXX	XXX	XXX
Grd Surveillance Radars		AAA	XXX	XXX			
Other MI Collection Sys			AAA	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX
Division Cavalry Squadron				AAA	XXX	XXX	
Air Cavalry				AAA	XXX	XXX	XXX
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles			AAA*	XXX*	XXX	XXX	XXX
Cavalry Regiment					AAA	XXX	XXX
Long-Range Surveillance Unit					AAA*	XXX	XXX
SOF (SF/RGR)					AAA	AAA	XXX
Technical Surveillance Platforms			AAA	AAA	AAA	AAA	XXX

XXX = Echelon controls or routinely tasks the asset.

AAA = Echelon can routinely expect the information from that source to be made available to it.

* Can be found in some divisions.

13-16. A commander primarily conducts reconnaissance with a combination of manned ground and air assets supported by technical systems. Acting in concert, these assets create a synergy, using the strengths of one system to overcome the weaknesses of another. To produce this synergy, the commander must delineate reporting procedures for all units to pass on information gathered during reconnaissance operations. This facilitates rapid mission execution.

13-17. Dedicated reconnaissance assets are easily overtasked and overextended. The commander uses all available resources, not just reconnaissance units, to satisfy his information requirements. Ground reconnaissance can involve assets not specifically tailored for the mission. Engineer reconnaissance units collect information on how the terrain affects the movement of enemy and friendly forces. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance teams can determine the presence or absence of NBC contamination and the extent of that contamination. Artillery forward observers, fire support teams, and combat observation and lasing teams (COLTs) report combat information as they observe the battlefield. Air defense units observe and report enemy aircraft and air corridors in use.

13-18. Ground reconnaissance elements are generally limited in the depth to which they can conduct reconnaissance. However, they can operate under weather conditions that prohibit air reconnaissance operations.

13-19. Reconnaissance conducted by manned Army aviation platforms complements ground reconnaissance by greatly increasing the speed and depth with which reconnaissance operations can be conducted over a given area. Air reconnaissance can operate easily over terrain that hinders ground operations, such as swamps, extremely rugged terrain, or deep snow. Aviation assets can operate at a considerable depth, far in advance of the normal capability of dedicated ground reconnaissance elements normally focused on the close fight. Thus, they provide the commander with additional time to attack or otherwise react to the enemy's presence. Scout and attack helicopters use their optics, video, thermal imaging, and communications capabilities to detect and report the enemy. All types of aviation units generate pilot reports in the course of conducting their primary missions. These reports are often a source of valuable combat information.

13-20. While several technical systems can perform reconnaissance, the majority of these types of systems can be more accurately described as surveillance platforms. Surveillance complements reconnaissance by cueing the commitment of reconnaissance assets against specific locations or specially targeted enemy units. Surveillance provides information while reconnaissance answers the commander's specific questions.

13-21. Military intelligence (MI) assets conduct both surveillance and reconnaissance missions. They provide intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support, such as electronic intercept, ground surveillance radars, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and remotely emplaced sensors. Theater and national reconnaissance and surveillance systems provide broadcast dissemination of information and intelligence to the commander and can provide near real-time imagery as a part of an integrated ISR effort. Artillery and air defense target acquisition radars can complement MI surveillance systems as a part

of the ISR effort. HUMINT collection occurs through face-to-face interrogation of captured enemy soldiers, screening of the civilian population, and debriefing of friendly soldiers, such as scouts and SOF.

FORMS OF RECONNAISSANCE

13-22. The four forms of reconnaissance operations are—

- Route reconnaissance.
- Zone reconnaissance.
- Area reconnaissance.
- Reconnaissance in force (RIF).

Table 13-2 shows what types of dedicated reconnaissance units are typically assigned the missions of conducting the four forms of reconnaissance operations.

Table 13-2. Dedicated Reconnaissance Units and Forms of Reconnaissance Operations

	SCOUT PLATOON	TROOP/CO TEAM	AIR CAV TROOP	AR CAV SQD/ BN	AR CAV REGT/ BDE	DIV
Route	X	X	X			
Zone	X	X	X	X	X	
Area	X	X	X	X	X	
Recon in Force				X	X	X

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

13-23. ***Route reconnaissance*** **is a form of reconnaissance that focuses along a specific line of communication, such as a road, railway, or cross-country mobility corridor.** It provides new or updated information on route conditions, such as obstacles and bridge classifications, and enemy and civilian activity along the route. A route reconnaissance includes not only the route itself, but also all terrain along the route from which the enemy could influence the friendly force's movement. The commander normally assigns this mission when he wants to use a specific route for friendly movement.

Organization of Forces

13-24. The commander may assign a route reconnaissance as a separate mission or as a specified task for a unit conducting a zone or area reconnaissance. A scout platoon can conduct a route reconnaissance over only one route at a time. For larger organizations, the number of scout platoons available directly influences the number of routes that can be covered at one time. Integrating ground, air, and technical assets assures a faster and more complete route reconnaissance.

13-25. A ground reconnaissance effort is essential if the mission is to conduct detailed reconnaissance of the route or the mission requires clearing the enemy from an AO that includes the route and the terrain around the route. The

forces assigned to conduct this ground reconnaissance must be robust enough to handle expected enemy forces in the AO. If the commander expects them to make contact with enemy forces possessing more combat power than that typically found in enemy reconnaissance elements, he ensures that his forces conducting ground reconnaissance have access to readily available fire support. If the commander requires detailed information on the route, engineer reconnaissance assets can determine the classification of critical points along the route more quickly and accurately than scouts can. If the commander anticipates significant obstacles, combat engineers should be included as part of the force. If NBC contamination is expected, NBC reconnaissance assets should accompany the force conducting ground reconnaissance because they can detect and determine the extent of contamination more accurately and quickly than scouts can. Air reconnaissance can be used if the reconnaissance mission must be completed quickly. However, aerial reconnaissance can rarely clear an enemy force from a location where it can affect movement on the route and aircraft cannot breach obstacles. When time is limited, air reconnaissance is essential to determine which areas are clear of enemy forces and obstacles, and to cue ground reconnaissance regarding where to focus its efforts.

Control Measures

13-26. Control measures for a route reconnaissance create an AO for the unit conducting the reconnaissance. (See Figure 13-3.) The commander places lateral boundaries on both sides of the route, far enough out to allow reconnaissance of all terrain from which the enemy could dominate the route. He places a line of departure (LD) perpendicular to the route short of the start point (SP), allowing adequate space for the unit conducting the reconnaissance to deploy into formation. The LD creates the rear boundary of the AO. A limit of advance (LOA) is placed far enough beyond the route's release point (RP) to include any terrain from which the enemy could dominate the route. A SP and a RP define that section of the route where the unit collects detailed information. He may add phase lines (PLs) and checkpoints to maintain coordinated reconnaissance, control movement, or designate critical points. He places additional control measures to coordinate indirect and direct fire as necessary. He



Figure 13-3. Route Reconnaissance Control Measures

places these control measures on terrain features that are identifiable from both the ground and the air to assist in air-to-ground coordination.

Tasks

13-27. Unless the commander orders otherwise, the unit conducting a route reconnaissance performs specific tasks within the limits of its capabilities. If a unit does not have the time or resources to complete all of these tasks, it must inform the commander assigning the mission. He must then issue further guidance on which tasks the unit must complete or the priority of each task, which is usually clear from the reconnaissance objective. If, after starting the reconnaissance, the unit determines that it cannot complete an assigned task, such as clearing the enemy or reducing obstacles to create lanes as required to support the maneuver of the main body along the route, it must report and await further instructions.

13-28. Route reconnaissance tasks are as follows:

- Find, report, and clear within capabilities all enemy forces that can influence movement along the route.
- Determine the trafficability of the route; can it support the friendly force?
- Reconnoiter all terrain that the enemy can use to dominate movement along the route, such as choke points, ambush sites, and pickup zones, landing zones, and drop zones.
- Reconnoiter all built-up areas, contaminated areas, and lateral routes along the route.
- Evaluate and classify all bridges, defiles, overpasses and underpasses, and culverts along the route.
- Locate any fords, crossing sites, or bypasses for existing and reinforcing obstacles (including built-up areas) along the route.
- Locate all obstacles and create lanes as specified in execution orders.
- Report the above route information to the headquarters initiating the route reconnaissance mission, to include providing a sketch map or a route overlay.

(See FM 3-34.212 and FM 3-20.95 for additional information concerning route reconnaissance.)

ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

13-29. ***Zone reconnaissance*** **is a form of reconnaissance that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries.** Obstacles include both existing and reinforcing, as well as areas with NBC contamination. The commander assigns a zone reconnaissance mission when he needs additional information on a zone before committing other forces in the zone. It is appropriate when the enemy situation is vague, existing knowledge of the terrain is limited, or combat operations have altered the terrain. A zone reconnaissance may include several route or area reconnaissance missions assigned to subordinate units.

13-30. A zone reconnaissance is normally a deliberate, time-consuming process. It takes more time than any other reconnaissance mission, so the commander must allow adequate time to conduct it. A zone reconnaissance is normally conducted over an extended distance. It requires all ground elements executing the zone reconnaissance to be employed abreast of each other. However, when the reconnaissance objective is the enemy force, a commander may forgo a detailed reconnaissance of the zone and focus his assets on those named areas of interest (NAI) that would reveal enemy dispositions and intentions. A reconnaissance unit can never disregard terrain when focusing on the enemy. However, it minimizes its terrain reconnaissance to that which may influence an NAI.

Organization of Forces

13-31. Considerations for organizing a zone reconnaissance are the same as for organizing a route reconnaissance except that several subordinate units, rather than just one unit, operate abreast during the zone reconnaissance. If the commander expects significant enemy forces to be found within the zone, he should provide the force conducting the zone reconnaissance with a reserve. This reserve should have adequate combat power to extract elements of the reconnaissance force from decisive engagement. In an armored cavalry squadron of an armored cavalry regiment, the tank company normally performs this task. If a unit conducts a zone reconnaissance out of supporting range of the main body, the commander ordering the zone reconnaissance provides the reconnaissance unit with adequate fire support assets that can move with the reconnaissance unit.

Control Measures

13-32. The commander controls a zone reconnaissance by assigning an AO to the unit conducting the reconnaissance. (See Figure 13-4.) The lateral boundaries, a LD, and a LOA define this AO. Within the AO, the force conducting the zone reconnaissance further divides the AO with additional lateral boundaries to define subordinate unit AOs. Subordinate AOs are not necessarily the same size. Phase lines and contact points, located where the commander determines that it is necessary for adjacent units to make physical contact, are used to coordinate the movement of elements operating abreast. He may further designate the time that this physical contact takes place. He uses



Figure 13-4. Zone Reconnaissance Control Measures

checkpoints to indicate critical terrain features and to coordinate air and ground teamwork. He may use fire support coordinating measures to control direct and indirect fires. He uses additional control measures as necessary. In addition, the commander assigning the zone reconnaissance mission must specify the route the reconnaissance unit must use to enter the AO. All control measures should be on recognizable terrain when possible.

Tasks

13-33. Unless the commander orders otherwise, a unit conducting a zone reconnaissance performs the following tasks within the limits of its capabilities. If a unit does not have the time or resources to complete all of these tasks, it must inform the commander assigning the mission. He must then issue further guidance on which tasks the unit must complete or the priority of tasks, which is usually clear from the reconnaissance objective. After starting the reconnaissance, if the unit determines that it cannot complete an assigned task, such as clear enemy or reduce obstacles in zone to create lanes as required to support the main body's maneuver, it must report and await further instructions.

13-34. Zone reconnaissance tasks are as follows:

- Find and report all enemy forces within the zone.
- Clear all enemy forces in the designated AO within the capability of the unit conducting reconnaissance.
- Determine the trafficability of all terrain within the zone, including built-up areas.
- Locate and determine the extent of all contaminated areas in the zone.
- Evaluate and classify all bridges, defiles, overpasses, underpasses, and culverts in the zone.
- Locate any fords, crossing sites, or bypasses for existing and reinforcing obstacles (including built-up areas) in the zone.
- Locate all obstacles and create lanes as specified in execution orders.
- Report the above information to the commander directing the zone reconnaissance, to include providing a sketch map or overlay.

AREA RECONNAISSANCE

13-35. ***Area reconnaissance*** **is a form of reconnaissance that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area.** This area may include a town, a ridgeline, woods, an airhead, or any other feature critical to operations. The area may consist of a single point, such as a bridge or an installation. Areas are normally smaller than zones and are not usually contiguous to other friendly areas targeted for reconnaissance. Because the area is smaller, an area reconnaissance moves faster than a zone reconnaissance.

Organization of Forces

13-36. Considerations for the organization of forces for an area reconnaissance are the same as for organizing a zone reconnaissance. (See paragraphs 13-31 to 13-33.)

Control Measures

13-37. The commander assigning an area reconnaissance specifies the area for reconnaissance with a single continuous line to enclose the area to reconnoiter. Alternatively, he may designate the area by marking lateral boundaries, a LD, and a LOA. An area reconnaissance mission always specifies the route to take in moving to the area. The commander of the unit conducting the area reconnaissance mission can use control measures for a zone reconnaissance within the AO to control the operation of his subordinate elements. (See Figure 13-5.)



Figure 13-5. Area Reconnaissance Control Measures

Tasks

13-38. The tasks for an area reconnaissance are also the same as for a zone reconnaissance. (See paragraph 13-34.)

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

13-39. **A *reconnaissance in force* is a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy's strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.** Battalion-size task forces or larger organizations usually conduct a reconnaissance in force (RIF) mission. A commander assigns a RIF mission when the enemy is known to be operating within an area and the commander cannot obtain adequate intelligence by any other means. A unit may also conduct a RIF in restrictive-type terrain where the enemy is likely to ambush smaller reconnaissance forces. A RIF is an aggressive reconnaissance, conducted as an offensive operation with clearly stated reconnaissance objectives. The overall goal of a RIF is to determine enemy weaknesses that can be exploited. It differs from other reconnaissance operations because it is normally conducted only to gain information about the enemy and not the terrain.

Organization of Forces

13-40. While specifically trained and equipped units usually conduct the other forms of reconnaissance operations, any maneuver force can conduct a RIF. The force conducting a RIF is organized as if it is conducting offensive operations. However, the lack of enemy information dictates that the force be large and strong enough to develop the situation, protect the force, cause the enemy to react, and put the enemy at some risk. The less known about the

enemy, the stronger the force conducting the RIF must be. Because of the lack of information about the enemy, a commander normally conducts a RIF as a movement to contact or a series of frontal attacks across a broad frontage.

Control Measures

13-41. The control measures for a RIF are the same as for offensive operations. The operation is conducted as an movement to contact with limited objectives. (Chapter 4 discusses the conduct of a movement to contact.)

Tasks

13-42. A unit conducting a RIF performs the following tasks within the limits of its capabilities. If a unit does not have the time or resources to complete all of these tasks, it must inform the commander assigning the mission. He must then issue further guidance on which tasks the unit must complete or the priority of tasks, which is usually clear from the reconnaissance objective. After starting the RIF, if the unit determines that it cannot complete an assigned task, it must report and await further instructions. Reconnaissance in force tasks are—

- Penetrating the enemy's security area and determining its size and depth.
- Determining the location and disposition of enemy main positions.
- Attacking enemy main positions and attempting to cause the enemy to react by using local reserves or major counterattack forces, employing fire support assets, adjusting positions, and employing specific weapon systems.
- Determining weaknesses in the enemy's dispositions to exploit.

PLANNING A RECONNAISSANCE

13-43. Reconnaissance contributes significantly to a commander's battlefield visualization. It supports the overall integrated ISR plan, which in turn supports the commander's decision making process.

13-44. The commander must make judicious yet aggressive use of his reconnaissance assets. Reconnaissance planning ensures that available reconnaissance assets produce the greatest results. Because there are never enough assets to accomplish all tasks, the commander must set priorities. Generating many unfocused missions rapidly wears down assets, making them ineffective. Improperly using assets can also leave an enemy vulnerability undiscovered.

13-45. The commander ensures the coordination and synchronization of his reconnaissance effort at all echelons. Since the need for reconnaissance cuts across all parts of the operational framework and core functions, reconnaissance operations demand an integrated approach to planning, preparation, and execution. The two habitual participants in the reconnaissance planning process are the echelon operations and intelligence staff officers. The echelon operations staff officer (G3 or S3) has primary staff responsibility for reconnaissance planning, allocating, and tasking resources. Normally, he has staff

responsibility for ground and air reconnaissance assets, which includes engineers, NBC, and artillery. The echelon intelligence staff officer (G2 or S2) has primary responsibility for ground surveillance systems and special electronics mission aircraft. The commander ensures these two staff elements adopt an integrated combined arms approach to planning, preparing, executing, and assessing reconnaissance.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE PLAN

13-46. The commander closely integrates reconnaissance missions with other intelligence-collection efforts to ensure that each ISR asset is used to its best advantage. The echelon staff, primarily the intelligence staff officer, identifies gaps in the intelligence available, based on the initial IPB and the situationally dependent CCIR. The IPB process helps determine factors that impact on the reconnaissance effort, such as—

- Avenues of approach that support friendly movement and exploit enemy weaknesses.
- Key terrain, choke points, obstacles, and danger areas.
- Enemy positions, especially flanks that can be exploited.
- Observation points.

The reconnaissance effort and the IPB process are interactive and iterative, each feeding the other. (See FM 2-0 for more information on the intelligence cycle. FM 2-01.3 addresses the IPB process.)

13-47. The intelligence staff officer develops an initial integrated ISR plan to acquire information to help answer those PIR based on available reconnaissance and surveillance assets. The ISR plan assigns specific intelligence acquisition tasks to specific units for action. It integrates surveillance and reconnaissance into the overall intelligence-collection plan.

13-48. The echelon operations staff officer uses the initial ISR plan as the base in preparing the ISR annex to the operation order. The ISR annex provides for the flexible execution of reconnaissance tasks, including providing for adequate command and control, indirect fires, and logistics when completed. (FM 5-0 discusses reconnaissance and the military decision making process.)

RECONNAISSANCE-PULL VERSUS RECONNAISSANCE-PUSH

13-49. In reconnaissance-pull, the commander uses the products of the IPB process in an interactive and iterative way. He obtains combat information from his reconnaissance assets to determine a preferred COA for the tactical situation presented by the factors of METT-TC. In reconnaissance-push, the commander uses the products of the IPB process in an interactive, but not iterative, way with combat information obtained from his reconnaissance assets in support of a previously determined COA. The time available to a commander is normally the chief reason for preferring one method over the other.

13-50. The time required to develop a preferred COA can give the enemy enough time to recover and prepare so that an objective which could be obtained with few casualties one day will cost far more to seize the next day.

There is no available model that a commander can use to determine how much is enough; that determination is part of the tactical art.

RECONNAISSANCE MANAGEMENT

13-51. No single reconnaissance asset can answer every intelligence requirement, and there are rarely enough reconnaissance assets to cover every requirement. The echelon staff uses as mix of reconnaissance management methods, such as cueing, mixing, redundancy, and task organizing, in an attempt to use limited assets most effectively and collect the most critical information with the fewest assets as quickly as possible,.

13-52. ***Cueing*** **is the integration of one or more types of reconnaissance or surveillance systems to provide information that directs follow-on collecting of more detailed information by another system.** Cueing helps to focus limited reconnaissance assets, especially limited ground reconnaissance assets, which can rarely examine every part of a large area closely. Electronic, thermal, visual, audio, and other technical assets with wide-area surveillance capabilities, often working from aerial platforms, can quickly determine areas of enemy concentration or areas where there is no enemy presence. These assets may cue ground and air reconnaissance assets to investigate specific areas to confirm and amplify information developed by technical assets. For example, joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) and Guardrail-equipped aircraft can cover large areas and cue ground reconnaissance or UAVs once an enemy force is identified. The commander may dispatch ground reconnaissance or UAVs to verify the information and track the enemy for targeting purposes. Similarly, a ground reconnaissance asset could cue surveillance assets. The key point is to use reconnaissance assets based on their capabilities and use the complementary capabilities of other assets to verify and expand information available.

13-53. ***Mixing*** **is using two or more different assets to collect against the same intelligence requirement.** Employing a mix of systems not only increases the probability of collection, but also tends to provide more complete information. For example, a JSTARS aircraft may detect and locate a moving enemy tactical force, while the G-2 analysis and control element uses organic and supporting assets to determine its identity, organizational structure, and indications of future plans. Employing a mix of systems is always desirable if the situation and available resources permit. Mixing systems can also help uncover deception attempts by revealing discrepancies in information reported by different collectors.

13-54. ***Redundancy*** **is using two or more like assets to collect against the same intelligence requirement.** Based on the priority of the information requirement, the commander must decide which NAI justifies having more than one asset covering it. When more than one asset covers the same NAI, a backup is available in the event that one asset cannot reach the NAI in time, the first asset suffers mechanical failure, or the enemy detects and engages the first asset. Redundancy also improves the chances that the required information will be collected.

13-55. To increase the effectiveness and survivability of a reconnaissance asset, the commander may task organize it by placing additional assets under

the control of the unit. For example, to conduct an area reconnaissance of possible river crossing sites at extended distances from a division's current location, a ground reconnaissance troop of the division cavalry squadron could be task-organized with a COLT, a signal retransmission element, an engineer reconnaissance element, and a mechanized infantry platoon. The engineers would provide additional technical information on proposed crossing sites; the signal retransmission elements would allow the reconnaissance troop's combat net radios to reach the division tactical command post. The COLT provides additional observation, lazing, and fire coordination capabilities. Last, the infantry platoon would provide additional protection for the reconnaissance troop.

SUSTAINMENT

13-56. Sustaining reconnaissance assets before, during, and after their commitment is a vital part of maintaining the commander's capability to conduct reconnaissance. Because the way that a commander deploys his reconnaissance assets in a given situation depends on the factors of METT-TC, the methods he employs to sustain those assets are equally situationally dependent. He must address them as part of the planning process for each reconnaissance operation.

13-57. Reconnaissance elements frequently operate in locations distant from their organic sustaining base. In this event, reconnaissance elements must either carry a large enough basic load or be task organized with those assets necessary to ensure their sustainment until they can be relieved. With either COA, casualty evacuation remains a problem. An alternative solution would be to plan and coordinate their sustainment from units near their operating locations.

EXECUTING A RECONNAISSANCE

13-58. Reconnaissance can be characterized as either stealthy or aggressive. Depending on how they are employed, scout helicopters and other aerial platforms, as well as mounted and dismounted ground reconnaissance, can be characterized as either stealthy or aggressive.

13-59. A key factor in reconnaissance execution is the time available to conduct the reconnaissance mission. The commander must recognize that he accepts increased risk to both the reconnaissance element and the main body when he accelerates the pace of reconnaissance. This risk can be somewhat offset by employing air reconnaissance and technical means to cover open terrain or areas of lower threat.

13-60. Aggressive reconnaissance is characterized by the speed and manner in which the reconnaissance force develops the situation once it makes contact with an enemy force. A unit conducting aggressive reconnaissance uses both direct- and indirect-fire systems and movement to rapidly develop the situation. Firepower, aggressive exploitation of actions on contact, operations security, and training are required for the unit to survive and accomplish its mission when conducting aggressive reconnaissance. Mounted reconnaissance is normally characterized as aggressive.

13-61. Stealthy reconnaissance emphasizes avoiding detection and engagement by the enemy. It is more time consuming than aggressive reconnaissance. Stealthy reconnaissance takes maximum advantage of covered and concealed terrain and the reduced battlefield signatures associated with systems that typically conduct stealthy reconnaissance, such as dismounted scouts. However, stealth cannot be guaranteed. As a result, units attempting to conduct stealthy reconnaissance must also be drilled to react correctly once the enemy makes contact, and they must have immediate access to supporting fires.

13-62. The commander considers the factors of METT-TC to determine whether to conduct mounted or dismounted reconnaissance. Conditions that may result in a decision to conduct mounted or aerial reconnaissance include—

- Time is limited.
- Detailed reconnaissance is not required.
- Air units are available to perform coordinated reconnaissance with the ground assets.
- The IPB process has provided detailed information on the enemy.
- Terrain is relatively open.
- Environmental conditions permit this type of reconnaissance. Deep snow and muddy terrain greatly hinder mounted reconnaissance.
- Dismounted reconnaissance cannot complete the mission within existing time constraints, while mounted reconnaissance can.

13-63. The following conditions may result in the commander directing a dismounted reconnaissance effort:

- Time is available.
- Detailed reconnaissance is required.
- Stealth is required.
- The IPB process indicates close proximity to enemy positions.
- The reconnaissance force encounters danger areas.
- Restrictive terrain limits the effectiveness of mounted reconnaissance.

FM 3-21.92 describes dismounted patrolling in detail.

13-64. Typically, air reconnaissance operates in concert with ground reconnaissance units. (Friendly ground forces in an area offer additional security to aircrews.) Aviation units can insert surveillance teams at observation posts. Aircraft can observe and provide security on station for extended times using rotation techniques if they have detailed requirements in advance. Dismounting an aircrew member to evaluate bridges, fords, or crossing sights is a last alternative because of the danger to the aircrew and the aircraft. Before resorting to this, the aircrew uses the sophisticated systems on the aircraft to avoid risk and to avoid drawing attention to the area of interest.

13-65. Reconnaissance by fire is a technique in which a unit fires on a suspected enemy position to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by movement or return fire. This technique is appropriate when time is critical and

stealthy maneuver to further develop the situation is not possible. The fires may be either direct, indirect, or a combination. The advantage of indirect fire is that it does not give away friendly locations and usually causes the enemy to displace from the impact area. However, reconnaissance by fire may not cause a seasoned or prepared enemy force to react. Reconnaissance by fire is always characterized as aggressive.

13-66. Smoke and battlefield obscuration, fog, rain, and snow all result in reduced visibility. Generally, reconnaissance during limited-visibility conditions takes more time. However, these conditions provide for better stealth and enhance the survivability of reconnaissance assets. A commander frequently employs dismounted reconnaissance patrols at night. These patrols use light amplification and thermal observation devices, electronic surveillance devices, and surveillance radars to compensate for reduced visibility conditions.

13-67. In limited visibility, mounted reconnaissance tends to focus on road networks. The enemy can detect engine and track movement noises of friendly mounted reconnaissance elements at considerable distances at night, which makes them susceptible to ambush. Strict sound and light discipline, along with masking sounds, such as artillery fires, helps a mounted reconnaissance force from being compromised or ambushed.

13-68. High winds, extreme temperature, and loose topsoil or sand may adversely affect aerial reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance units plan their missions in much the same way as ground units. They use the same type of operations graphics and consider the same critical tasks. The air reconnaissance commander organizes his assets to accomplish his mission by considering the same IPB aspects as those associated with ground forces. He focuses on air hazards to navigation and anticipated enemy air defense capabilities. (The effects or weather and atmosphere conditions are discussed in FM 2-01.3.)

RECUPERATION AND RECONSTITUTION OF RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

13-69. When any small unit is employed continuously for an extensive period of time, it can become ineffective. When this occurs, restoring the unit to an acceptable level of effectiveness may require either recuperation or reconstitution. Recuperation—a short break for rest, resupply, and maintenance—is often sufficient to return the unit to the desired degree of combat effectiveness. Leaders in reconnaissance units probably need more rest than their subordinates. If the recuperation period is extended, it can also be used to conduct refresher training, new equipment training, or any required specialized training for the next mission.

13-70. Units and systems performing reconnaissance are vulnerable to detection, engagement, and destruction by the enemy. When this occurs and the unit can no longer perform its primary mission, the commander must determine whether to reconstitute, by either regenerating or reorganizing the unit. (See FM 4-100.9 for additional information concerning reconstitution.)

13-71. Regenerating a unit requires significant resources. The organization two echelons above the unit being regenerated conducts the procedure. For example, a battalion task force can regenerate its scout platoon. In the

regeneration process, the battalion could use a combination of weapon system replacement operations, battle damage assessment and repair, normal replacement operations, and medical returnees to provide the needed resources. These resources, combined with training, could be used to regenerate the scout platoon. Alternatively, the commander could designate one of his line platoons as the task force's new scouts. This approach has significant training implications and requires adjustments to the line platoon's table of organization and equipment.

13-72. A unit commander can reorganize his unit with the approval of the next higher commander. For example, an armored cavalry troop commander could reorganize his two scout and two tank platoons into three platoons containing a mix of scouts and tanks. This approach to reconstitution also requires training time and other equipment resources to ensure the combat effectiveness of the resulting composite organization.

Chapter 14

Troop Movement

Aptitude for war is aptitude for movement.

Napoleon I, *Maxims of War,* 1831

Troop movement **is the movement of troops from one place to another by any available means.** The ability of a commander to posture his force for a decisive or shaping operation depends on his ability to move that force. The essence of battlefield agility is the capability to conduct rapid and orderly movement to concentrate the effects of combat power at decisive points and times. Successful movement places troops and equipment at their destination at the proper time, ready for combat. The three types of troop movement are administrative movement, tactical road march, and approach march.

METHODS OF TROOP MOVEMENT

14-1. Troop movements are made by foot marches, motor transport, rail, water, air, and various combinations of these methods. The method employed depends on the situation, the size and composition of the moving unit, the distance the unit must cover, the urgency of execution, and the condition of the troops. It also depends on the availability, suitability, and capacity of the different means of transportation. Troop movements over extended distances have extensive logistics considerations.

DISMOUNTED MARCHES

14-2. ***Dismounted marches*****, also called foot marches, are movements of troops and equipment, mainly by foot, with limited support by vehicles.** They increase the number of maneuver options available to a commander. Their positive characteristics include combat readiness—all soldiers

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can immediately respond to enemy attack without the need to dismount, ease of control, adaptability to terrain, and their independence from the existing road network. Their limitations include slow rate of movement and increased personnel fatigue—soldiers carrying heavy loads over long distances or large changes in elevation get tired. A unit conducts a dismounted march when the situation requires stealth, the distance to travel is short, transport or fuel is limited, or the situation or terrain precludes using a large number of vehicles. (FM 3-25.18 has more information on the techniques and procedures for conducting dismounted marches.)

MOUNTED MARCHES

14-3. A unit conducts mounted marches when it employs combat and tactical vehicles to move all of its personnel and equipment. Armored and mechanized units routinely conduct mounted marches. The speed of the march and the increased amounts of supplies that can accompany the unit characterize this march method. Heavy maneuver units are normally self-sufficient to conduct mounted marches over short distances. Light maneuver units and most combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units are not completely motorized and need assistance from transportation elements to conduct mounted marches. Considerations for mounted marches over extended distances include:

- The ability of the route network to support the numbers, sizes, and weights of the tactical and combat vehicles assigned to or supporting the unit making the move.
- Available refueling and maintenance sites and crew-rest areas.
- The need for recovery and evacuation assets.

(FM 4-01.30 discusses considerations for mounted marches.)

ARMY AIR MOVEMENTS

14-4. ***Army air movements*** **are operations involving the use of utility and cargo rotary-wing assets for other than air assaults.** The commander conducts air movements to move troops and equipment, to emplace systems, and to transport ammunition, fuel, and other high-value supplies. He may employ air movements as a substitute for a ground tactical movement. Army air movements are generally faster than ground tactical moves. The same general considerations that apply to air assault operations also apply to Army air movements. (See Appendix C for air assault operations. See FM 3-04.113 for additional information concerning air movement.)

14-5. Tactical forces can use rail and water modes to conduct troop movement if they are available within an area of operations (AO). Their use can provide flexibility by freeing other modes of transport for other missions. Their use normally involves a mixture of military and commercial assets, such as defense freight railway interchange railcars pulled by privately owned diesel-electric engines to transport tanks along railroad right of ways from one rail terminus to another. Responsibility for coordinating the use of railroads and waterways resides within the ARFOR headquarters within the theater of operations. (FMs 4-01.41 and 4-01.50 provide additional information concerning these two transportation modes.)

14-6. In cases of tactical necessity, a unit can accelerate its rate of movement by conducting a forced march so that it arrives at its destination quickly. Both heavy and light units can conduct a forced march. Forced marches require speed, exertion, and an increase in the number of hours marched or traveled by vehicles each day beyond normal standards. Soldiers cannot sustain forced marches for more than a short period. In a forced march, a unit may not halt as often nor for as long as recommended for maintenance, rest, feeding, and fuel. The commander must understand that immediately following a long and fast march, his soldiers and combat vehicles experience a temporary deterioration in their physical condition. The combat effectiveness and cohesion of his unit also temporarily decreases. His plan must accommodate the presence of stragglers and address the increased number of maintenance failures.

ADMINISTRATIVE MOVEMENT

14-7. *Administrative movement* is a movement in which troops and vehicles are arranged to expedite their movement and conserve time and energy when no enemy interference, except by air, is anticipated (JP 1-02). The commander conducts administrative movements only in secure areas. Examples of administrative movements include rail and highway movement within the continental United States. Once a unit deploys into a theater of war, administrative movements are the exception, not the norm. Since these types of moves are nontactical, the echelon logistics officer (the G4 or S4) usually supervises the moves. (FM 4-01.40 discusses administrative movement and convoy planning.)

TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

14-8. A *tactical road march* is a rapid movement used to relocate units within an area of operations to prepare for combat operations (FM 3-0). Security against enemy air attack is maintained and the unit is prepared to take immediate action against an enemy ambush, although contact with enemy ground forces is not expected.

14-9. The primary consideration of the tactical road march is rapid movement. However, the moving force employs security measures, even when contact with enemy ground forces is not expected. Units conducting road marches may or may not be organized into a combined arms formation. During a tactical road march, the commander is always prepared to take immediate action if the enemy attacks. (See Figure 14-1, page 14-4.)

ORGANIZATION FOR A TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

14-10. The organization for a tactical road march is the march column. **A *march column* consists of all elements using the same route for a single movement under control of a single commander.** The commander organizes a march column into four elements: reconnaissance, quartering party, main body, and trail party. A brigade conducting a tactical road march is an example of a march column. The subordinate elements of a march column are a march serial and a march unit. **A *march serial* is a major subdivision of a march column that is organized under one commander**

who plans, regulates, and controls the serial. An example is a battalion serial formed from a brigade-size march column. **A *march unit* is a subdivision of a march serial. It moves and halts under the control of a single commander who uses voice and visual signals.** An example of a march unit is a company from a battalion-size march serial.



Figure 14-1. Tactical Road March

14-11. A march column provides excellent speed, control, and flexibility, but sacrifices flank security. It provides the ability to deploy forces to the front of the column. The commander uses a march column when speed is essential and enemy contact is unlikely. However, the commander spaces combat support (CS) elements, such as air defense and engineers, throughout the column to protect and support the movement. Reconnaissance elements augmented by engineer, nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance, and other CS assets, as appropriate, conduct a route reconnaissance of the march routes. This reconnaissance confirms and supplements the data obtained from map studies and other headquarters.

14-12. A unit quartering party usually accompanies the reconnaissance effort to the designated assembly area (AA). Unit standing operating procedures (SOP) establish the exact composition of the quartering party and its transportation, security, and communications equipment needs, and its specific duties. The quartering party secures, reconnoiters, and organizes an area for the main body's arrival and occupation. It typically reconnoiters and confirms the tentative locations selected by the commander of its parent element, based on a map reconnaissance. When necessary, the quartering party changes previously assigned unit locations within the AA. The quartering party guides the main body into position from the release point (RP) to precise locations within the AA.

14-13. The main body of the march column consists of the remainder of the unit, including attachments minus the trail party. The trail party is the last march unit in a march column and normally consists of primarily maintenance elements in a mounted march. It maintains communications with the main body. The function of the trail party is to recover disabled vehicles or control stragglers in a dismounted march. If the trail party cannot repair a disabled vehicle immediately, it tows the disabled vehicle and moves its crew

and passengers to a unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) located at a secure area near the movement route.

GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES

14-14. The commander directing a tactical road march often uses a strip map or overlay to graphically depict critical information about the route to his subordinates. The overlay or strip map should show the route of march, start points (SPs), RPs, checkpoints, critical points (such as bridges), light line, and traffic control points (TCPs). (See Figure 14-2.) Other graphic control measures include AA sand phase lines.



Figure 14-2. Route Control Measures

The *start point* is a location on a route where the marching elements fall under the control of a designated march commander. Figure 14-3 shows SP 7. All routes must have a designated SP and it must be easily recognizable on the map and on the ground, such as a road junction. It must be far enough from the AA to allow units to organize and move at the prescribed speed and interval when they reach the SP.



Figure 14-3. Start Point

14-16. **A *release point* is a location on a route where marching elements are released from centralized control.** Figure 14-4, page 14-6, shows RP 11. Each SP must have a corresponding RP, which must also be easy to recognize on the ground. Marching units do not stop at the RP; instead, as they move through the RP, unit guides meet each march unit and lead it to AAs.

14-17. The commander designates checkpoints along the route to assist marching units in gauging their compliance with the timetable. Also, the movement overlay identifies critical points along the route where interference with movement might occur. The commander positions manned TCPs along the route to prevent congestion and confusion. They may be manned by MPs or unit personnel. These soldiers report to the appropriate area movement control organization when each convoy, march column, and march serial arrives at and completes passage of its location.



Figure 14-4. Release Point

14-18. **A *light line* is a designated phase line, forward of which vehicles are required to use blackout lights during periods of limited visibility.** Commanders at either corps or division echelon establish it based on the risk that the enemy will be able to detect moving vehicles using white light. Figure 14-5 depicts the light line for the 2nd Armored Division as the division rear boundary. (FM 4-01.40 details other march control measures, such as the bridge classification symbols depicted in Figure 14-2.)



Figure 14-5. Light Line

TACTICAL MARCH TECHNIQUES

14-19. Units conducting tactical road marches employ three tactical march techniques: open column, close column, and infiltration. Each of these techniques uses scheduled halts to control and sustain the road march. The factors of METT-TC require adjustments in the standard distances between vehicles and soldiers. During movement, elements within a column of any length may encounter many different types of routes and obstacles simultaneously. Consequently, parts of the column may be moving at different speeds, which can produce an undesirable accordion-like effect. The movement order establishes the order of march, rate of march, interval or time gaps between units, column gap, and maximum catch-up speed. Unless the commander directs them not to do so for security reasons, march units report when they have crossed each control point. During the move, the commander maintains air and ground security.

Open Column

14-20. In an open column, the commander increases the distance between vehicles and soldiers to provide greater dispersion. The vehicle distance varies from 50 to 100 meters, and may be greater if required. The distance between dismounted soldiers varies from two to five meters to allow for dispersion and space for marching comfort. Any distance that exceeds five meters between soldiers increases the length of the column and hinders control. The open column technique is normally used during daylight. It may also be used at night

with infrared lights, blackout lights, or passive night-vision equipment. Using an open column roughly doubles the column's length and thereby doubles the time it takes to clear any given point when compared to a close column. The open column is the most common movement technique because it offers the most security while still providing the commander with a reasonable degree of control. In an open column, vehicle density varies from 15 to 20 vehicles per kilometer. A single light infantry company, with intervals between its platoons, occupies roughly a kilometer of road or trail.

Close Column

14-21. In a close column, the commander spaces his vehicles about 20 to 25 meters apart. At night, he spaces vehicles so each driver can see the two lights in the blackout marker of the vehicle ahead. The commander normally employs a close column for marches during darkness under blackout driving conditions or for marches in restricted terrain. This method of marching takes maximum advantage of the traffic capacity of a route but provides little dispersion. Normally, vehicle density is from 40 to 50 vehicles per kilometer along the route in a close column.

14-22. The dismounted equivalent to the close column is a limited-visibility march. The distance between individual soldiers is reduced to one to three meters to help maintain contact and facilitate control. Limited-visibility marches are characterized by close formations, difficult command and control (C2) and reconnaissance, a slow rate of march, and good concealment from enemy visual observation and air attack.

Infiltration

14-23. The commander dispatches vehicles in small groups, or at irregular intervals, at a rate that keeps the traffic density down and prevents undue massing of vehicles during a move by infiltration. Infiltration provides the best possible passive defense against enemy observation and attack. It is suited for tactical road marches when there is enough time and road space and when the commander desires the maximum security, deception, and dispersion. The disadvantages of an infiltration are that more time is required to complete the move, column control is nearly impossible, and recovery of broken-down vehicles by the trail party is more protracted when compared to vehicle recovery in close and open columns. Additionally, unit integrity is not restored until the last vehicle arrives at the destination, complicating the unit's onward deployment. Infiltration during troop movement should not be confused with infiltration as a form of maneuver as discussed in Chapter 3.

14-24. During extended road marches, halts are necessary to rest personnel, service vehicles, and adjust movement schedules as necessary. The march order or unit standing operating procedures (SOP) regulates when to take halts. In motor movements, the commander schedules short halts for every two to three hours of movement and may last up to an hour. Long halts occur on marches that exceed 24 hours and last no more than two hours. Long halts are not scheduled at night, which allows maximum time for night movement. During halts, each unit normally clears the march route and moves to a previously selected AA to prevent route congestion and avoid being a lucrative target. Units establish security and take other measures to protect the

force. Unit leaders receive prompt notification of the time and approximate length of unscheduled halts.

14-25. The commander emphasizes the need to maintain security during halts. Once a unit stops moving, there is a natural tendency for soldiers to let their guard down and relax their vigilance. The commander addresses this problem by explicitly defining unit actions in his SOP for various types of halts, such as maintenance halts, security halts, and unexpected halts.

APPROACH MARCH

14-26. An *approach march* is the advance of a combat unit when direct contact with the enemy is intended (FM 3-0). However, it emphasizes speed over tactical deployment. Both heavy and light forces conduct tactical road marches and approach marches.

14-27. The commander employs an approach march when the enemy's approximate location is known, since it allows the force to move with greater speed and less physical security or dispersion. (See Figure 14-6.) Units conducting an approach march are task-organized before the march begins to allow them to transition to an on-order or a be-prepared mission without making major adjustments in organization. For example, artillery units march within their supported unit's columns, while engineer units are well forward to facilitate mobility. Air defense units may leapfrog short-range and medium-range assets to ensure continuous coverage. The approach march terminates in a march objective, such as an attack position, AA, or assault position, or can be used to transition to an attack. Follow-and-assume and reserve forces may also conduct an approach march forward of a LD.



Figure 14-6. Approach March

14-28. Based on the products of his intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, the overall commander should assign an AO or an axis of advance in combination with routes to the unit conducting the approach march. These routes, AOs, or axes should facilitate the force's movement and maximize its use of available concealment. Within the approach march, the

commander should assign the force conducting the decisive operation and forces conducting each shaping operation separate routes, AOs, or axes of advance unless an individual unit has the task of either follow-and-assume or follow-and-support.

14-29. As the approach march nears areas of likely enemy interference, the commander divides his main body into smaller, less vulnerable columns that move on additional multiple routes or cross-country while continuing to employ security elements. The commander takes advantage of successful reconnaissance and security operations to increase the distance traveled before the main body must transition to a tactical formation. As discussed in Chapter 12, the advance and any flank guards remain within supporting distance of the main body, which stays in these smaller columns to facilitate rapid movement.

14-30. Tactical road marches and approach marches occur within a theater of war when contact with the enemy is possible or anticipated. This style of movement emphasizes tactical considerations such as security and de-emphasizes efficiency and ease of movement. The commander organizes his unit to conduct combat operations in a tactical movement. A unit generally maintains unit integrity throughout its movement. It plans for enemy interference either en route to or shortly after arrival at its destination. Units conducting either a tactical road march or an approach march use formations and techniques consistent with the factors of METT-TC. The unit may conduct them over unsecured routes if there are no friendly forces between the foremost elements of the moving force and the enemy. The echelon operations officer (the G3 or S3) is the primary staff officer responsible for planning these tactical movements, with input from other staff members.

14-31. There are several differences between an approach march and a tactical road march. A force conducting an approach march employs larger security forces because of its greater exposure to enemy attack. Units conducting an approach march arrange their systems into combined arms organizations. An approach march allows the commander to disperse his task-organized force into a tactical formation in unrestricted terrain without being constrained to existing roads and trails. On the other hand, road marches can organize their columns for administrative convenience; for example, vehicles of similar type, speed, and cross-country capabilities move together. Units conducting an approach march establish appropriate tactical intervals between vehicles; they do not normally employ a close column. They also use more routes than units conducting road marches.

MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES

14-32. The commander uses the combat formations described in Chapter 3 in conjunction with three movement techniques: traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. Figure 14-7 on page 14-10 shows when a unit is most likely to use each technique.

14-33. Movement techniques limit the unit's exposure to enemy fire and position it in a good formation to react to enemy contact. The commander selects the appropriate movement technique based on the chance of enemy contact. While moving, individual soldiers and vehicles use the terrain to protect

themselves anytime enemy contact is possible or expected. They use natural cover and concealment to avoid enemy fires. The following rules apply to soldiers and vehicle crews using terrain for protection:



Figure 14-7. Movement Techniques

- Do not silhouette yourself against the skyline.
- Cross open areas quickly.
- Do not move directly forward from a concealed firing position.
- Avoid possible kill zones because it is easier to cross difficult terrain than fight the enemy on unfavorable terms.
- Avoid large, open areas, especially when they are dominated by high ground or by terrain that can cover and conceal the enemy.
- Take active countermeasures, such as using smoke and direct and indirect fire, to suppress or obscure suspected enemy positions.

TRAVELING

14-34. The commander uses the traveling movement technique when speed is necessary and contact with enemy forces is not likely. All elements of the unit move simultaneously. The commander or small-unit leader locates where he can best control the situation. Trailing elements may move in parallel columns to shorten the column and reaction time. (See Figure 14-8.)



Figure 14-8. Traveling

TRAVELING OVERWATCH

14-35. The commander uses the traveling overwatch movement technique when contact with enemy forces is possible, but speed is important. The lead element is continuously moving, while the trailing elements move at variable speeds, sometimes pausing to overwatch movement of the lead element. (See Figure 14-9.) The trailing elements key their movement to the terrain, overwatching from a position where they can support the lead element if it engages the enemy. The trailing elements overwatch from positions and at distances that will not prevent them from firing or moving to support the lead element.



Figure 14-9. Traveling Overwatch

BOUNDING OVERWATCH

14-36. The commander uses the bounding overwatch movement technique when he expects to make contact with enemy forces. There are two variations of this technique: alternate bounds and successive bounds. In both cases, the overwatching elements cover the bounding elements from covered, concealed positions with good observation and fields of fire against possible enemy positions. They can immediately support the bounding elements with maneuver or fires alone if the bounding elements make contact. Unless they make contact en route, the bounding elements move via covered and concealed routes into the next set of support-by-fire positions. The length of the bound is based on the terrain and the range of overwatching weapons. The commander can use the uncommitted part of the force whenever he feels it is needed as part of an immediate and controlled reaction to any threat to the bounding force. In bounding overwatch, all movement keys on the next support-by-fire position, which should offer at least some of the following advantages:

- Cover and concealment.
- Good observation and fields of fire.
- Protection for stationary weapon platforms.

14-37. If the unit uses alternate bounds, the lead element moves forward, halts, and occupies a support-by-fire position that is covered at all times by the rear overwatching element. That former rear overwatching element advances past the former lead element and takes an overwatch position. The initial lead element then advances past the initial trail element and occupies a new support-by-fire position. One element moves at a time. This method is usually more rapid than successive bounds. (See Figure 14-10.)

14-38. If the unit uses successive bounds, the lead element, covered by the trail element, advances and occupies a support-by-fire position. The trail element advances to a support-by-fire position abreast of the lead element and halts. The lead element moves to the next position and the move continues.

Only one element moves at a time, and the trail element avoids advancing beyond the lead element. (See Figure 14-11.)



Figure 14-10. Bounding Overwatch—Alternate Bounds



Figure 14-11. Bounding Overwatch—Successive Bounds

PLANNING A TROOP MOVEMENT

14-39. The commander plans, prepares, executes, and assesses troop movements to ensure the organized and uninterrupted flow of tactical units throughout the AO. The objective of a successful move is for the unit to arrive at its destination in a condition suitable to its probable employment. The goal of all movement planning is to retain flexibility to execute a variety of plans to meet ever-changing conditions. The commander ensures that his unit's movement SOP contain specifics, and he conducts rehearsals to ensure that his soldiers and subordinate leaders understand them. The SOP should use a standard task organization to simplify planning, provide flexibility, and allow greater responsiveness. Such SOP allow for smoother cooperation by

establishing habitual relationships between the unit's subordinate elements and outside supporting elements.

14-40. The movement order is the end result of the commander's planning process. The movement order is prepared as an annex to an operations order (OPORD) or as a separate OPORD. Prepared in a five-paragraph format, it consists of critical information needed by a unit to plan and execute the movement. Information normally found in the movement order includes the destination, routes, orders of march, rates of march, times that each serial (or march element for serial movement orders) will arrive and clear its SP, intervals, speeds, scheduled maintenance halts, communications, and location of the commander. The commander should also identify logistics sites and services in his movement order. He need not include information and procedures contained in movement SOP in the movement order. The movement order should include a strip map or overlay. (The format for a movement order is covered in FM 5-0.)

14-41. The commander bases his movement order on the best available information on the enemy, terrain, weather, unit capabilities, and civil considerations. This plan establishes how the unit will move from its current location to the desired location. The integration of and support from combat and CS—such as artillery, air defense, intelligence, military police, and engineers—are critical for a successful tactical movement. The commander's operations staff develops the detailed movement order, with the assistance of the commander's logistics staff, in accordance with his established priorities.

14-42. The movement order and unit SOP must address the possibility of ambushes, indirect fires, and air attacks. A small-unit SOP includes drills for reacting to these circumstances. Passive measures to mitigate the effects of an air attack include route selection, vehicle intervals, and movement during limited visibility. In case of attack, the commander has an evacuation plan for casualties. This plan takes into account SOP items, such as using combat lifesavers and dispersing medical evacuation assets throughout the convoy.

14-43. For units that are not 100-percent mobile in organic vehicles, such as a corps headquarters and many CSS units, the commander can either conduct a shuttle with organic vehicles or request assistance from transportation units. Shuttling requires transporting troops, equipment, and supplies by a series of round trips with the same vehicles. It may also be performed by carrying successive parts of a load for short distances while the remaining soldiers continue on foot.

14-44. The higher headquarters logistics staff normally coordinates the provision of logistics support to moving units, although units carry sufficient fuel and lubricants in their unit trains to conduct local movements. In coordination with the engineers, the logistics staff ensures that routes are adequate to support the movement of the types and numbers of vehicles and supplies projected for movement. The commander must be aware of the load-carrying capability of each route and the distances over which forces can be supported. His logistics operators determine if any logistics assets should displace to support the mission. The commander also establishes halts for refueling as part of his movement plan. Halt times should be long enough and locations large enough to allow the entire march unit to refuel.

14-45. The simplest troop movement scenario to plan and conduct is one where the commander directing the movement controls the entire AO. In this situation, he can use his normal C2 system. The headquarters ordering the tactical road march schedules the movement times and approves the routes, while its movements control organization allocates the required space and time on the approved routes. If the movement results in a unit going outside its parent headquarters' AO, coordination through various movement control centers is required. Otherwise, a higher headquarters must plan and control the movement.

14-46. Whenever possible, the commander should use multiple routes to move his unit. This reduces the length of columns, the vulnerability to enemy air attack, and the amount of time the routes are not available to other units. Multiple routes provide the commander with the flexibility to react to unexpected situations and permit more rapid concentration of combat power. The two primary disadvantages of using multiple routes are difficulty in exercising C2, and the unit may not have enough resources to provide logistic and maintenance support on all routes.

14-47. The echelon transportation officer uses route classification components, such as route widths, route types, military load classifications, overhead clearance, route obstructions and special conditions, as he determines his traffic circulation plan. A supporting engineer terrain detachment provides his the majority of this information. Engineer reconnaissance obtains necessary information not contained in existing databases. FM 3-34.212 and FM 3-34.310 defines these components and describes how to use them.

14-48. The staff depicts the echelon traffic circulation plan on overlays using transportation control measures. The traffic circulation plan takes into account—

- The most restrictive route features and route designations.
- Direction of movement over each route.
- Location of boundaries, units, highway regulation points, TCPs, and principal supply points.
- Major geographic features and light lines, if applicable.
- Routes designated for one-way traffic.
- Separate routes for CSS and tactical units.
- Current data on traffic regulation and control restrictions, obstructions, detours, defiles, capacities, surface conditions, and enemy activities that affect the highway net.

From information contained in the traffic circulation plan, a traffic control plan is prepared—usually by the provost marshal—from information contained in the traffic circulation plan. The traffic control plan normally is prepared in the form of an overlay. The commander primarily uses available aviation, movement regulating teams, and MP units to assist in traffic control, but can assign this mission to other units, such as battalion scout platoons.

PREPARING A TROOP MOVEMENT

14-49. Reconnaissance precedes unit movement. Before a unit starts any march, a reconnaissance element from that unit should reconnoiter the route from its current location to the SP and determine how long it will take the unit to reach the SP. This reconnaissance effort continues beyond the start point and carefully examines the route's trafficability, including the impact of weather, such as ice, snow, and rain. This reconnaissance should also include alternative routes and choke points, such as defiles, bridges, and fords, which could slow the march. This reconnaissance effort complements map and technical reconnaissance and provides the commander with important information about the terrain, obstacles, and potential enemy forces within his AO. He can then take steps to establish TCPs at critical locations along the route or mark the route where it becomes confusing.

14-50. A quartering party often accompanies reconnaissance elements to mark routes and battle positions. The party may also secure new positions with observation posts or limited forces until the unit conducting the movement arrives.

14-51. The unit begins a tactical movement, such as a road march, fully supplied. The unit should refuel at every opportunity, such as at halts and on arrival at the final destination. The transportation of fuel and the security of existing stockpiles are major factors in any mounted road march. The commander may choose to conduct a refuel on the move (ROM) to extend the range of his vehicles. Refuel on the move is a technique in which the commander positions tankers just off the route of the march to refuel combat and tactical vehicles rapidly, but only in the previously established quantities necessary to extend their range to the desired length.

14-52. Based on the form of movement selected and the march and movement techniques adopted, the commander may have to pre-position CSS assets to conduct rapid and efficient refueling and resupply. Generally, a column formation is the easiest movement technique to support. Any other formation requires increased logistics planning. Night movements require special preparation because not all soldiers have night-vision devices. These special preparations include marking vehicles and equipment for easy identification by friendly forces and repositioning vehicles and soldiers closer together so they can detect each others' movement.

EXECUTING A TROOP MOVEMENT

14-53. A unit's ability to execute movement depends on its march discipline and ability to maintain required movement standards and procedures as prescribed by its movement SOP and movement order. This includes staying on the given route and maintaining start, passage, and clear times. March discipline is absolutely essential throughout the movement. Any deviation from the movement order may interfere with the movements of other units and may have serious consequences. However, march discipline can only be maintained when the plan matches conditions and the unit's ability to move.

14-54. The strength and composition of the moving unit's security elements vary, depending on the factors of METT-TC. The commander employs his

organic assets and any supporting security assets to protect his forces from enemy activities. He positions them to the front, rear, and flanks of his formations while moving and at the halt to provide all-around security for the main body. He can also enhance security by adopting a march formation and movement technique that facilitate applying combat power in the direction he expects to make contact with the enemy.

14-55. Higher-echelon CSS organizations may support some tactical movements. When the situation permits, CSS organizations establish maintenance, ambulance exchange, and supply points along the route. While procedures, amounts, and types of external support vary among major commands, each logistics organization ensures that these sites are operational at the designated times and locations. External CSS along the route may include aeromedical evacuation, maintenance, water, and POL. Maintenance sites generally consist of UMCPs where disabled vehicles can be moved for limited maintenance and Class IX supplies. Vehicles unable to continue the movement remain at a UMCP and join their parent organization when repaired. The troop movement is complete when the last march unit clears the RP.



Figure 14-12. Corps Movement Control

MOVEMENT CONTROL

14-56. *Movement control* is the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications (JP 1-02). It is a continuum that involves coordinating and integrating logistics, movement information, and programs that span the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The balancing of requirements against capabilities and assigning resources based on the commander's priorities guides the conduct of movement control. Movement control gives the commander the ability to deconflict the movement of units—troop movement—and the distribution of supplies and services inherent in the provision of CSS. It is not a simple system as is shown in Figure 14-12 by the number of different agencies involved in corps movement control. (FM 4-01.30 discusses movement control.)

Chapter 15

Relief in Place

… the necessity for conservation of the fighting power of the troops requires provision for the periodic relief of units in line.

FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations*, 22 May 1941

A *relief in place* is a tactical enabling operation in which, by the direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit. The directing authority transfers the responsibilities for the mission and the assigned area of operations (AO) from the replaced elements to the incoming unit. A commander conducts a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat effectiveness of committed units. The higher headquarters directs when and where to conduct the relief and establishes the appropriate control measures. Normally, the unit relieved is defending. However, a relief may set the stage for resuming offensive operations. A relief may also serve to free the relieved unit for other tasks, such as decontamination, reconstitution, routine rest, resupply, maintenance, or specialized training. Sometimes, as part of a larger operation, a commander wants the enemy force to discover the relief, because that discovery might cause it to do something in response that is prejudicial to its interest, such as move reserves from an area where the friendly commander wants to conduct a penetration.

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Executing a Relief in Place 15-6

15-1. There are three techniques for conducting a relief: sequentially, simultaneously, or staggered. A sequential relief occurs when each element within the relieved unit is relieved in succession, from right to left or left to right, depending on how it is deployed. A simultaneous relief occurs when all elements are relieved at the same time. A staggered relief occurs when the commander relieves each element in a sequence determined by the tactical situation, not its geographical orientation. Simultaneous relief takes the least time to execute, but is more easily detected by the enemy. Sequential or staggered reliefs can take place over a significant amount of time.

15-2. A relief is either deliberate or hasty, depending on the amount of planning and preparations. The major differences are the depth and detail of planning and, potentially, the execution time. Detailed planning generally

facilitates shorter execution time by determining exactly what the commander believes he needs to do and the resources needed to accomplish the mission. Deliberate planning allows him and his staff to identify, develop, and coordinate solutions to most potential problems before they occur and to ensure the availability of resources when and where they are needed.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

15-3. Both units involved in a relief in place should be of similar type—such as mounted or dismounted—and task organized to help maintain operations security (OPSEC). The relieving unit usually assumes as closely as possible the same task organization as the unit being relieved. It assigns responsibilities and deploys in a configuration similar to the relieved unit.

15-4. The relieving unit establishes advance parties to conduct detailed coordination and preparations for the operation, down to the company level and possibly to the platoon level. These advance parties infiltrate forward to avoid detection. They normally include the echelon's tactical command post, which co-locates with the main headquarters of the unit being relieved. The commander may also attach additional liaison personnel to subordinate units to ensure a smooth changeover between subordinate units.

CONTROL MEASURES

15-5. Control measures associated with a relief in place are generally restrictive to prevent fratricide. As a minimum, these control measures include the AO with its associated boundaries, battle positions, contact points, start points, routes, release points, assembly areas (AAs), fire support coordinating measures, and defensive fire coordination measures, such as target reference points and engagement areas. (See Figure 15-1.) Expanded discussions of all these control measures appear elsewhere in this manual. A commander may use any control measure he feels is necessary to conduct a relief in place.

PLANNING A RELIEF IN PLACE

15-6. Once ordered to conduct a relief in place, the commander of the relieving unit contacts the commander of the unit to be relieved. The co-location of unit command posts also helps achieve the level of coordination required. If the relieved unit's forward elements can defend the AO, the relieving unit executes the relief in place from the rear to the front. This facilitates movement and terrain management.

15-7. In a deliberate relief, units exchange plans and liaison personnel, conduct briefings, perform detailed reconnaissance, and publish orders with detailed instructions. In a hasty relief, the commander abbreviates the planning process and controls the execution using oral and fragmentary orders. In both cases, the relieved unit designates liaison personnel from its combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) elements to remain with the relieving unit until completing the necessary plans. The relieving unit receives current intelligence, operations, and logistics information from the unit being relieved, as well as from common higher headquarters, adjacent units, and subordinate elements. The complexity of a relief in place requires

extensive liaison and reconnaissance. Exchanging information about the enemy and civilian situations, friendly dispositions, terrain analysis, and fire support and obstacle plans, coupled with reconnaissance, helps the relieving commander plan and execute his mission.



Figure 15-1. Overlay of a Brigade Relief in Place

15-8. The relief is a tactically vulnerable operation. The units involved must concentrate on security while preparing for and executing the operation. The intent of the operation is to complete the relief without discovery by the enemy. Consequently, commanders typically plan reliefs for execution during periods of reduced visibility, such as night or fog. Concealment of the relief from the enemy is a primary concern when the unit is conducting the relief as part of an economy of force measure to free forces for other operations. The enemy should perceive only one unit's command structure in operation—that of the unit being relieved—until completing the operation. This requires a detailed knowledge of friendly vulnerabilities. A counterintelligence assessment of enemy collective capabilities directed against the friendly forces involved in the relief can provide that detailed knowledge.

15-9. Generally, as soon as the mutual higher headquarters issues the warning order, the commander of the relieving unit co-locates one of his command posts with the command post of the unit being relieved. As a minimum, he establishes communications and liaison with that unit. The warning order designates the time of relief, relieving and relieved units, and sequence of events. It specifies the future missions of the relieved force, route priorities, any restrictions on advance parties, any extraordinary security measures, and the time and place for issuing the complete order.

15-10. During a relief, commanders and leaders from the relieving unit should conduct reconnaissance of the area for which they will assume responsibility. This leaders' reconnaissance should include the lowest-echelon leader allowed by the tactical situation. The reconnaissance should focus on the route into the position the unit is to occupy, the positions themselves, the current disposition of the unit being relieved, and any obstacles that could affect troop movement.

15-11. The two commanders must decide on a time or an event that initiates the passage of command. This allows the smooth transition of command and control from one commander to another. Normally, this occurs when the frontline subordinate commanders have assumed responsibility for their respective AOs and the incoming commander has sufficient communication facilities in operation to control the operation. Regardless of their parent organization, all units in the AO come under the operational control of the AO commander if the AO comes under attack or when a specified event occurs during the relief.

15-12. The fire support coordinators coordinate fire support coordinating measures and identify those artillery and other fire support units that are available to support the relief. The relieving unit adopts the fire plan of the unit being relieved. The fire support assets of both units support the relief. This is critical if the enemy detects the relief and tries to exploit the situation. Units plan their fires to deceive the enemy and expedite the relief. Units should maintain normal activity patterns. For example, a unit should continue to expend the same average number of artillery rounds per day during the relief that it expended prior to the initiation of the relief. The commander should not relieve fire support and other CS and CSS units at the same time as the maneuver units they support. The commander relieves these organizations at other times.

15-13. The relief plan must specify the method to use in relieving artillery units. If terrain allows, relieving artillery units should not occupy previously used firing positions. Instead, relieving firing units should establish firing positions nearby those firing positions of the relieved unit and carefully integrate their fire with that of the relieved unit. Occupying firing positions at night or during periods of poor visibility enhances OPSEC.

15-14. Priority of the air defense effort is to protect identified choke points, battle positions, routes to conduct the operation, and AAs. The air defense assets of both units support the relief. The air defense unit supporting the relieving force coordinates with the replaced force's supporting air defense unit. This coordination covers, but is not limited to, air intelligence preparation of the battlefield, rules of engagement, current air activity, present fire unit positions, Army airspace command and control information, the operation plan, logistics, and communications. Higher-echelon and joint air defense organizations may also support the relief. Provisions to obtain local air superiority reduce the vulnerability of the forces during the relief in place when the units involved cannot avoid congestion on the ground.

15-15. The relieving unit verifies the obstacle records of the unit being relieved. Handover of obstacles is a complex procedure. Initially, the engineer priority is on mobility to get the relieving unit into the AO. It focuses on those

routes and lanes leading into the AO. Once the relief occurs, priority of the mobility and survivability effort transitions to support the relieving unit's continuing mission. The commander may require his engineers to assist with survivability tasks to support the relieving force.

15-16. Force-intermingling inherent in a relief, places an increased burden on command and control systems. The consequences of mutual interference between the units and the complexity associated with such areas as traffic control, fire support coordination, obstacle plans, and communications require close coordination between all headquarters involved. Establishing early liaison between the stationary and the relieving forces is critical.

15-17. The relieving unit is responsible for all sustaining operations. As the support elements of the unit being relieved displace, they leave the relieving unit supply stocks according to previously coordinated arrangements. If the units conducting the relief have different modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs), mission analysis must be conducted to determine how the relieving unit will meet all of its responsibilities and what weapon systems will be used. The unit logistics staff must determine any special support requirements the relieving unit will have and address supporting those requirements with the available supporting organizations. The unit logistics staff ensures that both commanders know of any CSS constraints that might affect the relieving unit. The two units' rear command posts also co-locate and a single headquarters coordinates traffic movement into and out of the AO.

PREPARING A RELIEF IN PLACE

15-18. The commander conceals the relief from the enemy for as long as possible. At the first indication that a relief is necessary, which is usually the warning order for the relieving unit, both the relieved unit and the relieving unit review their OPSEC plans and procedures. Commanders may use deception measures when conducting a relief in place to maintain secrecy. To maintain security during the relief in place, the relieving unit makes maximum use of the relieved unit's radio nets and operators. Both units involved in the relief operate on the command frequencies and encryption variables of the relieved unit at all levels. The relieved unit's signal officer is in charge of communications throughout the relief operation.

15-19. To enhance security, commanders impose light and noise discipline and electromagnetic emission control measures, such as radio silence or radio-listening silence. In joint and multinational operations, the senior commander specifies the frequency bands and equipment types affected. Radio silence is a condition when the commander turns off all or specific radio equipment. Radio-listening silence is a situation in which combat net radios remain turned on and monitored, with strict criteria governing when a station on the radio network is allowed to break silence. An example of radio-listening silence would be, "Maintain radio listening silence until physical contact with the enemy is made."

15-20. The units conduct rehearsals to discover any weaknesses in the plan and familiarize all elements of both forces with the plan. Finding time for rehearsals requires commanders and staffs to focus on time management.

15-21. Reconnaissance elements of the relieving unit precede its movement with a route reconnaissance to the AA. They conduct reconnaissance of the routes leading from the AAs to the positions of the unit being relieved. The commander of the relieving unit normally conducts a leader's reconnaissance before starting the operation.

15-22. The commander must allocate time to construct individual vehicle fighting positions if a heavy unit is relieving a light unit. In a similar fashion, preparations for an armor heavy unit to relieve a mechanized infantry heavy unit must include expanding individual vehicle fighting positions to accommodate the larger tanks.

15-23. While the units involved plan, prepare, and execute the relief in place, their common higher headquarters and other units continue actions to mask the relief. These include using demonstrations, feints, smoke, and harassing and interdiction fires. The common higher headquarters executes operations to attack and disrupt the enemy's uncommitted and reserve forces during the relief. Its intent is to fix or distract the enemy so that he does not detect or interfere with the relief.

EXECUTING A RELIEF IN PLACE

15-24. In situations where the commander desires to conceal the relief from the enemy, such as during a sequential or staggered relief, the relieving unit may occupy the same positions as the unit it relieves. Alternatively, it may establish more favorable positions within the vicinity of the relieved unit's location. Occupying different positions makes early discovery by the enemy more likely. Any increase in activity in forward positions can reveal the relief to the enemy. Friendly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems attempt to detect if the enemy can discover the relief before its completion.

15-25. The enemy can usually detect a relief effort because of the increased activity resulting from the movement of soldiers and equipment out of position by the relieved unit and into position by the relieving unit. Additionally, after any period of combat, there are differences in the types and amount of equipment between the relieving unit and the relieved unit, even if they have the same MTOEs. These differences can also reveal the relief to the enemy. The two units establish guidelines for exchanging compatible equipment and supplies to limit these differences. In addition, it may be necessary to exchange certain weapons, supplies, equipment, and occasionally, vehicles between units. When major differences in the number of combat systems between the units exist—for example, a tank-heavy task force relieves a mechanized infantry-heavy task force—inoperable equipment or visual simulators may assist in hiding the change of units.

15-26. In a simultaneous relief, the relieving unit begins moving from its current location to AAs in the AO of the unit being relieved. Once the relief begins, all elements involved execute the relief as quickly as possible. Both units are vulnerable to enemy attack because of the concentration, movement, and intermingling of forces in a simultaneous relief. Any unnecessary delay during execution provides the enemy additional time to acquire and engage the forces involved. All units in the AO come under the operational

control of the relieving unit commander at the time or triggering event previously established by the plan for the operation.

15-27. As the first relieving element arrives from the AA to assume the position, it establishes a screen of the relieved unit's positions as the tactical situation permits. The remainder of the relieving unit moves forward to positions behind the unit being relieved. The relieving unit may use the relieved unit's alternate and supplementary defensive positions to take advantage of any previous defensive preparations. At the previously established time or event, passage of command takes place. At that point, if possible, the commander of the relieving unit informs all units involved in the relief of the passage of command.

15-28. The relieved unit continues to defend. The relieving unit's advance parties coordinate procedures for the rearward passage of the relieved unit. On order, the relieved unit begins withdrawing through the relieving unit and moves to AAs. Crew-served weapons are usually the last elements relieved after exchanging range cards. The relieving unit replaces them on a one-for-one basis to the maximum extent possible to maintain the illusion of routine activity. The relieved unit's CS and logistics assets assist both the relieved unit and the relieving unit during this period.

15-29. A relief does not normally require artillery units to relieve weapon system for weapon system unless the terrain limits the number of firing positions available. Generally, the relieved unit's artillery and other fire support assets remain in place until all other relieved elements displace and are available to reinforce the fires of the relieving unit in case the enemy tries to interfere. If the purpose of the relief is to continue the attack, the artillery of both forces generally remains in place to support the subsequent operation.

15-30. Multiple main supply routes that allow only one-way traffic can simplify the forward and rearward movement of both units. The relieving unit's rear command post controls both units' military police and any other traffic management assets. (The main command post performs these functions if the echelon does not have a rear command post.) The commander uses these assets to help control unit and convoy movement on lines of communications, main supply routes, and movement routes throughout his AO.

15-31. In the future, it is likely that conflicts will involve the relief of an allied or coalition force. The commander should consider the following additional points when such reliefs occur:

- Dissimilar unit organizations may require special adjustments in assigned areas.
- Control of fire support may require special liaison.
- Language difficulties may require an increased use of guides and translators.
- Using relieved unit communications requires special signal arrangements and additional operators.
- Ammunition and equipment incompatibility may make exchanging assets more difficult.
- Impact of civilians on the operations.

Chapter 16

Passage of Lines

The principal task involved in a passage of lines is the preparation for continuing the attack.

FM 1005, *Field Service Regulations: Operations*, 22 May 1941

Passage of lines **is a tactical enabling operation in which one unit moves through another unit's positions with the intent of moving into or out of enemy contact.** A commander conducts a passage of lines to continue an attack or conduct a counterattack, retrograde security or main battle forces, and anytime one unit cannot bypass another unit's position. The conduct of a passage of lines potentially involves close combat. It involves transferring the responsibility for an area of operations (AO) between two commanders. That transfer of responsibility usually occurs when roughly twothirds of the passing force has moved through the passage point. If not directed by higher authority, the unit commanders determine—by mutual agreement—the time to pass command. They disseminate this information to the lowest levels of both organizations.

16-1. The commander's reasons for conducting a passage of lines are to—

- Sustain the tempo of an offensive operation.
- Maintain the viability of the defense by transferring responsibility from one unit to another.
- Transition from a delay or security operation by one force to a defense.
- Free a unit for another mission or task.

The headquarters directing the passage of lines is responsible for determining when the passage starts and finishes.

16-2. A passage of lines occurs under two basic conditions. **A *forward passage of lines* occurs when a unit passes through another unit's positions while moving toward the enemy. A *rearward passage of lines* occurs when a unit passes through another unit's positions while**

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moving away from the enemy. Ideally, a passage of lines does not interfere with conducting the stationary unit's operations.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

16-3. A unit may participate in a passage of lines as either the passing or stationary force. Except for co-locating command posts and providing for guides by the stationary force, conducting a passage of lines does not require a special task organization. Both the passing force and the stationary force maintain their previous combat organization during the passage. Usually, if the stationary unit has the capability, it is responsible for conducting operations against uncommitted enemy forces. However, operations directed against uncommitted enemy forces may be the responsibility of a higher echelon, depending on the echelon at which the passage takes place.

16-4. A forward passing unit's order of march is generally reconnaissance and security elements first. The ground combat force move next, followed by combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. The commander integrates his artillery, air defense, and engineers into the order of march in accordance with the factors of METTTC. The passing unit reverses this order of march in a rearward passage of lines. The stationary unit normally provides the moving unit with guides to expedite the passage. Attack helicopters and air cavalry are useful in providing security.

CONTROL MEASURES

16-5. Control measures associated with a passage of lines are generally restrictive to prevent fratricide. As a minimum, they include the AO, assembly areas (AAs), attack positions, battle handover line (BHL), contact points, passage points, passage lanes, routes, gaps, phase lines, and recognition signals. The headquarters directing the passage designates or recommends contact points, passage lanes, AAs, routes, and start and end times for the passage. The commander may also use start points, release points, fire support coordinating measures, such as coordinated fire lines (CFLs), and other control measures as necessary to conduct this task. (See Figure 16-1, page 16-2.) Unless the higher headquarters of the two units establishes the necessary graphic control measures, the stationary unit establishes them for the passage. However, the stationary unit commander must coordinate them with the passing unit commander. The stationary unit establishes these measures because it owns the terrain, it knows where the obstacles are, and it knows the tactical plan. If the control measures dictated by the higher headquarters are not sufficient—because they do not contain enough passage points, lanes, and so forth—the two units can agree to add the necessary measures.

16-6. **A *passage point* is a specifically designated place where the passing units pass through the stationary unit.** The location of this point is where the commander wants subordinate units to physically execute a passage of lines. In a forward passage of lines, the passage point marks the location where the passing unit is no longer bound by the restrictions placed on it by the stationary force. On the other hand, in a rearward passage of lines, the passage point marks the location where the stationary unit can restrict the movement and maneuver of the passing force. Between the contact



Figure 16-1. Control Measures Associated with a Forward Passage of Lines

point and the passage point, the stationary unit controls the passing force's movement. Figure 16-2 depicts the graphic control measure for passage point 8.



Figure 16-2. Passage Point 8

16-7. **A *passage lane* is a lane through an enemy or friendly obstacle that provides safe passage for a passing force.** The lane may be cleared, including being reduced and proofed, as part of a breach operation, or it may be included as part of the design of a friendly obstacle. It is a clear route all the way through an obstacle. Passage lanes normally end where a route begins. That route should allow the passing unit to move rapidly through the stationary unit's area. Figure 16-3 depicts the graphic control measure for a lane.



Figure 16-3. Lane

16-8. **A *gap* is an area free of armed mines or obstacles whose width and direction allow a friendly force to pass through the area containing obstacles while dispersed in a tactical formation**. The presence of gaps prevents inadvertent concentrations of soldiers and equipment around the entry points of lanes. Figure 16-4 depicts the graphic control measure for a gap.

PLANNING A PASSAGE OF LINES



Figure 16-4. Gap

16-9. As with any activity involving transferring combat responsibility from one unit to another, the complex nature of a passage of lines involves risk. As with other operations, a passage of lines may be categorized as deliberate or hasty. During a passage of lines, the commander normally maintains the established tempo. Sustaining that established tempo requires detailed planning and preparations for a deliberate passage of lines. In this case, both the stationary and moving force have time to—

- Publish written orders.
- Exchange plans, intelligence information, databases, and liaison personnel.
- Conduct briefings and detailed reconnaissance.
- Conduct rehearsals.

The commander uses oral and fragmentary orders to conduct a hasty passage of lines.

16-10. In a passage of lines, the headquarters directing the passage is responsible for designating—

- Subsequent missions for both forces.
- When and under what conditions passage of command takes place.
- Start and finish times for the passage.
- Contact points between the units involved.
- Common maneuver control measures and graphics.

The directing headquarters normally establishes this information in either the warning order or the order directing the passage. In the absence of higher-echelon guidance, close coordination and understanding between the commanders and staffs of the two units are essential to a smooth passage.

16-11. The unit commanders plan the passage of lines to maintain enemy contact and provide constant fires on the enemy. Commanders reduce risk and ensure synchronization through detailed planning and decentralized execution. With forces intermingling during the passage, the need for positive control increases. The passage requires close coordination, clearly understood control measures, liaison between all headquarters and echelons involved in the passage, and clear identification of the moment or event that causes one force to assume responsibility for the AO from another.

16-12. After receiving the warning order that directs a passage of lines, the passing unit's commander and key staff representatives generally co-locate with the command post of the stationary unit to facilitate in planning the passage and establishing common situational understanding. If the passing unit cannot co-locate one of its command posts to help plan the passage, it conducts extensive liaison with the stationary unit. The planning focus for both the passing unit and the stationary unit is on operations following the passage. While this occurs, the two units involved coordinate the following:

- The exchange of intelligence and combat information.
- Current friendly dispositions and tactical plans, especially deception and obstacle plans.
- Direct and indirect fires and close air support plans.
- Any necessary maneuver control measures and graphics not directed by the higher headquarters, such as boundary changes, the BHL, emergency CSS points, and AA and firing positions for artillery, air defense, and other units.
- Long-range and short-range recognition symbols and vehicle markings to reduce the probability of fratricide.
- When and under what conditions control of the AO transfers from one headquarters to the other, if not previously established.
- Provisions for movement control, including contact points, start and release points, primary and alternate routes, route selection, priorities for using routes and facilities, passage points, and provision for guides.
- Reconnaissance by elements of the passing unit.
- Signal operating instruction details, such as call signs, frequencies, and recognition signals.
- Security measures during the passage, including nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance or biological detection systems.
- Fires, obscurants, and any other combat, CS, and CSS provided by the stationary unit.
- Measures to reduce both units' vulnerability to attack by enemy weapons of mass destruction.
- Operations security measures required before or during the passage.
- Allocation of terrain for use by the passing force.
- Air defense cover—up to and forward of the BHL.
- Logistics support for the passing unit provided by the stationary unit, especially fuel, maintenance, and medical treatment.

16-13. The fire support elements of both the stationary and the passing unit must agree on allocating firing positions. The AO commander controls the allocation of firing positions in case of disagreement. These positions must be far enough forward to support the operation without having to redeploy during critical stages of the battle. The fire support elements normally position in areas not identified by the enemy.

16-14. Detailed air defense planning is essential for a passage of lines. Moving units tend to move slowly and often in some type of column formation during the passage. Vehicle congestion presents lucrative targets to enemy aircraft. In most cases, the stationary air defense elements can protect the passing force, allowing the air defense units supporting the passing force to move with the passing force. Dissemination of early warning and Army airspace command and control information reduces the risk of fratricide to friendly aviation assets while increasing the probability of the timely detection of enemy air. Strict adherence to identification, friend-or-foe (IFF)

procedures among pilots and air defense fire units is critical, especially during periods of limited visibility. Local air superiority also reduces the vulnerability of the two forces when congestion cannot be avoided on the ground.

16-15. Once a passage of lines begins, it occurs quickly. Where possible, the operation takes place when the enemy has the least capability to detect it, such as at night or during periods of reduced visibility. In any passage of lines, the commander considers using smoke to screen friendly movement, even at night.

16-16. The passing unit prefers to conduct the passage through a gap in the stationary unit's positions rather than through a lane or a route that traverses those positions. This reduces the vulnerability that results from concentrating forces when one unit passes directly through the occupied positions of another unit. It also avoids the danger of concentrating the passing unit into passage lanes.

16-17. In a forward passage of lines, when there are no gaps through the stationary unit's positions, each battalion task force normally needs at least two passage lanes. In a rearward passage of lines, each battalion needs at least one passage lane. In both cases, a brigade needs at least one additional lane for its tactical vehicles. The routes and lanes provide cover, concealment, and rapid movement of the passing force. The commander may designate alternative routes and lanes for elements of the moving force that are contaminated. They should not disrupt the combat capability of the stationary unit. The commander seeks additional lanes to speed the process if the terrain and enemy situation allow.

16-18. The passing unit normally has priority of route use to and within the stationary unit's AO. Clearing and maintaining passage routes up to the BHL are the responsibility of the stationary force. The stationary force must provide an obstacle overlay of its obstacles. The passing unit must be prepared to help maintain these routes, and it positions its engineer equipment accordingly. The stationary unit is responsible for traffic control within its AO until the passing unit assumes control. During the passage, the passing unit augments the traffic-control capability of the stationary unit as required.

16-19. Based on the commander's concept and intent, the passing force focuses its planning effort on two general areas: coordination with the stationary force and guidance to subordinate units conducting the passage. These planning efforts occur simultaneously. If the enemy attacks during the passage, the plan probably requires modification to prevent hampering friendly maneuver.

16-20. Executing a passage of lines successfully requires effective communication between the two units. The commanders build redundancy of communication signals and means into their passage plans, such as using mobile subscriber equipment and combat net radios. The commanders also designate contact points to ensure effective communication between the two forces at the lowest tactical level.

FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

16-21. The purpose of a forward passage of lines is to move forces forward to conduct operations. It ensures the maintenance of enemy contact while allowing the relief of previously committed forces. The stationary force must control and secure the AO far enough to its front that the moving force can pass through the stationary force and reform into a combat formation prior to contact with an enemy force. Generally, the stationary unit supports the passing unit until the passing unit masks the stationary unit's direct fires. The stationary unit continues to support the passing force with its fire support systems until the passing unit moves beyond the supporting range of the stationary force. The stationary unit is also responsible for the security of the line of departure of the forward passing unit until it is able to assume that responsibility. The boundaries of the forward passing force after it completes its passage do not have to coincide with the boundaries of the stationary force. (See Figure 16-5.)



Figure 16-5. Forward Passage of Lines

PREPARING A FORWARD PASSAGE

16-22. The passing unit conducts reconnaissance from its current location to its designated AAs, which are generally located to the rear of the stationary unit. After completing its reconnaissance, the passing unit occupies these AAs.

16-23. The commander should organize the passing force for its subsequent mission before initiating the forward passage of lines. The passing force avoids regrouping in forward AAs or attack positions.

EXECUTING A FORWARD PASSAGE

16-24. When the passing force moves forward, it should move without a halt through the stationary unit while deployed in a combat formation. That minimizes the time the two forces are concentrated in the forward area, making them less vulnerable to enemy attack.

16-25. Support by the stationary force ends when the combat elements of the moving force, including the reserve, have moved beyond direct-fire range. However, artillery, air defense, and other long-range systems may remain to support the passing unit until a previously designated event occurs or a higher headquarters directs another mission.

16-26. When executing the forward passage, the passing unit's reconnaissance elements operate forward of the release points and establish a screen in front of the passing unit. The stationary unit continues to conduct aggressive security operations throughout the passage of lines. The movement of main body forces begins from their AAs to attack positions, where the passing unit conducts its final preparations for the passage of lines and the attack. The passing unit moves to and occupies attack positions when observation by the enemy is unlikely. The stationary unit clears any obstacles from designated passage gaps, lanes, or routes, and guides elements of the passing unit from the contact point through the passage points.

16-27. The direct and indirect-fire assets of the stationary unit normally support the movement of the passing unit. Offensive information operations—especially electronic attack—directed against enemy command and control (C2) nodes disrupt his dissemination of information and his reaction to friendly operations. Any preparatory or covering fires should coincide with the passing unit's movement from the attack position to the passage lanes. After the forward moving unit commander assumes responsibility for the AO, he coordinates all fire support. Depending on the situation at the time, the passing commander may continue to use only the fire support assets of the stationary force until the passage of lines is complete. This allows the passing unit's fire support assets to move forward, in the case of artillery, or remain available to support the passing unit's forward movement, in the case of attack helicopters and close air support. On passage of command, the passing commander also assumes control of fires forward of the BHL. For example, he moves the CFL forward to conform to the movement of his forward security elements.

16-28. The superior headquarters of the forces involved should exercise overall C2 of the passage. In a forward passage, the commander of the passing force normally assumes responsibility for conducting operations beyond the BHL once the attack begins. In practice, however, it is useful to complete the transfer of responsibility, including fire support, just before starting the operation. During the passage, two parallel chains of command are operating in one area simultaneously, and the possibility of confusion exists. A successful passage of lines requires clear C2 responsibilities. The passing unit's command post passes through the lines as soon as possible after the lead elements complete their passage and locates where it can best control operations.

16-29. The stationary unit furnishes the passing unit with any previously coordinated or emergency logistics assistance within its capabilities. These typically include—

- Evacuating casualties and enemy prisoners of war.
- Controlling dislocated civilians.
- Using areas and facilities such as water points and medical facilities.
- Controlling routes and traffic management.
- Recovering disabled vehicles and equipment.

The passing force normally assumes full responsibility for its CSS support forward of the BHL.

16-30. When dissimilar units, such as light infantry and mounted forces, are involved in a passage of lines, the principles involved are the same; however, the execution is different. For example, the type and amount of support provided by the stationary unit will change. In some cases, the higher headquarters ordering the passage needs to provide assets to support the passage.

REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

16-31. A rearward passage of lines is similar in concept to a forward passage of lines. It continues the defense or retrograde operation, maintaining enemy contact while allowing for recovery of security or other forward forces. This operation may or may not be conducted under enemy pressure. Counterintelligence analysis provides an assessment of enemy collection against friendly forces, specified by gaps and vulnerabilities, and countermeasures to enemy collection. Additionally, that analysis provides the commander with a view into the enemy's decision making and intelligence cycles and the time period in which the enemy may discover the movement.

PLANNING A REARWARD PASSAGE

16-32. Planning procedures for a rearward passage of lines closely resemble the planning procedures for a forward passage of lines. However, rearward movement is likely to be more difficult because of the following:

- The enemy probably has the initiative, which tends to reduce the time available to conduct liaison and reconnaissance and make detailed plans.
- If the rearward moving force has been in action, its soldiers are tired and possibly disorganized to some degree.
- The enemy may be applying pressure on the passing force.
- Friendly forces may be more difficult to recognize because enemy forces may be intermixed with them.

16-33. Close coordination between the two commanders is crucial to successfully executing the rearward passage and subsequent transfer of responsibility. This requirement for close coordination is even more critical when the tactical situation results in a staggered or incremental rearward passage across an AO. The passing commander relinquishes control of his elements remaining in contact at the time of the transfer of responsibility to the stationary commander. Generally, the stationary unit assumes control of the AO

forward of the BHL after twothirds of the passing force's combat elements move through the passage points.

16-34. After receiving the warning order, the passing unit begins coordination and establishes communication with the stationary unit. The commanders of these units coordinate the same details as those outlined for a forward passage of lines. For example, the stationary commander coordinates for fires to support the rearward passing force. The two staffs coordinate those control measures necessary to support retrograde operations and their associated rearward passage of lines. (See paragraphs 16-5 to 16-8.) The commanders establish a probable time to initiate passage. The stationary commander assigns responsibility for closing and executing obstacles.

16-35. The stationary unit identifies multiple routes through its AO and across its rear boundary to AAs. The passing unit begins reconnaissance of these routes as soon as possible. The stationary unit must physically show all obstacles and routes and gaps through them to the passing unit. It provides guides for the passing unit—especially through obstacles—and mans contact points and passage points. The passing unit begins to reconnoiter its routes to the established contact points with the stationary unit's troops. The stationary unit establishes a security area in which responsibility transitions from the moving force to the stationary force. Normally, a BHL designates the forward edge of this area. The BHL is within direct-fire range and observed indirect-fire range of the stationary force.

PREPARING A REARWARD PASSAGE

16-36. The command posts of both units involved should move to a position where they can co-locate as part of the preparations for the rearward passage. This co-location reduces the risk associated with a passage because it makes it easier to coordinate between the two units. If circumstances prevent the units' command posts from co-locating, they must exchange liaison teams to ensure thorough coordination. If necessary, fire support assets from the stationary force occupy positions forward of their primary positions to give maximum coverage of forces of rearward moving unit.

EXECUTING A REARWARD PASSAGE

16-37. The passing unit maintains command of its subordinate elements throughout the retrograde and rearward passage. The normal order of march in a rearward passage of lines is CSS elements, main command post, CS elements, tactical command post, and combat units. The passage point marks the location where the passing unit comes under the control of restrictions placed by the stationary unit. (See Figure 16-6.) Note that the unit on the far right does not have a passage point because of the gap existing at that location. If the enemy continues to press his attack during the passage, the passing unit controls the battle from co-located command posts while the stationary unit monitors and controls the passage of lines until battle handover occurs. The passing unit's command post passes through the lines as soon as possible after the lead elements complete their passage. On passage of command, the stationary unit assumes the defense of the AO.



Figure 16-6. Rearward Passage of Lines

16-38. The stationary unit provides the passing unit with as much assistance as possible. Pivotal to the success of the rearward passage of lines is providing indirect and direct fire support by the stationary unit to the passing unit. This is especially important in covering the withdrawal of elements left in contact during a delay. The stationary unit's fire support assets answer calls for fire from the passing unit until battle handover occurs. The passing unit's fire support assets echelon rearward to provide continuous fire support for the passing unit until it successfully disengages. Once the passing unit hands over control of the battle to the stationary unit, the stationary unit initiates and clears calls for all fires forward of its location. The same procedure applies to the dedicated air defense assets of the passing and stationary units.

16-39. The stationary unit's engineer assets provide support to prepare the defense and execute the passage. Priority of effort initially ensures that the passing unit is able to move through passage lanes around the stationary unit's defensive positions. It shifts to close these passage lanes once the passing unit and any security elements disengage and withdraw through the security area and obstacles.

16-40. The stationary unit provides the passing unit with the previously coordinated CSS as far forward as possible. The stationary unit concentrates on providing the passing unit with emergency medical, recovery, and fuel supplies to enable the passing unit to rapidly move through the stationary unit's positions.

Appendix B

Tactical Mission Tasks

Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.

General George H. Decker, address at Fort Leavenworth, 16 Dec 1960

The tactical mission tasks in this appendix describe the results or effects the commander wants to achieve—the *what* and *why* of a mission statement not previously addressed in this manual. A mission statement contains the *who*, *what*, *when*, *where*, and *why* associated with a specific operation. The *what* and *why* of a mission statement are not the same thing and both are needed. The *what* is an effect that is normally measurable. The *why* of a mission statement provides the mission's purpose or reason. These tasks have specific military definitions that are different from those found in a dictionary. In some cases, the discussion includes more than just a definition; it includes results or effects in relation to the enemy, terrain, or friendly forces not associated with any specific type or form of an operation. Tasks that identify a friendly action rarely provide sufficient clarity for a mission statement.

B-1. As shown in Figure B-1, there is no definitive list of words or terms to describe the *what* and the *why* of a mission state-ment. The commander is not limited to the tactical mission tasks listed in this appendix in specify-ing what actions he wants from his subordinates in an OPORD or OPLAN. Many of the words and terms used to describe the *what* and *why* of a mission statement do not have special connotations beyond their common English

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language meanings. However, both the commander and the subordinate must have a common understanding of the *what* and *why* of the operation. It should be noted that tasks involving only actions by friendly forces rarely provide sufficient clarity for a mission statement thus the addition of a solid purpose coupled with the task adds understanding and clarity. The commander ensures that the missions he assigns his subordinate units are consistent with his scheme of maneuver and the resources allocated to his subordinates. For example, a defending unit requires far greater effort (resources) to destroy an enemy force than to defeat it. Likewise, an attacking unit requires more combat power to clear the enemy from a given area than to contain him in that same area.

B-2. Many of the tactical mission tasks in this appendix have a tactical mission graphic associated with them. Tacticians use these graphics in conjunction with course of action development.

ACTIONS BY FRIENDLY FORCE		EFFECTS ON ENEMY FORCE
Assault*	Follow and Assume	Block
Attack-by-Fire	Follow and Support	Canalize
Breach	Linkup*	Contain
Bypass	Occupy	Defeat
Clear	Reconstitutioin**	Destroy
Combat Search and Rescue	Reduce	Disrupt
Consolidation & Reorganization*	Retain	Fix
Control	Secure	Interdict
Counterreconnaissaince	Seize	Isolate
Disengagement	Support-by-Fire	Neutralize
Exfiltrate	Suppress	Penetrate
		Turn

TYPES AND FORMS OF OPERATIONS	
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT*	RETROGRADE OPERATIONS*
Search and Attack*	Delay*
ATTACK*	Withdrawal*
Ambush*	Retirement
Demonstration*	RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS**
Feint*	SECURITY OPERATIONS*
Raid*	INFORMATION OPERATIONS**
Spoiling Attack*	COMBINED ARMS BREACH OPERATIONS**
EXPLOITATION*	PASSAGE OF LINES*
PURSUIT*	RELIEF IN PLACE*
FORMS OF OFFENSIVE MANEUVER*	RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS**
Envelopment*	TROOP MOVEMENT*
Frontal Attack*	Administrative Movement*
Infiltration*	Approach March*
Penetration*	Road March*
Turning Movement*	
AREA DEFENSE*	*Defined elsewhere in this manual
MOBILE DEFENSE**	**Defined in other manuals

Figure B-1. Tactical Mission Tasks

ACTIONS BY FRIENDLY FORCE

ATTACK-BY-FIRE

B-3. ***Attack-by-fire*** **is a tactical mission task in which a commander uses direct fires, supported by indirect fires, to engage an enemy without closing with him to destroy, suppress, fix, or deceive him.** A commander assigning this task to a subordinate must also state the desired effect on the enemy, such as neutralize, fix, or disrupt. A commander normally employs this task when the mission does not dictate or support close combat and occupation of a geographical objective by another friendly force. The commander may assign the force conducting an attack by fire a battle position with either a sector of fire or an engagement area (EA), or he may assign it an axis of advance and a force-oriented objective. The enemy may be stationary or moving. Figure B-2 shows the tactical mission graphic for attack by fire. The arrow points at the targeted force or objective, and the commander places the base of the arrow in the general area from which he wants to deliver the attack.



Figure B-2. Attack-by-Fire Tactical Mission Graphic

B-4. An attack by fire closely resembles the task of support by fire. The chief difference is that one unit conducts the support-by-fire task to support another unit so it can maneuver against the enemy. The attack by fire task includes—

- Assigning sectors of fire or EAs to each subordinate weapon system to include the enemy's defensive positions or avenues of approach.
- Designating control measures to allow massing, distributing, and shifting of direct and indirect fires.
- Designating battle positions, area of operations (AO), or axis of advance to allow the friendly force to engage the enemy.
- Providing for security and all-around defense, including control measures to ensure tie-in of subordinate elements and maximum use of hide positions.
- OPSEC to deceive the enemy about movement, occupation, and intent of the operation.
- Reconnaissance, preparing and securing movement routes and firing positions before the movement of the main body, and stocking Class V items.
- Movement instructions to the initial battle positions.

BREACH

B-5. ***Breach*** **is a tactical mission task in which the unit employs all available means to break through or secure a passage through an enemy defense, obstacle, minefield, or fortification.** A commander attempts to bypass and avoid obstacles and enemy defensive positions to the maximum extent possible to maintain tempo and momentum. Breaching enemy defenses and obstacle systems is normally his last choice. When they occur, they are a synchronized combined arms operation under the control of

the maneuver commander. (Figure B-3 shows the control graphic for a breach.) The area located between the arms of the graphic shows the general location for the breach. The length of the arms extend to include the entire depth of the area that must be breached. Breaching operations may be required to support an attack anywhere along the continuum from deliberate to hasty attack. Regardless of where the attack falls along the continuum, the breaching tenets—intelligence, breaching fundamentals, breaching organization, mass, and synchronization—apply when conducting breaching operations in support of an attack. (FM 3-34.2 gives detailed information concerning breaching operations.)



Figure B-3. Breach Tactical Mission Graphic

BYPASS

B-6. **Bypass is a tactical mission task in which the commander directs his unit to maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of the operation while deliberately avoiding combat with an enemy force.** A commander orders a bypass and directs combat power toward mission accomplishment. A bypass can take place in offensive or defensive actions. (Figure B-4 shows the tactical mission graphic for a bypass.) The arms of the graphic go on both sides of the location or unit that will be bypassed.



Figure B-4. Bypass Tactical Mission Graphic

B-7. The commander bases his bypass decision on—

- The requirement to maintain momentum and aggressive action.
- Knowledge of enemy strength, intent, or mission.
- The degree to which the bypassed enemy can interfere with the advance.
- The general state of the enemy force; for example, if enemy resistance is crumbling, the friendly force can take greater risks.
- Any bypass criteria established by a higher headquarters.

B-8. The force conducting the bypass immediately reports any bypassed obstacles and enemy forces to its higher headquarters. The force normally keeps the bypassed enemy under observation until relieved by another force unless as part of a raid. A senior commander does not normally delegate authority to bypass below the battalion task force level. He establishes bypass criteria to limit the size of the enemy force that can be bypassed without the authority of the next higher commander. Before approving the bypass, the commander

ensures that the bypassing force checks the bypass route for enemy presence and trafficability. At no time can the bypassing force allow the bypassed enemy force to interfere with the moving friendly force.

B-9. The two bypass techniques that the force can employ are—

- Avoiding the enemy totally.
- Fixing the enemy in place with fires and then conducting the bypass.

B-10. If the force cannot avoid the enemy, the bypassing force must fix the enemy with part of its maneuver elements and bypass with the balance of the force. (See Figure B-5.) Generally, a commander will not attempt to bypass an enemy force if more than a third of his combat power is required to fix the enemy. The commander assigns one subordinate unit the mission of fixing the enemy in this situation, reinforcing the fixing force as required by the factors of METT-TC. The fixing force coordinates with the unit assigned to relieve him as soon as possible and provides the new commander with all available information about the enemy and terrain. The relieving unit is normally another unit assigned a follow-and-support task. Once relieved, the force fixing the enemy either rejoins its parent organization or becomes part of the following element and comes under its control.



Figure B-5. Task Force Conducting a Fix and a Bypass

B-11. Occasionally the commander may direct the fixing force to break contact with the enemy after the bypassing force completes the bypass. This occurs when the bypassing force has no requirement to maintain an uninterrupted logistics flow, such as in a raid. In this case, the fixing force fixes the enemy by employing defensive and limited offensive actions in synchronization with all available fire support until ordered to rejoin the bypassing force.

CLEAR



Figure B-6. Clear Tactical Mission Graphic

B-12. ***Clear*** **is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area.** The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces so they cannot interfere with the friendly unit's mission. In all cases, this task requires a thorough reconnaissance to discover the enemy's locations. After discovering the location, the clearing force maneuvers against the enemy force. (Figure B-6 shows the tactical mission graphic for clear.) The bar connecting the arrows designates the desired limit of advance for the clearing force. The bar also establishes the width of the area to clear.

B-13. This task requires significant time and other resources. In his mission statement, a commander can modify the objective associated with this task to destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of only enemy forces larger than a stated size. In this case, the clearing force keeps smaller enemy forces under observation while the rest of the friendly force bypasses them.

CONTROL

B-14. ***Control*** **is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations.** That influence can result from friendly forces occupying the specified area or dominating that area by their weapon systems. Control of an area does not require the complete clearance of all enemy soldiers from the specified area. The tactical mission task of control differs from that of secure because secure does not allow enemy fires to impact on the secured area. The enemy can engage targets within the controlled area but cannot move his ground forces through that area.

B-15. Control may also mean a command relationship or a function commanders exercise through their C2 system. (See FMs 3-0, 3-52, and 6-0.)

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

B-16. ***Counterreconnaissance*** **is a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission, but a component of all forms of security operations.** It prevents hostile observation of a force or area. Counterreconnaissance is an element of all security operations and most local security measures. It involves both active and passive elements and includes combat action to destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance units and surveillance assets.

B-17. Destroying enemy ground reconnaissance assets while denying the enemy information through other collection systems allows friendly force

commanders to operate against an enemy who is operating blindly. The enemy commander's inability to see the battlefield eventually desynchronizes his actions and renders his command vulnerable to aggressive action by friendly forces. (See Chapter 12 for additional information on counterreconnaissance.)

DISENGAGE

B-18. ***Disengage* is a tactical mission task where a commander has his unit break contact with the enemy to allow the conduct of another mission or to avoid decisive engagement.** It involves moving to a location where the enemy cannot engage the friendly force with either direct fires or observed indirect fires. Disengaging from the enemy while displacing from one position to the next is a difficult procedure. A disengagement plan includes—

- The maneuver concept of operations for tactical elements after disengagement, along with the movement routes for each subordinate unit.
- Fires to suppress the enemy and cover the unit's movement.
- Screening smoke to conceal the unit's movement, as part of a deception operation, or to cover passage points.
- Contact and passage points if moving through friendly lines. (See Chapter 15.)
- The time disengagement starts.
- The earliest time that CS and CSS elements move.

B-19. The senior headquarters conducts operations to support the disengaging forces and relieve pressure on units in contact with the enemy. For example, if a division is conducting a delay, the division commander uses his aviation assets to help a ground maneuver brigade disengage from the close fight. Simultaneously, the division uses its long-range artillery, rocket, and EW systems to destroy or disrupt enemy follow-on echelons to prevent them from interfering with the disengagement. The intent is to create conditions that allow the unit to disengage while avoiding decisive combat.

B-20. To facilitate disengagement, the commander suppresses the enemy in contact by bombarding him with large volumes of both direct and indirect fires provided by forces other than the disengaging unit. In open terrain, the unit generally moves its short-range systems first. In close terrain, it generally moves its long-range systems first to support by fire positions. The time involved to move a system to its next position also affects when that system moves. Small unit leaders usually direct this movement because of the limited range of combat net radios and the fact that the tactical situation varies across a unit's front. The process repeats as necessary. Once disengagement starts, units must complete it rapidly. The commander can employ supporting units or reserves to protect the disengaging unit's flanks and assist in freeing any closely engaged elements. The unit then moves to its next position using the appropriate movement techniques. (See Chapter 14.)

B-21. If enemy combat systems have not closed within direct-fire range of the friendly disengaging unit, all its elements may be able to move simultaneously under the cover of intense fires and smoke. Speed of execution and continued coordination are essential to the success of this task.

EXFILTRATE

B-22. ***Exfiltrate*** **is a tactical mission task where a commander removes soldiers or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means.** Friendly forces exfiltrate when they have been encircled by enemy forces and cannot conduct a breakout or be relieved by other friendly forces. Forces returning from a raid, an infiltration, or a patrol behind enemy lines can also conduct an exfiltration. The commander exfiltrates an encircled force to preserve a portion of the force; it is preferable to the capture of the entire force. A force exfiltrates only after destroying or incapacitating all equipment (less medical) it must leave behind. Only as a last resort, when the alternative is the capture of the entire force, does a force conducting an exfiltration leaves its casualties in place with supplies, chaplain support, and medical attendants.

B-23. Exfiltration is most feasible through rough or difficult terrain in areas lightly covered by enemy observation and fire. These conditions often allow undetected movement of small elements, when movement of the entire force would present more risk. Exfiltration requires resourcefulness, a high degree of discipline, expert land navigational skills, and motivation. It is unlikely that the entire force will be able to exfiltrate, since part of it may have to create a diversion. Good, small-unit leadership is essential in this type of operation.

B-24. The exfiltrating force first establishes its rally points and exfiltration lanes. It coordinates its linkup plans with other friendly units. The commander designates exfiltration lanes as restricted fire areas (RFAs) or no-fire areas (NFAs). The exfiltrating force uses preparatory fires to cover its movement and to expend stockpiled ammunition. Based on reconnaissance and available intelligence, the exfiltrating force subdivides into small groups and exfiltrates during periods of limited visibility, passing through or around enemy defensive positions. If detected, it tries to bypass the enemy. Exfiltration may be more difficult with combat and tactical vehicles because of the noise they make and the limitations they impose on exfiltration routes, make detection more likely.

FOLLOW AND ASSUME

B-25. ***Follow and assume*** **is a tactical mission task in which a second committed force follows a force conducting an offensive operation and is prepared to continue the mission if the lead force is fixed, attritted, or unable to continue.** The follow-and-assume force is not a reserve but is committed to accomplish specific tasks. Figure B-7 shows the tactical mission graphic for follow and assume. The commander places the box part of the graphic around the symbol of the unit being assigned this task.

B-26. Tasks for a follow-and-assume force include—

- Preparing to execute all missions of the followed unit.
- Maintaining contact with the trail elements of the leading force.
- Preparing to conduct a forward passage of lines through the force it is following.
- Monitoring all combat information and intelligence being provided to and from the force it is following.

- Avoiding engaging enemy forces bypassed by the force it is following.

B-27. A commander assigns a follow-and-assume mission to ensure that he can maintain the momentum of his offensive operation. The follow-and-assume force ensures that it can immediately execute a forward passage of lines and assume the mission of the lead force.

B-28. The commander assigning a unit the task of follow and assume has two options in establishing the relationship between the lead and trail units. He normally retains command of both units and requires that all requests for support from the supported unit to the supporting unit pass through his headquarters. Alternatively, in situations where the commander will not be able to maintain control over both units, he places the supporting unit in a standard command relationship with the supported unit, such as attached or operational control. An example of this occurs when both units are trying to encircle a retrograding enemy force and the commander remains with the direct-pressure force.



Figure B-7. Follow and Assume Tactical Mission Graphic

FOLLOW AND SUPPORT

B-29. ***Follow and support*** **is a tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation.** The follow-and-support force is not a reserve but is a force committed to specific tasks. (Figure B-8 on page B-10 shows the tactical mission graphic for follow and support.) The commander places the box part of the graphic around the symbol of the unit being assigned this task.

B-30. Tasks for a follow-and-support force include—

- Destroying bypassed enemy units when the lead unit does not clear the AO as it advances.
- Blocking movement of enemy reinforcements.

- Relieving in place any direct-pressure or encircling force halted to contain the enemy.
- Securing lines of communication.
- Clearing obstacles.
- Guarding prisoners, key areas, and installations.
- Recovering friendly battle losses.
- Securing key terrain.
- Controlling dislocated civilians.



Figure B-8. Follow and Support Tactical Mission Graphic

B-31. A commander assigns a unit the task of follow and support to keep the supported force from having to commit its combat power to tasks other than the decisive operation, which would slow the offensive operation's momentum and tempo. The follow-and-support force must accomplish its tasks to prevent the enemy, obstacles, and other factors from interfering with offensive operations, especially along the lines of communications.

B-32. The commander assigning the follow-and-support task has two options in establishing the relationship between the supported and the supporting units. He can place the follow-and-support unit in a standard command relationship with the supported unit, such as attached or operational control. Alternatively, he can retain command of the follow-and-support force and require that all tasking request from the supported unit go through his headquarters.

OCCUPY

B-33. ***Occupy*** **is a tactical mission task that involves moving a friendly force into an area so that it can control that area. Both the**

force's movement to and occupation of the area occur without enemy opposition. A unit can control an area without occupying it, but not vice versa. That is the difference between the tactical mission tasks of occupy and control. (Figure B-9 shows the occupy tactical mission graphic.) The *X* on the tactical mission graphic has no significance, but the graphic should encompass the entire area that the commander desires to occupy. Units typically occupy assembly areas, objectives, and defensive positions. (Chapters 2, 3, and 8 discuss this process in detail.)



Figure B-9. Occupy Tactical Mission Graphic

REDUCE

B-34. ***Reduce*** **is a tactical mission task that involves the destruction of an encircled or bypassed enemy force.** There is no tactical mission graphic for this task. This task can occur at any location on the battlefield. (Appendix D discusses the reduction of an encircled enemy.) Reduce is also a mobility task that involves creating sufficient lanes through an obstacle to negate its intended effect.

RETAIN

B-35. ***Retain*** **is a tactical mission task in which the commander ensures that a terrain feature controlled by a friendly force remains free of enemy occupation or use.** The commander assigning this task must specify the area to retain and the duration of the retention, which is time- or event-driven. While a unit is conducting this task, it expects the enemy to attack and prepares to become decisively engaged. A unit tasked to retain a specific piece of terrain does not necessary have to occupy it. (Figure B-10 shows the tactical mission graphic for retain.) The direction of the arrow has no significance, but the graphic should include the entire area the commander wants to retain.



Figure B-10. Retain Tactical Mission Graphic

SECURE

B-36. ***Secure*** **is a tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action.** This task normally involves conducting area security operations. (See Chapter 12.) A force given the mission of securing a unit, facility, or geographical location not only prevents enemy forces from over-running or occupying the secured location, but also prevents enemy direct fires and observed indirect fires from impacting the secured location. This is the primary difference between control and secure. The control tactical mission task allows enemy direct and indirect fires to affect the location being controlled. A unit does not have to physically occupy the area

immediately around the unit, facility, or geographical location it is securing if it can prevent the enemy from occupying or firing at that location by other means. The commander states the mission duration in terms of time or event when assigning a mission to secure a given unit, facility, or geographical location. (Figure B-11 shows the tactical mission graphic for secure.) The direction of the arrow has no significance, but the graphic should include the entire area the commander wants to secure.



Figure B-11. Secure Tactical Mission Graphic

SEIZE

B-37. ***Seize* is a tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a designated area by using overwhelming force.** (Figure B-12 shows the tactical mission graphic for seize.) An enemy force can no longer place direct fire on an objective that has been seized. The arrow points to the location or objective to seize. This task differs from secure because it requires offensive action to obtain control of the designated area or objective. It differs from the task of occupy because it involves overcoming anticipated enemy opposition. Once a force seizes a physical objective, it clears the terrain within that objective by killing, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of all enemy forces.



Figure B-12. Seize Tactical Mission Graphic

SUPPORT-BY- FIRE

B-38. ***Support-by-fire* is a tactical mission task in which a maneuver force moves to a position where it can engage the enemy by direct fire in support of another maneuvering force.** The primary objective of the support force is normally to fix and suppress the enemy so he cannot effectively fire on the maneuvering force. The secondary objective is to destroy the enemy if he tries to reposition. The commander must specify the desired effect on the enemy when assigning this task to a subordinate.

B-39. A unit conducting the task of support by fire does not maneuver to capture enemy forces or terrain. The commander gives this task to another unit as part of a larger maneuver. When assigning a support-by-fire mission, the commander designates the enemy, when to attack, the general location from which to operate, the friendly force to support, and the purpose of the task, such as fix or suppress. (Figure B-13 shows the tactical mission graphic for support by fire.) The ends of the arrows should point in the general direction of the targeted unit or location. The base of the area indicates the general area from which to deliver fires.

B-40. Once the commander gives an element the task of support by fire, it should occupy support by fire positions that have cover and concealment,

good observation, and clear fields of fire. Elements occupying support-by-fire positions should—

- Check the security of the position.
- Search for targets.
- Orient weapons on likely or suspected enemy positions.
- Assume fighting positions that provide some degree of protection. Heavy forces occupy hull-down firing positions, while light forces use trees, natural berms, buildings, and similar existing terrain features.
- Assign observation sectors to each soldier or weapon system in the support-by-fire element.
- Use its available thermal sights to locate heat sources not visible to the naked eye, such as vehicles concealed in tree lines or other wooded areas or personnel serving at OPs.



Figure B-13. Support-by-Fire Position Tactical Mission Graphic

B-41. Support by fire closely resembles the task of attack by fire. The difference is that support by fire supports another force so it can maneuver against the enemy, while an attack by fire does not support the maneuver of another friendly force.

EFFECTS ON ENEMY FORCE

BLOCK

B-42. ***Block* is a tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or prevents his advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach.** A blocking task normally requires the friendly force to block the enemy force for a certain time or until a specific event has occurred. The line perpendicular to the enemy's line of advance indicates the limit of enemy advance. A blocking unit may have to hold terrain and become decisively engaged. (Figure B-14 illustrates the tactical mission graphic for a blocking task.)



Figure B-14. Block Tactical Mission Graphic

B-43. ***Block* is also an engineer obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to stop an attacker along a specific avenue of approach or prevent him from passing through an engagement area.** The vertical line in the obstacle effect graphic indicates the limit of enemy advance. They also indicate where the obstacle ties in to restricted terrain. (Figure B-15 on page B-14 illustrates the block obstacle effect graphic.) A blocking force may employ blocking obstacles to assist in the task. Blocking obstacles are complex, employed in depth, and integrated with fires to prevent the enemy from proceeding along an avenue of approach, or to

proceed only at unacceptable cost. When employed, blocking obstacles should serve as a limit, not allowing the enemy beyond that point. Obstacles alone cannot accomplish a blocking task. (FM 3-34.1 describes the block engineer obstacle effect.)



Figure B-15. Block Obstacle Effect Graphic

B-44. Block as a tactical mission task differs from the tactical mission task of fix because a blocked enemy force can move in any direction other than the obstructed one, while a fixed enemy force cannot move in any direction.

CANALIZE

B-45. ***Canalize* is a tactical mission task in which the commander restricts enemy movement to a narrow zone by exploiting terrain coupled with the use of obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver.** (See Figure B-16.) Figure B-17 shows how successful canalization results in moving the enemy formation or individual soldiers and weapon systems into a predetermined position where they are vulnerable to piecemeal destruction by direct and indirect fires.



Figure B-16. Canalize Tactical Mission Graphic


TREES 20 TO 25 CM IN DIAMETER, SPACED NOT MORE THAN 5 METERS APART
COMPLETED ANTITANK DITCH REINFORCED BY AT MINES AND AN ABATIS
C
EA
COLLEEN
SLOPE > 45% ANGLE

Figure B-17. Canalizing Terrain Enhanced by Obstacles Used with an Engagement Area

CONTAIN

B-46. ***Contain*** **is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to stop, hold, or surround enemy forces or to cause them to center their activity on a given front and prevent them from withdrawing any part of their forces for use elsewhere.** Containment allows an enemy to reposition himself within the designated geographical area, whereas fixing an enemy does not. Geo-graphic terms or time may express the limits of the containment. The contain graphic encompasses the entire geographical area in which the commander desires to contain the enemy during the development of alternative courses of action. (Figure B-18 shows the tactical control graphic for contain.)



Figure B-18. Contain Tactical Mission Graphic

DEFEAT

B-47. ***Defeat*** **is a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force's commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander's will and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use.**

B-48. A commander can generate different effects against an enemy to defeat him:

- Physical. The enemy loses the physical means to continue fighting. He no longer has the personnel, weapon systems, equipment, or supplies to carry out his assigned mission.
- Psychological. The enemy loses the will to fight. He becomes mentally exhausted, and his morale is so low that he can no longer continue to carry out his assigned mission.

These effects typically occur as a result of catastrophic losses inflicted over a very short time or from sustained attrition. An opponent who is not ideologically motivated opponent may be defeated psychologically on observing preparations for the delivery of clearly overwhelming combat power on his position. Defeat manifests itself in some sort of physical action, such as mass surrenders, abandonment of significant quantities of equipment and supplies, or retrograde operations.

DESTROY

B-49. ***Destroy*** **is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.** The amount of damage needed to render a unit combat-

ineffective depends on the unit's type, discipline, and morale. Destroying armored or dug-in targets with area fire weapons requires considerable ammunition and time, so forces do not normally attempt it unless they have terminally guided munitions. (Figure B-19 shows the tactical mission graphic for destroy.)



Figure B-19. Destroy Tactical Mission Graphic

DISRUPT

B-50. ***Disrupt*** **is a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy's formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion.** This increases the enemy's vulnerability to friendly fires. It may temporarily knock a unit out of the battle. Disruption is never an end; it is the means to an end. (Figure B-20 shows the tactical mission graphic for disrupt. The center arrow points toward the targeted enemy unit.)



Figure B-20. Disrupt Tactical Mission Graphic

B-51. The maneuver force attempting to disrupt an enemy must attack him with enough combat power to achieve desired results with one mass attack or sustain the attack until it achieves the desired results. It may involve attacking the enemy while he is still in his assembly areas or in an approach march before he can deploy into a combat formation. The commander deter-mines the amount of risk he is willing to accept based on anticipated friendly losses, the location of the attack, and the number of attacks.

B-52. ***Disrupt*** **is also an engineer obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break up his formation and tempo, interrupt his timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal effort.** It also helps to deceive the enemy concerning the location of friendly defensive positions, to separate combat echelons, or to separate combat forces from their logistic support. As shown in Figure B-21, the short arrow(s) in the obstacle-effect graphic indicates where obstacles impact the enemy's ability to maneuver. The longer arrow(s) indicate where the commander allows the enemy to bypass the obstacle effect so he can attack him with fires. The arrows indicate the direction of enemy attack. A defending



Figure B-21. Disrupt Obstacle Effect Graphic

commander normally uses the disrupt obstacle effect forward of his EAs. Obstacles alone cannot disrupt an enemy unit. (FM 3-34.1 describes the disrupt engineer obstacle effect.)

FIX

B-53. ***Fix* is a tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy from moving any part of his force from a specific location for a specific period.** This may occur by engaging him to prevent his withdrawal for use elsewhere, or by using deception, such as transmitting false orders. The commander uses fix in offensive and defensive actions; it is always a shaping operation. (Figure B-22 shows the tactical mission graphic for fix.) The commander points the arrow toward the enemy unit that he desires to fix. The broken part of the arrow indicates the desired location for that event to occur.



Figure B-22. Fix Tactical Mission Graphic

B-54. Fixing an enemy force does not mean destroying it. The friendly force has to prevent the enemy from moving in any direction. This task usually has a time constraint, such as fix the enemy reserve force until OBJECTIVE FALON, the decisive operation, is secured. The tactical mission task of fix differs from that of block in that a fixed enemy force cannot move from a given location, but a blocked enemy force can move in any direction other than the one obstructed.

B-55. ***Fix* is also an engineer obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker's movement within a specified area, normally an engagement area.** Primary use of this effect is to give the friendly unit time to acquire, target, and destroy the attacking enemy with direct and indirect fires throughout the depth of an EA or avenue of approach. The irregular part of the arrow in the obstacle-intent graphic indicates the location where the enemy's rate of advance will be slowed by complex obstacles. The arrow indicates the direction of enemy advance. (See Figure B-23.) (FM 3-34.1 describes the fix engineer obstacle effect.)



Figure B-23. Fix Obstacle Intent Graphic

INTERDICT

B-56. ***Interdict* is a tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy's use of an area or route.** Interdiction is a shaping operation conducted to complement and reinforce other ongoing offensive or defensive operations. (Figure B-24 on page B-18 shows the tactical mission graphic for interdict.) The two arrows should cross on the unit or location targeted for interdiction. An interdiction tasking must specify how long to interdict, defined as a length of time or some event that must occur before the interdiction is lifted, or the exact effect desired from the interdiction.

B-57. The depth at which the attacking force conducts the interdiction generally determines the friendly force's freedom of action. Increasing the depth of operations reduces the danger of fratricide to air and surface forces, reduces the coordination required, and allows increasingly flexible operations. With more freedom of action, aerial forces leave the enemy with no location immune from attack.



Figure B-24. Interdict Tactical Mission Graphic

B-58. The depth at which interdiction takes place also determines the speed with which its effects are observed. Normally, ground maneuver units first focus on targets close to the forward of line own troops (FLOT). Interdiction efforts there have immediate impact on enemy forces near the interdiction target but do not affect the enemy's ability to mass force effects. Attacks at greater distances from the FLOT have a delayed impact on close combat but eventually degrade the enemy's ability to mass effects.

B-59. The friendly force's capability to interdict may have a devastating impact on the enemy's plans and ability to respond to friendly actions. For example, interdiction efforts that result in the enemy's maneuver being delayed or disrupted enhances the friendly force's ability to achieve tactical advantages. Delaying or disrupting enemy resupply efforts limits his ability to sustain intense, high-tempo offensive or defensive operations and restricts the mobility of his forces.

B-60. Interdicting the movement of enemy units can be extremely effective in assisting their encirclement and eventual destruction. Fixed enemy ground forces—or those trapped by the loss of their mobility—provide lucrative targets. The commander should plan to interdict withdrawing enemy forces to enhance his pursuit. While interdiction can contribute to success by hampering reinforcement and resupply, it can also contribute by trapping enemy forces or canalizing their maneuvers, leading to their destruction in detail.

ISOLATE

B-61. ***Isolate*** **is a tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from his sources of support, deny him freedom of movement, and prevent him from having contact with other enemy forces.** A commander does not allow an isolated enemy sanctuary within his present position but continues to conduct offensive actions against him. (Figure B-25 shows the tactical mission graphic for isolate.) The position or direction of the arrow has no significance, but the graphic should surround the targeted enemy unit.



Figure B-25. Isolate Tactical Mission Graphic

NEUTRALIZE

B-62. ***Neutralize*** **is a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation.** (Figure B-26 shows the neutralize tactical mission graphic.) The two lines cross over the symbol of the unit or facility targeted for neutralization. When assigning a task to neutralize, the commander must specify the enemy force or materiel to neutralize and the duration, which is time- or event-driven. The neutralized target may become effective again when casualties are replaced, damage is repaired, or effort resulting in the neutralization is lifted. The commander normally uses a combination of lethal and nonlethal fires to neutralize enemy personnel or materiel. The assets required to neutralize a target vary according to the type and size of the target and the weapon and munitions combination used.



Figure B-26. Neutralize Tactical Mission Graphic

SUPPRESS

B-63. ***Suppress*** **is a tactical mission task that results in the temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapon system below the level needed to accomplish its mission.** It occurs when a commander employs direct or indirect lethal fires, offensive information operations, or smoke on enemy personnel, weapons, and equipment to prevent or degrade enemy fires, sensors, and visual observation of friendly forces. As opposed to the neutralization task, the original target regains its effectiveness without needing to reconstitute once the effects of the systems involved in the suppression effort lift or shift to another target.

TURN

B-64. ***Turn*** **is a tactical mission task that involves forcing an enemy element from one avenue of approach or movement corridor to another.** The commander relates obstacles, fires, and terrain to improve his tactical situation while degrading the enemy's situation. For example, in the offense, a commander might want to turn an enemy force he is pursuing to place it in a position where he can destroy it. In the defense, a commander might want to turn an attacking enemy force to allow him to conduct a counterattack into its flank. (Figure B-27 shows the turn tactical mission graphic.) The place where the arrow breaks indicates the general location of the obstacle complex that will force the enemy to move from one avenue of approach to another.



Figure B-27. Turn Tactical Mission Graphic

B-65. ***Turn*** **is also a tactical obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to divert an enemy formation from one**

avenue of approach to an adjacent avenue of approach or into an engagement area. Its development requires well-defined mobility corridors and avenues of approach. To achieve this effect, the obstacles have a subtle orientation relative to the enemy's approach as shown in Figure B-28. The obstacles and their associated fires allow bypasses in the direction desired by the friendly scheme of maneuver. Finally, the obstacles tie into restrictive terrain at the initial point of the turn. A commander normally uses the turn effect on the flanks of an EA. The direction of the arrow indicates the desired direction of turn. (See FM 3-34.1 for more information on tactical obstacle effects.)



Figure B-28. Turn Obstacle Effect

Appendix C

Airborne and Air Assault Operations

A landing against organized and highly trained opposition is probably the most difficult undertaking which military forces are called upon to face.

General of the Army George C. Marshall, 1943

Joint force commanders conduct entry operations at the operational level of war. Commanders operating at the tactical level conduct airborne or air assault operations to gain a positional advantage or to envelop or turn the enemy. Airborne and air assault operations are types of entry operations that use a vertical envelopment to insert a force into an area of operations (AO). An enemy may or may not be in a position to oppose the operation. While the commander should attempt to achieve an unopposed landing, he must prepare for the presence of opposition.

C-1. The capability to conduct airborne and air assault operations allows the commander to—

- Threaten enemy rear areas, causing the enemy to divert combat elements to protect vital installations and hold key terrain.
- Overcome distances quickly, overfly barriers, and bypass enemy defenses.
- Extend the area over which he can exert his influence.
- Disperse his reserve forces widely for force protection reasons while maintaining their capability for effective and rapid response.
- Exploit his combat power by increasing tactical mobility.

COMMON FACTORS

C-2. Factors common to airborne and air assault operations are the use of the reverse planning process, condition setting, and the impact of meteorological conditions (weather and light data).

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REVERSE PLANNING PROCESS

C-3. An inverse sequence of detailed planning and joint coordination characterizes both operations. As a minimum, airborne and air assault plans include a–

- Ground tactical plan.
- Landing plan.
- Movement plan.
- Marshaling plan. (The air assault terminology for this last plan is the staging plan.)

Intelligence regarding the enemy and terrain characteristics of the objective area is vital to this process.

C-4. Airborne and air assault operations result in establishing positions that support completing the force's assigned mission. The ground tactical plan is the first plan completed. It must address the early destruction of any enemy forces that pose an immediate threat to the lodgment area. Commanders and their staffs normally develop the landing plan from the ground tactical plan. From the landing plan, they develop the movement plan. This continues until the staff completes the marshaling plan.

C-5. The ground tactical plan is the basis for planning throughout the planning process. However, each plan affects the others, and changes in one plan can require adjustments in the other plans. The commander must determine if such adjustments entail acceptable risk. If the risk is unacceptable, the concept of operations must change. For example, the amount of lift available determines the feasibility of the ground tactical plan. If there are not enough lift systems to put all the required forces in place at the required time, the commander should adjust the ground tactical plan as well as the other plans. Therefore, planning for airborne and air assault operations requires the staff to obtain vital planning data, such as the availability of lift systems and the technical and tactical capabilities of those systems as early as possible.

C-6. Commanders ensure continuous coordination between the parallel echelons of the assaulting combat force and the unit or service providing the transportation from the beginning of an operation until its completion or abandonment. Units jointly coordinate and staff each detail before initiating operations. The commander makes maximum use of combined arms capabilities to ensure the assault force has sufficient power to accomplish its mission and protect itself. Short planning times often require staffs to modify existing contingency plans and standing operating procedures to meet the exact situation while still ensuring adequate coordination.

CONDITION SETTING

C-7. Setting conditions is also a common factor necessary for the success of air assault and airborne operations. Condition setting postures the air assault or parachute force for success with minimal or acceptable losses. The commander determines the exact conditions required in accordance with the factors of METT-TC, to include the degree of risk he is willing to accept with regard to each condition. Setting conditions is not limited to conducting suppression of enemy air defense and preparatory fires. It requires the

participation of numerous staffs, units, cells, and boards in different echelons and services.

C-8. Condition setting is an iterative process. The commander through his situational understanding, decides what part of the situation must change to ensure the success of the vertical envelopment. He tasks his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to detect the location of those enemy systems that unacceptably endanger the success of the operation. This allows his fire support systems to target and deliver fire effects against those enemy systems. He tasks his other battlefield operating systems to continue planning and preparing for the operation. The commander requests assistance from his higher headquarters if he does not have sufficient organic assets and information to accomplish the mission. He then assesses the progress of his battlefield operating systems. This process repeats until he is satisfied with the result or operational necessity forces him to either cancel or conduct the vertical envelopment.

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

C-9. Meteorological conditions affect airborne and air assault operations more than they affect any other type of operation. Long-range forecasts are vital to planning. As part of the planning process, commanders determine what adverse weather conditions would delay or cancel operations.

C-10. Commanders consider current and forecasted weather conditions in terms of their impact on tactical operations and aircraft performance. To issue the execution order that initiates the operation, the commander must know the current weather information at departure sites and pickup zones (PZs), along approach routes, and in the objective area. Operations conducted during marginal weather conditions may enhance the element of surprise, but they also increase the risk of accidents. The commander may have to postpone a planned operation or reduce the tempo of an ongoing operation when the risk becomes unacceptable because of deteriorating weather conditions.

C-11. Weather conditions affect aircraft performance and influence the conduct of operations. These conditions include: wind shears, crosswinds, and the ambient temperatures throughout the course of the operation. High temperature and altitude degrade aircraft lift performance. The combination of these factors results in trade-offs in the operating parameters of all missions. For example, a commander may insert dismounted reconnaissance teams on mountainsides in the cool of the morning, but be unable to execute the same mission in the noonday heat.

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

C-12. An *airborne operation* is an operation involving the air movement into an objective area of combat forces and their logistic support for execution of a tactical, operational, or strategic mission. The means employed may be any combination of airborne units, air transportable units, and types of transport aircraft, depending on the mission and the overall situation (JP 3-17). The objective area is known as the airhead. The airhead contains enough drop zones (DZs) and landing zones (LZs) to allow airborne forces to mass effects on their

objectives. The airhead should also contain extraction zones (EZs), interior lines of communications (LOCs), and terrain that allows for conducting a defense in depth. An administrative air movement of personnel, supplies, or equipment is not an airborne operation, although some procedures used in an airborne operation may apply. (JP 3-18 and FM 3-18.11 provide the doctrinal basis for airborne operations.)

C-13. Airborne operations are joint operations because of the interservice links of modern command and control (C2) systems, the multiservice structure of the defense transportation system, and the broad range of forces and support involved. Airborne operations require secure staging and departure areas coupled with the need to maintain operations security (OPSEC). OPSEC measures may include establishing intermediate support bases within tactical airlift range. The operation begins and ends on the order of the commander who establishes the joint airborne force.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

C-14. Once the commander determines the principal components of the ground tactical plan and the maneuver and fire support schemes, the airborne force organizes to execute its assigned mission. The commander balances the immediate need for combat power with the need to ensure force sustainability over time. To ensure unity of effort, part or all of the assigned forces' subordinate units can form into one or more temporary tactical groupings, such as teams or task forces. Each tactical group has a designated commander. Doctrine cannot prescribe in advance a standard organization to meet all conditions. However, airborne forces generally divide into one of three echelons: the assault echelon, the follow-on echelon, and the rear echelon.

C-15. The *assault echelon* is the element of a force that is scheduled for initial assault on the objective area (JP 4-01.2). In an airborne assault it normally comprises those forces capable of insertion by parachute in a single drop by the available lift systems. The assault echelon is a combined arms organization with only limited sustainment capabilities. The commander cross-loads vital assets, such as commanders, principal staff, communication systems, reconnaissance and security forces, and crew-served weapons among the various transportation systems so the loss of a single air frame will not compromise the operation. (Cross-loading also applies to air assault operations.)

C-16. **The *follow-on echelon* contains those additional forces moved into the objective area after the assault echelon.** They provide the combat power necessary to expand the initial airhead, secure the lodgment area, and establish one or more air or seaports of debarkation. The composition of the follow-on echelon depends on the factors of METT-TC. It can consist of heavy and light combined arms formations, field and air defense artillery assets, and combat engineers, as well as significant combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) elements. Introducing this echelon can extend over several days and involve multiple sorties by individual lift systems. Usually, this echelon does not require cross-loading of its allocated lift systems. This increases the carrying capacity of the lift systems delivering this echelon. This echelon contains increased sustainment capabilities.

C-17. The rear echelon contains those elements of the force that are not required in the objective area. It may remain at home station or at an intermediate staging base or intermediate support base throughout short-duration operations. This echelon generally contains the airborne unit's long-term sustainment capabilities.

CONTROL MEASURES

C-18. The commander has the full range of graphic control measures to help control his operation. As a minimum, the commander must assign each subordinate unit an AO. The airborne operation commander also use DZs, LZs, EZs, assault objectives, and the airhead line to focus the efforts of his subordinates.

C-19. Selecting DZs and LZs is a joint responsibility. The mission commander is responsible for delivering personnel and cargo to the DZ or LZ and for selecting approaches to the landing area. Both the joint and component commanders must base their decisions on their knowledge of respective problems and on the needs of the overall operation. The nature and location of landing areas are important when preparing the scheme of maneuver. The mission governs the general area where they should be established. At higher echelons, commanders can assign landing areas in broad terms. At lower echelons, they must describe these locations specifically. The commander selects his DZs only after conducting a detailed analysis. He uses the information provided by his intelligence system and Army pathfinders as he considers the following factors when selecting DZs and LZs:

- Ease of identification.
- Straight-line approach.
- Suitable for the weather and terrain.
- Out of range of enemy air defenses, strong ground defenses, and suppressive indirect fires.
- Close to or on top of an assault objective.

Since the last two entries conflict, he must decide which consideration has priority. (FM 3-17 provides detailed information regarding the desired characteristics of DZs and LZs.)

C-20. When assigning objectives and boundaries in airborne operations, the commander must consider other factors in addition to those inherent in conventional operations. He selects specific assault objectives based on an analysis of the situation. (See Figure C-1, page C-6.) The assault objectives dictate the size and shape of the airhead, although the commander develops the airhead line and determines the assault objectives concurrently. He selects assault objectives for his subordinate elements. Concurrently, the commanders of these subordinate elements decide the size, type, or disposition of the force that they commit to gain and maintain control of their objectives.

C-21. Selecting assault objectives should allow forces to accomplish mission-essential tasks while meeting the commander's intent. However, they may not include those objectives that must be seized to secure the airhead line. An appropriate assault objective is one that the force must control early in the assault to accomplish the mission or enhance the security of the airborne force. This can include key terrain within the airhead or terrain required for

linkup. The airborne force is vulnerable from the time it lands until follow-on forces arrive at the airhead. A mounted enemy unit that attacks the airhead immediately following the airborne assault can completely disrupt the operation or even cause it to fail. Therefore, the assault objectives selected by the commander are terrain locations that dominate high-speed enemy avenues of approach into the airhead. He can also select enemy positions that threaten the mission and are within the airhead. The unit must seize its assault objectives immediately to establish the airhead and provide security for follow-on forces.



Figure C-1. Assault Objectives

C-22. The commander ranks the assault objectives based on the most likely threat or mission requirements. The airborne force secures its assault objectives before it establishes a perimeter defensive line along the trace of the airhead. It clears the terrain within the airhead of organized enemy resistance and positions forces to secure the airhead line.

C-23. The commander selects assault objectives at the same time as he considers the extent of the airhead. He draws the airhead line to delineate the specific area to seize and designate the airhead. An airhead line resembles a forward edge of the battle area in that security and other forces operate outside of the airhead line. The airhead acts as a base for further operations and as the lodgment to allow the airborne force to build up combat power. Once the assault force secures the airhead, it clears all enemy forces within it, not just organized enemy units. The following factors determine the location, extent, and form of the airhead line:



Figure C-2. Airhead Line

- The actual trace of the airhead line reflects the control of key or critical terrain essential to the mission. (See Figure C-2.) The air-head line should place the arrival airfield and any LZs or DZs out of the range of enemy direct fires and observed indirect fires.
- The airhead line is anchored on obstacles, and the airhead takes advantage of existing natural and man-made obstacles.

- The airhead contains enough DZs, LZs, and EZs to ensure the force has interior LOCs and to permit one massed parachute assault by the entire assault echelon rather than piecemeal insertion.
- The airhead allows enough space to disperse units and supplies to reduce the airhead's vulnerability to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons if they are a threat.
- The airhead must be large enough to provide for defense in depth, yet small enough for the airborne unit to defend. Although this depends largely on the factors of METT-TC, a battalion can defend an airhead 3 to 5 kilometers in diameter. A brigade can occupy an airhead 5 to 8 kilometers in diameter.

C-24. When assigning boundaries and subordinate AOs in airborne operations, the commander considers several factors beyond those affecting more routine operations. Ideally, each unit's AO should include at least one DZ and one LZ to enable the unit and its attachments to land within its assigned AO during the assault. Each unit's presence also facilitates resupply and evacuation of enemy prisoners of war and casualties. Establishing a LZ and a DZ reduces coordination requirements with adjacent units. The commander assigns boundaries that should not require a unit to defend in more than one direction at the same time. Boundaries should extend as far as necessary beyond forward security forces to coordinate fires. This enables subordinate security units to operate forward of the airhead with minimal coordination. (See Figure C-3.)



Figure C-3. Boundaries and Fire Support Coordinating Measures for an Airhead

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

C-25. The airborne force commander begins planning when he receives an initiating directive or a warning order. JP 3-18 describes the contents of an initiating directive or warning order as including the—

- Mission for subordinate units.
- Higher commander's concept of the operation.
- Command structure for the operation.
- Time and duration of the operation, including D-day and H-hour (execution time).
- Intelligence and security requirements.
- Allocation and distribution of airlift assets.
- Unit deployment list and sequence.
- Departure airfields, remote marshaling bases, and intermediate staging bases.
- Signal requirements and instructions.
- Linkup and withdrawal concept.

C-26. In an airborne operation that envisions an early linkup with conventional ground maneuver forces, the airborne unit defends the airhead until completing the linkup. After linkup, the airborne force either resumes the offensive within the commander's concept of the operation or prepares for subsequent operations. Tactical airborne operations begin with an initial assault followed by independent operations. They then transition to the defense of the established airhead until enough forces can be delivered to the objective area to break out of the established lodgment or linkup with ground forces.

C-27. The flexibility of airborne forces gives the commander wide latitude to select approach routes and objective areas. Airborne forces bypass ground obstacles and enemy positions to strike objectives in otherwise inaccessible areas. The ability of airborne forces to move rapidly and land on or near their objectives increases the element of surprise. It also facilitates the massing of relative combat power because airborne forces can attack the objective from any direction, which leads to the dissipation of the enemy's defenses. The presence of airborne forces also constitutes a threat that affects the enemy's capability to mass. These forces compel him to disperse combat power to protect vital sustainment installations and other key locations.

C-28. The primary prerequisites to conducting successful airborne operations are moving forces to an objective area without incurring unacceptable losses and supplying these forces with the required combat power, CS, and CSS. Steps taken to attain these objectives include—

- Obtain and maintain air superiority.
- Suppress enemy air defense capabilities and ground fires.
- Provide adequate air defense in the marshaling area and en route to and within the objective area.

C-29. In an airborne operation, the commander's primary initial sources of long-range fire support are air support and rocket or missile fires that can range the airhead. Other sources may include naval surface fires. The commander may insert airborne artillery cannon units and attack helicopters to

provide close supporting fires during the initial assault. He may also introduce additional cannon, MLRS, and helicopter assets into the airhead during subsequent phases of the operation.

C-30. The capacity and availability of aircraft limit the size and amount of equipment and supplies available for movement to the objective area. The commander can insert his heavy equipment into the objective area by heavy parachute airdrops or an air landing. The limited number of vehicles in airborne units reduces the unit's tactical mobility in open terrain compared with that of armored and mechanized formations. However, airborne units may gain considerable mobility by using helicopters. Units also make concerted efforts to capture and exploit enemy supplies, equipment, weapons, vehicles, and petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL).

C-31. Because of the displacement range of forces and the need for air LOCs, airborne operations magnify the problems normally inherent in sustaining a combat force. Therefore, commanders must emphasize planning for resupply, equipment maintenance, casualty evacuation, graves registration, and prisoner of war handling. Prepackaging company- and battalion-size resupply sets can ease these problems when support units must push supplies to the combat units.

C-32. Commanders consider all supplies and equipment required for mission accomplishment as part of their tactical planning. The initial combat requirements dictate the quantities and types of supplies and equipment carried by assault forces in the operation. Commanders ensure that only supplies required to meet the immediate needs of the assault force initially deploy into the objective area. Excess supplies and equipment can constitute a burden on the assault force. Staffs establish and maintain required levels of supply by phasing supplies into the objective area on an accompanying, follow-on (automatic and on-call), and routine basis. Ammunition, water, and POL products normally constitute the major tonnage items in airborne operations.

C-33. As part of the preparation for the airborne operation, soldiers receive briefings on the plan of their unit, adjacent units, and higher echelons including contingencies. It is particularly important that all personnel understand the commander's intent of the next two higher echelons. This helps units or soldiers landing in unplanned areas direct their efforts toward accomplishing the mission.

EXECUTING AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

C-34. Airborne operations may precede, accompany, or follow other types of operations. An airborne unit conducts day or night operations; each has its advantages and disadvantages, such as ease of target acquisition and identification of DZs. Initially, as part of preparatory fires, available fires destroy or suppress enemy systems and units that pose an immediate danger to the airborne assault. Using precision munitions increases the probability of achieving the desired effect. At the same time, it reduces the number of friendly fire support systems required to achieve this effect.

C-35. Executing the ground tactical plan involves initially seizing DZs and LZs in and around an airfield, or actually seizing an airfield. The assault echelon lands as close as possible to its objective by parachute and

immediately assembles. Its initial assault emphasizes the coordinated action of small units to seize initial objectives before the advantage of surprise has worn off. Aggressive small-unit actions characterize this critical phase. Small-unit leader initiative is a key factor in a unit's ability to accomplish the mission. As assault forces seize assault objectives, the airborne force directs its efforts toward consolidating the airhead.

C-36. Tactical surprise and detailed planning should enable units to seize their assault objectives and to establish the airhead before the enemy has time to react in force. This ensures the uninterrupted landing of air-transported troops, equipment, and supplies. The commander changes the missions of his units as necessary in response to the enemy's actions. Units can expect the enemy to launch uncoordinated attacks quickly along major avenues of approach, using his locally available forces. Since the degree of coordination and strength of these attacks increases progressively, the airborne force must develop correspondingly greater strength in its defensive positions and prepare to defend against a mounted counterattack.

C-37. Units assigned to perform reconnaissance and security missions land in early serials so they can establish roadblocks, locate enemy forces, and disrupt enemy communication facilities. Since ground reconnaissance by unit commanders is seldom possible before the airborne operation, it must begin as soon as the unit lands. The flow of information must be continuous. The airborne commander's information requirements do not vary greatly from those of other light force commanders. However, his unit's method of arriving into the combat area makes immediate and thorough reconnaissance and transmission of combat information to higher headquarters necessary.

C-38. If the initial assault objectives are heavily defended, the bulk of the force has the task of seizing them. When initial objectives are lightly defended, the bulk of the force can clear assigned AOs and prepare defensive positions in depth. The commander initiates extensive patrolling as soon as possible between adjacent defensive positions within the airhead line and between the airhead and the forward trace of his security area. He uses his scout helicopters to support this patrolling effort. In most cases, the commander establishes contact with any special operations forces or friendly irregular forces in the area through a special operations command and control element that accompanies the assault force. Advanced ISR and digital C2 systems can assist this process by detecting the location of enemy forces within the airhead line and rapidly disseminating an accurate and timely common operational picture to all command posts involved in the operation. This precludes the necessity of conducting a zone reconnaissance of the entire area within the airhead line by foot mobile soldiers.

C-39. Sufficient communications personnel and equipment must move into the airhead before, (or simultaneously with) the assault command post to ensure the timely installation of vital communications. As soon as communications and the tactical situation permit, the commander establishes—

- Command fire control channels within the airborne forces.
- Communications with supporting air and naval forces.
- Communications with airlift forces concerned with buildup, air supply, and air evacuation.

- Communications with bases in friendly territory.
- Communications between widely separated airborne or ground forces with a common or coordinated mission, such as link-up forces.

C-40. The commander influences the action by shifting or reallocating available fire support means. He may also—

- Move forces.
- Modify missions.
- Change objectives and boundaries.
- Employ reserves.
- Move to a place from which he can best exercise personal influence, especially during the initial assault.

C-41. With initial objectives secured, subordinate units seize additional objectives to expedite establishing a coordinated defense or conducting future operations. The commander then organizes defensive positions, supplements combat net radio communications as required, and establishes a reserve. These, as well as other measures, prepare the force to repel enemy counterattacks, minimize the effects of weapons of mass destruction, or resume the offensive.

C-42. The reserve prepares and occupies defensive positions pending its commitment. The commander commits his reserve to exploit success, take over the mission of a unit delivered to the wrong locations, deal with unexpected opposition in seizing assault objectives, and secure the initial airhead. He reconstitutes a reserve on the commitment of his initial reserve, in accordance with the factors of METT-TC.

C-43. After the force makes the initial assault landing and accomplishes its first missions, the commander must organize his airhead line. The situation dictates how units occupy and organize the airhead line. The commander adjusts the disposition of his units and installations to fit the terrain and the situation. Units take reconnaissance and security measures, which usually include reinforcing the security area. The mission, enemy capabilities, and defensive characteristics of the terrain determine the degree to which the airhead line is actually occupied and organized for defense.

C-44. Introducing follow-on echelon forces in the buildup of the airhead proceeds concurrently with the seizure and organization of the airhead line. The intent of the buildup is to provide a secure operating logistics base for forces working to move the airhead away from the original point of attack. As additional combat troops arrive, they reinforce the airhead defensive positions, secure additional requisite terrain features and maneuver space as required by the mission, constitute reserves, and prepare for offensive operations. Follow-on ground operations exploit the advantages provided by the airhead. After firmly establishing the airhead or lodgment area, or after executing a linkup with ground forces, a higher commander will usually relieve airborne units to allow them to prepare for subsequent airborne assaults. If they cannot be relieved immediately, he provides them with additional combat power and sustainment capabilities.

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

C-45. *Air assault* operations are those in which assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service support) using the firepower, mobility, and total integration of helicopter assets, maneuver on the battlefield under the control of the ground or air maneuver commander to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain (FM 3-97.4). They are often high-risk, high-payoff operations.

C-46. An air assault task force (AATF) can dramatically extend the commander's ability to influence operations within his AO and to execute operations in locations beyond the capability of more conventional forces. The air assault force retains the flexibility to rapidly redeploy to conduct subsequent offensive or defensive operations. Air assault operations closely resemble airborne operations. Air assault forces are most vulnerable during the takeoff from PZs and the landing at LZs in unsecured areas.

C-47. The assault force uses the firepower, mobility, and total integration of helicopter assets to maneuver throughout the AO. Its purpose is to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. Joint doctrine regards air assault operations as a subset of airborne operations. Air assault operations are not administrative movements of soldiers, weapons, and materiel by Army aviation units. An air assault is a deliberate, precisely planned, and vigorously executed combat operation designed to allow friendly forces to strike over extended distances and terrain barriers to attack the enemy when and where he is most vulnerable. The commander plans these operations using the previously described reverse planning process. (The primary references for air assault operations are FMs 3-04.113 and 3-97.4.)

C-48. The substantial mobility of an air assault force enables its commander to achieve surprise and deception and to conduct operations throughout his AO. However, air assault operations conducted in locations geographically remote from supporting forces may place the air assault force at increased risk if its ISR systems do not accurately detect enemy forces positioned to disrupt the air assault. Air assault units are well suited for use as reaction forces and in search and attack operations when information about the enemy's location, strength, and disposition is vague.

C-49. The large-scale use of helicopters in air assault operations greatly multiplies the mobility of ground units and contributes directly to an increase in combat effectiveness. Their use allows the ground commander to take advantage of the speed and flexibility of Army aircraft to accomplish a variety of tasks. For example, during a river-crossing operation, an air assault can help secure the crossing site or bridgehead line.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

C-50. Air assault operations employ AATFs. An AATF is a combined arms force specifically designed to hit fast and hard. It is under the command of a single headquarters. Tactical commanders use an AATF in situations that provide a calculated advantage because of surprise, terrain, threat, or mobility. An AATF consists of infantry, attack helicopters, fire support, electronic warfare, and logistic assets. The ground or air maneuver commander is designated as the AATF commander.

C-51. The lowest-echelon headquarters capable of controlling and coordinating the entire air assault operation exercises control of the aircraft in accordance with the overall plan. As a minimum, this is normally a battalion headquarters. This headquarters must coordinate airspace with other users, including artillery, air defense, air support, and other Army aviation units. It must also coordinate the air assault force's plans for maneuver and logistics with those of higher, subordinate, and adjacent units.

C-52. The airlift unit is either in direct support of the ground combat unit or under the operational control (OPCON) of the AATF. The AATF commander determines—with the air mission commander's input—when the OPCON relationship begins and ends. The commander does not attach the airlift unit to the AATF, because it is unlikely that a ground unit can control the aviation unit and supply the aviation-specific munitions and large amounts of fuel required by aviation units. Direct support (DS) and OPCON command relationships place no logistics responsibility for the supporting unit on the supported unit. Consequently, DS or OPCON is usually the desired relationship between air and ground units in air assault operations.

CONTROL MEASURES

C-53. The control measures that apply to an airborne operation also apply to an air assault operation. As a minimum, the commander assigns each subordinate unit an AO. The AATF and aviation staffs select LZs that support the ground tactical plan and offer the best survivability for the AATF. As in airborne operations, designating LZs within the unit's AO simplifies the provision of additional support to the unit. The AATF commander also uses assault objectives and the airhead line to focus the efforts of his subordinates. As necessary, the commander uses those attack control measures introduced in Chapter 5 to help control the force's maneuver once it enters the AO.

C-54. In air assault operations, the commander makes extensive use of Army airspace command and control (A2C2) measures to control the movement of the assault, attack, special electronic mission, and cargo aircraft. For example, Figure C-4 on page C-14 shows flight routes as depicted on an overlay. (FM 3-52 details A2C2 measures.)

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

C-55. Integrating aviation and infantry does not fundamentally change the nature of combat operations. The air assault force continues to fight as a combined arms team. However, the tempo and distance involved in such operations change dramatically. Missions normally assigned to an AATF should take advantage of its superior mobility. However, the commander should not employ an AATF without a detailed resupply plan in operations that require sustained ground combat. Once the air assault is complete, the aviation unit can continue to support the infantry by conducting aerial movement of systems and critical supplies.

C-56. There are several basic air assault planning operational guidelines—

- Assign a mission that takes advantage of the AATF's mobility.
- Task organize the AATF as a combined arms team.
- Ensure the air assault plan supports the AATF commander's intent.

- Allow extra time for planning and preparing for limited-visibility and adverse weather air assaults.
- Maintain small-unit integrity throughout the air assault to ensure the ability to fight as a cohesive unit immediately upon landing.
- Plan and posture fire support to provide suppressive fires along flight routes, on LZs, and on enemy air defense systems.

C-57. The foundation of a successful air assault operation is the commander's ground tactical plan. The AATF staff prepares this plan based on input from all task force elements. All aircrews must be familiar with the ground tactical plan and the ground commander's intent.



Figure C-4. Flight Routes Depicted on an Overlay

C-58. The ground tactical plan for an air assault operation comprises essentially the same elements as any other infantry attack but differs in the requirements for speed and mobility. The plan places task-organized assault units on or near the objective so they are capable of seizing objectives immediately and consolidating quickly. If the commander cannot introduce adequate combat power quickly into the objective area, the air assault force must land away from the objective and build up combat power. This force then assaults like any other infantry unit; however, this diminishes the effectiveness of the air assault operation. The scheme of maneuver may take many forms depending on the situation and the factors of METT-TC.

C-59. The ground tactical plan addresses—

- Assault objectives for subordinate elements.

- Designating the LZs available for each subordinate element, considering the distance from each unit's LZ to the assault objective.
- D-day and H-hour.
- Special tasks.
- Task-organization and command relationship of all organic and supporting units.
- Fire support during the assault, such as close air support, field artillery, mortars, and jammers.
- Flight corridors.
- Air defense suppression.
- Subsequent operations, such as defense, linkup, and withdrawal.
- Enemy locations, including air defense positions and type.
- Combat service support.

C-60. To achieve tactical surprise, the commander may decide to make the initial assault without preparatory fires. However, he always plans fires to support helicopter assault and combat operations on each LZ so that they are rapidly available if needed. These fires are normally short with a high volume to maximize surprise and shock effect. All indirect fires should end just before the first assault element lands. The commander uses attack helicopters to suppress and destroy enemy systems during the interim between when indirect fires stop impacting and the initial assault element lands and prepares to conduct operations. Fire support planning provides suppressive fires along flight routes and near LZs to help ensure the air assault unit lands as planned. The commander normally assigns a high priority to the suppression of enemy air defense systems. The location of those systems is critical information needed by the commander.

C-61. A unit maintains its tactical integrity throughout the air assault. All members of a squad load onto the same aircraft, and platoons are in the same serial. Both ensure unit integrity upon landing. The commander cross-loads key weapons, ammunition, and command groups to ensure that the loss of one aircraft does not result in losing a given weapon system or disrupting the chain of command.

C-62. The ground commander uses aviation resources to the maximum degree of effectiveness. He should not retain aircraft under his direct control without viable aircraft mission requirements. The air mission commander must have the flexibility to shift idle aircraft to support other combat units, conduct required maintenance, or allow for crew rest. Plans to commit preplanned reaction forces should include provisions for their airlift to be on standby or alert status. The AATF commander makes the decision to release supporting aviation resources. The air mission commander ensures that the AATF commander is aware of subsequent or competing missions for his aviation resources. At times, the AATF commander may need to retain aviation support beyond the original time planned. In this case, he must inform higher headquarters immediately. The air mission commander continues to provide aircraft support until the AATF commander releases his unit.

C-63. The commander plans and organizes his CSS operations to support a rapid tempo of highly mobile and widely dispersed operations. Traditional

doctrinal supporting distances and support responsibilities do not always apply to air assault operations. The air assault logistics planner recognizes this from the outset and adapts the plan using available resources. Just as the commander tailors the AATF for combat operations by air, the logistics system must tailor itself to support by air. Medical evacuation, resupply, and reinforcement airlifts may be necessary to sustain the force's combat operations. Lift restrictions limit what can enter the airhead by helicopter. However, careful planning by the aviation staff provides methods for inserting reinforcements and most equipment lines and supplies.

EXECUTING AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

C-64. At the prescribed time, units move from the assembly area to the holding area via a route designated by the AATF commander. Each unit commander notifies the PZ control party when his unit arrives in the holding area. The PZ control officer (PZCO) coordinates the arrival of aircraft and troops so that they arrive at their respective loading points just before the aircraft land. This prevents congestion, facilitates security, and reduces vulnerability to enemy actions during PZ operations.

C-65. When the aircraft are loaded and ready, the PZCO signals the flight leader. Lift-off should be at the time prescribed in the air-movement table. However, aircraft will not loiter in the PZ. If they are early, they lift off and later speed to cross the start point (SP) or first ACP on time.

C-66. The air movement commander predetermines the enroute flight speed, and the flight leader paces the flight to ensure it crosses the SP on time. Commanders remain oriented throughout the flight by following and verifying the flight route using terrain observation, maps, global positioning systems, and other aids.

C-67. Attack helicopters and air cavalry assets assist in providing security for the air assault force. Under the control of the air mission commander, these helicopters provide reconnaissance of the routes and LZs, provide security for the lifting helicopters en route to the LZ, and protect the lifted ground maneuver force as it assembles on the LZs and moves toward its objective. At the conclusion of the air assault phase of the mission, attack helicopters may remain OPCON to the ground maneuver force and provide reconnaissance and security operations in the objective area.

C-68. After passing the release point (RP), serials proceed to assigned LZs. The commander uses the RP crossing to time the lifting and shifting of fire support assets. The RP is also where aircraft shift to LZ formation (if required) and the commander initiates preparatory fires.

C-69. Incendiary ordnance is not normally used on an LZ and its immediate vicinity just prior to landing because foliage fire and smoke could endanger aircraft or hamper the mission. However, helicopters equipped with smoke generators can provide a smoke screen.

C-70. The AATF lands as planned unless last-minute changes in the tactical situation force the commander to abort or alter the landing. Aviation crews keep soldiers in their aircraft informed of the situation, especially of any changes to the original plan. The commander wants his unit to land

simultaneously to place the maximum number of soldiers on the ground in a given area in the shortest possible time. Individual soldiers are most vulnerable during landing; they disembark rapidly and deploy to carry out assigned missions.

C-71. At the LZ, leaders at each command echelon account for all personnel and equipment and submit appropriate reports to higher headquarters. After the unit completes its consolidation of the LZ, the commander reorganizes it as necessary. The ground combat operations of an air assault unit are no different from those conducted by other infantry units.

Appendix D

Encirclement Operations

When the enemy is driven back, we have failed, and when he is cut off, encircled and dispersed, we have succeeded.

Field Marshal Prince Aleksander V. Suvorov

Encirclement operations **are operations where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communication and reinforcement.** A unit can conduct offensive encirclement operations designed to isolate an enemy force or conduct defensive encirclement operations as a result of the unit's isolation by the actions of an opposing force. Encirclement operations occur because combat operations involving modernized forces are likely to be chaotic, intense, and highly destructive, extending across large areas containing relatively few units as each side maneuvers against the other to obtain positional advantage.

OFFENSIVE ENCIRCLEMENT OPERATIONS

D-1. The commander intends offensive encirclements to isolate an enemy force. Typically, encirclements result from penetrations and envelopments, or are an extension of exploitation and pursuit operations. As such, they are not a separate form of offensive operations but an extension of an ongoing operation. They may be planned sequels or result from exploiting an unforeseen opportunity. They usually result from the linkup of two encircling arms conducting a double envelopment. However, they can occur in situations where the attacking commander uses a major obstacle, such as a shoreline, as a second encircling force. Although a commander may designate terrain objectives in an encirclement, isolating and defeating enemy forces are the primary goals. Ideally, an encirclement results in the surrender of the encircled force. This minimizes friendly force losses and resource expenditures.

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ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

D-2. An encirclement operation usually has at least two phases—the actual encirclement and actions taken against the isolated enemy. The commander should consider adjusting his task organization between phases to maximize his unit's effectiveness in each phase. The first phase is the actual encirclement that results in the enemy force's isolation. The organization of forces for an encirclement is similar to that of a movement to contact or an envelopment. The commander executing an encirclement operation organizes his forces into a direct pressure force and one or more encircling arms. Armor, mechanized and motorized infantry, aviation, air assault, and airborne units are especially well suited for use as an encircling arm since they have the tactical mobility to reach positions that cut enemy lines of communications (LOCs). The presence of bypassed and encircled enemy forces on the flanks and rear of advancing friendly forces requires all-around security, which includes local security measures and security forces.

D-3. One commander should direct the encirclement effort. However, there must also be unity of command for each encircling arm. The encircling force headquarters may name one of its subordinate units as the headquarters for an encircling arm. Alternatively, that force headquarters may create a temporary command post from organic assets, such as its tactical command post, to control one or more arms of the encirclement. If that encircling arm has subordinate inner and outer arms, each of them also requires separate subordinate commanders. The missions and spatial orientation between the inner and outer encircling arms are sufficiently different; therefore, one force cannot act in both directions at once. (See Figure D-1.)



Figure D-1. Inner and Outer Arms of an Encirclement

D-4. The commander organizes only an inner encircling arm if there is no possibility of the encircled forces receiving relief from enemy forces outside the encirclement. If there is danger of an enemy relief force reaching the encircled enemy force, the commander organizes both inner and outer encircling arms. He assigns the outer encircling arm a security mission, an offensive mission to drive away any enemy relief force, or a defensive mission to prevent the enemy relief force from making contact with the encircled enemy force. Once the encirclement is complete, these inner or outer encircling arms form a perimeter.

D-5. The second phase of an encirclement operation involves actions taken against an isolated enemy. The commander's decision on whether to fix, contain, or destroy isolated enemy forces affects his task organization, as will enemy attempts to break out from the encirclement or linkup with the encircled force. All these possible outcomes require resources in terms of units and supplies, but some require more resources than others do. If the commander's mission is to contain or fix an isolated enemy, he organizes his forces for defensive action and arranges them around the enemy's perimeter. If the commander's mission is to reduce or destroy that same enemy, he organizes his forces for offensive action. A higher commander often assigns either mission to the commander of a follow-and-support force.

D-6. Regardless of whether the commander decides to fix, contain, or destroy the enemy, he conducts reconnaissance to maintain contact and monitor enemy actions in response to the encirclement. This allows him to respond effectively to any enemy movement. The most effective reconnaissance combines ground, aerial, and surveillance systems to provide constant coverage and multiple assessments of enemy activities throughout the encircled area.

CONTROL MEASURES

D-7. Control measures for an encirclement are similar to those of other offensive operations, especially an envelopment, but with a few additional considerations. (See Figure D-2.) If the commander uses both an inner and an outer encircling arm, he must establish a boundary between them. He should place the boundary so that each element has enough space to accomplish the mission. The inner force must have enough space to fight a defensive battle to prevent the encircled force from breaking out. The outer force must have adequate terrain and enough depth to its area of operations (AO) to defeat any attempt to relieve the encircled force.

D-8. The commander who controls both converging forces establishes a restricted fire line (RFL) between them. The commander may also establish a free fire area (FFA), which encloses the area occupied by a bypassed or encircled enemy forces. (Chapter 2 discusses the use RFLs, FFAs, and other fire support coordinating measures.)

PLANNING AN ENCIRCLEMENT

D-9. Encirclement operations may require allocating large forces and significant resources. They take a great deal of time and usually slow an advance. If the mission of the encircling force is to maintain contact with a bypassed enemy force, the following general planning considerations apply:

- Determine the best available assets that gain and maintain contact with the enemy.
- Keep the enemy isolated and incapable of receiving intelligence, logistics, and fire support from enemy formations outside of the encirclement.
- Use intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets so that the commander knows the capabilities of the encircled force and, as much as possible, its commander's intentions.
- Retain freedom of maneuver.

D-10. The commander applies the general defensive planning considerations outlined in Chapter 8 if the mission is to contain or fix the encircled enemy force in a given location. If the mission is to attack and destroy the encircled enemy force, he applies the planning considerations outlined in Chapters 3 and 5. Commanders should plan to rotate the forces involved in reducing the encircled pocket to maintain constant pressure on the enemy.



Figure D-2. Encirclement Control Measures

D-11. Every encircled enemy unit reacts differently. Initially, some become demoralized and cannot offer any serious resistance. However, if left undisturbed, most enemy units recover and attempt to break out and regain contact with their main force or attack the flank and rear of advancing friendly units. The encircling force must plan for the enemy's most probable reactions.

D-12. If the enemy force is not reduced and it can be resupplied, or it has access to considerable supply stocks, it continues to be a serious threat to the commander in future operations. The encircling force must be approximately equal in size to this type of encircled force to fix or contain it. This situation occurred when German forces occupied various fortified French ports after Allied armies liberated the rest of France in 1944. Each encircled German

division took approximately one Allied division to maintain its isolation. Conversely, an enemy force isolated without adequate supplies either surrenders or faces containment by considerably smaller forces. This situation occurred in Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when an Israeli division isolated the Egyptian 3rd Army. Planning considerations for the linkup of encircling forces, such as command and control relationships, are outlined later in this appendix.

EXECUTING AN ENCIRCLEMENT

D-13. When feasible, the encircling force advances parallel to the enemy's direction of movement. It attempts to reach defiles, bridges, and other critical points before the main enemy force reaches them. When the encircling force cannot outdistance the enemy, it engages his flanks to force him to fight under the most unfavorable conditions possible, ultimately in two or more directions simultaneously. Engineer units rapidly breach obstacles in the path of the encircling force. Friendly forces emplace obstacle complexes, supported by fires, to block probable avenues of escape as they counter attempted enemy breakouts from encirclement. The commander may use air assault and airborne forces to seize defiles or other critical terrain objectives to cut enemy LOCs. He completes the encirclement when all enemy ground LOCs are cut. This generally occurs when the two arms of a double envelopment complete their linkup.

D-14. A commander usually creates intervals between the advancing units of an enveloping force to provide protection from enemy weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They can also occur during combat operations as the result of different rates of advance by combat formations that face dissimilar degrees of enemy resistance and different terrain. The encircled enemy attempts to discover intervals and take advantage of them as he tries to escape from or breakout of the encirclement. Once the enveloping force completes the linkup that actually creates the encirclement, it must close these intervals as quickly as possible to prevent the enemy from exploiting them.

D-15. The enemy may attempt to cut off the encircling force and extend his flank beyond the area of the friendly attack. If the commander attempts to outflank such a hostile extension, it may lead to his own overextension or to a dangerous separation of the enveloping force from support. It is usually better to take advantage of the enemy's extension and subsequent weakness by penetrating his thinly held front rather than overextending in an effort to completely outflank his position. Alternatively—in response to the unfolding encirclement—the enemy may attempt a frontal, spoiling attack. In this case, the friendly force in contact defends itself or engages in a delaying operation while the enveloping force continues the envelopment or moves directly toward the enemy force in a counterattack.

D-16. The commander of a highly mobile force forming the inner encircling arm may choose not to establish a continuous series of positions around an encircled enemy. He may order his forces to occupy only key terrain from which they can strike at the encircled enemy to prevent him from concentrating forces and to further isolate him. To effectively isolate the enemy, a commander who adopts this technique must be able to detect enemy attempts to breakout and concentrate sufficient combat power against these attempts to

thwart them. The commander of the outer encircling arm prevents additional enemy forces from reinforcing the isolated enemy force or interfering with the activities of the inner encircling arm.

D-17. Other operations may result in the encirclement of enemy forces. These include offensive operations that bypass large enemy forces to maintain the momentum of the force. Reconnaissance and security missions conducted by the main body must focus on detecting and reporting bypassed units. The main body should conduct these missions not only to its flanks, but also to its rear to discover if enemy forces move in behind them. Unit ISR assets should watch for measures taken by the enemy's main body to relieve or assist its bypassed or encircled forces.

D-18. Once the commander decides to destroy an encircled enemy force, he reduces the enemy as rapidly as possible to free resources for use elsewhere. The reduction of an encircled enemy force should continue without interruption, using the maximum concentration of forces and fires, until the encircled enemy force's complete destruction or surrender. A commander may destroy encircled enemy forces by fires alone or by a combination of fire and movement. The five main methods for reducing an encircled enemy are fire strike, squeeze, hammer and anvil, wedge, and escape route.

D-19. **A *fire strike* is the massed, synchronized, and nearly simultaneous delivery of precision-guided munitions.** It is the preferred method for destroying an encircled enemy force. The initial targets for these munitions are systems that present the greatest danger to the encircling force, such as the enemy's WMD, command posts, fire support and air defense systems, and field fortifications. However, the commander's ability to use precision-guided munitions in mass may be limited by the ability of the combat service support (CSS) system to supply them. Therefore, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft and conventional artillery continue to play an important role in the destruction of encircled forces. The commander also conducts offensive information operations—such as psychological operations (PSYOP) and electronic warfare (EW)—against the encircled enemy force. In some situations, fire strikes result in the rapid destruction of the encircled enemy. However, destruction is not guaranteed. In most cases, reducing the enemy pocket requires using ground maneuver forces.

D-20. The squeeze technique uses simultaneous, coordinated blows on the enemy from various directions. (See Figure D-3.) Following the initial encirclement, the capture or destruction of the enemy force is methodical and thorough. The commander uses fire and movement together in a controlled contraction of the encirclement. As the enemy's perimeter contracts, the commander removes units from the inner perimeter and adds them to his reserve depending on the terrain and other factors of METT-TC. This technique is effective against battalion or smaller groups of encircled enemy forces.



Figure D-3. Squeeze Technique

D-21. The squeeze technique promotes the enemy's confusion and rapid dispersion of combat power and prevents him from using his reserves in a decisive manner. The commander should shape the operation by initially concentrating on destroying enemy command nodes, air defense systems, artillery systems, and CSS capabilities. These CSS capabilities include any drop zones, landing zones, or airstrips available to the enemy that would allow him to receive support from outside the encirclement.

D-22. The hammer and anvil technique employs a stationary blocking force as an anvil on one or more sides of the inner perimeter while other elements of the encircling force use offensive action as a hammer to force the encircled enemy force against the blocking force. (See Figure D-4.) Either the anvil or the hammer can destroy the enemy. Usually the hammer, as the attacking element, accomplishes this task. This technique is most effective when the blocking force is located on or to the rear of a natural terrain obstacle. On favorable terrain, an airborne or air assault force can be used as an anvil or a blocking element.



Figure D-4. Hammer and Anvil Technique

D-23. The wedge technique uses a unit to divide enemy forces within the pocket while the rest of the encircling force remains in place. (See Figure D-5.) This technique allows the commander to concentrate against a small portion of the encircled enemy. However, the encircling force must maintain pressure on other encircled enemy forces to prevent them from reinforcing or supporting the threatened area. It is important that the unit dividing the pocket conduct sudden and swift attacks immediately after the end of supporting preparatory fires.



Figure D-5. Wedge Technique

D-24. The escape route technique involves leaving one or more gaps in the inner encircling arm to entice the enemy to attempt a breakout. Once the enemy starts moving, and is no longer sheltered in defensive positions, he is more vulnerable to acquisition, attack, and destruction. A commander using this technique should use PSYOP and constant offensive action to demoralize the escaping enemy force.

D-25. The negative aspect of these techniques is that they require considerable forces and supplies, which are not always available. Therefore, at times the encircling force has to limit itself to less decisive measures. These include temporarily containing or fixing bypassed enemy forces until resources become available to enable the encircling force to destroy the enemy. Continued isolation of the encircled force can only be guaranteed when the enemy cannot strengthen his forces by inserting additional units and supplies by air.

Even total, long-term isolation does not necessarily lead to decisive defeat of the encircled enemy. It is a temporary measure designed to provide the attacking force additional time.

DEFENDING ENCIRCLED

D-26. An encircled force can continue to defend encircled, conduct a breakout, exfiltrate toward other friendly forces, or attack deeper into enemy-controlled territory. The commander's form of maneuver once his unit becomes encircled depends on his senior commander's intent and the factors of METT-TC, including the—

- Availability of defensible terrain.
- Relative combat power of friendly and enemy forces.
- Logistic status of the encircled force and its ability to be resupplied, including the ability to treat and evacuate wounded soldiers.
- Morale and fighting capacity of the soldiers.

D-27. Encirclement of a friendly force is likely to occur during highly mobile fluid operations, or when operating in restricted terrain. A unit may find itself encircled as a result of its offensive actions, as a detachment left in contact, when defending a strong point, when occupying a combat outpost, or when defending an isolated defensive position. The commander must anticipate becoming encircled when he has a mission as a stay-behind force, or when he occupies either a strong point or a combat outpost. He must then make the necessary preparations.

D-28. The senior commander within an encirclement assumes command over all encircled forces and takes immediate action to protect them. In the confusion leading to an encirclement, it may be difficult to even determine what units are being encircled, let alone identify the senior commander. However, the senior commander must be determined as quickly as possible. When that commander determines he is about to be encircled, he must decide quickly what assets stay and what assets leave. He immediately informs his superior of the situation. Simultaneously, he begins to accomplish the following tasks:

- Establish security.
- Reestablish a chain of command.
- Establish a viable defense.
- Maintain morale.

D-29. The commander positions his security elements as far forward as possible to reestablish contact with the enemy and provide early warning. Vigorous patrolling begins immediately. Each unit clears its position to ensure that there are no enemy forces within the perimeter. Technical assets, such as JSTARS and EW systems, augment local security and locate those areas along the perimeter where the enemy is deploying additional forces.

D-30. The commander reestablishes unity of command. He reorganizes any fragmented units and places soldiers separated from their parent units under the control of other units. He establishes a clear chain of command throughout the encircled force, reestablishes communications with units outside the encirclement, and adjusts support relationships to reflect the new organization.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

D-31. The commander of the encircled force establishes a perimeter defense. (Chapter 8 discusses conducting a perimeter defense.) He must be aware of the unique capabilities and limitations of the different units within the encirclement. Therefore, he designs his defense to maximize the capabilities of his available forces. Forward units establish mutually supporting positions around the perimeter and in depth along principal avenues of approach. Units occupy the best available defensible terrain. It may be necessary to attack to seize key or decisive terrain so that it is incorporated within the perimeter defense. Once the commander assigns defensive AOs and battle positions, preparations are the same as in the defense. (See Figure D-6.) Encircled units make their defensive positions as strong as possible given time and resource constraints. The defensive scheme must anticipate that the enemy will attempt to split the defenses of the encircled force and defeat it in detail.



Figure D-6. Encircled Armor Division's Perimeter Defense

D-32. The encircled force commander establishes a reserve, which must have sufficient mobility to react in a timely manner. Therefore, given the availability of sufficient fuel, the commander uses armored and mechanized infantry units as his reserve. He centrally positions them to take advantage of interior lines, which exist if he can shift his forces' locations or reinforce faster than the enemy can shift location or reinforce. He can achieve interior lines through central position (with operations diverging from a central point), from superior lateral LOCs, or greater tactical mobility. If only dismounted infantry forces are available, the commander should establish small local reserves to react to potential threats. He organizes a mobile antiarmor element from the best available antiarmor systems. If possible, subordinate echelons should also retain a reserve.

D-33. While defending encircled, the commander may use his reserve to limit penetrations along the perimeter. It may conduct spoiling attacks or vigorous counterattacks. He initiates a counterattack at the decisive moment and location as the enemy force attempts to penetrate the defensive positions.

BOS CONSIDERATIONS

D-34. Divisions and corps may consider relocating their aviation systems to locations that are not encircled. Aviation can rapidly bring additional firepower to bear on the encircling enemy force or rapidly move reaction forces to threatened locations along the defensive perimeter. Generally, aviation assets fly out of the encirclement when it becomes small enough to allow the enemy's artillery to range throughout the area.

D-35. The commander centrally controls his fire support systems, such as artillery, to provide support at numerous points along the perimeter and mass the effects of his fires. Designating a fire support coordinator for all fire support systems is a technique for centrally controlling his fires. At lower levels, mortars from various units may be co-located under centralized control, especially if there are insufficient artillery assets. The encircled commander also centrally controls his air defense assets, ensuring that the forward units have sufficient short-range air defense coverage.

D-36. Generally, engineers concentrate first on countermobility, then survivability. An encircled force is particularly vulnerable to the enemy's use of WMD. Dispersal is difficult in a perimeter-type defense; therefore, the next best alternative is position hardening by constructing field fortifications.

D-37. Encircled units must closely monitor their logistic assets, especially if they cannot be resupplied for an extended period. Conservation and centralized control of available resources are imperative. The commander may force his forward units to virtually cease all vehicle movement to allocate remaining fuel assets to the reserve. He retains essential CSS capabilities to sustain his operations. They fall under the control of a senior logistician. When possible, the commander positions these units and their assets out of the reach of potential penetrations in protected and concealed locations. He may incorporate other CSS units into defensive positions in depth or around key facilities. He may choose to use soldiers from CSS units as fillers for combat units, although this action may affect his sustainment capabilities.

D-38. Casualty evacuation and mortuary affairs pose particular challenges for the encircled force. The commander evacuates his wounded from the encirclement whenever possible for humanitarian reasons. This also reduces the logistic burden of providing long-term medical care to wounded soldiers.

D-39. Soldiers have an inherent fear of being encircled by the enemy. Unchecked, this fear can lead to a degradation in morale and discipline. When encircled, soldiers under the firm control of their leaders can withstand the mental strain. Discipline can disintegrate rapidly in an encirclement. Officers and NCOs must uphold the highest standards of discipline. Their personal conduct sets the example. The commander must be seen frequently by his troops and display a calm and confident manner.

D-40. Soldiers in the encirclement must not regard their situation as desperate or hopeless. Commanders and leaders at all levels maintain the confidence of soldiers by resolute action and a positive attitude. They must keep soldiers informed to suppress rumors. The commander counters enemy PSYOP by conducting defensive information operations.

BREAKOUT FROM AN ENCIRCLEMENT

D-41. A breakout is an offensive and a defensive operation. An encircled force normally attempts to conduct breakout operations when one of the following four conditions exist:

- The commander directs the breakout or the breakout falls within the intent of a higher commander.
- The encircled force does not have sufficient relative combat power to defend itself against enemy forces attempting to reduce the encirclement.
- The encircled force does not have adequate terrain available to conduct its defense.
- The encircled force cannot sustain itself long enough to be relieved by forces outside the encirclement.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

D-42. Units typically task organize into a rupture force, follow-and-assume force, main body, and rear guard to conduct a breakout attack. (Figure D-7). If sufficient forces exist within the encirclement, the commander can organize a reserve and a separate diversionary force from his available resources. Some encircled units will be weakened, and if sufficient combat power does not exist to resource each of these forces, the commander must prioritize



Figure D-7. Organization of Forces for a Breakout Operation

which ones to resource. Normally, his first priority is to resource the rupture force. He assigns the responsibilities of those unresourced forces to the forces he can resource. For example, the follow-and-assume force could receive a be-prepared mission to help extract the rear guard, a mission generally given to the reserve. Forces located outside the encirclement can assist the breakout by conducting shaping operations. Above all, the encircled force must maintain the momentum of the attack; otherwise, it is more vulnerable to destruction than it was before the breakout attempt.

D-43. The force must reorganize based on available resources to conduct the breakout. Without resupply, armored and mechanized infantry units may not be able to move all of their vehicles during the breakout attack. Priority of support may be limited to the rupture force and the rear guard, with the remaining force keeping only sufficient transportation assets to move the wounded and critical assets and supplies. The breakout plan should outline the commander's destruction criteria for equipment or supplies left behind. All vehicles, critical munitions and other supplies, and equipment—less medical—that cannot be moved should be destroyed as soon as possible.

D-44. An encircled force attacks by using the rupture force to penetrate the enemy defensive positions in at least one location. The commander must produce overwhelming combat power at each breakout point. The commander assigns the rupture force, which varies in size from one-third to two-thirds of the total encircled force, the mission to penetrate the enemy's encircling position, widen the gap, and hold the shoulders of the gap until all other encircled forces can move through. The rupture force must have sufficient strength to penetrate the enemy line. This force must use surprise, mobility, and firepower to achieve a favorable combat power ratio over the enemy at the point of attack. (Chapter 3 discusses the penetration as a form of maneuver.)

D-45. Initially, the rupture force is the decisive operation. The attack occurs at a location where the commander anticipates a successful rupture of the enemy's inner ring, which facilitates subsequent operations by enabling the commander to attack enemy units from their flanks and rear. The rupture force commander most likely has additional assets attached to his unit, such as air defense artillery assets or additional engineer soldiers. The commander should integrate these assets to achieve the rupture.

D-46. The follow-and-assume force follows the rupture attack and is committed, as necessary, to maintain the momentum of the attack and secure objectives past the rupture. After the rupture force secures a gap in the enemy encirclement, the follow-and-assume force normally conducts the decisive operation until completing linkup operations with another friendly force. When a unit receives a follow and assume mission in a breakout, its commander must coordinate closely with the rupture force commander regarding the location of the gap, the enemy situation at the rupture point, and the enemy situation, if known, along the direction of attack past the rupture point. The commander should not assign this force supporting shaping tasks, such as clear routes and fix bypassed enemy forces, if those tasks would dissipate its available combat power. If executing these support tasks is vital to the success of the breakout and resources permit, the commander should designate a separate follow and support force to perform these tasks.

D-47. The main body consists of the main command post, the bulk of the CSS, the unit's casualties, and some CS assets. It contains combat forces not required for other missions and has sufficient combat power to protect itself. The commander should place one individual in charge of the various elements of the main body to ensure orderly movement. Typically, the main body establishes a flank security force that deploys once the main body passes through the point of penetration and performs flank screen or a guard mission.

D-48. The rear guard consists of soldiers and equipment left on the perimeter to provide protection for the rupture attack and any shaping operations, such as diversionary forces. Forces left in contact must conduct a vigorous delaying operation on the perimeter so that no portion of the rear guard gets cut off. Under a single commander, the rear guard protects the main body from attack while it moves from the area. In addition to providing security, the rear guard deceives the enemy about the intentions of the encircled force, simulating its activities until the main body clears the gap.

D-49. The primary purpose of a reserve is to retain flexibility through offensive action. The commander makes every attempt to keep a small portion of the encircled force uncommitted so he can employ it at the decisive moment to ensure the success of the breakout. The situation may preclude establishing a separate reserve force because of the need to resource either the rupture force, the follow-and-assume force, or the rear guard. In this event, the commander assigns and prioritizes various be-prepared missions to the follow-and-assume force.

D-50. A successful diversion is important to the success of any breakout operation. If the diversion fails to deceive the enemy regarding the intentions of the encircled force, he could direct his full combat power at the rupture point. On the other hand, the diversionary force may rupture the enemy's lines. If a rupture occurs, the diversion force commander must know the intent of the commander of the encircled force. The encircled force commander may choose to exploit the success of forces conducting a diversion, or he may have to disengage them for use elsewhere in the breakout attempt.

CONTROL MEASURES

D-51. As a minimum, a commander uses boundaries; a line of departure (LD) or line of contact; time of the attack; phase lines; axis of advance or direction of attack; objectives; and a limit of advance (LOA) to control and synchronize the breakout. (Chapter 2 describes using boundaries and phase lines. Chapter 3 discusses using axis of advance, direction of attack, objectives, LD or line of contact, LOA, and time of attack.) The commander imposes only those control measures necessary to synchronize his operations.

PLANNING A BREAKOUT

D-52. The commander should initiate a breakout attack as quickly as possible after the enemy encircles his force. While detailed combat information about the enemy's disposition is probably not available, the enemy is normally disorganized at that point in time and is least likely to respond in a coordinated manner. The enemy has not yet brought in sufficient combat power to encircle the friendly force in strength, and weak points exist in his perimeter.

However, sometimes the commander will not attempt a breakout until all other options fail.

D-53. Early in an encirclement, there are gaps between or weaknesses in the enemy's encircling forces. The commander uses his available ISR assets to provide information that increases the accuracy of his situational understanding and determines enemy weak points. The commander plans for the breakout attack to capitalize on identified weak points. Although the resulting attack may be along a less-direct route or over less-favorable terrain, it is the best course of action (COA) because it avoids enemy strength and increases the chance for surprise.

D-54. An encircled force may be operating under adverse conditions and may not have all of its ISR systems operating. This forces the commander to operate with low levels of intelligence regarding enemy strengths, weaknesses, and intentions. Within this environment, he should conduct aggressive reconnaissance to gather information on the enemy. The commander should also obtain information from long-range surveillance units, stay-behind units, and special operations forces in the area. If the enemy is in close contact, the commander may be forced to conduct a reconnaissance in force to ascertain information on enemy strengths. In either case, he must select a COA quickly and develop a plan accordingly.

D-55. A shaping operation, such as a diversionary attack, can assist a breakout by diverting enemy attention and resources away from the rupture effort. The force conducting shaping operations may be located either inside or outside the encirclement area. The enemy must regard the efforts of this force as credible and a threat to the continuity of his maneuver plan. The commander should direct the force's efforts to a point where the enemy might expect a breakout or relief effort. The diversionary force is as mobile as available vehicles, fuel stocks, and trafficability allow so it can reposition to take part in the breakout or maneuver elsewhere to support the breakout. Mobile, self-propelled weapon systems suit the needs of forces conducting shaping operations. Additionally, the probability of a successful breakout increases measurably if another friendly force attacks toward the encircled force as it attempts to breakout.

D-56. The commander conducts offensive information operations to assist the breakout attempt. Deception operations mislead the enemy about the intentions of the encircled force, especially the location of the breakout attempt. If it is not possible to breakout immediately, the commander attempts to deceive the enemy regarding the time and place of the breakout by concealing his preparations and changing positions. He can also give the appearance that the force will make a resolute stand and await relief.

D-57. The commander can use dummy radio traffic for the enemy to monitor or landlines that he might tap to convey false information. The breakout should not be along the obvious route toward friendly lines unless there is no other alternative. In this respect, the preparations for a breakout mirror the preparations for any other type or form of offensive operations. As in other offensive actions, secrecy, deception, and surprise allow for success. The other planning considerations for the breakout are the same as for any other attack.

EXECUTING A BREAKOUT

D-58. The commander exploits darkness and limited visibility during a breakout if his encircled forces have superior night-operations capabilities. The cover of darkness, fog, smoke, or severe weather conditions favor the breakout because the encircling enemy weapons are normally less effective then. The enemy has difficulty following the movements of the breakout force during conditions of limited visibility. However, if the encircled force commander waits for darkness or limited visibility, the enemy may have time to consolidate his containment positions. If friendly forces enjoy air superiority, they may initiate a breakout attack during daylight to fully exploit the capabilities of close air support.

D-59. The unit takes all possible precautions to deceive the enemy about the location of the decisive operation. The rupture force minimizes occupation of attack positions before starting the breakout. A commander may require one or more shaping operations to assist the rupture force in penetrating enemy positions and expanding the shoulders. He may use feints and demonstrations to deceive the enemy concerning the location and time of the decisive operation. However, diversionary attacks need not always occur first.

D-60. The commander organizes and controls his rupture force as he would an attack or movement to contact. (See Figure D-8.) The rupture force generates overwhelming combat power at the point of penetration and attempts to rapidly overwhelm enemy positions and expand the penetration. A commander hard pressed to generate sufficient combat power for both the rupture force and the perimeter defense can thin his defensive perimeter in certain areas by using a detachment left in contact in conjunction with a withdrawal prior to executing the attack. He may also shorten the perimeter's length, which reduces the size of the area occupied by the encircled force.



Figure D-8. Breakout by an Encircled Mechanized Division

D-61. The rupture forces applies the breaching fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault to ensure its success at the point of penetration. These fundamentals always apply, but their application will vary based on the prevailing factors of METT-TC. FM 3-34.2 defines these breaching fundamentals and provides guidance regarding the organization of forces, control measures, and planning, preparation, execution, and assessment considerations of combined arms breaching operations.

D-62. If enemy forces at the point of penetration have roughly the same combat power as the rupture force, the commander orders the rupture force to hold the shoulders of the penetration while the follow-and-assume force moves forward. It then becomes the decisive operation. (See Figure D-9.) If the enemy is not in strength, the commander may have the rupture force continue its attack. If there are no identified enemy formations beyond the penetration, the rupture force may transition to a movement to contact. After the encircled friendly force breaks out, it moves toward other friendly forces and links up with them. The next section addresses the control measures and considerations associated with conducting a linkup.



Figure D-9. Continued Breakout by an Encircled Mechanized Division

D-63. Initially, the follow-and-assume force passes through the gap created by the rupture force. It is essential that this force continue to move rapidly from the encircled area toward its final objective. If the follow-and-assume force becomes the encircled commander's decisive operation, it cannot allow itself to become bogged down. Preparatory fires by artillery, Army aviation, close air support, and air interdiction may help the follow-and-assume force in maintaining momentum out of the encircled area.

D-64. Once the breakout attack starts, the rear guard and any diversion forces disengage or delay toward the area of the rupture. Perimeter forces integrate smoothly into the rear of the breakout column. The commander shifts his priority of fires as required by METT-TC once the breakout occurs.

D-65. As other encircled units support or move through the area of penetration, the rear guard commander must spread his forces over an extended area. This requires flexibility and mobility by the rear guard. The perimeter must withstand enemy pressure. If the enemy succeeds in destroying or encircling the original rear guard in the breakout process, the commander must reconstitute a new rear guard.

D-66. The main body follows the follow-and-assume force. It moves rapidly as a single unit on multiple routes in an approach march or road march formation immediately behind the follow-and-assume force, protected on its flanks by security elements. It contains sufficient combat power to protect itself and reinforce the flank or rear security forces if they come under attack.

D-67. Normally, the rear guard initially conducts a withdrawal to break contact with the enemy forces around the perimeter. It contracts the perimeter as it delays back behind the main body. If the enemy closely pursues the breakout force, the efforts of the rear guard may become the decisive operation for the encircled force. The commander should position the reserve where it can also support the rear guard.

D-68. Initially, the priority for fire support is with the rupture force and should focus on suppressing and obscuring the point of penetration. Fire support assets move as part of the main body and rear guard so security forces have adequate fire support. Target identification difficulties resulting from close proximity and intermixing of forces, as well as the rapidly changing ground situation during the execution of a breakout, make the provision of close air support difficult.

D-69. Engineers with the rupture force focus on mobility operations. Engineers with the follow-and-assume force or the reserve improve routes as necessary. Engineers supporting flank security elements focus on conducting countermobility operations. The rear guard must also have enough engineers to conduct countermobility operations.

D-70. The commander prioritizes his air defense assets to protect the rupture force, the rear guard, and the main body. The rear guard is second in priority of protection to help prevent it from being overrun by an enemy pursuit targeted at the main body. The commander must dedicate air defense systems to cover critical points through which the encircled force will pass.

D-71. The commander can relieve his logistics shortfalls by using aerial resupply, ordering external forces to establish support areas, and by using captured supplies. All units and vehicles carry the maximum supplies possible, with emphasis on carrying POL and ammunition. The encircled force only takes vehicles it can support. It may be possible for the higher headquarters of the encircled force to establish an intermediate support base as the breakout attack moves toward a linkup.

EXFILTRATION

D-72. If the success of a breakout attack appears questionable, or if it fails and a relief operation is not planned, one way to preserve a portion of the force might be through organized exfiltration. (Appendix B describes exfiltration as a tactical mission task.)

ATTACKING DEEPER INTO ENEMY TERRITORY

D-73. A COA that the enemy is not likely to expect from an encircled force is to attack deeper to seize key terrain. It involves great risk but may offer the only feasible COA under some circumstances. Attacking may allow the encircled unit to move to a location where it can be extracted by other ground, naval, or air forces. It is only feasible if a unit can sustain itself while isolated, although that sustainment can come from aerial resupply and enemy supply stocks.

D-74. When the enemy is attacking, an encircled friendly force that attacks deeper into the enemy rear may disrupt his offense and provide an opportunity for linkup from another direction. If the enemy is defending and the attacking force finds itself isolated through its own offensive action, it may continue the attack toward its assigned objective or a new objective located on more favorable defensive terrain.

LINKUP

D-75. **A *linkup* is a meeting of friendly ground forces, which occurs in a variety of circumstances.** It happens when an advancing force reaches an objective area previously seized by an airborne or air assault; when an encircled element breaks out to rejoin friendly forces or a force comes to the relief of an encircled force; and when converging maneuver forces meet. Both forces may be moving toward each other, or one may be stationary. Whenever possible, joining forces exchange as much information as possible before starting an operation.

D-76. The headquarters ordering the linkup establishes—

- A common operational picture.
- Command relationship and responsibilities of each force before, during, and after linkup.
- Coordination of fire support before, during, and after linkup, including control measures.
- Linkup method.
- Recognition signals and communication procedures to use, include-ing pyrotechnics, armbands, vehicle markings, gun-tube orientation, panels, colored smoke, lights, and challenge and passwords.
- Operations to conduct following linkup.

CONTROL MEASURES

D-77. The commander establishes minimum control measures for units conducting a linkup. He assigns each unit an AO defined by lateral boundaries and a RFL that also acts as a LOA. The commander establishes a no-fire area around one or both forces and establishes a coordinated fire line beyond the

area where the forces linkup. The linkup forces use the linkup points established by the commander to initiate physical contact. The commander designates alternate linkup points since enemy action may interfere with the primary linkup points. He adjusts such control measures during the operation to provide for freedom of action as well as positive control.

EXECUTION

D-78. There are two methods of conducting a linkup. The preferred method is when the moving force has an assigned LOA near the other force and conducts the linkup at predetermined contact points. Units then coordinate further operations. The commander uses the other method during highly fluid mobile operations when the enemy force escapes from a potential encirclement, or when one of the linkup forces is at risk and requires immediate reinforcement. In this method, the moving force continues to move and conduct long-range recognition via radio or other measures, stopping only when it makes physical contact with the other force.

D-79. When one of the units involved is stationary, the commander usually locates the linkup points near the RFL/LOA. (See Figure D-10.) The linkup points are also located near the stationary force's security elements. Stationary forces assist in the linkup by opening lanes in minefields, breaching or removing selected obstacles, furnishing guides, and designating assembly areas. When a moving force is coming to relieve an encircled force, it brings additional logistics assets to restore the encircled unit's combat effectiveness to the desired level.



Figure D-10. Linkup of a Moving Force and a Stationary Force

D-80. Linkup between moving units is one of the most difficult operations. The commander establishes a LOA to prevent fratricide. He establishes

primary and alternate linkup points for the moving forces near the LOA. Fire support considerations are similar to when a stationary and moving force linkup. Leading elements of each force should exchange liaison teams and be on a common radio net. (See Figure D-11.)



Figure D-11. Linkup of Two Moving Forces

D-81. The commander must carefully coordinate linkup operations with forces of other nations. This is especially true if the two armies are not both members of an alliance with established internationally standardized procedures, or if the units involved have not previously established the necessary procedures.

Appendix E

Rear Area and Base Security

The base commander's plan of action must achieve adequate protection to ensure accomplishment of missions by base elements with as small a force as necessary, since any drain of time and personnel from operational activities will adversely affect the accomplishment of their missions.

Preface, FM 31-81 (Test), *Base Defense*, March 1970

This appendix provides basic guidance for commanders and staff officers on the organization of forces, control measures, and planning, preparing, and executing considerations pertaining to rear area and base security and route and convoy security operations. The tactics and techniques expressed in this appendix are applicable across the full spectrum of operations (offense, defense, stability, and support). However, commanders must interpret them in accordance with the enemy's capabilities. For example, the physical layout of a base will be vastly different if the enemy has a significant air capability than if the enemy has no air capability. The purpose of rear area and base security operations is to prevent interruption of current and future operations. Rear area and base security operations constitute one of the five elements that constitute sustaining operations. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of sustaining operations as part of the battlefield framework.)

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COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

E-1. One of the fundamental considerations in rear area and base security is the resolution of command authority. The echelon commander must clearly define command relationships before initiating any operations. A conflict of interest can occur if command relationships and responsibilities for rear area and base security are not clearly identified. All tenant units in a specific geographical area are responsible to the commander of that area for rear area and base security. Therefore, a rear area commander has tactical control (TACON) over tenant units for conducting rear area and base security. The echelon commander resolves conflicts between the tactical and functional command elements. (See Figure E-1.)


ECHELON COMMANDER
SUPPORT COMMAND/ FUNCTIONAL COMMAND
REAR AREA COMMANDER OR COMMANDER ASSIGNED AN AREA SECURITY MISSION
BASE/ BASE CLUSTER
COMBAT FORCES
OPCON
TACTICAL CONTROL WHEN COMMITTED TO SECURITY OPERATIONS

Figure E-1. OPCON versus TACON in Rear Area and Base Security

E-2. There are units subordinate to commanders other than the echelon commander located throughout an echelon's rear area. Many units operating in the rear areas of a corps, division, or brigade are not organic to those echelons. For example, units from the theater support command and other theater organizations, such as the theater signal command or theater engineer command, operate within the corps rear area. The division has elements of corps support groups (forward) and other corps organizations, such as a corps signal battalion, operating within the division rear area. The brigade many have elements of theater, corps, and division organizations operating within its rear area.

E-3. However, an echelon rear area, base cluster, or base commander is responsible for the rear area and base security of all units in his assigned area. The echelon rear area commander has the authority for terrain management within the echelon rear area and assigns every unit to a base or base cluster. All units assigned to a base or base cluster are TACON to the commander of that base or base cluster when an emergency or tactical situation requires the implementation of rear area and base security measures unless specifically exempted by order of the echelon commander.

E-4. The echelon commander establishes the relationships between the subordinate forces of different countries occupying the same geographical area. This structure unifies the different forces to the maximum degree feasible. Resulting language, doctrinal, and philosophical differences may be resolved by—

- Recognizing national affinities and permitting homogenous elements to operate together.

- Combining units of different nationalities only where a clear requirement exists.
- Cross-assigning liaison personnel to improve understanding.
- Organizing area responsibilities along national lines.
- Establishing a mutually supporting warning system.

E-5. Using host nation forces presents a distinct advantage to a commander responsible for rear area and base security because of their knowledge of the area, its language, and customs. Commanders involved in sustaining operations take all possible efforts to use these assets effectively.

DOD CIVILIANS AND CONTRACTORS

E-6. Civilian employees supporting US military forces are subject to hostile action. Protecting DOD civilians and contractors providing battlefield support to Army units is the responsibility of the commander of the host base. The supported base or military unit assures the protection of its operations and personnel. DOD civilians and contractor personnel cannot take an active role in conducting security operations, but retain the inherent right to self-defense.

E-7. Commanders and staff planners assess the need for protecting these individuals and designate forces to provide security when appropriate. The mission, threat, and location where DOD civilians or contractors operate determine the degree of security required.

E-8. Protecting DOD civilians and contractors involves not only active protection through the use of armed military forces to provide escort or perimeter security, but also training and equipping of these personnel for self-protection. Base cluster commanders may train and equip DOD civilian and contractor personnel, if they agree, to work in a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment and to carry individual, military specification weapons for personal protection when the threat exists and the geographic combatant commander grants approval.

E-9. The base commander identifies specific security and protection requirements for DOD civilians and contractors located on or transiting the base and designates resources and forces to address those requirements. He includes these decisions in the base's OPLANs/OPORDs and their supporting plans and standing operating procedures (SOP). This allows the base's tenant units and civilians to properly integrate these protection requirements into their operational procedures.

E-10. DOD civilians and contractors are responsible for following all protection requirements and policies—as stated in the contractual agreement. This includes ensuring they receive training in NBC protection and weapons familiarization, when authorized, and informing them of local threats, facility and travel security requirements, and off-limits restrictions directed by the base commander. Failure to adhere to protection requirements and policies could result in disciplinary actions for DOD civilians and possible contract termination for contractors.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

E-11. The success of rear area and base security hinges on binding together diverse resources. The commander must meet the following requirements to eliminate a potential confusion and to achieve a cohesive effort—

- There must be a single responsible commander.
- Geographical areas of operations (AOs) and thus responsibility must be clearly defined.

E-12. Overall responsibility for conducting sustaining operations in a commander's AO rests with the commander. Because the commander cannot afford to focus strictly on sustaining operations he assigns that responsibility to another officer and gives that individual a staff to help him accomplish that operation. The individual responsible for a tactical echelon's sustaining operations is called the rear area commander.

E-13. A corps commander normally assigns the mission of sustaining operation to the deputy corps commander. In a similar manner, the assistant division commander (support) is responsible to the division commander for sustaining operations in the division rear area. The forward support battalion commander supporting the brigade is normally responsible to the maneuver brigade commander for sustaining operations in the brigade rear area. While the echelon commander has the authority to designate someone else as the echelon's rear area commander, doing so complicates staff relationships.

E-14. The responsible rear area commander at each of these three echelons uses the echelon rear command post to monitor the echelon's sustaining operations. This assures the synchronization of the five elements of sustaining operations and an orderly, effective, and timely escalation when conducting rear area and base security. This encompasses the use of host nation and organic combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units through employing a tactical combat force (TCF). The echelon rear command post develops plans integrating the rear area and base security activities of all units located within the echelon rear area. Each echelon rear area commander has the authority to further divide the echelon rear area into subordinate AOs, base clusters, and bases.

E-15. A rear operations center (ROC) provides the corps or division rear area commander with the nucleus of an operations cell within the corps or division rear command post. It is a reserve component organization since the functions it performs are not required in garrison. It contains no organic life support capabilities, such as mess, supply, and maintenance, and relies on the echelon headquarters' commandant for those functions. The soldiers assigned in peacetime to these organization lose their separate identity after being activated and deployed. They are assigned to the corps or division headquarters company and become the rear command post representatives of the echelon G2 and G3.

E-16. A corps rear area commander generally subdivides the corps rear area into subordinate AOs that correspond to the AOs of his subordinate corps support groups. A rear area operations center (RAOC) provides the corps support group commander with a greatly increased plans and operations capability for his operations center to assist in conducting terrain management, rear area and base defense, movement control and area damage control (ADC)

within his AO. It also provides him a limited capability to conduct liaison with subordinate base cluster defense operations centers (BCOCs) and base defense operations centers (BDOCs). (See Figure E-2.)



Figure E-2. Organization of C2 Facilities in a Corps Rear Area

E-17. Like a ROC, a RAOC is a reserve component organization that contains no organic life support capabilities, such as mess, supply, and maintenance. It must rely on its assigned CS/CSS brigade/group headquarters to which they are assigned for those functions. The soldiers assigned to a RAOC maintain their separate identity after being activated and deployed, unlike those assigned to a ROC. Therefore, the corps rear area commander can move them as necessary to provide additional command and control (C2) capabilities within the corps rear area.

E-18. Responsibility for overall rear area and base security, as well as defense against large enemy attacks, belongs to the echelon rear area commander. He charges each base and base cluster commander with responsibility for his local and internal security to safeguard the base/base cluster and its facilities from infiltration and small-scale attacks. Each base and base cluster defense plan is coordinated with, and becomes a part of, the echelon rear area defense plan.

BASE

E-19. A *base* is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 1-02). It can contain one unit or multiple units. It has a defined perimeter, established access controls, and is situated and configured to take advantage of natural and man-made terrain features. Missions and security considerations determine the selection of a base site. To nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attack, the rear area commander assigns all units located in the rear area that are not actively involved in operations to a base.

Bases may be further organized into base clusters or organized as a separate bases that report directly to the ROC or RAOCs controlling rear area and base security for the AO where the base is located. A commander may name his base or use a mixture of alphanumeric characters to designate it.

Base Commander

E-20. In base defense operations, the *base commander* is the officer assigned to command a base (JP 1-02). The base commander is responsible for defending his base. He is normally the senior Army competitive category officer on the base unless the base contains only medical units. He exercises C2 over the base and necessary control of resident and transient units. The base commander's responsibilities include establishing the overall base defense organization as well as planning, preparing, executing, and assessing all local security measures. This includes the tactical control of US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces assigned to the base primarily for the purpose of local base defense, such as a US Air Force security flight. Forces of other services or functional components assigned or attached to the base for primary purposes other than local base defense will support local base defense during an imminent attack or threat of an attack. For more information on joint rear area and base security see JPs 3-10 and 3-10.1.

E-21. The base commander uses all assets within the base perimeter to create the required level of local security. He has the authority to position units assigned to his base in mutually supporting positions. He directs employing of obstacles, such as wire- and command-detonated antipersonnel mines, to defend each base within the guidance of his rules of engagement (ROE). He identifies shortages in materiel or weaknesses in required defensive capabilities early and requests the necessary reinforcements and supplies to correct those weaknesses.

E-22. A base commander is also usually a battalion commander, and the BDOC forms around the nucleus provided by his battalion staff. The echelon rear area commander normally does not assign the function of base command to MP commanders because of their need to exercise command over MP elements responding to Level II threats within the echelon rear area.

Base Defense Operations Center

E-23. The base defense force (BDF) commander needs a BDOC to ensure the integration of defense plans and maximum effectiveness of the total base defense effort. A *base defense operations center* is a command and control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense. It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts, and coordinates and integrates into area security operations with the rear area operations center/rear tactical operations center (JP 3-10.1). The nature of the BDOC depends on the combination of forces involved and may be joint, interagency, or multinational depending on the combination of forces involved.

E-24. The BDOC is similar in many respects to the tactical operations center found in maneuver brigades and battalions. Representatives of the intelligence, maneuver, and fire support battlefield operating systems (BOS) staff

the BDOC. The base commander provides other BOS representatives to his BDF commander on an "as required" basis. Multiservice, other agency, and multinational representation, with decision making authority, is present in the BDOC when elements of their armed forces, police, or paramilitary forces are directly involved in the overall base defense effort.

E-25. The center consists of two primary sections—the command section and the plans and operations section—with additional sections as deemed necessary. These additional sections could include a CSS section to plan the provision of services and support to the base, and an ADC section that provides inspection, planning, and control of the base's ADC resources. This center is fully manned and operates continuously. It primary functions are—

- Keeping the base commander informed of the current situation within his AO, including enemy, friendly, and civilian activities.
- Preparing comprehensive plans to implement the commander's overall base defense and security guidance.
- Ensuring the participation of all units within the base perimeter in conducting active and passive defense and security measures.
- Reducing any conflicting interests inherent in multiservice or multinational BDF environment.
- Providing centralized collection and processing of information from various intelligence and operational sources and disseminating resultant intelligence products as appropriate.
- Providing the essential C2 organization necessary to conduct coordinated defensive operations.

E-26. The base commander establishes the BDF from available base CS and CSS assets if MP and combat arms units are not available to provide the necessary local security. He designates the BDF commander to avoid confusion and provides that individual necessary guidance.

BASE CLUSTER

E-27. A *base cluster* in base defense operations, is a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control (JP 3-10). A base cluster normally does not have a defined perimeter or established access points. The base cluster is normally the next higher tactical C2 headquarters of the base. A base cluster typically contains five bases but can range from two to seven bases. The rear area commander designates each base cluster and assigns it either a name or an alphanumeric designation.

Base Cluster Commander

E-28. The senior Army competitive category officer in each cluster becomes the commander of that cluster. Like a base commander, he establishes a continuously operating BCOC to support the tactical chain of command. This officer is normally the commander of a CS or CSS brigade or group and his staff forms the BCOC nucleus. The BCOC integrates each base defense plan into the base cluster defense plan.

Base Cluster Operations Center

E-29. The BCOC keeps the base cluster commander informed of the situation in his area and of the resources available to cope with emergencies. It represents the commander's planning capability and provides him a C2 system to control the execution of rear area and base security missions. The BCOC can provide functional elements with current information they may require to conduct their normal CS and CSS functions. This includes—

- Highway road conditions, new unit or activity locations, security and support activities, refueling points, emergency maintenance and recovery facilities, medical facilities, rest stops, and reroutes.
- Intelligence data, including weather, terrain, and civil considerations.
- Location of area communications sites that units, convoys, or soldiers on the move can link into to maintain a current common operational picture.
- Location and level of contamination from enemy use of weapons of mass destruction or chemical contamination resulting from the use of conventional munitions and industrial accidents.
- Location of hazards resulting from battlefield activities of both sides.
- Available explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support.

CONTROL EXERCISED BY US AREA COMMANDERS

E-30. There are three basic considerations in determining command policies governing the authority and limitations of the echelon rear area commander. These three factors are—

- The threat levels and situation within the echelon rear area.
- The utility of different locations within the echelon rear area.
- Political considerations.

THREAT LEVELS

E-31. Threats to bases in the rear area are categorized by the three levels of defense required to counter them. Any or all levels may exist simultaneously in the rear area. Emphasis on specific base defense and security measures may depend on the anticipated threat level. **A *Level I threat* is a small enemy force that can be defeated by CS and CSS units operating in the rear area or by the perimeter defenses established by friendly bases and base clusters.** A Level I threat for a typical base consists of a squad-size unit or smaller groups of enemy soldiers, agents, or terrorists. Typical objectives for a Level I threat include supplying themselves from friendly supply stocks; disrupting friendly C2, logistics, and facilities; and interdicting friendly lines of communication (LOC).

E-32. **A *Level II threat* is enemy activities that can be defeated by a base or base cluster augmented by a response force.** A typical response force is a MP platoon; however, it can be a combat arms maneuver element. Level II threats consist of enemy special operations teams, long-range reconnaissance units, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and partially attritted small combat units. Typical objectives for a Level II threat include the destruction, as well as the disruption, of friendly C2 and logistics and commercial facilities, and the interdiction of friendly LOCs.

E-33. **A *Level III threat* is beyond the defensive capability of both the base and base cluster and any local reserve or response force.** It normally consists of a mobile enemy force. The friendly response to a Level III threat is a TCF. Possible objectives for a Level III threat include seizing key terrain, interfering with the movement and commitment of reserves and artillery, and destroying friendly combat forces. Its objectives could also include destroying friendly CSS facilities, supply points, command post facilities, airfields, aviation assembly areas, arming and refueling points, and interdicting LOCs and major supply routes.

UTILITY OF DIFFERENT LOCATIONS

E-34. The utility of a given location is a vital factor to the rear area commander. Some areas are critical to conducting the echelon's sustaining operations. Others are priority areas important to conducting the echelon's sustaining operations. Still others are areas where he must exercise some general control but which are neither critical nor priority areas. Finally, there are areas of no importance in the echelon's sustaining operations.

E-35. A critical area is an area or geographical point essential to accomplishing the echelon's sustaining operations. The loss, neutralization, or interdiction of this area allows no alternate operations and adversely affects sustaining operations. An example of a critical area would be the only available port within an AO.

E-36. A priority area is also an area or geographical point essential to accomplishing the echelon's sustaining operation except that within an acceptable amount of time sustaining operations functions can be transferred to an alternate location without an immediate significant impact on the total CSS effort. An example of a priority area would be a supply point containing the ammunition designed to support an offensive operation or an installation performing an important function, such as repairing thermal sights. Another example of a priority area would be a bridge over a major waterway.

E-37. Areas retained under general control are normally the best areas for their designated purpose, but sustaining operations conducted within them can move to other locations without major problems. Examples of areas over which the rear area commander must have some general control are LOCs and main supply routes.

E-38. The rear area commander coordinates with the host nation, using available civil affairs (CA) and operational law personnel to obtain the necessary authority to conduct security measures required by the sensitivity of the area and the situation. These security measures include conducting patrols outside of base perimeters, establishing procedures for clearing indirect fires, and conducting counterintelligence operations. Negotiations also address such measures as establishing a curfew, imposing circulation control over civilian traffic, and similar policies for the host nation civilian populace as dictated by the factors of METT-TC.

E-39. At the division and corps echelons, there could be areas within the echelon rear area commander's AO that do not affect the echelon's sustaining operations. The rear area commander prefers not to commit his scarce intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources in those areas but leaves

the responsibility for detecting and countering enemy activity in those areas to the host nation.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IMPACTING THE REAR AREA

E-40. The degree of control that the rear area commander has over host nation authorities and the civilian population depends primarily on the political conditions under which US forces entered the AO. Generally, US military presence occurs in one of two ways:

- Entry by invitation of the host nation.
- Forcible entry.

The extent of and limitations on military activities are prescribed by customary international law or by international agreements to which the US is a party, or by both in either environment.

E-41. The rear area commander may encounter a range of situations extending from a host-guest relationship to total US authority under conditions of military government. He may have no power over the host nation authorities and civilian population except what he can exert through influence and coordination in some cases. Populace controls, mutual support between civilian and military resources, and the coordination of civilian and military security and damage control measures are of utmost importance to rear area and base security. The commander must constantly be aware of and understand his relationship with host nation authorities and the civilian population. A clear understanding of his authority is essential to the rear area commander in exercising that degree of control necessary to ensure security and safety to all friendly military forces and the civilian population located within the AO.

Assisted Unopposed Entry

E-42. Through legitimate agreement by the interested governments, a host nation may request US forces to assist the host nation for a mutually agreed reason. Liaison and coordination are the primary means of establishing acceptable military-civilian communications. The commander's initial requirement is the provision of maximum civilian support for and the prevention of civil interference with military operations. Host nation forces may be effective in rear area and base security because of their knowledge of the area, its language, and customs. US military advice and assistance rendered in accordance with applicable laws and regulations may enhance their effectiveness.

Forcible Entry

E-43. Forcible entry entails the seizure of terrain and facilities from enemy forces. Depending on circumstances, the operation may require the removal of existing civil or martial governmental apparatus or the restoration of a suppressed government. In the absence of civil authority, Army forces establish measures to control the civilian population and provide basic services. When US combat forces enter enemy territory to occupy it, initial disclosure of the nature and extent of US authority should include basic occupation directives in accordance with the laws of land warfare and CA doctrine. (See FMs 1-27.10 and 3-57.) These actions include issuing necessary proclamations concerning US authority as it relates to civil government, curfew,

movement control, public order, and similar matters. Civil affairs units initiate, coordinate, and supervise local compliance with these directives.

US-Host Nation Relationships

E-44. The rear area commander must have the authority to protect and secure his installations and protect resources traveling along LOCs within his AO. Since this control affects the host nation governmental agencies and the civilian populace, he must not use that authority in a manner that alienates those audiences to the US mission and objectives.

E-45. Within the limits of the authority granted to them under local law, host nation civil officials may delegate political authority over local government to the military commanders of their own nation. The rear area commander must coordinate his operations with the host nation military area commander in conformance with US policy directives and requirements when this condition exists. Otherwise, the rear area commander coordinates his operations with the appropriate host nation agency.

E-46. The host nation military commander normally assumes responsibility for reconnaissance and security outside the perimeter of US military bases. The base commander provides for interior guard and control within the confines of his base and the security of his perimeter. The rear area commander may not have exclusive authority over local national civilian employees within his installation. Authority to hire and fire, investigative jurisdiction in matters of sabotage or espionage, and other vital matters of mutual concern to both the US command and the host nation must be delineated and agreed on for effective rear area and base security. The US rear area commander must maintain authority to control access to his bases when the situation warrants. Counterintelligence units are responsible for investigating sabotage, espionage, and subversion. Military police criminal investigation teams assist them as appropriate. In response to events having significant high-level interest, other governmental agencies, such as the FBI, may participate in these investigations.

BASE AND BASE CLUSTER DEFENSE

E-47. Base and base cluster defense is the cornerstone of an echelon's successful rear area and base security effort. The following paragraphs outline the organization of forces, control measures, and considerations pertaining to planning, preparing, and executing base and base cluster defense.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

E-48. The rear area commander uses a combination of base and base cluster defense forces, designated response forces, and TCF, to provide the required security within the echelon rear area. Special operations forces (SOF) may conduct counterterrorism operations within the rear area on an exception basis.

Base Defense Force

E-49. **A *base defense force* is a security element established to provide local security to a base.** It normally consists of the combined security

assets provided by each unit on the base toward the ongoing security requirements of the base. These assets include crews, weapon systems, and radios of combat vehicles temporarily located on the base for maintenance or other reasons. It may consist of MP, infantry, armor, or cavalry units when the echelon commander's mission focuses on stability or support operations. The mission of the BDF is to conduct reaction operations to deter, resist, or destroy an enemy Level I force attacking the base. The BDF must be sufficiently flexible to defend the base perimeter, provide for the base's interior guard requirements, and conduct local offensive operations beyond the base perimeter if allowed by the host nation.

E-50. The base commander normally appoints a BDF commander to assist in executing base defense functions. He tasks units located within the base to provide soldiers, equipment, and materiel to form the BDF. The principal BDF tactical increments are normally provisionally organized security platoons. (See Figure E-3.) The base commander organizes his BDF as required by the intensity of enemy activity within the rear area.



Figure E-3. Typical Base Defense Organization

E-51. A BDF should have a high degree of direct-fire lethality provided by a mixture of small arms, automatic weapons, and antitank systems. It should also have access to supporting indirect fires, a high degree of tactical mobility, and a reasonable span of control. It should be capable of—

- Conducting reconnaissance patrols for detecting and reporting the location, strength, and capabilities of enemy forces located near the base.
- Developing positions within and outside the base from which enemy advances can be stopped or destroyed.
- Using reserve elements to attack relatively small enemy units that threaten to penetrate the base perimeter.
- Providing internal security for critical capabilities located on the base.

The base commander must reconcile any issues about personnel and equipment resources shortfalls affecting the BDF and the desired level of security.

E-52. Most CS and CSS companies can provide a platoon-size security element toward the defense of their assigned base. (Figure E-4 on page E-12 shows a possible organization of such a security platoon.) A base having more than one security platoon also establishes a provisional security company headquarters for the BDF. The BDF commander will be the commander of this provisional security company. Most CS and CSS battalion headquarters can provide the resources for a provisional security company headquarters. The BDF commander designates a portion of the available security force as

his reserve. In an emergency, the BDF is augmented by the defensive efforts of all units assigned to or transiting the base.



Figure E-4. Security Platoon

E-53. Operational requirements frequently modify a unit's ability to contribute resources to the defense effort of its base. Responsibility for reporting such modifications rests with the individual unit. The base commander brings these unrelated and unfamiliar groups together when creating his BDF. Every effort must be made to retain the unit integrity of these security platoons while assigning security tasks to the BDF.

E-54. Providing a BDF from CS and CSS organizations results in two undesirable conditions—

- Reduced operational effectiveness of the units from which the resources are drawn.
- Soldiers performing duties other than those for which they are specifically trained.

The unit commanders providing these security platoons assign personnel to them. Soldiers assigned to the BDF should remain there if operations permit, in order to facilitate training, provide for continuity of defense operations, and ensure force efficiency.

E-55. The base commander considers all available Army, joint, and multinational resources and forces in determining the exact organization of the BDF. Host nation police, paramilitary, and military elements will frequently be available to assist in providing rear area and base security. Early clarification of the positions, responsibilities, and authority of these elements reduces possible confusion and duplication of effort. The degree of cooperation the base commander attains from local host nation or third nation officials largely determines the effectiveness of those countries resources as they apply to base defense, regardless of the existence or absence of agreements made

between forces at the national level. Special considerations for US employment of host nation elements include—

- Designated host nation security force must be responsive to the demands of the base commander.
- Caution may be necessary when assigning host nation security forces tasks requiring specialized equipment or skills.
- The base commander should consult with the appropriate civil-military operations office to clarify any restrictions that might apply to the use of these forces.

Base Cluster Defense Force

E-56. The base cluster defense force consists of all of the BDFs within the base cluster. The base cluster commander can direct the employment of BDFs within the base cluster or segments of those BDFs to counter identified Level II threats within the geographical area of the base cluster. The more normal course of action (COA) is to have a response force engage these Level II threats. Base commanders must reconstitute those portions of their BDFs committed to these missions.

Rear Area Security Forces

E-57. The purpose of rear area security forces is to facilitate a base's ability to return to mission accomplishment as quickly as possible rather than devoting CS and CSS resources to limited tactical operations. Rear area security forces can be further broken down into response forces and TCFs.

E-58. **Response Forces.** A *response force* is a mobile force with appropriate fire support designated, usually by the area commander, to deal with Level II threats in the rear area (JP 1-02). It usually consists of MP forces supported by available fire support and Army aviation assets. They are usually either platoon- or company-size forces. Military police elements may be temporarily or permanently unavailable in sufficient strength for response force operations because of their commitment to other missions. The commander should designate alternative response forces before this occurs. Other possible response force options include engineer units, chemical units, transiting combat units, elements of the reserve, or host nation assets. The rear command post coordinates with the echelon G3/S3 before committing forces other than MP units to response force missions.

E-59. The MP chain of command directs the size and composition of the response force when the echelon is primarily focused on conducting offensive and defensive operations. The nature and size of the threatening enemy force influences the size and number of MP elements that make up the response force. So, too, does the current rear intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and the echelon's rear area commander's risk assessment. The echelon provost marshal, in coordination with his rear area commander, considers—

- The priority of ongoing operations.
- The criticality of the base under attack.
- The amount of time needed for given elements to consolidate.

The rear area commander continuously assesses the situation and, if appropriate, commits more response force assets to deal with the threat.

E-60. **Tactical Combat Forces.** A *tactical combat force* (TCF) is a combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets, that is assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats (JP 1-02). These threats can result from enemy forces infiltrating friendly positions or penetrating friendly defensive positions and moving into the friendly rear area, or conducting airborne/air assault operations. A successful defense against such a Level III threat requires planning and preparing for the TCF's employment. The echelon commander can dedicate a TCF to deal with such a threat, designate another force as the on-order TCF, or accept the risk of not having a designated TCF. A dedicated TCF has the necessary assets, such as artillery and combat engineers, allocated to it to accomplish the mission. The echelon commander decides the exact composition of the TCF after weighing the risk of allocating forces to the TCF and thus decreasing the combat power available for his decisive operation.

E-61. The echelon G3 designates the number of TCFs in accordance with the situation and the echelon commander's guidance. Designating more than one TCF provides flexibility of response to competing needs. The primary advantage of having a dedicated, rather than an on-order, TCF is the assurance that it will be available when needed. Other advantages include the ability of the TCF staff to focus the force's planning and preparing activities on just one mission. This includes establishing liaison and communications with supported bases or base clusters and echelon Level II response forces. It also allows the dedicated TCF to rehearse its plans. When the commander assigns a subordinate unit an on-order TCF mission, he must establish criteria on when to commit that unit as the TCF.

E-62. A TCF can expect support from the following types of assets:

- MPs with working dogs.
- Military intelligence (includes counterintelligence).
- Field artillery.
- Engineers.
- Army aviation (attack, air cavalry, air assault, C2, and possibly special electronic mission aircraft).
- Public affairs.
- Air defense artillery.
- Area signal nodes.
- Civil affairs assisted by psychological operations (PSYOP) elements.
- CSS elements required to sustain the force conducting area security.

Any or all of these types of assets may not be immediately available to the TCF on its commitment. They are limited assets and may be engaged in other missions. The force conducting the rear area security mission may also receive support from other US and allied services, including the host nation.

E-63. The factors of METT-TC determine the size of the TCF. For a corps, this normally results in at least one battalion task force being assigned the mission. A division typically designates a reinforced company team as its TCF. The echelon commander configures his TCF to conduct offensive operations. The TCF must be extremely mobile and capable of moving by air and ground modes because of limited reaction time and extended distances

between units common to the rear area. The TCF must be as mobile as the enemy. It should be capable of destroying armor-protected vehicles and dismounted infantry and of suppressing enemy shortrange air defense (SHORAD) systems. Consequently, a TCF typically consists of infantry, Army aviation (attack and utility helicopters), and air cavalry elements with engineer and field artillery support. The commander may also organize a TCF with armored cavalry, armor, and mechanized infantry units if the situation so dictates.

E-64. The commander strives to obtain tactical self-sufficiency within both the response force and the TCF. He does this by attaching or placing in direct support adequate fire support, CS, and CSS elements so that they can perform semiindependent operations. In addition, he must obtain resources, such as CA, PSYOPS, and interpreters, for interacting with the civilian population of the area being secured.

Special Operations Forces

E-65. Special operations forces other than CA and PSYOP may combat terrorism within the AO of a conventional unit. A unit conducting rear area and base security may be tasked by a higher headquarters to provide conventional support to SOF elements conducting counterterrorism operations within its AO. If SOF operate in the area, a special operations command and control element (SOCCE) will normally be deployed at the Army forces or corps echelon, with liaisons attached lower for a specific mission to the unit responsible for the appropriate AO for the duration of the SOF mission.

CONTROL MEASURES

E-66. Control measures in base defense operations are the same as those used in other defensive operations. (See Figure E-5, page E-16.) The headquarters establishing the base or base cluster designates the base's AO using rear, lateral, and forward boundaries. The AO for the base may or may not be contiguous to the AO of other units. The echelon rear area commander may further subdivide his assigned area into subordinate AOs, bases, and base clusters. He can assign maneuver forces to assembly areas and battle positions. He establishes phase lines, contact points, objectives, and checkpoints as necessary to control his maneuver. He establishes fire support coordinating measures (FSCM) to permit or restrict fires in and around the base. (See Chapters 2, 3, and 8 and FM 3-09 for a discussion of FSCM.) No-fire areas may be required to protect civilians, prevent disruption of sustaining operations, or protect combat outposts, observation posts, and patrols from friendly fire. All established control graphics are coordinated with host nation agencies to minimize interference, misunderstandings, and unnecessary collateral damage. The BDF commander, in coordination with the base commander, designates the base perimeter, target reference points, and sectors of fire to organizations located within the base.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

E-67. The echelon commander designs his rear area and base security system to ensure—

- Maximum effectiveness of BDFs provided by CS and CSS units.

- Minimum degradation to unit mission performance while providing the unit's contribution to the BDF.
- Combat arms units are not diverted to provide dedicated rear area and base security forces.

E-68. Commanders in the rear area can improve their capability to effectively use available manpower and materiel by establishing logical priorities. The commander must allocate resources available to protect personnel, supplies, and facilities in consonance with the degree of risk involved. Sufficient personnel and materiel will not usually be available in the rear area to provide simultaneous protection to all of the echelon's sustaining operations.

E-69. Base defense plans are flexible and allow for differing degrees of security based on the probability of threat activity to maximize unit mission accomplishment. The common defensive planning considerations outlined in Chapter 8 apply to planning for base security. The following paragraphs explain fundamental principles of rear area and base security. They also address BOS specific planning considerations that apply to base security.



Figure E-5. Base Cluster Harrington

Fundamentals of Base Defense

E-70. The fundamentals of base defense are—

- Understand the enemy.
- See the AO.
- Use the defender's advantages.
- Concentrate at critical times and places.
- Conduct counterreconnaissance and counterattacks.
- Coordinate critical defense assets.
- Balance base security with political and legal constraints.

- Know the ROE.
- Responsiveness.

E-71. **Understand the Enemy.** Defenders must be familiar with the capabilities and limitation of enemy forces, weapons, equipment, and tactics. The base commander also must have access to the latest intelligence concerning probable enemy intent.

E-72. **See the AO.** Intelligence operations are key to assembling an accurate picture of the AO. The IPB process provides the commander a continuous, integrated, and comprehensive analysis of the effects of enemy and neutral capabilities, terrain, and weather on operations. It helps the commander anticipate events and develop the priority intelligence requirements and information requirements tied to those events. Intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence estimates are prepared, continuously updated, and integrated into the base commander's staff decision making process. Space-based, airborne, and ground sensors, patrols, and counterintelligence activities are all means that rear area commanders can employ to detect possible indicators of planned enemy action.

E-73. **Use the Defender's Advantages.** Defender's advantages may permit a numerically inferior force to defeat a much larger one. Some of these advantages are:

- The ability to fight from cover.
- More detailed knowledge of local terrain and environment.
- The ability to prepare positions, routes between them, obstacles, and fields of fire in advance.
- The ability to plan communications, control measures, indirect fires, and logistic support to fit any predictable situation.
- The ability to deceive enemy forces about friendly defensive capabilities, dispositions, and execution of operations.

E-74. **Concentrate at Critical Times and Places.** A base commander must measure and continually evaluate the various risks to his base. An enemy usually concentrates his resources on the most sensitive or vulnerable targets. Defense of a base is normally conducted along interior lines, permitting the timely and secure movement of forces to engage the most critical threats. The commander must mass enough combat power at points of decision by economizing in some areas, employing a reserve, and maneuvering to gain local superiority at critical points.

E-75. **Conduct Counterreconnaissance and Counterattacks.** A major contributing factor to vulnerability in the rear area is the relatively fixed nature of operations. An enemy can study the operational patterns of semifixed units and installations to determine their existing defensive measures. Further, fixed bases having well-established perimeters usually have limited depth. Counterreconnaissance and counterattack add depth to the battle outside the perimeter, allowing the base to continue its primary mission with minimal interference.

E-76. **Coordinate Critical Defense Assets.** Synchronization of indirect fires, air and missile defense resources, tactical aircraft, engineers, dismounted troops, armored vehicles, naval surface fire support, and helicopters

can produce a combined arms effect. Synchronizing forces and fires produces a synergy capable of defeating a larger enemy force. This synergy results from making enemy movement difficult or impossible and by causing a reaction that may make enemy forces more vulnerable to other friendly capabilities. Periodic rehearsals of security plans ensure effectiveness of the alert system, proficiency of key individuals, and identification of potential problem areas.

E-77. **Balance Base Security with Political and Legal Constraints.** Base security may have to be designed around numerous political constraints.

E-78. **Know the ROE.** The base commander and his subordinates must comply with established ROE. He ensures the reconciliation of any inconsistencies between service component and multinational ROE.

E-79. **Responsiveness.** The echelon rear area commander and his subordinate base cluster and base commanders have the authority and the capability to communicate operational requirements directly to units located within their AOs. The chain of command frequently changes from the functional to the tactical chain of command after implementing a rear area and base security plan. Therefore, the rear area commander must critically analyze and test his communication systems that filter through various levels of command to assure that they are responsive under given emergency conditions. The echelon rear area commander establishes direct communication links between the echelon rear command post and its subordinate base cluster and base operations centers if existing information systems are not adequate to transmit rear area and base security-related information to those centers in a timely manner.

E-80. Responsiveness may be attained by many different procedures and capabilities, some of which are listed below:

- Clearly established authority granted to base cluster and base commanders.
- A wide-area information system that provides a flexible warning system for a large variety of situations.
- Continuous identification and tracking of resources that can assist in providing rear area and base security, such as maintenance float weapon systems and replacement crews.
- Response forces have communication systems capable of using the existing wide-area information systems to communicate directly with the threatened BDOC. They also can communicate with the BCOC located in the threatened base cluster and the echelon rear command post.
- MP forces responding to Level II rear area threats have combat vehicles with a mixture of firepower, armor protection, and a high degree of tactical mobility.
- Identifying dual-capable units. For example, a rear area security force identified to respond to Level I or Level II threats also has capabilities to perform rescue or provide labor in an ADC mission. However, a rear area security element is not concurrently identified as an ADC element.

Other Planning Considerations

E-81. When the rear area commander commits his forces to semifixed installations or sites, the rear area security mission may become defensive in nature. Therefore, he must carefully balance his approach with the need for offensive action. Detecting enemy activity early is critical when conducting rear area security; it provides the commander with time to react to any threat. Proper integration of the BOS is key to successful operations.

E-82. **Intelligence.** A review is made of all available information about the general area before occupying a site. The IPB process addressing the rear area includes not only enemy information, but terrain, weather, and information about the civilian population and infrastructure. Intelligence, cavalry, scout, and CA organizations obtain relevant information about the area from host nation governmental organizations and the civilian population.

E-83. In the commander's visualization of the factors of METT-TC for the rear area security mission, he focuses on the enemy situation to determine how to organize and conduct the mission. Tactical intelligence is the key to defeating enemy operations directed against friendly sustaining operations. It provides the commander with information on current and possible future enemy locations, activities, strengths, weaknesses, and plans, which helps him seize the initiative. The commander should exploit all relevant sources of information within his AO, including information provided by civilian agencies and individuals. The IPB process is a vital part of answering the commander's intelligence requirements which include—

- Size and capabilities of enemy forces within the commander's AO.
- Natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
- Movement corridors throughout the AO for mounted and dismounted operations.
- Conditions of existing roads, railways, pipelines, and waterways for use as both military LOCs and civilian commerce.
- Proximity of enemy forces to critical facilities and installations, such as airfields, power generation plants, petroleum tank farms, and civic buildings.

E-84. **Maneuver.** The commander should not employ any organization in a role or configuration for which it is not principally designed unless such action is unavoidable. Rear area commanders employ the defensive potential of CS and CSS units to counter enemy actions. The defensive potential of each unit is that portion of a CS or CSS unit that may be used to provide rear area and base security with minimum degradation to overall mission capability. The echelon commander does not divert his combat forces to provide rear area and base security unless required by the factors of METT-TC. The rear area commander takes maximum advantage of host nation capabilities to provide response forces and TCFs.

E-85. Site selection is also an important factor in planning rear area and base security. Combat support and CSS operational requirements do not correspond to security requirements. Supporting units need a good road net, ready source of labor, storage areas, and other facilities that are available in established commercial areas. However, such placement decreases the security capabilities. The best site, from a security standpoint—given no air threat—is

in a cleared area, occupying high ground with sufficient vegetation to conceal base facilities from observation. The worst site contains complex terrain and large numbers of noncombatants. The former extremely limits observation and fields of fire from the base and the latter limits the firepower that can be employed to defend the base. The most common tendency is to occupy the low ground through which most roads run, a balance between operational requirements and security requirements. A commander can justify the cost, time, and manpower needed to relocate a site to more defensible terrain rather than secure a poor position. The base commander locates his base in a place that enhances its physical security. The base cluster and echelon rear area commanders must approve the location.

E-86. Forces engaged in rear area security must be flexible and able to adapt to rapidly changing tactical situations. Rear area and base security are normally the domain of small units. The organization of forces for base defense also differs, depending on how the commander plans to accomplish his mission. The base commander task-organizes his forces into combined arms elements to counter the level of enemy capabilities as determined by his intelligence assets. This enables him to find the enemy with the smallest possible element, maintain contact without risking the destruction of the element in contact before it can receive outside support, and mass his combat power rapidly to destroy the detected enemy.

E-87. All security measures must have an inherent offensive capability. The echelon TCF, response forces provided by echelon MP and other assets, and local security measures undertaken by bases and base clusters contain the rear area commander's offensive capabilities. The base commander uses the potential combat power available within CS and CSS units located within his AO to provide those local security measures. He organizes and trains that identified potential combat power to conduct limited offensive operations against confirmed enemy Level I threats that threaten his bases and base clusters.

E-88. Absent a direct enemy threat, there is a tendency to relax security measures after completing the base's fighting and survivability positions. However, well-established security patterns allow enemy elements to reconnoiter the base and determine its points of vulnerability with little risk.

E-89. The base commander designates reconnaissance and patrol areas outside the base's perimeter to provide additional security if allowed to do so by the host nation. The objective is to provide the base additional early warning.

E-90. The factors of METT-TC and unit capabilities determine the specific security element tasks of subordinate maneuver units. For example, mounted forces are more suited to secure key points, such as major road junctions, bridges, tunnels, canal locks, dams, and power plants; while dismounted forces are well-suited for securing areas containing restricted terrain or large numbers of civilians.

E-91. The base commander should plan to use only the minimum firepower required to accomplish the base security mission. While his right to self-defense is never denied, it may be limited in some manner. For example, unlimited use of firepower that negatively affects civilians in the secured area may cause them to embrace the enemy's cause or withhold support to the

friendly force. Soldiers must understand this and follow strict ROE when conducting sustaining operations.

E-92. Because of the decentralized nature of sustaining operations and the intermingling of military forces and civilians, the commander must address fratricide prevention when planning for rear area and base security. Fires that miss their intended targets can affect other forces, routes, and installations in the secured area. When considering a COA, the commander weighs the risk of fratricide against losses to enemy fire.

E-93. **Fire Support.** Artillery and mortars, if available, are the fastest means of responding to intruders beyond the base perimeter in the absence of maneuver forces positioned there. The commander desires the designation of a free-fire area beyond the base perimeter to allow for the optimum employment of available fire support systems. He positions no-fire or restricted fire areas over locations occupied by civilians and friendly forces operating outside the base, such as patrols and observation posts. These areas are large enough to provide the necessary degree of standoff protection.

E-94. **Air Defense.** Air and missile attacks are perhaps the greatest threats to units in the rear area. Rear area bases normally rely on passive air defense for protection against enemy air threats. Most rear area bases will not be supported by SHORAD systems. They will normally be located within the coverage provide by high- to medium-altitude air defense (HIMAD) systems. They will not normally control the positioning of HIMAD systems. (Chapter 8 discusses passive and active air defense considerations. Ballistic missile defense is an operational-level task addressed in FM 3-01.12.)

E-95. **Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability.** The commander directs the construction and improvement of perimeter barriers. This includes establishing clear fields of fire and implementing physical security measures, such as checkpoints on vehicle and pedestrian routes leading into the base, to improve overall base security. Barriers, natural obstacles, and aggressive offensive actions deny enemy access to the area immediately surrounding the base. If the force keeps the enemy at a distance, he cannot launch damaging attacks toward the base. The commander continues to direct improvement in his base defenses, as time and other resource permit, to ensure a stable security system.

E-96. Force protection considerations against terrorist attack are part of base defense planning. The base commander assesses the vulnerability of the base to terrorist attack and other nonbattlefield threats. He must assess the base's vulnerability to each identified threat. Risk and vulnerability assessments are the foundation for priorities of work and resource distribution.

E-97. The base defense plan includes those ADC measures necessary to minimize damage to the base's critical facilities resulting from fire, natural disaster, or enemy action. The commander dedicates resources to protect areas that, if destroyed, could cause catastrophic loss or mission failure since force protection resources are limited. The plan delineates responsibilities for ADC activities, such as fire fighting, light rescue and labor, and decontamination, and assigns appropriate priorities for assistance furnished by each unit on the base.

E-98. **Combat Service Support.** Since base security forces generally operate in close proximity to the base, the commander tailors the load carried by his dismounted elements to the immediate requirements of METT-TC. Resupply of dismounted elements takes place using ground or air modes.

E-99. **Command and Control.** Planning for rear area and base security operations, like all planning, requires the rear area commander to have an accurate common operational picture of his AO. This includes the strength and security potential of available units, terrain and environmental data, and intelligence information. The rear area commander uses existing echelon rear command posts and information systems to provide him and his subordinate commanders that common operational picture.

E-100. In planning for base security, a simple, flexible defensive plan disseminated to the lowest level of command is normally the best COA. The plan should include the maximum use of standing operating procedures (SOPs) and battle drills at the user level. It should incorporate adequate control measures to ensure the safety of friendly troops and civilians. Such a plan minimizes the impact of the inevitable miscues that accompany any combat operation.

E-101. The base commander integrates the base security plans with those of its base cluster and supporting rear area security forces. He periodically reviews the base defense plan. Alterations in the units assigned to the base and changes to their defense capabilities because of mission requirements also require updating the base defense plan. Frequent alterations of base security procedures reduce the base's vulnerability. The continuous monitoring of plans also allows adjustments based on experience to be incorporated into those plans.

E-102. The base commander establishes communications with the BCOC (or the echelon rear command post if the base in not part of a base cluster). He also establishes communications with the headquarters of the designated Level II response force.

E-103. Communication problems can occur in information exchanges during the planning for base security involving multinational forces. The commander must address any language barriers because units operating in the rear area normally need to communicate with various host nation governmental agencies and the civilian population. The ability to communicate with these different agencies and the local population helps to protect the force.

E-104. The echelon rear area commander maintains simplicity by making the minimum number of plans necessary. Rear area and base security is a secondary mission for CS and CSS units. The echelon rear command post, BCOC, and the BDOC must ensure that rear area and base security is not neglected in favor of the parent organization's primary mission. A BDOC sends out liaison teams to each base in its base cluster, with RAOC assistance, to ensure that each base's defensive plans are workable, coordinated with the BCOC, and routinely practiced.

PREPARING A BASE DEFENSE

E-105. Preparing for base defense begins before base units arrive, if possible. Normally, combat units provide the initial defense in the base area, as they are the first forces into an area. An exception may occur when conducting force projection operations supported by a host nation. In this case, the host nation's forces are the first forces into the area. These forces can be conventional military forces or police and internal security forces.

E-106. The rear area commander uses his available resources to initiate an area reconnaissance to determine the physical characteristics of the area and the presence or absence of enemy forces. Since rear area and base security is normally an economy of force measure, it is unlikely that sufficient forces will be available to secure the echelon's entire rear area at one time. Therefore, they concentrate on those areas immediately adjacent to the protected element, such as friendly forces. It is essential that base, base cluster, and other rear area security forces conduct continuous reconnaissance operations. They may focus their efforts on people, materiel, buildings, or terrain.

E-107. Reconnaissance operations that involve only US forces may not be effective if language problems prevent communication with the local population. In these instances, interpreters—US Army or host nation—should accompany forces conducting reconnaissance. When possible, host nation authorities, such as the civil police, should also accompany the reconnaissance force. Distributing leaflets and handbills before or during an area reconnaissance and using loudspeaker teams during the reconnaissance can aid the reconnaissance effort by informing civilians of what information the US reconnaissance force is seeking and how they can report that information to US forces.

E-108. The rear area commander directs units within his AO to establish bases and base clusters even while this initial area reconnaissance is ongoing. These bases and base clusters provide security to units located within them and can provide perimeter security around critical locations. Perimeters vary in shape depending on the factors of METT-TC. The perimeter shape conforms to the terrain features that offer the best use of observation and field of fire.

E-109. When the units constituting the base arrive, they immediately start organizing the defense of the base. Many tasks occur simultaneously, but some may require priority. The base commander specifies the sequence for preparing the defense system. (Chapter 9 provides a recommended sequence in its discussion of the preparation for an area defense.)

E-110. Construction of personnel shelters throughout the billeting, administrative, and maintenance areas provides individual protection against standoff attacks. These shelters may vary in construction. Shipping containers, dugouts, and double-walled plywood shelters with sand or gravel fill, all with sandbag reinforcement and overhead cover, provide acceptable protection. These shelters are close to the billets and work areas to permit rapid access. (To the degree possible, construction will be in consonance with the guidance provided in FM 3-34.34.)

E-111. Units may construct fighting positions or prefabricate and move them into position for assembly. These bunkers are constructed to withstand a direct hit by a medium antitank missile on the front and sides and a direct hit by a mortar on the top. Installing chain link fences around these positions can prematurely detonate shaped-charge warheads.

E-112. Constructing revetments for critical resources provides protection against mortar or rocket fragmentation. These revetments may be sand-filled, double-walled construction with either plywood or steel plate sides. Units within the base provide overhead cover for critical facilities and functions when possible. The base commander's preventive measures to avoid or minimize effects of enemy attacks also contribute to his ADC efforts by providing units, soldiers, facilities, and supplies on the base protection from major accidents and natural disasters as well.

E-113. The commander uses tactical wire barriers within the perimeter to limit and canalize penetrations by enemy groups or individuals. These interior barriers can be as simple as a single roll of concertina wire. Generally, the commander should place them to prevent a direct approach to vital facilities within the base. He should make provisions to cover these barriers by automatic weapons. The base should construct inconspicuous barriers and periodically relocate them to prevent counterplanning by the enemy. Further, the barriers should not be so intensive as to preclude freedom of movement by the reaction or reserve force. These forces, as well as all soldiers, should be familiarized with the location of all barriers through daylight and night drills.

E-114. Base defense training is an essential element of preparing to conduct a base defense. Base defense requires integrating the BDF and its emergency augmentation by all units on the base. Because they rarely function together, the commander can form an efficient fighting entity only through proper training. The BDF commander carefully coordinates the training of base units for base defense operations with the support operations of the base. All individuals receive training to allow them to participate, at least to a limited degree, in the base's defense. All units receive training to provide at least limited local security for the facilities they operate. Conducting rehearsals that test the base defense plan is an essential part of base defense training. Some equipment deemed necessary for base defense or for training purposes may not be available. The BDF commander must use his initiative to overcome these shortfalls.

E-115. Most of the training required to support base defense operations is currently a part of individual and unit training programs. Soldiers designated to take any part in base defense operations will probably require additional training in the following areas as applicable to their roles in the base defense effort:

- Ambush techniques and defensive measures against enemy ambushes.
- Use of hearing, sight, and smell as detection means.
- Police-type patrolling and operating roadblocks and checkpoints.
- Limited-visibility operations to include using night vision devises, sensors, and techniques for using sign and countersign procedures.
- Marksmanship, especially night firing.

- Observation post operations with emphasis on security, sound and light discipline, and reporting procedures.
- Operation and operator maintenance of base defense equipment, such as sensors, night observation devices, radios, and computer systems.
- Cross-training on all communications equipment available within the base and communication techniques.
- Barrier construction and, if authorized, using mines and boobytraps.
- Patrolling.
- Small-unit attacks, such as the employing movement formations, rushes, and a base of fire.
- Fire control and fire distribution of available weapons.

E-116. The existence of a common operational picture and the commander's situational understanding are the keys to knowing how and when a response force will be needed. Separate bases and base clusters establish continuous communications with the echelon rear command post to allow timely response and information dissemination.

E-117. The commander of the response force has a copy of the base defense plan so he can effect necessary coordination between the base and the response force once the latter is activated for the response mission. This coordination occurs through the BDOC. The response force commander coordinates with the base to ensure that he understands the base defense plan, to include—

- Method of contacting the BDOC or BCOC, including call signs and frequencies.
- Base defense plans and layouts to include—
  - Positions of critical internal assets, external coordination points, and no-fire areas.
  - Locations of any obstacles or mines near the base.
  - Locations and direction of fire of crew-served weapons.
  - Locations of target reference points and preplanned fires.
  - Locations of OPs and friendly patrols if employed by the base.
  - Signal for final protective fires.
- How to obtain available fire support.

E-118. The response force commander designated for each base must have the capability to mass the effect of supporting fires and support TCF operations. He must know which fire support targets are approved for engagement and the locations of the nearest medical treatment facility, NBC decontamination site, and ammunition supply point. He must be able to communicate with—

- Any supporting artillery and Army aviation units tasked to respond.
- The TCF, BDOC, BCOC, and the echelon rear command post.

EXECUTING A BASE DEFENSE

E-119. The preferred way to conduct a base defense is as an offensive operation designed to clear the area of enemy forces. Detecting and destroying significant enemy forces are responsibilities of the echelon rear area

commander. However, the individual conducting rear area security may be forced to adopt a primarily defensive posture because of—

- The size of the rear area.
- A lack of resources.
- Inability to detect and track the enemy.
- Enemy capabilities in relation to the friendly force capabilities.

E-120. Forces engaged solely in base defense operations conduct aggressive patrols, develop and occupy defensive positions within their assigned AOs, and provide security forces to counter enemy attacks. These actions may be multiservice or multinational depending on the composition of the base.

E-121. Rear area commanders at all echelons request ground maneuver forces to use as BDFs when the net effect of enemy activities in the echelon's rear area is beyond the limited defensive capabilities of CS or CSS resources. If a threat exceeds a base's ability to defend itself, the base commander requests response force support through his BCOC or the echelon rear command post if he commands a separate base.

E-122. The conduct of base defensive operations against a ground attack is the same as for conducting a perimeter defense. (Chapter 8 discusses the perimeter defense.) The paragraphs below discuss those execution considerations unique to base defense.

Patrols

E-123. Base defense operations to counter small enemy forces include aggressive, frequent patrolling by squad- and platoon-size forces to detect and capture or destroy small enemy bands. Host nation personnel are well suited to assist BDF patrols. Their knowledge of the terrain, inherent ability to operate effectively in the environment, language skills, and familiarity with local customs increases the effectiveness of these patrols.

E-124. Small, highly mobile units conduct patrols by moving on foot or by land, water, or air vehicles during daylight and darkness. They search populated areas contiguous to the base and establish surprise checkpoints along known or suspected routes used by enemy forces.

E-125. The BDF mans dug-in or concealed night ambush sites located outside of the base's external barrier system on a random basis. Host nation security personnel should accompany patrols traveling through populated areas. The base develops fire support targets to support the ambush in accordance with their availability and the ROE. If the area adjacent to the base perimeter is a free fire area, it is seldom necessary to occupy ambush sites there. When local restrictions preclude establishing a free-fire area, ambush sites are manned forward of the perimeter and the BDF is prepared to assist those elements conducting the ambush as necessary.

E-126. Patrols can install sensors in locations enemy forces threatening the base would cross to provide early warning of enemy movements. Such patrols also observe and report enemy activities, such as assembling personnel; moving weapons, amunition, or other supplies; and preparing firing positions for indirect-fire weapons. In addition to the acquisition of specific targets, patrols

may confirm or deny the presence of enemy activity in named areas of interest located near to base.

E-127. The base uses any available small boats to patrol nearby rivers and coasts. An infiltrating enemy takes advantage of waterways to transport heavy weapons because of their weight and bulk. Detecting these weapon systems is an important river and coastal surveillance mission for the BDF commander. The Army has type-classified small watercraft suitable for use in this type of patrol, as does the Navy and Coast Guard.

E-128. Military working dogs are a valuable asset in base defense operations. Their employment should habitually be considered in planning all patrol and security operations. Successfully using these dogs depends on the skill of the handler and the knowledge and full understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the dogs by employing commanders and staffs. (Army Regulation 190-12 provides this information.)

E-129. During base security operations, the base commander monitors the location of friendly troops and their relationship to friendly fires. The base commander must be constantly aware of the relative location of enemy, friendly, and neutral personnel. Subordinate elements, such as patrols, must understand the importance of accurately reporting their positions. Automation and navigation aids, such as the global positioning system (GPS) tied to combat net radios, assist in maintaining a common operational picture. When employing artillery, mortars, and air support, the commander must exercise positive control, whereby an observer must be able to see the target area. Unit SOP at all levels must address specific procedures for clearing indirect fires directed against identified targets located within the rear area.

Static Positions

E-130. The static positions of the base defense consist primarily of the bunkers and towers forming the base's defensive positions. Positioning bunkers and towers correctly affords maximum observation and mutually supporting fires over the area forward of the perimeter to include the perimeter barrier and sensor system.

E-131. The base commander establishes communications between the BDOC, the command posts of the units occupying the base, and the base's bunkers, towers, and reserve. In addition, each node be able to communicate laterally with adjacent units and defensive positions.

E-132. **Bunkers.** Although full-time observation and all-around defense of the base are essential, the BDF commander may reduce the number of soldiers conducting static defense mission by designating key bunkers around the perimeter to be manned at all times, with the remainder to be fully manned during periods of reduced visibility and increased enemy threat. The base prepares individual fighting positions near the bunkers to provide supporting fires. Night vision devices, binoculars, automatic weapons, grenade launchers, and hand grenades are commonly available within the bunker positions, and antitank systems cover possible ground vehicle approaches.

E-133. **Towers.** Towers provide increased visibility, which may be desired in specific situations. Elevated platforms enhance the capability of detecting

perimeter infiltration when coupled with night vision devices, binoculars, and spotter scopes. They may enhance the base's ability to determine the firing positions of enemy indirect weapon systems. Towers can be constructed according to standard military design using standard construction materiels or constructed from local materiels. Multistory buildings, such as grain silos, can also serve as towers. Installating sandbags or steel plating around the observation platform provides protection against automatic weapons and small-arms fire. Constructing a ground-level bunker near the base of the tower provides additional protection when the enemy directs fires against the tower. Access to the bunker from the tower may be by means of a fireman's pole or a ladder. Towers should incorporate the following safety measures—

- Lightning arresters.
- Built to withstand strong winds and to support two observers and their equipment.
- Enclosed mounting ladder.
- Provision of safety nets around tall towers.
- Painted an appropriate color to reduce reflection from moonlight.
- Installation of a suitable roof to shield observers from the elements without interference to observation. (A double-roof design can cause some types of mortar rounds to detonate at a height that affords some protection to the observers positioned in the tower.)

The base commander's decision to use towers is a result of his analysis of the factors of METT-TC. For example, he must decide if the additional security they provide is worth the effort to construct them in a fluid situation or the risk that they will attract additional enemy attention to the base.

Reaction Operations

E-134. Reaction operations are operations conducted by the BDF, operating from the base or from positions outside the base, for the purpose of countering local enemy activities. They are offensive in nature and conducted as either spoiling attacks or counterattacks.

E-135. The commander uses his BDF to destroy any small enemy units detected in the vicinity of the base. The base requests assistance if its forces cannot destroy or contain the enemy force in its current location. Elements of the BDF do not pursue a retrograding enemy outside of supporting distance from the base, because it could be part of a diversion designed to weaken the base's defensive capabilities. Pursuit of such fleeing enemy forces is turned over to rear area response forces instead.

E-136. Reaction operations are simple, planned, and rehearsed because the majority of actions are required at night. Designating primary and alternate checkpoints within the base facilitates response to multiple contingencies. Within security limitations, the force uses actual checkpoints during rehearsals to promote familiarity with the area and the reaction plan.

Response Force Operations

E-137. Response force operations are offensive operations conducted by the response force to countering Level II attacks. The response force moves quickly to counter the enemy before he can extensively damage the base. The

base commander lifts or shifts base defense fires to support the maneuver of the response force. The response force attempts to delay and disrupt the threat until a TCF arrives if it cannot destroy or deter the enemy. The base commander notifies his BCOC if the base defense and the response forces engage an enemy they cannot defeat. They maintain contact with the enemy force until the TCF arrives. The TCF commander has operational control (OPCON) of all base and response forces within his designated AO on commitment of the TCF.

Host Nation and Third Country Forces

E-138. The BDF commander integrates available host nation and third country forces in the overall base defense effort. Particular emphasis is placed on integrating host country forces in patrol and population control activities. Both host nation and third country forces provide local security for their own units. However, to ensure maximum benefit, all such local plans should be coordinated with and integrated in the base defense plan. The actual degree of host nation and third country force participation in base defense depends on the orders and guidance of their respective governments and the personal relationship their commanders have with the base commander.

Defense Against an Enemy Conducting an Attack-by-Fire

E-139. An enemy may conduct an attack by fire against a base when he knows that he is unable to penetrate the base perimeter. He wants to place a large volume of fire on the base to inflict casualties and destroy resources. Such an attack is normally of short duration, from 10 to 20 minutes. He may also direct harassing fires toward the base to accomplish the same purpose. The weapon systems delivering these attacks normally displace after completing their mission to prevent their destruction by friendly maneuver, and direct fires, and counterfires.

E-140. The base develops an aggressive reconnaissance and surveillance plan to detect the infiltration of enemy mortars, artillery, rockets, and antitank systems and to locate firing positions. The BDF commander considers likely firing positions and routes to them, intelligence reports, and available resources when formulating this plan. He plans offensive opertions to locate and destroy the enemy force prior to, during, and after such attacks and passive defensive actions to reduce friendly casualties and damage associated with them.

E-141. Primary active measures employed against these types of attack are airborne observers, establishing a critical friendly zone (CFZ) over the base, and using reaction forces. An unmanned aerial vehicle or attack helicopter may provide the airborne observer. The airborne observer orbits the base area, checking likely or suspected positions and noticeable changes in the terrain. The base acts against an enemy weapon system on its discovery by employing friendly fire support systems or maneuver forces against it. A CFZ over the base allows friendly counterfires against the enemy weapon system as soon as it attacks the base. In the absence of radar coverage, the base may use visual observation of the muzzle blast from two or more points to provide an intersection. This requires these observation posts to have properly oriented azimuth boards so the direction of sightings can be rapidly

determined and reported to the BDOC. Using a reaction force deployed by helicopter or tactical vehicle to engage and destroy the enemy weapon system is a primary consideration. The reaction force must be careful to prevent establishing a pattern, such as always using the same route or landing zone. If the enemy is aware of the pattern, he can set up an ambush to destroy the reaction force.

Sniper Teams

E-142. Sniper teams are useful when forces come under harassing small-arms fire by a small enemy element firing from, among, or near areas where civilians or cultural monuments protect it from the return fires of more nondiscriminating weapons. These teams allow the BDF commander to fix the enemy and move other BDF elements into positions where they can engage the enemy without endangering civilian lives or causing excessive collateral damage. The commander can employ smoke and, if authorized, riot-control agents to aid in this maneuver. If the force cannot engage the enemy without endangering civilian life or property, the BDF commander can try to disengage his forces and move them to positions that block the enemy's escape routes. However, the base commander must use all available means to protect his forces, even when it may place civilians at risk.

E-143. These teams may be provided from infantry units. Alternatively, this capability may be provided by giving special training to selected BDF soldiers to maximized the capabilities of their assigned individual weapons or specialized equipment provided to them.

Passive Defensive Measures

E-144. Passive defense measures are always practiced within the confines of the base. In addition, the commander employs CA and PSYOP programs to ensure the cooperation of the local civilian population. The BDOC evaluates all patrol, guard, and intelligence reports indicating an attack. Preparation of firing or assault positions, movement of weapons or ammunition, unusual actions or movement of the civilian population, and reports by host nation personnel may be indications of an attack.

Area Damage Control

E-145. When an attack occurs, the objective is to resume operations, including the maintaining or restoring of control, evacuating casualties, isolating danger areas, and reducing personnel and materiel losses. The base commander conducts an immediate survey of the damage and reports his assessment to the BCOC. Simultaneously, he initiates actions to isolate the danger areas and prevent extension or continuation of the damage, such as fighting fires and minimizing flooding.

E-146. Casualties receive self-, buddy-, and first aid care. If possible, medical personnel and vehicles evacuate casualties. However, timely transportation of casualties is important. The situation may require using nonmedical vehicles for mass casualties. If possible, medical personnel accompany those patients being transported in nonmedical vehicles to provide en route patient care.

E-147. The base establishes traffic control using MP or other elements to ensure fire-fighting equipment gains access to the area and ambulances and evacuation vehicles clear the area. The BDOC notifies the BCOC of blocked routes and necessary traffic diversions. The element conducting traffic control can also temporarily provide for controlling displaced civilians and stragglers and provide a degree of local security for the damaged area.

E-148. The BDOC coordinates with the BCOC and echelon rear command post for engineer support to restore critical facilities and any specialized fire fighting capabilities required. Engineer support is normally needed to clear debris and rubble to support the base damage control mission and extinguish extensive fires. The BDOC also coordinates for any necessary explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and decontamination support.

E-149. The base commander takes precautions by maintaining local security and interior guard posts when receiving ADC support from host nation resources to ensure the security of the base. He cannot afford confusion surrounding the base's damage control efforts to provide an opportunity for saboteurs and other hostile personnel to penetrate the base perimeter.

ROUTE SECURITY

E-150. ***Route security operations*** **are a specialized kind of area security operations conducted to protect lines of communication and friendly forces moving along them.** Enemy attempts to interdict LOCs may have little immediate impact on ongoing decisive and shaping operations because of unit basic loads and previously positioned caches. However, the security of those routes over which the echelon's sustaining operations flow is critical to sustained land operations, regardless of whether the commander is attempting to exploit success or recoup from failure.

E-151. The security of routes and LOCs, whether rail, pipeline, highway, or waterway, presents one of the greatest security problems in an echelon's rear area. Route security operations are defensive in nature and are terrain-oriented. A route security force prevents an enemy force from impeding, harassing, or destroying traffic along the route or portions of the route itself. Having a base permits the concentration of security resources. LOC security requires dedicated resources at almost infinite points or reaction forces to counter possible enemy action. Units performing missions that require the habitual use of LOCs, such as MP, transportation, supply, and service units, can perform route security operations in conjunction with their primary activities. The echelon rear area commander can employ the following techniques to provide route security:

- Passive security.
- Route reconnaissance.
- Cordon security.
- Combat security.

While the scope of these operations depends on the factors of METT-TC, route security operations tend to require significant resources. A combination of passive and route reconnaissance is commonly used over secured routes such as a LOC.

PASSIVE SECURITY

E-152. The passive security technique for provide route security includes measures initiated to achieve security without a significant expenditure of manpower or resources. It includes—

- Camouflage
- Formation and march control of convoys so they present the least lucrative target possible under prevailing conditions.
- Proper selection of routes.
- Capitalizing on security offered by other activities not related to the route's security requirements. These activities include aircraft traversing the route, maintenance activities taking place along the route, training exercises or troop movements adjacent to or along the route, military and host nation police traffic control activities, and the activities of the civilian population.
- Defensive information operations.

E-153. The commander uses passive security for all conditions or situations and as an adjunct to any other technique of route security employed. They are the products of a long-term and continually improved program for an integrated security system.

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

E-154. Route reconnaissance addresses not only the route itself, but also all terrain along the route from which the enemy could influence a friendly force's movement. Route reconnaissance takes place at irregular intervals to avoid developing a regular pattern that an enemy could exploit. (Chapter 13 discusses route reconnaissance.)

CORDON SECURITY

E-155. It is normally not feasible to secure all points on a route by physically allocating resources to each point. ***Cordon security* is the security provided between two combat outposts positioned to provide mutual support.** A commander can assign air assault, mechanized, or motorized units to combat outposts established at critical locations along the route. He locates these combat outposts within supporting distance of each other whenever possible. Units assigned to these combat outposts provide response forces in the event of enemy activity along the route within their assigned AO. Forces based at these combat outposts conduct reconnaissance patrols and offensive operations to counter enemy activities between these two points on a frequent but irregular schedule. Cordon security requires considerable manpower and other resources. The commander uses it only when a clear and evident requirement exists.

E-156. Normally, each combat outpost contains at least a platoon-size element equipped with automatic weapons, communications, and sensors and supported by those fire support assets available to the rear area commander. (Chapter 12 contains additional information on the combat outpost.) The outpost commander rotates his soldiers between duty at the combat outpost and duty on patrol. The higher commander contacts each of his deployed combat outposts frequently to check its status.

E-157. The establishment of cordon security will do little to eliminate the rear area threats that require its adoption. A commander directing the establishment of cordon security should also direct a series of parallel corrective actions, to include—

- Searching for a new route.
- Vigorous search and attack operations to destroy the enemy within the echelon rear area.
- Rigorously enforcing circulation control measures in coordination with the host nation over the civilian population.
- Removing cover from areas offering concealment to an enemy.
- Constructing new routes to bypass dangerous areas.
- Repositioning supply activities to permit better route selection.
- Mass evacuation of the civilian population from towns and villages along the route. (This is an extreme measure and requires consultation with host nation authorities and adherence to the laws of land warfare.)

E-158. The commander must recognize the loss of complete control over any given route early. The continued investment of resources into a "lost route" merely serves the enemy. Those resources and energy should be diverted to security measures elsewhere whenever feasible.

COMBAT SECURITY

E-159. The combat security technique for providing route security includes all measures taken by combat arms units to seize and secure the terrain necessary to permit use of the route in question. Units conduct combat security along a route to prevent enemy ground forces from moving into direct fire range of the protected route. The route and its adjoining terrain compose the AO. A route security force operates on and to the flanks of a designated route.

E-160. Combat security is the most costly technique for providing route security and draws on the strength of the maneuver force. For example, because of the distances involved, a commander usually assigns at least one battalion-size unit, if not more, to secure one route through a division-size AO. The maneuver force establishes a perimeter around the route or cordons sections of it to search suspected enemy locations while establishing roadblocks and checkpoints along the main route and lateral routes to stop and search vehicles and people as they enter or leave the route. Special considerations include coordinating with segments manned by rear area security forces and the echelon rear command posts integrating the maneuver force's operations with other rear area and base defense activities, and clarifying of C2 arrangements.

CONVOY SECURITY

E-161. ***Convoy security operations*** **are specialized area security operations conducted to protect convoys.** Units conduct convoy security operations anytime there are not enough friendly forces to continuously secure LOCs in an AO and there is a significant danger of enemy ground action directed against the convoy. The commander may also conduct them in conjunction with route security operations. A convoy security force operates to the

front, flanks, and rear of a convoy element moving along a designated route. Convoy security operations are offensive in nature and orient on the force being protected. (Chapter 14 discusses convoy movement operations; this section only addresses convoy security concerns.)

E-162. To protect a convoy, the convoy escort element must accomplish the following critical tasks:

- Reconnoiter the convoy route.
- Clear the route of obstacles or positions from which the enemy could affect movement along the route.
- Provide early warning of enemy presence along the route.
- Prevent the enemy from attacking the convoy.

ORGANIZATION OF A CONVOY ESCORT

E-163. The size of the escort needed to conduct convoy security operations is METT-TC dependent. However, as a general rule, an average-size convoy of 50 vehicles normally requires at least a maneuver company, an MP company, or air defense artillery battery equipped with self-propelled cannons to conduct the mission. Without such an escort, the transportation unit will have to provide security using its organic assets. This results in the reduction of cargo-hauling capabilities of each transportation unit to the degree that it must convert cargo vehicles into ad hoc gun trucks and leave other trucks in a motor pool because of their drivers being diverted to provide the necessary degree of security.

E-164. Cavalry, tank, mechanized infantry units, and MP elements equipped with tracked or wheeled armored vehicles are well suited to protect a convoy because of their organic reconnaissance capabilities and combat power. The commander may reinforce the convoy security force with engineers, dedicated air defense, and other assets as required. Usually the convoy's trail party also provides CSS support to the convoy escort, such as vehicle recovery and medical evacuation. If the convoy's trail element cannot provide that support, then the convoy escort provides its own CSS support. Other METT-TC considerations, such as restrictive terrain and limited time, dictate how to use aviation assets as part of the coordinated effort.

E-165. The convoy security force organizes into several elements to accomplish its tasks. (See Figure E-6.) The advance guard performs a route reconnaissance forward of the convoy. The security element provides early warning and security to the convoy's flanks and rear. This element can also perform the duties of the escort element. The escort element provides close-in protection to the convoy. It may also provide an immediate response force to assist in repelling or destroying enemy forces if they engage the convoy. The rear guard prevents an enemy from overrunning the convoy from the rear. It can also act as an immediate response force to enemy contact made on either flank of the convoy. Finally, a reaction force is available to respond to emergencies. Since the reaction force is a committed force, and not a reserve, it is task organized to include available fire support assets and other combat multipliers. It provides firepower and support to all convoy elements to help develop the situation, conduct a hasty attack, or prevent the convoy's destruction. The headquarters directing the convoy, rather than the convoy commander, controls the reaction force. It monitors the progress of the convoy

and responds if the convoy encounters an enemy unit the escort element cannot defeat or repel. It must be able to respond within 15 minutes. The reaction force always anticipates an ambush when moving to the relief of a convoy under enemy attack.

E-166. When a lack of resources prevents establishing all five elements, the commander normally first resources his forward reconnaissance or advance guard. He then resources his escort, flank screening, and rear guard elements in that order. It is the responsibility of the headquarters directing the convoy to designate the response element.

E-167. If available, air cavalry assets can participate in the convoy security operation by screening the convoy's movement as it moves along the route of march. Alternatively, they can assist in clearing the route ahead of the convoy as it moves along the route of march, or clearing the route in conjunction with the route reconnaissance element. Air cavalry can also assist by controlling indirect-fire support and coordinating with forward air controllers from other services for close air support. The supporting air cavalry unit must know the maneuver intentions of the ground element if contact with the enemy occurs. If heavy forces are not available for use as a convoy escort, the commander can use light infantry to augment the self-defense capabilities of transportation units.



Figure E-6. Convoy Security Organization

CONVOY CONTROL MEASURES

E-168. As shown in Figure E-7 on page E-36, convoy security control measures typically include the following:

- Routes (primary and alternate).
- Start point.
- Release point.

- Checkpoints.
- Phase lines.
- Observation posts.
- Target reference points.
- Areas of operation for various units that affect the convoy.
- Staging or marshaling areas.
- Known obstacles and lanes.

E-169. Although convoy size, passage time, and march speed are not graphic control measures, they determine how long it takes to execute the convoy security mission. Rules of engagement are also not a graphic control measure, but they greatly influence how a commander conducts convoy security operations.



Figure E-7. Convoy Control Measures

PLANNING CONVOY OPERATIONS

E-170. Because of the inherent dangers of convoy operations, the commander emphasizes security measures during the planning process. The best defense is to avoid being ambushed. These security measures include—

- Secrecy when planning and disseminating orders.
- Strict noise and light discipline during movement.
- Varying routes and schedules.
- Avoiding routes with known danger areas.
- Conducting route reconnaissance using aerial and ground systems.
- Using current intelligence information concerning the condition of the route and any enemy or other forces that may impact on the convoy's use of that route.
- Coordinating with supporting air liaison officers to ensure the scheduling of close air support to assist the movement if the convoy warrants committing these assets.

- Fire support elements to provide close and continuous fire support for the movement.
- Training in immediate actions drills, including actions at danger areas and in case of a near ambush, a far ambush, booby traps, encounters with enemy tactical combat vehicles, sniper contact, aerial attack, and indirect fire.
- Communications and coordination with supporting units and other units along the route, adjacent host nation forces, and higher headquarters, including airborne radio relay.
- Various locations for leaders, communications, medical support, and weapon systems within the movement formation.
- Questions asked of local civilians along the movement route for intelligence information, including possible enemy ambush sites.

E-171. The convoy commander must consider the unique requirements of convoy security when formulating his plan. He briefs his subordinates on the latest information regarding the enemy situation and the area through which the convoy will pass. He formulates his plan and issues his order, which includes the movement formation, intervals between echelons and vehicles, rate of travel, and a detailed plan of action if the convoy encounters an enemy force. Since there is seldom time to issue complicated orders during an ambush, subordinate commanders must plan the actions of the escort element and reaction force in the event of an ambush. Units should rehearse these actions before movement and execute them as drills if enemy contact takes place.

E-172. Communications are vital to the success of convoy movements. The convoy commander must plan for radio communication and ensure the availability and compatibility of communication means between convoy elements and indirect-fire support and air cavalry assets, as well as with units and host nation agencies in areas along the movement route. The convoy commander prearranges visual and sound signals, such as colored smoke, identification panels, whistles, or horns. Many of these signals can be SOP items. He must ensure that all convoy members understand these signals and rehearse the actions required by each. This is necessary because of the limited number of radios and other communications equipment in tactical vehicles.

E-173. The commander's fire support plan covers the entire convoy route, paying special attention to known danger areas and potential choke points. Convoy security elements may have mortars organic to the escort element or indirect fires provided by fire support elements positioned to range all or portions of the route. Coordinating with fire direction centers before the convoy's departure enables fire support teams in the convoy security element to enter the appropriate fire control nets, calling for and adjusting fires as necessary.

E-174. The convoy security commander must carefully plan for the appropriate CSS to support the operation. He should include fuel, maintenance, and recovery elements in the convoy or pre-position them in secure areas along the route. He also plans for casualty evacuation support that covers the entire route.

E-175. Convoy security operations in an urban environment or built-up area require different emphasis and techniques than those in rural areas. The population density and characteristics of the area may require using nonlethal weapons and carefully employing lethal weapons. When applying minimum-essential force to minimize loss of life and destruction of property, subordinate commanders must conduct detailed planning, coordination, and control. Whenever possible, convoys should move through populated areas when they are the least congested and, therefore, less dangerous to the security of the convoy. Convoy operations may require assistance from military or local police and other governmental agencies to secure the route before the convoy enters a built-up area.

PREPARING CONVOY SECURITY OPERATIONS

E-176. The convoy commander must rehearse maintaining march intervals and actions on contact for a variety of scenarios, including air attack, artillery or indirect fire, snipers, and ambush. Since the purpose of a convoy is to reach its destination—not to destroy the enemy in a movement to contact—the goal of these responses should be to free the convoy from enemy contact so it can continue its mission. All soldiers and vehicles traveling in the convoy should undergo precombat inspections to ensure they know and adhere to unit SOP, and that vehicles have a reasonable expectation of completing the convoy without mechanical failure. During this stage, drivers act to harden their vehicles, such as adding sandbags and Kevlar blankets and cover loads to prevent an enemy from identifying the cargo. The convoy commander spaces prime targets throughout the convoy and cross-loads his trucks as much as feasible to avoid losing all of one type of supply, such as all artillery fuzes, if a single vehicle is destroyed.

E-177. If possible, the convoy commander and his key subordinates perform a route reconnaissance. Shortly before the convoy's departure, MPs or scouts should perform another route reconnaissance to determine current conditions. This last route reconnaissance should also remove or neutralize individual mines emplaced by the enemy that endanger the convoy.

EXECUTING CONVOY SECURITY OPERATIONS

E-178. Unless the security force encounters the enemy during the convoy, the convoy conducts operations as discussed in Chapter 14. If the forward reconnaissance element, advance guard, or flank screen first encounters the enemy, it performs those actions on contact discussed in Chapter 4. (Chapter 8 discusses the active and passive air defense measures a convoy can take.)

Artillery or Indirect Fire

E-179. An enemy may use his fire support systems in an attempt to destroy convoys or to harass and interdict the movement of supplies and personnel. Artillery fires are either preplanned fires or fires called in and adjusted on a target of opportunity by a forward observer. The adjusted fires present the most complex problem, as the enemy can adjust the effects of his artillery fires to follow the actions of the convoy. The two active measures that a convoy can take against enemy artillery fires are using direct or indirect fires against the enemy forward observer, if his location can be identified and

calling for counterfire if the direction and approximate distance to the enemy artillery system can be estimated.

E-180. The convoy commander has three passive options when the convoy comes under enemy artillery fire: halt in place, continue to march, or disperse quickly to concealed positions. Regardless of the option selected, the unit SOP should cover the action taken and the signal directing the action. The primary consideration is the immediate departure from the impact area. The convoy only halts when the artillery concentration is ahead of the convoy. The convoy commander looks for an alternate route around the impact area and the convoy should remain prepared to move out quickly. The mission or the terrain may require the convoy to continue through the beaten area. In this case, the convoy increases its speed of movement and spreads out to the maximum extent allowed by the terrain.

Sniper Fire

E-181. The convoy commander takes caution when receiving sniper fire to ensure that any return fire does not harm friendly troops or civilians in the area. The best reactive measures against sniper attack by a convoy are passive. Ensure all soldiers wear helmets and available body armor. Vehicles move through the area without stopping. Convoy escort personnel act as necessary to locate, suppress, and kill snipers in accordance with the ROE.

Ambush

E-182. The very nature of an ambush—a surprise attack from a concealed position—places an ambushed convoy at a disadvantage. No single defensive measure, or combination of measures, prevents or effectively counters all ambushes. The training of the convoy elements directly relates to the effectiveness of counterambush measures. Immediate reaction and aggressive leadership are essential to limit casualties and damage to vehicles, cargo, and personnel. Small enemy forces are seldom able to contain an entire convoy in a single kill zone. This is due to the extensive road space occupied by even platoon-size convoys and because of the presence of security elements escorting the convoy. More often, an enemy is able to ambush only a part of a convoy—either the head, trail, or a section of the main body. Fire in the kill zone may be from only one side of the road, with a small holding force on the opposite side. An enemy frequently places mines and booby traps on the holding force side to contain the convoy in the kill zone. The part of the convoy that is in the kill zone and receiving fire must exit as quickly as possible if the road ahead is open. The security escort takes care in assaulting the main ambush forces because an enemy will commonly use mines and booby traps to protect his flanks.

E-183. The convoy leaves disable vehicles behind or, if they are blocking the road, pushes them out of the way with following vehicles. Combat vehicles providing escort to the convoy must not block convoy vehicles by halting in the traveled portion of the road to return fire. If the main body splits into two or more elements because of the ambush, those elements forward of the ambush site move to a secure location. Vehicles that have not entered the kill zone must not attempt to do so. They should stop, their personnel should dismount, take up a good defensive position, and await instructions. Since escort

vehicles may have left the road to attempt to overrun a hostile position, elements of the convoy should not fire on suspected enemy positions without coordinating with the escort forces.

E-184. Other actions that the convoy commander can take to neutralize the ambushing enemy force include—

- Calling for artillery fire on enemy positions.
- Calling for attack helicopters to engage the enemy positions.
- Directing the crew-served weapons mounted on convoy vehicles and the individual weapons of nondriving personnel to suppress the ambush force while the rest of the convoy's vehicles move out of the kill zone.
- Calling for the reaction force.

E-185. A convoy with a limited escort is seldom able to defeat an ambushing enemy force and should not attempt to do so. When part of the convoy is isolated in the kill zone, vehicles that have not entered the ambush area must not attempt to do so. They should stop in a herring bone formation; personnel should dismount, take good defensive positions, and await instruction until supporting forces clear the ambush area. Normally, the transportation unit conducting the convoy will not maneuver to attack the enemy ambush force unless it is necessary for self-preservation. It relies on its escort force, fire support, and reaction forces.

E-186. Convoy personnel will dismount, take cover, and return fire on enemy positions when an element of a convoy halts in the kill zone and is unable to proceed because of disabled vehicles, damaged bridges, or other obstacles, Personnel dismount their vehicles away from the direction of enemy fire. Escorting security forces that have passed through the kill zone or have not yet entered the kill zone maneuver to destroy the ambushing element. The convoy commander calls for the reaction force as soon as the ambush occurs.

E-187. The convoy clears the route and movement resumes as soon as possible after the ambushing enemy force is defeated or withdraws. Wounded soldiers are evacuated using the fastest possible mode. When the convoy cannot tow disabled vehicles, it should distribute their cargo among other vehicles if time permits. The convoy destroys vehicles and cargo on order of the convoy commander if it is not feasible to evacuate them. The convoy recovers combat net radios and other critical items before it destroys the vehicles. These items should not fall into enemy hands.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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FM 7-85

RANGER UNIT OPERATIONS

4-2. Deception.

There are always plans to deny the enemy knowledge of the ranger unit's insertion, or to deceive him as to the location or intent of the operation. Feints, false insertions, and other deception operations all add to ranger deception plans. Selection of unexpected means, time, place, and routes of insertion, as well as use of speed and mobility, give less reaction time to the enemy. Planning may include the use of diversionary fires to direct the enemy's attention away from the inserting unit. Deception techniques that may be used include--

a. Multiple airdrops, water landings, or both. This precludes the entire force from becoming engaged at the same time and place, if detected.

b. Dispersion of insertion craft (air or water) both in time and location.

c, Landing a force in an area closer to other potential targets than to the actual targets.

d. Leaks of false information and false messages.

e. False insertions or radio traffic to disguise actual insertions.

f. Diversionary actions such as airstrikes in other than the target areas.

g. Increased reconnaissance flights, either by manned aircraft or remotely piloted vehicles, over false targets.

4-3. Speed and Mobility.

a. Speed of action must be emphasized when the enemy can react quickly to the ranger force presence or when there are limited means of withdrawal. The operation must be conducted swiftly, allowing the ranger force to withdraw before the enemy can react.

b. Major problems facing ranger units are the need for speed and mobility, and the heavy loads carried by soldiers for sustained operations. Ranger units are required to be flexible and to be able to react to any problem within the objective area. However, if equipment is carried to cover every encounter, the load will become too heavy. This will reduce the speed and mobility of the ranger unit. The ranger force commander must always have a balance between the equipment carried and the mobility of his unit. He does this by making three different types of loads: fighting, mission, and existence. He decides what items will make up these loads, where they are carried, and what will be done with them upon contact with the enemy.

(1) The fighting load consists of those items of equipment, weapons, ammunition, food, and water that are common to all soldiers and are necessary for immediate use in combat. These items are normally carried and are retained at all times while in contact with the enemy.

(2) The mission load consists of those items of equipment or ammunition that are required by the mission, but are not normally carried by all rangers

updated through all available sources. This includes overhead photography and ground sources to ensure that the initial planning data are still current. Planning stresses the use of deception. Escape and evasion plans, external communication nets, and the location of caches must be known to leaders at all levels.

b. **Reverse planning sequence.** Insertion planning is done in the reverse planning sequence with the ground tactical plan being prepared first. Actions at the objective serve as the basis for the landing and assault plan, the plan for insertion and movement, the loading plan, and the plan for marshalling. All plans are interrelated. Some may be developed at the same time. Consideration of the factors of METT-T guides all planning. Special considerations that apply to these operations are:

(1) **Mission.** The nature of actions at the objective and requirements for special items of equipment and nonorganic personnel impacts on how the unit inserts. When the mission requires rapid deployment, the fastest method of insertion may be needed. In other operations, where success of the mission depends on maintaining secrecy, speed may be less important.

(2) **Enemy situation.** Enemy disposition, strength, and security measures along the route(s) near the objective area affect the method of insertion to be used. Planners must take into consideration whether the enemy:

(a) Uses RSTA detection devices or not.

(b) Has a strong air defense system or possesses air superiority.

(c) Has gaps between his defensive positions.

(3) **Terrain and weather.**

(a) **Topography.** Terrain such as mountains, swamps, or heavy forests favors land infiltration. Deserts, arctic regions, and open prairies favor air or water insertion. Areas not inhabited or with a friendly but scattered population favor land infiltration. A heavily populated area, or one which contains large enemy forces, favors air or water insertion. Hydrography--tides, currents, surf, reefs, and sandbars--must be considered when planning water insertion.

(b) **Weather.** Bad weather with reduced visibility and high winds favors land infiltration, and adversely affects air or water insertion. Limited visibility favors land infiltration; good visibility does not. Adverse weather aerial delivery systems (AWADS) lessens the impact of reduced visibility as a limiting factor on air infiltration. High winds may preclude airborne insertion.

(4) **Troops.** The number of men to be inserted and their level of training may be limiting factors. A need for special skills may call for use of nonranger unit personnel whose physical stamina and ability to perform many infiltration techniques may not equal that of the rangers. Whether supporting forces and special items of equipment are available must also be considered.

(5) **Time.** The main concern is whether the ranger operation is quick-response or deliberate-response. During a quick response mission, planning, preparation, and rehearsal time is short. The timing of the insertion is crucial with respect to weather, the enemy, and if an insertion craft is available.

4-12. Air insertion.

The most rapid form of insertion is by air. Rangers and equipment can be delivered by parachute (static-line or freefall technique), fixed-wing aircraft (airlanded), or helicopter (airlanded, parachute, or rappeling).

a. Suppression of enemy air defense along the insertion corridor may be necessary. The USAF will normally assume the major responsibility for suppressing enemy air defense artillery (ADA) capabilities that may interfere with the inserting forces. This is done by a variety of sophisticated electronic countermeasures applied against enemy equipment and by strikes against known enemy positions. Army fire support elements, special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA), and ground jammers may participate, as well as Navy aircraft, jammers, and gunfire.

(1) A main danger area is the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) or frontier areas where the enemy employs most of his sophisticated weapons systems and air defenses. Other dangerous areas are population or troop concentration areas behind enemy lines protected by point air defense systems.

(2) Since the majority of the enemy's detection devices and air defense weapons may be located near the point of entry, fire support, smoke screens (even at night), and suppressive measures may be critical. The use of special items of equipment may be needed to counter the enemy's RSTA effort.

(3) Long-range fires (artillery and naval gunfire) should be planned on known and suspected enemy antiaircraft locations and on prominent terrain features along the route(,s). Once beyond the FEBA, inserting units may be beyond the range of conventional indirect fire. More reliance will then be placed on air assets for fire support and electronic countermeasures.

b. There must be close coordination between the ranger unit and the transporting unit. What the transporting unit does during the insertion has a great impact on the success of the mission. To decrease the chance of detection, maximum use is made of periods of reduced visibility and tactical cover and deception. Drop zones and landing zones are chosen behind tree lines, in small clearings in forests, or on other types of terrain not easily seen.

c. All flight routes over enemy territory should be planned in order to avoid occupied areas and enemy air defenses. Routes should complement the cover and deception plan. They should avoid giving away final ranger objectives.

Although part of the E&E plan, actions by the ranger force during this phase become a forced land infiltration rather than an E&E. The senior surviving ranger must decide if enough personnel and equipment can be moved to the objective area in time to accomplish the mission. If so, he must proceed, taking along any surviving air or boat crew members. If not, he may proceed directly to the extraction point and wait, or he may contact SAR elements for recovery.

PHASE THREE: That portion of the operation after mission accomplishment. It is a hard time to escape and evade since the enemy is alert and reacting to the ranger forces. The confusion caused by the violence of the attack, coupled with the rangers' ability to move quickly cross-country away from the objective area, offers the best chance of a successful escape and evasion. The surviving ranger elements that cannot be extracted can do one of the following:

(1) Move over land at once to a PZ or beach for extraction by SAR elements.

(2) Move to an area where reentry into friendly lines can be made.

(3) Move to a neutral or nonaligned country where either internment or return to friendly control can be effected.

d. Any plan for E&E should provide for the issue to each ranger of an area map, a covert means of recognition, and a small compass. An emergency ration may also be included and any items needed for the climate in that objective area. The ranger force commander must balance the need for other survival equipment against the added weight and bulk involved.

CHAPTER 5

Strike Operations

The ranger regiment conducts strike operations in support of the Air Land Battle. Ranger strike operations are integrated into an overall plan designed to destroy, delay, and disorganize the enemy. They may also cause him to divert a major part of his combat forces and power to rear area security. Strike operations also help create an environment in which other special operations forces can operate. Strike operations can complement air power in disrupting enemy forces in depth. They allow the theater commander to regain the initiative and lead to decisive action.

5-1. Application.

a. The ranger regiment can conduct strike operations either as deliberate-response or quick-reaction missions. It can be inserted into the area of operations by land,

sea, or air.

b. Strike operations can be conducted throughout the depth of the battlefield in support of conventional or unconventional warfare. Multiple strike operations can have a synergistic effect and can create situations that help friendly forces seize and maintain the initiative.

c. Strike operations include raids, personnel and equipment recovery, and interdiction of lines of communication. They are best accomplished by ranger units who use conventional techniques and special skills. Strike operations vary in size. When well augmented and supported, the ranger regiment can conduct strike operations deep in enemy territory using up to three battalions. Strike operations normally are limited in time and may be conducted unilaterally or in conjunction with other special operations forces or allied forces. They are normally ended by the extraction or exfiltration of the ranger force.

5-2. Raid operations.

a. A raid is a strike operation conducted behind enemy lines against strategic objectives, targets of high tactical value, time-sensitive targets, or key personnel and facilities in enemy rear areas. It normally involves a swift penetration of hostile territory to confuse the enemy or destroy his installations. Ranger units can conduct deep penetration raids when given the appropriate assets for insertion.

b. A strategic raid by the ranger regiment would be directed by the NCA and conducted under the OPCOM of a unified or JTF commander. An operational raid would be directed by the unified or JTF commander and conducted by that command directly or under the OPCOM of a corps commander. Typical targets would include:

(1) Command, control, communications, and intelligence centers at front level or combined arms army level.

(2) Nuclear and chemical weapons storage sites and delivery means.

(3) Key logistical centers, warehouses, ammunition complexes, or fuel pumping centers supplying logistical support to a specific front.

(4) Air defense and air traffic control integrating centers and air defense weapons sites.

(5) Key power generating and transmitting facilities, hydroelectric dams, and irrigation systems.

(6) Key ports or rail complexes.

(7) Key installations or facilities, such as airstrips, buildings, bridges, dams, or tunnels.

c. The size of the ranger raid force is determined by a detailed analysis of METT-T. The unit committed to the ground phase of the raid mission is kept as small as possible. It may be as small as a ranger company or it could include all the

battalions of the ranger regiment. The force must be tailored to complete the mission quickly, violently, and with few casualties. The size of the force may also be affected by the augmentation of specially trained personnel needed for that mission.

d. Raids are normally conducted in five phases. (See Figure 5-1).



Figure 5-1. Five phases of a raid.

PHASE 1. The ranger force inserts or infiltrates into the objective area.

PHASE 2. The objective area is then sealed off from outside support or reinforcement, to include the enemy air threat.

PHASE 3. Any enemy force at or near the objective is overcome by surprise and violent attack, using all available firepower for shock effect.

PHASE 4. The mission is accomplished quickly before any surviving enemy can recover or be reinforced.

PHASE 5. The ranger force quickly withdraws from the objective area and is extracted.

e. This paragraph discusses the raid after insertion/infiltration. All considerations discussed in Chapter 4 must be applied in order for the unit to get deep behind enemy lines. Upon receipt of a raid mission, the following basics are emphasized:

(1) **Maximum use of intelligence information.** The gathering and dissemination of information must be continuous and provided to the raid force even while en route to the target area. To ensure mission

accomplishment, the ranger unit must be kept informed of the latest enemy developments in the objective area to prevent being surprised. Only then can the full combat power of the rangers be concentrated at the decisive time and place.

(2) **Plan development.** The reverse planning sequence and the planning steps set forth in FM 101-5 are followed in the plan development.

(3) **Coordination.** Coordination is through the operational headquarters with friendly units (such as higher and supporting Army or joint headquarters, intelligence agencies) for fire, RSTA, special equipment, and personnel and logistical support.

(4) **Rehearsals.** Rehearsals help validate all aspects of planning for the raid and ensure precision in execution-They allow changes to be made in the plan before it is carried out.

f. A successful raid is ensured by--

(1) Launching the raid at an unexpected time or place by taking advantage of darkness and other periods of limited visibility, and moving over terrain that the enemy may consider impassable.

(2) Avoiding detection through proper movement techniques and skillful camouflage and concealment to include taking advantage of natural cover of the terrain, and using sophisticated equipment to detect and avoid enemy forces.

(3) Timing the operation as close as possible.

(4) Using all available support, both organic and nonorganic, to include use of special weapons such as Air Force "smart bombs" and artillery cannon-launched guided projectiles, with the ranger unit using laser target designators.

(5) Performing quick, violent, precise, and audacious actions that focus full combat power at the decisive time and place.

(6) Disengaging quickly upon mission completion.

(7) Withdrawing swiftly using planned routes and including a deception plan.

g. Four functions are normally performed by ranger tactical formations when conducting a raid. Each subelement is organized and equipped to do a specific part of the overall mission. Depending upon the specific mission, nature of the target, enemy situation, and terrain, these four functions are as follows:

(1) The command group controls movement to and actions at the objective. This unit normally consists of the ground commander, other subordinate leaders in the raid organization, and communications to support these leaders.

(2) The security element, whose organization is determined by the mission

of the raid force, size and type of enemy force and its mobility and state of alert, terrain and avenues of approach into the area, and the time needed to seal off the objective area. The security element may perform the following:

(a) Secure the ORP.

(b) Give early warning of enemy approach.

(c) Block avenues of approach into the objective areas.

(d) Prevent enemy escape from the objective.

(e) Provide overmatch for the units at the objective and suppressive fires for their withdrawal.

(f) Provide short-range air defense.

(3) The support element provides the heavy volume of fire needed to neutralize the objective. Because fires from this unit are violent and devastating, they must be closely controlled to ensure the precision needed. On order or as planned, fires are lifted and shifted to cover the maneuver of the assault element by suppressing enemy fire from the objective or aerial fires. The support element may also be given specific locations to cover by fire in support of the security element if an enemy quick-reaction force moves toward the objective area. These may include routes into and out of the objective site, key terrain features, or installations adjacent to the main objective. Once the assault has been completed, or on order from the raid force commander, the support element displaces to the next planned position. Organization of the support element is determined by the following:

(a) Size of the objective, the geography of surrounding area, and the enemy threat (to include air) in the area. This element should be able to neutralize the objective (when supported by air or naval gunfire) and to lift or shift fires either when the assault is launched or when ordered by the raid force commander.

(b) Mission of the assault unit.

(e) Suitable firing positions.

(d) Size and nature of the enemy force in the objective area and those enemy forces capable of reinforcement at the objective.

(e) Fire support from other units (air strikes, naval gunfire, surface-to-surface missiles, and artillery fire).

(4) The assault element seizes and secures the objective and protects demolition teams, search teams, prisoner-of-way teams, or other teams.

(a) The organization of the assault element is always tailored to the mission. Each target area must be examined carefully. To assault, seize, and destroy an installation, position, or equipment, the

assault element could be organized into one or more assault teams. The element's mission is to overcome resistance and secure the objective and to destroy the installation or equipment. Other specialized teams may also be needed. For example, sniper teams could be needed to remove key sentries. To capture prisoners, liberate personnel, and seize or destroy equipment, the assault element could be organized into assault teams, prisoner teams, search teams, medical teams, demolition teams, or breach teams.

(b) To destroy a point target or installation in a heavily defended area where the USAF cannot get close en to be effective, the assault element might be organized with one small team equipped with laser target designators. From covered and concealed positions, members of the team could then provide guidance for USAF delivery of laser-guided munitions from a safe distance.

h. The site chosen for the raid LZ or DZ must support the planned actions at the objective. There are two options when choosing sites:

(1) The ranger force can land on or near the objective and seize it before the enemy can react. (See Figure 5-2.) This avoids forced marches over land carrying heavy combat loads. If there is no suitable landing area near the objective, or the enemy has a strong reaction force nearby, this option is not favored.

Figure 5-2. Airborne landing on the objective.

(2) The ranger force can land unseen far from the objective. It then assembles, reorganizes, and moves into an ORP near the objective. (See Figure 5-3.) The objective is seized after security and support elements are in place. This option makes coordinated action easier by setting up control of small units before engaging the enemy.



Figure 5-3. Airborne landing distant from the objective.

5-3. Interdiction operations.

a. AirLand Battle doctrine set forth in FM 100-5 is a shift in emphasis toward keeping the initiative in battle. The deep battle seeks out enemy elements separated from the main battle area and attacks them before they can be deployed. Interdiction of selected enemy forces by attacking them or blocking chokepoints hinders, delays, or interrupts the enemy's use of his lines of communication; it denies him the use of certain areas; it destroys industrial facilities, military installations, and equipment; and it stops or slows his advance along a particular route of approach. The ranger regiment's ability to conduct interdiction is vital to execution of the AirLand Battle doctrine.

b. Interdiction by ranger forces includes blocking or channeling approaches, holding key terrain for a limited time. and destroying facilities.

c. Ranger forces conduct interdiction missions that supplement those conducted by long-range Army and USAF weapon systems. Large-size ranger forces are normally used only when other systems fail or are not available, and the target is of such priority that it must be attacked. Small ranger laser target designator teams may work in concert with USAF or USN strike aircraft to direct terminally guided weapons systems. Rangers should be directed against crucial interdiction targets that disrupt, confuse, or delay the enemy and allow friendly forces to gain the initiative at the forward line of own troops (FLOT).

d. Typical interdiction operations are--

(1) Destroying rail lines, switches, rail yards, and rolling stock.

(2) Destroying bridges, overpasses, tunnels, and truck parks.

(3) Closing mountain passes or routes in restricted terrain.

(4) Cutting oil or natural gas pipelines and destroying pumping and distribution systems.

(5) Destroying dams, locks, spillways, and flood control gates.

(6) Destroying rail transload points, switches, and yard engines.

(7) Destroying shipyards, dry docks, wharfs, lighters, cranes, and stevedore facilities.

(8) Destroying electrical generation facilities, power lines, transformers, and grid monitoring centers.

(9) Destroying water pumping stations and filtration systems.

(10) Destroying radio and TV stations, phone lines, microwave terminals, satellite receiving stations, and telephone exchanges.

(11) Ambushing enemy forces and personnel moving along lines of communication.

e. Considerations when using rangers for interdiction are:

(1) Insertion and extraction.

(2) Support resources available.

(3) Ranger force vulnerability.

(4) Target identification.

(5) Threat environment.

(6) Other or supporting means of interdiction.

(7) Command and control.

(8) Time and magnitude of the effect on the enemy forces at the forward edge of the battle area.

(9) Collateral effects of target destruction.

f. Interdiction targets are not identified and attacked at random. They are part of an overall deep attack plan to destroy or cripple an entire system. Interdiction is based on the assigned deep campaign plan that directs which targets are to be attacked, by whom, the results desired, and the priorities of attack for specific systems. Based on his plan, the ranger force commander selects those ranger elements best suited to conduct the attack. Target selection, which requires detailed intelligence and planning, is based on:

(1) **Target criticality.** A target is critical when its destruction or damage would have a major influence on the enemy's ability to conduct or support operations. Each target is considered in relation to other elements of the particular target system designated for interdiction. The criticality of a

target changes with the situation. For example, when the enemy has few locomotives, a railroad bridge is less critical.

(2) **Target accessibility.** The ranger force must be able to insert into the target area. Terrain, security controls, location, and means of insertion are considered when studying a target for accessibility. systems. Based on his plan, the ranger force commander selects those ranger elements best suited to

(3) **Target restorability.** The enemy's ability to restore a damaged facility to normal operating capacity affects target selection. The enemy's repair and maintenance ability and his reserve stocks must be considered.

(4) **Target vulnerability.** A target is vulnerable when it is open to attack by means available to ranger forces. Vulnerability is affected by the nature of the target such as type, size, disposition, and security. It is also affected by the means available to attack it such as explosives, incendiaries, and special devices.

g. Key to the interdiction process is the ability to locate and evaluate target systems for attack and the timing of the attack. A target system is a series of related functions that serve a common purpose.

(1) A target is one element, installation, or activity identified for attack such as a locomotive, train, bridge, or prison.

(2) A target complex is several targets in the same general area, such as a railway marshalling yard, an airfield, or port and dock facilities.

(3) A target system consists of an industrial system and its sources of raw materials; the rail, highway, waterway, or airway systems over which these materials are transported; the source of power and method of transmission; the factory complex; and the means by which the finished product is transported to the user. The targeting process is usually accomplished in the special operations force cell at EAC and the battle coordination element (BCE) at corps level.

h. Interdiction techniques include ambush, emplacement of conventional demolitions, target designation for laser-guided munitions, and emplacement of beacons or sensors.

NOTE: The enemy surface-to-air threat normally precludes the use of an airborne platform for direct observation and designation. This may be accomplished by the on-ground ranger force.

i. Through interdiction, ranger units are an ideal force to contribute to the Army's AirLand Battle operational concept. This includes taking the initiative, moving quickly to strike deep in the rear of the enemy, and defeating the enemy force beyond the FEBA. Planners and commanders must ensure that the ranger units are used on missions that are synchronized to contribute to the overall deep battle campaign. Strikes against critical targets must combine with efforts of other assets to take the initiative from the enemy, limiting his flexibility, initiative, and momentum.

5-4. Personnel and equipment recovery operations.

Recovery operations are specialized raids to liberate imprisoned or detained personnel or to return certain items of equipment to friendly control. These operations include recovering and extracting downed or hijacked aircrews and political or military leaders. Rangers use surprise and combat power to overwhelm resistance before harm can come to the detainees or prisoners.

a. **Planning.** The planning of personnel and equipment recovery operations is the same as for the raid. The main difference is that the ranger force commander must plan for the extraction of the recovered personnel and the loading and extraction of sensitive equipment. Personnel and equipment recovery raids are often executed as quick-response missions. They normally require the ranger force commander to plan and execute the recovery quickly.

b. **Augmentations.** This type of strike operation often requires that the ranger force be augmented with nonranger personnel with special skills or abilities. Examples are medical personnel, technical experts, mechanics or crew members trained in repair and retrieval operations, linguists or translators, and other special operations force elements.

c. **Organization.** The organization of the recovery force is the same as for a raid. Sometimes special teams are needed to perform certain missions involved in the recovery. This mission is conducted aggressively, usually ending in close combat during darkness or other limited visibility conditions. Reconnaissance teams may be inserted ahead of the ranger force to reconnoiter the objective and to locate the detained personnel.

(1) All planning and execution takes place as described for the raid. The emphasis must be on detailed, timely intelligence.

(2) Medical teams must be available to care for the detainees.

(3) The ranger personnel must be adept at searching and clearing of buildings.

(4) The ranger force must--

(a) Locate the specific building or area where the friendly detainees are being held.

(b) Gain entry into buildings, use stun grenades, and avoid obstacles and booby traps.

(c) Engage all enemy personnel using selective-kill techniques.

(d) Locate, identify, and secure detained personnel.

(e) Move personnel to a secured extraction site.

(f) Leave no detainees or rangers behind in the objective area.

d. **Execution.** The key to success is surprise and speed. The enemy must be assaulted when least expected. The ranger force must ensure that friendly

detainees are not harmed during the assault - either by rangers or enemy personnel.

e. **Extraction.** The ranger force commander should plan for the extraction point to be as close as possible to the point of recovery. This prevents the detainees from having to move cross-country or for the ranger force to transport bulky equipment long distances. For small groups of detainees or small items of equipment, the extraction point can be further away. Recovery operations may use any method or combination of methods of insertion and extraction (see Chapter 4). Close planning and coordination is normally required with US Army, USAF, or USN aviation for both delivery and evacuation of the target area.

CHAPTER 6

Special Light Infantry Operations

Ranger units are normally employed on strike operations. However, broad US strategic needs demand a wide range of other military abilities. The ranger regiment may conduct special light infantry operations when larger conventional forces could not be used. The regiment conducts these operations using light infantry doctrine, methods, and techniques.

These operations include, but are not limited to, movement on foot, military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT), passage of lines, ambush, and reconnaissance. Ranger units do not normally conduct planned operations against enemy armored forces. Battlefield surprises or METT-T considerations may cause ranger units to engage armored forces for short periods. The ranger regiment can conduct a conventional light infantry defense for short periods. A defense is not normally conducted adjacent to other friendly forces. It is normally a perimeter defense from which the unit then breaks out from encirclement and links up with friendly forces.

6-1. Movement.

a. Most missions involve movement on foot in tactical operations. Ranger units infiltrating behind enemy lines seek to avoid chance enemy contact. They choose the movement that allows them to retain security and control. To avoid loss of surprise and initiative, casualties, and mission failure, ranger units normally--

(1) Avoid chance enemy contact, if possible.

(2) Move on covered and concealed routes.

(3) Avoid likely ambush sites and other danger areas.

(4) Practice camouflage, noise, and light discipline.

(5) Maintain all-round security.

(6) Make unavoidable enemy contact with the smallest element possible.

(7) Retain the initiative to attack at the time and place of the ranger unit's choice.

b. In planning the movement of his unit, the ranger commander must consider all the elements of METT-T and determine how they will affect the movement. He must determine the route, formations, security measures, methods of command and control, location of key leaders and weapons, and action to be taken on chance enemy contact.

(1) **Routes.** The ranger force commander conducts a careful route analysis, using the factors of observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA). He chooses a route that maintains the security of the force while ensuring surprise. He tries to choose a route that will avoid enemy contact and speed movement. The commander makes a detailed route reconnaissance using maps, aerial photographs, and reports from persons familiar with the area. If possible, he reconnoiters the route himself or uses a reconnaissance team. He may have that team act as guides or mark the route using covert marking devices.

(2) **Formations.** Ranger units use the movement techniques found in current light infantry doctrinal publications. The traveling, traveling overmatch, or bounding overmatch technique is chosen based on the likelihood of enemy contact. The ranger force normally tries to avoid detection and contact with the enemy while moving. The commander chooses a movement technique that ensures that if unexpected contact were made, it would be with the smallest element possible and not the entire formation. The distance between moving ranger elements depends on the terrain, visibility, and enemy situation. March interval is normally great enough to allow each succeeding element either to deploy or change direction if enemy contact is made. Distances are close enough that each element could quickly assist the element to its front.

(3) **Security.** Security is to the front, rear, and flanks when enemy contact is likely. A front security element is placed well forward with adequate communications with the main body. The security element is used to detect the enemy and warn the main body. The main body then either changes direction or hides until the enemy is past. If the enemy does detect the main body, the security element may be used to attack the enemy from the flanks or rear. Flank security elements are placed next to the route of march. They move forward either by alternate or successive bounds. An alternative is to have the security element moving adjacent to the column along routes paralleling the direction of march. Rear security is handled the same as front security. Plans are made for the rear guard to support the main body during chance enemy contact. This is done either by maneuver or by furnishing supporting fire.

(4) **Command, control, and communications.** All available communication is used, consistent with OPSEC and movement security, to

assist in maintaining control during movement. March objectives, checkpoints, and phase lines may be used to aid in control. The number of reports is reduced, normally only exception reports are needed. The ranger force commander should be well forward in the formation but may move throughout as the situation demands. Communications with security elements are mandatory. Operations security often precludes the use of radios. Therefore, connecting files, runners, and visual signals are normally used. Detailed planning, briefing, rehearsals, and control are valuable if there is enemy contact. Alternate plans are made to cover all possible situations.

(5) **Weapons.** Rangers are placed within the formation to allow a mix of their individual weapons to cover the front, flanks, and rear of the formation. Rifles, grenade launchers, and light automatic weapons cover all sectors. Crew-served weapons such as machine guns, antitank weapons, and mortars should be given designated locations within the formation. This allows the element leader to employ them quickly. They should be placed near the lead element, but not so close as to be engaged along with it. Crew-served weapons are used to provide overmatch, especially when employing the bounding overmatch technique of movement.

(6) **Rehearsals.** The ranger force, expecting movement as part of an operation, conducts the following combat drill rehearsals:

(a) Conduct movement.

(b) React to enemy contact.

(c) Maneuver under fire (fire and movement).

(d) Cross danger areas.

(e) Break contact.

(f) Conduct a hasty ambush.

(g) Make a temporary halt.

(h) Establish a perimeter.

(i) Establish a rally point.

(j) Take actions upon consolidation.

(k) Use arm-and-hand signals.

(l) React to flares and indirect fire.

c. After a ranger force is inside enemy territory, it must be alert to avoid detection before reaching the objective.

(1) Should the ranger force security element become aware of enemy presence, it alerts the main force. The main force tries to move away without alerting the enemy and continues the mission.

(2) If the enemy does make contact, the security element then engages the

enemy, trying to deceive him as to the size of the ranger force and its direction of movement. After breaking contact, the security force divides into small groups and moves to a rally point to rejoin the main force.

(3) The ranger force does not fight en route to the objective unless there is no alternative, then it quickly breaks contact and moves away.

(4) Ranger units may need to set up a temporary defensive position for resupply, evacuation of wounded, planning, or extraction. One technique that can be used is the temporary perimeter defense.

(5) If the moving ranger force comes under indirect fire, it moves quickly out of the impact area and continues the mission.

(6) The most effective means of combating an ambush is through the immediate return of a high volume of fire by all weapons. This requires alertness, discipline, dynamic leadership, and rehearsed plans.

(a) Regardless of the method of movement, all weapons should be positioned for immediate use. A well-executed ambush is hard to counteract. However, the effectiveness of an ambush can be reduced by the immediate return of fire. Enemy weapons may be silenced, thus creating weak points in the ambush position. Smoke and high-explosive (HE) grenades are effective in executing counterambush actions. They create confusion, provide a screen for movement, and disrupt the ambush plan.

(b) When all elements of a ranger force are not trapped within the ambush, the elements that are free to maneuver should initiate an immediate flank or rear assault against the ambush force. A flank assault permits better coordination with personnel in the ambush. Supporting fires are provided by those weapons that cannot be hand carried and fired in the assault.

(c) Specific actions against a near and far ambush are as follows:

- **Near ambush.** Elements caught in the kill zone return fire at once and move out of the kill zone. Elements not in the kill zone help by maneuvering and conducting a flanking attack. The unit assaults the ambush position.
- **Far ambush.** Those ranger elements not in the kill zone set up an overmatch position and lay down a base of fire for the elements in contact. The elements in contact move out of the kill zone and prepare to assault the enemy, using individual movement techniques and fire and movement.

(7) The reorganization after enemy contact involves the use of rally points, plans for local security, reorganization of the force, evacuation of dead and wounded, and movement based on the unit mission.

6-2. Ambush operations.

a. **Definition.** An ambush is a surprise attack, from a concealed position. It is used on a moving or temporarily halted enemy to destroy or capture him and his equipment. An ambush is a useful tactic because--

(1) Small, well-trained, disciplined forces, with limited weapons and equipment, can destroy much larger enemy forces.

(2) It reduces the enemy's overall combat effectiveness by destruction and harassment of his forces.

(3) Enemy morale and effectiveness suffer heavily at little cost to the force executing the ambush.

b. **Execution.** A successful ambush must be executed with precision, violence, speed, and audacity of execution. For success, ambush operations must emphasize the following:

(1) **Surprise.** Surprise, more than any other single aspect, enhances the value of an ambush. Surprise increases the potential for inflicting damage on the enemy with less danger to the ranger force.

(2) **Coordinated firepower and shock effect.**

(a) Coordinated firepower is used for maximum shock effect. Massive volumes of accurate fire, explosives, and mines, coupled with an aggressive attack, breaks the enemy's spirit to fight back. Surprise increases shock effect and the chances for success. Shock effect can cover unexpected defects in an ambush--for example, ambushing a much larger force than expected.

(b) All weapons must be sited with interlocking fires in the kill zone and along likely avenues of entrance or exit. Mortars should be used if the terrain permits. Tripods and traversing and elevating mechanisms are normally used with machine guns to lock in fires. All riflemen use firing stakes to mark left and right limits, and elevation stakes. There is a tendency to shoot high in an ambush--especially at night. The M203 grenade launchers are sited to cover the dead space and routes of escape. When the rules of engagement permit, plastic bags containing CS crystals may be taped to the front side of Claymore mines.

(3) **Control.** Control is essential.

(a) Leaders must have contact with all members of their unit to alert them to the oncoming enemy. Leaders should not move around the ambush site during this crucial period. A method used to alert members can be to tie strings or vines to rangers' legs or arms. By a series of light tugs, all members of the ambush can be alerted to enemy presence.

(b) The leader must initiate the ambush with a casualty-producing

device. A bank of Claymore mines on a double-ring main is an excellent device to spring an ambush. Other good techniques are to use a 90-mm recoilless rifle firing antipersonnel (APERS) rounds or a machine gun. All must be under the direct control of the ranger leader. Whistles or pyrotechnics must not be used. They will allow the enemy time to react.

- As soon as the enemy is hit, he reacts. The ambush force has only a few seconds to destroy the enemy in the kill zone. He will quickly recover from the initial shock and leave the kill zone--either with a direct counterattack or withdrawal, Subsequent fires and other banks of Claymore mines must be planned.
- The leader always executes the ambush, except when a member of the ambush knows he has been discovered. He then has the authority to execute--with killing fire, not by yelling.
- The cease-fire must be controlled by the ranger leader. A whistle or other device may be used to get attention, and then cease-fire is signaled.

(4) **Security.** The flanks and rear of an ambush site are open to counterattack. Flank and rear security may be enhanced by -

(a) Echeloning in depth.

(b) Designating sectors of observation.

(c) Positioning of RSTA devices.

(d) Enforcing noise and light discipline.

(e) Having a good withdrawal plan.

(f) Securing routes of withdrawal.

(g) Executing with speed and violence.

(h) Positioning security forces to sea] off the ambush area.

(i) Having good camouflage.

(5) **Simplicity.** A simple, direct plan improves the chance of success. The ambush plan must be clear yet concise to offer the greatest likelihood of success. For example:

(a) Mission statements for security, support, and assault elements must be clear, concise, and direct.

(b) Tasks to be performed by the ambush elements should be easy to understand.

(c) Contingency plans should be simple.

(d) Routes into positions and withdrawal routes should not cross.

They should be the shortest, most secure routes.

(6) **Training and self-discipline.** Precise and violent execution is how ranger units win against enemy forces. All advantages must be exploited. Discipline must be strict. There must be no sleeping, talking, eating, or smoking in the ambush site. If an ambush is to be set up for long periods, then the elements of the ambush must be pulled back at set times to the ORP for rest. Extended ambushes of 24, 36, or 48 hours require six- or eight-hour shifts. It may take a company to man an extended platoon ambush position. Tired troops cannot man an ambush well. Other vigorous operations cannot be performed all day and have an alert ambush all night.

(7) **Maximum use of specialized equipment.** This includes the most sophisticated weapons, communications equipment, and RSTA devices. The effectiveness of any mission is enhanced by the use of this equipment.

(8) **METT-T.** Every ambush mission must be evaluated by the ranger commander IAW METT-T to design an ambush that works.

(a) **Mission.** Clearly state the mission--for example, stop enemy resupply, ambush enemy armor columns, or capture personnel or equipment.

(b) **Enemy.** State the type of enemy units--for example, guerrillas, main force, logistics carrying parties, or armor units. What is the size of the force, its habits when attacked, and type of support? What is the enemy night vision ability and expected time of movement?

(c) **Terrain.** Is it wooded, mountain, jungle, or urban? Some good ambushes can be set in a city or suburb. Are the routes available to the enemy suitable to his activity?

(d) **Troops.** Squads and platoons are the basic ranger ambush forces. An ambushing force should be able to engage a force two to three times its size--but evaluate enemy and terrain, A platoon ambushing an enemy tank company in daylight in open terrain is risky. But engaging that same column at night or in a forest may give the ranger platoon an advantage.

(e) **Time.** How long will it take to emplace the ambush? A complex, lethal ambush with plenty of "dirty tricks" takes hours to set up; a hasty ambush on a trail takes 15 to 30 minutes. How long is the ambush to be in place? What hours of the day, or at nighttime only? How soon must it be set up? Do not set up an ambush in darkness--even if it is to be executed in darkness. Try to allow every ranger to '6see" and "lay" in his weapon in daylight. Time is important.

c. **Organization of the ambush force.** A ranger unit conducting an ambush must be task-organized to perform the following functions: assault, security, and support. The ambush forces should be task-organized according to the TOE--by

platoons, squads, and fire teams. The TOE should not be changed to create smaller elements for an ambush. The TOE formations may be reinforced with machine gun, recoilless rifle teams, or a 60-mm mortar squad.

(1) **Assault.** The elements assigned the assault mission either move directly into their positions or through a release point. The mission may include any combination of the following:

(a) Conduct the main assault.

(b) Halt an enemy's motorized column or any moving target,

(e) Kill or capture personnel.

(d) Recover supplies and equipment.

(e) Destroy vehicles and supplies.

Search teams are not always used. The ranger leader must decide how and when to use search teams. When rangers leave the security of their well-chosen, concealed ambush position, they are subject to the fires of the enemy who may also be hidden and ready. If it is at night, do not throw tripflares or shoot illumination to light the search area as this will illuminate and expose rangers to the enemy. Always assume there is hidden enemy--the ambush will not kill them all. Night observation devices (NODs) or a red filtered flashlight taped to M16s should be used to quickly search in ranger buddy teams. If the return fire from the enemy is great or if the ambush missed the main body, then the leader may choose to break contact and leave without searching the kill zone.

(2) **Security.** The elements assigned the mission of security may move to their positions directly or by way of a release point. Their missions may include any or all of the following:

(a) Secure flanks, rear, or ORP.

(b) Provide early warning.

(c) Seal off the kill zone to prevent the enemy from escaping or reinforcing.

(d) Assist in executing the ambush.

(e) Cover withdrawal of main ambush force.

(3) **Support.** The units assigned a support mission provide fires that may include employment of--

Heavy automatic weapon fires.
Antitank fires.
Mortar fires.
Mines.
Flame munitions.

d. **Ambush site.**

(1) **Choose an ambush site.** When choosing an ambush site, all sources of information must be used to enhance surprise, exploit the enemy's weak points, and take advantage of the terrain. An analysis of the terrain is also based on the other factors of METT-T to include maps, aerial photos, and, if possible, personal reconnaissance. Emphasis is on--

(a) Natural cover and concealment for the ambush force.

(b) Routes of entry and withdrawal (at least two) that should be direct and easy to reach.

(c) Good observation and fields of fire.

(d) Harmless-looking terrain.

(e) Few enemy escape routes.

(f) Limited enemy reinforcement ability.

(g) Nearby assembly or rendezvous area.

(h) Terrain that will canalize enemy into kill zones, and natural obstacles to keep him there.

NOTE: Try to select a site covered by friendly supporting indirect fires.

(2) **Take advantage of the terrain.** Emphasis must be on exploiting all natural cover and concealment afforded by the terrain. Site the ambush and individual positions based on the terrain rather than trying to adapt the terrain to a fixed geometric design.

(3) **Restrict enemy movement.** Restricting enemy movement by natural or man-made obstacles should also be planned.

e. **Types of ambushes.**

(1) Ambushes have two categories for ranger purposes--area ambush and point ambush.

(a) Area ambushes may be set up by ranger platoons, companies, or battalions. They are used to interdict enemy movement in a given area or inflict casualties on his forces. Area ambushes consist of a series of point ambushes. The size and location of the ambushes are dictated by the METT-T analysis.

(b) Point ambushes are set at the most ideal location to inflict damage on the enemy. Such ambushes must be able to accept the enemy force from more than one direction. The ranger force levels may enable it to execute an ambush in two or three main directions. The other directions must be covered by security that gives early warning of enemy attack.

(2) The basic ambush is linear (Figure 6-1). An ambush is set on an expected avenue of approach. This ambush can accept contact from three

basic directions--left, right, and front. The rear is secured by a security team.



Figure 6-1. The linear ambush.

(3) A variation of the linear ambush is the L-shaped ambush (Figure 6-2). The L-shaped ambush is formed with the base (bottom) of the L perpendicular to the expected enemy direction of advance. This is a good ambush for a road, jungle trail, or an area where the enemy is canalized and his approach route is known. The L-shaped ambush can handle an enemy coming from the expected direction (toward the base of the L) from the front (stem of the L). It is less effective against an enemy formation that comes from the opposite direction. The ambush must be executed when the enemy main body has cleared the base of the L. The flank security must protect the rear of the base of the L. In the L-shaped ambush, weapons must be sited to avoid direct or ricochet fire into friendly forces. The security elements must be considered as fire fans are being planned.



Figure 6-2. The L-shaped ambush.

(4) Other ambushes (the Z, the X, the V, and so on) are all variations of the linear and L formations (Figure 6-3). The more advanced ambush formations are difficult. Units must be expert in the basics before they are ready to employ such techniques.



Figure 6-3. Other ambush variations.

(5) Another type of point ambush is the mechanical ambush (Figure 6-4). It consists of Claymore mines set in series with a double-ring main. It is command detonated or detonated by a triggering device activated by the enemy. Mechanical ambushes are normally manned. Rangers prepare to engage the enemy with direct fire if the mechanical ambush does not detonate or if it is wholly or partially ineffective. Mechanical ambushes are an effective way to interdict a large area using a small ranger force. If the mechanical ambush is effective and rangers do not reveal their presence, the enemy is confused. This has a devastating effect on his morale and effectiveness.



Figure 6-4. The mechanical ambush.

f. **Execution of the ambush.**

(1) **Occupation.** Stealth and security are important factors.

(a) Position security teams and early warning detection devices first.

(b) Use the rest route to main ambush position consistent with security.

(c) Quickly occupy the ambush position and set up communications and signaling devices.

(d) Position key weapons (automatic and antiarmor).

(e) Rig Claymore mines, tripflares, and booby traps.

(f) Ensure that all weapons are correctly positioned. Assign sectors of fire to provide mutual support and cover dead space.

(2) **Camouflage.** Each man must be hidden from the enemy, During preparation for the mission, each man camouflages himself and his equipment, and secures his equipment to prevent noise. At the ambush site, positions are prepared with minimum change in the natural appearance of the site. All debris resulting from preparation of positions is concealed to prevent evidence of occupation.

(3) **Movement.** Movement is kept to a minimum. The number of men moving at a time is closely controlled. Every man is as quiet as possible, especially at night. Light discipline is rigidly enforced at night. Smoking is forbidden.

(4) **Signals.** Audible and visual signals, such as whistles or pyrotechnics,

must be changed often to avoid setting patterns and alerting the enemy. Three or four simple signals are needed to execute the ambush. Signals are used to--

(a) Provide early warning of an enemy approach. A signal by the security force to alert the patrol leader to the correct direction of enemy approach may be given. This includes arm-and-band signals, radio, or field telephone.

(b) Initiate the ambush. This may be the detonation of mines or explosives, Fire is then delivered at once in the heaviest, most accurate volume possible. Properly timed and delivered fires add to the achievement of surprise, as well as to the destruction of the target.

(c) Lift or shift fires, Signal for lift or shift fires, if the kill zone is to be assaulted. Voice commands, whistles, or pyrotechnics may be used. When the kill zone is assaulted, the lifting or shifting of fires must be as precise as when starting the ambush. Otherwise, the assault is delayed and the enemy has a chance to recover and react.

(d) Withdraw. A signal for withdrawal can be voice commands, whistles, or pyrotechnics.

(5) **Objective rally point.** The ORP is located far enough from the ambush site so that it will not be overrun if the enemy manages to attack the ambush unit(s). Existence loads are normally left in the ORP. Routes of withdrawal to the ORP are scouted (when possible by each man), Withdrawal routes should provide cover and concealment for the unit and hinder enemy pursuit. Withdrawal routes are a main consideration in the selection of the ambush site. They may be the key to survival after execution of the ambush. On signal, the ambush force quickly (but quietly) withdraws to the ORP. If pursued, the withdrawal may be by bounds, with mines or hasty ambushes used to delay pursuing forces.

(6) **Ambush variety.** If one method of ambush is used predominantly, the enemy will develop an effective defense against it and will be affected less by the shock of the ambush since he knows what to expect. More than one method of ambush should be used. No single method will fit all combinations of terrain, equipment, weather, and enemy capabilities. Variety should also be used when signaling - for example, use multiple signals, both audible and visual. Use weapons fire, mines, and RSTA when possible and vary signals to avoid compromise.

(7) **Swift action.** Speed in the execution of the ambush and the withdrawal should prevent enemy reaction forces from engaging the ambush force. Speed is often a shield against casualties and failure. When there is contact with reaction forces, speed may enhance quick disengagement. Ranger units must not only perform better than the enemy but also move faster than the enemy can react.

g. **Successful ambush.** Emphasize the following:

(1) Intelligence to ensure the enemy is ambushed at a time and place when he least expects or is least prepared to fight. This is preferred during reduced visibility to achieve surprise.

(2) Detailed planning and thorough training and rehearsing of all elements in all phases of the ambush. This ensures maximum shock effect through swift, precise execution.

(3) All available RSTA devices to permit daytime effectiveness at night when moving, shooting, or detecting enemy movement. To avoid detection, active RSTA devices should not be used until after the ambush has been triggered.

(4) All available firepower with emphasis on antiarmor, area and automatic weapons, and precision-guided munitions.

(5) Speed to achieve surprise and enhance security of the force.

(6) Cover, concealment, and overall protection afforded by the terrain when moving or when occupying ambush positions.

6-3. Antiarmor operations.

a. Antiarmor operations are not primary missions for ranger forces. They lack antiarmor firepower and have limited antiarmor ability. Ranger units can, however, perform limited antiarmor missions on close terrain by interdiction or ambush. The antiarmor weapons they do have are man-portable, but the ammunition is too heavy to carry many rounds cross-country. A ranger battalion has ten Dragon missile launchers and nine 90-mm recoilless rifles. It is also equipped with light antitank weapons (LAWs) and laser target designators (LTDs) that can guide Copperhead rounds.

b. Every ranger must be skilled with the limited antiarmor systems available. Proper selection, fortification, and camouflage of antiarmor ambush sites, route selections, withdrawal procedures, and initiative are important. Armor kill zones (AKZs) are normally set up after infiltrating the ranger force behind enemy lines under limited visibility.

c. A ranger antiarmor force is organized into four elements: command and control, support, security, and armor-killer teams (Dragons, LAWs, 90-mm recoilless rifles). These elements function the same as a raid force. The exception is that the assault force is the armor-killer team with the mission of destroying enemy armor, and it will probably not enter the AKZ. After the ambush occurs, the ranger force withdraws to its ORP. Indirect fires (if available) are then brought to bear on the AKZ.

d. Ranger units may conduct antiarmor ambushes and interdiction operation by use of laser-guided Copperhead rounds or air-delivered precision-guided munitions. Air-delivered family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) can be used to

provide the ranger force security against attack by armored forces.

6-4. Military operations on urbanized terrain.

a. The ranger regiment normally tries to avoid the manpower-intensive, high-casualty battles associated with MOUT. However, due to the nature of strike operations and the types of targets selected, the regiment may conduct MOUT for limited periods. As in all ranger operations, the ranger force commander tries to surprise the enemy, attack him from unexpected directions, and destroy him with a violent, precise attack. The maze of cellars, rooms, sewer systems, rooftops, and alleys common to urban areas presents many opportunities for the ranger force.

b. Offensive operations by a ranger force exploit the centralized planning and decentralized execution aspects of ranger unit training. Individual action and initiative are always channeled to accomplish the commander's intent. The ranger unit's offensive tactics are based on quick action and boldness. Attacks by the ranger force are short and sharp. Execution is marked by swiftness, daring, timing, and surprise. The enemy's sleeping habits, eating habits, and relief times are watched. launched almost always at night or under smoke screens, attacks are often made without mortars or artillery, relying on surprise for success. Snipers and sharpshooters are used to shift the balance of battle.

c. Deliberate defensive operations are not good ranger unit missions. However, if a ranger unit must defend for a short period, the close terrain of urban areas allows it to function well against a stronger force. The buildings in a city break up advancing enemy formations and force them to move along streets. The ranger force executes an active defense anchored on strongpoints, such as a building or a group of buildings. It launches surprise counterattacks against the enemy's flank and rear. The aim of ranger defense is to give the enemy no respite and to make him feel threatened by a sudden, deadly attack. Ranger units should be withdrawn from defensive positions in urbanized areas as soon as possible. Prolonged MOUT and the associated casualties quickly degrade a ranger unit's combat effectiveness.

6-5. Perimeter defense.

The Perimeter defense may be conducted to control key terrain, gain time or economize forces.

a. **Planning.**

(1) **Warning order.** The order must be issued soon after mission receipt. It should contain the mission, time schedule (including rehearsal and inspection times, mission time, and place for OPORD), uniform and equipment, and special instructions.

(2) **Operation order.** The leader normally gives the OPORD on the ground to be defended. Locations and sectors of fire for squads and crew-served weapons should be designated. If time permits, leaders walk the terrain with subordinates as the OPORD is issued. The OPORD covers

security, communications, signals, target reference points (TRPs), armor kill zones, and priority of engagement rules for antiarmor weapons. The OPORD also states the priority of work.

(a) Set up security and communications.

(b) Position crew-served weapons and personnel.

(c) Clear fields of fire.

(d) Prepare fighting positions.

b. **Organizing.**

(1) Squads are positioned with overlapping and interlocking sectors of fire and observation.

(2) The M60 machine guns are positioned either with an assigned final protective line (FPL) of fire or with a primary direction of fire (PDF). The PI)Fs are employed on covered avenues of approach such as gullies. The M60 FPLs should interlock across the unit front.

(3) The 90-mm recoilless rifles and Dragons are positioned with frontal cover to engage attacking armored vehicles from the flank.

(4) Riflemen are positioned to support and protect crew-served weapons. Riflemen are assigned FPLs that interlock at a point just beyond hand-grenade range.

(5) Dead space is covered with Claymore mines, antipersonnel mines, and M203 fires.

(6) Antitank mines, positioned to provide close-in protection from armored vehicles, are covered by LAW fires.

(7) Leaders plan indirect fire for long-range suppression of armored vehicles and short-range protection from dismounted assault. Mortar or artillery final protective fires (FPF) are placed on the most dangerous dismounted avenue of approach.

(8) Range cards are prepared for all crew-served weapons. Squad and platoon leaders prepare sector sketches and fire plans.

(9) The ranger force camouflages everything from ground and aerial observation.

(10) Leaders designate alternate and supplementary positions.

c. **Executing.** Leaders control the distribution and concentration of fires in their sectors. They constantly consider the overlap of fires with units to their left and right.

(1) Squads and crew-served weapons engage targets in sectors assigned by platoon leaders.

(2) Each weapon is used in its best role:

(a) Rifle, against enemy infantry within 300 meters.

(b) Machine gun, against enemy infantry within 1,000 meters.

(c) Grenade launcher, against infantry within 350 meters and armored vehicles within 200 meters.

(d) Light antitank weapon, against armored vehicles within 200 meters.

(e) Recoilless rifle, against armored vehicles within 400 meters.

(f) Dragon, against armored vehicles within 1,000 meters.

(3) Most dangerous targets are engaged first.

(4) Squads shift fires as needed or as directed by platoon leaders.

(5) The platoon masses fire on selected targets while maintaining coverage of the entire platoon sector.

(6) Platoon leaders control fires.

(7) After repelling an enemy assault, the platoon consolidates and reorganizes the defense.

6-6. Breakout from encirclement.

A breakout from encirclement is conducted when units, operating behind enemy lines, find themselves cut off from friendly forces and surrounded by superior forces. Given ranger unit missions, the chance of operating as an isolated force behind enemy lines is great. The breakout is characterized by determining enemy weak points, deception, massing of combat power, and a direct attack for a violent and timely breakout.

a. **Characteristics and fundamentals.** The breakout from encirclement involves the following characteristics and fundamentals:

(1) Set up a hasty defense. Adjust the perimeter as needed and make contact between subunits. Assign each a specific sector.

(2) Plan fire support. Plan FPFs on likely dismounted avenues of approach. Mass antiarmor weapons on the most dangerous mounted avenue of approach.

(3) Conduct reconnaissance. Identify enemy weak points. Locate enemy armored forces and the routes they must use. Locate enemy automatic weapons.

b. **Planning.**

(1) Organize all support personnel into maneuver elements--for example, company headquarters, mortars, and antitank. Organize the ranger force into a rupture force, reserve, support force, and a rear guard.

(2) Issue a fragmentary order. It should contain current local enemy situation and cover all pertinent areas of the five-paragraph field order.

(3) Select rally points.

c. **Execution.**

(1) Reduce the defense perimeter. This is done slowly until the unit is massed for the breakout attempt.

(2) Create a diversion. This is done either by fire from the rear guard force or by a limited attack in a direction other than that of the main breakout attack.

(3) Break through the defense with the rupture force. Hold the shoulders of the breakthrough.

(4) Move the reserve through to exploit the breakthrough.

(5) Move the support troops through with casualties. Have them collect casualties en route.

(6) Have the rear guard follow the support troops. It may have to fight a delaying action and use fire and movement to break contact with the enemy.

(7) Consolidate and reorganize following the breakout.

(8) Have the rupture force break contact with the enemy once the rear guard joins.

6-7. Linkup operations.

During operations behind enemy lines, ranger units may be required to link up with other friendly ground forces. Linkup may occur in airborne, air assault, amphibious, or shore-to-shore operations. It may occur during the breakout of an encircled force or during the convergence of separate forces. It may involve conventional or unconventional US forces, allied forces, or friendly guerrillas. Rangers may be required to link up with other rangers, partisans, or friendly ground forces that are conducting offensive operations.

a. **Planning.** Ranger commanders plan detailed linkup operations to avoid friendly forces firing on each other. Coordination and planning of communications, recognition signals, fires, command relationships and responsibilities, and control measures are essential. Coordination should be done before the start of the operation.

(1) Site. The linkup site should be easy to recognize, have cover and concealment, be located away from prominent terrain the enemy might use, be defensible, and provide multiple access and escape routes. An alternate site should be planned in case of compromise.

(2) **Communications and recognition signals.** Frequencies, call signs, codes, visual signals, and alternates for each of these should be planned before departure of friendly lines. Radios may be used to report the location of each unit to the site, and occupation and securing of the site. A system of mutual recognition must be devised to keep friendly patrols

from firing on each other. This may include visual signals such as arm bands, panels, colored lights, or RSTA devices.

(3) **Fires.** The headquarters directing the linkup sets up fire control measures and priority of fires. The most commonly used control measure is the restrictive fire line (RFL), beyond which one force may not fire without coordination with another force. The RFL may be adjusted as two units draw closer together. Such an adjustment needs close coordination and should be planned before the operation. Successive phase lines between the two units can serve as on-order RFLS, provided that neither unit comes too close to the RFL before it is shifted.

(4) **Command relationships and responsibilities.** These are set up by the headquarters directing the linkup. Ideally, liaison personnel are exchanged before the operation. The key to success is liaison and guides.

b. **Execution.** Each member of the ranger force must understand the plan. Rehearsals are necessary in order to avoid confusion during the linkup. One uninformed ranger can start firing and cause enough confusion that friendly forces could be identified as enemy. Actions must be quick since units are open to enemy attack while they try to link up.

(1) **Moving units.** A linkup between moving units is hard. As the units move closer to each other, the chance of them engaging one another increases. Therefore, the linkup units must adjust their movements to each other and continuously coordinate on a designated secure radio net. If possible, one or both units should come to a short halt before linkup.

(2) **Stationary units.** Moving units must know the positions of the stationary units. They must keep stationary units advised of locations. Stationary units guide the moving units to the linkup point by radio. The stationary units must be ready to accept and position the moving units smoothly and quickly.

6-8. Passage of lines.

A passage of lines is an operation in which one unit moves through another unit that is stationary and disposed in a tactical formation on a FEBA. Ranger forces may conduct a passage of lines to get behind the enemy. Movement in forward unit areas must be controlled, coordinated, and kept to a minimum. This avoids conflict with friendly troops or the activation of RSTA devices. Ranger units treat the positions of forward units as danger areas. They must be assumed to be under enemy surveillance in all weather or visibility. The ranger force is open to attack during the passage. Personnel and units may be more concentrated than is desired. Fires of the stationary unit may be masked for a limited time. The passing ranger unit may not be in a good position to react to enemy contact. Detailed reconnaissance and coordination are crucial to ensure that the passage is conducted quickly and smoothly.

a. **Principles.**

(1) **Coordination.** The ranger force commander, or his representative, must coordinate departure and reentry of friendly front lines (FFL). This is done either directly with the units through which the rangers pass or through designated staff agencies. Items to be coordinated include fire support, passage lanes, control measures, guides, communications, intelligence, CSS, and actions on enemy contact.

(2) **Reconnaissance.** The ranger force commander should make a ground reconnaissance of the area through which the unit will pass. He should pick the initial rally point (IRP) at this time. The reconnaissance should include observing the area just forward of the friendly unit for routes, danger areas, and obstacles. During reconnaissance or coordination, rangers should wear the same uniform as the troops in the forward unit. This will avoid attracting the enemy's attention.

(3) **Security.** Maintain security to avoid contact with the enemy while departing or reentering. It is important that the ranger force make no enemy contact at this time. Control is hard if a fire fight starts just forward of an FFL.

b. **Departure of friendly front lines.**

(1) Designate an IRP.

(2) Maintain security. Use an appropriate movement formation when departing the FFL.

(3) Do not move within the friendly unit's area without a guide.

(4) Make final coordination with the friendly unit commander.

(5) Count the ranger force members as they depart.

(6) Make a security and listening halt.

c. **Departure of friendly units.**

(1) The ranger force arrives at the forward unit and is met by a guide. The guide leads the rangers to an assembly area chosen by the ranger commander during initial coordination with the forward unit commander.

(2) No one should move, either singly or as a unit, anywhere in the FFL without a guide.

(3) The ranger commander makes final coordination with the forward unit commander. He determines if any changes have taken place since initial coordination and learns of any recent enemy activity.

(4) Before leaving to coordinate, the ranger commander gives instructions (called a contingency plan) for what should be done while he is gone. These instructions state where he is going, who is going with him, how long he will be gone, what to do if he does not return, and actions to be taken if there is enemy contact.

(5) On the commander's return from final coordination, he may issue a

fragmentary order (FRAGO) to cover any changes.

(6) Three common threats and techniques for countering them during departure from the FFL are:

(a) **Ambush and chance contact.**

- The ranger force commander must avoid enemy contact while departing.
- The ranger force goes to the friendly side of the departure point where a point team is dispatched to see that the area forward of the barriers is clear.
- The point element should check the area out to the first covered position or an area large enough to allow the unit room to maneuver if it is hit while departing.
- The distance varies with the size of the ranger force and the terrain.
- The point team notifies the ranger commander when the area is clear. The rest of the unit is brought forward.

(b) **Indirect fire.** If enemy indirect fire is falling, the ranger commander should not halt his unit after final coordination at the forward command post. Instead, he should move it quickly through the FFL. The point element should be far enough ahead of the main body to provide security from ambush or chance contact.

(c) **RSTA.** If the enemy has radar, sensors, or night vision devices, they may be offset by the following countermeasures:

- Use a well-hidden departure point, such as a reverse slope or a dense woods.
- Infiltrate the unit through the departure area and have the rangers rendezvous in a defilade.
- Pass through during rain, fog, snow, or darkness to help conceal the passage.
- Employ electronic countermeasures.

(7) Have a security and listening halt after the ranger force has moved out of sight and sound of the FFL. This is a short halt to see if enemy is in the area, and to accustom the unit to the sights and sounds of the battlefield. Halt in a position that covers the unit from chance friendly small-arms fire. If the security and listening halt must be in an exposed position, have each man lie flat on the ground.

(8) During movement, have frequent halts to see that the unit is not being followed and that no enemy is in the area.

d. **Reentry of friendly front lines.**

(1) Set up and occupy a reentry rally point (RRP).

(2) Maintain security at the RRP and at the reentry point.

(3) Use as few personnel as possible to locate the reentry point while the bulk of the unit remains in the RRP.

(4) Meet a guide at the reentry point. Normally, a forward-of FFL password is used since it may be overheard by enemy.

(5) Count the ranger force members to ensure no infiltrators follow the unit, especially during reduced visibility.

(6) Give the friendly unit commander a spot report, providing combat information of immediate tactical value.

e. **Reentry of friendly units.**

(1) The unit is moved into a rally point near the reentry point. This rally point should be on a prominent terrain feature where the ranger commander can pinpoint his location, with respect to the reentry point.

(2) The forward unit is alerted by radio that the ranger unit is ready to reenter. A code word is used for security and brevity. The code word must be acknowledged by the forward unit before the ranger force reconnoiters the reentry point. This shows that a guide has been sent to the reentry point and is waiting for the unit.

(3) If the ranger commander is certain of the reentry point location, he moves the entire unit directly to the reentry point. He has the point element coordinate the reentry.

(4) An effective method of locating the reentry point is through the use of a thermal imagery device. It detects the body beat of the reentry guide, even though he may be well camouflaged or his location masked by smoke. If ground surveillance radar is available, it can be used to vector the ranger unit to the reentry point.

(5) The reconnaissance party should never move parallel to friendly barriers or move around the wire. If the reentry point cannot be found by the initial reconnaissance or if the reconnaissance party finds only the barrier wire, the unit should notify higher headquarters and move to another rally point to wait until daylight. The unit should not stay in a rally point from which a radio transmission has been made.

(6) When the reentry point is found, the ranger commander can bring the unit forward. If the reentry point is easy to find, he can call by radio for the unit to come forward.

(7) The guide leads the unit through the barriers to the security position coordinated with the forward unit commander. The unit halts in the security position, remaining in movement formation. The ranger commander then gives a spot report to the forward unit commander. The ranger commander tells him anything of intelligence value or of immediate tactical use to the forward unit.

6-9. Reconnaissance platoon operations.

a. The reconnaissance platoon organic to the ranger regiment consists of a platoon leader, a senior reconnaissance sergeant, and three five-man reconnaissance teams that include a communications specialist in each team (see Appendix A). This platoon is responsible for short-duration reconnaissance of objectives for the ranger force commander. This reconnaissance is routinely in support of future strike or special light infantry operations. The teams can also be used by the ranger force commander to conduct deep target acquisition and designation, or to confirm or disprove information reported by other sources. Rarely will teams be used to attack enemy targets.

b. The reconnaissance teams of the ranger regiment do not replace (or perform the same reconnaissance tasks associated with) long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) units or long-range surveillance units (LRSUs) that may be organic to the corps or division. These units are organized, trained, and equipped for long-term passive surveillance and reconnaissance in enemy territory. The ranger reconnaissance teams are trained and organized to support the immediate intelligence-gathering needs of the ranger force commander. They are not to act as a human intelligence (HUMINT) collection asset for other operational headquarters.

c. The reconnaissance platoon headquarters trains, equips, and controls the employment of the three reconnaissance teams. It operates the communications stations needed to receive reports from deployed teams. In the absence of the S2, it debriefs team members upon extraction or exfiltration. It can provide one or more teams to support each ranger battalion on independent operations. The reconnaissance teams can--

(1) Infiltrate the objective area by parachute (HALO, HAHO, or static lines), helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft, SCUBA, small boat, foot, or other means.

(2) Remain undetected in the vicinity of the objective area up to five days.

(3) Perform reconnaissance operations employing a full range of night observation devices, infrared detection devices, unattended sensors, and photographic equipment.

(4) Perform demolition target analysis.

(5) Operate small watercraft and inflatable boats.

(6) Emplace unattended ground sensors, omni-directional navigational beacons, hand-emplaced expendable jammers, and electronic target designation devices.

(7) Collect combat information to satisfy priority information requirements and mission-essential elements of information. Teams report that information by use of long-range, secure, burst-transmission communications equipment.

(8) Perform DZ selection, marking and reception duties.

(9) Report objective area weather conditions.

(10) Perform highly selective, limited attacks or ambushes when so tasked.

(11) Link up with the main body of the ranger force in the objective area, or escape and evade the enemy in order to return to friendly lines.

(12) Act as part of the AAT during airborne operations.

d. There are many limits of the reconnaissance teams.

(1) Mobility is normally restricted to foot movement in the area of operations.

(2) Use of radio and other active electronic or optical devices makes the teams open to enemy detection.

(3) All supplies and equipment needed by the team must be carried on the initial insertion, since resupply increases the probability of detection by the enemy.

(4) Conduct of insertion and extraction operations deep in enemy-held territory is difficult due to the need for secrecy, timeliness, security, and accuracy of location.

(5) Medical treatment of team casualties is limited to individual first aid. Casualty evacuation is difficult unless linkup with the main ranger force has been achieved.

e. The training of reconnaissance team members parallels that given to all members of ranger units with emphasis on infiltration, communications, and reconnaissance skills. Extensive training is also given in survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) and advanced first aid. Training emphasis is placed on actions at the reconnaissance site. The reconnaissance teams must conduct their mission and remain unseen. Every team member is trained to consider the need for information balanced by the likelihood of detection. Detection by the enemy compromises future operations.

6-10. Reconnaissance planning.

a. Detailed planning ensures that the reconnaissance mission is successful. It is also vital to the survival of the reconnaissance team. This planning is conducted by the ranger force planning group assisted by elements of the JTF staff. The supporting air or naval commander, navigator, and electronic warfare officer may aid the ranger force staff in the planning.

b. Upon receipt of the mission, the team selected begins an intense preparatory phase at the REMAB or the ISB. There the team receives its initial mission briefing. The items covered allow the team to complete its detailed planning. The reconnaissance platoon leader reviews the team plan. He ensures compatibility and integration into the ranger force commander's plan for employment of the

main force. Staff specialists at ranger regiment and battalion--such as those concerned with intelligence, weather, or communications--provide help.

c. Planning for the use of reconnaissance teams is conducted within the framework of the ranger planning sequence for the entire mission. There are five planning considerations for the employment of reconnaissance teams:

(1) Operations security must be considered in all staff efforts to provide maximum protection for the reconnaissance teams. This includes intelligence, CE, logistics, administration, and maintenance. Operations security must be integrated throughout every ranger force operation. It consists of four main categories of security measures: signal security, physical security, information security, and deception. All are related and must be considered at the same time for each operation.

(2) Some missions may require rapid deployment to the operational area, thereby dictating the quickest method of insertion. However, others may depend on maintaining total secrecy, regardless of time.

(3) The transportation means selected for the delivery and recovery of the teams depends on the mission. This selection is also based on the abilities, limits, and availability of mission support platforms.

(4) The distance to and from the objective area must be considered, as well as the distance from the insertion point to the actual target. Reconnaissance teams can move great distances over rugged terrain. However, this movement does require time and limits the team's ability to carry bulky or sensitive equipment.

(5) Consideration must also be given to intelligence information available concerning the objective area which includes, but is not limited to--

(a) **Enemy situation.** The enemy threat--his abilities, disposition, security measures, detection, and air defense systems - affects the selection of the means for delivery or recovery.

(b) **Terrain.** Land formations must be considered in selecting the method of infiltration and exfiltration. Terrain affects the selection of altitudes, approach and exit routes, landing areas, drop zones, and beach landing sites. Air infiltration routes that provide terrain masking are desirable in static line parachute operations.

(c) **Weather.** Seasonal weather conditions affect team delivery and recovery. Factors to be considered are temperature, precipitation, visibility, clouds, and wind. If para-SCUBA techniques are used, high surface winds and their effect upon surf conditions or period of reduced visibility may preclude the use of parachutes, inflatable boats, or swimming as entry or recovery techniques. These same conditions favor land infiltration and exfiltration, The AWADS reduces the impact of visibility as a limiting factor for air infiltrations.

(d) **Astronomical conditions.** Periods of sunrise and sunset, moon phase, moonrise and moonset, and twilight must be considered.

d. A reconnaissance team mission must be specific and support the mission. Information concerning the target may not be gathered because the risk of detection by the enemy is so great. Detection may preclude the conduct of the planned operation. If more than one mission is assigned, priorities are set, All team missions must be coordinated to avoid other friendly forces operating near the target. Ranger forces conduct operations at such depth behind enemy lines that no other US or allied forces are normally present. There is a chance that a friendly indigenous guerrilla force may be operating near the objective, but ranger reconnaissance teams do not normally make contact with them.

e. The reconnaissance platoon leader joins with the intelligence and operations sections of the ranger force headquarters in the initial planning for reconnaissance team operations. The method of operation while moving, communication procedures, reporting, surveillance procedures, and actions on enemy contact should be included in the platoon's SOPS.

f. The ranger force intelligence officer normally prepares the reconnaissance plan IAW the guidance provided by the controlling headquarters. He is helped by the operations officer and the reconnaissance platoon leader. Selected team members and a member of the unit providing the insertion and extraction means are briefed on the mission early in the planning phase. They should participate in the detailed planning to follow. The essential details of a reconnaissance plan normally include--

(1) Areas to be observed and recommended areas or positions from which this can be done. These positions are determined in advance of the insertions of teams. They are based on a study of terrain, road and rail nets, enemy order of battle, delivery means, operations plans of the controlling headquarters, and the desires of the ranger force commander.

(2) Load plans and procedures. This includes both insertion and extraction. Alternate sites are chosen for possible use. Primary and alternate DZs are selected, if applicable.

(3) The flight plan. This includes insertion and extraction flight routes and alternate routes.

(4) The movement plan to and from a patrol base. This includes the times, routes,. and destinations when individuals or small groups are required to operate away from the patrol base.

(5) The fire support plan. This includes the location and times of planned air strikes in support of the main body, and all planned fires by the main assault force. The reconnaissance teams should know the frequencies and call signs for tactical air support.

(6) The timing and ground tactical plan for execution of the main force operation. This includes disposition of the main force, special mission teams from the ranger force, or any other special operations force

elements.

(7) The communications plan. This includes frequencies, reporting schedule, emergency reporting procedures, and alternate communications plans. It also includes the ground-to-air communications plan and the friendly recognition signal to be used during linkup with the main assault force or other friendly forces.

(8) Plans for use of technical specialists or special equipment.

(9) The plan for the treatment and evacuation of sick or wounded team members from the objective area.

(10) The E&E plan. This includes routes out of the objective area, passwords, and alternate extraction zones or methods far from the objective area.

(11) Mission-specific elements of information desired by the ranger force commander, and any special or on-order missions the team must conduct.

g. The team leader uses specific steps in planning, preparing, and executing missions. These procedures are comprehensive, yet adaptable to any situation. Three of the most important steps are:

(1) **Issuance of warning order.** This action gives the team maximum time to prepare for the mission. It should be issued as soon as the team leader has been notified of a mission and updated after he has made his tentative plan.

(2) **Issuance of OPORD.** The team leader conveys the information and instructions needed to accomplish the mission. He requires a briefback from each team member.

(3) **Rehearsals.**

h. The specific steps used when planning missions are as follows:

Step 1. Study the mission.

Step 2. Plan use of time.

Step 3. Issue initial warning order.

Step 4. Study terrain and situation.

Step 5. Make tentative plan.

Step 6. Organize.

Step 7. Update warning order.

Step 8. Coordinate (continuous throughout).

Step 9. Consult aerial photographs and map updates.

Step 10. Complete detailed plan. (To be combined with paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the operation order.)

Step 11. Issue operation order.

Step 12. Supervise (throughout), inspect, rehearse.

Step 13. Execute mission.

i. A workable E&E plan must be developed. Such a plan enhances the survival of the reconnaissance team members. It ensures that they are psychologically prepared to conduct the mission, by knowing there is a system and plan for returning them to friendly lines. The E&E plan must include a section describing the actions of the reconnaissance team members should their insertion craft be disabled en route to the objective area. It should also include what to do if the team is unable to link up with the main ranger force, or if the main ranger force has not been inserted into the objective area.

j. Rehearsals and briefbacks are best for finding flaws in procedures or planning. Thorough coordination of all procedures is essential. The exact type of aircraft or other means that will be used for insertion should be used for training. Rehearsals should be conducted under terrain, astronomical, hydrographical, and meteorological conditions close to those to be met on the operation. The team leader conducts a briefback with the platoon leader. This lets the platoon leader decide if the team is ready for the mission. It also allows him to make changes.

6-11. Execution of insertion.

a. Reconnaissance teams normally conduct blind insertions. Blind insertions are amphibious, heliborne, or parachute drops onto unmarked DZs without help from a DZ-marking party or a CCT. Blind insertions often depend on favorable light and weather conditions in the objective area. Favorable conditions for the reconnaissance team often means low-lying cloud cover, fog, and darkness. The teams are able to operate during reduced visibility by the extensive use of night observation devices. The team's extensive training and high level of land navigation skills allow it to quickly traverse rugged terrain and not be detected.

b. Team insertion into the objective area often needs a cover and deception plan. Team members can conduct HALO and HAHO operations. Teams can be inserted into areas not normally acceptable as a DZ for conventionally trained parachutists. By the use of HAHO techniques, reconnaissance teams can assemble in the air and glide to a landing at a location far from the drop point.

c. If reconnaissance teams need special or bulky equipment that cannot be carried on the individual team member, it can be airdropped, hidden near the DZ, and retrieved later. Such container drops are often used during low-level static line insertions. The high-altitude airdrop resupply system (HAARS) can be used to deliver such items at the same time as reconnaissance teams are inserted by HALO.

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* FM 22-100

FIELD MANUAL
No. 22-100

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 31 August 1999

FM 22-100

ARMY LEADERSHIP
BE, KNOW, DO

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1. "The Alabamians drove the Maine men from their positions five times. Five times they fought their way back again. At some places the muzzles of the opposing guns almost touched. "
2. "The edge of the conflict swayed to and fro," Chamberlain said [later], "with wild whirlpools and eddies. At times I saw around me more of the enemy than of my own men, gaps opening, swallowing, closing again; squads of stalwart men who had cut their way through us, disappearing as if translated. All around, a strange, mingled roar."
3. "A third of Chamberlain's men fell; 130 out of 386."
4. "COL Oates recalled, "I again ordered the advance...waving my hands, shouting, "Forward men, to the ledge! and was promptly followed by the command in splendid style."
5. "Disease was the chief killer in the [American Civil} war. Two soldiers died of it for every one killed in battle...In one year, 995 of every thousand men in the Union army contracted diarrhea and dysentry."

The intended use is not academic. It will be published in an Army field manual which is to be published in 300,000 copies and distributed throughout the Army as a training publication.

The anticipated final approval date is late December. We would appreciate any help you can give us in meeting this Army deadline.

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Preface

The Army consists of the active component, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Department of the Army (DA) civilians. It's the world's premier land combat force—a full-spectrum force trained and ready to answer the nation's call. The Army's foundation is confident and competent leaders of character. This manual is addressed to them and to those who train and develop them.

PURPOSE

FM 22-100 is a single-source reference for all Army leaders. Its purpose is threefold:

- To provide leadership doctrine for meeting mission requirements under all conditions.
- To establish a unified leadership theory for all Army leaders: military and civilian, active and reserve, officer and enlisted.
- To provide a comprehensive and adaptable leadership resource for the Army of the 21st century.

As the capstone leadership manual for the Army, FM 22-100 establishes the Army's leadership doctrine, the fundamental principles by which Army leaders act to accomplish the mission and take care of their people. The doctrine discusses how Army values form the basis of character. In addition, it links a suite of instruments, publications, and initiatives that the Army uses to develop leaders. Among these are—

- AR 600-100, which establishes the basis for leader development doctrine and training.
- DA Pam 350-58, which describes the Army's leader development model.
- DA Pam 600-3, which discusses qualification criteria and outlines development and career management programs for commissioned officers.
- DA Pam 600-11, which discusses qualification criteria and outlines development and career management programs for warrant officers.
- DA Pam 600-25, which discusses noncommissioned officer (NCO) career development.
- DA Pam 690-46, which discusses mentoring of DA civilians.
- The TRADOC Common Core, which lists tasks that military and DA civilian leaders must perform and establishes who is responsible for training leaders to perform them.
- Officer, NCO, and DA civilian evaluation reports.

FM 22-100 also serves as the basis for future leadership and leader development initiatives associated

with the three pillars of the Army's leader development model. Specifically, FM 22-100 serves as—

- The basis for leadership assessment.
- The basis for developmental counseling and leader development.
- The basis for leadership evaluation.
- A reference for leadership development in operational assignments.
- A guide for institutional instruction at proponent schools.
- A resource for individual leaders' self-development goals and initiatives.

FM 22-100 directly supports the Army's keystone manuals, FM 100-1 and FM 100-5, which describe the Army and its missions. It contains principles all Army leaders use when they apply the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures established in the following types of doctrinal publications:

- Combined arms publications, which describe the tactics and techniques of combined arms forces.
- Proponency publications, which describe doctrinal principles, tactics, techniques, and collective training tasks for branch-oriented or functional units.
- Employment procedure publications, which address the operation, employment, and maintenance of specific systems.
- Soldier publications, which address soldier duties.
- Reference publications, which focus on procedures (as opposed to doctrine, tactics, or techniques) for managing training, operating in special environments or against specific threats, providing leadership, and performing fundamental tasks.

This edition of FM 22-100 establishes a unified leadership theory for all Army leaders based on the Army leadership framework and three leadership levels. Specifically, it—

- Defines and discusses Army values and leader attributes.
- Discusses character-based leadership.
- Establishes leader attributes as part of character.
- Focuses on improving people and organizations for the long term.
- Outlines three levels of leadership—direct, organizational, and strategic.
- Identifies four skill domains that apply at all levels.
- Specifies leadership actions for each level.

The Army leadership framework brings together many existing leadership concepts by establishing leadership dimensions and showing how they relate to each other. Solidly based on BE, KNOW, DO—that is, character, competence, and action—the Army leadership framework provides a single instrument for leader development. Individuals can use it for self-development. Leaders can use it to develop subordinates. Commanders can use it to focus their programs. By establishing leadership dimensions grouped under the skill domains of values, attributes, skills, and actions, the Army leadership framework provides a simple way to think about and discuss leadership.

The Army is a values-based institution. FM 22-100 establishes and clarifies those values. Army leaders must set high standards, lead by example, do what is legally and morally right, and influence

other people to do the same. They must establish and sustain a climate that ensures people are treated with dignity and respect and create an environment in which people are challenged and motivated to be all they can be. FM 22-100 discusses these aspects of leadership and how they contribute to developing leaders of character and competence. These are the leaders who make the Army a trained and ready force prepared to fight and win the nation's wars.

The three leadership levels—direct, organizational, and strategic—reflect the different challenges facing leaders as they move into positions of increasing responsibility. Direct leaders lead face to face: they are the Army's first-line leaders. Organizational leaders lead large organizations, usually brigade-sized and larger. Strategic leaders are the Army's most senior leaders. They lead at the major command and national levels.

Unlike previous editions of FM 22-100—which focused exclusively on leadership by uniformed leaders at battalion level and below—this edition addresses leadership at all levels and is addressed to all Army leaders, military and DA civilian. It supersedes four publications—FM 22-101, *Leadership Counseling*; FM 22-102, *Soldier Team Development*; FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*; and DA Pam 600-80 *Executive Leadership*—as well as the previous edition of FM 22-100. A comprehensive reference, this manual shows how leader skills, actions, and concerns at the different levels are linked and allows direct leaders to read about issues that affect organizational and strategic leaders. This information can assist leaders serving in positions supporting organizational and strategic leaders and to other leaders who must work with members of organizational- and strategic-level staffs.

FM 22-100 emphasizes self-development and development of subordinates. It includes performance indicators to help leaders assess the values, attributes, skills, and actions that the rest of the manual discusses. It discusses developmental counseling, a skill all Army leaders must perfect so they can mentor their subordinates and leave their organization and people better than they found them. FM 22-100 prescribes DA Form 4856-E (Developmental Counseling Form), which supersedes DA Form 4856 (General Counseling Form). DA Form 4856-E is designed to support leader development. Its format follows the counseling steps outlined in Appendix C.

FM 22-100 offers a framework for how to lead and provides points for Army leaders to consider when assessing and developing themselves, their people, and their organizations. It doesn't presume to tell Army leaders exactly how they should lead every step of the way. They must be themselves and apply this leadership doctrine as appropriate to the situations they face.

SCOPE

FM 22-100 is divided into three parts. Part I (Chapters 1, 2, and 3) discusses leadership aspects common to all Army leaders. Part II (Chapters 4 and 5) addresses the skills and actions required of direct leaders. Part III (Chapters 6 and 7) discusses the skills and actions required of organizational and strategic leaders. The manual also includes six appendixes.

Chapter 1 defines Army leadership, establishes the Army leadership framework, and describes the

three Army leadership levels. It addresses the characteristics of an Army leader (BE, KNOW, DO), the importance of being a good subordinate, and how all Army leaders lead other leaders. Chapter 1 concludes with a discussion of moral and collective excellence.

Chapter 2 examines character, competence, and leadership—what an Army leader must BE, KNOW, and DO. The chapter addresses character in terms of Army values and leader attributes. In addition, it describes character development and how character is related to ethics, orders—to include illegal orders—and beliefs. Chapter 2 concludes by introducing the categories of leader skills—interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical—and the categories of leader actions—influencing, operating, and improving.

Chapter 3 covers the human dimension of leadership. The chapter begins by discussing discipline, morale, and care of subordinates. It then addresses stress, both combat- and change-related. Discussions of organizational climate, institutional culture, and leadership styles follow. Chapter 3 concludes by examining intended and unintended consequences of decisions and leader actions.

Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the skills and actions required of direct leaders. The skills and actions are grouped under the categories introduced at the end of Chapter 2.

Chapters 6 and 7 provide an overview of the skills and actions required of organizational and strategic leaders. These chapters introduce direct leaders to the concerns faced by leaders and staffs operating at the organizational and strategic levels. Like Chapters 4 and 5, Chapters 6 and 7 group skills and actions under the categories introduced in Chapter 2.

Appendix A outlines the roles and relationships of commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned officers. It includes discussions of authority, responsibility, the chain of command, the NCO support channel, and DA civilian support.

Appendix B lists performance indicators for Army values and leader attributes, skills, and actions. It provides general examples of what Army leaders must BE, KNOW, and DO.

Appendix C addresses developmental counseling in detail. It begins with a discussion of the characteristics of a good counselor, the skills a counselor requires, and the limitations leaders face when they counsel subordinates. The appendix then examines the types of developmental counseling, counseling approaches, and counseling techniques. Appendix C concludes by describing the counseling process and explaining how to use DA Form 4856-E, the Developmental Counseling Form.

Appendix D explains how to prepare a leader plan of action and provides an example of a direct leader preparing a leader plan of action based on information gathered using an ethical climate assessment survey (ECAS). The example explains how to conduct an ECAS.

Appendix E discusses how Army values contribute to character development and the importance of

developing the character of subordinates.

Appendix F contains a copy of the Constitution of the United States. All members of the Army take an oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States." It is included so it will be immediately available for Army leaders.

APPLICABILITY

FM 22-100's primary audience is direct leaders, military leaders serving at battalion level and below and DA civilian leaders in comparable organizations. However, FM 22-100 contains doctrine applicable at all leadership levels, to all military and DA civilian leaders of the Army.

The proponent of this publication is Headquarters (HQ), TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Center for Army Leadership, ATTN: ATZL-SWC, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2300.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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PART ONE

The Leader, Leadership, and the Human Dimension

There are two reasons why leadership is important to you and to the Army. The first was expressed eloquently by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in a 1962 speech. GA MacArthur spoke about what he had learned about soldiering and service in a career that spanned more than fifty years and two world wars. He distilled the lessons gathered from "twenty campaigns, on a hundred battlefields, around a thousand campfires" into a few words that are as true now as they ever were:

> *[Y]our mission…is to win our wars…[Y]ou are the ones who are trained to fight. Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory; that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed....*

Make no mistake about it. GA MacArthur is speaking to you as you sit in your classroom, as you read this in the dayroom or the motor pool or at the kitchen table. You are the Army's leaders, and on your shoulders rests this mission: win our wars. The desire to accomplish that mission despite all adversity is called the *warrior ethos* and makes the profession of arms different from all other professions. That ethos applies to all soldiers, not just those whose job it is to find, fight, and defeat the enemy. You'll read more about it in Chapter 2.

If that were not enough, there is a second reason you must strive to become the very best leader you can be: your people deserve nothing less. When you took your oath, when you agreed to be a leader, you entered into a pact with your subordinates and your nation. America has entrusted you with its most precious resource, its young people. Every person serving with you is someone's son or someone's daughter, a brother, mother, sister, father. They are capable of extraordinary feats of courage and sacrifice—as they have proven on GA MacArthur's hundred battlefields and on every battlefield since then. They are also capable of great patience and persistence and tremendous loyalty, as they show every day in thousands of orderly rooms and offices, in tank parks and on firing ranges around the world. They show up and they do the work, no matter how frightening, no matter how boring, no matter how risky or bloody or exhausting. And what they ask in return is competent leadership.

> *The most precious commodity with which the Army deals is the individual soldier who is the heart and soul of our combat forces.*

General J. Lawton Collins
VII Corps Commander, World War II

You have been entrusted with a great responsibility. How do you prepare yourself? How do you learn and embrace those values and skills that will enable you to meet the challenge?

This manual is a tool to help you answer these questions, to begin or continue becoming a leader of character and competence, an Army leader. Chapter 1 starts with an overview of what the Army requires of you as an Army leader. This is the Army leadership framework; it forms the structure of the Army's leadership doctrine. Chapter 1 also discusses the three levels of Army leadership: direct, organizational, and strategic. Chapter 2 discusses character, competence, and leadership—what you must BE, KNOW, and DO as an Army leader. Chapter 3 talks about the human dimension, the many factors that affect the people and teams that you lead and the institution of which you and they are a part.

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CHAPTER 1

The Army Leadership Framework

Just as the diamond requires three properties for its formation—carbon, heat, and pressure—successful leaders require the interaction of three properties—character, knowledge, and application. Like carbon to the diamond, character is the basic quality of the leader. But as carbon alone does not create a diamond, neither can character alone create a leader. The diamond needs heat. Man needs knowledge, study, and preparation. The third property, pressure—acting in conjunction with carbon and heat—forms the diamond. Similarly, one's character, attended by knowledge, blooms through application to produce a leader.

General Edward C. Meyer
Former Army Chief of Staff

1-1. The Army's ultimate responsibility is to win the nation's wars. For you as an Army leader, leadership in combat is your primary mission and most important challenge. To meet this challenge, you must develop character and competence while achieving excellence. This manual is about leadership. It focuses on character, competence, and excellence. It's about accomplishing the mission and taking care of people. It's about living up to your ultimate responsibility, leading your soldiers in combat and winning our nation's wars.

1-2. Figure 1-1 shows the Army leadership framework. The top of the figure shows the four categories of things leaders must BE, KNOW, and DO. The bottom of the figure lists dimensions of Army leadership, grouped under these four categories. The dimensions consist of Army values and subcategories under attributes, skills, and actions.

1-3. Leadership starts at the top, with the character of the leader, with your character. In order to lead others, you must first make sure your own house is in order. For example, the first line of *The Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer* states, "No one is more professional than I." But it takes a remarkable person to move from memorizing a creed to actually living that creed; a true leader *is* that remarkable person.

1-4. Army leadership begins with what the leader must BE, the values and attributes

that shape a leader's character. It may be helpful to think of these as internal qualities: you possess them all the time, alone and with others. They define who you are; they give you a solid footing. These values and attributes are the same for all leaders, regardless of position, although you certainly refine your understanding of them as you become more experienced and assume positions of greater responsibility. For example, a sergeant major with combat experience has a deeper understanding of selfless service and personal courage than a new soldier does.



Leaders of character and competence act to achieve excellence by developing a force that can

fight and win the nation's wars and serve the common defense of the United States.

Figure 1-1. The Army Leadership Framework

1-5. Your skills are those things you KNOW how to do, your competence in everything from the technical side of your job to the people skills a leader requires. The skill categories of the Army leadership framework apply to all leaders. However, as you assume positions of greater responsibility, you must master additional skills in each category. Army leadership positions fall into three levels: direct, organizational, and strategic. These levels are described later in this chapter. Chapters 4, 6, and 7 describe the skills leaders at each level require.

1-6. But character and knowledge—while absolutely necessary—are not enough. You cannot be effective, you cannot be a leader, until you apply what you know, until you act and DO what you must. As with skills, you will learn more leadership actions as you serve in different positions. Because actions are the essence of leadership, the discussion begins with them.

LEADERSHIP DEFINED

Leadership is **influencing** people—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—while **operating** to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.

INFLUENCING

1-7. Influencing means getting people to do what you want them to do. It is the means or method to achieve two ends: operating and improving. But there's more to influencing than simply passing along orders. The example you set is just as important as the words you speak. And you set an example—good or bad—with every action you take and word you utter, on or off duty. Through your words and example, you must communicate purpose, direction, and motivation.

Purpose

1-8. Purpose gives people a reason to do things. This does not mean that as a leader you must explain every decision to the satisfaction of your subordinates. It does mean you must earn their trust: they must know from experience that you care about them and would not ask them to do something—particularly something dangerous—unless there was a good reason, unless the task was essential to mission accomplishment.

1-9. Look, for example, at a battalion maintenance section. Its motor sergeant always takes the time—and has the patience—to explain to the mechanics what is required of

them. Nothing fancy; the motor sergeant usually just calls them together for a few minutes to talk about the workload and the time crunch. The soldiers may get tired of hearing "And, of course, unless we get the work finished, this unit doesn't roll and the mission doesn't get done," but they know it's true. And every time he passes information this way, the motor sergeant sends this signal to the soldiers: that he cares about their time and work and what they think, that they are members of a team, not cogs in the "green machine."

1-10. Then one day the unit is alerted for an emergency deployment. Things are happening at breakneck speed; there is no time to pause, and everything and everyone is under stress. The motor sergeant cannot stop to explain things, pat people on the back, or talk them up. But the soldiers will work themselves to exhaustion, if need be, because the motor sergeant has earned their trust. They know and appreciate their leader's normal way of operating, and they will assume there is a good reason the leader is doing things differently this time. And should the deployment lead to a combat mission, the team will be better prepared to accomplish their mission under fire. Trust is a basic bond of leadership, and it must be developed over time.

Direction

1-11. When providing direction, you communicate the way you want the mission accomplished. You prioritize tasks, assign responsibility for completing them (delegating authority when necessary), and make sure your people understand the standard. In short, you figure out how to get the work done right with the available people, time, and other resources; then you communicate that information to your subordinates: "We'll do these things first. You people work here; you people work there." As you think the job through, you can better aim your effort and resources at the right targets.

1-12. People want direction. They want to be given challenging tasks, training in how to accomplish them, and the resources necessary to do them well. Then they want to be left alone to do the job.

Motivation

1-13. Motivation gives subordinates the will to do everything they can to accomplish a mission. It results in their acting on their own initiative when they see something needs to be done.

1-14. To motivate your people, give them missions that challenge them. After all, they did not join the Army to be bored. Get to know your people and their capabilities; that way you can tell just how far to push each one. Give them as much responsibility as they can handle; then let them do the work without looking over their shoulders and nagging them. When they succeed, praise them. When they fall short, give them credit for what they have done and coach or counsel them on how to do better next time.

1-15. People who are trained this way will accomplish the mission, even when no one is watching. They will work harder than they thought they could. And when their leader notices and gives them credit (with something more than the offhand comment "good job"), they will be ready to take on even more next time.

1-16. But Army leaders motivate their people by more than words. The example you set is at least as important as what you say and how well you manage the work. As the unit prepares for the rollout, the motor sergeant you just read about is in the motor pool with the mechanics on Friday night and Saturday morning. If his people are working in the rain, the NCO's uniform will be wet too. If they have missed breakfast, the leader's stomach will be growling just as loudly. The best leaders lead from the front. Don't underestimate the importance of being where the action is.

OPERATING

1-17. Actions taken to influence others serve to accomplish operating actions, those actions you take to achieve the short-term goal of accomplishing the mission. The motor sergeant will make sure the vehicles roll out, on time and combat ready, through planning and preparing (laying out the work and making the necessary arrangements), executing (doing the job), and assessing (learning how to work smarter next time). The motor sergeant provides an example of how direct leaders perform operating actions. All leaders execute these operating actions, which become more complex as they assume positions of increasing responsibility.

IMPROVING

1-18. The motor sergeant's job is not complete when the last vehicle clears the gate. While getting the job done is key, the Army also expects him to do far more than just accomplish the day's work. Army leaders also strive to improve everything entrusted to them: their people, facilities, equipment, training, and resources. There will be a new mission, of course, but part of finishing the old one is improving the organization.

1-19. After checking to be sure the tools are repaired, cleaned, accounted for, and put away, the motor sergeant conducts an informal after-action review (AAR) with the section. (An AAR is a professional discussion of an event, focused on performance standards, that allows participants to discover for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve on weaknesses. Chapter 5 discusses AARs.) The motor sergeant is self-confident enough to ask subordinates for their ideas on how to make things work better (always a key goal). He then acts based on his own and team members' observations. The motor sergeant looks for strong areas to sustain and praises team members as appropriate; however if the motor sergeant saw the team members spend too much time on some tasks and not enough on others, he changes the section standing operating procedures (SOP) or counsels the people involved. (Developmental counseling is not an adverse action; it is a skill you use to

help your subordinates become better team members, improve performance, and prepare for the future. Counseling should address strong areas as well as weak ones and successes as well as failures. Appendix C discusses developmental counseling.) If the motor sergeant discovers gaps in individual or collective skills, he plans and conducts the training necessary to fill them. If something the motor sergeant did or a decision he made didn't turn out quite right, he will not make the same error again. More than that, the motor sergeant lets his people know what went wrong, finds out their impressions of why it happened, and determines how they will make it work next time.

1-20. By doing these things, the motor sergeant is creating a better organization, one that will work smarter the next time. His example sends an important message. The soldiers see their leader look at his own and the organization's performance, evaluate it, identify strong areas to sustain as well as mistakes and shortcomings, and commit to a better way of doing things. These actions are more powerful than any lecture on leadership.

BE, KNOW, DO

1-21. BE, KNOW, DO clearly and concisely state the characteristics of an Army leader. You have just read about leader actions, the DO of BE, KNOW, DO. Leadership is about taking action, but there's more to being a leader than just what you do. Character and competence, the BE and the KNOW, underlie everything a leader does. So becoming a leader involves developing all aspects of yourself. This includes adopting and living Army values. It means developing the attributes and learning the skills of an Army leader. Only by this self-development will you become a confident and competent leader of character. Being an Army leader is not easy. There are no cookie-cutter solutions to leadership challenges, and there are no shortcuts to success. However, the tools are available to every leader. It is up to you to master and use them.

BE

1-22. Character describes a person's inner strength, the BE of BE, KNOW, DO. Your character helps you know what is right; more than that, it links that knowledge to action. Character gives you the courage to do what is right regardless of the circumstances or the consequences. (Appendix E discusses character development.)

1-23. You demonstrate character through your behavior. One of your key responsibilities as a leader is to teach Army values to your subordinates. The old saying that actions speak louder than words has never been more true than here. Leaders who talk about honor, loyalty, and selfless service but do not live these values—both on and off duty—send the wrong message, that this "values stuff" is all just talk.

1-24. Understanding Army values and leader attributes (which Chapter 2 discusses) is only the first step. You also must embrace Army values and develop leader attributes,

living them until they become habit. You must teach Army values to your subordinates through action and example and help them develop leader attributes in themselves.

KNOW

1-25. A leader must have a certain level of knowledge to be competent. That knowledge is spread across four skill domains. You must develop **interpersonal skills**, knowledge of your people and how to work with them. You must have **conceptual skills**, the ability to understand and apply the doctrine and other ideas required to do your job. You must learn **technical skills**, how to use your equipment. Finally, warrior leaders must master **tactical skills**, the ability to make the right decisions concerning employment of units in combat. Tactical skills include mastery of the art of tactics appropriate to the leader's level of responsibility and unit type. They're amplified by the other skills—interpersonal, conceptual, and technical—and are the most important skills for warfighters. (FM 100-40 discusses the art of tactics.)

1-26. Mastery of different skills in these domains is essential to the Army's success in peace and war. But a true leader is not satisfied with knowing only how to do what will get the organization through today; you must also be concerned about what it will need tomorrow. You must strive to master your job and prepare to take over your boss's job. In addition, as you move to jobs of increasing responsibility, you'll face new equipment, new ideas, and new ways of thinking and doing things. You must learn to apply all these to accomplish your mission.

1-27. Army schools teach you basic job skills, but they are only part of the learning picture. You'll learn even more on the job. Good leaders add to their knowledge and skills every day. True leaders seek out opportunities; they're always looking for ways to increase their professional knowledge and skills. Dedicated squad leaders jump at the chance to fill in as acting platoon sergeant, not because they've mastered the platoon sergeant's job but because they know the best place to learn about it is in the thick of the action. Those squad leaders challenge themselves and will learn through doing; what's more, with coaching, they'll learn as much from their mistakes as from their successes.

DO

1-28. You read about leader actions, the DO of Army leadership doctrine, at the beginning of this chapter. Leader actions include—

- **Influencing:** making decisions, communicating those decisions, and motivating people.
- **Operating:** the things you do to accomplish your organization's immediate mission.
- **Improving:** the things you do to increase the organization's capability to accomplish current or future missions.

1-29. Earlier in this chapter, you read about a motor sergeant who lives Army values, has developed leader attributes, and routinely performs leader actions. But that was an example, and a garrison example at that. What about reality? What about combat? Trained soldiers know what they are supposed to do, but under stress, their instincts might tell them to do something different. The exhausted, hungry, cold, wet, disoriented, and frightened soldier is more likely to do the wrong thing—stop moving, lie down, retreat—than one not under that kind of stress. This is when the leader must step in—when things are falling apart, when there seems to be no hope—and get the job done.

1-30. The fight between the 20th Regiment of Maine Volunteers and the 15th and 47th Regiments of Alabama Infantry during the Civil War illustrates what can happen when a leader acts decisively. It shows how the actions of one leader, in a situation that looked hopeless, not only saved his unit, but allowed the entire Union Army to maintain its position and defeat the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania. The story's hero is a colonel—but it could have been a captain, or a sergeant, or a corporal. At other times and in other places it has been.

COL Chamberlain at Gettysburg

In late June 1863 GEN Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia passed through western Maryland and invaded Pennsylvania. For five days, the Army of the Potomac hurried to get between the Confederates and the national capital. On 1 July the 20th Maine received word to press on to Gettysburg. The Union Army had engaged the Confederates there, and Union commanders were hurrying all available forces to the hills south of the little town.

The 20th Maine arrived at Gettysburg near midday on 2 July, after marching more than one hundred miles in five days. They had had only two hours sleep and no hot food during the previous 24 hours. The regiment was preparing to go into a defensive position as part of the brigade commanded by COL Strong Vincent when a staff officer rode up to COL Vincent and began gesturing towards a little hill at the extreme southern end of the Union line. The hill, Little Round Top, dominated the Union position and, at that moment, was unoccupied. If the Confederates placed artillery on it, they could force the entire Union Army to withdraw. The hill had been left unprotected through a series of mistakes—wrong assumptions, the failure to communicate clearly, and the failure to check—and the situation was critical.

Realizing the danger, COL Vincent ordered his brigade to occupy Little Round Top. He positioned the 20th Maine, commanded by COL Joshua L. Chamberlain, on his brigade's left flank, the extreme left of the Union line. COL Vincent told COL Chamberlain to "hold at all hazards."

On Little Round Top, COL Chamberlain told his company commanders the purpose and importance of their mission. He ordered the right flank company to tie in with the 83d

Pennsylvania and the left flank company to anchor on a large boulder. His thoughts turned to his left flank. There was nothing there except a small hollow and the rising slope of Big Round Top. The 20th Maine was literally at the end of the line.

COL Chamberlain then showed a skill common to good tactical leaders. He imagined threats to his unit, did what he could to guard against them, and considered what he would do to meet other possible threats. Since his left flank was open, COL Chamberlain sent B Company, commanded by CPT Walter G. Morrill, off to guard it and "act as the necessities of battle required." The captain positioned his men behind a stone wall that would face the flank of any Confederate advance. There, fourteen soldiers from the 2d US Sharpshooters, who had been separated from their unit, joined them.

The 20th Maine had been in position only a few minutes when the soldiers of the 15th and 47th Alabama attacked. The Confederates had also marched all night and were tired and thirsty. Even so, they attacked ferociously.

The Maine men held their ground, but then one of COL Chamberlain's officers reported seeing a large body of Confederate soldiers moving laterally behind the attacking force. COL Chamberlain climbed on a rock—exposing himself to enemy fire—and saw a Confederate unit moving around his exposed left flank. If they outflanked him, his unit would be pushed off its position and destroyed. He would have failed his mission.

COL Chamberlain had to think fast. The tactical manuals he had so diligently studied called for a maneuver that would not work on this terrain. The colonel had to create a new maneuver, one that his soldiers could execute, and execute now.

The 20th Maine was in a defensive line, two ranks deep. It was threatened by an attack around its left flank. So the colonel ordered his company commanders to stretch the line to the left and bend it back to form an angle, concealing the maneuver by keeping up a steady rate of fire. The corner of the angle would be the large boulder he had pointed out earlier. The sidestep maneuver was tricky, but it was a combination of other battle drills his soldiers knew. In spite of the terrible noise that made voice commands useless, in spite of the blinding smoke, the cries of the wounded, and the continuing Confederate attack, the Maine men were able to pull it off. Now COL Chamberlain's thin line was only one rank deep. His units, covering twice their normal frontage, were bent back into an L shape. Minutes after COL Chamberlain repositioned his force, the Confederate infantry, moving up what they thought was an open flank, were thrown back by the redeployed left wing of the 20th Maine. Surprised and angry, they nonetheless attacked again.

The Maine men rallied and held; the Confederates regrouped and attacked. "The Alabamians drove the Maine men from their positions five times. Five times they fought their way back again. At some places, the muzzles of the opposing guns almost touched." After these assaults, the Maine men were down to one or two rounds per man, and the determined Confederates were regrouping for another try. COL Chamberlain saw that he could not stay where he was and could not withdraw. So he decided to counterattack. His men would have the advantage of

attacking down the steep hill, he reasoned, and the Confederates would not be expecting it. Clearly he was risking his entire unit, but the fate of the Union Army depended on his men.

The decision left COL Chamberlain with another problem: there was nothing in the tactics book about how to get his unit from their L-shaped position into a line of advance. Under tremendous fire and in the midst of the battle, COL Chamberlain again called his commanders together. He explained that the regiment's left wing would swing around "like a barn door on a hinge" until it was even with the right wing. Then the entire regiment, bayonets fixed, would charge downhill, staying anchored to the 83d Pennsylvania on its right. The explanation was clear and the situation clearly desperate.

When COL Chamberlain gave the order, 1LT Holman Melcher of F Company leaped forward and led the left wing downhill toward the surprised Confederates. COL Chamberlain had positioned himself at the boulder at the center of the L. When the left wing was abreast of the right wing, he jumped off the rock and led the right wing down the hill. The entire regiment was now charging on line, swinging like a great barn door—just as its commander had intended.

The Alabama soldiers, stunned at the sight of the charging Union troops, fell back on the positions behind them. There the 20th Maine's charge might have failed if not for a surprise resulting from COL Chamberlain's foresight. Just then CPT Morrill's B Company and the sharpshooters opened fire on the Confederate flank and rear. The exhausted and shattered Alabama regiments thought they were surrounded. They broke and ran, not realizing that one more attack would have carried the hill.

The slopes of Little Round Top were littered with bodies. Saplings halfway up the hill had been sawed in half by weapons fire. A third of the 20th Maine had fallen, 130 men out of 386. Nonetheless, the farmers, woodsmen, and fishermen from Maine—under the command of a brave and creative leader who had anticipated enemy actions, improvised under fire, and applied disciplined initiative in the heat of battle—had fought through to victory.

1-31. COL Joshua Chamberlain was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions on 2 July 1863. After surviving terrible wounds at Petersburg, Virginia, he and his command were chosen to receive the surrender of Confederate units at Appomattox in April 1865. His actions there contributed to national reconciliation and are described in Chapter 7.

PUTTING IT TOGETHER

1-32. Study the Army leadership framework; it is the Army's common basis for thinking about leadership. With all the day-to-day tasks you must do, it's easy to get lost in particulars. The Army leadership framework is a tool that allows you to step back and think about leadership as a whole. It is a canopy that covers the hundreds of things you do every day. The Army leadership framework gives you the big picture and

can help you put your job, your people, and your organization in perspective.

1-33. The dimensions of the Army leadership framework shown in Figure 1-1—the values, attributes, skills, and actions that support BE, KNOW, and DO—each contain components. All are interrelated; none stands alone. For example, *will* is very important, as you saw in the case of COL Chamberlain. It's discussed in Chapter 2 under mental attributes. Yet will cannot stand by itself. Left unchecked and without moral boundaries, will can be dangerous. The case of Adolf Hitler shows this fact. Will misapplied can also produce disastrous results. Early in World War I, French forces attacked German machine gun positions across open fields, believing their élan (unit morale and will to win) would overcome a technologically advanced weapon. The cost in lives was catastrophic. Nevertheless, the will of leaders of character and competence—like the small unit leaders at Normandy that you'll read about later in this chapter—can make the difference between victory and defeat.

1-34. This is how you should think about the Army leadership framework: all its pieces work in combination to produce something bigger and better than the sum of the parts. BE the leader of character: embrace Army values and demonstrate leader attributes. Study and practice so that you have the skills to KNOW your job. Then act, DO what's right to achieve excellence.

1-35. The Army leadership framework applies to all Army leaders. However, as you assume positions of increasing responsibility, you'll need to develop additional attributes and master more skills and actions. Part of this knowledge includes understanding what your bosses are doing—the factors that affect their decisions and the environment in which they work. To help you do this, Army leadership positions are divided into three levels—direct, organizational, and strategic.

LEVELS OF LEADERSHIP

NCOs like to make a decision right away and move on to the next thing…so the higher up the flagpole you go, the more you have to learn a very different style of leadership.

Command Sergeant Major Douglas E. Murray
United States Army Reserve

Strategic Leadership Skills & Actions
Global/Regional National/ Societal Perspective
Organizational Leadership Skills & Actions
Organizational/Systems and Processes Perspective
Direct Leadership Skills & Actions
Individual/Small Group Task Oriented Perspective
Values and Attributes

Figure 1-2. Army Leadership Levels

1-36. Figure 1-2 shows the perspectives of the three levels of Army leadership: direct, organizational, and strategic. Factors that determine a position's leadership level can include the position's span of control, its headquarters level, and the extent of the influence the leader holding the position exerts. Other factors include the size of the unit or organization, the type of operations it conducts, the number of people assigned, and its planning horizon.

1-37. Sometimes the rank or grade of the leader holding a position does not indicate the position's leadership level. That's why Figure 1-2 does not show rank. A sergeant first class serving as a platoon sergeant works at the direct leadership level. If the same NCO holds a headquarters job dealing with issues and policy affecting a brigade-sized or larger organization, the NCO works at the organizational leadership level. However, if the NCO's primary duty is running a staff section that supports the leaders who run the organization, the NCO is a direct leader. In fact, most leadership positions are direct leadership positions, and every leader at every level acts as a direct leader when dealing with immediate subordinates.

1-38. The headquarters echelon alone doesn't determine a position's leadership level. Soldiers and DA civilians of all ranks and grades serve in strategic-level headquarters, but they are not all strategic-level leaders. The responsibilities of a duty position, together with the other factors paragraph 1-36 lists, determine its leadership level. For example, a DA civilian at a training area range control with a dozen subordinates works at the direct leadership level while a DA civilian deputy garrison commander with a span of influence over several thousand people works at the organizational leadership level. Most NCOs, company grade officers, field grade officers, and DA civilian leaders serve at the direct leadership level. Some senior NCOs, field grade

officers, and higher-grade DA civilians serve at the organizational leadership level. Most general officers and equivalent Senior Executive Service DA civilians serve at the organizational or strategic leadership levels.

DIRECT LEADERSHIP

1-39. Direct leadership is face-to-face, first-line leadership. It takes place in those organizations where subordinates are used to seeing their leaders all the time: teams and squads, sections and platoons, companies, batteries, and troops—even squadrons and battalions. The direct leader's span of influence, those whose lives he can reach out and touch, may range from a handful to several hundred people.

1-40. Direct leaders develop their subordinates one-on-one; however, they also influence their organization through their subordinates. For instance, a cavalry squadron commander is close enough to his soldiers to have a direct influence on them. They're used to seeing him regularly, even if it is only once a week in garrison; they expect to see him from time to time in the field. Still, during daily operations, the commander guides the organization primarily through his subordinate officers and NCOs.

1-41. For direct leaders there is more certainty and less complexity than for organizational and strategic leaders. Direct leaders are close enough to see—very quickly—how things work, how things don't work, and how to address any problems. (Chapter 4 discusses direct leader skills. Chapter 5 discusses direct leader actions.)

ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

1-42. Organizational leaders influence several hundred to several thousand people. They do this indirectly, generally through more levels of subordinates than do direct leaders. The additional levels of subordinates can make it more difficult for them to see results. Organizational leaders have staffs to help them lead their people and manage their organizations' resources. They establish policies and the organizational climate that support their subordinate leaders. (Chapter 3 introduces climate and culture and explains the role of direct leaders in setting the organizational climate. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the roles of organizational and strategic leaders in establishing and maintaining the organizational climate and institutional culture.)

1-43. Organizational leadership skills differ from direct leadership skills in degree, but not in kind. That is, the skill domains are the same, but organizational leaders must deal with more complexity, more people, greater uncertainty, and a greater number of unintended consequences. They find themselves influencing people more through policymaking and systems integration than through face-to-face contact.

1-44. Organizational leaders include military leaders at the brigade through corps

levels, military and DA civilian leaders at directorate through installation levels, and DA civilians at the assistant through undersecretary of the Army levels. They focus on planning and mission accomplishment over the next two to ten years.

1-45. Getting out of their offices and visiting the parts of their organizations where the work is done is especially important for organizational leaders. They must make time to get to the field to compare the reports their staff gives them with the actual conditions their people face and the perceptions of the organization and mission they hold. Because of their less-frequent presence among their soldiers and DA civilians, organizational leaders must use those visits they are able to make to assess how well the commander's intent is understood and to reinforce the organization's priorities.

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

1-46. Strategic leaders include military and DA civilian leaders at the major command through Department of Defense levels. Strategic leaders are responsible for large organizations and influence several thousand to hundreds of thousands of people. They establish force structure, allocate resources, communicate strategic vision, and prepare their commands and the Army as a whole for their future roles.

1-47. Strategic leaders work in an uncertain environment on highly complex problems that affect and are affected by events and organizations outside the Army. Actions of a theater commander in chief (CINC), for example, may even have an impact on global politics. (CINCs command combatant commands, very large, joint organizations assigned broad, continuing missions. Theater CINCs are assigned responsibilities for a geographic area (a theater); for example, the CINC of the US Central Command is responsible for most of southwestern Asia and part of eastern Africa. Functional CINCs are assigned responsibilities not bounded by geography; for example, the CINC of the US Transportation Command is responsible for providing integrated land, sea, and air transportation to all services. (JP 0-2, JP 3-0, and FM 100-7 discuss combatant commands.) Although civilian leaders make national policy, decisions a CINC makes while carrying out that policy may affect whether or not a national objective is achieved. Strategic leaders apply many of the same leadership skills and actions they mastered as direct and organizational leaders; however, strategic leadership requires others that are more complex and indirectly applied.

1-48. Strategic leaders concern themselves with the total environment in which the Army functions; their decisions take into account such things as congressional hearings, Army budgetary constraints, new systems acquisition, civilian programs, research, development, and interservice cooperation—just to name a few.

1-49. Strategic leaders, like direct and organizational leaders, process information quickly, assess alternatives based on incomplete data, make decisions, and generate support. However, strategic leaders' decisions affect more people, commit more resources, and have wider-ranging consequences in both space and time than do

decisions of organizational and direct leaders.

1-50. Strategic leaders often do not see their ideas come to fruition during their "watch"; their initiatives may take years to plan, prepare, and execute. In-process reviews (IPRs) might not even begin until after the leader has left the job. This has important implications for long-range planning. On the other hand, some strategic decisions may become a front-page headline of the next morning's newspaper. Strategic leaders have very few opportunities to visit the lowest-level organizations of their commands; thus, their sense of when and where to visit is crucial. Because they exert influence primarily through subordinates, strategic leaders must develop strong skills in picking and developing good ones. This is an important improving skill, which Chapter 7 discusses.

LEADERS OF LEADERS

More than anything else, I had confidence in my soldiers, junior leaders, and staff. They were trained, and I knew they would carry the fight to the enemy. I trusted them, and they knew I trusted them. I think in Just Cause, which was a company commander's war, being a decentralized commander paid big dividends because I wasn't in the knickers of my company commanders all the time. I gave them the mission and let them do it. I couldn't do it for them.

A Battalion Commander, Operation Just Cause
Panama, 1989

1-51. At any level, anyone responsible for supervising people or accomplishing a mission that involves other people is a leader. Anyone who influences others, motivating them to action or influencing their thinking or decision making, is a leader. It's not a function only of position; it's also a function of role. In addition, everyone in the Army—including every leader—fits somewhere in a chain of command. Everyone in the Army is also a follower or subordinate. There are, obviously, many leaders in an organization, and it's important to understand that you don't just lead subordinates—you lead other leaders. Even at the lowest level, you are a leader of leaders.

1-52. For example, a rifle company has four leadership levels: the company commander leads through platoon leaders, the platoon leaders through squad leaders, and the squad leaders through team leaders. At each level, the leader must let subordinate leaders do their jobs. Practicing this kind of decentralized execution based on mission orders in peacetime trains subordinates who will, in battle, exercise disciplined initiative in the absence of orders. They'll continue to fight when the radios are jammed, when the plan falls apart, when the enemy does something unexpected. (Appendix A discusses leader roles and relationships. FM 100-34 discusses mission orders and initiative.)

1-53. This decentralization does not mean that a commander never steps in and takes direct control. There will be times when a leader has to stop leading through

subordinates, step forward, and say, "Follow me!" A situation like this may occur in combat, when things are falling apart and, like BG Thomas J. Jackson, you'll need to "stand like a stone wall" and save victory. (You'll read about BG Jackson in Chapter 2.) Or it may occur during training, when a subordinate is about to make a mistake that could result in serious injury or death and you must act to prevent disaster.

1-54. More often, however, you should empower your subordinate leaders: give them a task, delegate the necessary authority, and let them do the work. Of course you need to check periodically. How else will you be able to critique, coach, and evaluate them? But the point is to "power down without powering off." Give your subordinate leaders the authority they need to get the job done. Then check on them frequently enough to keep track of what is going on but not so often that you get in their way. You can develop this skill through experience.

1-55. It takes personal courage to operate this way. But a leader must let subordinate leaders learn by doing. Is there a risk that, for instance, a squad leader—especially an inexperienced one—will make mistakes? Of course there is. But if your subordinate leaders are to grow, you must let them take risks. This means you must let go of some control and let your subordinate leaders do things on their own—within bounds established by mission orders and your expressed intent.

1-56. A company commander who routinely steps in and gives orders directly to squad leaders weakens the whole chain of command, denies squad leaders valuable learning experiences, and sends a signal to the whole company that the chain of command and NCO support channel can be bypassed at any time. On the other hand, successful accomplishment of specified and implied missions results from subordinate leaders at all levels exercising disciplined initiative within the commander's intent. Effective leaders strive to create an environment of trust and understanding that encourages their subordinates to seize the initiative and act. (Appendix A discusses authority, the chain of command, and the NCO support channel. FM 100-34 contains information about building trust up and down the chain of command.)

1-57. Weak leaders who have not trained their subordinates sometimes say, "My organization can't do it without me." Many people, used to being at the center of the action, begin to feel as if they're indispensable. You have heard them: "I can't take a day off. I have to be here all the time. I must watch my subordinates' every move, or who knows what will happen?" But no one is irreplaceable. The Army is not going to stop functioning because one leader—no matter how senior, no matter how central—steps aside. In combat, the loss of a leader is a shock to a unit, but the unit must continue its mission. If leaders train their subordinates properly, one of them will take charge.

1-58. Strong commanders—those with personal courage—realize their subordinate leaders need room to work. This doesn't mean that you should let your subordinates make the same mistake over and over. Part of your responsibility as a leader is to help

your subordinates succeed. You can achieve this through empowering and coaching. Train your subordinates to plan, prepare, execute, and assess well enough to operate independently. Provide sufficient purpose, direction, and motivation for them to operate in support of the overall plan.

1-59. Finally, check and make corrections. Take time to help your subordinates sort out what happened and why. Conduct AARs so your people don't just make mistakes, but learn from them. There is not a soldier out there, from private to general, who has not slipped up from time to time. Good soldiers, and especially good leaders, learn from those mistakes. Good leaders help their subordinates grow by teaching, coaching, and counseling.

LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND

When you are commanding, leading [soldiers] under conditions where physical exhaustion and privations must be ignored, where the lives of [soldiers] may be sacrificed, then, the efficiency of your leadership will depend only to a minor degree on your tactical ability. It will primarily be determined by your character, your reputation, not much for courage—which will be accepted as a matter of course—but by the previous reputation you have established for fairness, for that high-minded patriotic purpose, that quality of unswerving determination to carry through any military task assigned to you.

General of the Army George C. Marshall
Speaking to officer candidates in September, 1941

1-60. Command is a specific and legal position unique to the military. It's where the buck stops. Like all leaders, commanders are responsible for the success of their organizations, but commanders have special accountability to their superiors, the institution, and the nation. Commanders must think deeply and creatively, for their concerns encompass yesterday's heritage, today's mission, and tomorrow's force. To maintain their balance among all demands on them, they must exemplify Army values. The nation, as well as the members of the Army, hold commanders accountable for accomplishing the mission, keeping the institution sound, and caring for its people.

1-61. Command is a sacred trust. The legal and moral responsibilities of commanders exceed those of any other leader of similar position or authority. Nowhere else does a boss have to answer for how subordinates live and what they do after work. Our society and the institution look to commanders to make sure that missions succeed, that people receive the proper training and care, that values survive. On the one hand, the nation grants commanders special authority to be good stewards of its most precious resources: freedom and people. On the other hand, those citizens serving in the Army also trust their commanders to lead them well. NCOs probably have a more immediate impact on their people, but commanders set the policies that reward superior performance and personally punish misconduct. It's no wonder that organizations take on the personal stamp of their commanders. Those selected to command offer

something beyond their formal authority: their personal example and public actions have tremendous moral force. Because of that powerful aspect of their position, people inside and outside the Army see a commander as the human face of "the system"—the person who embodies the commitment of the Army to operational readiness and care of its people.

SUBORDINATES

To our subordinates we owe everything we are or hope to be. For it is our subordinates, not our superiors, who raise us to the dizziest of professional heights, and it is our subordinates who can and will, if we deserve it, bury us in the deepest mire of disgrace. When the chips are down and our subordinates have accepted us as their leader, we don't need any superior to tell us; we see it in their eyes and in their faces, in the barracks, on the field, and on the battle line. And on that final day when we must be ruthlessly demanding, cruel and heartless, they will rise as one to do our bidding, knowing full well that it may be their last act in this life.

Colonel Albert G. Jenkins, CSA
8th Virginia Cavalry

1-62. No one is only a leader; each of you is also a subordinate, and all members of the Army are part of a team. A technical supervisor leading a team of DA civilian specialists, for instance, isn't just the leader of that group. The team chief also works for someone else, and the team has a place in a larger organization.

1-63. Part of being a good subordinate is supporting your chain of command. And it's your responsibility to make sure your team supports the larger organization. Consider a leader whose team is responsible for handling the pay administration of a large organization. The chief knows that when the team makes a mistake or falls behind in its work, its customers—soldiers and DA civilians—pay the price in terms of late pay actions. One day a message from the boss introducing a new computer system for handling payroll changes arrives. The team chief looks hard at the new system and decides it will not work as well as the old one. The team will spend a lot of time installing the new system, all the while keeping up with their regular workload. Then they'll have to spend more time undoing the work once the new system fails. And the team chief believes it will fail—all his experience points to that.

1-64. But the team chief cannot simply say, "We'll let these actions pile up; that'll send a signal to the commander about just how bad the new system is and how important we are down here." The team does not exist in a vacuum; it's part of a larger organization that serves soldiers and DA civilians. For the good of the organization and the people in it, the team chief must make sure the job gets done.

1-65. Since the team chief disagrees with the boss's order and it affects both the team's mission and the welfare of its members, the team chief must tell the boss; he must have the moral courage to make his opinions known. Of course, the team chief

must also have the right attitude; disagreement doesn't mean it's okay to be disrespectful. He must choose the time and place—usually in private—to explain his concerns to the boss fully and clearly. In addition, the team chief must go into the meeting knowing that, at some point, the discussion will be over and he must execute the boss's decision, whatever it is.

1-66. Once the boss has listened to all the arguments and made a decision, the team chief must support that decision as if it were his own. If he goes to the team and says, "I still don't think this is a good idea, but we're going to do it anyway," the team chief undermines the chain of command and teaches his people a bad lesson. Imagine what it would do to an organization's effectiveness if subordinates chose which orders to pursue vigorously and which ones to half step.

1-67. Such an action would also damage the team chief himself: in the future the team may treat his orders as he treated the boss's. And there is no great leap between people thinking their leader is disloyal to the boss to the same people thinking their leader will be disloyal to them as well. The good leader executes the boss's decision with energy and enthusiasm; looking at their leader, subordinates will believe the leader thinks it's absolutely the best possible solution. The only exception to this involves your duty to disobey obviously illegal orders. This is not a privilege you can claim, but a duty you must perform. (Chapter 2 discusses character and illegal orders. Chapter 4 discusses ethical reasoning.)

1-68. Loyalty to superiors and subordinates does more than ensure smooth-running peacetime organizations. It prepares units for combat by building soldiers' trust in leaders and leaders' faith in soldiers. The success of the airborne assault prior to the 1944 Normandy invasion is one example of how well trained subordinate leaders can make the difference between victory and defeat.

Small Unit Leaders' Initiative in Normandy

The amphibious landings in Normandy on D-Day, 1944, were preceded by a corps-sized, night parachute assault by American and British airborne units. Many of the thousands of aircraft that delivered the 82d and 101st (US) Airborne Divisions to Normandy on the night of 5-6 June 1944 were blown off course. Some wound up in the wrong place because of enemy fire; others were simply lost. Thousands of paratroopers, the spearhead of the Allied invasion of Western Europe, found themselves scattered across unfamiliar countryside, many of them miles from their drop zones. They wandered about in the night, searching for their units, their buddies, their leaders, and their objectives. In those first few hours, the fate of the invasion hung in the balance; if the airborne forces did not cut the roads leading to the beaches, the Germans could counterattack the landing forces at the water's edge, crushing the invasion before it even began.

Fortunately for the Allies and the soldiers in the landing craft, the leaders in these airborne forces had trained their subordinate leaders well, encouraging their initiative, allowing them to do their

jobs. Small unit leaders scattered around the darkened, unfamiliar countryside knew they were part of a larger effort, and they knew its success was up to them. They had been trained to act instead of waiting to be told what to do; they knew that if the invasion was to succeed, their small units had to accomplish their individual missions.

Among these leaders were men like CPT Sam Gibbons of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. He gathered a group of 12 soldiers—from different commands—and liberated a tiny village—which turned out to be outside the division area of operations—before heading south toward his original objective, the Douve River bridges. CPT Gibbons set off with a dozen people he had never seen before and no demolition equipment to destroy a bridge nearly 15 kilometers away. Later, he remarked, "This certainly wasn't the way I had thought the invasion would go, nor had we ever rehearsed it in this manner." But he was moving out to accomplish the mission. Throughout the Cotentin Peninsula, small unit leaders from both divisions were doing the same.

This was the payoff for hard training and leaders who valued soldiers, communicated the importance of the mission, and trusted their subordinate leaders to accomplish it. As they trained their commands for the invasion, organizational leaders focused downward as well as upward. They took care of their soldiers' needs while providing the most realistic training possible. This freed their subordinate leaders to focus upward as well as downward. Because they knew their units were well trained and their leaders would do everything in their power to support them, small unit leaders were able to focus on the force's overall mission. They knew and understood the commander's intent. They believed that if they exercised disciplined initiative within that intent, things would turn out right . Events proved them correct.

1-69. You read earlier about how COL Joshua Chamberlain accomplished his mission and took care of his soldiers at Little Round Top. Empower subordinates to take initiative and be the subordinate leader who stands up and makes a difference. That lesson applies in peace and in combat, from the smallest organization to the largest. Consider the words of GEN Edward C. Meyer, former Army Chief of Staff:

When I became chief of staff, I set two personal goals for myself. The first was to ensure that the Army was continually prepared to go to war, and the second was to create a climate in which each member could find personal meaning and fulfillment. It is my belief that only by attainment of the second goal will we ensure the first.

1-70. GEN Meyer's words and COL Chamberlain's actions both say the same thing: leaders must accomplish the mission and take care of their soldiers. For COL Chamberlain, this meant he had to personally lead his men in a bayonet charge and show he believed they could do what he asked of them. For GEN Meyer the challenge was on a larger scale: his task was to make sure the entire Army was ready to fight and win. He knew—and he tells us—that the only way to accomplish such a huge goal is to pay attention to the smallest parts of the machine, the individual soldiers and DA civilians. Through his subordinate leaders, GEN Meyer offered challenges and guidance and set the example so that every member of the Army felt a part of the team

and knew that the team was doing important work.

1-71. Both leaders understood the path to excellence: disciplined leaders with strong values produce disciplined soldiers with strong values. Together they become disciplined, cohesive units that train hard, fight honorably, and win decisively.

THE PAYOFF: EXCELLENCE

Leaders of character and competence act to achieve excellence by developing a force that can fight and win the nation's wars and serve the common defense of the United States.

1-72. You achieve excellence when your people are disciplined and committed to Army values. Individuals and organizations pursue excellence to improve, to get better and better. The Army is led by leaders of character who are good role models, consistently set the example, and accomplish the mission while improving their units. It is a cohesive organization of high-performing units characterized by the warrior ethos.

1-73. Army leaders get the job done. Sometimes it's on a large scale, such as GEN Meyer's role in making sure the Army was ready to fight. Other times it may be amid the terror of combat, as with COL Chamberlain at Gettysburg. However, most of you will not become Army Chief of Staff. Not all of you will face the challenge of combat. So it would be a mistake to think that the only time mission accomplishment and leadership are important is with the obvious examples—the general officer, the combat leader. The Army cannot accomplish its mission unless all Army leaders, soldiers, and DA civilians accomplish theirs—whether that means filling out a status report, repairing a vehicle, planning a budget, packing a parachute, maintaining pay records, or walking guard duty. The Army isn't a single general or a handful of combat heroes; it's hundreds of thousands of soldiers and DA civilians, tens of thousands of leaders, all striving to do the right things. Every soldier, every DA civilian, is important to the success of the Army.

MORAL EXCELLENCE: ACCOMPLISHING THE MISSION WITH CHARACTER

To the brave men and women who wear the uniform of the United States of America —thank you. Your calling is a high one—to be the defenders of freedom and the guarantors of liberty.

George Bush
41st President of the United States

1-74. The ultimate end of war, at least as America fights it, is to restore peace. For this reason the Army must accomplish its mission honorably. The Army fights to win, but

with one eye on the kind of peace that will follow the war. The actions of Ulysses S. Grant, general in chief of the Union Army at the end of the Civil War, provide an example of balancing fighting to win with restoring the peace.

1-75. In combat GEN Grant had been a relentless and determined commander. During the final days of campaigning in Virginia, he hounded his exhausted foes and pushed his own troops on forced marches of 30 and 40 miles to end the war quickly. GEN Grant's approach to war was best summed up by President Lincoln, who said simply, "He fights."

1-76. Yet even before the surrender was signed, GEN Grant had shifted his focus to the peace. Although some of his subordinates wanted the Confederates to submit to the humiliation of an unconditional surrender, GEN Grant treated his former enemies with respect and considered the long-term effects of his decisions. Rather than demanding an unconditional surrender, GEN Grant negotiated terms with GEN Lee. One of those was allowing his former enemies to keep their horses because they needed them for spring plowing. GEN Grant reasoned that peace would best be served if the Southerners got back to a normal existence as quickly as possible. GEN Grant's decisions and actions sent a message to every man in the Union Army: that it was time to move on, to get back to peacetime concerns.

1-77. At the same time, the Union commander insisted on a formal surrender. He realized that for a true peace to prevail, the Confederates had to publicly acknowledge that organized hostility to the Union had ended. GEN Grant knew that true peace would come about only if both victors and vanquished put the war behind them—a timeless lesson.

1-78. The Army must accomplish its mission honorably. FM 27-10 discusses the law of war and reminds you of the importance of restoring peace. The Army minimizes collateral damage and avoids harming noncombatants for practical as well as honorable reasons. No matter what, though, soldiers fight to win, to live or die with honor for the benefit of our country and its citizens.

1-79. Army leaders often make decisions amid uncertainty, without guidance or precedent, in situations dominated by fear and risk, and sometimes under the threat of sudden, violent death. At those times leaders fall back on their values and Army values and ask, What is right? The question is simple; the answer, often, is not. Having made the decision, the leader depends on self-discipline to see it through.

ACHIEVING COLLECTIVE EXCELLENCE

1-80. Some examples of excellence are obvious: COL Chamberlain's imaginative defense of Little Round Top, GA Dwight Eisenhower drafting his D-Day message (you'll read about it in Chapter 2), MSG Gary Gordon and SFC Randall Shughart putting their lives on the line to save other soldiers in Somalia (their story is in Chapter

3). Those examples of excellence shine, and good leaders teach these stories; soldiers must know they are part of a long tradition of excellence and valor.

1-81. But good leaders see excellence wherever and whenever it happens. Excellent leaders make certain all subordinates know the important roles they play. Look for everyday examples that occur under ordinary circumstances: the way a soldier digs a fighting position, prepares for guard duty, fixes a radio, lays an artillery battery; the way a DA civilian handles an action, takes care of customers, meets a deadline on short notice. Good leaders know that each of these people is contributing in a small but important way to the business of the Army. An excellent Army is the collection of small tasks done to standard, day in and day out. At the end of the day, at the end of a career, those leaders, soldiers and DA civilians—the ones whose excellent work created an excellent Army—can look back confidently. Whether they commanded an invasion armada of thousands of soldiers or supervised a technical section of three people, they know they did the job well and made a difference.

1-82. Excellence in leadership does not mean perfection; on the contrary, an excellent leader allows subordinates room to learn from their mistakes as well as their successes. In such a climate, people work to improve and take the risks necessary to learn. They know that when they fall short—as they will—their leader will pick them up, give them new or more detailed instructions, and send them on their way again. This is the only way to improve the force, the only way to train leaders.

1-83. A leader who sets a standard of "zero defects, no mistakes" is also saying "Don’t take any chances. Don’t try anything you can’t already do perfectly, and for heaven’s sake, don’t try anything new." That organization will not improve; in fact, its ability to perform the mission will deteriorate rapidly. Accomplishing the Army’s mission requires leaders who are imaginative, flexible, and daring. Improving the Army for future missions requires leaders who are thoughtful and reflective. These qualities are incompatible with a "zero-defects" attitude.

1-84. Competent, confident leaders tolerate honest mistakes that do not result from negligence. The pursuit of excellence is not a game to achieve perfection; it involves trying, learning, trying again, and getting better each time. This in no way justifies or excuses failure. Even the best efforts and good intentions cannot take away an individual’s responsibility for his actions.

SUMMARY

1-85. Leadership in combat is your primary and most important challenge. It requires you to accept a set of values that contributes to a core of motivation and will. If you fail to accept and live these Army values, your soldiers may die unnecessarily. Army leaders of character and competence act to achieve excellence by developing a force that can fight and win the nation’s wars and serve the common defense of the United States. The Army leadership framework identifies the dimensions of Army leadership:

what the Army expects you, as one of its leaders, to BE, KNOW, and DO.

1-86. Leadership positions fall into one of three leadership levels: direct, organizational, and strategic. The perspective and focus of leaders change and the actions they must DO become more complex with greater consequences as they assume positions of greater responsibility. Nonetheless, they must still live Army values and possess leader attributes.

1-87. Being a good subordinate is part of being a good leader. Everyone is part of a team, and all members have responsibilities that go with belonging to that team. But every soldier and DA civilian who is responsible for supervising people or accomplishing a mission that involves other people is a leader. All soldiers and DA civilians at one time or another must act as leaders.

1-88. Values and attributes make up a leader's character, the BE of Army leadership. Character embodies self-discipline and the will to win, among other things. It contributes to the motivation to persevere. From this motivation comes the lifelong work of mastering the skills that define competence, the KNOW of Army leadership. As you reflect on Army values and leadership attributes and develop the skills your position and experience require, you become a leader of character and competence, one who can act to achieve excellence, who can DO what is necessary to accomplish the mission and take care of your people. That is leadership—influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization. That is what makes a successful leader, one who lives the principles of BE, KNOW, DO.

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CHAPTER 2

The Leader and Leadership: What the Leader Must Be, Know, and Do

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.

Oath of Enlistment

I [full name], having been appointed a [rank] in the United States Army, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So help me God.

Oath of office taken by commissioned officers and DA civilians

2-1. Beneath the Army leadership framework shown in Figure 1-1, 30 words spell out your job as a leader: **Leaders of character and competence act to achieve excellence by developing a force that can fight and win the nation's wars and serve the common defense of the United States.** There's a lot in that sentence. This chapter looks at it in detail.

2-2. Army leadership doctrine addresses what makes leaders of character and competence and what makes leadership. Figure 2-1 highlights these values and attributes. Remember from Chapter 1 that character describes what leaders must BE; competence refers to what leaders must KNOW; and action is what leaders must DO. Although this chapter discusses these concepts one at a time, they don't stand alone; they are closely connected and together make up who you seek to be (a leader of character and competence) and what you need to do (leadership).

SECTION I

CHARACTER: WHAT A LEADER MUST BE

Everywhere you look—on the fields of athletic competition, in combat training, operations, and in civilian communities—soldiers are doing what is right.

Former Sergeant Major of the Army
Julius W. Gates

2-3. Character—who you are—contributes significantly to how you act. Character helps you know what's right and do what's right, all the time and at whatever the cost. Character is made up of two interacting parts: values and attributes. Stephen Ambrose, speaking about the Civil War, says that "at the pivotal point in the war it was always the character of individuals that made the difference." Army leaders must be those critical individuals of character themselves and in turn develop character in those they lead. (Appendix E discusses character development.)

ARMY VALUES

Figure 2-1. Army Values

2-4. Your attitudes about the worth of people, concepts, and other things describe your values. Everything begins there. Your subordinates enter the Army with their own values, developed in childhood and nurtured through experience. All people are all shaped by what they've seen, what they've learned, and whom they've met. But when soldiers and DA civilians take the oath, they enter an institution guided by Army values. These are more than a system of rules. They're not just a code tucked away in a drawer or a list in a dusty book. These values tell you what you need to be, every day, in every action you take. Army values form the very identity of the Army, the solid rock upon which everything else stands, especially in combat. They are the glue that binds together the members of a noble profession. As a result, the whole is much greater than the sum of its parts. Army values are nonnegotiable: they apply to everyone and in every situation throughout the Army.

2-5. Army values remind us and tell the rest of the world—the civilian government we

serve, the nation we protect, even our enemies—who we are and what we stand for. The trust soldiers and DA civilians have for each other and the trust the American people have in us depends on how well we live up to Army values. They are the fundamental building blocks that enable us to discern right from wrong in any situation. Army values are consistent; they support one another. You can't follow one value and ignore another.

2-6. Here are the Army values that guide you, the leader, and the rest of the Army. They form the acronym LDRSHIP:

Loyalty
Duty
Respect
Selfless **S**ervice
Honor
Integrity
Personal Courage

2-7. The following discussions can help you understand Army values, but understanding is only the first step. As a leader, you must not only understand them; you must believe in them, model them in your own actions, and teach others to accept and live by them.

LOYALTY

Bear true faith and allegiance to the US Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers.

Loyalty is the big thing, the greatest battle asset of all. But no man ever wins the loyalty of troops by preaching loyalty. It is given to him as he proves his possession of the other virtues.

Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall
Men Against Fire

2-8. Since before the founding of the republic, the Army has respected its subordination to its civilian political leaders. This subordination is fundamental to preserving the liberty of all Americans. You began your Army career by swearing allegiance to the Constitution, the basis of our government and laws. If you've never read it or if it has been a while, the Constitution is in Appendix F. Pay particular attention to Article I, Section 8, which outlines congressional responsibilities regarding the armed forces, and Article II, Section 2, which designates the president as commander in chief. Beyond your allegiance to the Constitution, you have an obligation to be faithful to the Army—the institution and its people—and to your unit or organization. Few examples illustrate loyalty to country and institution as well as the example of GEN George Washington in 1782.

2-9. GEN Washington's example shows how the obligation to subordinates and peers fits in the context of loyalty to the chain of command and the institution at large. As commander of the Continental Army, GEN Washington was obligated to see that his soldiers were taken care of. However, he also was obligated to ensure that the new nation remained secure and that the Continental Army remained able to fight if necessary. If the Continental Army had marched on the seat of government, it may well have destroyed the nation by undermining the law that held it together. It also would have destroyed the Army as an institution by destroying the basis for the authority under which it served. GEN Washington realized these things and acted based on his knowledge. Had he done nothing else, this single act would have been enough to establish GEN George Washington as the father of his country.

GEN Washington at Newburgh

Following its victory at Yorktown in 1781, the Continental Army set up camp at Newburgh, New York, to wait for peace with Great Britain. The central government formed under the Articles of Confederation proved weak and unwilling to supply the Army properly or even pay the soldiers who had won the war for independence. After months of waiting many officers, angry and impatient, suggested that the Army march on the seat of government in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and force Congress to meet the Army's demands. One colonel even suggested that GEN Washington become King George I.

Upon hearing this, GEN Washington assembled his officers and publicly and emphatically rejected the suggestion. He believed that seizing power by force would have destroyed everything for which the Revolutionary War had been fought. By this action, GEN Washington firmly established an enduring precedent: America's armed forces are subordinate to civilian authority and serve the democratic principles that are now enshrined in the Constitution. GEN Washington's action demonstrated the loyalty to country that the Army must maintain in order to protect the freedom enjoyed by all Americans.

2-10. Loyalty is a two-way street: you should not expect loyalty without being prepared to give it as well. Leaders can neither demand loyalty nor win it from their people by talking about it. The loyalty of your people is a gift they give you when, and only when, you deserve it—when you train them well, treat them fairly, and live by the concepts you talk about. Leaders who are loyal to their subordinates never let them be misused.

2-11. Soldiers fight for each other—loyalty is commitment. Some of you will encounter the most important way of earning this loyalty: leading your soldiers well in combat. There's no loyalty fiercer than that of soldiers who trust their leader to take them through the dangers of combat. However, loyalty extends to all members of an organization—to your superiors and subordinates, as well as your peers.

2-12. Loyalty extends to all members of all components of the Army. The reserve components—Army National Guard and Army Reserve—play an increasingly active role in the Army's mission. Most DA civilians will not be called upon to serve in combat theaters, but their contributions to mission accomplishment are nonetheless vital. As an Army leader, you'll serve throughout your career with soldiers of the active and reserve components as well as DA civilians. All are members of the same team, loyal to one another.

DUTY

Fulfill your obligations.

The essence of duty is acting in the absence of orders or direction from others, based on an inner sense of what is morally and professionally right....

General John A. Wickham, Jr.
Former Army Chief of Staff

2-13. Duty begins with everything required of you by law, regulation, and orders; but it includes much more than that. Professionals do their work not just to the minimum standard, but to the very best of their ability. Soldiers and DA civilians commit to excellence in all aspects of their professional responsibility so that when the job is done they can look back and say, "I couldn't have given any more."

2-14. Army leaders take the initiative, figuring out what needs to be done before being told what to do. What's more, they take full responsibility for their actions and those of their subordinates. Army leaders never shade the truth to make the unit look good—or even to make their subordinates feel good. Instead, they follow their higher duty to the Army and the nation.

Duty in Korea

CPT Viola B. McConnell was the only Army nurse on duty in Korea in July of 1950. When hostilities broke out, she escorted nearly 700 American evacuees from Seoul to Japan aboard a freighter designed to accommodate only 12 passengers. CPT McConnell assessed priorities for care of the evacuees and worked exhaustively with a medical team to care for them. Once in Japan, she requested reassignment back to Korea. After all she had already done, CPT McConnell returned to Taejon to care for and evacuate wounded soldiers of the 24th Infantry Division.

2-15. CPT McConnell understood and fulfilled her duty to the Army and to the soldiers she supported in ways that went beyond her medical training. A leader's duty is to take charge, even in unfamiliar circumstances. But duty isn't reserved for special

occasions. When a platoon sergeant tells a squad leader to inspect weapons, the squad leader has fulfilled his minimum obligation when he has checked the weapons. He's done what he was told to do. But if the squad leader finds weapons that are not clean or serviced, his sense of duty tells him to go beyond the platoon sergeant's instructions. The squad leader does his duty when he corrects the problem and ensures the weapons are up to standard.

2-16. In extremely rare cases, you may receive an illegal order. Duty requires that you refuse to obey it. You have no choice but to do what's ethically and legally correct. Paragraphs 2-97, 2-98, and 2-99 discuss illegal orders.

RESPECT

Treat people as they should be treated.

The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and to give commands in such manner and such a tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.

Major General John M. Schofield
Address to the United States Corps of Cadets
11 August 1879

2-17. Respect for the individual forms the basis for the rule of law, the very essence of what makes America. In the Army, respect means recognizing and appreciating the inherent dignity and worth of all people. This value reminds you that your people are your greatest resource. Army leaders honor everyone's individual worth by treating all people with dignity and respect.

2-18. As America becomes more culturally diverse, Army leaders must be aware that they will deal with people from a wider range of ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds. Effective leaders are tolerant of beliefs different from their own as long as those beliefs don't conflict with Army values, are not illegal, and are not unethical. As an Army leader, you need to avoid misunderstandings arising from cultural differences. Actively seeking to learn about people and cultures different from your own can help you do this. Being sensitive to other cultures can also aid you in counseling your people more effectively. You show respect when you seek to understand your people's background, see things from their perspective, and appreciate

what's important to them.

2-19. As an Army leader, you must also foster a climate in which everyone is treated with dignity and respect regardless of race, gender, creed, or religious belief. Fostering this climate begins with your example: how you live Army values shows your people how they should live them. However, values training is another major contributor. Effective training helps create a common understanding of Army values and the standards you expect. When you conduct it as part of your regular routine—such as during developmental counseling sessions—you reinforce the message that respect for others is part of the character of every soldier and DA civilian. Combined with your example, such training creates an organizational climate that promotes consideration for others, fairness in all dealings, and equal opportunity. In essence, Army leaders treat others as they wish to be treated.

2-20. As part of this consideration, leaders create an environment in which subordinates are challenged, where they can reach their full potential and be all they can be. Providing tough training doesn't demean subordinates; in fact, building their capabilities and showing faith in their potential is the essence of respect. Effective leaders take the time to learn what their subordinates want to accomplish. They advise their people on how they can grow, personally and professionally. Not all of your subordinates will succeed equally, but they all deserve respect.

2-21. Respect is also an essential component for the development of disciplined, cohesive, and effective warfighting teams. In the deadly confusion of combat, soldiers often overcome incredible odds to accomplish the mission and protect the lives of their comrades. This spirit of selfless service and duty is built on a soldier's personal trust and regard for fellow soldiers. A leader's willingness to tolerate discrimination or harassment on any basis, or a failure to cultivate a climate of respect, eats away at this trust and erodes unit cohesion. But respect goes beyond issues of discrimination and harassment; it includes the broader issue of civility, the way people treat each other and those they come in contact with. It involves being sensitive to diversity and one's own behaviors that others may find insensitive, offensive, or abusive. Soldiers and DA civilians, like their leaders, treat everyone with dignity and respect.

SELFLESS SERVICE

Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and subordinates before your own.

The nation today needs men who think in terms of service to their country and not in terms of their country's debt to them.

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

2-22. You have often heard the military referred to as "the service." As a member of the Army, you serve the United States. Selfless service means doing what's right for

the nation, the Army, your organization, and your people—and putting these responsibilities above your own interests. The needs of the Army and the nation come first. This doesn't mean that you neglect your family or yourself; in fact, such neglect weakens a leader and can cause the Army more harm than good. Selfless service doesn't mean that you can't have a strong ego, high self-esteem, or even healthy ambition. Rather, selfless service means that you don't make decisions or take actions that help your image or your career but hurt others or sabotage the mission. The selfish superior claims credit for work his subordinates do; the selfless leader gives credit to those who earned it. The Army can't function except as a team, and for a team to work, the individual has to give up self-interest for the good of the whole.

2-23. Soldiers are not the only members of the Army who display selfless service. DA civilians display this value as well. Then Army Chief of Staff, Gordon R. Sullivan assessed the DA civilian contribution to Operation Desert Storm this way:

Not surprisingly, most of the civilians deployed to Southwest Asia volunteered to serve there. But the civilian presence in the Gulf region meant more than moral support and filling in for soldiers. Gulf War veterans say that many of the combat soldiers could owe their lives to the DA civilians who helped maintain equipment by speeding up the process of getting parts and other support from 60 logistics agencies Army-wide.

2-24. As GEN Sullivan's comment indicates, selfless service is an essential component of teamwork. Team members give of themselves so that the team may succeed. In combat some soldiers give themselves completely so that their comrades can live and the mission can be accomplished. But the need for selflessness isn't limited to combat situations. Requirements for individuals to place their own needs below those of their organization can occur during peacetime as well. And the requirement for selflessness doesn't decrease with one's rank; it increases. Consider this example of a soldier of long service and high rank who demonstrated the value of selfless service.

GA Marshall Continues to Serve

GA George C. Marshall served as Army Chief of Staff from 1939 until 1945. He led the Army through the buildup, deployment, and worldwide operations of World War II. Chapter 7 outlines some of his contributions to the Allied victory. In November 1945 he retired to a well-deserved rest at his home in Leesburg, Virginia. Just six days later President Harry S Truman called on him to serve as Special Ambassador to China. From the White House President Truman telephoned GA Marshall at his home: "General, I want you to go to China for me," the president said. "Yes, Mr. President," GA Marshall replied. He then hung up the telephone, informed his wife of the president's request and his reply, and prepared to return to government service.

President Truman didn't appoint GA Marshall a special ambassador to reward his faithful service; he appointed GA Marshall because there was a tough job in China that needed to be done. The Chinese communists under Mao Tse-tung were battling the Nationalists under Chiang

Kai-shek, who had been America's ally against the Japanese; GA Marshall's job was to mediate peace between them. In the end he was unsuccessful in spite of a year of frustrating work; the scale of the problem was more than any one person could handle. However, in January 1947 President Truman appointed GA Marshall Secretary of State. The Cold War had begun and the president needed a leader Americans trusted. GA Marshall's reputation made him the one; his selflessness led him to continue to serve.

2-25. When faced with a request to solve a difficult problem in an overseas theater after six years of demanding work, GA Marshall didn't say, "I've been in uniform for over thirty years, we just won a world war, and I think I've done enough." Instead, he responded to his commander in chief the only way a professional could. He said yes, took care of his family, and prepared to accomplish the mission. After a year overseas, when faced with a similar question, he gave the same answer. GA Marshall always placed his country's interests first and his own second. Army leaders who follow his example do the same.

HONOR

Live up to all the Army values.

What is life without honor? Degradation is worse than death.

Lieutenant General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson

2-26. Honor provides the "moral compass" for character and personal conduct in the Army. Though many people struggle to define the term, most recognize instinctively those with a keen sense of right and wrong, those who live such that their words and deeds are above reproach. The expression "honorable person," therefore, refers to both the character traits an individual actually possesses and the fact that the community recognizes and respects them.

2-27. Honor holds Army values together while at the same time being a value itself. Together, Army values describe the foundation essential to develop leaders of character. Honor means demonstrating an understanding of what's right and taking pride in the community's acknowledgment of that reputation. Military ceremonies recognizing individual and unit achievement demonstrate and reinforce the importance the Army places on honor.

2-28. For you as an Army leader, demonstrating an understanding of what's right and taking pride in that reputation means this: **Live up to all the Army values**. Implicitly, that's what you promised when you took your oath of office or enlistment. You made this promise publicly, and the standards—Army values—are also public. To be an honorable person, you must be true to your oath and live Army values in all you do. Living honorably strengthens Army values, not only for yourself but for others as

well: all members of an organization contribute to the organization's climate (which you'll read about in Chapter 3). By what they do, people living out Army values contribute to a climate that encourages all members of the Army to do the same.

2-29. How you conduct yourself and meet your obligations defines who you are as a person; how the Army meets the nation's commitments defines the Army as an institution. For you as an Army leader, honor means putting Army values above self-interest, above career and comfort. For all soldiers, it means putting Army values above self-preservation as well. This honor is essential for creating a bond of trust among members of the Army and between the Army and the nation it serves. Army leaders have the strength of will to live according to Army values, even though the temptations to do otherwise are strong, especially in the face of personal danger. The military's highest award is the Medal of Honor. Its recipients didn't do just what was required of them; they went beyond the expected, above and beyond the call of duty. Some gave their own lives so that others could live. It's fitting that the word we use to describe their achievements is "honor."

MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart in Somalia

During a raid in Mogadishu in October 1993, MSG Gary Gordon and SFC Randall Shughart, leader and member of a sniper team with Task Force Ranger in Somalia, were providing precision and suppressive fires from helicopters above two helicopter crash sites. Learning that no ground forces were available to rescue one of the downed aircrews and aware that a growing number of enemy were closing in on the site, MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart volunteered to be inserted to protect their critically wounded comrades. Their initial request was turned down because of the danger of the situation. They asked a second time; permission was denied. Only after their third request were they inserted.

MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart were inserted one hundred meters south of the downed chopper. Armed only with their personal weapons, the two NCOs fought their way to the downed fliers through intense small arms fire, a maze of shanties and shacks, and the enemy converging on the site. After MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart pulled the wounded from the wreckage, they established a perimeter, put themselves in the most dangerous position, and fought off a series of attacks. The two NCOs continued to protect their comrades until they had depleted their ammunition and were themselves fatally wounded. Their actions saved the life of an Army pilot.

2-30. No one will ever know what was running through the minds of MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart as they left the comparative safety of their helicopter to go to the aid of the downed aircrew. The two NCOs knew there was no ground rescue force available, and they certainly knew there was no going back to their helicopter. They may have suspected that things would turn out as they did; nonetheless, they did what they believed to be the right thing. They acted based on Army values, which they had clearly made their own: *loyalty* to their fellow soldiers; the *duty* to stand by them, regardless of the circumstances; the *personal courage* to act, even in the face of great

danger; *selfless service*, the willingness to give their all. MSG Gary I. Gordon and SFC Randall D. Shughart lived Army values to the end; they were posthumously awarded Medals of Honor.

INTEGRITY

Do what's right—legally and morally.

The American people rightly look to their military leaders not only to be skilled in the technical aspects of the profession of arms, but also to be men of integrity.

General J. Lawton Collins
Former Army Chief of Staff

2-31. People of integrity consistently act according to principles—not just what might work at the moment. Leaders of integrity make their principles known and consistently act in accordance with them. The Army requires leaders of integrity who possess high moral standards and are honest in word and deed. Being honest means being truthful and upright all the time, despite pressures to do otherwise. Having integrity means being both morally complete and true to yourself. As an Army leader, you're honest to yourself by committing to and consistently living Army values; you're honest to others by not presenting yourself or your actions as anything other than what they are. Army leaders say what they mean and do what they say. If you can't accomplish a mission, inform your chain of command. If you inadvertently pass on bad information, correct it as soon as you find out it's wrong. People of integrity do the right thing not because it's convenient or because they have no choice. They choose the right thing because their character permits no less. Conducting yourself with integrity has three parts:

- Separating what's right from what's wrong.
- Always acting according to what you know to be right, even at personal cost.
- Saying openly that you're acting on your understanding of right versus wrong.

2-32. Leaders can't hide what they do: that's why you must carefully decide how you act. As an Army leader, you're always on display. If you want to instill Army values in others, you must internalize and demonstrate them yourself. Your personal values may and probably do extend beyond the Army values, to include such things as political, cultural, or religious beliefs. However, if you're to be an Army leader *and* a person of integrity, these values must reinforce, not contradict, Army values.

2-33. Any conflict between your personal values and Army values must be resolved before you can become a morally complete Army leader. You may need to consult with someone whose values and judgment you respect. You would not be the first person to face this issue, and as a leader, you can expect others to come to you, too. Chapter 5 contains the story of how SGT Alvin York and his leaders confronted and resolved a conflict between SGT York's personal values and Army values. Read it and reflect on

it. If one of your subordinates asks you to help resolve a similar conflict, you must be prepared by being sure your own values align with Army values. Resolving such conflicts is necessary to become a leader of integrity.

PERSONAL COURAGE

Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral).

The concept of professional courage does not always mean being as tough as nails either. It also suggests a willingness to listen to the soldiers' problems, to go to bat for them in a tough situation, and it means knowing just how far they can go. It also means being willing to tell the boss when he's wrong.

Former Sergeant Major of the Army William Connelly

2-34. Personal courage isn't the absence of fear; rather, it's the ability to put fear aside and do what's necessary. It takes two forms, physical and moral. Good leaders demonstrate both.

2-35. Physical courage means overcoming fears of bodily harm and doing your duty. It's the bravery that allows a soldier to take risks in combat in spite of the fear of wounds or death. Physical courage is what gets the soldier at Airborne School out the aircraft door. It's what allows an infantryman to assault a bunker to save his buddies.

2-36. In contrast, moral courage is the willingness to stand firm on your values, principles, and convictions—even when threatened. It enables leaders to stand up for what they believe is right, regardless of the consequences. Leaders who take responsibility for their decisions and actions, even when things go wrong, display moral courage. Courageous leaders are willing to look critically inside themselves, consider new ideas, and change what needs changing.

2-37. Moral courage is sometimes overlooked, both in discussions of personal courage and in the everyday rush of business. A DA civilian at a meeting heard *courage* mentioned several times in the context of combat. The DA civilian pointed out that consistent moral courage is every bit as important as momentary physical courage. Situations requiring physical courage are rare; situations requiring moral courage can occur frequently. Moral courage is essential to living the Army values of integrity and honor every day.

2-38. Moral courage often expresses itself as candor. Candor means being frank, honest, and sincere with others while keeping your words free from bias, prejudice, or malice. Candor means calling things as you see them, even when it's uncomfortable or you think it might be better for you to just keep quiet. It means not allowing your feelings to affect what you say about a person or situation. A candid company commander calmly points out the first sergeant's mistake. Likewise, the candid first

sergeant respectfully points out when the company commander's pet project isn't working and they need to do something different. For trust to exist between leaders and subordinates, candor is essential. Without it, subordinates won't know if they've met the standard and leaders won't know what's going on.

2-39. In combat physical and moral courage may blend together. The right thing to do may not only be unpopular, but dangerous as well. Situations of that sort reveal who's a leader of character and who's not. Consider this example.

WO1 Thompson at My Lai

Personal courage—whether physical, moral, or a combination of the two—may be manifested in a variety of ways, both on and off the battlefield. On March 16, 1968 Warrant Officer (WO1) Hugh C. Thompson, Jr. and his two-man crew were on a reconnaissance mission over the village of My Lai, Republic of Vietnam. WO1 Thompson watched in horror as he saw an American soldier shoot an injured Vietnamese child. Minutes later, when he observed American soldiers advancing on a number of civilians in a ditch, WO1 Thompson landed his helicopter and questioned a young officer about what was happening on the ground. Told that the ground action was none of his business, WO1 Thompson took off and continued to circle the area.

When it became apparent that the American soldiers were now firing on civilians, WO1 Thompson landed his helicopter between the soldiers and a group of 10 villagers who were headed for a homemade bomb shelter. He ordered his gunner to train his weapon on the approaching American soldiers and to fire if necessary. Then he personally coaxed the civilians out of the shelter and airlifted them to safety. WO1 Thompson's radio reports of what was happening were instrumental in bringing about the cease-fire order that saved the lives of more civilians. His willingness to place himself in physical danger in order to do the morally right thing is a sterling example of personal courage.

LEADER ATTRIBUTES

Leadership is not a natural trait, something inherited like the color of eyes or hair… Leadership is a skill that can be studied, learned, and perfected by practice.

The Noncom's Guide, 1962

Figure 2-2. Leader Attributes

2-40. Values tell us part of what the leader must BE; the other side of what a leader must BE are the attributes listed in Figure 2-2. Leader attributes influence leader actions; leader actions, in turn, always influence the unit or organization. As an example, if you're physically fit, you're more likely to inspire your subordinates to be physically fit.

2-41. Attributes are a person's fundamental qualities and characteristics. People are born with some attributes; for instance, a person's genetic code determines eye, hair, and skin color. However, other attributes—including leader attributes—are learned and can be changed. Leader attributes can be characterized as mental, physical, and emotional. Successful leaders work to improve those attributes.

MENTAL ATTRIBUTES

2-42. The mental attributes of an Army leader include will, self-discipline, initiative, judgment, self-confidence, intelligence, and cultural awareness.

Will

The will of soldiers is three times more important than their weapons.

Colonel Dandridge M. "Mike" Malone
Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach

2-43. Will is the inner drive that compels soldiers and leaders to keep going when they are exhausted, hungry, afraid, cold, and wet—when it would be easier to quit. Will enables soldiers to press the fight to its conclusion. Yet will without competence is useless. It's not enough that soldiers are willing, or even eager, to fight; they must know how to fight. Likewise, soldiers who have competence but no will don't fight. The leader's task is to develop a winning spirit by building their subordinates' will as well as their skill. That begins with hard, realistic training.

2-44. Will is an attribute essential to all members of the Army. Work conditions vary among branches and components, between those deployed and those closer to home. In the Army, personal attitude must prevail over any adverse external conditions. All members of the Army—active, reserve, and DA civilian—will experience situations when it would be easier to quit rather than finish the task at hand. At those times, everyone needs that inner drive to press on to mission completion.

2-45. It's easy to talk about will when things go well. But the test of your will comes when things go badly— when events seem to be out of control, when you think your bosses have forgotten you, when the plan doesn't seem to work and it looks like you're going to lose. It's then that you must draw on your inner reserves to persevere—to do your job until there's nothing left to do it with and then to remain faithful to your people, your organization, and your country. The story of the American and Filipino stand on the Bataan Peninsula and their subsequent captivity is one of individuals, leaders, and units deciding to remain true to the end—and living and dying by that decision.

The Will to Persevere

On 8 December 1941, hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces attacked the American and Filipino forces defending the Philippines. With insufficient combat power to launch a counterattack, GEN Douglas MacArthur, the American commander, ordered his force to consolidate on the Bataan Peninsula and hold as long as possible. Among his units was the 12th Quartermaster (QM) Regiment, which had the mission of supporting the force.

Completely cut off from outside support, the Allies held against an overwhelming Japanese army for the next three and a half months. Soldiers of the 12th QM Regiment worked in the debris of warehouses and repair shops under merciless shelling and bombing, fighting to make the meager supplies last. They slaughtered water buffaloes for meat, caught fish with traps they built themselves, and distilled salt from sea water. In coffeepots made from oil drums they boiled and reboiled the tiny coffee supply until the grounds were white. As long as an ounce of food existed, it was used. In the last desperate days, they resorted to killing horses and pack mules. More important, these supporters delivered rations to the foxholes on the front lines—fighting their way in when necessary. After Bataan and Corregidor fell, members of the 12th QM Regiment were prominent among the 7,000 Americans and Filipinos who died on the infamous Bataan Death March.

Though captured, the soldiers of the 12th QM Regiment maintained their will to resist. 1LT Beulah Greenwalt, a nurse assigned to the 12th QM Regiment, personified this will. Realizing the regimental colors represent the soul of a regiment and that they could serve as a symbol for resistance, 1LT Greenwalt assumed the mission of protecting the colors from the Japanese. She carried the colors to the prisoner of war (PW) camp in Manila by wrapping them around her shoulders and convincing her Japanese captors that they were "only a shawl." For the next 33 months 1LT Greenwalt and the remains of the regiment remained PWs, living on starvation diets and denied all comforts. But through it all, 1LT Greenwalt held onto the flag. The regimental colors were safeguarded: the soul of the regiment remained with the regiment, and its soldiers continued to resist.

When the war ended in 1945 and the surviving PWs were released, 1LT Greenwalt presented the colors to the regimental commander. She and her fellow PWs had persevered. They had resisted on Bataan until they had no more means to resist. They continued to resist through three long years of captivity. They decided on Bataan to carry on, and they renewed that decision daily until they were liberated. The 12th QM Regiment—and the other units that had fought and resisted with them—remained true to themselves, the Army, and their country. Their will allowed them to see events through to the end.

Self-Discipline

The core of a soldier is moral discipline. It is intertwined with the discipline of physical and mental achievement. Total discipline overcomes adversity, and physical stamina draws on an

inner strength that says "drive on."

Former Sergeant Major of the Army
William G. Bainbridge

2-46. Self-disciplined people are masters of their impulses. This mastery comes from the habit of doing the right thing. Self-discipline allows Army leaders to do the right thing regardless of the consequences for them or their subordinates. Under the extreme stress of combat, you and your team might be cut off and alone, fearing for your lives, and having to act without guidance or knowledge of what's going on around you. Still, you—the leader—must think clearly and act reasonably. Self-discipline is the key to this kind of behavior.

2-47. In peacetime, self-discipline gets the unit out for the hard training. Self-discipline makes the tank commander demand another run-through of a battle drill if the performance doesn't meet the standard—even though everyone is long past ready to quit. Self-discipline doesn't mean that you never get tired or discouraged—after all, you're only human. It does mean that you do what needs to be done regardless of your feelings.

Initiative

The leader must be an aggressive thinker—always anticipating and analyzing. He must be able to make good assessments and solid tactical judgments.

Brigadier General John T. Nelson, II

2-48. Initiative is the ability to be a self-starter—to act when there are no clear instructions, to act when the situation changes or when the plan falls apart. In the operational context, it means setting and dictating the terms of action throughout the battle or operation. An individual leader with initiative is willing to decide and initiate independent actions when the concept of operations no longer applies or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to accomplishment of the commander's intent presents itself. Initiative drives the Army leader to seek a better method, anticipate what must be done, and perform without waiting for instructions. Balanced with good judgment, it becomes *disciplined* initiative, an essential leader attribute. (FM 100-5 discusses initiative as it relates to military actions at the operational level. FM 100-34 discusses the relationship of initiative to command and control. FM 100-40 discusses the place of initiative in the art of tactics.)

2-49. As an Army leader, you can't just give orders: you must make clear the intent of those orders, the final goal of the mission. In combat, it's critically important for subordinates to understand their commander's intent. When they are cut off or enemy actions derail the original plan, well-trained soldiers who understand the commander's intent will apply disciplined initiative to accomplish the mission.

2-50. Disciplined initiative doesn't just appear; you must develop it within your subordinates. Your leadership style and the organizational climate you establish can either encourage or discourage initiative: you can instill initiative in your subordinates or you can drive it out. If you underwrite honest mistakes, your subordinates will be more likely to develop initiative. If you set a "zero defects" standard, you risk strangling initiative in its cradle, the hearts of your subordinates. (Chapter 5 discusses "zero defects" and learning.)

The Quick Reaction Platoon

On 26 December 1994 a group of armed and disgruntled members of the Haitian Army entered the Haitian Army Headquarters in Port-au-Prince demanding back pay. A gunfight ensued less than 150 meters from the grounds of the Haitian Palace, seat of the new government. American soldiers from C Company, 1-22 Infantry, who had deployed to Haiti as part of Operation Uphold Democracy, were guarding the palace grounds. The quick reaction platoon leader deployed and immediately maneuvered his platoon towards the gunfire. The platoon attacked, inflicting at least four casualties and causing the rest of the hostile soldiers to flee. The platoon quelled a potentially explosive situation by responding correctly and aggressively to the orders of their leader, who knew his mission and the commander's intent.

Judgment

I learned that good judgment comes from experience and that experience grows out of mistakes.

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

2-51. Leaders must often juggle hard facts, questionable data, and gut-level intuition to arrive at a decision. Good judgment means making the best decision for the situation. It's a key attribute of the art of command and the transformation of knowledge into understanding. (FM 100-34 discusses how leaders convert data and information into knowledge and understanding.)

2-52. Good judgment is the ability to size up a situation quickly, determine what's important, and decide what needs to be done. Given a problem, you should consider a range of alternatives before you act. You need to think through the consequences of what you're about to do before you do it. In addition to considering the consequences, you should also think methodically. Some sources that aid judgment are the boss's intent, the desired goal, rules, laws, regulations, experience, and values. Good judgment also includes the ability to size up subordinates, peers, and the enemy for strengths, weaknesses, and potential actions. It's a critical part of problem solving and decision making. (Chapter 5 discusses problem solving and decision making).

2-53. Judgment and initiative go hand in hand. As an Army leader, you must weigh what you know and make decisions in situations where others do nothing. There will be times when you'll have to make decisions under severe time constraints. In all cases, however, you must take responsibility for your actions. In addition, you must encourage disciplined initiative in, and teach good judgment to, your subordinates. Help your subordinates learn from mistakes by coaching and mentoring them along the way. (Chapter 5 discusses mentoring.)

Self-Confidence

2-54. Self-confidence is the faith that you'll act correctly and properly in any situation, even one in which you're under stress and don't have all the information you want. Self-confidence comes from competence: it's based on mastering skills, which takes hard work and dedication. Leaders who know their own capabilities and believe in themselves are self-confident. Don't mistake bluster—loudmouthed bragging or self-promotion—for self-confidence. Truly self-confident leaders don't need to advertise; their actions say it all.

2-55. Self-confidence is important for leaders and teams. People want self-confident leaders, leaders who understand the situation, know what needs to be done, and demonstrate that understanding and knowledge. Self-confident leaders instill self-confidence in their people. In combat, self-confidence helps soldiers control doubt and reduce anxiety. Together with will and self-discipline, self-confidence helps leaders act —do what must be done in circumstances where it would be easier to do nothing—and to convince their people to act as well.

Intelligence

2-56. Intelligent leaders think, learn, and reflect; then they apply what they learn. Intelligence is more than knowledge, and the ability to think isn't the same as book learning. All people have some intellectual ability that, when developed, allows them to analyze and understand a situation. And although some people are smarter than others, all people can develop the capabilities they have. Napoleon himself observed how a leader's intellectual development applies directly to battlefield success:

It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and meditation.

2-57. Knowledge is only part of the equation. Smart decisions result when you combine professional skills (which you learn through study) with experience (which you gain on the job) and your ability to reason through a problem based on the information available. Reflection is also important. From time to time, you find yourself carefully and thoughtfully considering how leadership, values, and other military principles apply to you and your job. When things don't go quite the way they

intended, intelligent leaders are confident enough to step back and ask, "Why did things turn out that way?" Then they are smart enough to build on their strengths and avoid making the same mistake again.

2-58. Reflection also contributes to your originality (the ability to innovate, rather than only adopt others' methods) and intuition (direct, immediate insight or understanding of important factors without apparent rational thought or inference). Remember COL Chamberlain at Little Round Top. To his soldiers, it sometimes appeared that he could "see through forests and hills and know what was coming." But this was no magical ability. Through study and reflection, the colonel had learned how to analyze terrain and imagine how the enemy might attempt to use it to his advantage. He had applied his intelligence and developed his intellectual capabilities. Good leaders follow COL Chamberlain's example.

Cultural Awareness

2-59. Culture is a group's shared set of beliefs, values, and assumptions about what's important. As an Army leader, you must be aware of cultural factors in three contexts:

- You must be sensitive to the different backgrounds of your people.
- You must be aware of the culture of the country in which your organization is operating.
- You must take into account your partners' customs and traditions when you're working with forces of another nation.

2-60. Within the Army, people come from widely different backgrounds: they are shaped by their schooling, race, gender, and religion as well as a host of other influences. Although they share Army values, an African-American man from rural Texas may look at many things differently from, say, a third-generation Irish-American man who grew up in Philadelphia or a Native American woman from the Pacific Northwest. But be aware that perspectives vary within groups as well. That's why you should try to understand individuals based on their own ideas, qualifications, and contributions and not jump to conclusions based on stereotypes.

2-61. Army values are part of the Army's institutional culture, a starting point for how you as a member of the Army should think and act. Beyond that, Army leaders not only recognize that people are different; they value them because of their differences, because they are people. Your job as a leader isn't to make everyone the same. Instead, your job is to take advantage of the fact that everyone is different and build a cohesive team. (Chapter 7 discusses the role strategic leaders play in establishing and maintaining the Army's institutional culture.)

2-62. There's great diversity in the Army—religious, ethnic, and social—and people of different backgrounds bring different talents to the table. By joining the Army, these people have agreed to adopt the Army culture. Army leaders make this easier by

embracing and making use of everyone's talents. What's more, they create a team where subordinates know they are valuable and their talents are important.

2-63. You never know how the talents of an individual or group will contribute to mission accomplishment. For example, during World War II US Marines from the Navajo nation formed a group of radio communications specialists dubbed the Navajo Code Talkers. The code talkers used their native language—a unique talent—to handle command radio traffic. Not even the best Japanese code breakers could decipher what was being said.

2-64. Understanding the culture of your adversaries and of the country in which your organization is operating is just as important as understanding the culture of your own country and organization. This aspect of cultural awareness has always been important, but today's operational environment of frequent deployments—often conducted by small units under constant media coverage—makes it even more so. As an Army leader, you need to remain aware of current events—particularly those in areas where America has national interests. You may have to deal with people who live in those areas, either as partners, neutrals, or adversaries. The more you know about them, the better prepared you'll be.

2-65. You may think that understanding other cultures applies mostly to stability operations and support operations. However, it's critical to planning offensive and defensive operations as well. For example, you may employ different tactics against an adversary who considers surrender a dishonor worse than death than against those for whom surrender is an honorable option. Likewise, if your organization is operating as part of a multinational team, how well you understand your partners will affect how well the team accomplishes its mission.

2-66. Cultural awareness is crucial to the success of multinational operations. In such situations Army leaders take the time to learn the customs and traditions of the partners' cultures. They learn how and why others think and act as they do. In multinational forces, effective leaders create a "third culture," which is the bridge or the compromise among partners. This is what GA Eisenhower did in the following example.

GA Eisenhower Forms SHAEF

During World War II, one of GA Eisenhower's duties as Supreme Allied Commander in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) was to form his theater headquarters, the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). GA Eisenhower had to create an environment in this multinational headquarters in which staff members from the different Allied armies could work together harmoniously. It was one of GA Eisenhower's toughest jobs.

The forces under his command—American, British, French, Canadian, and Polish—brought not only different languages, but different ways of thinking, different ideas about what was important, and different strategies. GA Eisenhower could have tried to bend everyone to his will and his way of thinking; he was the boss, after all. But it's doubtful the Allies would have fought as well for a bullying commander or that a bullying commander would have survived politically. Instead, he created a positive organizational climate that made best use of the various capabilities of his subordinates. This kind of work takes tact, patience, and trust. It doesn't destroy existing cultures but creates a new one. (Chapter 7 discusses how building this coalition contributed to the Allied victory in the ETO.)

PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES

2-67. Physical attributes—health fitness, physical fitness, and military and professional bearing—can be developed. Army leaders maintain the appropriate level of physical fitness and military bearing.

Health Fitness

Disease was the chief killer in the [American Civil] war. Two soldiers died of it for every one killed in battle…In one year, 995 of every thousand men in the Union army contracted diarrhea and dysentery.

Geoffrey C. Ward
The Civil War

2-68. Health fitness is everything you do to maintain good health, things such as undergoing routine physical exams, practicing good dental hygiene, maintaining deployability standards, and even personal grooming and cleanliness. A soldier unable to fight because of dysentery is as much a loss as one who's wounded. Healthy soldiers can perform under extremes in temperature, humidity, and other conditions better than unhealthy ones. Health fitness also includes avoiding things that degrade your health, such as substance abuse, obesity, and smoking.

Physical Fitness

Fatigue makes cowards of us all.

General George S. Patton, Jr.
Commanding General, Third Army, World War II

2-69. Unit readiness begins with physically fit soldiers and leaders. Combat drains soldiers physically, mentally, and emotionally. To minimize those effects, Army leaders are physically fit, and they make sure their subordinates are fit as well. Physically fit soldiers perform better in all areas, and physically fit leaders are better able to think, decide, and act appropriately under pressure. Physical readiness provides a foundation for combat readiness, and it's up to you, the leader, to get your soldiers ready.

2-70. Although physical fitness is a crucial element of success in battle, it's not just for front-line soldiers. Wherever they are, people who are physically fit feel more competent and confident. That attitude reassures and inspires those around them. Physically fit soldiers and DA civilians can handle stress better, work longer and harder, and recover faster than ones who are not fit. These payoffs are valuable in both peace and war.

2-71. The physical demands of leadership positions, prolonged deployments, and continuous operations can erode more than just physical attributes. Soldiers must show up ready for deprivations because it's difficult to maintain high levels of fitness during deployments and demanding operations. Trying to get fit under those conditions is even harder. If a person isn't physically fit, the effects of additional stress snowball until their mental and emotional fitness are compromised as well. Army leaders' physical fitness has significance beyond their personal performance and well-being. Since leaders' decisions affect their organizations' combat effectiveness, health, and safety and not just their own, maintaining physical fitness is an ethical as well as a practical imperative.

2-72. The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) measures a baseline level of physical fitness. As an Army leader, you're required to develop a physical fitness program that enhances your soldiers' ability to complete soldier and leader tasks that support the unit's mission essential task list (METL). (FM 25-101 discusses METL-based integration of soldier, leader, and collective training.) Fitness programs that emphasize training specifically for the APFT are boring and don't prepare soldiers for the varied stresses of combat. Make every effort to design a physical fitness program that prepares your people for what you expect them to do in combat. Readiness should be your program's primary focus; preparation for the APFT itself is secondary. (FM 21-20 is your primary physical fitness resource.)

You have to lead men in war by requiring more from the individual than he thinks he can do. You have to [bring] them along to endure and to display qualities of fortitude that are beyond the average man's thought of what he should be expected to do. You have to inspire them when they are hungry and exhausted and desperately uncomfortable and in great danger; and only a man of positive characteristics of leadership, with the physical stamina [fitness] that goes with it, can function under those conditions.

General of the Army George C. Marshall
Army Chief of Staff, World War II

Military and Professional Bearing

Our…soldiers should look as good as they are.

Sergeant Major of the Army Julius W. Gates

2-73. As an Army leader, you're expected to look like a soldier. Know how to wear the uniform and wear it with pride at all times. Meet height and weight standards. By the way you carry yourself and through your military courtesy and appearance, you send a signal: I am proud of my uniform, my unit, and myself. Skillful use of your professional bearing—fitness, courtesy, and military appearance—can often help you manage difficult situations. A professional—DA civilian or soldier—presents a professional appearance, but there's more to being an Army professional than looking good. Professionals are competent as well; the Army requires you to both *look* good and *be* good.

EMOTIONAL ATTRIBUTES

Anyone can become angry—that is easy. But to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way—that is not easy.

Aristotle
Greek philosopher and tutor to Alexander the Great

2-74. As an Army leader, your emotional attributes—self-control, balance, and stability—contribute to how you feel and therefore to how you interact with others. Your people are human beings with hopes, fears, concerns, and dreams. When you understand that will and endurance come from emotional energy, you possess a powerful leadership tool. The feedback you give can help your subordinates use their emotional energy to accomplish amazing feats in tough times.

Self-Control in Combat

An American infantry company in Vietnam had been taking a lot of casualties from booby traps. The soldiers were frustrated because they could not fight back. One night, snipers ambushed the company near a village, killing two soldiers. The rest of the company—scared, anguished, and frustrated—wanted to enter the village, but the commander—who was just as angry—knew that the snipers were long gone. Further, he knew that there was a danger his soldiers would let their emotions get the upper hand, that they might injure or kill some villagers out of a desire to strike back at something. Besides being criminal, such killings would drive more villagers to the Viet Cong. The commander maintained control of his emotions, and the company avoided the village.

2-75. Self-control, balance, and stability also help you make the right ethical choices. Chapter 4 discusses the steps of ethical reasoning. However, in order to follow those steps, you must remain in control of yourself; you can't be at the mercy of your impulses. You must remain calm under pressure, "watch your lane," and expend energy on things you can fix. Inform your boss of things you can't fix and don't worry about things you can't affect.

2-76. Leaders who are emotionally mature also have a better awareness of their own strengths and weaknesses. Mature leaders spend their energy on self-improvement; immature leaders spend their energy denying there's anything wrong. Mature, less defensive leaders benefit from constructive criticism in ways that immature people cannot.

Self-Control

Sure I was scared, but under the circumstances, I'd have been crazy not to be scared.… There's nothing wrong with fear. Without fear, you can't have acts of courage.

Sergeant Theresa Kristek
Operation Just Cause, Panama

2-77. Leaders control their emotions. No one wants to work for a hysterical leader who might lose control in a tough situation. This doesn't mean you never show emotion. Instead, you must display the proper amount of emotion and passion—somewhere between too much and too little—required to tap into your subordinates' emotions. Maintaining self-control inspires calm confidence in subordinates, the coolness under fire so essential to a successful unit. It also encourages feedback from your subordinates that can expand your sense of what's really going on.

Balance

An officer or noncommissioned officer who loses his temper and flies into a tantrum has failed

to obtain his first triumph in discipline.

Noncommissioned Officer's Manual, 1917

2-78. Emotionally balanced leaders display the right emotion for the situation and can also read others' emotional state. They draw on their experience and provide their subordinates the proper perspective on events. They have a range of attitudes—from relaxed to intense—with which to approach situations and can choose the one appropriate to the circumstances. Such leaders know when it's time to send a message that things are urgent and how to do that without throwing the organization into chaos. They also know how to encourage people at the toughest moments and keep them driving on.

Stability

Never let yourself be driven by impatience or anger. One always regrets having followed the first dictates of his emotions.

Marshal de Belle-Isle
French Minister of War, 1757-1760

2-79. Effective leaders are steady, levelheaded under pressure and fatigue, and calm in the face of danger. These characteristics calm their subordinates, who are always looking to their leader's example. Display the emotions you want your people to display; don't give in to the temptation to do what feels good for you. If you're under great stress, it might feel better to vent—scream, throw things, kick furniture—but that will not help the organization. If you want your subordinates to be calm and rational under pressure, you must be also.

BG Jackson at First Bull Run

At a crucial juncture in the First Battle of Bull Run, the Confederate line was being beaten back from Matthews Hill by Union forces. Confederate BG Thomas J. Jackson and his 2,000-man brigade of Virginians, hearing the sounds of battle to the left of their position, pressed on to the action. Despite a painful shrapnel wound, BG Jackson calmly placed his men in a defensive position on Henry Hill and assured them that all was well.

As men of the broken regiments flowed past, one of their officers, BG Barnard E. Bee, exclaimed to BG Jackson, "General, they are driving us!" Looking toward the direction of the enemy, BG Jackson replied, "Sir, we will give them the bayonet." Impressed by BG Jackson's confidence and self-control, BG Bee rode off towards what was left of the officers and men of his brigade. As he rode into the throng he gestured with his sword toward Henry Hill and shouted, "Look, men! There is Jackson standing like a stone wall! Let us determine to die here, and we will conquer! Follow me!"

BG Bee would later be mortally wounded, but the Confederate line stiffened and the nickname he gave to BG Jackson would live on in American military history. This example shows how one leader's self-control under fire can turn the tide of battle by influencing not only the leader's own soldiers, but the leaders and soldiers of other units as well.

FOCUS ON CHARACTER

Just as fire tempers iron into fine steel, so does adversity temper one's character into firmness, tolerance, and determination.

Margaret Chase Smith
Lieutenant Colonel, US Air Force Reserve
and United States Senator

2-80. Earlier in this chapter, you read how character is made up of two interacting sets of characteristics: values and attributes. People enter the Army with values and attributes they've developed over the course of a lifetime, but those are just the starting points for further character development. Army leaders continuously develop in themselves and their subordinates the Army values and leader attributes that this chapter discusses and Figure 1-1 shows. This isn't just an academic exercise, another mandatory training topic to address once a year. Your character shows through in your actions—on and off duty.

2-81. Character helps you determine what's right and motivates you to do it, regardless of the circumstances or the consequences. What's more, an informed ethical conscience consistent with Army values steels you for making the right choices when faced with tough questions. Since Army leaders seek to do what's right and inspire others to do the same, you must be concerned with character development. Examine the actions in this example, taken from the report of a platoon sergeant during Operation Desert Storm. Consider the aspects of character that contributed to them.

Character and Prisoners

The morning of [28 February 1991], about a half-hour prior to the cease-fire, we had a T-55 tank in front of us and we were getting ready [to engage it with a TOW]. We had the TOW up and we were tracking him and my wingman saw him just stop and a head pop up out of it. And Neil started calling me saying, "Don't shoot, don't shoot, I think they're getting off the tank." And they did. Three of them jumped off the tank and ran around a sand dune. I told my wingman, "I'll cover the tank, you go on down and check around the back side and see what's down there." He went down there and found about 150 PWs….

[T]he only way we could handle that many was just to line them up and run them through…a

little gauntlet…[W]e had to check them for weapons and stuff and we lined them up and called for the PW handlers to pick them up. It was just amazing.

We had to blow the tank up. My instructions were to destroy the tank, so I told them to go ahead and move it around the back side of the berm a little bit to safeguard us, so we wouldn't catch any shrapnel or ammunition coming off. When the tank blew up, these guys started yelling and screaming at my soldiers, "Don't shoot us, don't shoot us," and one of my soldiers said, "Hey, we're from America; we don't shoot our prisoners." That sort of stuck with me.

2-82. The soldier's comment at the end of this story captures the essence of character. He said, "We're from America…" He defined, in a very simple way, the connection between who you are—your character—and what you do. This example illustrates character—shared values and attributes—telling soldiers what to do and what not to do. However, it's interesting for other reasons. Read it again: You can almost feel the soldiers' surprise when they realized what the Iraqi PWs were afraid of. You can picture the young soldier, nervous, hands on his weapon, but still managing to be a bit amused. The right thing, the ethical choice, was so deeply ingrained in those soldiers that it never occurred to them to do anything other than safeguard the PWs.

The Battle of the Bulge

In December 1944 the German Army launched its last major offensive on the Western Front of the ETO, sending massive infantry and armor formations into a lightly-held sector of the Allied line in Belgium. American units were overrun. Thousands of green troops, sent to that sector because it was quiet, were captured. For two desperate weeks the Allies fought to check the enemy advance. The 101st Airborne Division was sent to the town of Bastogne. The Germans needed to control the crossroads there to move equipment to the front; the 101st was there to stop them.

Outnumbered, surrounded, low on ammunition, out of medical supplies, and with wounded piling up, the 101st, elements of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions, and a tank destroyer battalion fought off repeated attacks through some of the coldest weather Europe had seen in 50 years. Wounded men froze to death in their foxholes. Paratroopers fought tanks. Nonetheless, when the German commander demanded American surrender, BG Anthony C. McAuliffe, acting division commander, sent a one-word reply: "Nuts."

The Americans held. By the time the Allies regained control of the area and pushed the Germans back, Hitler's "Thousand Year Reich" had fewer than four months remaining.

2-83. BG McAuliffe spoke based on what he knew his soldiers were capable of, even in the most extreme circumstances. This kind of courage and toughness didn't develop overnight. Every Allied soldier brought a lifetime's worth of character to that battle; that character was the foundation for everything else that made them successful.

GA Eisenhower's Message

On 5 June 1944, the day before the D-Day invasion, with his hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sailors and airmen poised to invade France, GA Dwight D. Eisenhower took a few minutes to draft a message he hoped he would never deliver. It was a "statement he wrote out to have ready when the invasion was repulsed, his troops torn apart for nothing, his planes ripped and smashed to no end, his warships sunk, his reputation blasted."

In his handwritten statement, GA Eisenhower began, "Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops." Originally he had written, the "troops have been withdrawn," a use of the passive voice that conceals the actor. But he changed the wording to reflect his acceptance of full personal accountability.

GA Eisenhower went on, "My decision to attack at this time and place was based on the best information available." And after recognizing the courage and sacrifice of the troops he concluded, "If any blame or fault attaches to this attempt, it is mine alone."

2-84. GA Eisenhower, in command of the largest invasion force ever assembled and poised on the eve of a battle that would decide the fate of millions of people, was guided by the same values and attributes that shaped the actions of the soldiers in the Desert Storm example. His character allowed for nothing less than acceptance of total personal responsibility. If things went badly, he was ready to take the blame. When things went well, he gave credit to his subordinates. The Army values GA Eisenhower personified provide a powerful example for all members of the Army.

CHARACTER AND THE WARRIOR ETHOS

2-85. The *warrior ethos* refers to the professional attitudes and beliefs that characterize the American soldier. At its core, the warrior ethos grounds itself on the refusal to accept failure. The Army has forged the warrior ethos on training grounds from Valley Forge to the CTCs and honed it in battle from Bunker Hill to San Juan Hill, from the Meuse-Argonne to Omaha Beach, from Pork Chop Hill to the Ia Drang Valley, from Salinas Airfield to the Battle of 73 Easting. It derives from the unique realities of battle. It echoes through the precepts in the Code of Conduct. Developed through discipline, commitment to Army values, and knowledge of the Army's proud heritage, the warrior ethos makes clear that military service is much more than just another job: the purpose of winning the nation's wars calls for total commitment.

2-86. America has a proud tradition of winning. The ability to forge victory out of the chaos of battle includes overcoming fear, hunger, deprivation, and fatigue. The Army wins because it fights hard; it fights hard because it trains hard; and it trains hard because that's the way to *win*. Thus, the warrior ethos is about more than persevering

under the worst of conditions; it fuels the fire to fight through those conditions to victory no matter how long it takes, no matter how much effort is required. It's one thing to make a snap decision to risk your life for a brief period of time. It's quite another to sustain the will to win when the situation looks hopeless and doesn't show any indications of getting better, when being away from home and family is a profound hardship. The soldier who jumps on a grenade to save his comrades is courageous, without question. That action requires great physical courage, but pursuing victory over time also requires a deep moral courage that concentrates on the mission.

2-87. The warrior ethos concerns character, shaping who you are and what you do. In that sense, it's clearly linked to Army values such as *personal courage, loyalty to comrades, and dedication to duty*. Both loyalty and duty involve putting your life on the line, even when there's little chance of survival, for the good of a cause larger than yourself. That's the clearest example of *selfless service*. American soldiers never give up on their fellow soldiers, and they never compromise on doing their duty. *Integrity* underlies the character of the Army as well. The warrior ethos requires unrelenting and consistent determination to do what is right and to do it with pride, both in war and military operations other than war. Understanding what is right requires *respect* for both your comrades and other people involved in such complex arenas as peace operations and nation assistance. In such ambiguous situations, decisions to use lethal or nonlethal force severely test judgment and discipline. In whatever conditions Army leaders find themselves, they turn the personal warrior ethos into a collective commitment to win with *honor*.

2-88. The warrior ethos is crucial—and perishable—so the Army must continually affirm, develop, and sustain it. Its martial ethic connects American warriors today with those whose sacrifices have allowed our very existence. The Army's continuing drive to be the best, to triumph over all adversity, and to remain focused on mission accomplishment does more than preserve the Army's institutional culture; it sustains the nation.

2-89. Actions that safeguard the nation occur everywhere you find soldiers. The warrior ethos spurs the lead tank driver across a line of departure into uncertainty. It drives the bone-tired medic continually to put others first. It pushes the sweat-soaked gunner near muscle failure to keep up the fire. It drives the heavily loaded infantry soldier into an icy wind, steadily uphill to the objective. It presses the signaler through fatigue to provide communications. And the warrior ethos urges the truck driver across frozen roads bounded by minefields because fellow soldiers at an isolated outpost need supplies. Such tireless motivation comes in part from the comradeship that springs from the warrior ethos. Soldiers fight for each other; they would rather die than let their buddies down. That loyalty runs front to rear as well as left to right: mutual support marks Army culture regardless of who you are, where you are, or what you are doing.

2-90. That tight fabric of loyalty to one another and to collective victory reflects perhaps the noblest aspect of our American warrior ethos: the military's subordinate relationship to civilian authority. That subordination began in 1775, was reconfirmed at

Newburgh, New York, in 1782, and continues to this day. It's established in the Constitution and makes possible the freedom all Americans enjoy. The Army sets out to achieve national objectives, not its own, for *selfless service* is an institutional as well as an individual value. And in the end, the Army returns its people back to the nation. America's sons and daughters return with their experience as part of a winning team and share that spirit as citizens. The traditions and values of the service derive from a commitment to excellent performance and operational success. They also point to the Army's unwavering commitment to the society we serve. Those characteristics serve America and its citizens—both in and out of uniform—well.

CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT

2-91. People come to the Army with a character formed by their background, religious or philosophical beliefs, education, and experience. Your job as an Army leader would be a great deal easier if you could check the values of a new DA civilian or soldier the way medics check teeth or run a blood test. You could figure out what values were missing by a quick glance at Figure 1-1 and administer the right combination, maybe with an injection or magic pill.

2-92. But character development is a complex, lifelong process. No scientist can point to a person and say, "This is when it all happens." However, there are a few things you can count on. You build character in subordinates by creating organizations in which Army values are not just words in a book but precepts for what their members do. You help build subordinates' character by acting the way you want them to act. You teach by example, and coach along the way. (Appendix E contains additional information on character development.) When you hold yourself and your subordinates to the highest standards, you reinforce the values those standards embody. They spread throughout the team, unit, or organization—throughout the Army—like the waves from a pebble dropped into a pond.

CHARACTER AND ETHICS

2-93. When you talk about character, you help your people answer the question, What kind of person should I be? You must not only embrace Army values and leader attributes but also use them to think, reason, and—after reflection—act. Acting in a situation that tests your character requires moral courage. Consider this example.

The Qualification Report

A battalion in a newly activated division had just spent a great deal of time and effort on weapons qualification. When the companies reported results, the battalion commander could not understand why B and C Companies had reported all machine gunners fully qualified while A Company had not. The A Company Commander said that he could not report his gunners qualified because they had only fired on the 10-meter range and the manual for qualification clearly stated that the gunners had to fire on the transition range as well. The battalion commander responded that since the transition range was not built yet, the gunners should be reported as qualified: "They fired on the only range we have. And besides, that's how we did it at Fort Braxton."

Some of the A Company NCOs, who had also been at Fort Braxton, tried to tell their company commander the same thing. But the captain insisted the A Company gunners were not fully qualified, and that's how the report went to the brigade commander.

The brigade commander asked for an explanation of the qualification scores. After hearing the A Company Commander's story, he agreed that the brigade would be doing itself no favors by reporting partially qualified gunners as fully qualified. The incident also sent a message to division: get that transition range built.

The A Company Commander's choice was not between loyalty to his battalion commander and honesty; doing the right thing here meant being loyal and honest. And the company commander had the moral courage to be both honest and loyal—loyal to the Army, loyal to his unit, and loyal to his soldiers.

2-94. The A Company Commander made his decision and submitted his report without knowing how it would turn out. He didn't know the brigade commander would back him up, but he reported his company's status relative to the published Army standard anyway. He insisted on reporting the truth—which took character—because it was the right thing to do.

2-95. Character is important in living a consistent and moral life, but character doesn't always provide the final answer to the specific question, What should I do now? Finding that answer can be called ethical reasoning. Chapter 4 outlines a process for ethical reasoning. When you read it, keep in mind that the process is much more complex than the steps indicate and that you must apply your own values, critical reasoning skills, and imagination to the situation. There are no formulas that will serve every time; sometimes you may not even come up with an answer that completely satisfies you. But if you embrace Army values and let them govern your actions, if you learn from your experiences and develop your skills over time, you're as prepared as you can be to face the tough calls.

2-96. Some people try to set different Army values against one another, saying a problem is about loyalty versus honesty or duty versus respect. Leadership is more complicated than that; the world isn't always black and white. If it were, leadership would be easy and anybody could do it. However, in the vast majority of cases, Army values are perfectly compatible; in fact, they reinforce each other.

CHARACTER AND ORDERS

2-97. Making the right choice and acting on it when faced with an ethical question can be difficult. Sometimes it means standing your ground. Sometimes it means telling your boss you think the boss is wrong, like the finance supervisor in Chapter 1 did. Situations like these test your character. But a situation in which you think you've received an illegal order can be even more difficult.

2-98. In Chapter 1 you read that a good leader executes the boss's decision with energy and enthusiasm. The only exception to this principle is your duty to disobey illegal orders. This isn't a privilege you can conveniently claim, but a duty you must perform. If you think an order is illegal, first be sure that you understand both the details of the order and its original intent. Seek clarification from the person who gave the order. This takes moral courage, but the question will be straightforward: Did you really mean for me to…steal the part…submit a false report…shoot the prisoners? If the question is complex or time permits, always seek legal counsel. However, if you must decide immediately—as may happen in the heat of combat make the best judgment possible based on Army values, your experience, and your previous study and reflection. You take a risk when you disobey what you believe to be an illegal order. It may be the most difficult decision you'll ever make, but that's what leaders do.

2-99. While you'll never be completely prepared for such a situation, spending time reflecting on Army values and leader attributes may help. Talk to your superiors, particularly those who have done what you aspire to do or what you think you'll be called on to do; providing counsel of this sort is an important part of mentoring (which Chapter 5 discusses). Obviously, you need to make time to do this before you're faced with a tough call. When you're in the middle of a firefight, you don't have time to reflect.

CHARACTER AND BELIEFS

2-100. What role do beliefs play in ethical matters? Beliefs are convictions people hold as true; they are based on their upbringing, culture, heritage, families, and traditions. As a result, different moral beliefs have been and will continue to be shaped by diverse religious and philosophical traditions. You serve a nation that takes very seriously the notion that people are free to choose their own beliefs and the basis for those beliefs. In fact, America's strength comes from that diversity. The Army respects different moral backgrounds and personal convictions—as long as they don't conflict

with Army values.

2-101. Beliefs matter because they are the way people make sense of what they experience. Beliefs also provide the basis for personal values; values are moral beliefs that shape a person's behavior. Effective leaders are careful not to require their people to violate their beliefs by ordering or encouraging any illegal or unethical action.

2-102. The Constitution reflects our deepest national values. One of these values is the guarantee of freedom of religion. While religious beliefs and practices are left to individual conscience, Army leaders are responsible for ensuring their soldiers' right to freely practice their religion. Title 10 of the United States Code states, "Each commanding officer shall furnish facilities, including necessary transportation, to any chaplain assigned to his command, to assist the chaplain in performing his duties." What does this mean for Army leaders? The commander delegates staff responsibility to the chaplain for programs to enhance spiritual fitness since many people draw moral fortitude and inner strength from a spiritual foundation. At the same time, no leader may apply undue influence or coerce others in matters of religion—whether to practice or not to practice specific religious beliefs. (The first ten amendments to the Constitution are called the Bill of Rights. Freedom of religion is guaranteed by the First Amendment, an indication of how important the Founders considered it. You can read the Bill of Rights in Appendix F.)

2-103. Army leaders also recognize the role beliefs play in preparing soldiers for battle. Soldiers often fight and win over tremendous odds when they are convinced of the ideals (beliefs) for which they are fighting. Commitment to such beliefs as justice, liberty, freedom, and not letting down your fellow soldier can be essential ingredients in creating and sustaining the will to fight and prevail. A common theme expressed by American PWs during the Vietnam Conflict was the importance of values instilled by a common American culture. Those values helped them to withstand torture and the hardships of captivity.

SECTION II

COMPETENCE: WHAT A LEADER MUST KNOW

The American soldier…demands professional competence in his leaders. In battle, he wants to know that the job is going to be done right, with no unnecessary casualties. The noncommissioned officer wearing the chevron is supposed to be the best soldier in the platoon and he is supposed to know how to perform all the duties expected of him. The American soldier expects his sergeant to be able to teach him how to do his job. And he expects even more from his officers.

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

2-104. Army values and leader attributes form the foundation of the character of soldiers and DA civilians. Character, in turn, serves as the basis of knowing (competence) and doing (leadership). The self-discipline that leads to teamwork is rooted in character. In the Army, teamwork depends on the actions of competent leaders of proven character who know their profession and act to improve their organizations. The best Army leaders constantly strive to improve, to get better at what they do. Their self-discipline focuses on learning more about their profession and continually getting the team to perform better. They build competence in themselves and their subordinates. Leader skills increase in scope and complexity as one moves from direct leader positions to organizational and strategic leader positions. Chapters 4, 6, and 7 discuss in detail the different skills direct, organizational, and strategic leaders require.

2-105. Competence results from hard, realistic training. That's why Basic Training starts with simple skills, such as drill and marksmanship. Soldiers who master these skills have a couple of victories under their belts. The message from the drill sergeants —explicit or not—is, "You've learned how to do those things; now you're ready to take on something tougher." When you lead people through progressively more complex tasks this way, they develop the confidence and will—the inner drive—to take on the next, more difficult challenge.

Figure 2-3. Leader Skills

2-106. For you as an Army leader, competence means much more than being well-trained. Competence links character (knowing the right thing to do) and leadership (doing or influencing your people to do the right thing). Leaders are responsible for being personally competent, but even that isn't enough: as a leader, you're responsible for your subordinates' competence as well.

2-107. Figure 2-3 highlights the four categories containing skills an Army leader must KNOW:

- **Interpersonal skills** affect how you deal with people. They include coaching, teaching, counseling, motivating, and empowering.
- **Conceptual skills** enable you to handle ideas. They require sound judgment as well as the ability to think creatively and reason analytically, critically, and ethically.

- **Technical skills** are job-related abilities. They include basic soldier skills. As an Army leader, you must possess the expertise necessary to accomplish all tasks and functions you're assigned.
- **Tactical skills** apply to solving tactical problems, that is, problems concerning employment of units in combat. You enhance tactical skills when you combine them with interpersonal, conceptual, and technical skills to accomplish a mission.

2-108. Leaders in combat combine interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills to accomplish the mission. They use their interpersonal skills to communicate their intent effectively and motivate their soldiers. They apply their conceptual skills to determine viable concepts of operations, make the right decisions, and execute the tactics the operational environment requires. They capitalize on their technical skills to properly employ the techniques, procedures, fieldcraft, and equipment that fit the situation. Finally, combat leaders employ tactical skill, combining skills from the other skill categories with knowledge of the art of tactics appropriate to their level of responsibility and unit type to accomplish the mission. When plans go wrong and leadership must turn the tide, it is tactical skill, combined with character, that enables an Army leader to seize control of the situation and lead the unit to mission accomplishment.

2-109. The Army leadership framework draws a distinction between developing skills and performing actions. Army leaders who take their units to a combat training center (CTC) improve their skills by performing actions—by doing their jobs on the ground in the midst of intense simulated combat. But they don't wait until they arrive at the CTC to develop their skills; they practice ahead of time in command post exercises, in combat drills, on firing ranges, and even on the physical training (PT) field.

2-110. Your leader skills will improve as your experience broadens. A platoon sergeant gains valuable experience on the job that will help him be a better first sergeant. Army leaders take advantage of every chance to improve: they look for new learning opportunities, ask questions, seek training opportunities, and request performance critiques.

SECTION III

LEADERSHIP: WHAT A LEADER MUST DO

He gets his men to go along with him because they want to do it for him and they believe in him.

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

Figure 2-4. Leader Actions

2-111. Leaders act. They bring together everything they are, everything they believe, and everything they know how to do to provide purpose, direction, and motivation. Army leaders work to influence people, operate to accomplish the mission, and act to improve their organization. This section introduces leader actions. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 discuss them more fully. As with leader skills, leader actions increase in scope and complexity as you move from direct leader positions to organizational and strategic leader positions.

2-112. Developing the right values, attributes, and skills is only preparation to lead. Leadership doesn't begin until you act. Leaders who live up to Army values, who display leader attributes, who are competent, who act at all times as they would have their people act, will succeed. Leaders who talk a good game but can't back their words with actions will fail in the long run.

INFLUENCING

2-113. Army leaders use interpersonal skills to guide others toward a goal. Direct leaders most often influence subordinates face to face—such as when a team leader gives instructions, recognizes achievement, and encourages hard work. Organizational and strategic leaders also influence their immediate subordinates and staff face to face; however, they guide their organizations primarily by indirect influence. Squad leaders, for example, know what their division commander wants, not because the general has briefed each one personally, but because his intent is passed through the chain of command. Influencing actions fall into these categories:

- **Communicating** involves displaying good oral, written, and listening skills for individuals and groups.
- **Decision making** involves selecting the line of action intended to be followed as the one most favorable to the successful accomplishment of the mission. This involves using sound judgment, reasoning logically, and managing resources wisely.
- **Motivating** involves inspiring and guiding others toward mission accomplishment.

OPERATING

2-114. Operating is what you do to accomplish the immediate mission, to get the job done on time and to standard. Operating actions fall into these categories:

- **Planning and preparing** involve developing detailed, executable plans that are feasible, acceptable, and suitable; arranging unit support for the exercise or operation; and conducting rehearsals. During tactical operations, decision making and planning are enhanced by two methodologies: the military decision making process (MDMP) and the troop leading procedures (TLP). Battalion and higher echelons follow the MDMP. Company and lower echelons follow the TLP. (FM 101-5 discusses the MDMP.)
- **Executing** involves meeting mission standards, taking care of people, and efficiently managing resources.
- **Assessing** involves evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of any system or plan in terms of its purpose and mission.

2-115. Leaders assess, or judge, performance so they can determine what needs to be done to sustain the strong areas and improve weak ones. This kind of forward thinking is linked to the last leader action, improving.

IMPROVING

2-116. Good leaders strive to leave an organization better than they found it. A child

struggling to understand why it is better to put money in a piggy bank is learning what leaders know: plan and sacrifice now for the sake of the future. All leaders are tempted to focus on the short-term gain that makes them and their organizations look good today: "Why bother to fix it now? By the time next year rolls around, it will be someone else's problem." But that attitude doesn't serve either your subordinates or the Army well. When an organization sacrifices important training with long-term effects—say, training that leads to true marksmanship skill—and focuses exclusively on short-term appearances—such as qualification scores—the organization's capabilities suffers.

2-117. The results of shortsighted priorities may not appear immediately, but they will appear. Loyalty to your people as well as the Army as an institution demands you consider the long-term effects of your actions. Some of your people will remain in the organization after you've moved on. Some will still be in the Army after you're long gone. Soldiers and DA civilians tomorrow must live with problems leaders don't fix today.

2-118. Army leaders set priorities and balance competing demands. They focus their organizations' efforts on short- and long-term goals while continuing to meet requirements that may or may not contribute directly to achieving those goals. In the case of weapons proficiency, qualification is a requirement but true marksmanship skill is the goal. For battlefield success, soldiers need training that leads to understanding and mastery of technical and tactical skills that hold up under the stress of combat. Throw in all the other things vying for an organization's time and resources and your job becomes even more difficult. Guidance from higher headquarters may help, but you must make the tough calls. Improving actions fall into these categories:

- **Developing** involves investing adequate time and effort to develop individual subordinates as leaders. It includes mentoring.
- **Building** involves spending time and resources to improve teams, groups, and units and to foster an ethical climate.
- **Learning** involves seeking self-improvement and organizational growth. It includes envisioning, adapting, and leading change.

SUMMARY

2-119. As an Army leader, leadership in combat is your primary and most important challenge. It requires you to accept a set of values that contributes to a core of motivation and will. If you fail to accept and live these Army values, your soldiers may die unnecessarily and you may fail to accomplish your mission.

2-120. What must you, as an Army leader, BE, KNOW, and DO? You must have character, that combination of values and attributes that underlie your ability to see what needs to be done, decide to do it, and influence others to follow you. You must be competent, that is, possess the knowledge and skills required to do your job right. And you must lead, take the proper actions to accomplish the mission based on what your

character tells you is ethically right and appropriate for the situation.

2-121. Leadership in combat, the greatest challenge, requires a basis for your motivation and will. That foundation is Army values. In them are rooted the basis for the character and self-discipline that generate the will to succeed and the motivation to persevere. From this motivation derives the lifelong work of self-development in the skills that make a successful Army leader, one who walks the talk of BE, KNOW, DO. Chapter 3 examines the environment that surrounds your people and how what you do as a leader affects it. Understanding the human dimension is essential to mastering leader skills and performing leader actions.

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Chapter 3

The Human Dimension

All soldiers are entitled to outstanding leadership; I will provide that leadership. I know my soldiers and I will always place their needs above my own. I will communicate consistently with my soldiers and never leave them uninformed.

Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer

3-1. Regardless of the level, keep in mind one important aspect of leadership: you lead people. In the words of former Army Chief of Staff Creighton W. Abrams,

The Army is not made up of people; the Army is people…living, breathing, serving human beings. They have needs and interests and desires. They have spirit and will, strengths and abilities. They have weaknesses and faults, and they have means. They are the heart of our preparedness…and this preparedness—as a nation and as an Army—depends upon the spirit of our soldiers. It is the spirit that gives the Army…life. Without it we cannot succeed.

3-2. GEN Abrams could not have been more clear about what's important. To fully appreciate the human dimension of leadership, you must understand two key elements: leadership itself and the people you lead. Leadership—what this manual is about—is far from an exact science; every person and organization is different. Not only that, the environment in which you lead is shaped first by who you are and what you know; second, by your people and what they know; and third, by everything that goes on around you.

3-3. This chapter examines this all-important human dimension. Later chapters discuss the levels of Army leadership and the skills and actions required of leaders at each level.

PEOPLE, THE TEAM, AND THE INSTITUTION

3-4. Former Army Chief of Staff John A. Wickham Jr. described the relationship between the people who are the Army and the Army as an institution this way:

The Army is an institution, not an occupation. Members take an oath of service to the nation and the Army, rather than simply accept a job…the Army has moral and ethical obligations to those who serve and their families; they, correspondingly, have responsibilities to the Army.

3-5. The Army has obligations to soldiers, DA civilians, and their families that most organizations don't have; in return, soldiers and DA civilians have responsibilities to the Army that far exceed those of an employee to most employers. This relationship, one of mutual obligation and responsibility, is at the very center of what makes the Army a team, an institution rather than an occupation.

3-6. Chapter 2 discussed how the Army can't function except as a team. This team identity doesn't come about just because people take an oath or join an organization; you can't force a team to come together any more than you can force a plant to grow. Rather, the team identity comes out of mutual respect among its members and a trust between leaders and subordinates. That bond between leaders and subordinates likewise springs from mutual respect as well as from discipline. The highest form of discipline is the willing obedience of subordinates who trust their leaders, understand and believe in the mission's purpose, value the team and their place in it, and have the will to see the mission through. This form of discipline produces individuals and teams who—in the really tough moments—come up with solutions themselves.

Soldiers Are Our Credentials

In September 1944 on the Cotentin Peninsula in France, the commander of a German stronghold under siege by an American force sent word that he wanted to discuss surrender terms. German MG Hermann Ramcke was in his bunker when his staff escorted the assistant division commander of the US 8th Infantry Division down the concrete stairway to the underground headquarters. MG Ramcke addressed BG Charles D. W. Canham through an interpreter: "I am to surrender to you. Let me see your credentials." Pointing to the dirty, tired, disheveled—but victorious—American infantrymen who had accompanied him and were now crowding the dugout entrance, the American officer replied, "These are my credentials."

DISCIPLINE

I am confident that an army of strong individuals, held together by a sound discipline based on respect for personal initiative and rights and dignity of the individual, will never fail this nation in time of need.

General J. Lawton Collins
Former Army Chief of Staff

3-7. People are our most important resource; soldiers are in fact our "credentials." Part of knowing how to use this most precious resource is understanding the stresses and demands that influence people.

3-8. One sergeant major has described discipline as "a moral, mental, and physical state in which all ranks respond to the will of the [leader], whether he is there or not." Disciplined people take the right action, even if they don't feel like it. True discipline demands habitual and reasoned obedience, an obedience that preserves initiative and works, even when the leader isn't around. Soldiers and DA civilians who understand the purpose of the mission, trust the leader, and share Army values will do the right thing because they're truly committed to the organization.

3-9. Discipline doesn't just mean barking orders and demanding an instant response—it's more complex than that. You build discipline by training to standard, using rewards and punishment judiciously, instilling confidence in and building trust among team members, and creating a knowledgeable collective will. The confidence, trust, and collective will of a disciplined, cohesive unit is crucial in combat.

3-10. You can see the importance of these three characteristics in an example that occurred during the 3 October 1993 American raid in Somalia. One soldier kept fighting despite his wounds. His comrades remembered that he seemed to stop caring about himself, that he had to keep fighting because the other guys—his buddies—were all that mattered. When things go badly, soldiers draw strength from their own and their unit's discipline; they know that other members of the team are depending on them.

3-11. Soldiers—like those of Task Force Ranger in Somalia (which you'll read about later in this chapter) and SGT Alvin York (whose story is in Chapter 5)—persevere in tough situations. They fight through because they have confidence in themselves, their buddies, their leaders, their equipment, and their training—and because they have discipline and will. A young sergeant who participated in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994 asserted this fact when interviewed by the media. The soldier said that operations went well because his unit did things just the way they did them in training and that his training never let him down.

3-12. Even in the most complex operations, the performance of the Army comes down to the training and disciplined performance of individuals and teams on the ground. One example of this fact occurred when a detachment of American soldiers was sent to guard a television tower in Udrigovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3-13. After the soldiers had assumed their posts, a crowd of about 100 people gathered, grew to about 300, and began throwing rocks at the Americans. However, the soldiers didn't overreact. They prevented damage to the tower without creating an international incident. There was no "Boston Massacre" in Udrigovo. The discipline of American soldiers sent into this and other highly volatile situations in Bosnia kept the

lid on that operation. The bloody guerrilla war predicted by some didn't materialize. This is a testament to the professionalism of today's American soldiers—your soldiers—and the quality of their leaders—you.

MORALE

NSDQ [Night Stalkers Don't Quit]

Motto of the 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment, "The Night Stalkers"
Message sent by Chief Warrant Officer Mike Durant,
held by Somali guerrillas, to his wife, October 1993

3-14. When military historians discuss great armies, they write about weapons and equipment, training and the national cause. They may mention sheer numbers (Voltaire said, "God is always on the side of the heaviest battalions") and all sorts of other things that can be analyzed, measured, and compared. However, some also write about another factor equally important to success in battle, something that can't be measured: the emotional element called morale.

3-15. Morale is the human dimension's most important intangible element. It's a measure of how people feel about themselves, their team, and their leaders. High morale comes from good leadership, shared hardship, and mutual respect. It's an emotional bond that springs from common values like loyalty to fellow soldiers and a belief that the organization will care for families. High morale results in a cohesive team that enthusiastically strives to achieve common goals. Leaders know that morale, the essential human element, holds the team together and keeps it going in the face of the terrifying and dispiriting things that occur in war.

You have a comradeship, a rapport that you'll never have again…There's no competitiveness, no money values. You trust the man on your left and your right with your life.

Captain Audie Murphy
Medal of Honor recipient and most decorated
American soldier of World War II

TAKING CARE OF SOLDIERS

Readiness is the best way of truly taking care of soldiers.

Former Sergeant Major of the Army
Richard A. Kidd

3-16. Sending soldiers in harm's way, into places where they may be killed or wounded, might seem to contradict all the emphasis on taking care of soldiers. Does it? How can you truly care for your comrades and send them on missions that might get them killed? Consider this important and fundamental point as you read the next few paragraphs.

3-17. Whenever the talk turns to what leaders do, you'll almost certainly hear someone say, "Take care of your soldiers." And that's good advice. In fact, if you add one more clause, "Accomplish the mission *and* take care of your soldiers," you have guidance for a career. But "taking care of soldiers" is one of those slippery phrases, like the word "honor," that lots of people talk about but few take the trouble to explain. So what does taking care of soldiers mean?

3-18. Taking care of soldiers means creating a disciplined environment where they can learn and grow. It means holding them to high standards, training them to do their jobs so they can function in peace and win in war. You take care of soldiers when you treat them fairly, refuse to cut corners, share their hardships, and set the example. Taking care of soldiers encompasses everything from making sure a soldier has time for an annual dental exam to visiting off-post housing to make sure it's adequate. It also means providing the family support that assures soldiers their families will be taken care of, whether the soldier is home or deployed. Family support means ensuring there's a support group in place, that even the most junior soldier and most inexperienced family members know where to turn for help when their soldier is deployed.

3-19. Taking care of soldiers also means demanding that soldiers do their duty, even at the risk of their lives. It doesn't mean coddling them or making training easy or comfortable. In fact, that kind of training can get soldiers killed. Training must be rigorous and as much like combat as is possible while being safe. Hard training is one way of preparing soldiers for the rigors of combat. Take care of soldiers by giving them the training, equipment, and support they need to keep them alive in combat.

3-20. In war, soldiers' comfort is important because it affects morale and combat effectiveness, but comfort takes a back seat to the mission. Consider this account of the 1944 landings on the island of Leyte in the Philippines, written more than 50 years later by Richard Gerhardt. Gerhardt, who was an 18-year-old rifleman in the 96th Infantry Division, survived two amphibious landings and months of close combat with the Japanese.

The 96th Division on Leyte

By the time we reached the beach, the smoke and dust created by the preparation fire had largely dissipated and we could see the terrain surrounding the landing area, which was flat and covered with some underbrush and palm trees. We were fortunate in that our sector of the beach was not heavily defended, and in going ashore there were few casualties in our platoon. Our company was engaged by small arms fire and a few mortar rounds, but we were able to move forward and secure the landing area in short order. Inland from the beach, however, the terrain turned into swamps, and as we moved ahead it was necessary to wade through muck and mud that was knee-deep at times.…Roads in this part of the island were almost nonexistent, with the area being served by dirt trails around the swamps, connecting the villages.…The Japanese had generally backed off the beaches and left them lightly defended, setting up their defense around certain villages which were at the junctions of the road system, as well as dug-in positions at points along the roads and trails. Our strategy was to…not use the roads and trails, but instead to move through the swamps and rice paddies and attack the enemy strong points from directions not as strongly defended. This was slow, dirty, and extremely fatiguing, but by this tactic we reduced our exposure to the enemy defensive plan, and to heavy fire from their strong points. It must be recognized that in combat the comfort of the front-line troops isn't part of the…planning process, but only what they can endure and still be effective. Conditions that seriously [affect] the combat efficiency of the troops then become a factor.

3-21. Gerhardt learned a lifetime's worth of lessons on physical hardship in the Pacific. Mud, tropical heat, monsoon rains, insects, malaria, Japanese snipers, and infiltrators—the details are still clear in his mind half a century later. Yet he knows—and he tells you—that soldiers must endure physical hardship when the best plan calls for it. In the Leyte campaign, the best plan was extremely difficult to execute, but it was tactically sound and it saved lives.

3-22. This concept doesn't mean that leaders sit at some safe, dry headquarters and make plans without seeing what their soldiers are going through, counting on them to tough out any situation. Leaders know that graphics on a map symbolize soldiers going forward to fight. Leaders get out with the soldiers to see and feel what they're experiencing as well as to influence the battle by their presence. (Gerhardt and numerous other front-line writers refer to the rear echelon as "anything behind my foxhole.") Leaders who stay a safe distance from the front jeopardize operations because they don't know what's going on. They risk destroying their soldiers' trust, not to mention their unit.

The K Company Visit

1LT Harold Leinbaugh, commander of K Company, 333d Infantry Regiment, 84th Division, related this experience from the ETO in January, 1945, during the coldest winter in Europe in nearly 50 years:

On a front-line visit, the battalion commander criticized 1LT Leinbaugh and CPT Jay Prophet, the A Company Commander, for their own and their men's appearance. He said it looked like no one had shaved for a week. 1LT Leinbaugh replied that there was no hot water. Sensing a teaching moment, the colonel responded: "Now if you men would save some of your morning coffee it could be used for shaving." Stepping over to a snowbank, 1LT Leinbaugh picked up a five-gallon GI [general issue] coffee can brought up that morning, and shook it in the colonel's face. The frozen coffee produced a thunk. 1LT Leinbaugh shook it again.

"That's enough," said the colonel,"…I can hear."

3-23. This example illustrates three points:

- The importance of a leader going to where the action is to see and feel what's really going on.
- The importance of a first-line leader telling the boss something he doesn't want to hear.
- The importance of a leader accepting information that doesn't fit his preconceived notions.

3-24. Soldiers are extremely sensitive to situations where their leaders are not at risk, and they're not likely to forget a mistake by a leader they haven't seen. Leaders who are out with their soldiers—in the same rain or snow, under the same blazing sun or in the same dark night, under the same threat of enemy artillery or small arms fire—will not fall into the trap of ignorance. Those who lead from the front can better motivate their soldiers to carry on under extreme conditions.

3-25. Taking care of soldiers is every leader's business. A DA civilian engineering team chief volunteered to oversee the installation of six Force Provider troop life support systems in the vicinity of Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzogovina. Using organizational skills, motivational techniques, and careful supervision, the team chief ensured that the sites were properly laid out, integrated, and installed. As a result of thorough planning and the teamwork the DA civilian leader generated, the morale and quality of life of over 5,000 soldiers were significantly improved.

COMBAT STRESS

All men are frightened. The more intelligent they are, the more they are frightened. The courageous man is the man who forces himself, in spite of his fear, to carry on.

General George S. Patton, Jr.
War As I Knew It

3-26. Leaders understand the human dimension and anticipate soldiers' reactions to stress, especially to the tremendous stress of combat. The answers may look simple as you sit somewhere safe and read this manual, but be sure easy answers don't come in combat. However, if you think about combat stress and its effects on you and your soldiers ahead of time, you'll be less surprised and better prepared to deal with and reduce its effects. It takes mental discipline to imagine the unthinkable—the plan going wrong, your soldiers wounded or dying, and the enemy coming after YOU. But in combat all of these things can happen, and your soldiers expect you, their leader, to have thought through each of them. Put yourself in the position of the squad leader in the following example.

Task Force Ranger in Somalia, 1993

"Sarge" was a company favorite, a big powerful kid from New Jersey who talked with his hands and played up his "Joy-zee" accent. He loved practical jokes. One of his favorites was to put those tiny charges in guys' cigarettes, the kind that would explode with a loud "POP!" about halfway through a smoke. If anyone else had done it, it would have been annoying; Sarge usually got everyone to laugh—even the guy whose cigarette he destroyed.

During the 3 October 1993 raid in Mogadishu, Sarge was manning his Humvee's .50 cal when he was hit and killed. The driver and some of the guys in back screamed, "He's dead! He's dead!" They panicked and were not responding as their squad leader tried to get someone else up and behind the gun. The squad leader had to yell at them, "Just calm down! We've got to keep fighting or none of us will get back alive."

3-27. Consider carefully what the squad leader did. First he told his squad to calm down. Then he told them why it was important: they had to continue the fight if they wanted to make it back to their base alive. In this way he jerked his soldiers back to a conditioned response, one that had been drilled during training and that took their minds off the loss. The squad leader demonstrated the calm, reasoned leadership under stress that's critical to mission success. In spite of the loss, the unit persevered.

WILL AND WINNING IN BATTLE

3-28. The Army's ultimate responsibility is to win the nation's wars. And what is it that carries soldiers through the terrible challenges of combat? It's the will to win, the

ability to gut it out when things get really tough, even when things look hopeless. It's the will not only to persevere but also to find workable solutions to the toughest problems. This drive is part of the warrior ethos, the ability to forge victory out of the chaos of battle—to overcome fear, hunger, deprivation, and fatigue and accomplish the mission. And the will to win serves you just as well in peacetime, when it's easy to become discouraged, feel let down, and spend your energy complaining instead of using your talents to make things better. Discipline holds a team together; the warrior ethos motivates its members—you and your people—to continue the mission.

3-29. All soldiers are warriors: all need to develop and display the will to win—the desire to do their job well—to persevere, no matter what the circumstances. The Army is a team, and all members' contributions are essential to mission accomplishment. As an Army leader, you're responsible for developing this sense of belonging in your subordinates. Not only that; it's your job to inculcate in your people the winning spirit —the commitment to do their part to accomplish the mission, no matter when, no matter where, no matter what.

3-30. Army operations often involve danger and therefore fear. Battling the effects of fear has nothing to do with denying it and everything to do with recognizing fear and handling it. Leaders let their subordinates know, "You can expect to be afraid; here's what we'll do about it." The Army standard is to continue your mission to successful completion, as GEN Patton said, in spite of your fears. But saying this isn't going to make it happen. Army leaders expect fear to take hold when things go poorly, setbacks occur, the unit fails to complete a mission, or there are casualties. The sights and sounds of the modern battlefield are terrifying. So is fear of the unknown. Soldiers who see their buddies killed or wounded suddenly have a greater burden: they become aware of their own mortality. On top of all these obvious sources of fear is the insecurity before battle that many veterans have written about: "Will I perform well or will I let my buddies down?"

3-31 the October 1993 fight in Somalia, one soldier who made it back to the safety of the American position was told to prepare to go back out; there were other soldiers in trouble. He had just run a gauntlet of fire, had just seen his friends killed and wounded, and was understandably afraid. "I can't go back out there," he told his sergeant. The leader reassured the soldier while reminding him of the mission and his responsibility to the team: "I know you're scared…I'm scared…I've never been in a situation like this, either. But we've got to go. It's our job. The difference between being a coward and a man isn't whether you're scared; it's what you do while you're scared." That frightened soldier probably wasn't any less afraid, but he climbed back on the vehicle and went out to rescue the other American soldiers.

3-32. Will and a winning spirit apply in more situations than those requiring physical courage; sometimes you'll have to carry on for long periods in very difficult situations. The difficulties soldiers face may not be ones of physical danger, but of great physical, emotional, and mental strain. Physical courage allowed the soldier in the situation described above to return to the fight; will allowed his leader to say the right thing, to

influence his frightened subordinate to do the right thing. Physical courage causes soldiers to charge a machine gun; will empowers them to fight on when they're hopelessly outnumbered, under appalling conditions, and without basic necessities.

STRESS IN TRAINING

When the bullets started flying…I never thought about half the things I was doing. I simply relied on my training and concentrated on the mission.

Captain Marie Bezubic
Operation Just Cause, Panama

3-33. Leaders must inject stress into training to prepare soldiers for stress in combat. However, creating a problem for subordinates and having them react to it doesn't induce the kind of stress required for combat training. A meaningful and productive mission, given with detailed constraints and limitations plus high standards of performance, does produce stress. Still, leaders must add unanticipated conditions to that stress to create a real learning environment. Sometimes, you don't even have to add stress; it just happens, as in this example.

Mix-up at the Crossroads

A young transportation section chief was leading a convoy of trucks on a night move to link up with several rifle companies. He was to transport the infantry to a new assembly area. When a sudden rainstorm dropped visibility to near zero, the section chief was especially glad that he had carefully briefed his drivers, issued strip maps, and made contingency plans. At a road intersection, his northbound convoy passed through an artillery battery moving east. When his convoy reached the rendezvous and the section chief got out to check his vehicles, he found he was missing two of his own trucks but had picked up three others towing howitzers. The tired and wet infantry commander was concerned that his unit would be late crossing the line of departure and forcefully expressed that concern to the section chief. The section chief now had to accomplish the same mission with fewer resources as well as run down his lost trucks and soldiers. There was certainly enough stress to go around.

After the section chief sent one of his most reliable soldiers with the artillery vehicles to find his missing trucks, he started shuttling the infantrymen to their destination. Later, after the mission was accomplished, the section chief and his drivers talked about what had happened. The leader admitted that he needed to supervise a convoy more closely under difficult conditions, and his soldiers recognized the need to follow the part of the unit SOP concerning reduced visibility operations.

3-34. The section chief fixed the immediate problem by starting to shuttle the infantry

soldiers in the available trucks. During the AAR with the drivers, the leader admitted a mistake and figured out how to prevent similar errors in the future. The section chief also let the team know that sometimes, in spite of the best plans, things go wrong. A well-trained organization doesn't buckle under stress but deals with any setbacks and continues the mission.

THE STRESS OF CHANGE

3-35. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has gone through tremendous change—dramatic decreases in the number of soldiers and DA civilians in all components, changes in assignment policies, base closings, and a host of other shifts that put stress on soldiers, DA civilians, and families. In those same years, the number of deployments to support missions such as peace operations and nation assistance has increased. And these changes have occurred in peacetime Army. At the same time, Army leaders have had to prepare their soldiers for the stresses of combat, the ultimate crucible.

3-36. The stresses of combat you read about earlier in this chapter are classic: they've been the same for centuries. However, there's an aspect of the human dimension that has assumed an increasing importance: the effect of technological advances on organizations and people. Military leaders have always had to deal with the effect of technological changes. What's different today is the rate at which technology, to include warfighting technology, is changing. Rapid advances in new technologies are forcing the Army to change many aspects of the way it operates and are creating new leadership challenges.

TECHNOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP

3-37. Technology's presence challenges all Army leaders. Technology is here to stay and you, as an Army leader, need to continually learn how to manage it and make it work for you. The challenges come from many directions. Among them—

- You need to learn the strengths and vulnerabilities of the different technologies that support your team and its mission.
- You need to think through how your organization will operate with organizations that are less or more technologically complex. This situation may take the form of heavy and light Army units working together, operating with elements of another service, or cooperating with elements of another nation's armed forces.
- You need to consider the effect of technology on the time you have to analyze problems, make a decision, and act. Events happen faster today, and the stress you encounter as an Army leader is correspondingly greater.
- Technological advances have the potential to permit better and more sustainable operations. However, as an Army leader you must remember the limitations of your people. No matter what technology you have or how it affects your

mission, it's still your soldiers and DA civilians—their minds, hearts, courage, and talents—that will win the day.

3-38. Advances in electronic data processing let you handle large amounts of information easily. Today's desktop computer can do more, and do it faster, than the room-sized computers of only 20 years ago. Technology is a powerful tool—if you understand its potential uses and limitations. The challenge for all Army leaders is to overcome confusion on a fast-moving battlefield characterized by too much information coming in too fast.

3-39. Army leaders and staffs have always needed to determine mission-critical information, prioritize incoming reports, and process them quickly. The volume of information that current technology makes available makes this skill even more important than in the past. Sometimes something low-tech can divert the flood of technological help into channels the leader and staff can manage. For example, a well-understood commander's intent and thought-through commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) can help free leaders from nonessential information while pushing decisions to lower levels. As an Army leader, you must work hard to overcome the attractiveness and potential pitfalls of centralized decision making that access to information will appear to make practical.

3-40. Technology is also changing the size of the battlefield and the speed of battle. Instant global communications are increasing the pace of military actions. Global positioning systems and night vision capabilities mean the Army can fight at night and during periods of limited visibility—conditions that used to slow things down. Continuous operations increase the mental and physical stress on soldiers and leaders. Nonlinear operations make it more difficult for commanders to determine critical points on the battlefield. Effective leaders develop techniques to identify and manage stress well before actual conflict occurs. They also find ways to overcome the soldier's increased sense of isolation that comes with the greater breadth and depth of the modern battlefield. (FM 100-34 discusses continuous operations. FM 22-51 discusses combat stress control.)

3-41. Modern technology has also increased the number and complexity of skills the Army requires. Army leaders must carefully manage low-density specialties. They need to ensure that critical positions are filled and that their people maintain perishable skills. Army leaders must bring together leadership, personnel management, and training management to ensure their organizations are assigned people with the right specialties and that the entire organization is trained and ready. On top of this, the speed and lethality of modern battle have made mental agility and initiative even more necessary for fighting and winning. As in the past, Army leaders must develop these attributes in their subordinates.

3-42. To some, technology suggests a bloodless battlefield that resembles a computer war game more than the battlefields of the past. That isn't true now and it won't be true

in the immediate future. Technology is still directed at answering the same basic questions that Civil War leaders tried to answer when they sent out a line of skirmishers: Where am I? Where are my buddies? Where is the enemy? How do I defeat him? Armed with this information, the soldiers and DA civilians of the Army will continue to accomplish the mission with character, using their technological edge to do the job better, faster, and smarter.

3-43. Modern digital technology can contribute a great deal to the Army leader's understanding of the battlefield; good leaders stay abreast of advances that enhance their tactical abilities. Digital technology has a lot to offer, but don't be fooled. A video image of a place, an action, or an organization can never substitute for the leader's getting down on the ground with the soldiers to find out what's going on. Technology can provide a great deal of information, but it may not present a completely accurate picture. The only way leaders can see the urgency in the faces of their soldiers is to get out and see them. As with any new weapon, the Army leader must know how to use technology without being seduced by it. Technology may be invaluable; however, effective leaders understand its limits.

3-44. Whatever their feeling regarding technology, today's leaders must contend more and more with an increased information flow and operational tempo (OPTEMPO). Pressures to make a decision increase, even as the time to verify and validate information decreases. Regardless of the crunch, Army leaders are responsible for the consequences of their decisions, so they gather, process, analyze, evaluate—and check—information. If they don't, the costs can be disastrous. (FM 100-34 discusses information management and decision making.)

"Superior Technology"

In the late fall of 1950, as United Nations (UN) forces pushed the North Korean People's Army northward, the People's Republic of China prepared to enter the conflict in support of its ally. The UN had air superiority, a marked advantage that had contributed significantly to the UN tactical and operational successes of the summer and early fall. Nonetheless, daily reconnaissance missions over the rugged North Korean interior failed to detect the Chinese People's Liberation Army's movement of nearly a quarter of a million ground troops across the border and into position in the North Korean mountains.

When the first reports of Chinese soldiers in North Korea arrived at Far East Command in Tokyo, intelligence analysts ignored them because they contradicted the information provided by the latest technology—aerial surveillance. Tactical commanders failed to send ground patrols into the mountains. They assumed the photos gave an accurate picture of the enemy situation when, in fact, the Chinese were practicing strict camouflage discipline. When the Chinese attacked in late November, UN forces were surprised, suffered heavy losses, and were driven from the Chinese border back to the 38th parallel.

When GEN Matthew B. Ridgway took over the UN forces in Korea in December, he immediately visited the headquarters of every regiment and many of the battalions on the front line. This gave GEN Ridgway an unfiltered look at the situation, and it sent a message to all his commanders: get out on the ground and find out what's going on.

3-45. The Chinese counterattack undid the results of the previous summer's campaign and denied UN forces the opportunity for a decisive victory that may have ended the war. The UN forces, under US leadership, enjoyed significant technological advantages over the Chinese. However, failure to verify the information provided by aerial photography set this advantage to zero. And this failure was one of leadership, not technology. Questioning good news provided by the latest "gee-whiz" system and ordering reconnaissance patrols to go out in lousy weather both require judgment and moral courage: judgment as to when a doubt is reasonable and courage to order soldiers to risk their lives in cold, miserable weather. But Army leaders must make those judgments and give those orders. Technology has not changed that.

3-46. Technology and making the most of it will become increasingly important. Today's Army leaders require systems understanding and more technical and tactical skills. Technical skill: What does this system do? What does it not do? What are its strengths? What are its weaknesses? What must I check? Tactical skill: How do this system's capabilities support my organization? How should I employ it to support this mission? What must I do if it fails? There's a fine line between a healthy questioning of new systems' capabilities and an unreasoning hostility that rejects the advantages technology offers. You, as an Army leader, must stay on the right side of that line, the side that allows you to maximize the advantages of technology. You need to remain aware of its capabilities and shortcomings, and you need to make sure your people do as well.

LEADERSHIP AND THE CHANGING THREAT

3-47. Another factor that will have a major impact on Army leadership in the near future is the changing nature of the threat. For the Army, the twenty-first century began in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union. America no longer defines its security interests in terms of a single, major threat. Instead, it faces numerous, smaller threats and situations, any of which can quickly mushroom into a major security challenge.

3-48. The end of the Cold War has increased the frequency and variety of Army missions. Since 1989, the Army has fought a large-scale land war and been continually involved in many different kinds of stability operations and support operations. There has been a greater demand for special, joint, and multinational operations as well. Initiative at all levels is becoming more and more important. In many instances, Army leaders on the ground have had to invent ways of doing business for situations they

could not have anticipated.

3-49. Not only that, the importance of direct leaders—NCOs and junior officers—making the right decisions in stressful situations has increased. Actions by direct-level leaders—sergeants, warrant officers, lieutenants, and captains—can have organizational- and strategic-level implications. Earlier in this chapter, you read about the disciplined soldiers and leaders who accomplished their mission of securing a television tower in Udrigovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that case, the local population's perception of how American soldiers secured the tower was just as important as securing the tower itself. Had the American detachment created an international incident by using what could have been interpreted as excessive force, maintaining order throughout Bosnia Herzegovina would have become more difficult. The Army's organizational and strategic leaders count on direct leaders. It has always been important to accomplish the mission the right way the first time; today it's more important than ever.

3-50. The Army has handled change in the past. It will continue to do so in the future as long as Army leaders emphasize the constants—Army values, teamwork, and discipline—and help their people anticipate change by seeking always to improve. Army leaders explain, to the extent of their knowledge and in clear terms, what may happen and how the organization can effectively react if it does. Change is inevitable; trying to avoid it is futile. The disciplined, cohesive organization rides out the tough times and will emerge even better than it started. Leadership, in a very real sense, includes managing change and making it work for you. To do that, you must know what to change and what not to change.

3-51. FM 100-5 provides a doctrinal framework for coping with these challenges while executing operations. It gives Army leaders clues as to what they will face and what will be required of them, but as COL Chamberlain found on Little Round Top, no manual can cover all possibilities. The essence of leadership remains the same: Army leaders create a vision of what's necessary, communicate it in a way that makes their intent clear, and vigorously execute it to achieve success.

CLIMATE AND CULTURE

3-52. Climate and culture describe the environment in which you lead your people. Culture refers to the environment of the Army as an institution and of major elements or communities within it. Strategic leaders maintain the Army's institutional culture. (Chapter 7 discusses their role.) Climate refers to the environment of units and organizations. All organizational and direct leaders establish their organization's climate, whether purposefully or unwittingly. (Chapters 5 and 6 discuss their responsibilities.)

CLIMATE

3-53. Taking care of people and maximizing their performance also depends on the climate a leader creates in the organization. An organization's climate is the way its members feel about their organization. Climate comes from people's shared perceptions and attitudes, what they believe about the day-to-day functioning of their outfit. These things have a great impact on their motivation and the trust they feel for their team and their leaders. Climate is generally short-term: it depends on a network of the personalities in a small organization. As people come and go, the climate changes. When a soldier says "My last platoon sergeant was pretty good, but this new one is great," the soldier is talking about one of the many elements that affect organizational climate.

3-54. Although such a call seems subjective, some very definite things determine climate. The members' collective sense of the organization—its organizational climat—is directly attributable to the leader's values, skills, and actions. As an Army leader, you establish the climate of your organization, no matter how small it is or how large. Answering the following questions can help you describe an organization's climate:

- Does the leader set clear priorities and goals?
- Is there a system of recognition, rewards and punishments? Does it work?
- Do the leaders know what they're doing? Do they admit when they're wrong?
- Do leaders seek input from subordinates? Do they act on the feedback they're provided?
- In the absence of orders, do junior leaders have authority to make decisions that are consistent with the leader's intent?
- Are there high levels of internal stress and negative competition in the organization? If so, what's the leader doing to change that situation?
- Do the leaders behave the way they talk? Is that behavior consistent with Army values? Are they good role models?
- Do the leaders lead from the front, sharing hardship when things get tough?
- Do leaders talk to their organizations on a regular basis? Do they keep their people informed?

3-55. Army leaders who do the right things for the right reasons—even when it would be easier to do the wrong thing—create a healthy organizational climate. In fact, it's the leader's behavior that has the greatest effect on the organizational climate. That behavior signals to every member of the organization what the leader will and will not tolerate. Consider this example.

Changing a Unit Climate—The New Squad Leader

SSG Withers was having a tough week. He had just been promoted to squad leader in a different company; he had new responsibilities, new leaders, and new soldiers. Then, on his second day, his unit was alerted for a big inspection in two days. A quick check of the records let him know that the squad leader before him had let maintenance slip; the records were sloppy and a lot of the scheduled work had not been done. On top of that, SSG Withers was sure his new platoon sergeant didn't like him. SFC King was professional but gruff, a person of few words. The soldiers in SSG Withers' squad seemed a little afraid of the platoon sergeant.

After receiving the company commander's guidance about the inspection, the squad leaders briefed the platoon sergeant on their plans to get ready. SSG Withers had already determined that he and his soldiers would have to work late. He could have complained about his predecessor, but he thought it would be best just to stick to the facts and talk about what he had found in the squad. For all he knew, the old squad leader might have been a favorite of SFC King.

SFC King scowled as he asked, "You're going to work late?"

SSG Withers had checked his plan twice: "Yes, sergeant. I think it's necessary."

SFC King grunted, but the sound could have meant "okay" or it could have meant "You're being foolish." SSG Withers wasn't sure.

The next day SSG Withers told his soldiers what they would have to accomplish. One of the soldiers said that the old squad leader would have just fudged the paperwork. "No kidding," SSG Withers thought. He wondered if SFC King knew about it. Of course, there was a good chance he would fail the inspection if he didn't fudge the paperwork—and wouldn't that be a good introduction to the new company? But he told his squad that they would do it right: "We'll do the best we can. If we don't pass, we'll do better next time."

SSG Withers then asked his squad for their thoughts on how to get ready. He listened to their ideas and offered some of his own. One soldier suggested that they could beat the other squads by sneaking into the motor pool at night and lowering the oil levels in their vehicles. "SFC King gives a half day off to whatever squad does best," the soldier explained. SSG Withers didn't want to badmouth the previous squad leader; on the other hand, the squad was his responsibility now. "It'd be nice to win," SSG Withers said, "but we're not going to cheat."

The squad worked past 2200 hours the night before the inspection. At one point SSG Withers found one of the soldiers sleeping under a vehicle. "Don't you want to finish and go home to sleep?" he asked the soldier.

"I…uh…I didn't think you'd still be here," the soldier answered.

"Where else would I be?" replied the squad leader.

The next day, SFC King asked SSG Withers if he thought his squad's vehicle was going to pass the inspection.

"Not a chance," SSG Withers said.

SFC King gave another mysterious grunt.

Later, when the inspector was going over his vehicle, SSG Withers asked if his soldiers could follow along. "I want them to see how to do a thorough inspection," he told the inspector. As the soldiers followed the inspector around and learned how to look closely at the vehicle, one of them commented that the squad had never been around for any inspection up to that point. "We were always told to stay away," he said.

Later, when the company commander went over the results of the inspection, he looked up at SSG Withers as he read the failing grade. SSG Withers was about to say, "We'll try harder next time, sir," but he decided that sounded lame, so he said nothing. Then SFC King spoke up.

"First time that squad has ever failed an inspection," the platoon sergeant said, "but they're already better off than they were the day before yesterday, failing grade and all."

3-56. SFC King saw immediately that things had changed for the better in SSG Withers' squad. The failing grade was real; previous passing grades had not been. The new squad leader told the truth and expected his soldiers to do the same. He was there when his people were working late. He acted to improve the squad's ethical and performance standards (by clearly stating and enforcing them). He moved to teach his soldiers the skills and standards associated with vehicle maintenance (by asking the inspector to show them how to look at a vehicle). And not once did SSG Withers whine that the failing grade was not his fault; instead, he focused on how to make things better. SSG Withers knew how to motivate soldiers to perform to standard and had the strength of character to do the right thing. In addition, he trusted the chain of command to take the long-term view. Because of his decisive actions, based on his character and competence, SSG Withers was well on his way to creating a much healthier climate in his squad.

3-57. No matter how they complain about it, soldiers and DA civilians expect to be held to standard; in the long run they feel better about themselves when they do hard work successfully. They gain confidence in leaders who help them achieve standards and lose confidence in leaders who don't know the standards or who fail to demand performance.

CULTURE

When you're first sergeant, you're a role model whether you know it or not. You're a role model for the guy that will be in your job. Not next month or next year, but ten years from now. Every day soldiers are watching you and deciding if you are the kind of first sergeant they want to be.

An Army First Sergeant
1988

3-58. Culture is a longer lasting, more complex set of shared expectations than climate. While climate is how people feel about their organization right now, culture consists of the shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterize the larger institution. It's deeply rooted in long-held beliefs, customs, and practices. For instance, the culture of the armed forces is different from that of the business world, and the culture of the Army is different from that of the Navy. Leaders must establish a climate consistent with the culture of the larger institution. They also use the culture to let their people know they're part of something bigger than just themselves, that they have responsibilities not only to the people around them but also to those who have gone before and those who will come after.

3-59. Soldiers draw strength from knowing they're part of a tradition. Most meaningful traditions have their roots in the institution's culture. Many of the Army's everyday customs and traditions are there to remind you that you're just the latest addition to a long line of American soldiers. Think of how much of your daily life connects you to the past and to American soldiers not yet born: the uniforms you wear, the martial music that punctuates your day, the way you salute, your title, your organization's history, and Army values such as selfless service. Reminders of your place in history surround you.

3-60. This sense of belonging is vitally important. Visit the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, DC, some Memorial Day weekend and you'll see dozens of veterans, many of them wearing bush hats or campaign ribbons or fatigue jackets decorated with unit patches. They're paying tribute to their comrades in this division or that company. They're also acknowledging what for many of them was the most intense experience of their lives.

3-61. Young soldiers want to belong to something bigger than themselves. Look at them off duty, wearing tee shirts with names of sports teams and famous athletes. It's not as if an 18-year-old who puts on a jacket with a professional sports team's logo thinks anyone will mistake him for a professional player; rather, that soldier wants to be associated with a winner. Advertising and mass media make heroes of rock stars, athletes, and actors. Unfortunately, it's easier to let some magazine or TV show tell you whom to admire than it is to dig up an organization's history and learn about heroes.

3-62. Soldiers want to have heroes. If they don't know about SGT Alvin York in

World War I, about COL Joshua Chamberlain's 20th Maine during the Civil War, about MSG Gary Gordon and SFC Randall Shughart in the 1993 Somalia fight, then it's up to you, their leaders, to teach them. (The bibliography lists works you can use to learn more about your profession, its history, and the people who made it.)

3-63. When soldiers join the Army, they become part of a history: the Big Red One, the King of Battle, Sua Sponte. Teach them the history behind unit crests, behind greetings, behind decorations and badges. The Army's culture isn't something that exists apart from you; it's part of who you are, something you can use to give your soldiers pride in themselves and in what they're doing with their lives.

LEADERSHIP STYLES

3-64. You read in Chapter 2 that all people are shaped by what they've seen, what they've learned, and whom they've met. Who you are determines the way you work with other people. Some people are happy and smiling all the time; others are serious. Some leaders can wade into a room full of strangers and inside of five minutes have everyone there thinking, "How have I lived so long without meeting this person?" Other very competent leaders are uncomfortable in social situations. Most of us are somewhere in between. Although Army leadership doctrine describes at great length how you should interact with your subordinates and how you must strive to learn and improve your leadership skills, the Army recognizes that you must always be yourself; anything else comes across as fake and insincere.

3-65. Having said that, effective leaders are flexible enough to adjust their leadership style and techniques to the people they lead. Some subordinates respond best to coaxing, suggestions, or gentle prodding; others need, and even want at times, the verbal equivalent of a kick in the pants. Treating people fairly doesn't mean treating people as if they were clones of one another. In fact, if you treat everyone the same way, you're probably being unfair, because different people need different things from you.

3-66. Think of it this way: Say you must teach map reading to a large group of soldiers ranging in rank from private to senior NCO. The senior NCOs know a great deal about the subject, while the privates know very little. To meet all their needs, you must teach the privates more than you teach the senior NCOs. If you train the privates only in the advanced skills the NCOs need, the privates will be lost. If you make the NCOs sit through training in the basic tasks the privates need, you'll waste the NCOs' time. You must fit the training to the experience of those being trained. In the same way, you must adjust your leadership style and techniques to the experience of your people and characteristics of your organization.

3-67. Obviously, you don't lead senior NCOs the same way you lead privates. But the easiest distinctions to make are those of rank and experience. You must also take into account personalities, self-confidence, self-esteem—all the elements of the complex

mix of character traits that makes dealing with people so difficult and so rewarding. One of the many things that makes your job tough is that, in order to get their best performance, you must figure out what your subordinates need and what they're able to do—even when they don't know themselves.

3-68. When discussing leadership styles, many people focus on the extremes: autocratic and democratic. Autocratic leaders tell people what to do with no explanation; their message is, "I'm the boss; you'll do it because I said so." Democratic leaders use their personalities to persuade subordinates. There are many shades in between; the following paragraphs discuss five of them. However, bear in mind that competent leaders mix elements of all these styles to match to the place, task, and people involved. Using different leadership styles in different situations or elements of different styles in the same situation isn't inconsistent. The opposite is true: if you can use only one leadership style, you're inflexible and will have difficulty operating in situations where that style doesn't fit.

DIRECTING LEADERSHIP STYLE

3-69. The directing style is leader-centered. Leaders using this style don't solicit input from subordinates and give detailed instructions on how, when, and where they want a task performed. They then supervise its execution very closely.

3-70. The directing style may be appropriate when time is short and leaders don't have a chance to explain things. They may simply give orders: Do this. Go there. Move. In fast-paced operations or in combat, leaders may revert to the directing style, even with experienced subordinates. This is what the motor sergeant you read about in Chapter 1 did. If the leader has created a climate of trust, subordinates will assume the leader has switched to the directing style because of the circumstances.

3-71. The directing style is also appropriate when leading inexperienced teams or individuals who are not yet trained to operate on their own. In this kind of situation, the leader will probably remain close to the action to make sure things go smoothly.

3-72. Some people mistakenly believe the directing style means using abusive or demeaning language or includes threats and intimidation. This is wrong. If you're ever tempted to be abusive, whether because of pressure or stress or what seems like improper behavior by a subordinate, ask yourself these questions: Would I want to work for someone like me? Would I want my boss to see and hear me treat subordinates this way? Would I want to be treated this way?

PARTICIPATING LEADERSHIP STYLE

3-73. The participating style centers on both the leader and the team. Given a mission, leaders ask subordinates for input, information, and recommendations but make the final decision on what to do themselves. This style is especially appropriate for leaders

who have time for such consultations or who are dealing with experienced subordinates.

3-74. The team-building approach lies behind the participating leadership style. When subordinates help create a plan, it becomes—at least in part—their plan. This ownership creates a strong incentive to invest the effort necessary to make the plan work. Asking for this kind of input is a sign of a leader's strength and self-confidence. But asking for advice doesn't mean the leader is obligated to follow it; the leader alone is always responsible for the quality of decisions and plans.

DELEGATING LEADERSHIP STYLE

3-75. The delegating style involves giving subordinates the authority to solve problems and make decisions without clearing them through the leader. Leaders with mature and experienced subordinates or who want to create a learning experience for subordinates often need only to give them authority to make decisions, the necessary resources, and a clear understanding of the mission's purpose. As always, the leader is ultimately responsible for what does or does not happen, but in the delegating leadership style, the leader holds subordinate leaders accountable for their actions. This is the style most often used by officers dealing with senior NCOs and by organizational and strategic leaders.

TRANSFORMATIONAL AND TRANSACTIONAL LEADERSHIP STYLES

A man does not have himself killed for a few halfpence a day or for a petty distinction. You must speak to the soul in order to electrify the man.

Napoleon Bonaparte

3-76. These words of a distinguished military leader capture the distinction between the transformational leadership style, which focuses on inspiration and change, and the transactional leadership style, which focuses on rewards and punishments. Of course Napoleon understood the importance of rewards and punishments. Nonetheless, he also understood that carrots and sticks alone don't inspire individuals to excellence.

Transformational Leadership Style

3-77. As the name suggests, the transformational style "transforms" subordinates by challenging them to rise above their immediate needs and self-interests. The transformational style is developmental: it emphasizes individual growth (both professional and personal) and organizational enhancement. Key features of the transformational style include empowering and mentally stimulating subordinates: you consider and motivate them first as individuals and then as a group. To use the transformational style, you must have the courage to communicate your intent and then step back and let your subordinates work. You must also be aware that immediate

benefits are often delayed until the mission is accomplished.

3-78. The transformational style allows you to take advantage of the skills and knowledge of experienced subordinates who may have better ideas on how to accomplish a mission. Leaders who use this style communicate reasons for their decisions or actions and, in the process, build in subordinates a broader understanding and ability to exercise initiative and operate effectively. However, not all situations lend themselves to the transformational leadership style. The transformational style is most effective during periods that call for change or present new opportunities. It also works well when organizations face a crisis, instability, mediocrity, or disenchantment. It may not be effective when subordinates are inexperienced, when the mission allows little deviation from accepted procedures, or when subordinates are not motivated. Leaders who use only the transformational leadership style limit their ability to influence individuals in these and similar situations.

Transactional Leadership Style

3-79. In contrast, some leaders employ only the transactional leadership style. This style includes such techniques as—

- Motivating subordinates to work by offering rewards or threatening punishment.
- Prescribing task assignments in writing.
- Outlining all the conditions of task completion, the applicable rules and regulations, the benefits of success, and the consequences—to include possible disciplinary actions—of failure.
- "Management -by- exception,"where leaders focus on their subordinates' failures, showing up only when something goes wrong.
- The leader who relies exclusively on the transactional style, rather than combining it with the transformational style, evokes only short-term commitment from his subordinates and discourages risk-taking and innovation.

3-80. There are situations where the transactional style is acceptable, if not preferred. For example, a leader who wants to emphasize safety could reward the organization with a three-day pass if the organization prevents any serious safety-related incidents over a two-month deployment. In this case, the leader's intent appears clear: unsafe acts are not tolerated and safe habits are rewarded.

3-81. However, using only the transactional style can make the leader's efforts appear self-serving. In this example, soldiers might interpret the leader's attempt to reward safe practices as an effort to look good by focusing on something that's unimportant but that has the boss's attention. Such perceptions can destroy the trust subordinates have in the leader. Using the transactional style alone can also deprive subordinates of opportunities to grow, because it leaves no room for honest mistakes.

3-82. The most effective leaders combine techniques from the transformational and

transactional leadership styles to fit the situation. A strong base of transactional understanding supplemented by charisma, inspiration and individualized concern for each subordinate, produces the most enthusiastic and genuine response. Subordinates will be more committed, creative, and innovative. They will also be more likely to take calculated risks to accomplish their mission. Again referring to the safety example, leaders can avoid any misunderstanding of their intent by combining transformational techniques with transactional techniques. They can explain why safety is important (intellectual stimulation) and encourage their subordinates to take care of each other (individualized concern).

INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

3-83. The actions you take as a leader will most likely have unintended as well as intended consequences. Like a chess player trying to anticipate an opponent's moves three or four turns in advance—if I do this, what will my opponent do; then what will I do next?—leaders think through what they can expect to happen as a result of a decision. Some decisions set off a chain of events; as far as possible, leaders must anticipate the second- and third-order effects of their actions. Even lower-level leaders' actions may have effects well beyond what they expect.

3-84. Consider the case of a sergeant whose team is manning a roadblock as part of a peace operation. The mission has received lots of media attention (Haiti and Bosnia come to mind), and millions of people back home are watching. Early one morning, a truckload of civilians appears, racing toward the roadblock. In the half-light, the sergeant can't tell if the things in the passengers' hands are weapons or farm tools, and the driver seems intent on smashing through the barricade. In the space of a few seconds, the sergeant must decide whether or not to order his team to fire on the truck.

3-85. If the sergeant orders his team to fire because he feels he and his soldiers are threatened, that decision will have international consequences. If he kills any civilians, chances are good that his chain of command from the president on down—not to mention the entire television audience of the developed world—will know about the incident in a few short hours. But the decision is tough for another reason: if the sergeant doesn't order his team to fire and the civilians turn out to be an armed gang, the team may take casualties that could have been avoided. If the only factor involved was avoiding civilian casualties, the choice is simple: don't shoot. But the sergeant must also consider the requirement to protect his force and accomplish the mission of preventing unauthorized traffic from passing the roadblock. So the sergeant must act; he's the leader, and he's in charge. Leaders who have thought through the consequences of possible actions, talked with their own leaders about the commander's intent and mission priorities, and trust their chain of command to support them are less likely to be paralyzed by this kind of pressure.

INTENDED CONSEQUENCES

3-86. Intended consequences are the anticipated results of a leader's decisions and actions. When a squad leader shows a team leader a better way to lead PT, that action will have intended consequences: the team leader will be better equipped to do the job. When leaders streamline procedures, help people work smarter, and get the resources to the right place at the right time, the intended consequences are good.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

3-87. Unintended consequences are the results of things a leader does that have an unplanned impact on the organization or accomplishment of the mission. Unintended consequences are often more lasting and harder to anticipate than intended consequences. Organizational and strategic leaders spend a good deal of energy considering possible unintended consequences of their actions. Their organizations are complex, so figuring out the effects today's decisions will have a few years in the future is difficult.

3-88. Unintended consequences are best described with an example, such as setting the morning PT formation time: Setting the formation time at 0600 hours results in soldiers standing in formation at 0600 hours, an intended consequence. To not be late, soldiers living off post may have to depart their homes at 0500 hours, a consequence that's probably also anticipated. However, since most junior enlisted soldiers with families probably own only one car, there will most likely be another consequence: entire families rising at 0430 hours. Spouses must drive their soldiers to post and children, who can't be left at home unattended, must accompany them. This is an unintended consequence.

SUMMARY

3-89. The human dimension of leadership, how the environment affects you and your people, affects how you lead. Stress is a major part of the environment, both in peace and war. Major sources of stress include the rapid pace of change and the increasing complexity of technology. As an Army leader, you must stay on top of both. Your character and skills—how you handle stress—and the morale and discipline you develop and your team are more important in establishing the climate in your organization than any external circumstances.

3-90. The organizational climate and the institutional culture define the environment in which you and your people work. Direct, organizational, and strategic leaders all have different responsibilities regarding climate and culture; what's important now is to realize that you, the leader, establish the climate of your organization. By action or inaction, you determine the environment in which your people work.

3-91. Leadership styles are different ways of approaching the DO of BE, KNOW, DO—the actual work of leading people. You've read about five leadership styles: directing, participating, delegating, transformational, and transactional. But

remember that you must be able to adjust the leadership style you use to the situation and the people you're leading. Remember also that you're not limited to any one style in a given situation: you should use techniques from different styles if that will help you motivate your people to accomplish the mission. Your leader attributes of judgment, intelligence, cultural awareness, and self-control all play major roles in helping you choose the proper style and the appropriate techniques for the task at hand. That said, you must always be yourself.

3-92. All leader actions result in intended and unintended consequences. Two points to remember: think through your decisions and do your duty. It might not seem that the actions of one leader of one small unit matter in the big picture. But they do. In the words of Confederate COL William C. Oats, who faced COL Joshua Chamberlain at Little Round Top: "Great events sometimes turn on comparatively small affairs."

3-93. In spite of stress and changes, whether social or technological, leadership always involves shaping human emotions and behaviors. As they serve in more complex environments with wider-ranging consequences, Army leaders refine what they've known and done as well as develop new styles, skills, and actions. Parts Two and Three discuss the skills and actions required of leaders from team to Department of the Army level.

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PART TWO

Direct Leadership

Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of this manual cover the constants of leadership. They focus primarily on what a leader must BE. Part Two examines what a direct leader must KNOW and DO. Note the distinction between a skill, *knowing* something, and an action, *doing* something. The reason for this distinction bears repeating: knowledge isn't enough. You can't be a leader until you apply what you know, until you act and DO what you must.

Army leaders are grounded in the heritage, values, and tradition of the Army. They embody the warrior ethos, value continuous learning, and demonstrate the ability to lead and train their subordinates. Army leaders lead by example, train from experience, and maintain and enforce standards. They do these things while taking care of their people and adapting to a changing world. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss these subjects in detail.

The *warrior ethos* is the will to win with honor. Despite a thinking enemy, despite adverse conditions, you accomplish your mission. You express your character— the BE of BE, KNOW, DO— when you and your people confront a difficult mission and persevere. The warrior ethos applies to all soldiers and DA civilians, not just those who close with and destroy the enemy. It's the will to meet mission demands no matter what, the drive to get the job done whatever the cost.

Continuous learning requires dedication to improving your technical and tactical skills through study and practice. It also includes learning about the world around you—mastering new technology, studying other cultures, staying aware of current events at home and abroad. All these things affect your job as a leader.

Continuous learning also means consciously developing your *character* through study and reflection. It means reflecting on Army values and developing leader attributes. Broad knowledge and strong character underlie the right decisions in hard times. Seek to learn as much as you can about your job, your people, and yourself. That way you'll be prepared when the time comes for tough decisions. You'll BE a leader of character, KNOW the necessary skills, and DO the right thing.

Army leaders train and lead people. Part of this responsibility is maintaining and enforcing standards. Your subordinates expect you to show them what the standard is and train them to it: they expect you to lead by example. In addition, as an Army leader you're required to take care of your people. You

may have to call on them to do things that seem impossible. You may have to ask them to make extraordinary sacrifices to accomplish the mission. If you train your people to standard, inspire the warrior ethos in them, and consistently look after their interests, they'll be prepared to accomplish the mission—anytime, anywhere.

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Chapter 4

Direct Leadership Skills

Never get so caught up in cutting wood that you forget to sharpen your ax.

First Sergeant James J. Karolchyk, 1986

4-1. The Army's direct leaders perform a huge array of functions in all kinds of places and under all kinds of conditions. Even as you read these pages, someone is in the field in a cold place, someone else in a hot place. There are people headed to a training exercise and others headed home. Somewhere a motor pool is buzzing, a medical ward operating, supplies moving. Somewhere a duty NCO is conducting inspections and a sergeant of the guard is making the rounds. In all these places, no matter what the conditions or the mission, direct leaders are guided by the same principles, using the same skills, and performing the same actions.

4-2. This chapter discusses the skills a direct leader must master and develop. It addresses the KNOW of BE, KNOW, and DO for direct leaders. The skills are organized under the four skill groups Chapter 1 introduced: interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical. (Appendix B lists performance indicators for leader skills.)

INTERPERSONAL SKILLS

4-3. A DA civilian supervisor was in a frenzy because all the material needed for a project wasn't available. The branch chief took the supervisor aside and said, "You're worrying about *things*. Things are not important; things will or won't be there. Worry about working with the people who will get the job done."

4-4. Since leadership is about people, it's not surprising to find interpersonal skills, what some call "people skills," at the top of the list of what an Army leader must KNOW. Figure 4-1 identifies the direct leader interpersonal skills. All these skills—communicating, team building, supervising, and counseling—require communication. They're all closely related; you can hardly use one without using the others.

COMMUNICATING

4-5. Since leadership is about getting other people to do what you want them to do, it follows that communicating—transmitting information so that it's clearly understood—is an important skill. After all, if people can't understand you, how will you ever let them know what you want? The other interpersonal skills—supervising, team building, and counseling—also depend on your ability to communicate.

4-6. If you take a moment to think about all the training you've received under the heading "communication," you'll see that it probably falls into four broad categories: speaking, reading, writing, and listening. You begin practicing speech early; many children are using words by the age of one. The heavy emphasis on reading and writing begins in school, if not before. Yet how many times have you been taught how to listen? Of the four forms of communication, listening is the one in which most people receive the least amount of formal training. Yet for an Army leader, it's every bit as important as the others. It often comes first because you must listen and understand before you can decide what to say.



Figure 4-1. Direct Leader Skills—Interpersonal

One-Way and Two-Way Communication

4-7. There are two common forms of one-way communication that are not necessarily the best way to exchange information: seeing and hearing. The key difference between one-way and two-way communication is that one-way communication—hearing or seeing something on television, reading a copy of a slide presentation, or even watching a training event unfold—may not give you a complete picture. You may have unanswered questions or even walk away with the wrong concept of what has occurred. That's why two-way communication is preferred when time and resources permit.

Active Listening

4-8. An important form of two-way communication is active listening. When you practice active listening, you send signals to the speaker that say, "I'm paying attention." Nod your head every once in a while, as if to say, "Yes, I understand." When you agree with the speaker, you might use an occasional "uh-huh." Look the speaker in the eye. Give the speaker your full attention. Don't allow yourself to be distracted by looking out the window, checking your watch, playing with something on your desk, or trying to do more than one thing at a time. Avoid interrupting the speaker; that's the cardinal sin of active listening.

4-9. Be aware of barriers to listening. Don't form your response while the other person is still talking. Don't allow yourself to become distracted by the fact that you're angry, or that you have a problem with the speaker, or that you have lots of other things you need to be thinking about. If you give in to these temptations, you'll miss most of what's being said.

Nonverbal Communication

4-10. In face-to-face communication, even in the simplest conversation, there's a great deal going on that has almost nothing to do with the words being used. Nonverbal communication involves all the signals you send with your facial expressions, tone of voice, and body language. Effective leaders know that communication includes both verbal and nonverbal cues. Look for them in this example.

The Checking Account

A young soldier named PVT Bell, new to the unit, approaches his team leader, SGT Adams, and says, "I have a problem I'd like to talk to you about."

The team leader makes time—right then if possible—to listen. Stopping, looking the soldier in the eye, and asking, "What's up?" sends many signals: *I am concerned about your problem. You're part of the team, and we help each other. What can I do to help?* All these signals, by the way, reinforce Army values.

PVT Bell sees the leader is paying attention and continues, "Well, I have this checking account, see, and it's the first time I've had one. I have lots of checks left, but for some reason the PX [post exchange] is saying they're no good."

SGT Adams has seen this problem before: PVT Bell thinks that checks are like cash and has no idea that there must be money in the bank to cover checks written against the account. SGT Adams, no matter how tempted, doesn't say anything that would make PVT Bell think that his difficulty was anything other than the most important problem in the world. He is careful to make sure that PVT Bell doesn't think that he's anyone other than the most important soldier in the world. Instead, SGT Adams remembers life as a young soldier and how many things were new and strange. What may seem like an obvious problem to an experienced person isn't so obvious to an inexperienced one. Although the soldier's problem may seem funny, SGT Adams doesn't laugh at the subordinate. And because nonverbal cues are important, SGT Adams is careful that his tone of voice and facial expressions don't convey contempt or disregard for the subordinate.

Instead, the leader listens patiently as PVT Bell explains the problem; then SGT Adams reassures PVT Bell that it can be fixed and carefully explains the solution. What's more, SGT Adams follows up later to make sure the soldier has straightened things out with the bank.

A few months later, a newly promoted PFC Bell realizes that this problem must have looked pretty silly to someone with SGT Adams' experience. But PFC Bell will always remember the example SGT Adams set. Future leaders are groomed every day and reflect their past leaders. By the simple act of listening and communicating, SGT Adams won the loyalty of PFC Bell. And when the next batch of new soldiers arrives, PFC Bell, now the old-timer, will say to them, "Yeah, in all my experience, I've got to say this is one of the best units in the Army. And SGT Adams is the best team leader around. Why, I remember a time…"

4-11. SGT Adams performed crisis counseling, a leader action Appendix C discusses. Look for the communicating skills in this example. SGT Adams listened actively and controlled his nonverbal communication. He gave PVT Bell his full attention and was careful not to signal indifference or a lack of concern. SGT Adams' ability to do this

shows the mental attribute of self-discipline and the emotional attribute of self-control, which you read about in Chapter 2. The leader also displayed empathy, that is, sensitivity to the feelings, thoughts, and experiences of another person. It's an important quality for a counselor.

SUPERVISING

If a squad leader doesn't check, and the guy on point has no batteries for his night vision goggles, he has just degraded the effectiveness of the entire unit.

A Company Commander, Desert Storm

4-12. Direct leaders check and recheck things. Leaders strike a balance between checking too much and not checking enough. Training subordinates to act independently is important; that's why direct leaders give instructions or their intent and then allow subordinates to work without constantly looking over their shoulders. Accomplishing the mission is equally important; that's why leaders check things—especially conditions critical to the mission (fuel levels), details a soldier might forget (spare batteries for night vision goggles), or tasks at the limit of what a soldier has accomplished before (preparing a new version of a report).

4-13. Checking minimizes the chance of oversights, mistakes, or other circumstances that might derail a mission. Checking also gives leaders a chance to see and recognize subordinates who are doing things right or make on-the-spot corrections when necessary. Consider this example: A platoon sergeant delegates to the platoon's squad leaders the authority to get their squads ready for a tactical road march. The platoon sergeant oversees the activity but doesn't intervene unless errors, sloppy work, or lapses occur. The leader is there to answer questions or resolve problems that the squad leaders can't handle. This supervision ensures that the squads are prepared to standard and demonstrates to the squad leaders that the platoon sergeant cares about them and their people.

The Rusty Rifles Incident

While serving in the Republic of Vietnam, SFC Jackson was transferred from platoon sergeant of one platoon to platoon leader of another platoon in the same company. SFC Jackson quickly sized up the existing standards in the platoon. He wasn't pleased. One problem was that his soldiers were not keeping their weapons cleaned properly: rifles were dirty and rusty. He put out the word: weapons would be cleaned to standard each day, each squad leader would inspect each day, and he would inspect a sample of the weapons each day. He gave this order three days before the platoon was to go to the division rest and recuperation (R&R) area on the South China Sea.

The next day SFC Jackson checked several weapons in each squad. Most weapons were still

unacceptable. He called the squad leaders together and explained the policy and his reasons for implementing it. SFC Jackson checked again the following day and still found dirty and rusty weapons. He decided there were two causes for the problem. First, the squad leaders were not doing their jobs. Second, the squad leaders and troops were bucking him—testing him to see who would really make the rules in the platoon. He sensed that, because he was new, they resisted his leadership. He knew he had a serious discipline problem he had to handle correctly. He called the squad leaders together again. Once again, he explained his standards clearly. He then said, "Tomorrow we are due to go on R&R for three days and I'll be inspecting rifles. We won't go on R&R until each weapon in this platoon meets the standard."

The next morning SFC Jackson inspected and found that most weapons in each squad were still below standard. He called the squad leaders together. With a determined look and a firm voice, he told them he would hold a formal in-ranks inspection at 1300 hours, even though the platoon was scheduled to board helicopters for R&R then. If every weapon didn't meet the standard, he would conduct another in-ranks inspection for squad leaders and troops with substandard weapons. He would continue inspections until all weapons met the standard.

At 1300 hours the platoon formed up, surly and angry with the new platoon leader, who was taking their hard-earned R&R time. The soldiers could hardly believe it, but his message was starting to sink in. This leader meant what he said. This time all weapons met the standard.

COUNSELING

Nothing will ever replace one person looking another in the eyes and telling the soldier his strengths and weaknesses. [Counseling] charts a path to success and diverts soldiers from heading down the wrong road.

Sergeant Major Randolph S. Hollingsworth

4-14. Counseling is subordinate-centered communication that produces a plan outlining actions necessary for subordinates to achieve individual or organizational goals. Effective counseling takes time, patience, and practice. As with everything else you do, you must develop your skills as a counselor. Seek feedback on how effective you are at counseling, study various counseling techniques, and make efforts to improve. (Appendix C discusses developmental counseling techniques.)

4-15. Proper counseling leads to a specific plan of action that the subordinate can use as a road map for improvement. Both parties, counselor and counseled, prepare this plan of action. The leader makes certain the subordinate understands and takes ownership of it. The best plan of action in the world does no good if the subordinate doesn't understand it, follow it, and believe in it. And once the plan of action is agreed upon, the leader must follow up with one-on-one sessions to ensure the subordinate stays on track.

4-16. Remember the Army values of loyalty, duty, and selfless service require you to counsel your subordinates. The values of honor, integrity, and personal courage require you to give them straightforward feedback. And the Army value of respect requires you to find the best way to communicate that feedback so that your subordinates understand it. These Army values all point to the requirement for you to become a proficient counselor. Effective counseling helps your subordinates develop personally and professionally.

4-17. One of the most important duties of all direct, organizational, and strategic leaders is to develop subordinates. Mentoring, which links the operating and improving leader actions, plays a major part in developing competent and confident future leaders. Counseling is an interpersonal skill essential to effective mentoring. (Chapters 5, 6, and 7 discuss the direct, organizational, and strategic leader mentoring actions.)

CONCEPTUAL SKILLS

4-18. Conceptual skills include competence in handling ideas, thoughts, and concepts. Figure 4-2 lists the direct leader conceptual skills.

CRITICAL REASONING

4-19. Critical reasoning helps you think through problems. It’s the key to understanding situations, finding causes, arriving at justifiable conclusions, making good judgments, and learning from the experience—in short, solving problems. Critical reasoning is an essential part of effective counseling and underlies ethical reasoning, another conceptual skill. It’s also a central aspect of decision making, which Chapter 5 discusses.

4-20. The word "critical" here doesn’t mean finding fault; it doesn’t have a negative meaning at all. It means getting past the surface of the problem and thinking about it in depth. It means looking at a problem from several points of view instead of just being satisfied with the first answer that comes to mind. Army leaders need this ability because many of the choices they face are complex and offer no easy solution.

4-21. Sometime during your schooling, you probably ran across a multiple choice test, one that required you to "choose answer a, b, c, or d" or "choose one response from column a and two from column b." Your job as an Army leader would be a lot easier if the problems you faced were presented that way, but leadership is a lot more complex than that. Sometimes just figuring out the real problem presents a huge hurdle; at other times you have to sort through distracting multiple problems to get to the real difficulty. On some occasions you know what the problem is but have no clue as to what an answer might be. On others you can come up with two or three answers that all look pretty good.

Finding the Real Problem

A platoon sergeant directs the platoon's squad leaders to counsel their soldiers every month and keep written records. Three months later, the leader finds the records are sloppy or incomplete; in many cases, there's no record at all. The platoon sergeant's first instinct is to chew out the squad leaders for ignoring his instructions. It even occurs to him to write a counseling annex to the platoon SOP so he can point to it the next time the squad leaders fail to follow instructions.

But those are just knee-jerk reactions and the platoon sergeant knows it. Instead of venting his frustration, the leader does a little investigating and finds that two squad leaders have never really been taught how to do formal, written counseling. The third one has no idea why counseling is important. So what looked like a disciplinary problem—the squad leaders disobeying instructions—turns out to be a training shortfall. By thinking beyond the surface and by checking, the platoon sergeant was able to isolate the real problem: that the squad leaders had not been trained in counseling. The next step is to begin training and motivating subordinates to do the tasks.

Figure 4-2. Direct Leader Skills—Conceptual

CREATIVE THINKING

4-22. Sometimes you run into a problem that you haven't seen before or an old problem that requires a new solution. Here you must apply imagination; a radical departure from the old way of doing things may be refreshing. Army leaders prevent complacency by finding ways to challenge subordinates with new approaches and ideas. In these cases, rely on your intuition, experience, and knowledge. Ask for input from your subordinates. Reinforce team building by making everybody responsible for, and shareholders in, the accomplishment of difficult tasks.

4-23. Creative thinking isn't some mysterious gift, nor does it have to be outlandish. It's not reserved for senior officers; all leaders think creatively. You employ it every day to solve small problems. A unit that deploys from a stateside post on a peace operation, for instance, may find itself in a small compound with limited athletic

facilities and no room to run. Its leaders must devise new ways for their soldiers to maintain physical fitness. These may include sports and games, even games the local nationals play.

Pulling Dragons' Teeth

As American forces approached the Siegfried Line between Germany and France at the end of World War II, the armored advance was slowed by "dragons' teeth," concrete obstacles that looked like large, tightly spaced traffic cones. Engineers predicted it would take many days and tons of explosives to reduce the obstacles, which were heavily reinforced and deeply rooted. Then an NCO suggested using bulldozers to push dirt on top of the spikes, creating an earthen ramp to allow tanks to drive over the obstacles. This is but one example of the creative thinking by American soldiers of all ranks that contributed to victory in the ETO.

ETHICAL REASONING

4-24. Ethical leaders do the right things for the right reasons all the time, even when no one is watching. But figuring out what's the "right" thing is often, to put it mildly, a most difficult task. To fulfill your duty, maintain your integrity, and serve honorably, you must be able to reason ethically.

4-25. Occasionally, when there's little or no time, you'll have to make a snap decision based on your experience and intuition about what feels right. For Army leaders, such decisions are guided by Army values (discussed in Chapter 2), the institutional culture, and the organizational climate (discussed in Chapter 3). These shared values then serve as a basis for the whole team's buying into the leader's decision. But comfortable as this might be, you should not make all decisions on intuition.

4-26. When there's time to consider alternatives, ask for advice, and think things through, you can make a deliberate decision. First determine what's legally right by law and regulation. In gray areas requiring interpretation, apply Army values to the situation. Inside those boundaries, determine the best possible answer from among competing solutions, make your decision, and act on it.

4-27. The distinction between snap and deliberate decisions is important. In many decisions, you must think critically because your intuition—what feels right—may lead to the wrong answer. In combat especially, the intuitive response won't always work.

4-28. The moral application of force goes to the heart of military ethics. S. L. A. Marshall, a military historian as well as a brigadier general, has written that the typical soldier is often at a disadvantage in combat because he "comes from a civilization in which aggression, connected with the taking of a human life, is prohibited and

unacceptable." Artist Jon Wolfe, an infantryman in Vietnam, once said that the first time he aimed his weapon at another human being, a "little voice" in the back of his mind asked, "Who gave you permission to do this?" That "little voice" comes, of course, from a lifetime of living within the law. You can determine the right thing to do in these very unusual circumstances only when you apply ethical as well as critical reasoning.

4-29. The right action in the situation you face may not be in regulations or field manuals. Even the most exhaustive regulations can't predict every situation. They're designed for the routine, not the exceptional. One of the most difficult tasks facing you as an Army leader is determining when a rule or regulation simply doesn't apply because the situation you're facing falls outside the set of conditions envisioned by those who wrote the regulation. Remember COL Chamberlain on Little Round Top. The drill manuals he had studied didn't contain the solution to the tactical problem he faced; neither this nor any other manual contain "cookbook" solutions to ethical questions you will confront. COL Chamberlain *applied* the doctrine he learned from the drill manuals. So you should apply Army values, your knowledge, and your experience to any decision you make and be prepared to accept the consequences of your actions. Study, reflection, and ethical reasoning can help you do this.

4-30. Ethical reasoning takes you through these steps:

- Define the problem.
- Know the relevant rules.
- Develop and evaluate courses of action.
- Choose the course of action that best represents Army values.

4-31. These steps correspond to some of the steps of the decision making leadership action in Chapter 5. Thus, ethical reasoning isn't a separate process you trot out only when you think you're facing an ethical question. It should be part of the thought process you use to make any decision. Your subordinates count on you to do more than make tactically sound decisions. They rely on you to make decisions that are ethically sound as well. You should always consider ethical factors and, when necessary, use Army values to gauge what's right.

4-32. That said, not every decision is an ethical problem. In fact, most decisions are ethically neutral. But that doesn't mean you don't have to think about the ethical consequences of your actions. Only if you reflect on whether what you're asked to do or what you ask your people to do accords with Army values will you develop that sense of right and wrong that marks ethical people and great leaders. That sense of right and wrong alerts you to the presence of ethical aspects when you face a decision.

4-33. Ethical reasoning is an art, not a science, and sometimes the best answer is going to be hard to determine. Often, the hardest decisions are not between right and wrong, but between shades of right. Regulations may allow more than one choice. There may

even be more than one good answer, or there may not be enough time to conduct a long review. In those cases, you must rely on your judgment.

Define the Problem

4-34. Defining the problem is the first step in making any decision. When you think a decision may have ethical aspects or effects, it's especially important to define it precisely. Know who said what—and what specifically was said, ordered, or demanded. Don't settle for secondhand information; get the details. Problems can be described in more than one way. This is the hardest step in solving any problem. It's especially difficult for decisions in the face of potential ethical conflicts. Too often some people come to rapid conclusions about the nature of a problem and end up applying solutions to what turn out to be only symptoms.

Know the Relevant Rules

4-35. This step is part of fact gathering, the second step in problem solving. Do your homework. Sometimes what looks like an ethical problem may stem from a misunderstanding of a regulation or policy, frustration, or overenthusiasm. Sometimes the person who gave an order or made a demand didn't check the regulation and a thorough reading may make the problem go away. Other times, a difficult situation results from trying to do something right in the wrong way. Also, some regulations leave room for interpretation; the problem then becomes a policy matter rather than an ethical one. If you do perceive an ethical problem, explain it to the person you think is causing it and try to come up with a better way to do the job.

Develop and Evaluate Courses of Action

4-36. Once you know the rules, lay out possible courses of action. As with the previous steps, you do this whenever you must make a decision. Next, consider these courses of action in view of Army values. Consider the consequences of your courses of action by asking yourself a few practical questions: Which course of action best upholds Army values? Do any of the courses of action compromise Army values? Does any course of action violate a principle, rule, or regulation identified in Step 2? Which course of action is in the best interest of the Army and of the nation? This part will feel like a juggling act; but with careful ethical reflection, you can reduce the chaos, determine the essentials, and choose the best course—even when that choice is the least bad of a set of undesirable options.

Choose the Course of Action That Best Represents Army Values

4-37. The last step in solving any problem is making a decision and acting on it. Leaders are paid to make decisions. As an Army leader, you're expected—by your bosses and your people—to make decisions that solve problems without violating

Army values.

4-38. As a values-based organization, the Army uses expressed values—Army values—to provide its fundamental ethical framework. Army values lay out the ethical standards expected of soldiers and DA civilians. Taken together, Army values and ethical decision making provide a moral touchstone and a workable process that enable you to make sound ethical decisions and take right actions confidently.

4-39. The ethical aspects of some decisions are more obvious that those of others. This example contains an obvious ethical problem. The issues will seldom be so clear-cut; however, as you read the example, focus on the steps SGT Kirk follows as he moves toward an ethical decision. Follow the same steps when you seek to do the right thing.

The EFMB Test

SGT Kirk, who has already earned the Expert Field Medical Badge (EFMB), is assigned as a grader on the division's EFMB course. Sergeant Kirk's squad leader, SSG Michaels, passes through SGT Kirk's station and fails the task. Just before SGT Kirk records the score, SSG Michaels pulls him aside.

"I need my EFMB to get promoted," SSG Michaels says. "You can really help me out here; it's only a couple of points anyway. No big deal. Show a little loyalty."

SGT Kirk wants to help SSG Michaels, who's been an excellent squad leader and who's loyal to his subordinates. SSG Michaels even spent two Saturdays helping SGT Kirk prepare for his promotion board. If SGT Kirk wanted to make this easy on himself, he would say the choice is between honesty and loyalty. Then he could choose loyalty, falsify the score, and send everyone home happy. His life under SSG Michaels would probably be much easier too.

However, SGT Kirk would not have defined the problem correctly. (Remember, defining the problem is often the hardest step in ethical reasoning.) SGT Kirk knows the choice isn't between loyalty and honesty. Loyalty doesn't require that he lie. In fact, lying would be disloyal to the Army, himself, and the soldiers who met the standard. To falsify the score would also be a violation of the trust and confidence the Army placed in him when he was made an NCO and a grader. SGT Kirk knows that loyalty to the Army and the NCO corps comes first and that giving SSG Michaels a passing score would be granting the squad leader an unfair advantage. SGT Kirk knows it would be wrong to be a coward in the face of this ethical choice, just as it would be wrong to be a coward in battle. And if all that were not enough, when SGT Kirk imagines seeing the incident in the newspaper the next morning—Trusted NCO Lies to Help Boss—he knows what he must do.

4-40. When SGT Kirk stands his ground and does the right thing, it may cost him

some pain in the short run, but the entire Army benefits. If he makes the wrong choice, he weakens the Army. Whether or not the Army lives by its values isn't just up to generals and colonels; it's up to each of the thousands of SGT Kirks, the Army leaders who must make tough calls when no one is watching, when the easy thing to do is the wrong thing to do.

REFLECTIVE THINKING

4-41. Leader development doesn't occur in a vacuum. All leaders must be open to feedback on their performance from multiple perspectives—seniors, peers, and subordinates. But being open to feedback is only one part of the equation. As a leader, you must also listen to and use the feedback: you must be able to reflect. Reflecting is the ability to take information, assess it, and apply it to behavior to explain why things did or did not go well. You can then use the resulting explanations to improve future behavior. Good leaders are always striving to become better leaders. This means you need consistently to assess your strengths and weaknesses and reflect on what you can do to sustain your strengths and correct your weaknesses. To become a better leader, you must be willing to change.

4-42. For reasons discussed fully in Chapter 5, the Army often places a premium on doing—on the third element of BE, KNOW, DO. All Army leaders are busy dealing with what's on their plates and investing a lot of energy in accomplishing tasks. But how often do they take the time to STOP and really THINK about what they are doing? How often have you seen this sign on a leader's door: Do Not Disturb—Busy Reflecting? Not often. Well, good leaders need to take the time to think and reflect. Schedule it; start really exercising your capacity to get feedback. Then reflect on it and use it to improve. There's nothing wrong with making mistakes, but there's plenty wrong with not learning from those mistakes. Reflection is the means to that end.

TECHNICAL SKILLS

The first thing the senior NCOs had to do was to determine who wasn't qualified with his weapon, who didn't have his protective mask properly tested and sealed—just all the basic little things. Those things had to be determined real fast.

A Command Sergeant Major, Desert Storm

Figure 4-3. Direct Leader Skills—Technical

KNOWING EQUIPMENT

4-43. Technical skill is skill with things—equipment, weapons, systems—everything from the towing winch on the front of a vehicle to the computer that keeps track of corps personnel actions. Direct leaders must know their equipment and how to operate it. Figure 4-3 highlights direct leader technical skills. Technical manuals, training circulars, SOPs, and all the other publications necessary for efficient, effective performance explain specific skills more completely.

4-44. Direct leaders are closer to their equipment than organizational and strategic leaders. Thus, they have a greater need to know how it works and how to use it. In addition, direct leaders are the experts who are called upon to solve problems with the equipment, the ones who figure out how to make it work better, how to apply it, how to fix it—even how to modify it. Sergeants, junior officers, warrant officers, wage grade employees, and journeymen are the Army's technical experts and best teachers.

Subordinates expect their first-line leaders to know their equipment and be experts in all the applicable technical skills.

OPERATING EQUIPMENT

4-45. Direct leaders know how to operate their equipment and make sure their people do as well. They set the example with a hands-on approach. When new equipment arrives, direct leaders find out how it works, learn how to use it themselves, and train their subordinates to do the same.

Technical Skill into Combat Power

Technical skill gave the Army a decided advantage in the 1944 battle for France. For example, the German Army had nothing like the US Army's maintenance battalions. Such an organization was a new idea, and a good one. These machine-age units were able to return almost half the battle-damaged tanks to action within two days. The job was done by young men who had been working at gas stations and body shops two years earlier and had brought their skill into the service of their country. Instead of fixing cars, they replaced damaged tank tracks, welded patches on the armor, and repaired engines. These combat supporters dragged tanks that were beyond repair to the rear and stripped them for parts. The Germans just left theirs in place.

I felt we had to get back to the basic soldier skills. The basics of setting up a training schedule for every soldier every day. We had to execute the standard field disciplines, such as NCOs checking weapons cleanliness and ensuring soldiers practiced personal hygiene daily. Our job is to go out there and kill the enemy. In order to do that, as Fehrenbach writes in [his study of the Korean Conflict entitled] This Kind of War, we have to have disciplined teams; discipline brings pride to the unit. Discipline coupled with tough, realistic training is the key to high morale in units. Soldiers want to belong to good outfits, and our job as leaders is to give them the best outfit we can.

A Company Commander, Desert Storm

4-46. This company commander is talking about two levels of skill. First is the individual level: soldiers are trained with their equipment and know how to do their jobs. Next is the collective level: leaders take these trained individuals and form them into teams. The result: a whole greater than the sum of its parts, a team that's more than just a collection of trained individuals, an organization that's capable of much more than any one of its elements. (FM 25-101 discusses how to integrate individual, collective, and leader training).

TACTICAL SKILLS

General Matthew B. Ridgway
Former Army Chief of Staff

Man is and always will be the supreme element in combat, and upon the skill, the courage and endurance, and the fighting heart of the individual soldier the issue will ultimately depend.

Figure 4-4. Direct Leader Skills—Tactical

DOCTRINE

4-47. Tactics is the art and science of employing available means to win battles and engagements. The science of tactics encompasses capabilities, techniques, and procedures that can be codified. The art of tactics includes the creative and flexible array of means to accomplish assigned missions, decision making when faced with an intelligent enemy, and the effects of combat on soldiers. Together, FM 100-34, FM 100-40, and branch-specific doctrinal manuals capture the tactical skills that are essential to

mastering both the science and the art of tactics. Figure 4-4 highlights direct leader tactical skills.

FIELDCRAFT

4-48. Fieldcraft consists of the skills soldiers need to sustain themselves in the field. Proficiency in fieldcraft reduces the likelihood soldiers will become casualties. The requirement to be able to do one's job in a field environment distinguishes the soldier's profession from most civilian occupations. Likewise, the requirement that Army leaders make sure their soldiers take care of themselves and provide them with the means to do so is unique.

4-49. The Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks lists the individual skills all soldiers must master to operate effectively in the field. Those skills include everything from how to stay healthy, to how to pitch a tent, to how to run a heater. Some military occupational specialties (MOS) require proficiency in additional fieldcraft skills. Soldier's Manuals for these MOS list them.

4-50. Army leaders gain proficiency in fieldcraft through schooling, study, and practice. Once learned, few fieldcraft skills are difficult. However, they are easy to neglect during exercises, when everyone knows that the exercise will end at a specific time, sick and injured soldiers are always evacuated, and the adversary isn't using real ammunition. During peacetime, it's up to Army leaders to enforce tactical discipline, to make sure their soldiers practice the fieldcraft skills that will keep them from becoming casualties—battle or nonbattle—during operations.

TACTICAL SKILLS AND TRAINING

4-51. Direct leaders are the Army's primary tactical trainers, both for individuals and for teams. Practicing tactical skills is often challenging. The best way to improve individual and collective skills is to replicate operational conditions. Unfortunately, Army leaders can't always get the whole unit out in the field to practice maneuvers, so they make do with training parts of it separately. Sometimes they can't get the people, the time, and the money all together at the right time and the right place to train the entire team. There are always training distracters. There will always be a hundred excuses not to train together and one reason why such training must occur: units fight as they train. (FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 discuss training principles and techniques.)

4-52. Unfortunately, the Army has been caught unprepared for war more than once. In July 1950, American troops who had been on occupation duty in Japan were thrown into combat when North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Ill-trained, ill-equipped, and out of shape, they went into action and were overrun. However, that same conflict provides another example of how well things can go when a direct leader has tactical skill, the ability to pull people and things together into a team. Near the end of November 1950, American forces were chasing the remnants of the broken North

Korean People's Army into the remote northern corners of the Korean Peninsula. Two American units pushed all the way to the Yalu River, which forms the boundary between North Korea and the People's Republic of China. One was the 17th Infantry Regiment. The other was a task force commanded by a 24-year-old first lieutenant named Joseph Kingston.

Task Force Kingston

1LT Joseph Kingston, a boyish-looking platoon leader in K Company, 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was the lead element for his battalion's move northward. The terrain was mountainous, the weather bitterly cold—the temperature often below zero—and the cornered enemy still dangerous. 1LT Kingston inched his way forward, with the battalion adding elements to his force. He had antiaircraft jeeps mounted with quad .50 caliber machine guns, a tank, a squad (later a platoon) of engineers, and an artillery forward observer. Some of these attachments were commanded by lieutenants who outranked him, as did a captain who was the tactical air controller. But 1LT Kingston remained in command, and battalion headquarters began referring to Task Force Kingston.

Bogged down in Yongsong-ni with casualties mounting, Task Force Kingston received reinforcements that brought the number of men to nearly 300. Despite tough fighting, the force continued to move northward. 1LT Kingston's battalion commander wanted him to remain in command, even though they sent several more officers who outranked 1LT Kingston. One of theattached units was a rifle company, commanded by a captain. But the arrangement worked, mostly because 1LT Kingston himself was an able leader. Hit while leading an assault on one enemy stronghold, he managed to toss a grenade just as a North Korean soldier shot him in the head. His helmet, badly grazed, saved his life. His personal courage inspired his men and the soldiers from the widely varied units who were under his control. Task Force Kingston was commanded by the soldier who showed, by courage and personal example, that he could handle the job.

4-53. 1LT Kingston made the task force work by applying skills at a level of responsibility far above what was normal for a soldier of his rank and experience. He knew how to shoot, move, and communicate. He knew the fundamentals of his profession. He employed the weapons under his command and controlled a rather unwieldy collection of combat assets. He understood small-unit tactics and applied his reasoning skills to make decisions. He fostered a sense of teamwork, even in this collection of units that had never trained together. Finally, he set the example with personal courage.

SUMMARY

4-54. Direct leadership is face-to-face, first-line leadership. It takes place in

organizations where subordinates are used to seeing their leaders all the time: teams, squads, sections, platoons, companies, and battalions. To be effective, direct leaders must master many interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills.

4-55. Direct leaders are first-line leaders. They apply the conceptual skills of critical reasoning and creative thinking to determine the best way to accomplish the mission. They use ethical reasoning to make sure their choice is the right thing to do, and they use reflective thinking to assess and improve team performance, their subordinates, and themselves. They employ the interpersonal skills of communicating and supervising to get the job done. They develop their people by mentoring and counseling and mold them into cohesive teams by training them to standard.

4-56. Direct leaders are the Army's technical experts and best teachers. Both their bosses and their people expect them to know their equipment and be experts in all the applicable technical skills. On top of that, direct leaders combine those skills with the tactical skills of doctrine, fieldcraft, and training to accomplish tactical missions.

4-57. Direct leaders use their competence to foster discipline in their units and to develop soldiers and DA civilians of character. They use their mastery of equipment and doctrine to train their subordinates to standard. They create and sustain teams with the skill, trust, and confidence to succeed—in peace and war.

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Chapter 5

Direct Leadership Actions

5-1. Preparing to be a leader doesn't get the job done; the test of your character and competence comes when you act, when you DO those things required of a leader.

5-2. The three broad leader actions that Chapters 1 and 2 introduced—influencing, operating, and improving—contain other activities. As with the skills and attributes discussed previously, none of these exist alone. Most of what you do as a leader is a mix of these actions. This manual talks about them individually to explain them more clearly; in practice they're often too closely connected to sort out.

5-3. Remember that your actions say more about what kind of leader you are than anything else. Your people watch you all the time; you're always on duty. And if there's a disconnect between what you say and how you act, they'll make up their minds about you—and act accordingly—based on how you act. It's not good enough to talk the talk; you have to walk the walk.

The most important influence you have on your people is the example you set.

INFLUENCING ACTIONS

Figure 5-1. Direct Leader Actions—Influencing

5-4. Leadership is both art and science. It requires constant study, hard work, and frequent practice. Since you're dealing with people and their emotions, dreams, and fears, it also calls for imagination and a positive, upbeat approach.

5-5. Effective leaders act competently and confidently. Your attitude sets the tone for the entire unit, and you choose your attitude—day to day, task to task, even minute to minute. Remember that optimism, a positive outlook, and a sense of humor are infectious. This is especially true when you must make unpopular decisions and face the challenge of bringing the team on board.

5-6. Figure 5-1 shows that influencing consists of communicating, decision making and motivating. As a leader, you should be asking several questions: What's happening? What should be happening but isn't? Why are these things happening? Then ask yourself: How can I get this team moving toward the goal? (Appendix B lists

leader performance indicators).

COMMUNICATING

You must talk to your soldiers…I don't just mean in formation or groups, but one-on-one. Take time (at least 15 to 30 minutes a day) to really talk to a soldier, one soldier a day.

Command Sergeant Major Daniel E. Wright

5-7. Leaders keep their subordinates informed because doing so shows trust, because sharing information can relieve stress, and because information allows subordinates to determine what they need to do to accomplish the mission when circumstances change. By informing them of a decision—and, as much as possible, the reasons for it—you show your subordinates they're important members of the team. Accurate information also relieves unnecessary stress and helps keep rumors under control. (Without an explanation for what's happening, your people will manufacture one—or several—of their own.) Finally, if something should happen to you, the next leader in the chain will be better prepared to take over and accomplish the mission if everyone knows what's going on. Subordinates must understand your intent. In a tactical setting, leaders must understand the intent of their commanders two levels up.

5-8. In other situations, leaders use a variety of means to keep people informed, from face-to-face talks to published memos and family newsletters. No matter what the method, keep two things in mind:

- As a leader, you are responsible for making sure your subordinates understand you.
- Communication isn't limited to your immediate superiors and subordinates.

5-9. The success or failure of any communication is the responsibility of the leader. If it appears your subordinates don't understand, check to make sure you've made yourself clear. In fact, even if you think your people understand, check anyway; ask for a back-brief.

5-10. Don't assume that communication begins or ends at the next level up or the next level down. If you're a team leader, listen carefully to what your supervisors, platoon sergeants, platoon leaders, and company commanders say. If you're a platoon sergeant, pass the word through your squad leaders or section chiefs, but also watch and *listen to the troops* to see if the information has made it all the way to where it needs to go. Listen carefully at least two levels up and two levels down.

5-11. In combat, subordinates may be out of contact with their leaders. Sometimes the plan falls apart because of something unexpected—weather, terrain, enemy action. Sometimes the leader may be killed or wounded. In those situations, subordinates who know the overall purpose of the mission and the commander's intent have the basic

information they need to carry on. And if the leader has established a climate of trust, if the leader has trained the subordinate leaders in how and why decisions are made, one of these subordinates is more likely to step up and take charge.

5-12. To prepare your subordinates for such circumstances, create training situations where they must act on their own with a minimum of guidance—or with no guidance except a clear understanding of the purpose. Follow up these training situations with AARs so that subordinates learn what they did well, what they could have done better, and they should do differently next time.

5-13. Communicating also goes on from bottom to top. Leaders find out what their people are thinking, saying, and doing by using that most important communication tool: listening. By listening carefully, you can even hear those messages behind what a person is actually saying, the equivalent of reading between the lines. Practice "leadership by walking around." Get out and coach, listen, teach, and clarify; pass on what you learn to your superiors. They need to know what's going on to make good plans.

DECISION MAKING

A good leader must sometimes be stubborn. Armed with the courage of his convictions, he must often fight to defend them. When he has come to a decision after thorough analysis—and when he is sure he is right—he must stick to it even to the point of stubbornness.

General of the Army, Omar N. Bradley
Address to the US Army Command and
General Staff College, May 1967

5-14. A problem is an existing condition or situation in which what you want to happen is different from what actually is happening. Decision making is the process that begins to change that situation. Thus, decision making is knowing *whether* to decide, then *when* and *what* to decide. It includes understanding the consequences of your decisions.

5-15. Army leaders usually follow one of two decision-making processes. Leaders at company level and below follow the troop leading procedures (TLP). The TLP are designed to support solving tactical problems. Leaders at battalion level and above follow the military decision making process (MDMP). The MDMP, which FM 101-5 discusses, is designed for organizations with staffs. These established and proven methodologies combine elements of the planning operating action to save time and achieve parallel decision making and planning. Both follow the problem solving steps discussed below.

5-16. Every once in a while, you may come across a decision that's easy to make: yes or no, right or left, on or off. As you gain experience as a leader, some of the decisions

you find difficult now will become easier. But there will always be difficult decisions that require imagination, that require rigorous thinking and analysis, or that require you to factor in your gut reaction. Those are the tough decisions, the ones you're getting paid to make. As an experienced first sergeant once said to a brand new company commander, "We get paid the big bucks to make the hard calls." The next several paragraphs explain the steps you should use to solve a problem; then you'll read about other factors that affect how you make those hard calls and the importance of setting priorities.

Problem Solving Steps

5-17. **Identify the problem.** Don't be distracted by the symptoms of the problem; get at its root cause. There may be more than one thing contributing to a problem, and you may run into a case where there are lots of contributing factors but no real "smoking gun." The issue you choose to address as the root cause becomes the mission (or restated mission for tactical problems). The mission must include a simple statement of who, what, when, where, and why. In addition, it should include your end state, how you want things to look when the mission is complete.

5-18. **Identify facts and assumptions.** Get whatever facts you can in the time you have. Facts are statements of what you know about the situation. Assumptions are statements of what you believe about the situation but don't have facts to support. Make only assumptions that are likely to be true and essential to generate alternatives. Some of the many sources of facts include regulations, policies, and doctrinal publications. Your organization's mission, goals, and objectives may also be a source. Sources of assumptions can be personal experiences, members of the organization, subject matter experts, or written observations. Analyze the facts and assumptions you identify to determine the scope of the problem. (FM 101-5 contains more information on facts and assumptions.)

5-19. **Generate alternatives.** Alternatives are ways to solve the problem. Develop more than one possible alternative. Don't be satisfied with the first thing that comes into your mind. That's lazy thinking; the third or fourth or twentieth alternative you come up with might be the best one. If you have time and experienced subordinates, include them in this step.

5-20. **Analyze the alternatives.** Identify intended and unintended consequences, resource or other constraints, and the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. Be sure to consider all your alternatives. Don't prejudge the situation by favoring any one alternative over the others.

5-21. **Compare the alternatives.** Evaluate each alternative for its probability of success and its cost. Think past the immediate future. How will this decision change things tomorrow? Next week? Next year?

5-22. **Make and execute your decision**. Prepare a leader's plan of action, if necessary, and put it in motion. (Planning, an operating action, is covered later in this chapter. Appendix C discusses plans of action as part of developmental counseling. Appendix D contains an example of a leader's plan of action.)

5-23. **Assess the results.** Check constantly to see how the execution of your plan of action is going. Keep track of what happens. Adjust your plan, if necessary. Learn from the experience so you'll be better equipped next time. Follow up on results and make further adjustments as required.

Factors to Consider

5-24. All of this looks great on paper; and it's easy to talk about when things are calm, when there's plenty of time. But even when there isn't a great deal of time, you'll come up with the best solution if you follow this process to the extent that time allows.

5-25. Even following these steps, you may find that with some decisions you need to take into account your knowledge, your intuition, and your best judgment. Intuition tells you what feels right; it comes from accumulated experience, often referred to as "gut feeling." However, don't be fooled into relying only on intuition, even if it has worked in the past. A leader who says "Hey, I just do what feels right" may be hiding a lack of competence or may just be too lazy to do the homework needed to make a reasoned, thought-out decision. Don't let that be you. Use your experience, listen to your instincts, but do your research as well. Get the facts and generate alternatives. Analyze and compare as many as time allows. Then make your decision and act.

5-26. Remember also that any decision you make must reflect Army values. Chapter 4 discusses ethical reasoning. Its steps match the problem solving steps outlined here. Most problems are not ethical problems, but many have ethical aspects. Taking leave for example, is a right soldiers and DA civilians enjoy, but leaders must balance mission requirements with their people's desires and their own. Reconciling such issues may require ethical reasoning. As a leader, your superiors and your people expect you to take ethical aspects into account and make decisions that are right as well as good.

Setting Priorities

5-27. Decisions are not often narrowly defined, as in "Do I choose A or B?" Leaders make decisions when they establish priorities and determine what's important, when they supervise, when they choose someone for a job, when they train.

5-28. As a leader, you must also set priorities. If you give your subordinates a list of things to do and say "They're all important," you may be trying to say something about urgency. But the message you actually send is "I can't decide which of these are most

important, so I'll just lean on you and see what happens."

5-29. Sometimes all courses of action may appear equally good (or equally bad) and that any decision will be equally right (or equally wrong). Situations like that may tempt you to sit on the fence, to make no decision and let things work themselves out. Occasionally that may be appropriate; remember that decision making involves judgment, knowing whether to decide. More often, things left to themselves go from bad to worse. In such situations, the decision you make may be less important than simply deciding to do something. Leaders must have the personal courage to say which tasks are more important than others. In the absence of a clear priority, you must set one; not everything can be a top priority, and you can't make progress without making decisions.

Solving a Training Problem

A rifle platoon gets a new platoon leader and a new platoon sergeant within days of a poor showing in the division's military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) exercise. The new leaders assume the platoon's poor showing is a problem. Feedback from the evaluators is general and vague. The platoon's squad and fire team leaders are angry and not much help in assessing what went wrong, so the new leaders begin investigating. In their fact-finding step they identify the following facts: (1) The soldiers are out of shape and unable to complete some of the physical tasks. (2) The fire team leaders don't know MOUT tactics, and some of the squad leaders are also weak. (3) Third Squad performed well, but didn't help the other squads. (4) The soldiers didn't have the right equipment at the training site.

Pushing a bit further to get at the root causes of these problems, the new leaders uncover the following: (1) Platoon PT emphasizes preparation for the APFT only. (2) Third Squad's leaders know MOUT techniques, and had even developed simple drills to help their soldiers learn, but because of unhealthy competition encouraged by the previous leaders, Third Squad didn't share the knowledge. (3) The company supply sergeant has the equipment the soldiers needed, but because the platoon had lost some equipment on the last field exercise, the supply sergeant didn't let the platoon sign out the equipment.

The new platoon leader and platoon sergeant set a goal of successfully meeting the exercise standard in two months. To generate alternatives, they meet with the squad leaders and ask for suggestions to improve training. They use all their available resources to develop solutions. Among the things suggested was to shuffle some of the team leaders to break up Third Squad's clique and spread some of the tactical knowledge around. When squad leaders complained, the platoon sergeant emphasized that they must think as a platoon, not just a collection of squads.

The platoon sergeant talks to the supply sergeant, who tells him the platoon's previous leadership had been lax about property accountability. Furthermore, the previous leaders didn't want to bother keeping track of equipment, so they often left it in garrison. The platoon sergeant teaches his squad leaders how to keep track of equipment and says that, in the future, soldiers

who lose equipment will pay for it: "We wouldn't leave our stuff behind in war, so we're not going to do it in training."

Building on Third Squad's experience, the platoon leader works with the squad and fire team leaders to come up with some simple drills for the platoon's missions. He takes the leaders to the field and practices the drills with them so they'll be able to train their soldiers to the new standard.

The platoon sergeant also goes to the brigade's fitness trainers and, with their help, develops a PT program that emphasizes skills the soldiers need for their combat tasks. The new program includes rope climbing, running with weapons and equipment, and road marches. Finally, the leaders monitor how their plan is working. A few weeks before going through the course again, they decide to eliminate one of the battle drills because the squad leaders suggested that it wasn't necessary after all.

5-30. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant followed the problem solving steps you just read about. Given a problem (poor performance), they identified the facts surrounding it (poor PT practices, poor property accountability, and unhealthy competition), developed a plan of action, and executed it. Where appropriate, they analyzed and compared different alternatives (Third Squad's drills). They included their subordinates in the process, but had the moral courage to make unpopular decisions (breaking up the Third Squad clique). Will the platoon do better the next time out? Probably, but before then the new leaders will have to assess the results of their actions to make sure they're accomplishing what the leaders want. There may be other aspects of this problem that were not apparent at first. And following this or any process doesn't guarantee success. The process is only a framework that helps you make a plan and act. Success depends on your ability to apply your attributes and skills to influencing and operating actions.

5-31. Army leaders also make decisions when they evaluate subordinates, whether it's with a counseling statement, an evaluation report, or even on-the-spot encouragement. At an in-ranks inspection, a new squad leader takes a second look at a soldier's haircut —or lack of one. The squad leader's first reaction may be to ask, "Did you get your haircut lately?" But that avoids the problem. The soldier's haircut is either to standard or not—the NCO must decide. The squad leader either says—without apologizing or dancing around the subject—"You need a haircut" or else says nothing. Either way, the decision communicates the leader's standard. Looking a subordinate in the eye and making a necessary correction is a direct leader hallmark.

MOTIVATING

A unit with a high esprit de corps can accomplish its mission in spite of seemingly insurmountable odds.

5-32. Recall from Chapter 1 that motivation involves using word and example to give your subordinates the will to accomplish the mission. Motivation grows out of people's confidence in themselves, their unit, and their leaders. This confidence is born in hard, realistic training; it's nurtured by constant reinforcement and through the kind of leadership—consistent, hard, and fair—that promotes trust. Remember that trust, like loyalty, is a gift your soldiers give you only when you demonstrate that you deserve it. Motivation also springs from the person's faith in the larger mission of the organization—a sense of being a part of the big picture.

Empowering People

5-33. People want to be recognized for the work they do and want to be empowered. You empower subordinates when you train them to do a job, give them the necessary resources and authority, get out of their way, and let them work. Not only is this a tremendous statement of the trust you have in your subordinates; it's one of the best ways to develop them as leaders. Coach and counsel them, both when they succeed and when they fail.

Positive Reinforcement

5-34. Part of empowering subordinates is finding out their needs. Talk to your people: find out what's important to them, what they want to accomplish, what their personal goals are. Give them feedback that lets them know how they're doing. Listen carefully so that you know what they mean, not just what they say. Use their feedback when it makes sense, and if you change something in the organization because of a subordinate's suggestion, let everyone know where the good idea came from. Remember, there's no limit to the amount of good you can do as long as you don't worry about who gets the credit. Give the credit to those who deserve it and you'll be amazed at the results.

5-35. You recognize subordinates when you give them credit for the work they do, from a pat on the back to a formal award or decoration. Don't underestimate the power of a few choice words of praise when a person has done a good job. Don't hesitate to give out awards—commendations, letters, certificates—when appropriate. (Use good judgment, however. If you give out a medal for every little thing, pretty soon the award becomes meaningless. Give an award for the wrong thing and you show you're out of touch.) Napoleon marveled at the motivational power of properly awarded ribbons and medals. He once said that if he had enough ribbon, he could rule the world.

5-36. When using rewards, you have many options. Here are some things to consider:

- Consult the leadership chain for recommendations.
- Choose a reward valued by the person receiving it, one that appeals to the

individual's personal pride. This may be a locally approved award that's more respected than traditional DA awards.

- Use the established system of awards (certificates, medals, letters of commendation, driver and mechanic badges) when appropriate. These are recognized throughout the Army; when a soldier goes to a new unit, the reward will still be valuable.
- Present the award at an appropriate ceremony. Emphasize its importance. Let others see how hard work is rewarded.
- Give rewards promptly.
- Praise only good work or honest effort. Giving praise too freely cheapens its effect.
- Promote people who get the job done and who influence others to do better work.
- Recognize those who meet the standard and improve their performance. A soldier who works hard and raises his score on the APFT deserves some recognition, even if the soldier doesn't achieve the maximum score. Not everyone can be soldier of the quarter.

Negative Reinforcement

5-37. Of course, not everyone is going to perform to standard. In fact, some will require punishment. Using punishment to motivate a person away from an undesirable behavior is effective, but can be tricky. Sound judgment must guide you when administering punishment. Consider these guidelines:

- Before you punish a subordinate, make sure the subordinate understands the reason for the punishment. In most—although not all—cases, you'll want to try to change the subordinate's behavior by counseling or retraining before resulting to punishment.
- Consult your leader or supervisor before you punish a subordinate. They'll be aware of policies you need to consider and may be able to assist you in changing the subordinate's behavior.
- Avoid threatening a subordinate with punishment. Making a threat puts you in the position of having to deliver on that threat. In such a situation you may end up punishing because you said you would rather than because the behavior merits punishment. This undermines your standing as a leader.
- Avoid mass punishment. Correctly identify the problem, determine if an individual or individuals are responsible, and use an appropriate form of correction.
- With an open mind and without prejudging, listen to the subordinate's side of the story.
- Let the subordinate know that it's the behavior—not the individual—that is the problem. "You let the team down" works; "You're a loser" sends the wrong message.
- Since people tend to live up to their leader's expectations, tell them, "I know you can do better than that. I expect you to do better than that."

- Punish those who are able but *unwilling* to perform. Retrain a person who's *unable* to complete a task.
- Respond immediately to undesirable behavior. Investigate fully. Take prompt and prudent corrective action in accordance with established legal or regulatory procedures.
- Never humiliate a subordinate; avoid public reprimand.
- Ensure the person knows exactly what behavior got the person in trouble.
- Make sure the punishment isn't excessive or unreasonable. It's not only the severity of punishment that keeps subordinates in line; it's the certainty that they can't get away with undesirable behavior.
- Control your temper and hold no grudges. Don't let your personal feelings interfere; whether you like or dislike someone has nothing to do with good order and discipline.

5-38. If you were surprised to find a discussion of punishment under the section on motivation, consider this: good leaders are always on the lookout for opportunities to develop subordinates, even the ones who are being punished. Your people—even the ones who cause you problems—are still the most important resource you have. When a vehicle is broken, you don't throw it out; you fix it. If one of your people is performing poorly, don't just get rid of the person; try to help fix the problem.

OPERATING ACTIONS

Figure 5-2. Direct Leader Actions—Operating

5-39. You're operating when you act to achieve an immediate objective, when you're working to get today's job done. Although FM 25-100 is predominantly a training tool, its methodology applies to a unit's overall operational effectiveness. Because operating includes planning, preparing, executing, and assessing (see Figure 5-2), you can use the FM 25-100 principles as a model for operations other than training. Sometimes these elements are part of a cycle; other times they happen simultaneously.

5-40. You'll often find yourself influencing after you've moved on to operating. In practice, the nice, neat divisions in this manual are not clear-cut; you often must handle multiple tasks requiring different skills at the same time. (Appendix B lists operating actions and some indicators of effectiveness.)

PLANNING AND PREPARING

5-41. In peacetime training, in actual operations, and especially in combat, your job is to help your organization function effectively—accomplish the mission—in an environment that can be chaotic. That begins with a well thought-out plan and thorough preparation. A well-trained organization with a sound plan is much better prepared than one without a plan. Planning ahead reduces confusion, builds subordinates' confidence in themselves and the organization, and helps ensure success with a minimum of wasted effort—or in combat, the minimum number of casualties. (FM 101-5 discusses the different types of plans.)

5-42. A plan is a proposal for executing a command decision or project. Planning begins with a mission, specified or implied. A specified mission comes from your boss or from higher headquarters. An implied mission results when the leader, who may be you, sees something within his area of responsibility that needs to be done and, on his own initiative, develops a leader plan of action. (Remember that a problem exists when you're not satisfied with the way things are or the direction they're heading.) Either type of mission contains implied and specified tasks, actions that must be completed to accomplish the mission. (FM 101-5 discusses how the MDMP supports planning.)

Reverse Planning

5-43. When you begin with the goal in mind, you often will use the reverse planning method. Start with the question "Where do I want to end up?" and work backward from there until you reach "We are here right now."

5-44. Along the way, determine the basics of what's required: who, what, when, where, and why. You may also want to consider how to accomplish the task, although the "how" is usually not included in a mission to a subordinate. As you plan, consider the amount of time needed to coordinate and conduct each step. For instance, a tank platoon sergeant whose platoon has to spend part of a field exercise on the firing range might have to arrange, among other things, refueling at the range. No one explicitly said to refuel at the range, but the platoon sergeant knows what needs to happen. The platoon sergeant must think through the steps from the last to the first: (1) when the refueling must be complete, (2) how long the refueling will take, (3) how long it takes the refueling unit to get set up, and finally (4) when the refueling vehicles should report to the range.

5-45. After you have figured out what must happen on the way to the goal, put the tasks in sequence, set priorities, and determine a schedule. Look at the steps in the order they will occur. Make sure events are in logical order and you have allotted enough time for each one. As always, a good leader asks for input from subordinates when time allows. Getting input not only acts as a check on the your plan (you may have overlooked something), but also gets your people involved; involvement builds trust, self-confidence, and the will to succeed.

Preparing

5-46. While leaders plan, subordinates prepare. Leaders can develop a plan while their organization is preparing if they provide advance notice of the task or mission and initial guidance for preparation in a warning order. (Warning orders are part of the TLP and MDMP; however, any leader—uniformed or DA civilian—can apply the principle of the warning order by giving subordinates advance notice of an impending requirement and how they'll be expected to contribute to it. FM 101-5 discusses warning orders.) Based on this guidance, subordinates can draw ammunition, rehearse key actions, inspect equipment, conduct security patrols, or begin movement while the leader completes the plan. In the case of a nontactical requirement, preparation may include making sure the necessary facilities and other resources are available to support it. In all cases, preparation includes coordinating with people and organizations that are involved or might be affected by the operation or project. (TC 25-30 discusses preparing for company- and platoon-level training).

5-47. Rehearsal is an important element of preparation. Rehearsing key combat actions lets subordinates see how things are supposed to work and builds confidence in the plan for both soldiers and leaders. Even a simple walk-through helps them visualize who's supposed to be where and do what when. Mobilization exercises provide a similar function for DA civilians and reserve component soldiers: they provide a chance to understand and rehearse mobilization and deployment support functions. Execution goes more smoothly because everyone has a mental picture of what's supposed to happen. Rehearsals help people remember their responsibilities. They also help leaders see how things might happen, what might go wrong, how the plan needs to be changed, and what things the leader didn't think of. (FM 101-5 contains an in-depth discussion of rehearsals.)

An Implied Mission and Leader Plan of Action

Not all missions originate with higher headquarters; sometimes the leader sees what's required and, exercising initiative develops a leader plan of action.

Suppose a platoon sergeant's soldiers had trouble meeting minimum weapons qualification requirements. Since everyone qualified, no one has said to it when necessary. Later, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant meet to assess the plan's results and to decide if further action is required work on marksmanship. But the platoon sergeant knows the platoon made it through range week on sheer luck. The leader develops a training plan to work on basic marksmanship, then goes to the platoon leader and presents it. Together the two leaders figure out a way to make sure their soldiers get a chance to train, even with all the other mission requirements. After they've talked it over, they bring in their subordinate leaders and involve them in the planning process. The platoon sergeant keeps track of the progress and effectiveness of the leader plan of action, making sure it accomplishes the intent and changing it when necessary. Later, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant meet to assess the plan's results and to decide if further action is required.

5-48. Leader plans of action can be used to reinforce positive behavior, improve performance, or even change an aspect of the organizational climate. A leader plan of action may also be personal—as when the leader decides "I need to improve my skills in this area."

Brief Solutions, Not Problems

Leaders develop their subordinates by requiring those subordinates to plan. A lieutenant, new to the battalion staff, ran into a problem getting all the resources the unit was going to need for an upcoming deployment. The officer studied the problem, talked to the people involved, checked his facts, and generally did a thorough analysis—of which he was very proud. Then he marched into the battalion executive officer's (XO's) office and laid it all out in a masterly fashion. The XO looked up from his desk and said, "Great. What are you going to do about it?"

The lieutenant was back in a half-hour with three possible solutions he had worked out with his NCOs. From that day on, the officer never presented a problem to any boss without offering some solutions as well. The lieutenant learned a useful technique from the XO. He learned it so well he began using it with his soldiers and became a better coach and mentor because of it.

5-49. No matter what your position is, part of your duty is making your boss's job easier. Just as you loyally provide resources and authority for your subordinates to do their jobs, you leave the boss free to do his. Ask only for decisions that fall outside your scope of authority—not those you want to avoid. Forward only problems you can't fix—not those whose solutions are just difficult. Ask for advice from others with more experience or seek clarification when you don't understand what's required. Do all that and exercise disciplined initiative within your boss's intent. (Appendix A discusses delegation of authority.)

EXECUTING

Soldiers do what they are told to do. It's leadership that's the key. Young men and women join the Army; if they're with competent, confident, capable leaders they turn into good soldiers.

Sergeant Major of the Army Robert E. Hall

5-50. Executing means acting to accomplish the mission, moving to achieve the leader's goals as expressed in the leader's vision—to standard and on time—while taking care of your people.

5-51. Execution, the payoff, is based on all the work that has gone before. But planning and preparation alone can't guarantee success. Things will go wrong. Large

chunks of the plan will go flying out the window. At times, it will seem as if everything is working against you. Then you must have the will to fight through, keeping in mind your higher leaders' intent and the mission's ultimate goal. You must adapt and improvise.

5-52. In a tactical setting, all leaders must know the intent of commanders two levels up. During execution, position yourself to best lead your people, initiate and control the action, get others to follow the plan, react to changes, keep your people focused, and work the team to accomplish the goal to standard. A well-trained organization accomplishes the mission, even when things go wrong.

5-53. Finally, leaders ensure they and their subordinate leaders are doing the right jobs. This goes hand in hand with empowerment. A company commander doesn't do a squad leader's job. A division chief doesn't do a branch chief's job. A supervisor doesn't do a team leader's job.

Maintaining Standards

5-54. The Army has established standards for all military activities. Standards are formal, detailed instructions that can be stated, measured, and achieved. They provide a performance baseline to evaluate how well a specific task has been executed. You must know, communicate and enforce standards. Explain the ones that apply to your organization and give your subordinate leaders the authority to enforce them. Then hold your subordinates responsible for achieving them.

5-55. Army leaders don't set the minimum standards as goals. However, everything can't be a number one priority. As an Army leader, you must exercise judgment concerning which tasks are most important. Organizations are required to perform many tasks that are not mission-related. While some of these are extremely important, others require only a minimum effort. Striving for excellence in every area, regardless of how trivial, quickly works an organization to death. On the other hand, the fact that a task isn't a first priority doesn't excuse a sloppy performance. Professional soldiers accomplish all tasks to standard. Competent leaders make sure the standard fits the task's importance.

Setting Goals

5-56. The leader's ultimate goal—your ultimate goal—is to train the organization to succeed in its wartime mission. Your daily work includes setting intermediate goals to get the organization ready. Involve your subordinates in goal setting. This kind of cooperation fosters trust and makes the best use of subordinates' talents. When developing goals, consider these points:

- Goals must be realistic, challenging, and attainable.
- Goals should lead to improved combat readiness.

- Subordinates ought to be involved in the goal setting.
- Leaders develop a plan of action to achieve each goal.

ASSESSING

Schools and their training offer better ways to do things, but only through experience are we able to capitalize on this learning. The process of profiting from mistakes becomes a milestone in learning to become a more efficient soldier.

Former Sergeant Major of the Army
William G. Bainbridge

5-57. Setting goals and maintaining standards are central to assessing mission accomplishment. Whenever you talk about accomplishing the mission, always include the phrase "to standard." When you set goals for your subordinates, make sure they know what the standards are. To use a simple example, the goal might be "All unit members will pass the APFT." The APFT standard tells you, for each exercise, how many repetitions are required in how much time, as well as describing a proper way to do the exercise.

5-58. Also central to assessing is spot checking. Army leaders check things: people, performance, equipment, resources. They check things to ensure the organization is meeting standards and moving toward the goals the leader has established. Look closely; do it early and often; do it both before and after the fact. Praise good performance and figure out how to fix poor performance. Watch good first sergeants or command sergeants major as they go through the mess line at the organizational dining facility. They pick up the silverware and run their fingers over it—almost unconsciously—checking for cleanliness. Good leaders supervise, inspect, and correct their subordinates. They don’t waste time; they’re always on duty.

5-59. Some assessments you make yourself. For others, you may want to involve subordinates. Involving subordinates in assessments and obtaining straightforward feedback from them become more important as your span of authority increases. Two techniques that involve your subordinates in assessing are in-process reviews (IPRs) and after-action reviews (AARs).

In-Process Reviews

5-60. Successful assessment begins with forming a picture of the organization’s performance early. Anticipate which areas the organization might have trouble in; that way you know which areas to watch closely. Once the organization begins the mission, use IPRs to evaluate performance and give feedback. Think of an IPR as a checkpoint on the way to mission accomplishment.

5-61. Say you tell your driver to take you to division headquarters. If you recognize

the landmarks, you decide your driver knows the way and probably say nothing. If you don't recognize the landmarks, you might ask where you are. And if you determine that the driver is lost or has made a wrong turn, you give instructions to get back to where you need to be. In more complex missions, IPRs give leaders and subordinates a chance to talk about what's going on. They can catch problems early and take steps to correct or avoid them.

After-Action Reviews

5-62. AARs fill a similar role at the end of the mission. Army leaders use AARs as opportunities to develop subordinates. During an AAR, give subordinates a chance to talk about how they saw things. Teach them how to look past a problem's symptoms to its root cause. Teach them how to give constructive, useful feedback. ("Here's what we did well; here's what we can do better.") When subordinates share in identifying reasons for success and failure, they become owners of a stake in how things get done. AARs also give you a chance to hear what's on your subordinates' minds—and good leaders listen closely. (FM 25-101 and TC 25-20 discuss how to prepare, conduct, and follow up after AARs.)

5-63. Leaders base reviews on accurate observations and correct recording of those observations. If you're evaluating a ten-day field exercise, take good notes because you won't remember everything. Look at things in a systematic way; get out and see things firsthand. Don't neglect tasks that call for subjective judgment: evaluate unit cohesion, discipline, and morale. (FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 discuss training assessment.)

Initial Leader Assessments

5-64. Leaders often conduct an initial assessment before they take over a new position. How competent are your new subordinates? What's expected of you in your new job? Watch how people operate; this will give you clues about the organizational climate. (Remember SSG Withers and the vehicle inspection in Chapter 3?) Review the organization's SOP and any regulations that apply. Meet with the outgoing leader and listen to his assessment. (But don't take it as the absolute truth; everyone sees things through filters.) Review status reports and recent inspection results. Identify the key people outside the organization whose help you'll need to be successful. However, remember that your initial impression may be off-base. After you've been in the position for a while, take the necessary time to make an in-depth assessment.

5-65. And in the midst of all this checking and rechecking, don't forget to take a look at yourself. What kind of leader are you? Do you oversupervise? Undersupervise? How can you improve? What's your plan for working on your weak areas? What's the best way to make use of your strengths? Get feedback on yourself from as many sources as possible: your boss, your peers, even your subordinates. As Chapter 1 said in the discussion of character, make sure your own house is in order.

Assessment of Subordinates

5-66. Good leaders provide straightforward feedback to subordinates. Tell them where you see their strengths; let them know where they can improve. Have them come up with a plan of action for self-improvement; offer your help. Leader assessment should be a positive experience that your subordinates see as a chance for them to improve. They should see it as an opportunity to tap into your experience and knowledge for their benefit.

5-67. To assess your subordinate leaders, you must—

- Observe and record leadership actions. Figure 1-1 is a handy guide for organizing your thoughts.
- Compare what you see to the performance indicators in Appendix B or the appropriate reference.
- Determine if the performance meets, exceeds, or falls below standard.
- Tell your subordinates what you saw; give them a chance to assess themselves.
- Help your subordinate develop a plan of action to improve performance.

Leader Assessments and Plans of Action

5-68. Leader assessment won't help anyone improve unless it includes a plan of action designed to correct weaknesses and sustain strengths. Not only that, you and the subordinate must use the plan; it doesn't do anyone any good if you stick it in a drawer or file cabinet and never think about it again. Here is what you must do:

- Design the plan of action together; let your subordinate take the lead as much as possible.
- Agree on the actions necessary to improve leader performance; your subordinate must buy into this plan if it's going to work.
- Review the plan frequently, check progress, and change the plan if necessary.

(Appendix C discusses the relationship between a leader plan of action and developmental counseling.)

IMPROVING ACTIONS

How can you know if you've made a difference? Sometimes—rarely—the results are instant. Usually it takes much longer. You may see a soldier again as a seasoned NCO; you may get a call or a letter or see a name in the Army Times. In most cases, you will never be sure how well you succeeded, but don't let that stop you.

Command Sergeant Major John D. Woodyard, 1993

5-69. Improving actions are things leaders do to leave their organizations better than they found them. Improving actions fall into the categories highlighted in Figure 5-3: developing, building, and learning.

5-70. Developing refers to people: you improve your organization and the Army as an institution when you develop your subordinates.

5-71. Building refers to team building: as a direct leader, you improve your organization by building strong, cohesive teams that perform to standard, even in your absence.

5-72. Learning refers to you, your subordinates, and your organization as a whole. As a leader, you must model self-development for your people; you must constantly be learning. In addition, you must also encourage your subordinates to learn and reward their self-development efforts. Finally, you must establish an organizational climate that rewards collective learning and act to ensure your organization learns from its experiences.



Figure 5-3. Direct Leader Actions—Improving

DEVELOPING

I've reminded many NCOs that they wouldn't be where they are today if someone hadn't given them a little extra time. I know I wouldn't be where I am.

Former Sergeant Major of the Army Glenn E. Morrell

5-73. In the Army, developing means developing people. Your subordinates are the leaders of tomorrow's Army. You have a responsibility to train them, to be the kind of leader they deserve so that they'll see how leading is done. It's your duty to invest the time and energy it takes to help them reach their fullest potential. The driving principle behind Army leader development is that leaders must be prepared before assuming leadership positions; they must be competent and confident in their abilities. This principle applies to all ranks and levels, to soldiers and DA civilians, and to both the active and reserve components.

5-74. As Figure 5-4 shows, a trained and ready Army rests on effective leader development. In turn, leader development rests on a foundation of training and education, expectations and standards, and values and ethics. This foundation supports the three leader development pillars: institutional training (schooling), operational assignments, and self-development. (DA Pam 350-58 discusses Army leader development.)

Institutional Training

5-75. The Army school system provides formal education and training for job-related and leadership skills. The American public education system is progressive; that is, children attend primary school before middle school or junior high and then go on to high school. Likewise, the Army school system is progressive. The main difference is that you can expect to go out and use your skills in an assignment before being considered for the next level of schooling. Institutional training is critical in developing leaders and preparing them for increased positions of responsibility throughout the Army.

Figure 5-4. Leader Development

Operational Assignments

5-76. When you take what you've learned in school into the field Army, you continue to learn through on-the-job experience and by watching your leaders, peers, and subordinates. Operational assignments provide opportunities to broaden your knowledge and refine skills you gain during institutional training and previous assignments. You gain and expand your experience base by performing a wide range of duties and tasks under a variety of frequently changing conditions and situations. Operational assignments provide a powerful resource for leader development—an opportunity to learn by doing.

Self-Development

5-77. Self-development is a process you should use to enhance previously acquired skills, knowledge, and experience. Its goal is to increase your readiness and potential for positions of greater responsibility. Effective self-development focuses on aspects of your character, knowledge, and capabilities that you believe need developing or improving. You can use the dimensions of the Army leadership framework to help you

determine what areas to work on. Self-development is continuous: it takes place during institutional training and operational assignments.

5-78. Self-development is a joint effort involving you, your first-line leader, and your commander. Commanders establish and monitor self-development programs for their organizations. You and your first-line leader together establish goals to meet your individual needs and plan the actions you must take to meet them. You do this as part of developmental counseling, which is discussed below and in Appendix C. Finally, you must execute your plan of action. If you have subordinates, you monitor how well they're acting on their plans of action. You can't execute their plans for them, but you can give them advice, encouragement, and—when necessary and mission permits—time.

5-79. Self-development for junior personnel is very structured and generally narrow in focus. The focus broadens as individuals learn their strengths and weaknesses, determine their individual needs, and become more independent. Everyone's knowledge and perspective increases with age, experience, institutional training, and operational assignments. Specific, goal-oriented self-development actions can accelerate and broaden a person's skills and knowledge. As a member of the Army, you're obligated to develop your abilities to the greatest extent possible. As an Army leader, you're responsible to assist your subordinates in their self-development.

5-80. Civilian and military education is part of self-development. Army leaders never stop learning. They seek to educate and train themselves beyond what's offered in formal schooling or even in their duty assignments. Leaders look for educational opportunities to prepare themselves for their next job and future responsibilities. Look for Army off-duty education that interests you and will give you useful skills. Seek civilian education to broaden your outlook on life. Look for things to read that will develop your mind and help you build skills. Challenge yourself and apply the same initiative here as you do in your day-to-day duties.

5-81. Remember that Army leaders challenge themselves and take advantage of work done by others in such fields as leadership and military history as well as in their off-duty areas of interest. In the leadership area, you can begin with some of the books listed in the bibliography or go to any bookstore or library. You'll find hundreds of titles under the heading of leadership. The libraries of your post, nearby civilian communities, and colleges contain works on these topics. In addition, the Internet can also be a useful place for obtaining information on some areas. However, be careful. Some books contain more reliable and useful information than others; the same is true of Internet sites.

5-82. Figure 5-4 also shows that actions, skills, and attributes form the foundation of success in operational assignments. This is where you, the leader, fit into Army leader development. As a leader, you help your subordinates internalize Army values. You also assist them in developing the individual attributes, learning the skills, and

mastering the actions required to become leaders of character and competence themselves. You do this through the action of mentoring.

Mentoring

Good NCOs are not just born—they are groomed and grown through a lot of hard work and strong leadership by senior NCOs.

Former Sergeant Major of the Army
William A. Connelly

Mentoring (in the Army) is the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity. Mentoring is an inclusive process (not an exclusive one) for everyone under a leader's charge.

5-83. Mentoring is totally inclusive, real-life leader development for every subordinate. Because leaders don't know which of their subordinates today will be the most significant contributors and leaders in the future, they strive to provide all their subordinates with the knowledge and skills necessary to become the best they can be—for the Army and for themselves.

5-84. Mentoring begins with the leader setting the right example. As an Army leader, you mentor people every day in a positive or negative way, depending on how you live Army values and perform leader actions. Mentoring shows your subordinates a mature example of values, attributes, and skills in action. It encourages them to develop their own character and leader attributes accordingly.

5-85. Mentoring links operating leader actions to improving leader actions. When you mentor, you take the observing, assessing, and evaluating you do when you operate and apply these actions to developing individual subordinates. Mentoring techniques include teaching, developmental counseling, and coaching.

Teaching gives knowledge or provides skills to others, causing them to learn by example or experience.

5-86. Teaching is passing on knowledge and skills to subordinates. It's a primary task for first-line leaders. Teaching focuses primarily on technical and tactical skills. Developmental counseling is better for improving interpersonal and conceptual skills. Technical competence is critical to effective teaching. In order to develop subordinates, you must be able to demonstrate the technical and tactical skills you expect them to perform; otherwise they won't listen to you.

5-87. To be an Army leader, you must be a teacher. You give your subordinates knowledge and skills all the time, whether in formal, classroom settings or through your example. To be an effective teacher, you must first be professionally competent; then you must create conditions in which your subordinates can learn.

Soldiers learn to be good leaders from good leaders.

Former Sergeant Major of the Army Richard A. Kidd

5-88. The measure of how well you teach is how well your people learn. In most cases, your people will learn more by performing a skill than they will by watching you do it or by hearing you talk about how to do it. However, it's up to you to choose the teaching method that best fits the material. To make this choice, you need to understand the different ways people learn. People learn—

- Through the example of others (observing).
- By forming a picture in their minds of what they're trying to learn (thinking).
- By absorbing information (thinking).
- Through practice (hands-on experience).

5-89. Teaching is a complex art, one that you must learn in addition to the competencies you seek to teach. Just because you can pull the engine out of a tank doesn't mean you would be any good at teaching other people to do it. There are techniques and methods involved in teaching that have nothing to do with how good you are on the job; you must know both the skills related to the subject and another set of teaching skills. As an Army leader, you must develop these teaching skills as well. A subject matter expert who has acquired technical knowledge but is unable to teach that knowledge to others isn't improving the organization or the Army. (FM 25-101 addresses these and other areas related to conducting training.)

Developmental Counseling is subordinate-centered communication that produces a plan outlining actions necessary for subordinates to achieve individual or organizational goals.

5-90. Developmental counseling is central to leader development. It's the means by which you prepare your subordinates of today to be the leaders of tomorrow. (Appendix C contains more details on developmental counseling.)

5-91. Developmental counseling isn't a time for war stories or for tales of how things were done way back when. It should focus on today's performance and problems and tomorrow's plans and solutions. Effective developmental counseling is centered on the subordinate, who is actively involved—listening, asking for more feedback, seeking

elaboration of what the counselor has to say.

5-92. Developmental counseling isn't an occasional event that you do when you feel like it. It needs to be part of your program to develop your subordinates. It requires you to use all your counseling tools and skills. This means using counseling requirements such as those prescribed in the NCO Evaluation Reporting System (NCOERS), Officer Evaluation Reporting System (OERS), and Total Army Performance Evaluation System (TAPES, which is used to evaluate DA civilians) as more than paper drills. It means face-to-face counseling of individuals you rate. But more important, it means making time throughout the rating period to discuss performance objectives and provide meaningful assessments and feedback. No evaluation report—positive or negative—should be a surprise. A consistent developmental counseling program ensures your people know where they stand and what they should be doing to improve their performance and develop themselves. Your program should include all your people, not just the ones you think have the most potential. (The bibliography lists the evaluation and support forms prescribed by the OERS, NCOERS, and TAPES. Appendix C discusses how to use support forms to assist you with developmental counseling.)

5-93. New direct leaders are sometimes uncomfortable confronting a subordinate who isn't performing to standard. However, remember that counseling isn't about how comfortable or uncomfortable you are; counseling is about correcting the performance or developing the character of a subordinate. Therefore, be honest and frank with your subordinates during developmental counseling. If you let your people get away with substandard behavior because you want them to like you or because you're afraid to make a hard call, you're sacrificing Army standards for your personal well-being—and you're not developing your subordinates.

5-94. This manual has emphasized throughout the importance of the example that you, as an Army leader, set for your subordinates. Your people look to you to see what kind of leader they want to be. The example you set in counseling is especially important. Army leaders at every level must ensure their subordinate leaders use counseling to develop their own subordinates. Setting the example is a powerful leadership tool: if you counsel your subordinates, your subordinate leaders will counsel theirs as well. The way you counsel is the way they'll counsel. Your people copy your behavior. The significance of your position as a role model can't be understated. It's a powerful teaching tool, for developmental counseling as well as other behaviors.

5-95. Although you're responsible for developing your subordinates, no leader can be all things to all people. In addition, the Army is already culturally diverse and is becoming increasingly technologically complex. In this environment, some of your subordinates may seek advice and counsel from informal relationships in addition to their leadership chain. Such relationships can be particularly important for women, minorities, and those in low-density specialties who have relatively few role models nearby.

5-96. This situation in no way relieves you, the leader, of any of your responsibilities regarding caring for and developing your people. Rather, being sensitive to your subordinates' professional development and cultural needs is part of the cultural awareness leader attribute. As an Army leader, you must know your people and take advantage of every resource available to help your subordinates develop as leaders. This includes other leaders who have skills or attributes different from your own.

Coaching involves a leader's assessing performance based on observations, helping the subordinate develop an effective plan of action to sustain strengths and overcome weaknesses, and supporting the subordinate and the plan.

5-97. You can consider coaching to be both an operating and an improving leader action. It's less formal than teaching. When you're dealing with individuals, coaching is a form of specific instance counseling (which Appendix C discusses). When you're dealing with all or part of a team, it's generally associated with AARs (which you read about earlier in this chapter).

5-98. Coaching follows naturally from the assessing leader action. As you observe your subordinates at work, you'll see them perform some tasks to standard and some not to standard. Some of their plans will work; some won't. Your subordinates know when you're watching them. They expect you to tell them what they need to do to meet the standard, improve the team's performance, or develop themselves. You provide this sort of feedback through coaching. And don't limit your coaching to formal sessions. Use every opportunity to teach, counsel or coach from quarterly training briefings to AARs. Teaching moments and coaching opportunities occur all the time when you concentrate on developing leaders.

Mentoring and Developing Tomorrow's Army

5-99. Mentoring is demanding business, but the future of the Army depends on the trained and effective leaders whom you leave behind. Sometimes it requires you to set priorities, to balance short-term readiness with long-term leader development. The commitment to mentoring future leaders may require you to take risks. It requires you to give subordinates the opportunity to learn and develop themselves while using your experience to guide them without micromanaging. Mentoring will lead your subordinates to successes that build their confidence and skills for the future.

5-100. Mentoring isn't something new for the Army. Past successes and failures can often be traced to how seriously those in charge took the challenge of developing future leaders. As you consider the rapid pace of change in today's world, it's critical that you take the time to develop leaders capable of responding to that change. The success of the next generation of Army leaders depends on how well you accept the responsibility of mentoring your subordinates. Competent and confident leaders trained to meet

tomorrow's challenges and fight and win future conflicts will be your legacy.

5-101. As you assume positions of greater responsibility, as the number of people for whom you are responsible increases, you need to do even more to develop your subordinates. More, in this case, means establishing a leader development program for your organization. It also means encouraging your subordinates to take actions to develop themselves personally and professionally. In addition, you may have to provide time for them to pursue self-development. (FM 25-101 discusses leader development programs.)

What have YOU done TODAY to develop the leaders of tomorrow's Army?

BUILDING
Building Teams

5-102. You've heard—no doubt countless times—that the Army is a team. Just how important is it that people have a sense of the team? Very important. The national cause, the purpose of the mission, and all the larger concerns may not be visible from the battlefield. Regardless of other issues, soldiers perform for the other people in the squad or section, for others in the team or crew, for the person on their right or left. This is a fundamental truth: soldiers perform because they don't want to let their buddies down.

5-103. If the leaders of the small teams that make up the Army are competent, and if their members trust one another, those teams and the larger team of teams will hang together and get the job done. People who belong to a successful team look at nearly everything in a positive light; their winners' attitudes are infectious, and they see problems as challenges rather than obstacles. Additionally, a cohesive team accomplishes the mission much more efficiently than a group of individuals. Just as a football team practices to win on the gridiron, so must a team of soldiers practice to be effective on the battlefield.

5-104. Training together builds collective competence; trust is a product of that competence. Subordinates learn to trust their leaders if the leaders know how to do their jobs and act consistently—if they say what they mean and mean what they say. Trust also springs from the collective competence of the team. As the team becomes more experienced and enjoys more successes, it becomes more cohesive.

Trust Earned

In a 1976 interview, Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York told of his experiences as a white officer with the 369th Infantry Regiment, an all-black unit in the segregated Army of 1917. Fish knew that his unit would function only if his soldiers trusted him; his soldiers, all of whom had volunteered for combat duty, deserved nothing less than a trustworthy leader. When a white regiment threatened to attack the black soldiers in training camp, Fish, his pistol drawn, alerted the leaders of that regiment and headed off a disaster.

"There was one thing they wanted above all from a white officer," [Fish recalled in an interview nearly 60 years later] "and that was fair treatment. You see, even in New York City [home of most of his soldiers] they really did not get a square deal most of the time. But if they felt you were on the level with them, they would go all out for you. And they seemed to have a sixth sense in realizing just how you felt. I sincerely wanted to lead them as real soldiers, and they knew it."

5-105. Developing teams takes hard work, patience, and quite a bit of interpersonal skill on the part of the leader, but it's a worthwhile investment. Good teams get the job done. People who are part of a good team complete the mission on time with the resources given them and a minimum of wasted effort; in combat, good teams are the most effective and take the fewest casualties.

5-106. Good teams—

- Work together to accomplish the mission.
- Execute tasks thoroughly and quickly.
- Meet or exceed the standard.
- Thrive on demanding challenges.
- Learn from their experiences and are proud of their accomplishments.

5-107. The Army is a team that includes members who are not soldiers but whose contributions are essential to mission success. The contributions made by almost 1,600 DA civilians in the Persian Gulf region were all but lost in the celebrations surrounding the military victory against Iraq and the homecoming celebration for the soldiers that followed. However, one safety specialist noted that these deployed DA civilians recognized the need for a team effort:

Patriotism was their drawing force for being there....We were part of the team supporting our soldiers! The focus is where it should be—on the military. They're here to do the job; we're here to help them.

5-108. People will do the most extraordinary things for their buddies. It's your job as an Army leader to pull each member into the team because you may someday ask that

person for extraordinary effort. Team building involves applying interpersonal leader skills that transform individuals into productive teams. If you've done your work, the team member won't let you down.

5-109. Within a larger team, smaller teams may be at different stages of development. For instance, members of First Squad may be used to working together. They trust one another and get the job done—usually exceeding the standard—with no wasted motion. Second Squad in the same platoon just received three new soldiers and a team leader from another company. As a team, Second Squad is less mature; it will take them some time to get up to the level of First Squad. New team members have to learn how things work: they have to be brought on board and made to feel members of the team; they must learn the standards and the climate of their new unit; they'll have to demonstrate some competence before other members really accept them; and finally, they must practice working together. Leaders, who must oversee all this, are better equipped if they know what to expect. Make use of the information on the next few pages; learn what to look for—and stay flexible.

5-110. Figure 5-5 lists things you must do to pull a team together, get it going in the right direction, and keep it moving. And that list only hints at the work that lies ahead as you get your team to work together. Your subordinates must know—must truly believe—that they're a part of the team, that their contribution is important and valued. They must know that you'll train them and listen to them. They don't want you to let them get away with shoddy work or half-baked efforts; there's no pride in loafing. You must constantly observe, counsel, develop, listen; you must be every bit the team player you want your subordinates to be—and more.

5-111. Teams don't come together by accident; leaders must build and guide them through a series of developmental stages: formation, enrichment, and sustainment. This discussion may make the process seem more orderly than it actually is; as with so many things leaders do, the reality is more complicated than the explanation. Each team develops differently: the boundaries between stages are not hard and fast. As a leader, you must be sensitive to the characteristics of the team you're building and of its individual members—your people. Compare the characteristics of your team with the team building stage descriptions. The information that results can help you determine what to expect of your team and what you need to do to improve its capabilities.

Stages of Team Building

5-112. Teams, like individuals, have different personalities. As with individuals, the leader's job isn't to make teams that are clones of one another; the job is to make best use of the peculiar talents of the team, maximize the potential of the unit climate, and motivate aggressive execution.

5-113. **Formation stage.** Teams work best when new members are brought on board

quickly, when they're made to feel a part of the team. The two steps—reception and orientation—are dramatically different in peace and war. In combat, this sponsorship process can literally mean life or death to new members and to the team.

5-114. Reception is the leader's welcome: the orientation begins with meeting other team members, learning the layout of the workplace, learning the schedule and other requirements, and generally getting to know the lay of the land. In combat, leaders may not have time to spend with new members. In this case, new arrivals are often assigned a buddy who will help them get oriented and keep them out of trouble until they learn their way around. Whatever technique you use, your soldiers should never encounter a situation similar to the one in the next example.

TEAM BUILDING STAGES

	SUBORDINATE CHALLENGES	LEADER & UNIT/ORGANIZATION ACTIONS
FORMATION STAGE GENERIC	• Achieve belonging and acceptance • Set personal & family concerns • Learn about leaders and other members	• Listen to and care for subordinates • Design effective reception and orientation • Communicate • Reward positive contributions • Set example
SOLDIER CRITICAL	• Face the uncertainty of war • Cope with fear of unknown injury and death • Adjust to sights and sounds of war • Adjust to separation from home and family	• Talk with each soldier • Reassure with calm presence • Communicate vital safety tips • Provide stable situation • Establish buddy system • Assist soldiers to deal with immediate problems
ENRICHMENT STAGE GENERIC	• Trust leaders & other members • Find close friends • Learn who is in charge • Accept the way things are done • Adjust to feelings about how things ought to be done • Overcome family-versus-unit conflict	• Trust and encourage trust • Allow growth while keeping control • Identify and channel emerging leaders • Establish clear lines of authority • Establish individual and unit goals • Train as a unit for mission • Build pride through accomplishment • Acquire self-evaluation/self-assessment habits • Be fair and give responsibility
SOLDIER CRITICAL	• Survive • Demonstrate competence • Become a team member quickly • Learn about the enemy • Learn about the battlefield • Avoid life-threating mistakes	• Train as a unit for combat • Demonstrate competence • Know the soldiers • Pace subordinate battlefield integration • Provide stable unit climate • Emphasize safety awareness for improved readiness
SUSTAINMENT STAGE GENERIC	• Trust others • Share ideas and feelings freely • Assist other team members • Sustain trust and confidence • Share mission and values	• Demonstrate trust • Focus on teamwork, training & maintaining • Respond to subordinate problems • Devise more challenging training • Build pride and spirit through unit sports, social & spiritual activities.
	• Adjust to continuous operations • Cope with casualties	• Observe and enforce sleep discipline • Sustain safety awareness

SOLDIER CRITICAL
• Adjust to continuous operations
• Cope with casualties
• Adjust to enemy actions
• Overcome boredom
• Avoid rumors
• Control fear, anger, despair, and panic
• Observe and enforce sleep discipline
• Sustain safety awareness
• Inform soldiers
• Know and deal with soldiers' perceptions
• Keep soldiers productively busy
• Use in-process reviews (IPRs) and after-action reviews (AARs)
• Act decisively in face of panic

Figure 5-5. Team Building Stages

Replacements in the ETO

Most historians writing about World War II agree that the replacement system that fed new soldiers into the line units was seriously flawed, especially in the ETO, and did tremendous harm to the soldiers and the Army. Troops fresh from stateside posts were shuffled about in tent cities where they were just numbers. 1LT George Wilson, an infantry company commander who received one hundred replacements on December 29, 1944, in the midst of the Battle of the Bulge, remembers the results: "We discovered that these men had been on a rifle range only once; they had never thrown a grenade or fired a bazooka [antitank rocket], mortar or machine gun."

PVT Morris Dunn, another soldier who ended up with the 84th Division after weeks in a replacement depot recalls how the new soldiers felt: "We were just numbers, we didn't know anybody, and I've never felt so alone and miserable and helpless in my entire life—we'd been herded around like cattle at roundup time.…On the ride to the front it was cold and raining with the artillery fire louder every mile, and finally we were dumped out in the middle of a heavily damaged town."

5-115. In combat, Army leaders have countless things to worry about; the mental state of new arrivals might seem low on the list. But if those soldiers can't fight, the unit will suffer needless casualties and may fail to complete the mission.

5-116. Discipline and shared hardship pull people together in powerful ways. SGT Alvin C. York, who won the Medal of Honor in an action you'll read about later in this chapter, talked about cohesion this way:

War brings out the worst in you. It turns you into a mad, fighting animal, but it also brings out something else, something I just don't know how to describe, a sort of tenderness and love for the fellow fighting with you.

5-117. However, the emotions SGT York mentions don't emerge automatically in combat. One way to ensure cohesion is to build it during peacetime. Team building begins with receiving new members; you know how important first impressions are

when you meet someone new. The same thing is true of teams; the new member's reception and orientation creates that crucial first impression that colors the person's opinion of the team for a long time. A good experience joining the organization will make it easier for the new member to fit in and contribute. Even in peacetime, the way a person is received into an organization can have long-lasting effects—good or bad—on the individual and the team. (Appendix C discusses reception and integration counseling.)

Reception on Christmas Eve

An assistant division commander of the 25th Infantry Division told this story as part of his farewell speech:

"I ran across some new soldiers and asked them about their arrival on the island [of Oahu]. They said they got in on Christmas Eve, and I thought to myself, 'Can't we do a better job when we ship these kids out, so they're not sitting in some airport on their first big holiday away from home?' I mean, I really felt sorry for them. So I said, 'Must have been pretty lonesome sitting in a new barracks where you didn't know anyone.' And one of them said, 'No, sir. We weren't there a half-hour before the CQ [charge of quarters] came up and told us to get into class B's and be standing out front of the company in 15 minutes. Then this civilian drives up, a teenager, and the CQ orders us into the car. Turns out the kid was the first sergeant's son; his father had sent him over to police up anybody who was hanging around the barracks. We went over to the first sergeant's house to a big luau [party] with his family and a bunch of their neighbors and friends.'

"My guess is that those soldiers will not only do anything and everything that first sergeant wants, but they are going to tell anyone who will listen that they belong to the best outfit in the Army."

5-118. **Enrichment stage.** New teams and new team members gradually move from questioning everything to trusting themselves, their peers, and their leaders. Leaders earn that trust by listening, following up on what they hear, establishing clear lines of authority, and setting standards. By far the most important thing a leader does to strengthen the team is training. Training takes a group of individuals and molds them into a team while preparing them to accomplish their missions. Training occurs during all three team building stages, but is particularly important during enrichment; it's at this point that the team is building collective proficiency.

5-119. **Sustainment stage.** When a team reaches this stage, its members think of the team as "their team." They own it, have pride in it, and want the team to succeed. At this stage, team members will do what needs to be done without being told. Every new mission gives the leader a chance to make the bonds even stronger, to challenge the team to reach for new heights. The leader develops his subordinates because they're tomorrow's team leaders. He continues to train the team so that it maintains proficiency

in the collective and individual tasks it must perform to accomplish its missions. Finally, the leader works to keep the team going in spite of the stresses and losses of combat.

Building the Ethical Climate

5-120. As an Army leader, you are the ethical standard bearer for your organization. You're responsible for building an ethical climate that demands and rewards behavior consistent with Army values. The primary factor affecting an organization's ethical climate is its leader's ethical standard. Leaders can look to other organizational or installation personnel—for example, the chaplain, staff judge advocate, inspector general, and equal employment opportunity manager—to assist them in building and assessing their organization's ethical climate, but the ultimate responsibility belongs to the leader—period.

5-121. Setting a good ethical example doesn't necessarily mean subordinates will follow it. Some of them may feel that circumstances justify unethical behavior. (See, for example, the situation portrayed in Appendix D.) Therefore, you must constantly seek to maintain a feel for your organization's current ethical climate and take prompt action to correct any discrepancies between the climate and the standard. One tool to help you is the Ethical Climate Assessment Survey (ECAS), which is discussed in Appendix D. You can also use some of the resources listed above to help you get a feel for your organization's ethical climate. After analyzing the information gathered from the survey or other sources, a focus group may be a part of your plan of action to improve the ethical climate. Your abilities to listen and decide are the most important tools you have for this job.

5-122. It's important for subordinates to have confidence in the organization's ethical environment because much of what is necessary in war goes against the grain of the societal values individuals bring into the Army. You read in the part of Chapter 4 that discusses ethical reasoning that a soldier's conscience may tell him it's wrong to take human life while the mission of the unit calls for exactly that. Unless you've established a strong ethical climate that lets that soldier know his duty, the conflict of values may sap the soldier's will to fight.

SGT York

A conscientious objector from the Tennessee hills, Alvin C. York was drafted after America's entry into World War I and assigned to the 328th Infantry Regiment of the 82d Division, the "All Americans." PVT York, a devout Christian, told his commander, CPT E. C. B. Danforth, that he would bear arms against the enemy but didn't believe in killing. Recognizing PVT York as a potential leader but unable to sway him from his convictions, CPT Danforth consulted his battalion commander, MAJ George E. Buxton, about how to handle the situation.

MAJ Buxton was also deeply religious and knew the Bible as well as PVT York did. He had CPT Danforth bring PVT York to him, and they talked at length about the Scriptures, about God's teachings, about right and wrong, about just wars. Then MAJ Buxton sent PVT York home on leave to ponder and pray over the dilemma. The battalion commander promised to release him from the Army if PVT York decided he could not serve his country without sacrificing his integrity. After two weeks of reflection and deep soul-searching, PVT York returned, having reconciled his personal values with those of the Army. PVT York's decision had great consequences for both himself and his unit.

Alvin York performed an exploit of almost unbelievable heroism in the morning hours of 8 October 1918 in France's Argonne Forest. He was now a corporal (CPL), having won his stripes during combat in the Lorraine. That morning CPL York's battalion was moving across a valley to seize a German-held rail point when a German infantry battalion, hidden on a wooded ridge overlooking the valley, opened up with machine gun fire. The American battalion dived for cover, and the attack stalled. CPL York's platoon, already reduced to 16 men, was sent to flank the enemy machine guns.

As the platoon advanced through the woods to the rear of the German outfit, it surprised a group of about 25 German soldiers. The shocked enemy offered only token resistance, but then more hidden machine guns swept the clearing with fire. The Germans dropped safely to the ground, but nine Americans, including the platoon leader and the other two corporals, fell dead or wounded. CPL York was the only unwounded leader remaining.

CPL York found his platoon trapped and under fire within 25 yards of the enemy's machine gun pits. Nonetheless, he didn't panic. Instead, he began firing into the nearest enemy position, aware that the Germans would have to expose themselves to get an aimed shot at him. An expert marksman, CPL York was able to hit every enemy soldier who popped his head over the parapet.

After he had shot more than a dozen enemy, six German soldiers charged him with fixed bayonets. As the Germans ran toward him, CPL York once again drew on the instincts of a Tennessee hunter and shot the last man first (so the ones in front wouldn't see the ones he shot fall), then the fifth, and so on. After he had shot all the assaulting Germans, CPL York again turned his attention to the machine gun pits. In between shots, he called for the Germans to give up. It may have initially seemed ludicrous for a lone soldier in the open to call on a well-entrenched enemy to surrender, but their situation looked desperate to the German battalion

commander, who had seen over 20 of his soldiers killed by this one American. The commander advanced and offered to surrender if CPL York would stop shooting.

CPL York now faced a daunting task. His platoon, now numbering seven unwounded soldiers, was isolated behind enemy lines with several dozen prisoners. However, when one American said their predicament was hopeless, CPL York told him to be quiet and began organizing the prisoners for a movement. CPL York moved his unit and prisoners toward American lines, encountering other German positions and forcing their surrender. By the time the platoon reached the edge of the valley they had left just a few hours before, the hill was clear of German machine guns. The fire on the Americans in the valley was substantially reduced and their advance began again.

CPL York returned to American lines, having taken a total of 132 prisoners and putting 35 machine guns out of action. He left the prisoners and headed back to his own outfit. Intelligence officers questioned the prisoners and learned from their testimony the incredible story of how a fighting battalion was destroyed by one determined soldier armed only with a rifle and pistol. Alvin C. York was promoted to sergeant and awarded the Medal of Honor for this action. His character, physical courage, technical competence, and leadership enabled him to destroy the morale and effectiveness of an entire enemy infantry battalion.

5-123. CPT Danforth and MAJ Buxton could have ordered SGT York to go to war, or they might have shipped him out to a job that would take him away from the fight. Instead, these leaders carefully addressed the soldier's ethical concerns. MAJ Buxton, in particular, established the ethical climate by showing that he, too, had wrestled with the very questions that troubled SGT York. The climate these leaders created held that every person's beliefs are important and should be considered. MAJ Buxton demonstrated that a soldier's duties could be consistent with the ethical framework established by his religious beliefs. Leaders who create a healthy ethical environment inspire confidence in their subordinates; that confidence and the trust it engenders builds the unit's will. They create an environment where soldiers can truly "be all they can be."

LEARNING

For most men, the matter of learning is one of personal preference. But for Army [leaders], the obligation to learn, to grow in their profession, is clearly a public duty.

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

5-124. The Army is a learning organization, one that harnesses the experience of its people and organizations to improve the way it does business. Based on their experiences, learning organizations adopt new techniques and procedures that get the job done more efficiently or effectively. Likewise, they discard techniques and procedures that have outlived their purpose. However, you must remain flexible when

trying to make sense of your experiences. The leader who works day after day after day and never stops to ask "How can I do this better?" is never going to learn and won't improve the team.

5-125. Leaders who learn look at their experience and find better ways of doing things. Don't be afraid to challenge how you and your subordinates operate. When you ask "Why do we do it that way?" and the only answer you get is "Because we've always done it that way," it's time for a closer look. Teams that have found a way that works still may not be doing things the best way. Unless leaders are willing to question how things are, no one will ever know what can be.

"Zero Defects" and Learning

5-126. There's no room for the "zero-defects" mentality in a learning organization. Leaders willing to learn welcome new ways of looking at things, examine what's going well, and are not afraid to look at what's going poorly. When direct leaders stop receiving feedback from subordinates, it's a good indication that something is wrong. If the message you hammer home is "There will be no mistakes," or if you lose your temper and "shoot the messenger" every time there's bad news, eventually your people will just stop telling you when things go wrong or suggesting how to make things go right. Then there will be some unpleasant surprises in store. Any time you have human beings in a complex organization doing difficult jobs, often under pressure, there are going to be problems. Effective leaders use those mistakes to figure out how to do things better and share what they have learned with other leaders in the organization, both peers and superiors.

5-127. That being said, all environments are not learning environments; a standard of "zero-defects" is acceptable, if not mandatory, in some circumstances. A parachute rigger is charged with a "zero-defect" standard. If a rigger makes a mistake, a parachutist will die. Helicopter repairers live in a "zero-defect" environment as well. They can't allow aircraft to be mechanically unstable during flight. In these and similar work environments, safety concerns mandate a "zero-defects" mentality. Of course, organizations and people make mistakes; mistakes are part of training and may be the price of taking action. Leaders must make their intent clear and ensure their people understand the sorts of mistakes that are acceptable and those that are not.

5-128. Leaders can create a "zero-defects" environment without realizing it. Good leaders want their organizations to excel. But an organizational "standard" of excellence can quickly slide into "zero defects" if the leader isn't careful. For example, the published minimum standard for passing the APFT is 180 points—60 points per event. However, in units that are routinely assigned missions requiring highly strenuous physical activities, leaders need to train their people to a higher-than-average level of physical fitness. If leaders use APFT scores as the primary means of gauging physical fitness, their soldiers will focus on the test rather than the need for physical fitness. A better course would be for leaders to train their people on mission-related

skills that require the higher level of physical readiness while at the same time motivating them to strive for their personal best on the APFT.

Barriers to Learning

5-129. Fear of mistakes isn't the only thing that can get in the way of learning; so can rigid, lockstep thinking and plain mental laziness. These habits can become learning barriers leaders are so used to that they don't even notice them. Fight this tendency. Challenge yourself. Use your imagination. Ask how other people do things. Listen to subordinates.

Helping People Learn

5-130. Certain conditions help people learn. First, you must motivate the person to learn. Explain to the subordinate why the subject is important or show how it will help the individual perform better. Second, involve the subordinate in the learning process; make it active. For instance, you would never try to teach someone how to drive a vehicle with classroom instruction alone; you have to get the person behind the wheel. That same approach applies to much more complex tasks; keep the lecture to a minimum and maximize the hands-on time.

5-131. Learning from experience isn't enough; you can't have every kind of experience. But if you take advantage of what others have learned, you get the benefit without having the experience. An obvious example is when combat veterans in a unit share their experiences with soldiers who haven't been to war. A less obvious, but no less important, example is when leaders share their experience with subordinates during developmental counseling.

After-Action Reviews and Learning

5-132. Individuals benefit when the group learns together. The AAR is one tool good leaders use to help their organizations learn as a group. Properly conducted, an AAR is a professional discussion of an event, focused on performance standards, that enables people to discover for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve on weaknesses. Like warning orders and rehearsals, the AAR is a technique that all leaders—military or DA civilian—can use in garrison as well as field environments. (FM 25-101 and TC 25-20 discuss how to prepare for, conduct, and follow up after an AAR.) When your team sits down for an AAR, make sure everyone participates and all understand what's being said. With input from the whole team, your people will learn more than if they just think about the experience by themselves.

Organizational Climate and Learning

5-133. It takes courage to create a learning environment. When you try new things or

try things in different ways, you're bound to make mistakes. Learn from your mistakes and the mistakes of others. Pick your team and yourself up, determine what went right and wrong, and continue the mission. Be confident in your abilities. Theodore Roosevelt, a colonel during the Spanish-American War and twenty-sixth President of the United States, put it this way:

Whenever you are asked if you can do a job, tell 'em, Certainly I can!—and get busy and find out how to do it.

5-134. Your actions as a direct leader move the Army forward. How you influence your subordinates and the people you work for, how you operate to get the job done, how you improve the organization for a better future, all determine the Army's success or failure.

SUMMARY

5-135. Direct leaders influence their subordinates face-to-face as they operate to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. Because their leadership is face-to-face, direct leaders see the outcomes of their actions almost immediately. This is partly because they receive immediate feedback on the results of their actions.

5-136. Direct leaders influence by determining their purpose and direction from the boss's intent and concept of the operation. They motivate subordinates by completing tasks that reinforce this intent and concept. They continually acquire and assess outcomes and motivate their subordinates through face-to-face contact and personal example.

5-137. Direct leaders operate by focusing their subordinates' activities toward the organization's objective and achieving it. Direct leaders plan, prepare, execute, and assess as they operate. These functions sometimes occur simultaneously.

5-138. Direct leaders improve by living Army values and providing the proper role model for subordinates. Leaders must develop all subordinates as they build strong, cohesive teams and establish an effective learning environment.

PART THREE

Organizational and Strategic Leadership

As they mature and assume greater responsibilities, Army leaders must also learn new skills, develop new abilities, and act in more complex environments. Organizational and strategic leaders maintain their own personalities and propensities, but they also expand what they know and refine what they do.

Chapters 6 and 7 describe (rather than prescribe or mandate) skills and actions required of organizational and strategic leaders. The chapters discuss much of what developing leaders often sense and explore some concepts that may seem foreign to them. Neither chapter outlines exhaustively what leaders know and do at higher levels; they simply introduce what's different.

The audience for Chapters 6 and 7 is only in part organizational and strategic leaders, who have prepared to serve in those positions by career-long experience and study. Primarily, these chapters offer staffs and subordinates who work for those leaders insight into the additional concerns and activities of organizational and strategic leadership.

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Chapter 6

Organizational Leadership

6-1. During the Battle of the Bulge, with the Germans bearing down on retreating US forces, PFC Vernon L. Haught dug in and told a sergeant in a tank destroyer, "Just pull your vehicle behind me . . . I'm the 82d Airborne, and this is as far as the bastards are going." He knew his division commander's intent. Despite desperate odds, he had confidence in himself and his unit and knew they would make the difference. Faced with a fluid situation, he knew where the line had to be drawn; he had the will to act and he didn't hesitate to do what he thought was right.

6-2. Whether for key terrain in combat or for results in peacetime training, leaders in units and organizations translate strategy into policy and practice. They develop programs, plans, and systems that allow soldiers in teams, like the infantryman in the All-American Division, to turn plans and orders into fire and maneuver that seize victory at the least possible cost in sweat and blood. By force of will and application of their leadership skills, organizational leaders build teams with discipline, cohesion, trust, and proficiency. They clarify missions throughout the ranks by producing an intent, concept, and systematic approach to execution.

6-3. Organizational leadership builds on direct leader actions. Organizational leaders apply direct leader skills in their daily work with their command and staff teams and, with soldiers and subordinate leaders, they influence during their contacts with units. But to lead complex organizations like brigades, divisions, and corps at today's OPTEMPO and under the stresses of training, contingency operations, and combat, organizational leaders must add a whole new set of skills and actions to their leadership arsenal. They must practice direct and organizational leadership simultaneously.

6-4. Communicating to NCOs, like the airborne soldier at the Battle of the Bulge, occurs through individual subordinates, the staff, and the chain of command. Organizational leaders divide their attention between the concerns of the larger organization and their staffs and those of their subordinate leaders, units, and individuals. This tradeoff requires them to apply interpersonal and conceptual skills differently when exercising organizational leadership than when exercising direct leadership.

6-5. Organizational leaders rely heavily on mentoring subordinates and empowering them to execute their assigned responsibilities and missions. They stay mentally and emotionally detached from their immediate surroundings so they can visualize the larger impact on the organization and mission. Soldiers and subordinate leaders look to their organizational leaders to establish standards for mission accomplishment and provide resources (conditions) to achieve that goal. Organizational leaders provide direction and programs for training and execution that focus efforts on mission success.

6-6. Due to the indirect nature of their influence, organizational leaders assess interrelated systems and design long-term plans to accomplish the mission. They must sharpen their abilities to assess their environments, their organization, and their subordinates. Organizational leaders determine the cause and effect of shortcomings, translate these new understandings into plans and programs, and allow their subordinate leaders latitude to execute and get the job done.

6-7. Organizational demands also differ as leaders develop a systems perspective. At the strategic level, the Army has identified six imperatives: quality people, training, force mix, doctrine, modern equipment, and leader development. In organizations these imperatives translate into doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers—commonly called DTLOMS. Together with Army values, these systems provide the framework for influencing people and organizations at all levels, conducting a wide variety of operations, and continually improving the force. Doctrine includes techniques to drive the functional systems in Army organizations. FMs 25-100, 25-101, and 101-5 lay out procedures for training management and military decision making that enable and focus execution. The training management and military decision-making processes provide a ready-made, systemic approach to planning, preparing, executing, and assessing.

SECTION I

WHAT IT TAKES TO LEAD ORGANIZATIONS—SKILLS

6-8. Organizational leaders continue to use the direct leader skills discussed in Chapter 4. However their larger organizations and spans of authority require them to master additional skills. As with direct leader skills, these span four areas: interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical.

INTERPERSONAL SKILLS

To get the best out of your men, they must feel that you are their real leader and must know that they can depend upon you.

General of the Armies John J. Pershing



Figure 6-1. Organizational Leader Skills—Interpersonal

UNDERSTANDING SOLDIERS

6-9. Good organizational leaders understand the human dimension, which Chapter 3 discussed. They use that understanding to motivate subordinates and to encourage initiative. Chapter 5 explained that motivation means much more than an individual willingness to do what's directed. It imparts a desire on the part of individuals and organizations to do what's needed *without* being directed. This collective desire to accomplish the mission underlies good organizational discipline: good soldiers and competent DA civilians adhere to standards because they understand that doing so, even when it's a nuisance or hardship, leads to success.

6-10. This understanding, along with Army values, forms the foundation of great units. Units that have solid discipline can take tremendous stress and friction yet persevere, fight through, and win. Fostering initiative builds on motivation and discipline. It

requires subordinates' confidence that in an uncertain situation, when they know the commander's intent and develop a competent solution, the commander will underwrite the risk they take. While this principle applies to both direct and organizational leaders, the stakes are usually higher in larger, more complex organizations. Additionally, organizational leaders may be more remote in time and distance and subordinates' ability to check back with them is diminished. Therefore, organizational leaders' understanding must develop beyond what they can immediately and personally observe.

COMMUNICATING

6-11. Persuasion is a communication skill important to organizational leaders. Well-developed skills of persuasion and openness to working through controversy in a positive way help organizational leaders overcome resistance and build support. These characteristics are particularly important in dealing with other organizational leaders. By reducing grounds for misunderstanding, persuasion reduces time wasted in overcoming unimportant issues. It also ensures involvement of others, opens communication with them, and places value on their opinions—all team-building actions. Openness to discussing one's position and a positive attitude toward a dissenting view often diffuses tension and saves time and resistance in the long run. By demonstrating these traits, organizational leaders also provide an example that subordinates can use in self-development.

6-12. In some circumstances, persuasion may be inappropriate. In combat, all leaders make decisions quickly, modifying the decision-making process to fit the circumstances. But this practice of using the directing leadership styles as opposed to more participatory ones should occur when situations are in doubt, risks are high, and time is short—circumstances that often appear in combat. No exact blueprints exist for success in every context; leadership and the ability to adapt to the situation will carry the day. Appropriate style, seasoned instinct, and the realities of the situation must prevail.

SUPERVISING

6-13. Organizations pay attention to things leaders check. Feedback and coaching enhance motivation and improve performance by showing subordinates how to succeed. But how much should you check and how much is too much? When are statistics and reports adequate indicators and when must you visit your front-line organizations, talk to your soldiers and DA civilians and see what's going on yourself?

6-14. Overcentralized authority and oversupervising undermine trust and empowerment. Undersupervising can lead to failure, especially in cases where the leader's intent wasn't fully understood or where subordinate organizations lack the training for the task. Different subordinate commanders need different levels of supervision: some need a great deal of coaching and encouragement, though most would just as soon be left alone. As always, a good leader knows his subordinates and

has the skill to supervise at the appropriate level.

Knowing Your People

This General said, "Each of our three regimental commanders must be handled differently. Colonel ‘A’ does not want an order. He wants to do everything himself and always does well. Colonel ‘B’ executes every order, but has no initiative. Colonel ‘C’ opposes everything he is told to do and wants to do the contrary."

A few days later the troops confronted a well-entrenched enemy whose position would have to be attacked. The General issued the following orders:

To Colonel "A" (who wants to do everything himself): "My dear Colonel "A", I think we will attack. Your regiment will have to carry the burden of the attack. I have, however, selected you for this reason. The boundaries of your regiment are so-and-so. Attack at X-hour. I don’t have to tell you anything more."

To Colonel "C" (who opposes everything): "We have met a very strong enemy. I am afraid we will not be able to attack with the forces at our disposal." "Oh, General, certainly we will attack. Just give my regiment the time of attack and you will see that we are successful," replied Colonel "C." "Go then, we will try it," said the General, giving him the order for the attack, which he had prepared some time previously.

To Colonel "B" (who always must have detailed orders) the attack order was merely sent with additional details.

All three regiments attacked splendidly.

Adolph von Schell German liaison to the Infantry School between the World Wars

CONCEPTUAL SKILLS



Figure 6-2. Organizational Leader Skills—Conceptual

6-15. The complexity of the organizational leader's environment requires patience, the willingness to think before acting. Furthermore, the importance of conceptual and analytical skills increases as an organizational leader moves into positions of greater responsibility. Organizational environments with multiple dimensions offer problems that become more abstract, complex, and uncertain.

6-16. Figure 6-2 identifies the conceptual skills required of organizational leaders. For organizational leaders, reasoning skills are crucial for developing intent and direction toward common goals. Critical thinking at the organizational level requires understanding systems and an increased ability to filter information, that is, to identify quickly information that applies to the task at hand and separate the important from the unimportant. Organizational leaders use this analytical ability to assess ambiguous environments and to calculate and manage risk. Their experience may allow them to see and define problems more easily—but not necessarily *fix* them quickly. Therefore, they also dedicate time to think and generate alternative ways of organizing their

organizations and resources for maximum effect. It's important for organizational leaders to encourage critical thinking in subordinates because subordinates also assess organizational challenges, analyze indicators, and recommend courses of action. It's also important, time and mission permitting, to allow subordinates' solutions to bear fruit.

ESTABLISHING INTENT

In an organization like ours, you have to think through what it is that you are becoming. Like a marathon runner, you have to get out in front, mentally, and pull the organization to you. You have to visualize the finish line—to see yourself there—and pull yourself along—not push—pull yourself to the future.

General Gordon R. Sullivan
Former Army Chief of Staff

6-17. Intent is the leader's personal expression of a mission's end state and the key tasks the organization must accomplish to achieve it. During operations and field training, it's a clear, concise statement of what the force must do to succeed with respect to the enemy and the terrain and to the desired end state. It provides the link between the mission and the concept of operations. By describing their intent, organizational leaders highlight the key tasks that, along with the mission, are the basis for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original concept of operations no longer applies. Clear and concise, the leader's intent includes a mission's overall purpose and expected results. It provides purpose, motivation, and direction, whether the leader is commanding a division or running a staff directorate. An organizational leader visualizes the sequence of activities that will move the organization from its current state to the desired end state and expresses it as simply and clearly as possible. (FM 101-5-1 contains a complete definition of commander's intent. FM 100-34 discusses the relationship of intent and visualization to command and control. FM 101-5 discusses the development of intent in the MDMP.)

6-18. After establishing a clear and valid intent, the art of organizational leadership lies in having subordinates take actions on their own to transform that intent into reality. Since organizational leaders are likely to be farther away from the point of execution in time and space, they must describe the collective goal rather than list tasks for individual subordinates. With clearly communicated purpose and direction, subordinates can then determine what they must do and why. Within that broad framework, leaders empower subordinates, delegating authority to act within the intent: "Here's where we're headed, why we're going there, and how we're going to get there." Purpose and direction align the efforts of subordinates working toward common goals.

6-19. A former division commander has said, "You must be seen to be heard." There's a great temptation for organizational leaders to rely exclusively on indirect leadership,

to spread intent by passing orders through subordinates or communicating electronically with troops scattered far and wide. However, nothing can take the place of face-to-face contact. Organizational leaders make every effort to get out among the troops. There they can spot-check intent to see that it's disseminated and understood among those who must execute it.

GEN Grant and the End of the Civil War

I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.

General Ulysses S. Grant
Dispatch, May 11, 1864

GEN Ulysses S. Grant penned those words at Spotsylvania, Virginia, after being appointed general in chief of the Union Army and stationing himself forward with the Army of the Potomac. After fighting a bloody draw at the Wilderness, the Army of the Potomac had moved aggressively to outflank GEN Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia but once more faced a dug-in Confederate Army. However, where previous Union commanders had turned away, GEN Grant would not relent. His intent was clear. It was reinforced in the sentiment of his army, which wanted to finish the war.

In a series of determined attacks, the new Union commander broke GEN Lee's defense and used a turning movement to force his opponent out of position. Again they met at Cold Harbor, where GEN Grant attacked frontally and failed. Prior to his attack, Union soldiers, literally days from the end of their enlistment, were seen writing notes to their families and pinning them on the backs of their shirts so one last message would get home if they were killed. Their resolution demonstrates the power of their commitment to a shared intent.

After his bloody repulse at Cold Harbor, GEN Grant again moved south, maintaining the initiative, always pressing, always threatening to turn the Confederate flank and expose Richmond, the capital of Virginia. GEN Lee, in turn, was forced to block and defend Petersburg, Richmond's railroad hub. Uncovering it would have isolated Richmond as well as his army's rail-based lines of communication. GEN Grant had his opponent pinned to a critical strategic resource. Doing this denied the Army of Northern Virginia its greatest asset, its excellent ability to maneuver. It would not escape.

GEN Grant was unstinting in his resolve to totally defeat GEN Lee. He was a familiar figure to his soldiers, riding among them with his slouch hat in his private's uniform with general's rank. He drove his subordinates, who themselves wanted to finish off their old foe; despite casualties, he unflinchingly resisted pressure to back away from his intent.

6-20. Having established an azimuth, organizational leaders assist their subordinates' efforts to build and train their organizations on those tasks necessary for success.

Finally, they act to motivate subordinate leaders and organizations to meet the operational standards upon which discipline depends.

FILTERING INFORMATION

Leaders at all levels, but particularly those at higher levels who lack recent personal observations, can only make decisions based on the information given to them. What sets senior leaders apart is their ability to sort through great amounts of information, key in on what is significant, and then make decisions. But, these decisions are only as good as the information provided.

A Former Battalion Commander

6-21. Organizational leaders deal with a tremendous amount of information. Some information will make sense only to someone with a broad perspective and an understanding of the entire situation. Organizational leaders communicate clearly to their staffs what information they need and then hold the staff accountable for providing it. Then, they judge—based on their education, training, and experience—what's important and make well-informed, timely decisions.

6-22. Analysis and synthesis are essential to effective decision-making and program development. Analysis breaks a problem into its component parts. Synthesis assembles complex and disorganized data into a solution. Often, data must be processed before it fits into place.

6-23. Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are the commander's most important information filters. Commanders must know the environment, the situation, their organizations, and themselves well enough to articulate what they need to know to control their organizations and accomplish their missions. They must also ensure they have thought through the feedback systems necessary to supervise execution. Organizational-level commanders must not only establish CCIR but also train their staffs to battle drill proficiency in information filtering. (FM 101-5 discusses CCIR, mission analysis, information management, and other staff operations.)

UNDERSTANDING SYSTEMS

6-24. Organizational leaders think about systems in their organization: how they work together, how using one affects the others, and how to get the best performance from the whole. They think beyond their own organizations to how what their organization does affects other organizations and the team as a whole. Whether coordinating fires among different units or improving sponsorship of new personnel, organizational leaders use a systems perspective. While direct leaders think about tasks, organizational leaders integrate, synchronize, and fine-tune systems and monitor outcomes. If organizational leaders can't get something done, the flaw or failure is more likely systemic than human. Being able to understand and leverage systems

increases a leader's ability to achieve organizational goals and objectives.

6-25. Organizational leaders also know how effectively apply all available systems to achieve mission success. They constantly make sure that the systems for personnel, administration, logistical support, resourcing, and training work effectively. They know where to look to see if the critical parts of the system are functioning properly.

DA Civilian Support to Desert Shield

During Operation Desert Shield, a contingent of DA civilians deployed to a depot in the combat theater to provide warfighting supplies and operational equipment to Third (US) Army. These DA civilians were under the supervision of DA civilian supervisors, who motivated their employees in spite of the harsh conditions in the region: hot weather, a dismal environment, and the constant threat of Iraqi missile and chemical attacks. It turned out that the uplifting organizational climate these leaders provided overcame the physical deprivation.

Two senior DA civilian leaders, the depot's deputy director of maintenance and the chief of the vehicle branch, developed a plan to replace arriving units' M1 tanks with M1A1s, which boasted greater firepower, better armor, and a more advanced nuclear, biological, and chemical protective system. They also developed systems for performing semiannual and annual maintenance checks, quickly resolving problems, applying modifications such as additional armor, and repainting the tanks in the desert camouflage pattern.

Although similar programs normally take 18 to 24 months to complete, the two leaders set an ambitious objective of 6 months. Many experts thought the goal could not be met, but the tenacious leaders never wavered in their resolve. After 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a week operations, their inspired team of teams completed the project in 2 months. These DA civilian leaders with clear intent, firm objectives, and unrelenting will motivated their team and provided modern, lethal weapons to the soldiers who needed them when they were needed.

6-26. Organizational leaders analyze systems and results to determine why things happened the way they did. Performance indicators and standards for systems assist them in their analysis. Equipment failure rates, unit status reports (USR) Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS), Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (DCPDS) data, and evaluation report timeliness all show the health of systems. Once an assessment is complete and causes of a problem known, organizational leaders develop appropriate solutions that address the problem's root cause.

6-27 Isolating why things go wrong and where systems break down usually requires giving subordinates time and encouragement to ferret out what's really happening. The dilemma for organizational leaders occurs when circumstances and mission pressures require immediate remedial action and preclude gathering more data. It's then that they

must fall back on their experience and that of their subordinates, make a judgment, and act.

Innovative Reorganization

Facing a long-term downsizing of his organization, a DA civilian director didn't simply shrink its size. Instead, the director creatively flattened the organization by reducing the number of deputy executives, managers, and supervisors. The director increased responsibilities of those in leadership positions and returned to a technical focus those managers and supervisors with dominant mission skills. The result was a better leader-to-led ratio, a reduced number of administrative and clerical positions, and a smoother transition to multi-disciplined team operations. The director's systems understanding led him to tailor inputs that maintained healthy systems and improved outputs.

TECHNICAL SKILLS

Figure 6-3. Organizational leader Skills—Technical

6-28. The external responsibilities of organizational leaders are greater than those of direct leaders, both vertically and horizontally. Their organizations have more levels than direct-level organizations and, depending on the organization's role, command interest may reach to the CINC or national command authority. There are more requirements to coordinate with other organizations, which may include agencies outside the Department of Defense (DOD). To make full use of their organizations' capabilities, organizational leaders must continue to master technical skills outside their original area of expertise.

MAINTAINING CRITICAL SKILLS

6-29. Organizational leaders have fewer opportunities to practice many of the technical skills they mastered as direct leaders. However, that doesn't mean they can forget about them. In every organization there are certain skills in which all members must be proficient. Soldiers know what they are and expect their leaders to be able to perform them. This doesn't mean that organizational leaders must be able to perform every specialty-related skill as well as an individual holding that specialty. The Army is too complex for that. It does, however, mean that organizational leaders must identify and be proficient in those critical, direct-leader skills they need to assess tactical training and set the example.

6-30. One organizational leader who set the example by drawing on deeply embedded technical skills was COL Marian Tierney. In her final military assignment, COL Tierney was responsible for nursing operations at 38 hospitals with 2500 nurses in the Republic of Vietnam. In 1966 she had to call on the basic medical skills and personal character she had honed throughout a career in places like Omaha Beach during the Normandy invasion. That day, 22 years after D-Day, the aircraft on which she was a passenger crashed, leaving many injured and panicked survivors. Ignoring her own injuries COL Tierney treated her comrades and took charge of evacuating the scene. For her heroism she received the Soldier's Medal. Her actions demonstrate that courageous leaders of character and competence serve at all levels.

RESOURCING

6-31. In addition to using the technical skills they learned as direct leaders, organizational leaders must also master the skill of resourcing. Resources—which include time, equipment, facilities, budgets, and people—are required to achieve organizational goals. Organizational leaders must aggressively manage the resources at their disposal to ensure their organizations' readiness. The leader's job grows more difficult when unprogrammed costs—such as an emergency deployment—shift priorities.

6-32. Organizational leaders are stewards of their people's time and energy and their own will and tenacity. They don't waste these resources but skillfully evaluate objectives, anticipate resource requirements, and efficiently allocate what's available. They balance available resources with organizational requirements and distribute them in a way that best achieves organizational goals—in combat as well as peacetime. For instance, when a cavalry squadron acting as the division flank guard makes contact, its commander asks for priority of fires. The division commander considers the needs of the squadron but must weigh it against the overall requirements of the current and future missions.

PREDICTING SECOND- AND THIRD-ORDER EFFECTS

6-33. Because the decisions of organizational leaders have wider-ranging effects than those of direct leaders, organizational leaders must be more sensitive to how their own actions affect the organization's climate. These actions may be conscious, as in the case of orders and policies, or unconscious, such as requirements for routine or unscheduled reports and meetings. The ability to discern and predict second- and third-order effects helps organizational leaders assess the health of the organizational climate and provide constructive feedback to subordinates. It can also result in identifying resource requirements and changes to organizations and procedures. (The ECAS process illustrated in Appendix D or a similar one can be applied by organizational as well as direct leaders.)

6-34. For instance, when the Army Chief of Staff approved a separate military occupational specialty code for mechanized infantry soldiers, the consequences were wide-ranging. Second-order effects included more specialized schooling for infantry NCOs, a revised promotion system to accommodate different infantry NCO career patterns, and more doctrinal and training material to support the new specialty. Third-order effects included resource requirements for developing the training material and adding additional instructor positions at the Infantry Center and School. Organizational leaders are responsible for anticipating the consequences of any action they take or direct. Requiring thorough staff work can help. However, proper anticipation also requires imagination and vision as well as an appreciation for other people and organizations.

TACTICAL SKILLS

Soldiers need leaders who know how to fight and how to make the right decisions.

General Carl F. Vuono
Former Army Chief of Staff



Figure 6-4. Organization Leader Skills—Tactical

6-35. Organizational leaders must master the tactical skills of synchronization and orchestration. Synchronization applies at the tactical level of war; orchestration is an operational-level term. Synchronization arranges activities in time, space, and purpose to focus maximum relative military power at a decisive point in space and time. Organizational leaders synchronize battles, each of which may comprise several synchronized engagements. (FM 100-40 discusses synchronization. FM 100-5 discusses orchestration.)

6-36. Organizational leaders at corps and higher levels orchestrate by applying the complementary and reinforcing effects of all military and nonmilitary assets to overwhelm opponents at one or more decisive points. Both synchronization and orchestration require leaders to put together technical, interpersonal, and conceptual skills and apply them to warfighting tasks.

6-37. Tactical skill for direct leaders involves employing individuals and teams of

company size and smaller. In contrast, tactical skill for organizational leaders entails employing *units* of battalion size and larger. Organizational leaders get divisions, brigades, and battalions to the right place, at the right time, and in the right combination to fight and win battles and engagements. (FM 100-40 discusses battles and engagements.) They project the effects of their decisions further out—in time and distance—than do direct leaders.

6-38. The operational skill of orchestrating a series of tactical events is also more demanding and far-reaching. Time horizons are longer. Effects take more time to unfold. Decision sets are more intricate. GEN Grant's Vicksburg campaign in the spring of 1863, which split the Confederacy and opened the Mississippi River to Union use, is a classic example of an organizational leader orchestrating the efforts of subordinate forces.

GEN Grant at Vicksburg

After failing to capture Vicksburg by attacking from the north, GEN Ulysses S. Grant moved along the west bank of the Mississippi River to a point south of the city. He masked his movement and intentions by sending COL Benjamin Grierson's cavalry deep into Mississippi to conduct a series of raids. The Union commander also synchronized the daring dispatch of US Navy gunboats through Confederate shore batteries to link up with his army south of Vicksburg. Using Admiral (ADM) David D. Porter's gunboats, the Union Army crossed to the east bank of the Mississippi while MG William T. Sherman conducted a diversionary attack on the northern approaches to Vicksburg.

Once across the Mississippi, GEN Grant bypassed Vicksburg, used the Big Black River to protect his flank, and maneuvered east toward Jackson, Mississippi. By threatening both Jackson and Vicksburg, GEN Grant prevented Confederate forces from uniting against him. After a rapid series of engagements, the Union Army forced the enemy out of Jackson, blocking Vicksburg's main line of supply. It then turned west for an assault of Vicksburg, the key to control of the Mississippi. With supply lines severed and Union forces surrounding the city, Confederate forces at Vicksburg capitulated on 4 July 1863.

GEN Grant's Vicksburg campaign demonstrates the orchestration of a series of subordinate unit actions. In a succession of calculated moves, he defeated the Confederate forces under the command of Generals Joseph E. Johnston and John C. Pemberton, gained control of the Mississippi River, and divided the Confederacy.

6-39. Organizational leaders know doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Their refined tactical skills allow them to understand, integrate, and synchronize the activities of systems, bringing all resources and systems to bear on warfighting tasks.

SECTION II

WHAT IT TAKES TO LEAD ORGANIZATIONS—ACTIONS

Making decisions, exercising command, managing, administering—those are the dynamics of our calling. Responsibility is its core.

General Harold K. Johnson
Former Army Chief of Staff

6-40. Actions by organizational leaders have far greater consequences for more people over a longer time than those of direct leaders. Because the connections between action and effect are sometimes more remote and difficult to see, organizational leaders spend more time thinking about what they're doing and how they're doing it than direct leaders do. When organizational leaders act, they must translate their intent into action through the larger number of people working for them.

6-41. Knowledge of subordinates is crucial to success. To maximize and focus the energy of their staffs, organizational leaders ensure that subordinates know what must be done and why. In addition, they ensure that work being done is moving the organization in the right direction. They develop concepts for operations and policies and procedures to control and monitor their execution. Since the challenges they face are varied and complicated, no manual can possibly address them all. However, the following section provides a framework for examining, explaining, and reflecting on organizational leader actions.

INFLUENCING ACTIONS

A soldier may not always believe what you say, but he will never doubt what you do.

The Battalion Commander's Handbook

6-42. As Figure 6-5 shows, influencing is achieved through communicating, decision making, and motivating. At the organizational level, influencing means not only getting the order or concept out; it means marshaling the activities of the staff and subordinate leaders to move towards the organization's objective. Influencing involves continuing to reinforce the intent and concept, continually acquiring and assessing available feedback, and inspiring subordinates with the leader's own presence and encouragement.

Figure 6-5. Organization Leader Actions—Influencing

6-43. The chain of command provides the initial tool for getting the word out from, and returning feedback to, the commander. In training, commanders must constantly improve its functioning. They must stress it in training situations, pushing it to the point of failure. Combat training centers (CTCs) offer tremendous opportunities to exercise and assess the chain of command in their communicating and monitoring tasks. Programs for officer and NCO professional development based on either terrain walks or seminars can reinforce chain of command functioning. Checking organizational functions daily ("leading by walking around") can reveal whether the commander’s intent is getting to the lowest level.

6-44. Communication becomes more complex for organizational leaders because of their increased span of control and separation from elements actually executing the mission. Whatever organizational leaders ask for, explicitly or implicitly, causes ripples throughout the organization. Therefore, they must consider how subordinates might interpret their wishes. Directives and actions must be clear and issued in a

manner that discourages overreaction. The installation commander who remarks out loud about bland walls may cause an entire organization's soldiers to paint all weekend (it has happened).

6-45. Organizational leaders also lose the right to complain in public; for example, their opinion of a support agency affects the attitude of hundreds or thousands of people. Where the leader is, how the leader looks, and what the leader does and says influence routine leadership actions throughout the organization. Like direct leaders, organizational leaders are always on display, and their demeanor and presence set the tone and climate for subordinate organizations. However, the position of organizational leaders makes them more prominent, and they must remain aware of how their behavior affects their organization. A bad day for the leader should not have to be a bad day for everyone else.

COMMUNICATING

Too often we place the burden of comprehension on [those at a different level from] us, assuming both the existence of a common language and motivation.

General Edward C. Meyer
Former Army Chief of Staff

6-46. Ironically, organizational leaders' face-to-face communication must be more powerful, more focused, and more unequivocal than direct leaders' communication. Because organizational leaders move quickly from one project to another and one part of the organization to the other, they must be careful that the right message goes out the first time. Poor communication can have tremendously negative consequences.

Know Yourself

6-47. Even before assuming an organizational, leadership position, leaders must assess themselves, understand their strengths and weaknesses, and commit to an appropriate leadership philosophy. Organizational leaders must realize that some techniques that worked in direct-level positions may no longer work at the organizational level. They must resist the temptation to revert to their old role and thus preempt their subordinates by making decisions for them.

6-48. That said, personal qualities that contributed to their previous success are still important for organizational leaders. They must be themselves. They must know their biases, frustrations, and desires and try to keep these factors from negatively influencing their communication. It's not enough to be careful about what they say. Nonverbal communication is so powerful that organizational leaders need to be aware of personal mannerisms, behavioral quirks, and demeanor that reinforce or contradict a spoken message.

Know the Purpose

6-49. Organizational leaders know themselves, the mission, and the message. They owe it to their organization and their people to share as much as possible. People have to know what to do and why. At the most basic level, communication provides the primary way that organizational leaders show they care. If subordinates are to succeed and the organization is to move forward, then the organizational leader must work hard at maintaining positive communication. Encouraging open dialogue, actively listening to all perspectives, and ensuring that subordinate leaders and staffs can have a forthright, open, and honest voice in the organization without fear of negative consequences greatly fosters communication at all levels. Organizational leaders who communicate openly and genuinely reinforce team values, send a message of trust to subordinates, and benefit from subordinates' good ideas.

The Commander's Notebook

A brigade commander met with his subordinate leaders and outlined his goals for an upcoming training exercise. In the days following, while the brigade staff worked on the formal orders and requirements, the commander spent time visiting subordinate units as they trained. As a part of each visit, he asked his subordinate leaders for specific feedback on his intent. Was it clear? Could they repeat the three main points he had tried to make? What would they add to the unit's goals for the training? He listened, asked his own questions, and allowed them to question him. It turned out that most of the people he spoke to missed one of his three main points, which led the commander to believe that he hadn't made himself clear the first time. Eventually, he started the conversation by saying, "There are a couple of points I tried to make in my talk; apparently, I dropped the ball on at least one of them. Let me take another shot at it." Then he explained the point again.

Whenever subordinate leaders offered suggestions about the upcoming exercise, the brigade commander took out a pocket notebook and wrote some notes. Even when suggestions sounded lame, he wrote them down. That way, he signaled to the speaker, "Yes, your opinion counts, too." Secondly, by writing down the ideas, the commander guaranteed himself a chance to look at the comments later. He knew from experience that sometimes the ones that don't seem to make sense at first turn out to be quite useful later. Many of the direct leaders remarked that they had never seen a brigade commander do anything like that before. They were even more astonished when they got feedback on the suggestion. The brigade adjutant even explained to one company commander why his suggestion wasn't implemented. On a Saturday morning the brigade commander was standing in line at the PX when a platoon sergeant engaged him in conversation. "I wasn't around the day you visited my company last week, sir," the NCO said, "but I heard the other folks had a few suggestions for you. I wonder if I could add something?"

Know the Environment

6-50. Before organizational leaders can effectively communicate, they must assess the environment—people, events, and systems—and tailor their message to the target audience. Organizational leaders constantly communicate by persuading and conveying intent, standards, goals, and priorities at four levels within the Army: their people, their own and higher staffs, their subordinate leaders and commanders, and their superiors. There may also be occasions that require organizational leaders to speak to audiences outside the Army such as the media or community groups. They may have to repeat the message to different audiences and retune it for different echelons, but only leaders can reinforce their true intent.

Know the Boss

6-51. Working to communicate consistently with the boss is especially important for organizational leaders. Organizational leaders have to figure out how to reach the boss. They must assess how the boss communicates and how the boss receives information. For some leaders, direct and personal contact is best; others may be more comfortable with weekly meetings, e-mail, or letters. Knowing the boss's intent, priorities, and thought processes greatly enhances organizational success. An organizational leader who communicates well with the boss minimizes friction between the organization and the higher headquarters and improves the overall organizational climate.

Know the Subordinates

If it's dumb it's not our policy.

Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer, Jr.
Former Commanding General, III Corps

6-52. The mere presence of an organizational leader somewhere communicates the leader's character and what the leader values. The organizational leader who hurries through a talk about caring for subordinates, then passes up an opportunity to speak face-to-face with some soldiers, does more than negate the message; he undercuts whatever trust his subordinates may have had.

6-53. Because organizational leaders know themselves, they also know that others bring the sum total of their experience to their duties. They analyze interpersonal contact to gather meaning; they look for the message behind the words. In this way, they gain a greater understanding of peers, subordinates, and superiors. Improving communication skills becomes a major self-development challenge for them. By stating their intent openly, organizational leaders give subordinates an open door for feedback on unintended consequences or just bad policy: "Hey sir, did you really mean it when you said, 'If it's dumb it's not our policy?' OK, well what about…?" Leaders must be seen to be heard.

Know the Staff

6-54. Organizational leaders must understand what's going on within their own and the next-higher echelon staff. Networking allows them to improve communication and mission accomplishment by giving them a better understanding of the overall environment. Networking requires leaders to constantly interact and share thoughts, ideas, and priorities. Informed staffs can then turn policies, plans, and programs into realities.

6-55. Organizational leaders must also know the focus of the next-higher staff and commander. Through taking time to interact with the next-higher staff, organizational leaders gain a greater understanding of the boss's priorities and also help set the conditions for their own requirements. Constantly sensing—observing, talking, questioning, and actively listening to—what's going on helps organizational leaders better identify and solve potential problems and allows them to anticipate decisions and put their outfit in the best possible position to execute.

Know the Best Method

6-56. To disseminate information accurately and rapidly, organizational leaders must also develop an effective communications network. Some of these networks—such as the chain of command, the family support network, the NCO support channel, and staff relationships—simply need to be recognized and exploited. Other informal chains must be developed. Different actions may require different networks.

6-57. The more adept organizational leaders become in recognizing, establishing, and using these networks, the more successful the outcome, especially as they become comfortable using a wider range of communications forums. Memorandums, notes, and e-mail as well as formal and informal meetings, interactions, and publications are tools of an effective communicator. Organizational leaders must know the audiences these methods reach and use them accordingly.

DECISION MAKING

The key is not to make quick decisions, but to make timely decisions.

General Colin Powell
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

6-58. Organizational leaders are far more likely than direct leaders to be required to make decisions with incomplete information. They determine whether they have to decide at all, which decisions to make themselves, and which ones to push down to lower levels. To determine the right course of action, they consider possible second- and third-order effects and think farther into the future—months, or even years, out in the case of some directorates.

6-59. Organizational leaders identify the problem, collect input from all levels, synthesize that input into solutions, and then choose and execute the best solution in time to make a difference. To maximize the use of resources and have the greatest effect on developing an effective organization, organizational leaders move beyond a reacting, problem-*solving* approach to an anticipating, problem-*preemption* method. While there will always be emergencies and unforeseen circumstances, organizational leaders focus on anticipating future events and making decisions about the systems and people necessary to minimize crises. Vision is essential for organizational leaders.

6-60. During operations, the pace and stress of action increase over those of training. Organizational leaders use the MDMP to make tactical decisions; however, they must add their conceptual skill of systems understanding to their knowledge of tactics when considering courses of action. Organizational leaders may be tempted—because of pressure, the threat, fear, or fatigue—to abandon sound decision making by reacting to short-term demands. The same impulses may result in focusing too narrowly on specific events and losing their sense of time and timing. But there's no reason for organizational leaders to abandon proven decision-making processes in crises, although they shouldn't hesitate to modify a process to fit the situation. In combat, success comes from creative, flexible decision making by leaders who quickly analyze a problem, anticipate enemy actions, and rapidly execute their decisions. (Remember GEN Grant's actions at Vicksburg.) Leaders who delay or attempt to avoid a decision may cause unnecessary casualties and even mission failure.

6-61. Effective and timely decision making—both the commander's and subordinates'—is crucial to success. As part of decision making, organizational leaders establish responsibility and accountability among their subordinates. They delegate decision making authority as far as it will go, empowering and encouraging subordinates to make decisions that affect their areas of responsibility or to further delegate that authority to their own subordinates.

6-62. Effective organizational leaders encourage initiative and risk-taking. They remember that they are training leaders and soldiers; the goal is a better-trained team, not some ideal outcome. When necessary, they support subordinates' bad decisions, but only those made attempting to follow the commander's intent. Failing through want of experience or luck is forgivable. Negligence, indecision, or attempts to take an easy route should never be tolerated.

6-63. As GEN Powell's comment makes clear, a decision's timeliness is as important as the speed at which it is made. Just as for direct leaders, a good decision now is better than a perfect one too late. Leaders who are good at handling the decision-making process will perform better when the OPTEMPO speeds up. Leaders who don't deliver timely decisions leave their subordinates scrambling and trying to make up for lost time. Better to launch the operation with a good concept and let empowered subordinates develop subsequent changes to the plan than to court failure by waiting too long for the perfect plan.

6-64. In tough moments, organizational leaders may need the support of key subordinates to close an issue. Consider MG George G. Meade's position at Gettysburg. In command of the Army of the Potomac for only a few days, MG Meade met with his subordinates on the night of 2 July 1863 after two days of tough fighting. Uncertainty hung heavy in the air. MG Meade's decision to stand and fight, made with the support of his corps commanders, influenced the outcome of the battle and became a turning point of the Civil War.

6-65. Coping with uncertainty is normal for all leaders, increasingly so for organizational leaders. Given today's information technology, the dangerous temptation to wait for all available information before making a decision will persist. Even though this same technology may also bring the unwanted attention of a superior, leaders should not allow it to unduly influence their decisions. Organizational leaders are where they are because of their experience, intuition, initiative, and judgment. Events move quickly, and it's more important for decisive organizational leaders to recognize and seize opportunities, thereby creating success, than to wait for all the facts and risk failure.

6-66. In the end, leaders bear ultimate responsibility for their organizations' success or failure. If the mission fails, they can't lay the blame elsewhere but must take full responsibility. If the mission succeeds, good leaders give credit to their subordinates. While organizational leaders can't ensure success by being all-knowing or present everywhere, they can assert themselves throughout the organization by being decisive in times of crisis and quick to seize opportunities. In combat, leaders take advantage of fleeting windows of opportunity: they see challenges rather than obstacles; they seek solutions rather than excuses; they fight through uncertainty to victory.

MOTIVATING

It is not enough to fight. It is the spirit which we bring to the fight that decides the issue. It is morale that wins the victory.

General of the Army George C. Marshall

6-67. Interpersonal skills involved in creating and sustaining ethical and supportive climates are required at the organizational as well as the direct leadership level. As Chapter 3 explains, the organizational, unit, or command climate describes the environment in which subordinates work. Chapter 5 discusses how direct leaders focus their motivational skills on individuals or small groups of subordinates. While direct leaders are responsible for their organizations' climate, their efforts are constrained (or reinforced) by the larger organization's climate. Organizational leaders shape that larger environment. Their primary motivational responsibility is to establish and maintain the climate of their entire organization.

6-68. Disciplined organizations evolve within a positive organizational climate. An organization's climate springs from its leader's attitudes, actions, and priorities. Organizational leaders set the tone most powerfully through a personal example that brings Army values to life. Upon assuming an organizational leadership position, a leader determines the organizational climate by assessing the organization from the bottom up. Once this assessment is complete, the leader can provide the guidance and focus (purpose, direction, and motivation) required to move the organizational climate to the desired end state.

6-69. A climate that promotes Army values and fosters the warrior ethos encourages learning and promotes creative performance. The foundation for a positive organizational climate is a healthy ethical climate, but that alone is insufficient. Characteristics of successful organizational climates include a clear, widely known intent; well-trained and confident soldiers; disciplined, cohesive teams; and trusted, competent leadership.

6-70. To create such a climate, organizational leaders recognize mistakes as opportunities to learn, create cohesive teams, and reward leaders of character and competence. Organizational leaders value honest feedback and constantly use all available means to maintain a feel for the environment. Staff members who may be good sources for straightforward feedback may include equal opportunity advisors and chaplains. Methods may include town hall meetings, surveys, and councils. And of course, personal observation—getting out and talking to DA civilians, soldiers, and family members—brings organizational leaders face-to-face with the people affected by their decisions and policies. Organizational leaders' consistent, sincere effort to see what's really going on and fix things that are not working right can result in mutual respect throughout their organizations. They must know the intricacies of the job, trust their people, develop trust among them, and support their subordinates.

6-71. Organizational leaders who are positive, fair, and honest in their dealings and who are not afraid of constructive criticism encourage an atmosphere of openness and trust. Their people willingly share ideas and take risks to get the job done well because their leaders strive for more than compliance; they seek to develop subordinates with good judgment.

6-72. Good judgment doesn't mean lockstep thinking. Thinking "outside the box" isn't the same as indiscipline. In fact, a disciplined organization systematically encourages creativity and taking prudent risks. The leader convinces subordinates that anything they break can be fixed, except life or limb. Effective organizational leaders actively listen to, support, and reward subordinates who show disciplined initiative. All these things create opportunities for subordinates to succeed and thereby build their confidence and motivation.

6-73. However, it's not enough that individuals can perform. When people are part of a disciplined and cohesive team, they gain proficiency, are motivated, and willingly

subordinate themselves to organizational needs. People who sense they're part of a competent, well-trained team act on what the team needs; they're confident in themselves and feel a part of something important and compelling. These team members know that what they do matters and discipline themselves.

The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment at Normandy

On 7 June 1944, the day after D-Day, nearly 600 paratroopers of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment were in position in the town of Ste. Mère Église in Normandy to block any German counterattack of the Allied invasion force. Although outnumbered by an enemy force of over 6,000 soldiers, the paratroopers attacked the German flank and prevented the enemy's assault. The paratroopers were motivated and well-trained, and they all understood the absolute necessity of preventing the German counterattack. Even in the fog of war, they did what needed to be done to achieve victory. Their feat is especially noteworthy since many landed outside their planned drop zones and had to find their units on their own. They did so quickly and efficiently in the face of the enemy.

The 505th combined shared purpose, a positive and ethical climate, and cohesive, disciplined teams to build the confidence and motivation necessary to fight and win in the face of uncertainty and adversity. Both leaders and soldiers understood that no plan remains intact after a unit crosses the line of departure. The leaders' initiative allowed the disciplined units to execute the mission by following the commander's intent, even when the conditions on the battlefield changed.

Figure 6-6. Organizational Leader Actions—Operating

OPERATING ACTIONS

6-74. Organizational leaders see, decide, and act as they perform the operating actions shown in Figure 6-6. They emphasize teamwork and cooperation over competition. They provide their intent so subordinates can accomplish the mission, no matter what happens to the original plan. Because organizational leaders primarily work through subordinates, empowerment and delegation are indispensable. As a result of communicating with subordinates, listening to their responses, and obtaining feedback from their assessments, organizational leaders are better equipped to make decisions.

6-75. Organizational-level commanders usually use the MDMP for tactical decision making and planning. However, those who command in the joint environment must use the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) methodology. Both the MDMP and JOPES allow organizational commanders to apply the factors discussed in

this chapter.

SYSTEMS PLANNING AND PREPARING

[A] good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.

General George S. Patton, Jr.
War As I Knew It

6-76. GEN Patton wasn't belittling the importance of planning; he was emphasizing the balance necessary for successful operations. Planning, getting ready for the future by laying out how leaders aim to turn their intent into reality, is something leaders do every day and something the Army does very well. However, organizational leaders plan for the systems that support training and operations as well as for the actual training event or operation. Systems planning involves seven steps:

- Establish intent.
- Set goals.
- Determine objectives.
- Determine tasks.
- Establish priorities.
- Follow up.

Establish Intent

6-77. The first step in systems planning is for the organizational leader to have a clear intent for what he wants the organization to be. What will it look like at some future point? Spending extra time visualizing the end state up front is more important than quickly jumping into the mechanics of planning. Obviously, the actual mission is critical in determining this end state. The organizational leader's intent should be announced at the earliest practicable time after it has been formulated so the staff and subordinate commanders can have maximum time to plan. For a division, the intent might be—

- The best infantry division in the world.
- Supported by the finest installation in the Army.
- Trained and ready to deploy anywhere in the world to fight and win.
- But flexible enough to accomplish any other mission the nation asks us to perform.
- A values-based organization that takes care of its soldiers, DA civilians, and families.

6-78. Organizational leaders must determine how this intent affects the various systems for which they are responsible. By their actions and those of their subordinates and by using their presence to be heard, organizational leaders bring meaning for their

intent to their people.

Set Goals

6-79. Once they have established their intent, organizational leaders, with the help of their team of subordinate leaders and staffs, set specific goals for their organizations. Goals frame the organizational leader's intent. For instance, the goal "Improve fire control and killing power" could support that part of the intent that states the division will be "trained and ready to deploy anywhere in the world to fight and win." Organizational leaders are personally involved in setting goals and priorities to execute their intent and are aware that unrealistic goals punish subordinates.

Determine Objectives

6-80. In the third step, organizational leaders establish objectives that are specific and measurable. For example, an objective that supports the goal of improving fire control and killing power could be "Fifty percent of the force must fire expert on their personal weapons." Establishing objectives is difficult because the process requires making precise calls from a wide variety of options. Since time and resources are limited, organizational leaders make choices about what can and cannot be accomplished. They check key system nodes to monitor subsystem functions.

Determine Tasks

6-81. The fourth step involves determining the measurable, concrete steps that must be taken on the way to the objective. For example, the commander of a forward-stationed division might ensure family readiness by ordering that any newly arriving soldier with a family may not be deployed without having a vehicle in country and household goods delivered.

Establish Priorities

6-82. The fifth step is to establish a priority for the tasks. This crucial step lets subordinates know how to spend one of their most critical resources: time.

6-83. This system of establishing priorities is important for the organization; organizational leaders must also practice it personally. In fact, a highly developed system of time management may be the only way for organizational leaders to handle all the demands upon them. There's rarely enough time to do everything, yet they must make the time to assess and synthesize information and make timely decisions. Leaders who recognize distractions are better equipped to handle their time well.

Prepare

6-84. Though organizational leaders have more complex missions than direct leaders, they also have more assets: a staff and additional subordinate leaders, specialists, and equipment allow their preparation to be diverse and complete. Direct leaders prepare by getting individuals moving in the right direction; organizational leaders take a step back and check to make sure the systems necessary to support the mission are in place and functioning correctly.

Follow Up

6-85. The final step in systems planning is to follow up: Does the team understand the tasks? Is the team taking the necessary actions to complete them? Check the chain of command again: does everyone have the word? Organizational leader involvement in this follow up validates the priorities and demonstrates that the leader is serious about seeing the mission completed. Organizational leaders who fail to follow up send a message that the priorities are not really that important and that their orders are not really binding.

The "Paperwork Purge"

The division's new chief of staff was surprised at how much time subordinates spent at meetings; it seemed they had time for little else. After observing the way things worked for two weeks, the chief did away with most of the scheduled meetings, telling the staff, "We'll meet when we need to meet, and not just because it's Friday morning." What's more, the chief required an agenda for each meeting ahead of time: "That way, people can do their homework and see who needs to be there and who doesn't." The chief was always on time for meetings and started at the time specified on the agenda. There were no interruptions of whomever had the floor, and the long, meandering speeches that had marked previous meetings were cut short.

The chief put a one-page limit on briefing papers for the boss. This meant subordinates learned to write concisely. Each staff section did a top-to-bottom review of procedures that had been in place as long as anyone could remember. Anything that couldn't be justified was thrown out. The chief handled most of the correspondence that came across his desk with a quick note written on the original and told the staff to do the same.

The chief made the staff justify requirements they sent to subordinate organizations, with the comment, "If you can't tell them why it's important, then maybe it's not important." The explanation also helped subordinate elements determine their own priorities: "You can't keep sending stuff down saying, 'This is critical!' It gets to be like the boy who cried wolf."

Of course, the staff didn't take the new chief quite seriously at first, and after a week of reviewing old policy letters, some staff sections let the requirement slide. Then the chief showed up one day and had them give him a rundown on all the policies left after what everyone was calling "the big paperwork purge." A few more outdated requirements fell by the wayside that afternoon. More important, the staff got the message that the chief followed through on decisions.

Finally, and most startling, the chief told staff members that now and then they should sit quietly and stare into space: "You're getting paid to think, and every once in a while you've got to stop moving to do that well."

6-86. Keeping their intent in mind, organizational leaders fight distracters, make time to reflect, and seek to work more efficiently. Despite the pressure of too much to do in too little time, they keep their sense of humor and help those around them do the same.

THE CREATIVE STAFF PROCESS

None of us is as smart as all of us.

A Former Brigade Commander

6-87. The size and complexity of the organizations led by organizational leaders requires well-trained, competent staffs. Training these staffs is a major responsibility of organizational leaders. The chief of staff or executive officer is the organizational leader's right hand in that effort.

6-88. In the 100 days leading to the Battle of Waterloo, Napoleon had to campaign without his intensely loyal and untiring chief of staff, Berthier. In all his other campaigns, Berthier had transformed Napoleon's orders into instructions to the marshals, usually in quadruplicate with different riders carrying four copies to the same marshal over different routes. Berthier's genius for translating Napoleon's intent into tasks for each corps underlay the French Army's versatile, fluid maneuver style. Without Berthier and with an increasingly rigid Napoleon disdaining advice from any source, Napoleon's formations lost a good deal of their flexibility and speed.

6-89. Great staffs work in concert with the leader to turn intent into reality. A single leader in isolation has no doubt done great things and made good decisions. However, the organizational leader alone can't consistently make the right decisions in an environment where operational momentum never stops.

6-90. Building a creative, thinking staff requires the commander's time, maturity, wisdom, and patience. Although managing information is important, the organizational leader needs to invest in both quality people and in training them to think rather than just process information. Several factors contribute to building a creative, thinking staff.

The Right People

6-91. A high-performing staff starts with putting the right people in the right places. Organizational leaders are limited to their organization's resources, but have many choices about how to use them. They assemble, from throughout their organizations,

people who think creatively, possess a vast array of technical skills, are trained to solve problems, and can work together. They take the time to evaluate the staff and implement a training program to improve it as a whole. They avoid micromanaging the staff, instead trusting and empowering it to think creatively and provide answers.

The Chief of Staff

6-92. The staff needs its own leader to take charge—someone who can focus it, work with it, inspire it, and move it to decisive action in the absence of the commander. The sections of the staff work as equals, yet without superb leadership they won't perform exceptionally. To make a staff a true team, an empowered deputy must be worthy of the staff and have its respect. The chief of staff must have the courage to anticipate and demand the best possible quality. On the other hand, the chief must take care of the hardworking people who make up the staff and create an environment that fosters individual initiative and develops potential. (FM 100-34 discusses the role of the chief of staff.)

Challenging Problems

6-93. A staff constantly needs challenging problems to solve if it's to build the attitude that it can overcome any obstacle. Tackling problems with restricted time and resources improves the staff members' confidence and proficiency, as long as they get an opportunity to celebrate successes and to recharge their batteries. Great confidence comes from training under conditions more strenuous than they would likely face otherwise.

Clear Guidance

6-94. The commander constantly shares thoughts and guidance with the staff. Well-trained staffs can then synthesize data according to those guidelines. Computers, because of their ability to handle large amounts of data, are useful analytical tools, but they can do only limited, low-order synthesis. There's no substitute for a clear commander's intent, clearly understood by every member of the staff.

EXECUTING

The American soldier demonstrated that, properly equipped, trained, and led, he has no superior among all the armies of the world.

General Lucian K. Truscott
Former Commanding General, 5th Army

6-95. Planning and preparation for branches and sequels of a plan and contingencies for future operations may continue, even during execution. However, execution is the

purpose for which the other operating actions occur; at some point, the organizational leader commits to action, spurs his organization forward, and sees the job through to the end. (FM 100-34 and FM 101-5 discuss branches and sequels.)

6-96. In combat, organizational leaders integrate and synchronize all available elements of the combined arms team, empower subordinates, and assign tasks to accomplish the mission. But the essence of warfighting for organizational leaders is their will. They must persevere despite limitations, setbacks, physical exhaustion, and declining mental and emotional reserves. They then directly and indirectly energize their units—commanders and soldiers—to push through confusion and hardship to victory.

6-97. Whether they're officers, NCOs, or DA civilians, the ultimate responsibility of organizational-level leaders is to accomplish the mission. To this end, they must mass the effects of available forces on the battlefield, to include supporting assets from other services. The process starts before the fight as leaders align forces, resources, training, and other supporting systems.

Combined Arms and Joint Warfighting

6-98. Brigades and battalions usually conduct single-service operations supported by assets from other services. In contrast, the large areas of responsibility in which divisions and corps operate make division and corps fights joint by nature. Joint task forces (JTFs) are also organizational-level formations. Therefore, organizational leaders and their staffs at division-level and higher must understand joint procedures and concerns at least as well as they understand Army procedures and concerns. In addition, it's not unusual for a corps to control forces of another nation; divisions do also, but not as frequently. This means that corps and division headquarters include liaison officers from other nations. In some cases, these staffs may have members of other nations permanently assigned: such a staff is truly multinational.

6-99. Today's operations present all Army leaders—but particularly organizational leaders—with a nonlinear, dynamic environment ranging the full spectrum of continuous operations. These dispersed conditions create an information-intense environment that challenges leaders to synchronize their efforts with nonmilitary and often nongovernmental agencies.

Empowering

Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.

General George S. Patton, Jr.
War As I Knew It

6-100. To increase the effects of their will, organizational leaders must encourage initiative in their subordinates. Although unity of command is a principle of war, at some level a single leader alone can no longer control all elements of an organization and personally direct the accomplishment of every aspect of its mission. As leaders approach the brigade or directorate level, hard work and force of personality alone cannot carry the organization. Effective organizational leaders delegate authority and support their subordinates' decisions, while holding subordinates accountable for their actions.

6-101. Delegating successfully involves convincing subordinates that they're empowered, that they indeed have the freedom to act independently. Empowered subordinates have, and know they have, more than the responsibility to get the job done. They have the authority to operate in the way they see fit and are limited only by the leader's intent.

6-102. To do that, the organizational leader gives subordinates the mission, motivates them, and lets them go. Subordinates know that the boss trusts them to make the right things happen; this security motivates them, in turn, to lead their people with determination. They know the boss will underwrite honest mistakes, well intentioned mistakes—not stupid, careless, or repeated ones. So for the boss, empowering subordinates means building the systems and establishing the climate that gives subordinates the rein to do the job within the bounds of acceptable risk. It means setting organizational objectives and delegating tasks to ensure parallel, synchronized progress.

6-103 Delegation is a critical task: Which subordinates can be trusted with independent action? Which need a short rein? In fluid situations—especially in combat, where circumstances can change rapidly or where leaders may be out of touch or become casualties—empowered subordinates will pursue the commander's intent as the situation develops and react correctly to changes that previous orders failed to anticipate. However, as important as delegation is to the success of organizations, it does not imply in any way a reduction of the commander's responsibility for the outcome. Only the commander is accountable for the overall outcome, the success or failure, of the mission.

ASSESSING

6-104. The ability to assess a situation accurately and reliably—a critical tool in the leader's arsenal—requires instinct and intuition based on experience and learning. It also requires a feel for the reliability and validity of information and its sources. Organizational assessment is necessary to determine organizational weaknesses and preempt mishaps. Accurately determining causes is essential to training management, developing subordinate leadership, and process improvement.

6-105. There are several different ways to gather information: asking subordinates

questions to find out if the word is getting to them, meeting people, and checking for synchronized plans are a few. Assessing may also involve delving into the electronic databases upon which situational understanding depends. Assessment techniques are more than measurement tools; in fact, the way a leader assesses something can influence the process being assessed. The techniques used may produce high quality, useful feedback; however, in a dysfunctional command climate, they can backfire and send the wrong message about priorities.

6-106. Staff and subordinates manage and process information for a leader, but this doesn't relieve the leader from the responsibility of analyzing information as part of the decision-making process. Leaders obtain information from various sources so they can compare and make judgments about the accuracy of sources.

6-107. As Third Army commander during World War II, GEN George Patton did this continuously. Third Army staff officers visited front-line units daily to gather the latest available information. In addition, the 6th Cavalry Group, the so-called "Household Cavalry" monitored subordinate unit reconnaissance nets and sent liaison patrols to visit command and observation posts of units in contact. These liaison patrols would exchange information with subordinate unit G2s and G3s and report tactical and operational information directly to the Third Army forward headquarters (after clearing it with the operations section of the unit they were visiting).

6-108. In addition to providing timely combat information, the Household Cavalry and staff visits reduced the number of reports Third Army headquarters required and created a sense of cohesiveness and understanding not found in other field armies. Other organizational leaders have accomplished the same thing using liaison officers grounded in their commander's intent. Whatever the method they choose, organizational leaders must be aware of the second- and third-order effects of having "another set of eyes."

6-109. In the world of digital command and control, commanders may set screens on various command and control systems to monitor the status of key units, selected enemy parameters, and critical planning and execution timelines. They may establish prompts in the command and control terminal that warn of imminent selected events, such as low fuel levels in maneuver units, tight fighter management timelines among aviation crews, or massing enemy artillery.

6-110. A leader's preconceived notions and opinions (such as "technology undermines basic skills" or "technology is the answer") can interfere with objective analysis. It's also possible to be too analytical, especially with limited amounts of information and time. Therefore, when analyzing information, organizational leaders guard against dogmatism, impatience, or overconfidence that may bias their analysis.

6-111. The first step in designing an assessment system is to determine the purpose of the assessment. While purposes vary, most fall into one of the following categories:

- Evaluate progress toward organizational goals (using an emergency deployment readiness exercise to check unit readiness or monitoring progress of units through stages of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration).
- Evaluate the efficiency of a system, that is, the ratio of the resources expended to the results gained (comparing the amount of time spent performing maintenance to the organization's readiness rate).
- Evaluate the effectiveness of a system, that is, the quality of the results it produces (analyzing the variation in Bradley gunnery scores).
- Compare the relative efficiency or effectiveness against standards.
- Compare the behavior of individuals in a group with the prescribed standards (APFT or gunnery scores).
- Evaluate systems supporting the organization (following up "no pay dues" to see what the NCO support channel did about them).

6-112. Organizational leaders consider the direct and indirect costs of assessing. Objective costs include the manpower required to design and administer the system and to collect, analyze, and report the data. Costs may also include machine-processing times and expenses related to communicating the data. Subjective costs include possible confusion regarding organizational priorities and philosophies, misperceptions regarding trust and decentralization, fears over unfair use of collected data, and the energy expended to collect and refine the data.

6-113. Organizational leaders ask themselves these questions: What's the standard? Does the standard make sense to all concerned? Did we meet it? What system measures it? Who's responsible for the system? How do we reinforce or correct our findings? One of the greatest contributions organizational leaders can make to their organizations is to assess their own leadership actions: Are you doing things the way you would to support the nation at war? Will your current systems serve equally well under the stress and strain of continuous fighting? If not, why not?

6-114. It follows that organizational leaders who make those evaluations every day will also hold their organizations to the highest standards. When asked, their closest subordinates will give them informal AARs of their leadership behaviors in the critical situations. When they arrange to be part of official AARs, they can invite subordinates to comment on how they could have made things go better. Organizational leader errors are very visible; their results are probably observed and felt by many subordinates. Thus, there's no sense in not admitting, analyzing. and learning from these errors. A bit of reflection in peacetime may lead to greater effectiveness in war.

6-115. The 1991 ground war in the Iraqi desert lasted only 100 hours, but it was won through hard work over a period of years, in countless field exercises on ranges and at the combat training centers. The continual assessment process allowed organizational leaders to trade long hours of hard work in peacetime for operations in war.

6-116. Organizational leaders are personally dedicated to providing tough, battle-

focused training so that the scrimmage is always harder than the game. They must ensure that in training, to the extent that resources and risks allow, nothing is simulated. Constant assessments refine training challenges, forge confidence, and foster the quiet, calculating, and deadly warrior ethos that wins battles and campaigns. (FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 discuss battle focus and training assessment.)

IMPROVING ACTIONS

The creative leader is one who will rewrite doctrine, employ new weapons systems, develop new tactics and who pushes the state of the art.

John O. Marsh, Jr.
Former Secretary of the Army

Figure 6-7. Organizational Leader Actions—Improving

6-117. Improving actions are what all leaders do today to make their organization and subordinates better tomorrow, next month, next year, five years from now. The responsibility for how the Army fights the next war lies with today's leaders; the work to improve the organization in the long term never ends. Leaders teaching subordinates to do the leader's job in combat is the hallmark of the profession of arms.

6-118. The payoff for improving actions might not be evident for years. In fact, leaders at all levels may never see the benefit of developing subordinates, since those subordinates go on to work for someone else. But this doesn't stop them from taking pride in their subordinates' development and performance; a subordinate's success is a great measure of a leader's success. Further, it's often difficult to draw a cause-and-effect line from what leaders do today to how it pays off tomorrow. Precisely because of these difficulties, organizational leaders ensure the goals they establish include improving people and organizations. They also make sure they communicate this to their subordinates.

6-119. The developing, building, and learning actions may be more difficult at the organizational level because the leaders themselves must rely more on indirect leadership methods. The challenge is greater because of the size of the organization, but the rewards increase as well: organizational leaders can influence large numbers of people and improve large segments of the Army.

DEVELOPING

Let us set for ourselves a standard so high that it will be a glory to live up to it, and then let us live up to it and add a new laurel to the crown of America.

Woodrow Wilson
28th President of the United States

6-120. Just as leadership begins at the top, so does developing. Organizational leaders keep a focus on where the organization needs to go and what all leaders must be capable of accomplishing. They continually develop themselves and mentor their subordinate leaders. As discussed in Chapter 3, leaders search for and take advantage of opportunities to mentor their subordinates. At the organizational level, commanders ensure that systems and conditions are in place for the mentoring of all organizational members.

6-121. Effective organizational leaders grow leaders at all levels of their organization. Just as they prepare their units for in-stride breaches, for example, they combine existing opportunities into a coherent plan for leadership development. Leaders get much of their development when they practice what they've learned and receive straightforward feedback in rigorously honest AARs. Feedback also comes from self-assessments as well as from peers, subordinates, and supervisors.

6-122. Organizational leaders design and integrate leader development programs into everyday training. They aim to capture learning in common duties, ensure timely feedback, and allow reflection and analysis. As Frederick the Great said, "What good is experience if you do not reflect?" Simply scheduling officer and NCO professional development sessions isn't enough for genuine, lasting leader development. Letting "operating" overwhelm "improving" threatens the future.

6-123. Leadership development is purposeful, not accidental. Everyday mission requirements are opportunities to grow leaders. Based on assessment of their subordinate leaders, organizational leaders describe how they intend to deliberately influence leader development through a comprehensive leadership development program that captures and harnesses what's already occurring in the organization. A leadership development program must provide for learning skills, practicing actions, and receiving feedback.

6-124. Organizational leaders assess their organizations to determine organization-specific developmental needs. They analyze their mission, equipment, and long-term schedule as well as the experience and competence of their subordinate leaders to determine leadership requirements. In addition to preparing their immediate subordinates to take their place, organizational leaders must also prepare subordinate leaders selected for specific duties to actually execute them.

6-125. Based on their assessment, organizational leaders define and clearly articulate their goals and objectives for leadership development within the organization. They create program goals and objectives to support their focus as well as to communicate specific responsibilities for subordinate leaders. These subordinate leaders help bring leadership development to life through constant mentoring and experiential learning opportunities. Leadership development is an important responsibility shared by leaders at every level. It becomes their greatest contribution—their legacy.

6-126. The development technique used depends on the leaders involved. Learning by making mistakes is possible, but having subordinates develop habits of succeeding is better for instilling self-confidence and initiative. Newly assigned assistant operations officers may need time to visit remote sites over which they have day-to-day control. They may need time to visit higher headquarters to establish rapport with those action officers they will have to deal with under the pressure of a tense operational situation. They may have to see the tactical operations center set up in the field and get a chance to review its SOPs before a big exercise. These activities can only happen if the organizational leader supports the leader development program and demands it take place in spite of the pressures of daily (routine) business.

6-127. There are many ways to tackle leader development. For example, instead of pursuing long-term training programs for his career civilians, one DA civilian leader enrolled both his DA civilian managers and military officers in graduate programs while they continued to work full-time. This approach allowed the directorate to

provide development opportunities to four times as many personnel at one-third the cost of long-term training. In addition, the students were able to apply what they were learning directly to their jobs, thus providing immediate benefit to the organization.

6-128. In addition to educational programs, innovative interagency exchange assignments can cross-level the knowledge, skills, and experience of DA civilian leaders. Whether taking on new interns or expanding the perspectives of seasoned managers, the DA civilian component mirrors the uniformed components in its approach to broad-based leadership opportunities.

6-129. Often developmental programs involve historical events similar to current operational challenges. Such situations allow all to share a sense of what works and what does not from what worked before and what did not. This analysis can also be applied to recent organizational experiences. For example, in preparation for a CTC rotation, leaders review their own as well as others' experiences to determine valuable lessons learned. They master the individual and collective tasks through a training program that sets up soldiers and leaders for success. Based on internal AARs, they continue to learn, practice, and assess. CTCs also provide individual leaders with invaluable experience in operating under harsh conditions. Organizations execute missions, receive candid feedback and coaching to facilitate lessons learned, then execute again.

6-130. Commanders must take the time to ensure they do developmental counseling. Nothing can replace the face-to-face contribution made by a commander mentoring a subordinate. Developing the most talented and (often) those with the greatest challenges requires a great amount of time and energy, but it's an essential investment for the future.

BUILDING
Building Combat Power

6-131. Emphasis on winning can't waver during training, deploying, and fighting. By developing the right systems and formulating appropriate contingency plans, organizational leaders ensure that the organization is prepared for a variety of conditions and uncertainties. In wartime, building combat power derives from task organization, resourcing, and preparing for execution while still meeting the human needs of the organization. Commanders must preserve and recycle organizational energy throughout the campaign. In peacetime, the main component of potential combat power is embedded collective skill and organizational readiness stemming from hard, continuous, and challenging training to standard.

Building Teams

All United States military doctrine is based upon reliance on the ingenuity of the individual working on his own initiative as a member of a team and using the most modern weapons and

equipment which can be provided him.

General Manton S. Eddy
Commanding General, XII Corps, World War II

6-132. Organizational leaders rely on others to follow and execute their intent. Turning a battlefield vision or training goals into reality takes the combined efforts of many teams inside and outside of the leader's organization. Organizational leaders build solid, effective teams by developing and training them and sustain those teams by creating healthy organizational climates.

6-133. Organizational leaders work consistently to create individual and team ownership of organizational goals. By knowing their subordinates—their aspirations, fears, and concerns—organizational leaders can ensure their subordinate organizations and leaders work together. Taking time to allow subordinates to develop ways to meet organizational missions fosters ownership of a plan. The FM 25-100 training management process, in which subordinate organizations define supporting tasks and suggest the training required to gain and maintain proficiency, is an example of a process that encourages collective investment in training. That investment leads to a commitment that not only supports execution but also reduces the chances of internal conflict.

6-134. Subordinates work hard and fight tenaciously when they're well-trained and feel they're part of a good team. Collective confidence comes from winning under challenging and stressful conditions. People's sense of belonging comes from technical and tactical proficiency—as individuals and then collectively as a team—and the confidence they have in their peers and their leaders. As cohesive teams combine into a network, a team of teams, organizations work in harness with those on the left and right to fight as a whole. The balance among three good battalions is more important than having a single outstanding one. Following that philosophy necessarily affects resource allocation and task assignment.

6-135. Organizational leaders build cohesive organizations. They overcome, and even capitalize on, diversity of background and experience to create the energy necessary to achieve organizational goals. They resolve conflicts among subordinate leaders as well as any conflicts between their own organization and others.

6-136. For example, subordinate leaders may compete for limited resources while pursuing their individual organization's goals. Two battalion commanders may both want and need a certain maneuver training area to prepare for deployment, so they both present the issue professionally and creatively to their commander. The brigade commander must then weigh and decide between the different unit requirements, balancing their competing demands with the greater good of the entire organization and the Army. An even better situation would be if the organizational climate facilitates teamwork and cooperation that results in the subordinate commanders themselves

producing a satisfactory solution.

6-137. Similarly, the brigade commander's own interests may at times conflict with that of other organizations. He must maintain a broad perspective and develop sensible solutions for positive resolution with his contemporaries. In both these cases, subordinates observe the actions of leaders and pattern their attitudes and actions after them. Everyone, even experienced leaders, looks up the chain of command for the example of "how we do it here," how to do it right. Organizational leaders empower their subordinates with a powerful personal example.

6-138. Like direct leaders, organizational leaders build teams by keeping team members informed. They share information, solicit input, and consider suggestions. This give-and-take also allows subordinates a glimpse into the mind of their leaders, which helps them prepare for the day when they fill that job. The leader who sends these messages—"I value your opinion; I'm preparing you for greater responsibilities; you're part of the team"—strengthens the bonds that hold the team together.

6-139. Team building produces trust. Trust begins with action, when leaders demonstrate discipline and competence. Over time, subordinates learn that leaders do what they say they'll do. Likewise leaders learn to trust their subordinates. That connection, that mutual assurance, is the link that helps organizations accomplish the most difficult tasks. (FM 100-34 discusses the importance of building trust for command and control.)

LEARNING

6-140. Organizational leaders create an environment that supports people within their organizations learning from their own experiences and the experiences of others. How leaders react to failure and encourage success now is critical to reaching excellence in the future. Subordinates who feel they need to hide mistakes deprive others of valuable lessons. Organizational leaders set the tone for this honest sharing of experiences by acknowledging that not all experiences (even their own) are successful. They encourage subordinates to examine their experiences, and make it easy for them to share what they learn.

6-141. Learning is continuous and occurs throughout an organization: someone is always experiencing something from which a lesson can be drawn. For this reason, organizational leaders ensure continual teaching at all levels; the organization as a whole shares knowledge and applies relevant lessons. They have systems in place to collect and disseminate those lessons so that individual mistakes become organizational tools. This commitment improves organizational programs, processes, and performances.

SECTION III

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP—GENERAL RIDGWAY IN KOREA

6-142. Few leaders have better exemplified effective organizational leadership in combat than GEN Matthew B. Ridgway. GEN Ridgway successfully led the 82d Airborne Division and XVIII Airborne Corps in the ETO during World War II and Eighth (US) Army during the Korean War. His actions during four months in command of Eighth Army prior to his appointment as UN Supreme Commander bring to life the skills and actions described throughout this chapter.

6-143. At the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, GEN Ridgway was assigned as the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. In an agreement between the Army Chief of Staff, GEN J. Lawton Collins, and the UN Supreme Commander, GA Douglas MacArthur, GEN Ridgway was identified early as the replacement for the Eighth Army commander, GEN Walton H. Walker, in the event GEN Walker was killed in combat.

6-144. That year, on 23 December, GEN Walker died in a jeep accident. Following approval by Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall and President Truman, GEN Ridgway was ordered to take command of Eighth Army. At that time, Eighth Army was defending near the 38th parallel, having completed a 300-mile retreat after the Chinese intervention and stunning victory on the Chongchin River.

6-145. The UN defeat had left its forces in serious disarray. One of Eighth Army's four American divisions, the 2d, needed extensive replacements and reorganization. Two other divisions, the 25th and 1st Cavalry, were seriously battered. Of the Republic of Korea divisions, only the 1st was in good fighting shape. A British brigade was combat ready, but it too had suffered substantial losses in helping cover the retreat.

6-146. Within 24 hours of GEN Walker's death, GEN Ridgway was bound for Korea. During the long flight from Washington, DC, to GA MacArthur's headquarters in Japan, GEN Ridgway had an opportunity to reflect on what lay ahead. He felt this problem was like so many others he had experienced: "Here's the situation—what's your solution?" He began to formulate his plan of action. He determined each step based on his assessment of the enemy's strengths and capabilities as well as his own command's strengths and capabilities.

6-147. The necessary steps seemed clear: gain an appreciation for the immediate situation from GA MacArthur's staff, establish his presence as Eighth Army commander by sending a statement of his confidence in them, and then meet with his own staff to establish his priorities. His first message to his new command was straight to the point: "You will have my utmost. I shall expect yours."

6-148. During the flight from Japan to his forward command post, GEN Ridgway carefully looked at the terrain upon which he was to fight. The battered Eighth Army

had to cover a rugged, 100-mile-long front that restricted both maneuver and resupply. Poor morale presented a further problem. Many military observers felt that Eighth Army lacked spirit and possessed little stomach for continuing the bruising battle with the Chinese.

6-149. For three days GEN Ridgway traveled the army area by jeep, talking with commanders who had faced the enemy beyond the Han River. GEN Ridgway wrote later,

I held to the old-fashioned idea that it helped the spirits of the men to see the Old Man up there, in the snow and the sleet and the mud, sharing the same cold, miserable existence they had to endure.

6-150. GEN Ridgway believed a commander should publicly show a personal interest in the well-being of his soldiers. He needed to do something to attract notice and display his concern for the front-line fighters. Finding that one of his units was still short of some winter equipment, GEN Ridgway dramatically ordered that the equipment be delivered within 24 hours. In response, the logistical command made a massive effort to comply, flying equipment from Pusan to the front lines. Everyone noticed. He also ordered—and made sure the order was known—that the troops be served hot meals, with any failures to comply reported directly to him.

6-151. GEN Ridgway was candid, criticizing the spirit of both the commanders and soldiers of Eighth Army. He talked with riflemen and generals, from front-line foxholes to corps command posts. He was appalled at American infantrymen who didn't patrol, who had no knowledge of the terrain in which they fought, and who failed to know the whereabouts of their enemy. Moreover, this army was road-bound and failed to occupy commanding terrain overlooking its positions and supply lines. GEN Ridgway also sensed that Eighth Army—particularly the commanders and their staffs—kept looking over their shoulders for the best route to the rear and planned only for retreat. In short, he found his army immobilized and demoralized.

6-152. An important part of GEN Ridgway's effort to instill fighting spirit in Eighth Army was to order units to close up their flanks and tie in with other units. He said he wanted no units cut off and abandoned, as had happened to the 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry at Unsan, Task Force Faith at Chosin Reservoir, and the 2d Division at Kuni-ri. GEN Ridgway felt that it was essential for soldiers to know they would not be left to fend for themselves if cut off. He believed that soldiers would be persuaded to stand and fight only if they realized help would come. Without that confidence in the command and their fellow soldiers, they would pull out, fearing to be left behind.

6-153. As he visited their headquarters, GEN Ridgway spoke to commanders and their staffs. These talks contained many of his ideas about proper combat leadership. He told his commanders to get out of their command posts and up to the front. When commanders reported on terrain, GEN Ridgway demanded that they base their

information on personal knowledge and that it be correct.

6-154. Furthermore, he urged commanders to conduct intensive training in night fighting and make full use of their firepower. He also required commanders to personally check that their men had adequate winter clothing, warming tents, and writing materials. In addition, he encouraged commanders to locate wounded who had been evacuated and make every effort to return them to their old units. Finally, the army commander ordered his officers to stop wasting resources, calling for punishment of those who lost government equipment.

6-155. During its first battle under GEN Ridgway's command in early January 1951, Eighth Army fell back another 70 miles and lost Seoul, South Korea's capital. Major commanders didn't carry out orders to fall back in an orderly fashion, use field artillery to inflict the heaviest possible enemy casualties, and counterattack in force during daylight hours. Eighth Army's morale and sense of purpose reached their lowest point ever.

6-156. Eighth Army had only two choices: substantially improve its fighting spirit or get out of Korea. GEN Ridgway began to restore his men's fighting spirit by ordering aggressive patrolling into areas just lost. When patrols found the enemy few in number and not aggressive, the army commander increased the number and size of patrols. His army discovered it could drive back the Chinese without suffering overwhelming casualties. Buoyed by these successes, GEN Ridgway ordered a general advance along Korea's west coast, where the terrain was more open and his forces could take advantage of its tanks, artillery, and aircraft.

6-157. During this advance, GEN Ridgway also attempted to tell the men of Eighth Army why they were fighting in Korea. He sought to build a fighting spirit in his men based on unit and soldier pride. In addition, he called on them to defend Western Civilization from Communist degradation, saying:

In the final analysis, the issue now joined right here in Korea is whether Communism or individual freedom shall prevail; whether the flight of the fear-driven people we have witnessed here shall be checked, or shall at some future time, however distant, engulf our own loved ones in all its misery and despair.

6-158. In mid-February of 1951, the Chinese and North Koreans launched yet another offensive in the central area of Korea, where US tanks could not maneuver as readily and artillery could be trapped on narrow roads in mountainous terrain. In heavy fights at Chipyon-ni and Wonju, Eighth Army, for the first time, repulsed the Communist attacks. Eighth Army's offensive spirit soared as GEN Ridgway quickly followed up with a renewed attack that took Seoul and regained roughly the same positions Eight Army had held when he first took command. In late March, Eighth Army pushed the Communist forces north of the 38th parallel.

6-159. GEN Ridgway's actions superbly exemplify those expected of organizational leaders. His knowledge of American soldiers, units, and the Korean situation led him to certain expectations. Those expectations gave him a baseline from which to assess his command once he arrived. He continually visited units throughout the army area, talked with soldiers and their commanders, assessed command climate, and took action to mold attitudes with clear intent, supreme confidence, and unyielding tactical discipline.

6-160. He sought to develop subordinate commanders and their staffs by sharing his thoughts and expectations of combat leadership. He felt the pulse of the men on the front, shared their hardships, and demanded they be taken care of. He pushed the logistical systems to provide creature comforts as well as the supplies of war. He eliminated the skepticism of purpose, gave soldiers cause to fight, and helped them gain confidence by winning small victories. Most of all, he led by example.

6-161. In April GEN Ridgway turned Eighth Army over to GEN James A. Van Fleet. In under four months, a dynamic, aggressive commander had revitalized and transformed a traumatized and desperate army into a proud, determined fighting force. GA Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summed up GEN Ridgway's contributions:

It is not often that a single battlefield commander can make a decisive difference. But in Korea Ridgway would prove to be that exception. His brilliant, driving, uncompromising leadership would turn the tide of battle like no other general's in our military history.

SUMMARY

6-162. This chapter has covered how organizational leaders train and lead staffs, subordinate leaders, and entire organizations. The influence of organizational leaders is primarily indirect: they communicate and motivate through staffs and subordinate commanders. Because their leadership is much more indirect, the eventual outcomes of their actions are often difficult to foresee. Nor do organizational leaders receive the immediate feedback that direct leaders do.

6-163. Still, as demonstrated by GEN Ridgway in Korea, the presence of commanders at the critical time and place boosts confidence and performance. Regardless of the type of organization they head, organizational leaders direct operations by setting the example, empowering their subordinates and organizations and supervising them appropriately. Organizational leaders concern themselves with combat power—how to build, maintain, and recover it. That includes developing systems that will provide the organization and the Army with its next generation of leaders. They also improve conditions by sustaining an ethical and supportive climate, building strong cohesive teams and organizations, and improving the processes that work within the organization.

6-164. Strategic leaders provide leadership at the highest levels of the Army. Their influence is even more indirect and the consequences of their actions more delayed than those of organizational leaders. Because of this, strategic leaders must develop additional skills based on those they've mastered as direct and organizational leaders. Chapter 7 discusses these and other aspects of strategic leadership.

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Chapter 7

Strategic Leadership

It became clear to me that at the age of 58, I would have to learn new tricks that were not taught in the military manuals or on the battlefield. In this position I am a political soldier and will have to put my training in rapping-out orders and making snap decisions on the back burner, and have to learn the arts of persuasion and guile. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills.

General of the Army George C. Marshall

7-1. Strategic leaders are the Army's highest-level thinkers, warfighters, and political-military experts. Some work in an institutional setting within the United States; others work in strategic regions around the world. They simultaneously sustain the Army's culture, envision the future, convey that vision to a wide audience, and personally lead change. Strategic leaders look at the environment outside the Army today to understand the context for the institution's future role. They also use their knowledge of the current force to anchor their vision in reality. This chapter outlines strategic leadership for audiences other than the general officers and Senior Executive Service DA civilians who actually lead there. Those who support strategic leaders need to understand the distinct environment in which these leaders work and the special considerations it requires.

7-2. Strategic leadership requires significantly different techniques in both scope and skill from direct and organizational leadership. In an environment of extreme uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, and volatility, strategic leaders think in multiple time domains and operate flexibly to manage change. Moreover, strategic leaders often interact with other leaders over whom they have minimal authority.

7-3. Strategic leaders are not only experts in their own domain—warfighting and leading large military organizations—but also are astute in the departmental and political environments of the nation's decision-making process. They're expected to deal competently with the public sector, the executive branch, and the legislature. The complex national security environment requires an in-depth knowledge of the political, economic, informational, and military elements of national power as well as the interrelationship among them. In short, strategic leaders not only know themselves and

their own organizations but also understand a host of different players, rules, and conditions.

7-4. Because strategic leaders implement the National Military Strategy, they deal with the elements that shape that strategy. The most important of these are Presidential Decision Memorandums, Department of State Policies, the will of the American people, US national security interests, and the collective strategies—theater and functional—of the combatant commanders (CINCs). Strategic leaders operate in intricate networks of competing constituencies and cooperate in endeavors extending beyond their establishments. As institutional leaders, they represent their organizations to soldiers, DA civilians, citizens, statesmen, and the media, as well as to other services and nations. Communicating effectively with these different audiences is vital to the organization's success.

7-5. Strategic leaders are keenly aware of the complexities of the national security environment. Their decisions take into account factors such as congressional hearings, Army budget constraints, reserve component issues, new systems acquisition, DA civilian programs, research, development, and interservice cooperation. Strategic leaders process information from these areas quickly, assess alternatives based on incomplete data, make decisions, and garner support. Often, highly developed interpersonal skills are essential to building consensus among civilian and military policy makers. Limited interpersonal skills can limit the effect of other skills.

7-6. While direct and organizational leaders have a short-term focus, strategic leaders have a "future focus." Strategic leaders spend much of their time looking toward the mid-term and positioning their establishments for long-term success, even as they contend with immediate issues. With that perspective, strategic leaders seldom see the whole life span of their ideas; initiatives at this level may take years to come to fruition. Strategic leaders think, therefore, in terms of strategic systems that will operate over extended time periods. They ensure these systems are built in accord with the six imperatives mentioned in Chapter 6—quality people, training, force mix, doctrine, modern equipment, and leader development—and they ensure that programs and resources are in place to sustain them. This systems approach sharpens strategic leaders' "future focus" and helps align separate actions, reduce conflict, and improve cooperation.

SECTION I

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP SKILLS

7-7. The values and attributes demanded of Army leaders are the same at all leadership levels. Strategic leaders live by Army values and set the example just as much as direct and organizational leaders, but they face additional challenges. Strategic leaders affect the culture of the entire Army and may find themselves involved in political decision making at the highest national or even global levels. Therefore, nearly any task

strategic leaders set out to accomplish requires more coordination, takes longer, has a wider impact, and produces longer-term effects than a similar organizational-level task.

7-8. Strategic leaders understand, embody, and execute values-based leadership. The political and long-term nature of their decisions doesn't release strategic leaders from the current demands of training, readiness, and unforeseen crises; they are responsible to continue to work toward the ultimate goals of the force, despite the burden of those events. Army values provide the constant reference for actions in the stressful environment of strategic leaders. Strategic leaders understand, embody, and execute leadership based on Army values.

INTERPERSONAL SKILLS

7-9. Strategic leaders continue to use interpersonal skills developed as direct and organizational leaders, but the scope, responsibilities, and authority of strategic positions require leaders with unusually sophisticated interpersonal skills. Internally, there are more levels of people to deal with; externally, there are more interactions with outside agencies, with the media, even with foreign governments. Knowing the Army's needs and goals, strategic leaders patiently but tenaciously labor to convince the proper people about what the Army must have and become. Figure 7-1 lists strategic leader interpersonal skills.

7-10. Strategic leaders and their staffs develop networks of knowledgeable individuals in organizations and agencies that influence their own organizations. Through penetrating assessments, these leaders seek to understand the personal strengths and weaknesses of all the main players on a particular issue. Strategic leaders are adept at reading other people, and they work to completely control their own actions and reactions. Armed with improved knowledge of others, self-control, and established networks, strategic leaders influence external events by providing leadership, timely and relevant information, and access to the right people and agencies.



Figure 7-1. Strategic Leader Skills—Interpersonal

COMMUNICATING

7-11. Communication at the strategic level is complicated by the wide array of staff, functional, and operational components interacting with each other and with external agencies. These complex relationships require strategic leaders to employ comprehensive communications skills as they represent their organizations. One of the most prominent differences between strategic leaders and leaders at other levels is the greater importance of symbolic communication. The example strategic leaders set, their decisions, and their actions have meaning beyond their immediate consequences to a much greater extent than those of direct and organizational leaders.

7-12. Thus, strategic leaders identify those actions that send messages. Then they use their positions to send the desired messages to their organizations and ensure that the right audiences hear them. The messages strategic leaders send set the example in the largest sense. For instance, messages that support traditions, Army values, or a

particular program indicate the strategic leader's priorities.

7-13. Thus, strategic leaders communicate not only to the organization but also to a large external audience that includes the political leadership, media, and the American people. To influence those audiences, strategic leaders seek to convey integrity and win trust. As GA Marshall noted, they become expert in "the art of persuasion."

7-14. Strategic leaders commit to a few common, powerful, and consistent messages and repeat them over and over in different forms and settings. They devise a communications campaign plan, written or conceptual, that outlines how to deal with each target group. When preparing to address a specific audience, they determine its composition and agenda so they know how best to reach its members. Finding some apparent success with the medium, frequency, and words of the message, strategic leaders determine the best way to measure the message's effectiveness and continually scan and assess the environment to make sure that the message is going to all the right groups.

USING DIALOGUE

7-15. One of the forms of communication that strategic leaders use to persuade individuals, rather than groups, is dialogue. Dialogue is a conversation between two or more people. It requires not only active listening, but carefully considering what's said (and not said), logically assessing it without personal bias, and specifying issues that are not understood or don't make sense within the strategic leader's frame of reference. By using dialogue to thoroughly exchange points of view, assumptions, and concepts, strategic leaders gather information, clarify issues, and enlist support of subordinates and peers.

NEGOTIATING

7-16. Many relationships between strategic-level organizations are lateral and without clear subordination. Often, strategic leaders rely heavily on negotiating skills to obtain the cooperation and support necessary to accomplish a mission or meet the command's needs. For example, commanders of the national contingents that made up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) implementation force (IFOR) sent to Bosnia to support the 1995 Dayton peace accords all had limitations imposed on the extent of their participation. In addition, they all had direct lines to their home governments, which they used when they believed IFOR commanders exceeded those limits. NATO strategic leaders had to negotiate some actions that ordinarily would have required only issuing orders. They often had to interpret a requirement to the satisfaction of one or more foreign governments.

7-17. Successful negotiation requires a range of interpersonal skills. Good negotiators are also able to visualize several possible end states while maintaining a clear idea of the best end state from the command's perspective. One of the most important skills is

the ability to stand firm on nonnegotiable points while simultaneously communicating respect for other participants and their negotiating limits. In international forums, firmness and respect demonstrate that the negotiator knows and understands US interests. That understanding can help the negotiator persuade others of the validity of US interests and convince others that the United States understands and respects the interests of other states.

7-18. A good negotiator is particularly skilled in active listening. Other essential personal characteristics include perceptiveness and objectivity. Negotiators must be able to diagnose unspoken agendas and detach themselves from the negotiation process. Successful negotiating involves communicating a clear position on all issues while still conveying willingness to bargain on negotiable issues, recognizing what's acceptable to all concerned, and achieving a compromise that meets the needs of all participants to the greatest extent possible.

7-19. Sometimes strategic leaders to put out a proposal early so the interchange and ultimate solution revolve around factors important to the Army. However, they are confident enough to resist the impulse to leave their thumbprints on final products. Strategic leaders don't have to claim every good idea because they know they will have more. Their understanding of selfless service allows them to subordinate personal recognition to negotiated settlements that produce the greatest good for their establishment, the Army, and the nation or coalition.

ACHIEVING CONSENSUS

7-20. Strategic leaders are skilled at reaching consensus and building and sustaining coalitions. They may apply these skills to tasks as diverse as designing combatant commands, JTFs, and policy working groups or determining the direction of a major command or the Army as an institution. Strategic leaders routinely weld people together for missions lasting from months to years. Using peer leadership rather than strict positional authority, strategic leaders oversee progress toward their visualized end state and monitor the health of the relationships necessary to achieve it. Interpersonal contact sets the tone for professional relations: strategic leaders are tactful and discreet.

7-21. GA Eisenhower's creation of SHAEF during World War II (which was mentioned in Chapter 2) is an outstanding example of coalition building and sustainment. GA Eisenhower insisted on unity of command over the forces assigned to him. He received this authority from both the British and US governments but exercised it through an integrated command and staff structure that related influence roughly to the contribution of the nations involved. The sections within SHAEF all had chiefs of one nationality and deputies of another.

7-22. GA Eisenhower also insisted that military, rather than political, criteria would predominate in his operational and strategic decisions as Supreme Allied Commander. His most controversial decisions, adoption of the so-called broad-front strategy and the

refusal to race the Soviet forces to Berlin, rested on his belief that maintaining the Anglo-American alliance was a national interest and his personal responsibility. Many historians argue that this feat of getting the Allies to work together was his most important contribution to the war.

Allied Command During the Battle of the Bulge

A pivotal moment in the history of the Western Alliance arrived on 16 December 1944, when the German Army launched a massive offensive in a lightly held-sector of the American line in the Ardennes Forest. This offensive, which became known as the Battle of the Bulge, split GEN Omar Bradley's Twelfth Army Group. North of the salient, British GEN Bernard Montgomery commanded most of the Allied forces, so GA Eisenhower shifted command of the US forces there to GEN Montgomery rather than have one US command straddle the gap. GEN Bradley, the Supreme Allied Commander reasoned, could not effectively control forces both north and south of the penetration. It made more sense for GEN Montgomery to command all Allied forces on the northern shoulder and GEN Bradley all those on its southern shoulder. GA Eisenhower personally telephoned GEN Bradley to tell his old comrade of the decision. With the SHAEF staff still present, GA Eisenhower passed the order to his reluctant subordinate, listened to GEN Bradley's protests, and then said sharply, "Well, Brad, those are my orders."

According to historian J.D. Morelock, this short conversation, more than any other action taken by GA Eisenhower and the SHAEF staff during the battle, "discredited the German assumption that nationalistic fears and rivalries would inhibit prompt and effective steps to meet the German challenge." It demonstrated GA Eisenhower's "firm grasp of the true nature of an allied command" and it meant that Hitler's gamble to win the war had failed.

7-23. Across the Atlantic Ocean, GA George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, also had to seek consensus with demanding peers, none more so than ADM Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, US Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. GA Marshall expended great personal energy to ensure that interservice feuding at the top didn't mar the US war effort. ADM King, a forceful leader with strong and often differing views, responded in kind. Because of the ability of these two strategic leaders to work in harmony, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had few issues of major consequence to resolve once he had issued a decision and guidance.

7-24. Opportunities for strategic leadership may come at surprising moments. For instance, Joshua Chamberlain's greatest contribution to our nation may have been not at Gettysburg or Petersburg, but at Appomattox. By that time a major general, Chamberlain was chosen to command the parade at which GEN Lee's Army of Northern Virginia laid down its arms and colors. GEN Grant had directed a simple ceremony that recognized the Union victory without humiliating the Confederates.

7-25. However, MG Chamberlain sensed the need for something even greater. Instead of gloating as the vanquished army passed, he directed his bugler to sound the

commands for attention and present arms. His units came to attention and rendered a salute, following his order out of respect for their commander, certainly not out of sudden warmth for recent enemies. That act set the tone for reconciliation and reconstruction and marks a brilliant leader, brave in battle and respectful in peace, who knew when, where, and how to lead.

BUILDING STAFFS

The best executive is the one who has sense enough to pick good men to do what he wants done, and self-restraint enough to keep from meddling with them while they do it.

Theodore Roosevelt
26th President of the United States

7-26. Until Army leaders reach the highest levels, they cannot staff positions and projects as they prefer. Strategic leaders have not only the authority but also the responsibility to pick the best people for their staffs. They seek to put the right people in the right places, balancing strengths and weaknesses for the good of the nation. They mold staffs able to package concise, unbiased information and build networks across organizational lines. Strategic leaders make so many wide-ranging, interrelated decisions that they must have imaginative staff members who know the environment, foresee consequences of various courses of action, and identify crucial information accordingly.

7-27. With their understanding of the strategic environment and vision for the future, strategic leaders seek to build staffs that compensate for their weaknesses, reinforce their vision, and ensure institutional success. Strategic leaders can’t afford to be surrounded by staffs that blindly agree with everything they say. Not only do they avoid surrounding themselves with "yes-men," they also reward staff members for speaking the truth. Strategic leaders encourage their staffs to participate in dialogue with them, discuss alternative points of view, and explore all facts, assumptions, and implications. Such dialogue assists strategic leaders to fully assess all aspects of an issue and helps clarify their intent and guidance.

7-28. As strategic leaders build and use their staffs, they continually seek honesty and competence. Strategic-level staffs must be able to discern what the "truth" is. During World War II, GA Marshall’s ability to fill his staff and commands with excellent officers made a difference in how quickly the Army could create a wartime force able to mobilize, deploy, fight, and win. Today’s strategic leaders face an environment more complex than the one GA Marshall faced. They often have less time than GA Marshall had to assess situations, make plans, prepare an appropriate response, and execute. The importance of building courageous, honest, and competent staffs has correspondingly increased.

CONCEPTUAL SKILLS

From an intellectual standpoint, Princeton was a world-shaking experience. It fundamentally changed my approach to life. The basic thrust of the curriculum was to give students an appreciation of how complex and diverse various political systems and issues are....The bottom line was that answers had to be sought in terms of the shifting relationships of groups and individuals, that politics pervades all human activity, a truth not to be condemned but appreciated and put to use.

Admiral William Crowe
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



Figure 7-2. Strategic leader Skills—Conceptual

7-29. Strategic leaders, more than direct and organizational leaders, draw on their conceptual skills to comprehend national, national security, and theater strategies, operate in the strategic and theater contexts, and improve their vast, complex

organizations. The variety and scope of their concerns demand the application of more sophisticated concepts.

7-30. Strategic leaders need wisdom—and wisdom isn't just knowledge. They routinely deal with diversity, complexity, ambiguity, change, uncertainty, and conflicting policies. They are responsible for developing well-reasoned positions and providing their views and advice to our nation's highest leaders. For the good of the Army and the nation, strategic leaders seek to determine what's important now and what will be important in the future. They develop the necessary wisdom by freeing themselves to stay in touch with the force and spending time thinking, simply thinking.

ENVISIONING

It is in the minds of the commanders that the issue of battle is really decided.

Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart

7-31. Strategic leaders design compelling visions for their organizations and inspire a collaborative effort to articulate the vision in detail. They then communicate that vision clearly and use it to create a plan, gain support, and focus subordinates' work. Strategic leaders have the further responsibility of defining for their diverse organizations what counts as success in achieving the vision. They monitor their progress by drawing on personal observations, review and analysis, strategic management plans, and informal discussions with soldiers and DA civilians.

7-32. Strategic leaders look realistically at what the future may hold. They consider things they know and things they can anticipate. They incorporate new ideas, new technologies, and new capabilities. The National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy guide strategic leaders as they develop visions for their organizations. From a complicated mixture of ideas, facts, conjecture, and personal experience they create an image of what their organizations need to be.

7-33. Once strategic leaders have developed a vision, they create a plan to reach that end state. They consider objectives, courses of action to take the organization there, and resources needed to do the job. The word "vision" implies that strategic leaders create a conceptual model of what they want. Subordinates will be more involved in moving the organization forward if they can "see" what the leader has in mind. And because moving a large organization is often a long haul, subordinates need some sign that they're making progress. Strategic leaders therefore provide intermediate objectives that act as milestones for their subordinates in checking their direction and measuring their progress.

7-34. The strategic leader's vision provides the ultimate sense of purpose, direction, and motivation for everyone in the organization. It is at once the starting point for developing specific goals and plans, a yardstick for measuring what the organization

accomplishes, and a check on organizational values. Ordinarily, a strategic leader's vision for the organization may have a time horizon of years, or even decades. In combat, the horizon is much closer, but strategic leaders still focus far beyond the immediate actions.

7-35. The strategic leader's vision is a goal, something the organization strives for (even though some goals may always be just out of reach). When members understand the vision, they can see it as clearly as the strategic leader can. When they see it as worthwhile and accept it, the vision creates energy, inspiration, commitment, and a sense of belonging.

7-36. Strategic leaders set the vision for their entire organization. They seek to keep the vision consistent with the external environment, alliance or coalition goals, the National Security Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. Subordinate leaders align their visions and intent with their strategic leader's vision. A strategic leader's vision may be expressed in everything from small acts to formal, written policy statements.

7-37. Joint Vision 2010 and Army Vision 2010, which is derived from it, are not based on formal organizations; rather they array future technologies and force structure against emerging threats. While no one can yet see exactly what that force will look like, the concepts themselves provide an azimuth and a point on the horizon. Achieving well-publicized milepost initiatives shows that the Army as an institution is progressing toward the end state visualized by its strategic leaders.

DEVELOPING FRAMES OF REFERENCE

7-38. All Army leaders build a personal frame of reference from schooling, experience, self-study, and reflection on current events and history. Strategic leaders create a comprehensive frame of reference that encompasses their organization and places it in the strategic environment. To construct a useful frame, strategic leaders are open to new experiences and to comments from others, including subordinates. Strategic leaders are reflective, thoughtful, and unafraid to rethink past experiences and to learn from them. They are comfortable with the abstractions and concepts common in the strategic environment. Moreover, they understand the circumstances surrounding them, their organization, and the nation.

7-39. Much like intelligence analysts, strategic leaders look at events and see patterns that others often miss. These leaders are likely to identify and understand a strategic situation and, more important, infer the outcome of interventions or the absence of interventions. A strategic leader's frame of reference helps identify the information most relevant to a strategic situation so that the leader can go to the heart of a matter without being distracted. In the new information environment, that talent is more important than ever. Cosmopolitan strategic leaders, those with comprehensive frames of reference and the wisdom that comes from thought and reflection, are well equipped

to deal with events having complex causes and to envision creative solutions.

7-40. A well-developed frame of reference also gives strategic leaders a thorough understanding of organizational subsystems and their interacting processes. Cognizant of the relationships among systems, strategic leaders foresee the possible effects on one system of actions in others. Their vision helps them anticipate and avoid problems.

DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY AND AMBIGUITY

True genius resides in the capacity for evaluation of uncertain, hazardous, and conflicting information.

Sir Winston Churchill
Prime Minister of Great Britain, World War II

7-41. Strategic leaders operate in an environment of increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Change at this level may arrive suddenly and unannounced. As they plan for contingencies, strategic leaders prepare intellectually for a range of uncertain threats and scenarios. Since even great planning and foresight can't predict or influence all future events, strategic leaders work to shape the future on terms they can control, using diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power.

7-42. Strategic leaders fight complexity by encompassing it. They must be more complex than the situations they face. This means they're able to expand their frame of reference to fit a situation rather than reducing a situation to fit their preconceptions. They don't lose sight of Army values and force capabilities as they focus on national policy. Because of their maturity and wisdom, they tolerate ambiguity, knowing they will never have all the information they want. Instead, they carefully analyze events and decide when to make a decision, realizing that they must innovate and accept some risk. Once they make decisions, strategic leaders then explain them to the Army and the nation, in the process imposing order on the uncertainty and ambiguity of the situation. Strategic leaders not only understand the environment themselves; they also translate their understanding to others.

Strategic Flexibility in Haiti

Operation Uphold Democracy, the 1994 US intervention in Haiti conducted under UN auspices, provides an example of strategic leaders achieving success in spite of extreme uncertainty and ambiguity. Prior to the order to enter Haiti, strategic leaders didn't know either D-day or the available forces. Neither did they know whether the operation would be an invitation (permissive entry), an invasion (forced entry), or something in between. To complicate the actual military execution, former President Jimmy Carter, retired GEN Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn were negotiating with LTG Raoul Cedras, commander in chief of the Haitian armed forces, in the Haitian capital even as paratroopers, ready for a combat jump, were inbound.

When LTG Cedras agreed to hand over power, the mission of the inbound JTF changed from a forced to a permissive entry. The basis for the operation wound up being an operation plan based on an "in-between" course of action inferred by the JTF staff during planning. The ability of the strategic leaders involved to change their focus so dramatically and quickly provides an outstanding example of strategic flexibility during a crisis. The ability of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines of the JTF to execute the new mission on short notice is a credit to them and their leaders at all levels.

7-43. In addition to demonstrating the flexibility required to handle competing demands, strategic leaders understand complex cause-and-effect relationships and anticipate the second- and third-order effects of their decisions throughout the organization. The highly volatile nature of the strategic environment may tempt them to concentrate on the short term, but strategic leaders don't allow the crisis of the moment absorb them completely. They remain focused on their responsibility to shape an organization or policies that will perform successfully over the next 10 to 20 years. Some second- and third-order effects are desirable; leaders can design and pursue actions to achieve them. For example, strategic leaders who continually send—through their actions—messages of trust to subordinates inspire trust in themselves. The third-order effect may be to enhance subordinates' initiative.

TECHNICAL SKILLS

The crucial difference (apart from levels of innate ability) between Washington and the commanders who opposed him was they were sure they knew all the answers, while Washington tried every day and every hour to learn.

James Thomas Flexner
George Washington in the American Revolution

Figure 7-3. Strategic Leader Skills—Technical

7-44. Strategic leaders create their work on a broad canvas that requires broad technical skills of the sort named in Figure 7-3.

STRATEGIC ART

7-45. The strategic art, broadly defined, is the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to promote and defend the national interest. Masters of the strategic art competently integrate the three roles performed by the complete strategist: strategic leader, strategic practitioner, and strategic theorist.

7-46. Using their understanding of the systems within their own organizations, strategic leaders work through the complexity and uncertainty of the strategic environment and translate abstract concepts into concrete actions. Proficiency in the science of leadership—programs, schedules, and systems, for example—can bring

direct or organizational leaders success. For strategic leaders, however, the intangible qualities of leadership draw on their long and varied experience to produce a rare art.

7-47. Strategic leaders do more than imagine and accurately predict the future; they shape it by moving out of the conceptual realm into practical execution. Although strategic leaders never lose touch with soldiers and their technical skills, some practical activities are unique to this level.

7-48. By reconciling political and economic constraints with the Army's needs, strategic leaders navigate to move the force forward using the strategy and budget processes. They spend a great deal of time obtaining and allocating resources and determining conceptual directions, especially those judged critical for future strategic positioning and necessary to prevent readiness shortfalls. They're also charged with overseeing of the Army's responsibilities under Title 10 of the United States Code.

7-49. Strategic leaders focus not so much on internal processes as on how the organization fits into the DOD and the international arena: What are the relationships among external organizations? What are the broad political and social systems in which the organization and the Army must operate? Because of the complex reporting and coordinating relationships, strategic leaders fully understand their roles, the boundaries of these roles, and the expectations of other departments and agencies. Understanding those interdependencies outside the Army helps strategic leaders do the right thing for the programs, systems, and people within the Army as well as for the nation.

7-50. Theater CINCs, with their service component commanders, seek to shape their environments and accomplish long-term national security policy goals within their theaters. They operate through congressional testimony, creative use of assigned and attached military forces, imaginative bilateral and multilateral programs, treaty obligations, person-to-person contacts with regional leaders, and various joint processes. These actions require strategic leaders to apply the strategic art just as much as does designing and employing force packages to achieve military end states.

7-51. GA Douglas MacArthur, a theater CINC during World War II, became military governor of occupied Japan after the Japanese surrender. His former enemies became his responsibility; he had to deal diplomatically with the defeated nation as well as the directives of American civil authorities and the interests of the former Allies. GA MacArthur understood the difference between preliminary (often called military) end state conditions and the broader set of end state conditions that are necessary for the transition from war to peace. Once a war has ended, military force can no longer be the principal means of achieving strategic aims. Thus, a strategic leader's end state vision must include diplomatic, economic, and informational—as well as military—aspects. GA MacArthur's vision, and the actions he took to achieve it, helped establish the framework that preserved peace in the Pacific Ocean and rebuilt a nation that would become a trusted ally.

7-52. A similar institutional example occurred in the summer of 1990. Then, while the Army was in the midst of the most precisely planned force "build-down" in history, Army Chief of Staff Carl Vuono had to halt the process to meet a crisis in the Persian Gulf. GEN Vuono was required to call up, mobilize and deploy forces necessary to meet the immediate crisis while retaining adequate capabilities in other theaters. The following year he redeployed Third (US) Army, demobilized the activated reserves, and resumed downsizing toward the smallest active force since the 1930s. GEN Vuono demonstrated the technical skill of the strategic art and proved himself a leader of character and competence motivated by Army values.

LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY

7-53. Leveraging technology—that is, applying technological capabilities to obtain a decisive military advantage—has given strategic leaders advantages in force projection, in command and control, and in the generation of overwhelming combat power. Leveraging technology has also increased the tempo of operations, the speed of maneuver, the precision of firepower, and the pace at which information is processed. Ideally, information technology, in particular, enhances not only communications, but also situational understanding. With all these advantages, of course, comes increasing complexity: it's harder to control large organizations that are moving quickly. Strategic leaders seek to understand emerging military technologies and apply that understanding to resourcing, allocating, and exploiting the many systems under their control.

7-54. Emerging combat, combat support, and combat service support technologies bring more than changes to doctrine. Technological change allows organizations to do the things they do now better and faster, but it also enables them to do things that were not possible before. So a part of leveraging technology is envisioning the future capability that could be exploited by developing a technology. Another aspect is rethinking the form the organization ought to take in order to exploit new processes that previously were not available. This is why strategic leaders take time to think "out of the box."

TRANSLATING POLITICAL GOALS INTO MILITARY OBJECTIVES

7-55. Leveraging technology takes more than understanding; it takes money. Strategic leaders call on their understanding and their knowledge of the budgetary process to determine which combat, combat support, and combat service support technologies will provide the leap-ahead capability commensurate with the cost. Wise Army leaders in the 1970s and 1980s realized that superior night systems and greater standoff ranges could expose fewer Americans to danger yet kill more of the enemy. Those leaders committed money to developing and procuring appropriate weapons systems and equipment. Operation Desert Storm validated these decisions when, for example, M1 tanks destroyed Soviet-style equipment before it could close within its maximum effective range. However strategic leaders are always in the position of balancing

budget constraints, technological improvements, and current force readiness against potential threats as they shape the force for the future.

7-56. Strategic leaders identify military conditions necessary to satisfy political ends desired by America's civilian leadership. They must synchronize the efforts of the Army with those of the other services and government agencies to attain those conditions and achieve the end state envisioned by America's political leaders. To operate on the world stage, often in conjunction with allies, strategic leaders call on their international perspective and relationships with policy makers in other countries.

Show of Force in the Philippines

At the end of November 1989, 1,000 rebels seized two Filipino air bases in an attempt to overthrow the government of the Philippines. There had been rumors that someone was plotting a coup to end Philippine President Corazon Aquino's rule. Now rebel aircraft from the captured airfields had bombed and strafed the presidential palace. President Aquino requested that the United States help suppress the coup attempt by destroying the captured airfields. Vice President Dan Quayle and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger favored US intervention to support the Philippine government. As the principal military advisor to the president, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell was asked to recommend a response to President Aquino's request.

GEN Powell applied critical reasoning to this request for US military power in support of a foreign government. He first asked the purpose of the proposed intervention. The State Department and White House answered that the United States needed to demonstrate support for President Aquino and keep her in power. GEN Powell then asked the purpose of bombing the airfields. To prevent aircraft from supporting the coup, was the reply. Once GEN Powell understood the political goal, he recommended a military response to support it.

The chairman recommended to the White House that American jets fly menacing runs over the captured airfields. The goal would be to prevent takeoffs from the airfields by intimidating the rebel pilots rather than destroying rebel aircraft and facilities. This course of action was approved by President George Bush and achieved the desired political goal: it deterred the rebel pilots from supporting the coup attempt. By understanding the political goal and properly defining the military objective, GEN Powell was able to recommend a course of action that applied a measured military response to what was, from the United States' perspective, a diplomatic problem. By electing to conduct a show of force rather than an attack, the United States avoided unnecessary casualties and damage to the Philippine infrastructure.

7-57. Since the end of the Cold War, the international stage has become more confused. Threats to US national security may come from a number of quarters: regional instability, insurgencies, terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to name a few. International drug traffickers and other transnational groups are also potential adversaries. To counter such diverse threats, the nation needs

a force flexible enough to execute a wide array of missions, from warfighting to peace operations to humanitarian assistance. And of course, the nation needs strategic leaders with the sound perspective that allows them to understand the nation's political goals in the complex international environment and to shape military objectives appropriate to the various threats.

SECTION II

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP ACTIONS

Leadership is understanding people and involving them to help you do a job. That takes all of the good characteristics, like integrity, dedication of purpose, selflessness, knowledge, skill, implacability, as well as determination not to accept failure.

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke
Naval Leadership: Voices of Experience

7-58. Operating at the highest levels of the Army, the DOD, and the national security establishment, military and DA civilian strategic leaders face highly complex demands from inside and outside the Army. Constantly changing global conditions challenge their decision-making abilities. Strategic leaders tell the Army story, make long-range decisions, and shape the Army culture to influence the force and its partners inside and outside the United States. They plan for contingencies across the range of military operations and allocate resources to prepare for them, all the while assessing the threat and the force's readiness. Steadily improving the Army, strategic leaders develop their successors, lead changes in the force, and optimize systems and operations. This section addresses the influencing, operating, and improving actions they use.

INFLUENCING ACTIONS

Figure 7-4. Strategic leader Actions—Influencing

7-59. Strategic leaders act to influence both their organization and its outside environment. Like direct and organizational leaders, strategic leaders influence through personal example as well as by communicating, making decisions, and motivating.

7-60. Because the external environment is diverse and complex, it's sometimes difficult for strategic leaders to identify and influence the origins of factors affecting the organization. This difficulty applies particularly to fast-paced situations like theater campaigns. Strategic leaders meet this challenge by becoming masters of information, influence, and vision.

7-61. Strategic leaders also seek to control the information environment, consistent with US law and Army values. Action in this area can range from psychological operations campaigns to managing media relationships. Strategic leaders who know what's happening with present and future requirements, both inside and outside the

organization, are in a position to influence events, take advantage of opportunities, and move the organization toward its goals.

7-62. As noted earlier, strategic leaders develop the wisdom and frames of reference necessary to identify the information relevant to the situation at hand. In addition, they use interpersonal skills to develop a network of knowledgeable people, especially in those organizations that can influence their own. They encourage staff members to develop similar networks. Through these networks, strategic leaders actively seek information relevant to their organizations and subject matter experts they can call on to assist themselves and their staffs. Strategic leaders can often call on the nation's best minds and information sources and may face situations where nothing less will do.

COMMUNICATING

Moving our Army into the next century is a journey, not a destination; we know where we are going and we are moving out.

General Gordon R. Sullivan
Former Army Chief of Staff

Communicating a Vision

7-63. The skill of envisioning is vital to the strategic leader. But forming a vision is pointless unless the leader shares it with a broad audience, gains widespread support, and uses it as a compass to guide the organization. For the vision to provide purpose, direction, and motivation, the strategic leader must personally commit to it, gain commitment from the organization as a whole, and persistently pursue the goals and objectives that will spread the vision throughout the organization and make it a reality.

7-64. Strategic leaders identify trends, opportunities, and threats that could affect the Army's future and move vigorously to mobilize the talent that will help create strategic vision. In 1991 Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan formed a study group of two dozen people to help craft his vision for the Army. In this process, GEN Sullivan considered authorship less important than shared vision:

Once a vision has been articulated and the process of buy-in has begun, the vision must be continually interpreted. In some cases, the vision may be immediately understandable at every level. In other cases, it must be translated—put into more appropriate language—for each part of the organization. In still other cases, it may be possible to find symbols that come to represent the vision.

7-65. Strategic leaders are open to ideas from a variety of sources, not just their own organizations. Some ideas will work; some won't. Some will have few, if any, long-lasting effects; others, like the one in this example, will have effects few will foresee.

Combat Power from a Good Idea

In 1941, as the American military was preparing for war, Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers correctly anticipated manpower shortages in industry and in the armed forces as the military grew. To meet this need, she proposed creation of a Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) of 25,000 women to fill administrative jobs and free men for service with combat units. After the United States entered the war, when the size of the effort needed became clearer, Congresswoman Rogers introduced another bill for a WAAC of some 150,000 women. Although the bill met stiff opposition in some quarters, a version passed and eventually the Women's Army Corps was born. Congresswoman Rogers' vision of how to best get the job done in the face of vast demands on manpower contributed a great deal to the war effort.

Telling the Army Story

If you have an important point to make, don't try to be subtle or clever. Use a pile-driver. Hit the point once. Then come back and hit it a second time—a tremendous whack!

Sir Winston Churchill
Prime Minister of Great Britain, World War II

7-66. Whether by nuance or overt presentation, strategic leaders vigorously and constantly represent who Army is, what it's doing, and where it's going. The audience is the Army itself as well as the rest of the world. There's an especially powerful responsibility to explain things to the American people, who support their Army with money and lives. Whether working with other branches of government, federal agencies, the media, other militaries, the other services, or their own organizations, strategic leaders rely increasingly on writing and public speaking (conferences and press briefings) to reinforce the Army's central messages. Because so much of this communication is directed at outside agencies, strategic leaders avoid parochial language and remain sensitive to the Army's image.

7-67. Strategic leaders of all times have determined and reinforced the message that speaks to the soul of the nation and unifies the force. In 1973 Army leaders at all levels knew about "The Big Five," the weapons systems that would transform the Army (a new tank, an infantry fighting vehicle, an advanced attack helicopter, a new utility helicopter, and an air defense system). Those programs yielded the M1 Abrams, the M2/M3 Bradley, the AH-64 Apache, the UH-60 Blackhawk, and the Patriot. But those initiatives were more than sales pitches for newer hardware; they were linked to concepts about how to fight and win against a massive Soviet-style force. As a result, fielding the new equipment gave physical form to the new ideas being adopted at the same time. Soldiers could see improvements as well as read about them. The synergism of new equipment, new ideas, and good leadership resulted in the Army of Excellence.

7-68. Today, given the rapid growth of technology, unpredictable threats, and newly emerging roles, Army leaders can't cling to new hardware as the key to the Army's vision. Instead, today's strategic leaders emphasize the Army's core strength: Army values and the timeless character of the American soldier. The Army— trained, ready, and led by leaders of character and competence at all levels—has met and will continue to meet the nation's security needs. That's the message of today's Army to the nation it serves.

7-69. A recent example of successfully telling the Army story occurred during Operation Desert Shield. During the deployment phase, strategic leaders decided to get local reporters to the theater of war to report on mobilized reserve component units from their communities. That decision had several effects. The first-order effect was to get the Army story to the citizens of hometown America. That publicity resulted in an unintended second-order effect: a flood of mail that the nation sent to its deployed soldiers. That mail, in turn, produced a third-order effect felt by American soldiers: a new pride in themselves.

STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING

When I am faced with a decision—picking somebody for a post, or choosing a course of action —I dredge up every scrap of knowledge I can. I call in people. I telephone them. I read whatever I can get my hands on. I use my intellect to inform my instinct. I then use my instinct to test all this data. "Hey, instinct, does this sound right? Does it smell right, feel right, fit right?"

General Colin Powell
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

7-70. Strategic leaders have great conceptual resources; they have a collegial network to share thoughts and plan for the institution's continued success and well being. Even when there's consensual decision making, however, everyone knows who the boss is. Decisions made by strategic leaders—whether CINCs deploying forces or service chiefs initiating budget programs—often result in a major commitment of resources. They're expensive and tough to reverse. Therefore, strategic leaders rely on timely feedback throughout the decision-making process in order to avoid making a decision based on inadequate or faulty information. Their purpose, direction, and motivation flow down; information and recommendations surface from below.

7-71. Strategic leaders use the processes of the DOD, Joint Staff, and Army strategic planning systems to provide purpose and direction to subordinate leaders. These systems include the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). However, no matter how many systems are involved and no matter how complex they are, providing motivation remains the province of the individual strategic leader.

7-72. Because strategic leaders are constantly involved in this sort of planning and because decisions at this level are so complex and depend on so many variables, there's a temptation to analyze things endlessly. There's always new information; there's always a reason to wait for the next batch of reports or the next dispatch. Strategic leaders' perspective, wisdom, courage, and sense of timing help them know when to decide. In peacetime the products of those decisions may not see completion for 10 to 20 years and may require leaders to constantly adjust them along the way. By contrast, a strategic leader's decision at a critical moment in combat can rapidly alter the course of the war, as did the one in this example.

The D-Day Decision

On 4 June 1944 the largest invasion armada ever assembled was poised to strike the Normandy region of France. Weather delays had already caused a 24-hour postponement and another front of bad weather was heading for the area. If the Allies didn't make the landings on 6 June, they would miss the combination of favorable tides, clear flying weather, and moonlight needed for the assault. In addition to his concerns about the weather, GA Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, worried about his soldiers. Every hour they spent jammed aboard crowded ships, tossed about and seasick, degraded their fighting ability.

The next possible invasion date was 19 June; however the optimal tide and visibility conditions would not recur until mid-July. GA Eisenhower was ever mindful that the longer he delayed, the greater chance German intelligence had to discover the Allied plan. The Germans would use any additional time to improve the already formidable coastal defenses.

On the evening of 4 June GA Eisenhower and his staff received word that there would be a window of clear weather on the next night, the night of 5-6 June. If the meteorologists were wrong, GA Eisenhower would be sending seasick men ashore with no air cover or accurate naval gunfire. GA Eisenhower was concerned for his soldiers.

"Don't forget," GA Eisenhower said in an interview 20 years later, "some hundreds of thousands of men were down here around Portsmouth, and many of them had already been loaded for some time, particularly those who were going to make the initial assault. Those people in the ships and ready to go were in cages, you might say. You couldn't call them anything else. They were fenced in. They were crowded up, and everybody was unhappy."

GA Eisenhower continued, "Goodness knows, those fellows meant a lot to me. But these are the decisions that have to be made when you're in a war. You say to yourself, I'm going to do something that will be to my country's advantage for the least cost. You can't say without any cost. You know you're going to lose some of them, and it's very difficult."

A failed invasion would delay the end of a war that had already dragged on for nearly five years. GA Eisenhower paced back and forth as a storm rattled the windows. There were no guarantees, but the time had come to act.

He stopped pacing and, facing his subordinates, said quietly but clearly, "OK, let's go."

MOTIVATING

It is the morale of armies, as well as of nations, more than anything else, which makes victories and their results decisive.

Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini
Precis de l'Art de Guerre, 1838

Shaping Culture

7-73. Strategic leaders inspire great effort. To mold morale and motivate the entire Army, strategic leaders cultivate a challenging, supportive, and respectful environment for soldiers and DA civilians to operate in. An institution with a history has a mature, well-established culture—a shared set of values and assumptions that members hold about it. At the same time, large and complex institutions like the Army are diverse; they have many subcultures, such as those that exist in the civilian and reserve components, heavy and light forces, and special operations forces. Gender, ethnic, religious, occupational, and regional differences also define groups within the force.

Culture and Values

7-74. The challenge for strategic leaders is to ensure that all these subcultures are part of the larger Army culture and that they all share Army values. Strategic leaders do this by working with the best that each subculture has to offer and ensuring that subcultures don't foster unhealthy competition with each other, outside agencies, or the rest of the Army. Rather, these various subcultures must complement each other and the Army's institutional culture. Strategic leaders appreciate the differences that characterize these subcultures and treat all members of all components with dignity and respect. They're responsible for creating an environment that fosters mutual understanding so that soldiers and DA civilians treat one another as they should.

7-75. Army values form the foundation on which the Army's institutional culture stands. Army values also form the basis for Army policies and procedures. But written values are of little use unless they are practiced. Strategic leaders help subordinates adopt these values by making sure that their experience validates them. In this, strategic leaders support the efforts all Army leaders make to develop the their subordinates' character. This character development effort (discussed in Appendix E) strives to have all soldiers and DA civilians adopt Army values, incorporate them into a personal code, and act according to them.

7-76. Like organizational and direct leaders, strategic leaders model character by their actions. Only experience can validate Army values: subordinates will hear of Army values, then look to see if they are being lived around them. If they are, the Army's institutional culture is strengthened; if they are not, the Army's institutional culture begins to weaken. Strategic leaders ensure Army values remain fundamental to the Army's institutional culture.

7-77. Over time, an institution's culture becomes so embedded in its members that they may not even notice how it affects their attitudes. The institutional culture becomes second nature and influences the way people think, the way they act in relation to each other and outside agencies, and the way they approach the mission. Institutional culture helps define the boundaries of acceptable behavior, ranging from how to wear the uniform to how to interact with foreign nationals. It helps determine how people approach problems, make judgments, determine right from wrong, and establish priorities. Culture shapes Army customs and traditions through doctrine, policies and regulations, and the philosophy that guides the institution. Professional journals, historical works, ceremonies—even the folklore of the organization—all contain evidence of the Army's institutional culture.

Culture and Leadership

7-78. A healthy culture is a powerful leadership tool strategic leaders use to help them guide their large diverse organizations. Strategic leaders seek to shape the culture to support their vision, accomplish the mission, and improve the organization. A cohesive culture molds the organization's morale, reinforcing an ethical climate built on Army values, especially respect. As leaders initiate changes for long-range improvements, soldiers and DA civilians must feel that they're valued as persons, not just as workers or program supporters.

7-79. One way the Army's institutional culture affirms the importance of individuals is through its commitment to leader development: in essence, this commitment declares that people are the Army's future. By committing to broad-based leader development, the Army has redefined what it means to be a soldier. In fact, Army leaders have even changed the appearance of American soldiers and the way they perform. Introducing height and weight standards, raising PT standards, emphasizing training and education, and deglamorizing alcohol have all fundamentally changed the Army's institutional culture.

OPERATING ACTIONS

Figure 7-5. Strategic leader Actions—Operating

7-80. Operating at the strategic level can involve both short-term and long-term actions. The most agile organizations have standing procedures and policies to take the guesswork out of routine actions and allow leaders to concentrate their imagination and energy on the most difficult tasks. Strategic leaders coordinate their organizations' actions to accomplish near-term missions, often without the benefit of direct guidance. Strategic leaders receive general guidance—frequently from several sources, including the national command authority.

7-81. Although they perform many of the same operating actions as organizational and direct leaders, strategic leaders also manage joint, multinational, and interagency relationships. For strategic leaders, planning, preparing, executing, and assessing are nearly continuous, more so than at the other leadership levels, because the larger organizations they lead have continuing missions. In addition, the preparing action takes on a more comprehensive meaning at the strategic leadership level. Leaders at all levels keep one eye on tomorrow. Strategic leaders, to a greater extent than leaders at other levels, must coordinate their organizations' actions, positioning them to accomplish the current mission in a way that will feed seamlessly into the next one. The Army doesn't stop at the end of a field exercise—or even after recovering from a major deployment; there's always another mission about to start and still another one on the drawing board.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

7-82. Strategic-level plans must balance competing demands across the vast structure of the DOD, but the fundamental requirements for strategic-level planning are the same as for direct- and organizational-level planning. At all levels, leaders establish priorities

and communicate decisions; however, at the strategic level, the sheer number of players who can influence the organization means that strategic leaders must stay on top of multiple demands. To plan coherently and comprehensively, they look at the mission from other players' points of view. Strategic planning depends heavily on wisely applying interpersonal and conceptual skills. Strategic leaders ask, What will these people want? How will they see things? Have I justified the mission? The interaction among strategic leaders' interpersonal and conceptual skills and their operating actions is highly complex.

7-83. Interpersonal and conceptual understanding helped the Army during Operation Uphold Democracy, the US intervention in Haiti. The success of the plan to collect and disarm former Haitian police and military officials, investigate them, remove them (if required), or retrain them owed much to recognizing the special demands of the Haitian psyche. The population needed a secure and stable environment and a way to know when that condition was in place. The Haitians feared the resurgence of government terror, and any long-term solution had to address their concerns. Strategic planners maintained a focus on the desired end state: US disengagement and a return to a peaceful, self-governing Haiti. In the end, the United States forced Haitian leaders to cooperate, restored the elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and made provisions for returning control of affairs to the Haitians themselves.

EXECUTING

There are no victories at bargain prices.

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

Allocating Resources

7-84. Because lives are precious and materiel is scarce, strategic leaders make tough decisions about priorities. Their goal is a capable, prepared, and victorious force. In peacetime, strategic leaders decide which programs get funded and consider the implications of those choices. Allocating resources isn't simply a matter of choosing helicopters, tanks, and missiles for the future Army. Strategic resourcing affects how the Army will operate and fight tomorrow. For example, strategic leaders determine how much equipment can be pre-positioned for contingencies without degrading current operational capabilities.

Managing Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Relationships

7-85. Strategic leaders oversee the relationship between their organizations, as part of the nation's total defense force, and the national policy apparatus. They use their knowledge of how things work at the national and international levels to influence opinion and build consensus for the organization's missions, gathering support of diverse players to achieve their vision. Among their duties, strategic leaders—

- Provide military counsel in national policy forums.
- Interpret national policy guidelines and directions.
- Plan for and maintain the military capability required to implement national policy.
- Present the organization's resource requirements.
- Develop strategies to support national objectives.
- Bridge the gap between political decisions made as part of national strategy and the individuals and organizations that must carry out those decisions.

Multinational Resource Allocation

Following the breakout and pursuit after the Normandy landings, Allied logistics systems became seriously overstretched. GA Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, had to make a number of decisions on resource allocation among his three army groups. These decisions had serious implications for the conduct of the war in the ETO. Both GEN George Patton, Commander of the Third (US) Army in GEN Omar Bradley's Twelfth Army Group, and British GEN Bernard Montgomery, the Twenty-first Army Group Commander, argued that sole priority for their single thrusts into the German homeland could win the war. GA Eisenhower, dedicated to preserving the alliance with an Allied success in the West, gave GEN Montgomery only a limited priority for a risky attempt to gain a Rhine bridgehead, and at the same time, slowed GEN Patton's effort to what was logistically feasible under the circumstances. The Supreme Allied Commander's decision was undoubtedly unpopular with his longtime colleague, GEN Patton, but it contributed to alliance solidarity, sent a message to the Soviets, and ensured a final success that did not rely on the still highly uncertain collapse of German defenses.

7-86. As part of this last requirement, strategic leaders clarify national policy for subordinates and explain the perspectives that contribute to that national policy. They develop policies reflecting national security objectives and prepare their organizations to respond to missions across the spectrum of military actions.

7-87. Just as direct and organizational leaders consider their sister units and agencies, strategic leaders consider and work with other armed services and government agencies. How important is this joint perspective? Most of the Army's four-star billets are joint or multinational. Almost half of the lieutenant generals hold similar positions on the Joint Staff, with the DOD, or in combatant commands. While the remaining strategic leaders are assigned to organizations that are nominally single service (Forces Command, Training and Doctrine Command, Army Materiel Command), they frequently work outside Army channels. In addition, many DA civilian strategic leaders hold positions that require a joint perspective.

7-88. The complexity of the work created by joint and multinational requirements is twofold. First, communication is more complicated because of the different interests, cultures, and languages of the participants. Even the cultures and jargon of the various

US armed services differ dramatically. Second, subordinates may not be subordinate in the same sense as they are in a purely Army organization. Strategic leaders and their forces may fall under international operational control but retain their allegiances and lines of authority to their own national commanders. UN and NATO commands, such as the IFOR, discussed earlier are examples of this kind of arrangement.

7-89. To operate effectively in a joint or multinational environment, strategic leaders exercise a heightened multiservice and international sensitivity developed over their years of experience. A joint perspective results from shared experiences and interactions with leaders of other services, complemented by the leader's habitual introspection. Similar elements in the international arena inform an international perspective. Combing those perspectives with their own Army and national perspectives, strategic leaders—

- Influence the opinions of those outside the Army and help them understand Army needs.
- Interpret the outside environment for people on the inside, especially in the formulation of plans and policies.

Most Army leaders will have several opportunities to serve abroad, sometimes with forces of other nations. Perceptive leaders turn such service into opportunities for self-development and personal broadening.

7-90. Chapter 2 describes building a "third culture," that is, a hybrid culture that bridges the gap between partners in multinational operations. Strategic leaders take the time to learn about their partners' cultures—including political, social and economic aspects—so that they understand how and why the partners think and act as they do. Strategic leaders are also aware that the successful conduct of multinational operations requires a particular sensitivity to the effect that deploying US forces may have on the laws, traditions, and customs of a third country.

7-91. Strategic leaders understand American and Army culture. This allows them to see their own culturally-based actions from the viewpoint of another culture—civilian, military, or foreign. Effective testimony before Congress requires an understanding of how Congress works and how its members think. The same is true concerning dealings with other federal and state agencies, non-governmental organizations, local political leaders, the media, and other people who shape public opinion and national attitudes toward the military. Awareness of the audience helps strategic leaders represent their organizations to outside agencies. Understanding societal values—those values people bring into the Army—helps strategic leaders motivate subordinates to live Army values.

7-92. When the Army's immediate needs conflict with the objectives of other agencies, strategic leaders work to reconcile the differences. Reconciliation begins with a clear understanding of the other agency's position. Understanding the other side's position is the first step in identifying shared interests, which may permit a new

outcome better for both parties. There will be times when strategic leaders decide to stick to their course; there will be other times when Army leaders bend to accommodate other organizations. Continued disagreement can impair the Army's ability to serve the nation; therefore, strategic leaders must work to devise Army courses of action that reflect national policy objectives and take into account the interests of other organizations and agencies.

7-93. Joint and multinational task force commanders may be strategic leaders. In certain operations they will work for a CINC but receive guidance directly from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, or the UN. Besides establishing professional relationships within the DOD and US government, such strategic leaders must build personal rapport with officials from other countries and military establishments.

Military Actions Across the Spectrum

7-94. Since the character of the next war has not been clearly defined for them, today's strategic leaders rely on hints in the international environment to provide information on what sort of force to prepare. Questions they consider include these: Where is the next threat? Will we have allies or contend alone? What will our national and military goals be? What will the exit strategy be? Strategic leaders address the technological, leadership, and moral considerations associated with fighting on an asymmetrical battlefield. They're at the center of the tension between traditional warfare and the newer kinds of multiparty conflict emerging outside the industrialized world. Recent actions like those in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Grenada, and the Persian Gulf suggest the range of possible military contingencies. Strategic leaders struggle with the ramifications of switching repeatedly among the different types of military actions required under a strategy of engagement.

7-95. The variety of potential missions calls for the ability to quickly build temporary organizations able to perform specific tasks. As they design future joint organizations, strategic leaders must also determine how to engineer both cohesion and proficiency in modular units that are constantly forming and reforming.

STRATEGIC ASSESSING

7-96. There are many elements of their environment that strategic leaders must assess. Like leaders at other levels, they must first assess themselves: their leadership style, strengths and weaknesses, and their fields of excellence. They must also understand the present operational environment—to include the will of the American people, expressed in part through law, policy, and their leaders. Finally, strategic leaders must survey the political landscape and the international environment, for these affect the organization and shape the future strategic requirements.

7-97. Strategic leaders also cast a wide net to assess their own organizations. They

develop performance indicators to signal how well they're communicating to all levels of their commands and how well established systems and processes are balancing the six imperatives. Assessment starts early in each mission and continues through its end. It may include monitoring such diverse areas as resource use, development of subordinates, efficiency, effects of stress and fatigue, morale, and mission accomplishment. Such assessments generate huge amounts of data; strategic leaders must make clear what they're looking for so their staffs can filter information for them. They must also guard against misuse of assessment data.

World War II Strategic Assessment

Pursuing a "Germany first" strategy in World War II was a deliberate decision based on a strategic and political assessment of the global situation. Military planners, particularly Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, worried that US troops might be dispersed and used piecemeal. Strategic leaders heeded Frederick the Great's adage, "He who defends everywhere defends nowhere." The greatest threat to US interests was a total German success in Europe: a defeated Russia and neutralized Great Britain. Still, the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines and the threat to the line of communications with Australia tugged forces toward the opposite hemisphere. Indeed, throughout the first months of 1942, more forces headed for the Pacific Theater than across the Atlantic.

However, before the US was at war with anyone, President Franklin Roosevelt had agreed with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to a "Germany first" strategy. The 1942 invasion of North Africa restored this focus. While the US military buildup took hold and forces flowed into Great Britain for the Normandy invasion in 1944, operations in secondary theaters could and did continue. However, they were resourced only after measuring their impact on the planned cross-channel attack.

IMPROVING ACTIONS

Figure 7-6. Strategic Leader Actions—Improving

7-98. Improving is institutional investment for the long haul, refining the things we do today for a better organization tomorrow. A fundamental goal of strategic leaders is to leave the Army better than they found it. Improving at this level calls for experimentation and innovation; however, because strategic-level organizations are so complex, quantifying the results of changes may be difficult.

7-99. Improving the institution and organizations involves an ongoing tradeoff between today and tomorrow. Wisdom and a refined frame of reference are tools to understand what improvement is and what change is needed. Knowing when and what to change is a constant challenge: what traditions should remain stable, and which long-standing methods need to evolve? Strategic leaders set the conditions for long-term success of the organization by developing subordinates, leading change, building the culture and teams, and creating a learning environment.

7-100. One technique for the Army as a learning institution is to decentralize the learning and other improving actions to some extent. That technique raises the questions of how to share good ideas across the entire institution and how to incorporate the best ideas into doctrine (thus establishing an Army-wide standard) without discouraging the decentralized learning process that generated the ideas in the first place. Those and other questions face the strategic leaders of the learning organization the Army seeks to become.

DEVELOPING

George C. Marshall learned leadership from John J. Pershing, and Marshall's followers became great captains themselves: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley…among them. Pershing and Marshall each taught their subordinates their profession; and, more importantly, they gave them room to grow.

General Gordon R. Sullivan
Former Army Chief of Staff

Mentoring

7-101. Strategic leaders develop subordinates by sharing the benefit of their perspective and experience. People arriving at the Pentagon know how the Army works in the field, but regardless of what they may have read, they don't really know how the institutional Army works. Strategic leaders act as a kind of sponsor by introducing them to the important players and pointing out the important places and activities. But strategic leaders actually become mentors as they, in effect, underwrite the learning, efforts, projects, and ideas of rising leaders. The moral responsibility associated with mentoring is compelling for all leaders; for strategic leaders, the potential significance is enormous.

7-102. More than a matter of required forms and sessions, mentoring by strategic leaders means giving the right people an intellectual boost so that they make the leap to operations and thinking at the highest levels. Because those being groomed for strategic leadership positions are among the most talented Army leaders, the manner in which leaders and subordinates interact also changes. Strategic leaders aim not only to pass on knowledge but also to grow wisdom in those they mentor.

7-103. Since few formal leader development programs exist beyond the senior service colleges, strategic leaders pay special attention to their subordinates' self-development, showing them what to study, where to focus, whom to watch, and how to proceed. They speak to audiences at service schools about what goes on "at the top" and spend time sharing their perspectives with those who haven't yet reached the highest levels of Army leadership. Today's subordinates will, after all, become the next generation of strategic leaders. Strategic leaders are continually concerned that the Army institutional culture and the climates in subordinate organizations encourage mentoring by others so

that growth opportunities are available from the earliest days of a soldier or DA civilian's careers.

Developing Intellectual Capital

7-104. What strategic leaders do for individuals they personally mentor, they also seek to provide to the force at large. They invest in the future of the force in several ways. Committing money to programs and projects and investing more time and resources in some actions than others are obvious ways strategic leaders choose what's important. They also value people and ideas as investments in the future. The concepts that shape the thinking of strategic leaders become the intellectual currency of the coming era; the soldiers and DA civilians who develop those ideas become trusted assets themselves. Strategic leaders must choose wisely the ideas that bridge the gap between today and tomorrow and skillfully determine how best to resource important ideas and people.

7-105. Strategic leaders make difficult decisions about how much institutional development is enough. They calculate how much time it will take to plant and grow the seeds required for the Army's great leaders and ideas in the future. They balance today's operational requirements with tomorrow's leadership needs to produce programs that develop a core of Army leaders with the required skills and knowledge.

7-106. Programs like training with industry, advanced civil schooling, and foreign area officer education complement the training and education available in Army schools and contribute to shaping the people who will shape the Army's future. Strategic leaders develop the institution using Army resources when they are available and those of other services or the public sector when they are not.

7-107. After Vietnam the Army's leadership thought investing in officer development so important that new courses were instituted to revitalize professional education for the force. The establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command revived Army doctrine as a central intellectual pillar of the entire service. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 provided similar attention and invigoration to professional joint education and joint doctrine.

7-108. Likewise, there has been a huge investment in and payoff from developing the NCO corps. The Army has the world's finest noncommissioned officers, in part because they get the world's best professional development. The strategic decision to resource a robust NCO education system signaled the Army's investment in developing the whole person—not just the technical skills—of its first-line leaders.

7-109. The Army Civilian Training and Education Development System is the Army's program for developing DA civilian leaders. Like the NCO education system, it continues throughout an individual's career. The first course integrates interns into the Army by explaining Army values, culture, customs, and policies. The Leadership Education and Development Course helps prepare leaders for supervisory demands

with training in communication, counseling, team building, problem solving, and group development. For organizational managers, the Organizational Leadership for Executives course adds higher-order study on topics such as strategic planning, change management, climate, and culture. DA civilians in the Senior Executive Service have a variety of leadership education options that deal with leadership in both the military and civilian contexts. Together, these programs highlight ways that leadership development of DA civilians parallels that of soldiers.

BUILDING

The higher up the chain of command, the greater is the need for boldness to be supported by a reflective mind, so that boldness does not degenerate into purposeless bursts of blind passion.

Carl von Clausewitz

Building Amid Change

7-110. The Army has no choice but to face change. It's in a nearly constant state of flux, with new people, new missions, new technologies, new equipment, and new information. At the same time, the Army, inspired by strategic leaders, must innovate and create change. The Army's customs, procedures, hierarchical structure, and sheer size make change especially daunting and stressful. Nonetheless, the Army must be flexible enough to produce and respond to change, even as it preserves the core of traditions that tie it to the nation, its heritage and its values.

7-111. Strategic leaders deal with change by being proactive, not reactive. They anticipate change even as they shield their organizations from unimportant and bothersome influences; they use the "change-drivers" of technology, education, doctrine, equipment, and organization to control the direction and pace of change. Many agencies and corporations have "futures" groups charged with thinking about tomorrow; strategic leaders and their advisory teams are the Army's "futures people."

Leading Change

7-112. Strategic leaders lead change by—

- Identifying the force capabilities necessary to accomplish the National Military Strategy.
- Assigning strategic and operational missions, including priorities for allocating resources.
- Preparing plans for using military forces across the spectrum of operations.
- Creating, resourcing, and sustaining organizational systems, including—
    - Force modernization programs.
    - Requisite personnel and equipment.

    - Essential command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems.
- Developing and improving doctrine and the training methods to support it.
- Planning for the second- and third-order effects of change.
- Maintaining an effective leader development program and other human resource initiatives.

Change After Vietnam

The history of the post-Vietnam Army provides an example of how strategic leaders' commitment can shape the environment and harness change to improve the institution while continuing to operate.

The Army began seeking only volunteers in the early 1970s. With the all-volunteer force came a tremendous emphasis on doctrinal, personnel, and training initiatives that took years to mature. The Army tackled problems in drug abuse, racial tensions, and education with ambitious, long-range plans and aggressive leader actions. Strategic leaders overhauled doctrine and created an environment that improved training at all levels; the CTC program provided a uniform, rock-solid foundation of a single, well-understood warfighting doctrine upon which to build a trained and ready Army. Simultaneously, new equipment, weapons, vehicles, and uniforms were introduced. The result was the Army of Desert Storm, which differed greatly from the force of 15 years earlier.

None of these changes happened by chance or through evolution. Change depended on the hard work of direct and organizational leaders who developed systematically in an environment directed, engineered, and led by strategic leaders.

7-113. Strategic leaders must guide their organizations through eight stages if their initiatives for change are to make lasting progress. Skipping a step or moving forward prematurely subverts the process and compromises success. Strategic leaders (1) demonstrate a sense of urgency by showing not only the benefits of but the necessity for change. They (2) form guiding coalitions to work the process all the way from concept through implementation. With those groups they (3) develop a vision of the future and strategy for achieving it. Because change is most effective when members embrace it, strategic leaders (4) communicate the vision throughout the institution or organization, and then (5) empower subordinates at all levels for widespread, parallel efforts. They (6) plan for short-term successes to validate the programs and keep the vision credible and (7) consolidate those wins and produce further change. Finally, the leader (8) preserves the change culturally. The result is an institution that constantly prepares for and even shapes the future environment. Strategic leaders seek to sustain the Army as that kind of institution.

LEARNING

A good soldier, whether he leads a platoon or an army, is expected to look backward as well as forward; but he must think only forward.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

7-114. The nation expects military professionals as individuals and the Army as an institution to learn from the experience of others and apply that learning to understanding the present and preparing for the future. Such learning requires both individual and institutional commitments. Each military professional must be committed to self-development, part of which is studying military history and other disciplines related to military operations. The Army as an institution must be committed to conducting technical research, monitoring emerging threats, and developing leaders for the next generation. Strategic leaders, by their example and resourcing decisions, sustain the culture and policies that encourage both the individual and the Army to learn.

7-115. Strategic leaders promote learning by emplacing systems for studying the force and the future. Strategic leaders must resource a structure that constantly reflects on how the Army fights and what victory may cost. All that means constantly assessing the culture and deliberately encouraging creativity and learning.

7-116. The notion of the Army as a "learning organization" is epitomized by the AAR concept, which was developed as part of the REALTRAIN project, the first version of engagement simulation. Since then, it has been part of a cultural change, in which realistic "hot washes," such as following tough engagements at CTCs, are now embedded in all training. Twenty years ago, anything like today’s AARs would have been rare.

7-117. Efficient and effective operations require aligning various initiatives so that different factions are not working at cross-purposes. Strategic leaders focus research and development efforts on achieving combined arms success. They deal with questions such as: Can these new systems from various sources communicate with one another? What happens during digitization lapses—what’s our residual combat capability? Strategic leaders coordinate time lines and budgets so that compatible systems are fielded together. However, they are also concerned that the force have optimal capability across time; therefore, they prepare plans that integrate new equipment and concepts into the force as they’re developed, rather than waiting for all elements of a system to be ready before fielding it. Finally, learning what the force should be means developing the structure, training, and leaders those future systems will support and studying the variety of threats they may face.

7-118. The Louisiana Maneuvers in 1941 taught the Army what mechanized warfare would look like and what was needed to prepare for it. The study of the same name 50 years later helped produce the conceptual Force XXI and the first digitized division. Strategic leaders commissioned these projects because the Army is dedicated to

learning about operations in new environments, against different threats. The projects were strategic counterparts to the rehearsals that direct and organizational leaders conduct to prepare for upcoming missions.

SECTION III

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP — GENERAL OF THE ARMY MARSHALL DURING WORLD WAR II

7-119. GA George C. Marshall was one of the greatest strategic leaders of World War II, of this century, of our nation's history. His example over many years demonstrates the skills and actions this chapter has identified as the hallmarks of strategic leadership.

7-120. Chosen over 34 officers senior to him, GA Marshall became Army Chief of Staff in 1939, a time of great uncertainty about the future of the free world. Part of his appeal for President Roosevelt was his strength of character and personal integrity. The honesty and candor that GA Marshall displayed early in their relationship were qualities the president knew he and the nation would need in the difficult times ahead.

7-121. The new Army Chief of Staff knew he had to wake the Army from its interwar slumber and grow it beyond its 174,000 soldiers—a size that ranked it seventeenth internationally, behind Bulgaria and Portugal. By 1941 he had begun to move the Army toward his vision of what it needed to become: a world-changing force of 8,795,000 soldiers and airmen. His vision was remarkably accurate: by the end of the war, 89 divisions and over 8,200,000 soldiers in Army uniforms had made history.

7-122. GA Marshall reached deep within the Army for leaders capable of the conceptual leaps necessary to fight the impending war. He demanded leaders ready for the huge tasks ahead, and he accepted no excuses. As he found colonels, lieutenant colonels, and even majors who seemed ready for the biggest challenge of their lives, he promoted them ahead of those more senior but less capable and made many of them generals. He knew firsthand that such jumps could be productive. As a lieutenant in the Philippines, he had commanded 5,000 soldiers during an exercise. For generals who could not adjust to the sweeping changes in the Army, he made career shifts as well: he retired them. His loyalty to the institution and the nation came before any personal relationships.

7-123. Merely assembling the required number of soldiers would not be enough. The mass Army that was forming required a new structure to manage the forces and resources the nation was mobilizing for the war effort. Realizing this, GA Marshall reorganized the Army into the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces. His foresight organized the Army for the evolving nature of warfare.

7-124. Preparing for combat required more than manning the force. GA Marshall understood that World War I had presented confusing lessons about the future of warfare. His in-theater experience during that war and later reflection distilled a vision of the future. He believed that maneuver of motorized formations spearheaded by tanks and supported logistically by trucks (instead of horse-drawn wagons) would replace the almost siege-like battles of World War I. So while the French trusted the Maginot Line, GA Marshall emphasized the new technologies that would heighten the speed and complexity of the coming conflict.

7-125. Further, GA Marshall championed the common sense training to prepare soldiers to go overseas ready to fight and win. By having new units spend sufficient time on marksmanship, fitness, drill, and fieldcraft, GA Marshall ensured that soldiers and leaders had the requisite competence and confidence to face an experienced enemy.

7-126. Before and during the war, GA Marshall showed a gift for communicating with the American public. He worked closely with the press, frequently confiding in senior newsmen so they would know about the Army's activities and the progress of the war. They responded to his trust by not printing damaging or premature stories. His relaxed manner and complete command of pertinent facts reassured the press, and through it the nation, that America's youth were entrusted to the right person.

7-127. He was equally successful with Congress. GA Marshall understood that getting what he wanted meant asking, not demanding. His humble and respectful approach with lawmakers won his troops what they needed; arrogant demands would have never worked. Because he never sought anything for himself (his five-star rank was awarded over his objections), his credibility soared.

7-128. However, GA Marshall knew how to shift his approach depending on the audience, the environment, and the situation. He refused to be intimidated by leaders such as Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, or even the president. Though he was always respectful, his integrity demanded that he stand up for his deeply held convictions—and he did, without exception.

7-129. The US role in Europe was to open a major second front to relieve pressure on the Soviet Union and ensure the Allied victory over Germany. GA Marshall had spent years preparing the Army for Operation Overlord, the D-Day invasion that would become the main effort by the Western Allies and the one expected to lead to final victory over Nazi Germany. Many assumed GA Marshall would command it. President Roosevelt might have felt obligated to reward the general's faithful and towering service, but GA Marshall never raised the subject. Ultimately, the president told GA Marshall that it was more important that he lead global resourcing than command a theater of war. GA Eisenhower got the command, while GA Marshall continued to serve on staff.

7-130. GA Marshall didn't request the command that would have placed him

alongside immortal combat commanders like Washington, Grant, and Lee. His decision reflects the value of selfless service that kept him laboring for decades without the recognition that came to some of his associates. GA Marshall never attempted to be anyplace but where his country needed him. And there, finally as Army Chief of Staff, GA Marshall served with unsurpassed vision and brilliance, engineering the greatest victory in our nation's history and setting an extraordinary example for those who came after him.

SUMMARY

7-131. Just as GA Marshall prepared for the coming war, strategic leaders today ready the Army for the next conflict. They may not have years before the next D-Day; it could be just hours away. Strategic leaders operate between extremes, balancing a constant awareness of the current national and global situation with a steady focus on the Army's long-term mission and goals.

7-132. Since the nature of future military operations is so unclear, the vision of the Army's strategic leaders is especially crucial. Identifying what's important among the concerns of mission, soldiers, weapons, logistics, and technology produces decisions that determine the structure and capability of tomorrow's Army.

7-133. Within the institution, strategic leaders build support for the end state they desire. That means building a staff that can take broad guidance and turn it into initiatives that move the Army forward. To obtain the required support, strategic leaders also seek to achieve consensus beyond the Army, working with Congress and the other services on budget, force structure, and strategy issues and working with other countries and militaries on shared interests. The way strategic leaders communicate direction to soldiers, DA civilians, and citizens determines the understanding and support for the new ideas.

7-134. Like GA Marshall, today's strategic leaders are deciding how to transform today's force into tomorrow's. These leaders have little guidance. Still, they know that they work to develop the next generation of Army leaders, build the organizations of the future, and resource the systems that will help gain the next success. The way strategic leaders communicate direction to soldiers, DA civilians, and citizens determines the understanding and support for the new ideas. To communicate with these diverse audiences, strategic leaders work through multiple media, adjust the message when necessary, and constantly reinforce Army themes.

7-135. To lead change personally and move the Army establishment toward their concept of the future, strategic leaders transform political and conceptual programs into practical and concrete initiatives. That process increasingly involves leveraging technology and shaping the culture. By knowing themselves, the strategic players, the operational requirements, the geopolitical situation, and the American public, strategic leaders position the force and the nation for success. Because there may be no time for

a World War II or Desert Storm sort of buildup, success for Army strategic leaders means being ready to win a variety of conflicts now and remaining ready in the uncertain years ahead.

7-136. Strategic leaders prepare the Army for the future through their leadership. That means **influencing** people—members of the Army, members of other government agencies, and the people of the nation the Army serves—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation. It means **operating** to accomplish today's missions, foreign and domestic. And it means **improving** the institution—making sure its people are trained and that its equipment and organizations are ready for tomorrow's missions, anytime, anywhere.

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Appendix A

Roles and Relationships

A-1. When the Army speaks of soldiers, it refers to commissioned officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and enlisted personnel—both men and women. The terms commissioned officer and warrant officer are used when it is necessary to specifically address or refer to a particular group of officers. All Army leaders—soldiers and DA civilians—share the same goal: to accomplish their organization's mission. The roles and responsibilities of Army leaders—commissioned, warrant, noncommissioned, and DA civilian—overlap. Figure A-1 summarizes them.

A-2. Commissioned officers are direct representatives of the President of the United States. Commissions are legal instruments the president uses to appoint and exercise direct control over qualified people to act as his legal agents and help him carry out his duties. The Army retains this direct-agent relationship with the president through its commissioned officers. The commission serves as the basis for a commissioned officer's legal authority. Commissioned officers command, establish policy, and manage Army resources. They are normally generalists who assume progressively broader responsibilities over the course of a career.

A-3. Warrant officers are highly specialized, single-track specialty officers who receive their authority from the Secretary of the Army upon their initial appointment. However, Title 10 USC authorizes the commissioning of warrant officers (WO1) upon promotion to chief warrant officer (CW2). These commissioned warrant officers are direct representatives of the president of the United States. They derive their authority from the same source as commissioned officers but remain specialists, in contrast to commissioned officers, who are generalists. Warrant officers can and do command detachments, units, activities, and vessels as well as lead, coach, train, and counsel subordinates. As leaders and technical experts, they provide valuable skills, guidance, and expertise to commanders and organizations in their particular field.

A-4. NCOs, the backbone of the Army, train, lead, and take care of enlisted soldiers. They receive their authority from their oaths of office, law, rank structure, traditions, and regulations. This authority allows them to direct soldiers, take actions required to accomplish the mission, and enforce good order and discipline. NCOs represent officer,

and sometimes DA civilian, leaders. They ensure their subordinates, along with their personal equipment, are prepared to function as effective unit and team members. While commissioned officers command, establish policy, and manage resources, NCOs conduct the Army's daily business.

A-5. As members of the executive branch of the federal government, DA civilians are part of the Army. They derive their authority from a variety of sources, such as commanders, supervisors, Army regulations, and Title 5 USC. DA civilians' authority is job-related: they normally exercise authority related to their positions. DA civilians fill positions in staff and base sustaining operations that would otherwise have to be filled by officers and NCOs. Senior DA civilians establish policy and manage Army resources, but they do not have the authority to command.

A-6. The complementary relationship and mutual respect between the military and civilian members of the Army is a long-standing tradition. Since the Army's beginning in 1775, military and DA civilian duties have stayed separate, yet necessarily related. Taken in combination, traditions, functions, and laws serve to delineate the particular duties of military and civilian members of the Army.


THE COMMISSIONED OFFICER
•Commands, establishes policy, and manages Army resources.
•Integrates collective, leader, and soldier training to accomplish missions.
•Deals primarily with units and unit operations.
•Concentrates on unit effectiveness and readiness.
THE WARRANT OFFICER
•Provides quality advice, counsel, and solutions to support the command.
•Executes policy and manages the Army's systems.
•Commands special-purpose units and task-organized operational elements.
•Focuses on collective, leader, and individual training.
•Operates, maintains, administers, and manages the Army's equipment, support activities, and technical systems.
•Concentrates on unit effectiveness and readiness.
THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER
•Trains soldiers and conducts the daily business of the Army within established policy.
•Focuses on individual soldier training.
•Deals primarily with individual soldier training and team leading.
•Ensures that subordinate teams, NCOs, and soldiers are prepared to function as effective unit and team members.
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CIVILIAN


THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CIVILIAN
•Establishes and executes policy, leads people, and manages programs, projects, and Army systems.
•Focuses on integrating collective, leader, and individual training.
•Operates, maintains, administers, and manages Army equipment and support, research, and technical activities.
•Concentrates on DA civilian individual and organizational effectiveness and readiness.

Figure A-1. Roles and Responsibilities of Commissioned, Warrant, Noncommissioned, and DA Civilian Leaders

AUTHORITY

A-7. Authority is the legitimate power of leaders to direct subordinates or to take action within the scope of their positions. Military authority begins with the Constitution, which divides it between Congress and the president. (The Constitution appears in Appendix F.) Congress has the authority to make laws that govern the Army. The president, as commander in chief, commands the armed forces, including the Army. Two types of military authority exist: command and general military.

Command Authority

A-8. Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to organize, direct, coordinate, employ, and control military forces so that they accomplish assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

A-9. Command authority originates with the president and may be supplemented by law or regulation. It is the authority that a commander lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Only commissioned and warrant officers may command Army units and installations. DA civilians may exercise general supervision over an Army installation or activity; however, they act under the authority of a military supervisor. DA civilians do not command. (AR 600-20 addresses command authority in more detail.)

A-10. Army leaders are granted command authority when they fill command-designated positions. These normally involve the direction and control of other soldiers and DA civilians. Leaders in command-designated positions have the inherent authority to issue orders, carry out the unit mission, and care for both military members and DA civilians within the leader's scope of responsibility.

General Military Authority

A-11. General military authority originates in oaths of office, law, rank structure, traditions, and regulations. This broad-based authority also allows leaders to take appropriate corrective actions whenever a member of any armed service, anywhere, commits an act involving a breach of good order or discipline. AR 600-20, paragraph 4-5, states this specifically, giving commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned officers authority to "quell all quarrels, frays, and disorders among persons subject to military law"—in other words, to maintain good order and discipline.

A-12. All enlisted leaders have general military authority. For example, dining facility managers, platoon sergeants, squad leaders, and tank commanders all use general military authority when they issue orders to direct and control their subordinates. Army leaders may exercise general military authority over soldiers from different units.

A-13. For NCOs, another source of general military authority stems from the combination of the chain of command and the NCO support channel. The chain of command passes orders and policies through the NCO support channel to provide authority for NCOs to do their job.

Delegation of Authority

A-14. Just as Congress and the president cannot participate in every aspect of armed forces operations, most leaders cannot handle every action directly. To meet the organization’s goals, officers delegate authority to NCOs and, when appropriate, to DA civilians. These leaders, in turn, may further delegate that authority.

A-15. Unless restricted by law, regulation, or a superior, leaders may delegate any or all of their authority to their subordinate leaders. However, such delegation must fall within the leader’s scope of authority. Leaders cannot delegate authority they do not have and subordinate leaders may not assume authority that their superiors do not have, cannot delegate, or have retained. The task or duty to be performed limits the authority of the leader to which it is assigned.

A-16. When a leader is assigned a task or duty, the authority necessary to accomplish it accompanies the assignment. When a leader delegates a task or duty to a subordinate, he delegates the requisite authority as well. However, leaders always retain responsibility for the outcome of any tasks they assign. They must answer for any actions or omissions related to them.

RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

A-17. No definitive lines separate officer, NCO, and DA civilian responsibilities. Officers, NCOs, and DA civilians lead other officers, NCOs, and DA civilians and help

them carry out their responsibilities. Commanders set overall policies and standards, but all leaders must provide the guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to perform their duties. Similarly, subordinates must assist and advise their leaders. Mission accomplishment demands that officers, NCOs, and DA civilians work together to advise, assist, and learn from each other. Responsibilities fall into two categories: command and individual.

Command Responsibility

A-18. Command responsibility refers to collective or organizational accountability and includes how well units perform their missions. For example, a company commander is responsible for all the tasks and missions assigned to his company; his leaders hold him accountable for completing them. Military and DA civilian leaders have responsibility for what their sections, units, or organizations do or fail to do.

Individual Responsibility

A-19. All soldiers and DA civilians must account for their personal conduct. Commissioned officers, warrant officers, and DA civilians assume personal responsibility when they take their oath. DA civilians take the same oath as commissioned officers. Soldiers take their initial oath of enlistment. Members of the Army account for their actions to their fellow soldiers or coworkers, the appointed leader, their unit or organization, the Army, and the American people.

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

A-20. Communication among individuals, teams, units, and organizations is essential to efficient and effective mission accomplishment. As Chapter 4 discusses, two-way communication is more effective than one-way communication. Mission accomplishment depends on information passing accurately to and from subordinates and leaders, up and down the chain of command and NCO support channel, and laterally among adjacent organizations or activities. In garrison operations, organizations working on the same mission or project should be considered "adjacent."

A-21. The Army has only one chain of command. Through this chain of command, leaders issue orders and instructions and convey policies. A healthy chain of command is a two-way communications channel. Its members do more than transmit orders; they carry information from within the unit or organization back up to its leader. They furnish information about how things are developing, notify the leader of problems, and provide requests for clarification and help. Leaders at all levels use the chain of command—their subordinate leaders—to keep their people informed and render assistance. They continually facilitate the process of gaining the necessary clarification and solving problems.

A-22. Beyond conducting their normal duties, NCOs train soldiers and advise commanders on individual soldier readiness and the training needed to ensure unit readiness. Officers and DA civilian leaders should consult their command sergeant major, first sergeant, or NCO assistant, before implementing policy. Commanders, commissioned and warrant officers, DA civilian leaders, and NCOs must continually communicate to avoid duplicating instructions or issuing conflicting orders. Continuous and open lines of communication enable commanders and DA civilian leaders to freely plan, make decisions, and program future training and operations.

THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER SUPPORT CHANNEL

A-23. The NCO support channel parallels and reinforces the chain of command. NCO leaders work with and support the commissioned and warrant officers of their chain of command. For the chain of command to work efficiently, the NCO support channel must operate effectively. At battalion level and higher, the NCO support channel begins with the command sergeant major, extends through first sergeants and platoon sergeants, and ends with section chiefs, squad leaders, or team leaders. (TC 22-6 discusses the NCO support channel.)

A-24. The connection between the chain of command and NCO support channel is the senior NCO. Commanders issue orders through the chain of command, but senior NCOs must know and understand the orders to issue effective implementing instructions through the NCO support channel. Although the first sergeant and command sergeant major are not part of the formal chain of command, leaders should consult them on all individual soldier matters.

A-25. Successful leaders have a good relationship with their senior NCOs. Successful commanders have a good leader-NCO relationship with their first sergeants and command sergeants major. The need for such a relationship applies to platoon leaders and platoon sergeants as well as to staff officers and NCOs. Senior NCOs have extensive experience in successfully completing missions and dealing with enlisted soldier issues. Also, senior NCOs can monitor organizational activities at all levels, take corrective action to keep the organization within the boundaries of the commander’s intent, or report situations that require the attention of the officer leadership. A positive relationship between officers and NCOs creates conditions for success.

DA CIVILIAN SUPPORT

A-26. The Army employs DA civilians because they possess or develop technical skills that are necessary to accomplish some missions. The specialized skills of DA civilians are essential to victory but, for a variety of reasons, they are difficult to maintain in the uniformed components. The Army expects DA civilian leaders to be more than specialists: they are expected to apply technical, conceptual, and

interpersonal skills together to accomplish missions—in a combat theater, if necessary.

A-27. While the command sergeant major is the advocate in a unit for soldier issues, DA civilians have no single advocate. Rather, their own leaders, civilian personnel advisory center, or civilian personnel operations center represent them and their issues to the chain of command. Often the senior DA civilian in an organization or the senior DA civilian in a particular career field has the additional duty of advising and counseling junior DA civilians on job-related issues and career development.

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Appendix B

Performance Indicators

B-1. Appendix B is organized around the leadership dimensions that Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 discuss and that Figure B-1 shows. This appendix lists indicators for you to use to assess the leadership of yourself and others based on these leadership dimensions. Use it as an assessment and counseling tool, not as a source of phrases for evaluation reports. When you prepare an evaluation, make comments that apply specifically to the individual you are evaluating. Do not limit yourself to the general indicators listed here. Be specific; be precise; be objective; be fair.

Leaders of character and competence . .			*act to achieve excellence by providing purpose, direction and motivation.*		
Values *'Be'*	Attributes *'Be'*	Skills[4] *'Know'*	Actions[6] *'Do'*		
Loyalty Duty Respect Selfless Service Honor Integrity Personal Courage	Mental[1] Physical[2] Emotional[3]	Interpersonal Conceptual Technical Tactical	Influencing Communicating Decision Making Motivating	Operating Planning/ Preparing Executing Assessing	Improving Developing Building Learning

[1] The mental attributes of an Army leader are will, self-discipline, initiative, judgment, self-confidence, intelligence, and cultural awareness.

[2] The physical attributes of an Army leader are health fitness, physical fitness, and military and professional bearing.

[3] The emotional attributes of an Army leader are self-control, balance, and stability.

[4] The interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills are different for direct, organizational, and strategic leaders.

[5] The influencing, operating, and improving actions are different for direct, organizational, and strategic leaders.

Figure B-1. Leadership Dimensions

VALUES

LOYALTY

B-2. Leaders who demonstrate loyalty—

- Bear true faith and allegiance in the correct order to the Constitution, the Army, and the organization.
- Observe higher headquarters' priorities.
- Work within the system without manipulating it for personal gain.

DUTY

B-3. Leaders who demonstrate devotion to duty—

- Fulfill obligations—professional, legal, and moral.
- Carry out mission requirements.
- Meet professional standards.
- Set the example.
- Comply with policies and directives.
- Continually pursue excellence.

RESPECT

B-4. Leaders who demonstrate respect—

- Treat people as they should be treated.
- Create a climate of fairness and equal opportunity.
- Are discreet and tactful when correcting or questioning others.
- Show concern for and make an effort to check on the safety and well-being of others.
- Are courteous.
- Don't take advantage of positions of authority.

SELFLESS SERVICE

B-5. Leaders who demonstrate selfless service—

- Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and subordinates before their own.
- Sustain team morale.
- Share subordinates' hardships.
- Give credit for success to others and accept responsibility for failure themselves.

HONOR

B-6. Leaders who demonstrate honor—

- Live up to Army values.
- Don't lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those actions by others.

INTEGRITY

B-7. Leaders who demonstrate integrity—

- Do what is right legally and morally.
- Possess high personal moral standards.
- Are honest in word and deed.
- Show consistently good moral judgment and behavior.
- Put being right ahead of being popular.

PERSONAL COURAGE

B-8. Leaders who demonstrate personal courage—

- Show physical and moral bravery.
- Take responsibility for decisions and actions.
- Accept responsibility for mistakes and shortcomings.

ATTRIBUTES

MENTAL ATTRIBUTES

B-9. Leaders who demonstrate desirable mental attributes—

- Possess and display will, self-discipline, initiative, judgment, self-confidence, intelligence, common sense, and cultural awareness.
- Think and act quickly and logically, even when there are no clear instructions or the plan falls apart.
- Analyze situations.
- Combine complex ideas to generate feasible courses of action.
- Balance resolve and flexibility.
- Show a desire to succeed; do not quit in the face of adversity.
- Do their fair share.
- Balance competing demands.
- Embrace and use the talents of all members to build team cohesion.

PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES

B-10. Leaders who demonstrate desirable physical attributes—

- Maintain an appropriate level of physical fitness and military bearing.
- Present a neat and professional appearance.
- Meet established norms of personal hygiene, grooming, and cleanliness.
- Maintain Army height and weight standards (not applicable to DA civilians).
- Render appropriate military and civilian courtesies.
- Demonstrate nonverbal expressions and gestures appropriate to the situation.
- Are personally energetic.
- Cope with hardship.
- Complete physically demanding endeavors.
- Continue to function under adverse conditions.
- Lead by example in performance, fitness, and appearance.

EMOTIONAL ATTRIBUTES

B-11. Leaders who demonstrate appropriate emotional attributes—

- Show self-confidence.
- Remain calm during conditions of stress, chaos, and rapid change.
- Exercise self-control, balance, and stability.
- Maintain a positive attitude.
- Demonstrate mature, responsible behavior that inspires trust and earns respect.

SKILLS

INTERPERSONAL SKILLS

B-12. Leaders who demonstrate interpersonal skills—

- Coach, teach, counsel, motivate, and empower subordinates.
- Readily interact with others.
- Earn trust and respect.
- Actively contribute to problem solving and decision making.
- Are sought out by peers for expertise and counsel

CONCEPTUAL SKILLS

B-13. Leaders who demonstrate conceptual skills—

- Reason critically and ethically.
- Think creatively.
- Anticipate requirements and contingencies.
- Improvise within the commander’s intent.
- Use appropriate reference materials.
- Pay attention to details.

TECHNICAL SKILLS

B-14. Leaders who demonstrate technical skills—

- Possess or develop the expertise necessary to accomplish all assigned tasks and functions.
- Know standards for task accomplishment.
- Know the small unit tactics, techniques, and procedures that support the organization’s mission.
- Know the drills that support the organization’s mission.
- Prepare clear, concise operation orders.
- Understand how to apply the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) to mission analysis.
- Master basic soldier skills.
- Know how to use and maintain equipment.
- Know how and what to inspect or check.
- Use technology, especially information technology, to enhance communication.

TACTICAL SKILLS

B-15. Leaders who demonstrate tactical skills—

- Know how to apply warfighting doctrine within the commander’s intent.

- Apply their professional knowledge, judgment, and warfighting skill at the appropriate leadership level.
- Combine and apply skill with people, ideas, and things to accomplish short-term missions.
- Apply skill with people, ideas, and things to train for, plan, prepare, execute and assess offensive, defensive, stability, and support actions.

ACTIONS

INFLUENCING

B-16. Leaders who influence—

- Use appropriate methods to reach goals while operating and improving.
- Motivate subordinates to accomplish assigned tasks and missions.
- Set the example by demonstrating enthusiasm for—and, if necessary, methods of—accomplishing assigned tasks.
- Make themselves available to assist peers and subordinates.
- Share information with subordinates.
- Encourage subordinates and peers to express candid opinions.
- Actively listen to feedback and act appropriately based on it.
- Mediate peer conflicts and disagreements.
- Tactfully confront and correct others when necessary.
- Earn respect and obtain willing cooperation of peers, subordinates, and superiors.
- Challenge others to match their example.
- Take care of subordinates and their families, providing for their health, welfare, morale, and training.
- Are persuasive in peer discussions and prudently rally peer pressure against peers when required.
- Provide a team vision for the future.
- Shape the organizational climate by setting, sustaining, and ensuring a values-based environment.

Communicating

B-17. Leaders who communicate effectively—

- Display good oral, written, and listening skills.
- Persuade others.
- Express thoughts and ideas clearly to individuals and groups.

B-18. **Oral Communication**. Leaders who effectively communicate orally—

- Speak clearly and concisely.
- Speak enthusiastically and maintain listeners' interest and involvement.
- Make appropriate eye contact when speaking.
- Use gestures that are appropriate but not distracting.
- Convey ideas, feelings, sincerity, and conviction.
- Express well-thought-out and well-organized ideas.
- Use grammatically and doctrinally correct terms and phrases.
- Use appropriate visual aids.
- Act to determine, recognize and resolve misunderstandings.
- Listen and watch attentively; make appropriate notes; convey the essence of what was said or done to others.
- React appropriately to verbal and nonverbal feedback.
- Keep conversations on track.

B-19. **Written Communication.** Leaders who effectively communicate in writing—

- Are understood in a single rapid reading by the intended audience.
- Use correct grammar, spelling, and punctuation.
- Have legible handwriting.
- Put the "bottom line up front."
- Use the active voice.
- Use an appropriate format, a clear organization, and a reasonably simple style.
- Use only essential acronyms and spell out those used.
- Stay on topic.
- Correctly use facts and data.

(DA Pam 600-67 discusses techniques for writing effectively.)

Decision Making

B-20. Leaders who make effective, timely decisions—

- Employ sound judgment and logical reasoning.
- Gather and analyze relevant information about changing situations to recognize and define emerging problems.
- Make logical assumptions in the absence of facts.
- Uncover critical issues to use as a guide in both making decisions and taking advantage of opportunities.
- Keep informed about developments and policy changes inside and outside the organization.
- Recognize and generate innovative solutions.
- Develop alternative courses of action and choose the best course of action based on analysis of their relative costs and benefits.
- Anticipate needs for action.
- Relate and compare information from different sources to identify possible

cause-and-effect relationships.
- Consider the impact and implications of decisions on others and on situations.
- Involve others in decisions and keep them informed of consequences that affect them.
- Take charge when in charge.
- Define intent.
- Consider contingencies and their consequences.
- Remain decisive after discovering a mistake.
- Act in the absence of guidance.
- Improvise within commander's intent; handle a fluid environment.

Motivating

B-21. Leaders who effectively motivate—

- Inspire, encourage, and guide others toward mission accomplishment.
- Don't show discouragement when facing setbacks.
- Attempt to satisfy subordinates' needs.
- Give subordinates the reason for tasks.
- Provide accurate, timely, and (where appropriate) positive feedback.
- Actively listen for feedback from subordinates.
- Use feedback to modify duties, tasks, requirements, and goals when appropriate.
- Recognize individual and team accomplishments and reward them appropriately.
- Recognize poor performance and address it appropriately.
- Justly apply disciplinary measures.
- Keep subordinates informed.
- Clearly articulate expectations.
- Consider duty positions, capabilities, and developmental needs when assigning tasks.
- Provide early warning to subordinate leaders of tasks they will be responsible for.
- Define requirements by issuing clear and concise orders or guidance.
- Allocate as much time as possible for task completion.
- Accept responsibility for organizational performance. Credit subordinates for good performance. Take responsibility for and correct poor performance.

OPERATING

B-22. Leaders who effectively operate—

- Accomplish short-term missions.
- Demonstrate tactical and technical competency appropriate to their rank and position.
- Complete individual and unit tasks to standard, on time, and within the commander's intent.

Planning and Preparing

B-23. Leaders who effectively plan—

- Develop feasible and acceptable plans for themselves and others that accomplish the mission while expending minimum resources and posturing the organization for future missions.
- Use forward planning to ensure each course of action achieves the desired outcome.
- Use reverse planning to ensure that all tasks can be executed in the time available and that tasks depending on other tasks are executed in the correct sequence.
- Determine specified and implied tasks and restate the higher headquarters' mission in terms appropriate to the organization.
- Incorporate adequate controls such as time phasing; ensure others understand when actions should begin or end.
- Adhere to the "1/3–2/3 Rule"; give subordinates time to plan.
- Allocate time to prepare and conduct rehearsals.
- Ensure all courses of action accomplish the mission within the commander's intent.
- Allocate available resources to competing demands by setting task priorities based on the relative importance of each task.
- Address likely contingencies.
- Remain flexible.
- Consider SOPs, the factors of METT-TC, and the military aspects of terrain (OCOKA).
- Coordinate plans with higher, lower, adjacent, and affected organizations.
- Personally arrive on time and meet deadlines; require subordinates and their organizations to accomplish tasks on time.
- Delegate all tasks except those they are required to do personally.
- Schedule activities so the organization meets all commitments in critical performance areas.
- Recognize and resolve scheduling conflicts.
- Notify peers and subordinates as far in advance as possible when their support is required.
- Use some form of a personal planning calendar to organize requirements.

Executing

B-24. Leaders who effectively execute—

- Use technical and tactical skills to meet mission standards, take care of people, and accomplish the mission with available resources.
- Perform individual and collective tasks to standard.

- Execute plans, adjusting when necessary, to accomplish the mission.
- Encourage initiative.
- Keep higher and lower headquarters, superiors, and subordinates informed.
- Keep track of people and equipment.
- Make necessary on-the-spot corrections.
- Adapt to and handle fluid environments.
- Fight through obstacles, difficulties, and hardships to accomplish the mission.
- Keep track of task assignments and suspenses; adjust assignments, if necessary; follow up.

Assessing

B-25. Leaders who effectively assess—

- Use assessment techniques and evaluation tools (especially AARs) to identify lessons learned and facilitate consistent improvement.
- Establish and employ procedures for monitoring, coordinating, and regulating subordinates' actions and activities.
- Conduct initial assessments when beginning a new task or assuming a new position.
- Conduct IPRs.
- Analyze activities to determine how desired end states are achieved or affected.
- Seek sustainment in areas when the organization meets the standard.
- Observe and assess actions in progress without oversupervising.
- Judge results based on standards.
- Sort out important actual and potential problems.
- Conduct and facilitate AARs; identify lessons.
- Determine causes, effects, and contributing factors for problems.
- Analyze activities to determine how desired end states can be achieved ethically.

IMPROVING

B-26. Leaders who effectively improve the organization—

- Sustain skills and actions that benefit themselves and each of their people for the future.
- Sustain and renew the organization for the future by managing change and exploiting individual and institutional learning capabilities.
- Create and sustain an environment where all leaders, subordinates, and organizations can reach their full potential.

Developing

B-27. Leaders who effectively develop—

- Strive to improve themselves, subordinates, and the organization.
- Mentor by investing adequate time and effort in counseling, coaching, and teaching their individual subordinates and subordinate leaders.
- Set the example by displaying high standards of duty performance, personal appearance, military and professional bearing, and ethics.
- Create a climate that expects good performance, recognizes superior performance, and doesn't accept poor performance.
- Design tasks to provide practice in areas of subordinate leaders' weaknesses.
- Clearly articulate tasks and expectations and set realistic standards.
- Guide subordinate leaders in thinking through problems for themselves.
- Anticipate mistakes and freely offer assistance without being overbearing.
- Observe, assess, counsel, coach, and evaluate subordinate leaders.
- Motivate subordinates to develop themselves.
- Arrange training opportunities that help subordinates achieve insight, self-awareness, self-esteem, and effectiveness.
- Balance the organization's tasks, goals, and objectives with subordinates' personal and professional needs.
- Develop subordinate leaders who demonstrate respect for natural resources and the environment.
- Act to expand and enhance subordinates' competence and self-confidence.
- Encourage initiative.
- Create and contribute to a positive organizational climate.
- Build on successes.
- Improve weaknesses.

Building

B-28. Leaders who effectively build—

- Spend time and resources improving the organization.
- Foster a healthy ethical climate.
- Act to improve the organization's collective performance.
- Comply with and support organizational goals.
- Encourage people to work effectively with each other.
- Promote teamwork and team achievement.
- Are examples of team players.
- Offer suggestions, but properly execute decisions of the chain of command and NCO support channel—even unpopular ones—as if they were their own.
- Accept and act on assigned tasks.
- Volunteer in useful ways.
- Remain positive when the situation becomes confused or changes.
- Use the chain of command and NCO support channel to solve problems.
- Support equal opportunity.
- Prevent sexual harassment.
- Participate in organizational activities and functions.

- Participate in team tasks and missions without being requested to do so.
- Establish an organizational climate that demonstrates respect for the environment and stewards natural resources.

Learning

B-29. Leaders who effectively learn—

- Seek self-improvement in weak areas.
- Encourage organizational growth.
- Envision, adapt, and lead change.
- Act to expand and enhance personal and organizational knowledge and capabilities.
- Apply lessons learned.
- Ask incisive questions.
- Envision ways to improve.
- Design ways to practice.
- Endeavor to broaden their understanding.
- Transform experience into knowledge and use it to improve future performance.
- Make knowledge accessible to the entire organization.
- Exhibit reasonable self-awareness.
- Take time off to grow and recreate.
- Embrace and manage change; adopt a future orientation.
- Use experience to improve themselves and the organization.

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Appendix C

Developmental Counseling

C-1. Subordinate leadership development is one of the most important responsibilities of every Army leader. Developing the leaders who will come after you should be one of your highest priorities. Your legacy and the Army's future rests on the shoulders of those you prepare for greater responsibility.

C-2. Leadership development reviews are a means to focus the growing of tomorrow's leaders. Think of them as AARs with a focus of making leaders more effective every day. These important reviews are not necessarily limited to internal counseling sessions; leadership feedback mechanisms also apply in operational settings such as the CTCs.

C-3. Just as training includes AARs and training strategies to fix shortcomings, leadership development includes performance reviews. These reviews result in agreements between leader and subordinate on a development strategy or plan of action that builds on the subordinate's strengths and establishes goals to improve on weaknesses. Leaders conduct performance reviews and create plans of action during developmental counseling.

C-4. Leadership development reviews are a component of the broader concept of developmental counseling. Developmental counseling is subordinate-centered communication that produces a plan outlining actions that subordinates must take to achieve individual and organizational goals. During developmental counseling, subordinates are not merely passive listeners; they're actively involved in the process. The Developmental Counseling Form (DA Form 4856-E, which is discussed at the end of this appendix) provides a useful framework to prepare for almost any type of counseling. Use it to help you mentally organize issues and isolate important, relevant items to cover during counseling sessions.

C-5. Developmental counseling is a shared effort. As a leader, you assist your subordinates in identifying strengths and weaknesses and creating plans of action. Then you support them throughout the plan implementation and assessment. However, to achieve success, your subordinates must be forthright in their commitment to improve and candid in their own assessment and goal setting.

THE LEADER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

C-6. Organizational readiness and mission accomplishment depend on every member's ability to perform to established standards. Supervisors must mentor their subordinates through teaching, coaching, and counseling. Leaders coach subordinates the same way sports coaches improve their teams: by identifying weaknesses, setting goals, developing and implementing plans of action, and providing oversight and motivation throughout the process. To be effective coaches, leaders must thoroughly understand the strengths, weaknesses, and professional goals of their subordinates. (Chapter 5 discusses coaching.)

C-7. Army leaders evaluate DA civilians using procedures prescribed under the Total Army Performance Evaluation System (TAPES). Although TAPES doesn't address developmental counseling, you can use DA Form 4856-E to counsel DA civilians concerning professional growth and career goals. DA Form 4856-E is not appropriate for documenting counseling concerning DA civilian misconduct or poor performance. The servicing civilian personnel office can provide guidance for such situations.

C-8. Soldiers and DA civilians often perceive counseling as an adverse action. Effective leaders who counsel properly can change that perception. Army leaders conduct counseling to help subordinates become better members of the team, maintain or improve performance, and prepare for the future. Just as no easy answers exist for exactly what to do in all leadership situations, no easy answers exist for exactly what to do in all counseling situations. However, to conduct effective counseling, you should develop a counseling style with the characteristics listed in Figure C-1.

- **Purpose:** Clearly define the purpose of the counseling.
- **Flexibility:** Fit the counseling style to the character of each subordinate and to the relationship desired.
- **Respect:** View subordinates as unique, complex individuals, each with a distinct set of values, beliefs, and attitudes.
- **Communication:** Establish open, two-way communication with subordinates using spoken language, nonverbal actions, gestures, and body language. Effective counselors listen more than they speak.
- **Support:** Encourage subordinates through actions while guiding them through their problems.

Figure C-1. Characteristics of Effective Counseling

THE LEADER AS A COUNSELOR

C-9. Army leaders must demonstrate certain qualities to be effective counselors. These qualities include respect for subordinates, self-awareness and cultural awareness, empathy, and credibility.

RESPECT FOR SUBORDINATES

C-10. As an Army leader, you show respect for subordinates when you allow them to take responsibility for their own ideas and actions. Respecting subordinates helps create mutual respect in the leader-subordinate relationship. Mutual respect improves the chances of changing (or maintaining) behavior and achieving goals.

SELF AWARENESS AND CULTURAL AWARENESS

C-11. As an Army leader, you must be fully aware of your own values, needs, and biases prior to counseling subordinates. Self-aware leaders are less likely to project their biases onto subordinates. Also, aware leaders are more likely to act consistently with their own values and actions.

C-12. Cultural awareness, as discussed in Chapter 2, is a mental attribute. As an Army leader, you need to be aware of the similarities and differences between individuals of different cultural backgrounds and how these factors may influence values, perspectives, and actions. Don't let unfamiliarity with cultural backgrounds hinder you in addressing cultural issues, especially if they generate concerns within the organization or hinder team-building. Cultural awareness enhances your ability to display empathy.

EMPATHY

C-13. Empathy is the action of being understanding of and sensitive to the feelings, thoughts, and experiences of another person to the point that you can almost feel or experience them yourself. Leaders with empathy can put themselves in their subordinate's shoes; they can see a situation from the other person's perspective. By understanding the subordinate's position, you can help a subordinate develop a plan of action that fits the subordinate's personality and needs, one that works for the subordinate. If you don't fully comprehend a situation from your subordinate's point of view, you have less credibility and influence and your subordinate is less likely to commit to the agreed upon plan of action.

CREDIBILITY

C-14. Leaders achieve credibility by being honest and consistent in their statements and actions. To be credible, use a straightforward style with your subordinates. Behave in a manner that your subordinates respect and trust. You can earn credibility by repeatedly demonstrating your willingness to assist a subordinate and being consistent

in what you say and do. If you lack credibility with your subordinates, you'll find it difficult to influence them.

LEADER COUNSELING SKILLS

C-15. One challenging aspect of counseling is selecting the proper approach to a specific situation. To counsel effectively, the technique you use must fit the situation, your capabilities, and your subordinate's expectations. In some cases, you may only need to give information or listen. A subordinate's improvement may call for just a brief word of praise. Other situations may require structured counseling followed by definite actions.

C-16. All leaders should seek to develop and improve their own counseling abilities. You can improve your counseling techniques by studying human behavior, learning the kinds of problems that affect your subordinates, and developing your interpersonal skills. The techniques needed to provide effective counseling will vary from person to person and session to session. However, general skills that you'll need in almost every situation include active listening, responding, and questioning.

ACTIVE LISTENING

C-17. During counseling, you must actively listen to your subordinate. When you're actively listening, you communicate verbally and nonverbally that you've received the subordinate's message. To fully understand a subordinate's message, you must listen to the words and observe the subordinate's manners. Elements of active listening you should consider include—

- **Eye contact.** Maintaining eye contact without staring helps show sincere interest. Occasional breaks of contact are normal and acceptable. Subordinates may perceive excessive breaks of eye contact, paper shuffling, and clock-watching as a lack of interest or concern. These are guidelines only. Based on cultural background, participants in a particular counseling session may have different ideas about what proper eye contact is.
- **Body posture.** Being relaxed and comfortable will help put the subordinate at ease. However, a too-relaxed position or slouching may be interpreted as a lack of interest.
- **Head nods.** Occasionally nodding your head shows you're paying attention and encourages the subordinate to continue.
- **Facial expressions.** Keep your facial expressions natural and relaxed. A blank look or fixed expression may disturb the subordinate. Smiling too much or frowning may discourage the subordinate from continuing.
- **Verbal expressions.** Refrain from talking too much and avoid interrupting. Let the subordinate do the talking while keeping the discussion on the counseling subject. Speaking only when necessary reinforces the importance of what the subordinate is saying and encourages the subordinate to continue. Silence can

also do this, but be careful. Occasional silence may indicate to the subordinate that it's okay to continue talking, but a long silence can sometimes be distracting and make the subordinate feel uncomfortable.

C-18. Active listening also means listening thoughtfully and deliberately to the way a subordinate says things. Stay alert for common themes. A subordinate's opening and closing statements as well as recurring references may indicate the subordinate's priorities. Inconsistencies and gaps may indicate a subordinate's avoidance of the real issue. This confusion and uncertainty may suggest additional questions.

C-19. While listening, pay attention to the subordinate's gestures. These actions complete the total message. By watching the subordinate's actions, you can "see" the feelings behind the words. Not all actions are proof of a subordinate's feelings, but they should be taken into consideration. Note differences between what the subordinate says and does. Nonverbal indicators of a subordinate's attitude include—

- **Boredom.** Drumming on the table, doodling, clicking a ball-point pen, or resting the head in the palm of the hand.
- **Self-confidence.** Standing tall, leaning back with hands behind the head, and maintaining steady eye contact.
- **Defensiveness.** Pushing deeply into a chair, glaring at the leader, and making sarcastic comments as well as crossing or folding arms in front of the chest.
- **Frustration.** Rubbing eyes, pulling on an ear, taking short breaths, wringing the hands, or frequently changing total body position.
- **Interest, friendliness, and openness.** Moving toward the leader while sitting.
- **Openness or anxiety.** Sitting on the edge of the chair with arms uncrossed and hands open.

C-20. Consider these indicators carefully. Although each indicator may show something about the subordinate, don't assume a particular behavior absolutely means something. Ask the subordinate about the indicator so you can better understand the behavior and allow the subordinate to take responsibility for it.

RESPONDING

C-21. Responding skills follow-up on active listening skills. A leader responds to communicate that the leader understands the subordinate. From time to time, check your understanding: clarify and confirm what has been said. Respond to subordinates both verbally and nonverbal. Verbal responses consist of summarizing, interpreting, and clarifying the subordinate's message. Nonverbal responses include eye contact and occasional gestures such as a head nod.

QUESTIONING

C-22. Although questioning is a necessary skill, you must use it with caution. Too

many questions can aggravate the power differential between a leader and a subordinate and place the subordinate in a passive mode. The subordinate may also react to excessive questioning as an intrusion of privacy and become defensive. During a leadership development review, ask questions to obtain information or to get the subordinate to think about a particular situation. Generally, the questions should be open-ended so as to evoke more than a yes or no answer. Well-posed questions may help to verify understanding, encourage further explanation, or help the subordinate move through the stages of the counseling session.

COUNSELING ERRORS

C-23. Effective leaders avoid common counseling mistakes. Dominating the counseling by talking too much, giving unnecessary or inappropriate "advice," not truly listening, and projecting personal likes, dislikes, biases, and prejudices all interfere with effective counseling. You should also avoid other common mistakes such as rash judgments, stereotypes, loss of emotional control, inflexible methods of counseling and improper follow-up. To improve your counseling skills, follow the guidelines in Figure C-2.

- Determine the subordinate's role in the situation and what the subordinate has done to resolve the problem or improve performance.
- Draw conclusions based on more than the subordinate's statement.
- Try to understand what the subordinate says and feels; listen to what the subordinate says and how the subordinate says it.
- Show empathy when discussing the problem.
- When asking questions, be sure that you need the information.
- Keep the conversation open-ended; avoid interrupting.
- Give the subordinate your full attention.
- Be receptive to the subordinate's feelings without feeling responsible to save the subordinate from hurting.
- Encourage the subordinate to take the initiative and to say what the subordinate wants to say.
- Avoid interrogating.
- Keep your personal experiences out of the counseling session unless you believe your experiences will really help.
- Listen more; talk less.
- Remain objective.
- Avoid confirming a subordinate's prejudices.
- Help the subordinate help himself.
- Know what information to keep confidential and what to present to the chain of command.

Figure C-2. Guidelines to Improve Counseling

THE LEADER'S LIMITATIONS

C-24. Army leaders can't help everyone in every situation. Even professional counselors can't provide all the help that a person might need. You must recognize your limitations and, when the situation calls for it, refer a subordinate to a person or agency more qualified to help.

C-25. These agencies Figure C-3 lists can help you and your people resolve problems. Although it's generally in an individual's best interest to seek help first from their first-line leaders, leaders must always respect an individual's right to contact most of these agencies on their own.

Activity	Description
Adjutant General	Provides personnel and administrative services support such as orders, ID cards, retirement assistance, deferments, and in- and out-processing.
American Red Cross	Provides communications support between soldiers and families and assistance during or after emergency or compassionate situations.
Army Community Service	Assists military families through their information and referral services, budget and indebtedness counseling, household item loan closet, information on other military posts, and welcome packets for new arrivals.
Army Substance Abuse Program	Provides alcohol and drug abuse prevention and control programs for DA civilians.
Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers (BOSS)	Serves as a liaison between upper levels of command on the installation and single soldiers.
Army Education Center	Provides services for continuing education and individual learning services support.
Army Emergency Relief	Provides financial assistance and personal budget counseling; coordinates student loans through Army Emergency Relief education loan programs.

Career Counselor	Explains reenlistment options and provides current information on prerequisites for reenlistment and selective reenlistment bonuses.
Chaplain	Provides spiritual and humanitarian counseling to soldiers and DA civilians.
Claims Section, SJA	Handles claims for and against the government, most often those for the loss and damage of household goods.
Legal Assistance Office	Provides legal information or assistance on matters of contracts, citizenship, adoption, marital problems, taxes, wills, and powers of attorney.
Community Counseling Center	Provides alcohol and drug abuse prevention and control programs for soldiers.
Community Health Nurse	Provides preventive health care services.
Community Mental Health Service	Provides assistance and counseling for mental health problems.
Employee Assistance Program	Provides health nurse, mental health service, and social work services for DA civilians.
Equal Opportunity Staff office and Equal Employment Opportunity Office	Provides assistance for matters involving discrimination in race, color, national origin, gender, and religion. Provides, information on procedures for initiating complaints and resolving complaints informally.
Family Advocacy Officer	Coordinates programs supporting children and families including abuse and neglect investigation, counseling, and educational programs.
Finance and Accounting Office	Handles inquiries for pay, allowances, and allotments.
Housing Referral Office	Provides assistance with housing on and off post.

Inspector General	Renders assistance to soldiers and DA civilians. Corrects injustices affecting individuals and eliminates conditions determined to be detrimental to the efficiency, economy, morale, and reputation of the Army. Investigates matters involving fraud, waste, and abuse.
Social Work Office	Provides services dealing with social problems to include crisis intervention, family therapy, marital counseling, and parent or child management assistance.
Transition Office	Provides assistance and information on separation from the Army.

Figure C-3. Support Activities

TYPES OF DEVELOPMENTAL COUNSELING

C-26. You can often categorize developmental counseling based on the topic of the session. The two major categories of counseling are event-oriented and performance/ professional growth.

EVENT-ORIENTED COUNSELING

C-27. Event-oriented counseling involves a specific event or situation. It may precede events, such as going to a promotion board or attending a school; or it may follow events, such as a noteworthy duty performance, a problem with performance or mission accomplishment, or a personal problem. Examples of event-oriented counseling include, but are not limited to—

- Specific instances of superior or substandard performance.
- Reception and integration counseling.
- Crisis counseling.
- Referral counseling.
- Promotion counseling.
- Separation counseling.

Counseling for Specific Instances

C-28. Sometimes counseling is tied to specific instances of superior or substandard duty performance. You tell your subordinate whether or not the performance met the standard and what the subordinate did right or wrong. The key to successful counseling for specific performance is to conduct it as close to the event as possible.

C-29. Many leaders focus counseling for specific instances on poor performance and miss, or at least fail to acknowledge, excellent performance. You should counsel subordinates for specific examples of superior as well as substandard duty performance. To measure your own performance and counseling emphasis, you can note how often you document counseling for superior versus substandard performance.

C-30. You should counsel subordinates who don't meet the standard. If the subordinate's performance is unsatisfactory because of a lack of knowledge or ability, you and the subordinate should develop a plan to improve the subordinate's skills. Corrective training may be required at times to ensure the subordinate knows and achieves the standard. Once the subordinate can achieve the standard, you should end the corrective training.

C-31. When counseling a subordinate for a specific performance, take the following actions:

- Tell the subordinate the purpose of the counseling, what was expected, and how the subordinate failed to meet the standard.
- Address the specific unacceptable behavior or action, not the person's character.
- Tell the subordinate the effect of the behavior, action, or performance on the rest of the organization.
- Actively listen to the subordinate's response.
- Remain unemotional.
- Teach the subordinate how to meet the standard.
- Be prepared to do some personal counseling, since a failure to meet the standard may be related to or the result of an unresolved personal problem.
- Explain to the subordinate what will be done to improve performance (plan of action). Identify your responsibilities in implementing the plan of action; continue to assess and follow up on the subordinate's progress. Adjust plan of action as necessary.

Reception and Integration Counseling

C-32. As the leader, you must counsel new team members when they arrive at your organization. This reception and integration counseling serves two purposes. First, it identifies and helps fix any problems or concerns that new members may have, especially any issues resulting from the new duty assignment. Second, it lets them know the organizational standards and how they fit into the team. It clarifies job titles and sends the message that the chain of command cares. Reception and integration counseling should begin immediately upon arrival so new team members can quickly become integrated into the organization. (Figure C-4 gives some possible discussion points.)

- Organizational standards.
- Chain of command.
- NCO support channel (who and how used).
- On-and-off duty conduct.
- Personnel/personal affairs/initial clothing issue.
- Organizational history, organization, and mission.
- Soldier programs within the organization, such as soldier of the month/quarter/year and Audie Murphy.
- Off limits and danger areas.
- Functions and locations of support activities (see Figure C-3).
- On- and off-post recreational, educational, cultural, and historical opportunities.
- Foreign nation or host nation orientation.
- Other areas the individual should be aware of, as determined by the leader.

Figure C-4. Reception and Integration Counseling Points

Crisis Counseling

C-33. You may conduct crisis counseling to get a subordinate through the initial shock after receiving negative news, such as notification of the death of a loved one. You may assist the subordinate by listening and, as appropriate, providing assistance. Assistance may include referring the subordinate to a support activity or coordinating external agency support. Crisis counseling focuses on the subordinate's immediate, short-term needs.

Referral Counseling

C-34. Referral counseling helps subordinates work through a personal situation and may or may not follow crisis counseling. Referral counseling may also act as preventative counseling before the situation becomes a problem. Usually, the leader assists the subordinate in identifying the problem and refers the subordinate to the appropriate resource, such as Army Community Services, a chaplain, or an alcohol and drug counselor. (Figure C-3 lists support activities.)

Promotion Counseling

C-35. Leaders must conduct promotion counseling for all specialists and sergeants who are eligible for advancement without waivers but not recommended for promotion to the next higher grade. Army regulations require that soldiers within this category receive initial (event-oriented) counseling when they attain full eligibility and then periodic (performance/personal growth) counseling thereafter.

Adverse Separation Counseling

C-36. Adverse separation counseling may involve informing the soldier of the administrative actions available to the commander in the event substandard performance continues and of the consequences associated with those administrative actions (see AR 635-200).

C-37. Developmental counseling may not apply when an individual has engaged in more serious acts of misconduct. In those situations, you should refer the matter to the commander and the servicing staff judge advocate. When the leader's rehabilitative efforts fail, counseling with a view towards separation fills an administrative prerequisite to many administrative discharges and serves as a final warning to the soldier to improve performance or face discharge. In many situations, it may be beneficial to involve the chain of command as soon as you determine that adverse separation counseling might be required. A unit first sergeant or commander should be the person who informs the soldier of the notification requirements outlined in AR 635-200.

PERFORMANCE AND PROFESSIONAL GROWTH COUNSELING
Performance Counseling

C-38. During performance counseling, you conduct a review of a subordinate's duty performance during a certain period. You and the subordinate jointly establish performance objectives and standards for the next period. Rather than dwelling on the past, you should focus the session on the subordinate's strengths, areas needing improvement, and potential.

C-39. Performance counseling is required under the officer, NCO, and DA civilian evaluation reporting systems. The OER process requires periodic performance counseling as part of the OER Support Form requirements. Mandatory, face-to-face performance counseling between the rater and the rated NCO is required under the NCOERS. TAPES includes a combination of both of these requirements.

C-40. Counseling at the beginning of and during the evaluation period facilitates a subordinate's involvement in the evaluation process. Performance counseling communicates standards and is an opportunity for leaders to establish and clarify the expected values, attributes, skills, and actions. Part IVb (Leader Attributes/Skills/Actions) of the OER Support Form (DA Form 67-9-1) serves as an excellent tool for leaders doing performance counseling. For lieutenants and warrant officers one, the major performance objectives on the OER Support Form are used as the basis for determining the developmental tasks on the Junior Officer Developmental Support Form (DA Form 67-9-1a). Quarterly face-to-face performance and developmental counseling is required for these junior officers as outlined in AR 623-105.

C-41. As an Army leader, you must ensure you've tied your expectations to performance objectives and appropriate standards. You must establish standards that your subordinates can work towards and must teach them how to achieve the standards if they are to develop.

Professional Growth Counseling

C-42. Professional growth counseling includes planning for the accomplishment of individual and professional goals. You conduct this counseling to assist subordinates in achieving organizational and individual goals. During the counseling, you and your subordinate conduct a review to identify and discuss the subordinate's strengths and weaknesses and create a plan of action to build upon strengths and overcome weaknesses. This counseling isn't normally event-driven.

C-43. As part of professional growth counseling, you may choose to discuss and develop a "pathway to success" with the subordinate. This future-oriented counseling establishes short- and long-term goals and objectives. The discussion may include opportunities for civilian or military schooling, future duty assignments, special programs, and reenlistment options. Every person's needs are different, and leaders must apply specific courses of action tailored to each individual.

C-44. Career field counseling is required for lieutenants and captains before they're considered for promotion to major. Raters and senior raters, in conjunction with the rated officer, need to determine where the officer's skills best fit the needs of the Army. During career field counseling, consideration must be given to the rated officer's preference and his abilities (both performance and academic). The rater and senior rater should discuss career field designation with the officer prior to making a recommendation on the rated officer's OER.

C-45. While these categories can help you organize and focus counseling sessions, they should not be viewed as separate, distinct, or exhaustive. For example, a counseling session that focuses on resolving a problem may also address improving duty performance. A session focused on performance may also include a discussion on opportunities for professional growth. Regardless of the topic of the counseling session, leaders should follow the same basic format to prepare for and conduct it.

APPROACHES TO COUNSELING

C-46. An effective leader approaches each subordinate as an individual. Different people and different situations require different counseling approaches. Three approaches to counseling include nondirective, directive, and combined. These approaches differ in the techniques used, but they all fit the definition of counseling and contribute to its overall purpose. The major difference between the approaches is the degree to which the subordinate participates and interacts during a counseling session. Figure C-5 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.

NONDIRECTIVE

C-47. The nondirective approach is preferred for most counseling sessions. Leaders use their experienced insight and judgment to assist subordinates in developing solutions. You should partially structure this type of counseling by telling the subordinate about the counseling process and explaining what you expect.

C-48. During the counseling session, listen rather than make decisions or give advice. Clarify what's said. Cause the subordinate to bring out important points, so as to better understand the situation. When appropriate, summarize the discussion. Avoid providing solutions or rendering opinions; instead, maintain a focus on individual and organizational goals and objectives. Ensure the subordinate's plan of action supports those goals and objectives.

DIRECTIVE

C-49. The directive approach works best to correct simple problems, make on-the-spot corrections, and correct aspects of duty performance. The leader using the directive style does most of the talking and tells the subordinate what to do and when to do it. In contrast to the nondirective approach, the leader directs a course of action for the subordinate.

C-50. Choose this approach when time is short, when you alone know what to do, or if a subordinate has limited problem-solving skills. It's also appropriate when a subordinate needs guidance, is immature, or is insecure.

COMBINED

C-51. In the combined approach, the leader uses techniques from both the directive and nondirective approaches, adjusting them to articulate what's best for the subordinate. The combined approach emphasizes the subordinate's planning and decision-making responsibilities.

C-52. With your assistance, the subordinate develops the subordinate's own plan of action. You should listen, suggest possible courses, and help analyze each possible solution to determine its good and bad points. You should then help the subordinate fully understand all aspects of the situation and encourage the subordinate to decide which solution is best.

	Advantages	**Disadvantages**

Nondirective	• Encourages maturity. • Encourages open communication. • Develops personal responsibility.	• More time-consuming • Requires greatest counselor skill.
Directive	• Quickest method. • Good for people who need clear, concise direction. • Allows counselors to actively use their experience.	• Doesn't encourage subordinates to be part of the solution. • Tends to treat symptoms, not problems. • Tends to discourage subordinates from talking freely. • Solution is the counselor's, not the subordinate's.
Combined	• Moderately quick. • Encourages maturity. • Encourages open communication. • Allows counselors to actively use their experience.	• May take too much time for some situations.

Figure C-5. Counseling Approach Summary Chart

COUNSELING TECHNIQUES

C-53. As an Army leader, you may select from a variety of techniques when counseling subordinates. These counseling techniques, when appropriately used, cause subordinates to do things or improve upon their performance. You can use these methods during scheduled counseling sessions or while simply coaching a subordinate. Counseling techniques you can use during the nondirective or combined approaches include—

- **Suggesting alternatives.** Discuss alternative actions that the subordinate may take, but both you and the subordinate decide which course of action is most appropriate.
- **Recommending.** Recommend one course of action, but leave the decision to accept the recommended action to the subordinate.

- **Persuading.** Persuade the subordinate that a given course of action is best, but leave the decision to the subordinate. Successful persuasion depends on the leader's credibility, the subordinate's willingness to listen, and their mutual trust.
- **Advising.** Advise the subordinate that a given course of action is best. This is the strongest form of influence not involving a command.

C-54. Some techniques you can use during the directive approach to counseling include —

- **Corrective training.** Teach and assist the subordinate in attaining and maintaining the standards. The subordinate completes corrective training when the subordinate attains the standard.
- **Commanding.** Order the subordinate to take a given course of action in clear, exact words. The subordinate understands that he has been given a command and will face the consequences for failing to carry it out.

THE COUNSELING PROCESS

C-55. Effective leaders use the counseling process. It consists of four stages:

- Identify the need for counseling.
- Prepare for counseling.
- Conduct counseling.
- Follow up.

IDENTIFY THE NEED FOR COUNSELING

C-56. Quite often organizational policies, such as counseling associated with an evaluation or counseling required by the command, focus a counseling session. However, you may conduct developmental counseling whenever the need arises for focused, two-way communication aimed at subordinate development. Developing subordinates consists of observing the subordinate's performance, comparing it to the standard, and then providing feedback to the subordinate in the form of counseling.

PREPARE FOR COUNSELING

C-57. Successful counseling requires preparation. To prepare for counseling, do the following:

- Select a suitable place.
- Schedule the time.
- Notify the subordinate well in advance.
- Organize information.
- Outline the counseling session components.

- Plan your counseling strategy.
- Establish the right atmosphere.

Select a Suitable Place

C-58. Schedule counseling in an environment that minimizes interruptions and is free from distracting sights and sounds.

Schedule the Time

C-59. When possible, counsel a subordinate during the duty day. Counseling after duty hours may be rushed or perceived as unfavorable. The length of time required for counseling depends on the complexity of the issue. Generally a counseling session should last less than an hour. If you need more time, schedule a second session. Additionally, select a time free from competition with other activities and consider what has been planned after the counseling session. Important events can distract a subordinate from concentrating on the counseling.

Notify the Subordinate Well in Advance

C-60. For a counseling session to be a subordinate-centered, two-person effort, the subordinate must have time to prepare for it. The subordinate should know why, where, and when the counseling will take place. Counseling following a specific event should happen as close to the event as possible. However, for performance or professional development counseling, subordinates may need a week or more to prepare or review specific products, such as support forms or counseling records.

Organize Information

C-61. Solid preparation is essential to effective counseling. Review all pertinent information. This includes the purpose of the counseling, facts and observations about the subordinate, identification of possible problems, main points of discussion, and the development of a plan of action. Focus on specific and objective behaviors that the subordinate must maintain or improve as well as a plan of action with clear, obtainable goals.

Outline the Components of the Counseling Session

C-62. Using the information obtained, determine what to discuss during the counseling session. Note what prompted the counseling, what you aim to achieve, and what your role as a counselor is. Identify possible comments or questions to help you keep the counseling session subordinate-centered and help the subordinate progress through its stages. Although you never know what a subordinate will say or do during counseling, a written outline helps organize the session and enhances the chance of positive results.

(Figure C-6 is one example of a counseling outline prepared by a platoon leader about to conduct an initial NCOER counseling session with a platoon sergeant.)

Type of counseling: Initial NCOER counseling for SFC Taylor, a recently promoted new arrival to the unit.

Place and time: The platoon office, 1500 hours, 9 October.

Time to notify the subordinate: Notify SFC Taylor one week in advance of the scheduled counseling session.

Subordinate preparation: Have SFC Taylor put together a list of goals and objectives he would like to complete over the next 90 to 180 days. Review the values, attributes, skills, and actions from FM 22-100.

Counselor preparation:

- Review the NCO Counseling Checklist/Record (DA Form 2166-8-1).
- Update or review SFC Taylor's duty description and fill out the rating chain and duty description on the working copy of the NCOER (DA Form 2166-8, Parts II and III).
- Review each of the values and responsibilities in Part IV of the NCOER and the values, attributes, skills and actions in FM 22-100. Think of how each applies to SFC Taylor and the platoon sergeant position.
- Review the actions you consider necessary for a success or excellence in each value and responsibility.
- Make notes in blank spaces in Part IV of the NCOER to assist when counseling.

Role as counselor: Help SFC Taylor to understand the expectations and standards associated with the platoon sergeant position. Assist SFC Taylor in developing the values, attributes, skills, and actions that will enable him to achieve his performance objectives, consistent with those of the platoon and company. Resolve any aspects of the job that aren't clearly understood.

Session outline: Complete an outline following the counseling session components in Figure C-7 and based on the draft duty description on the NCOER, ideally at least two to three days prior to the actual counseling session.

Figure C-6. Example of a Counseling Outline

Plan Counseling Strategy

C-63. As many approaches to counseling exist as there are leaders. The directive, nondirective, and combined approaches to counseling were addressed earlier. Use a

strategy that suits your subordinates and the situation.

Establish the Right Atmosphere

C-64. The right atmosphere promotes two-way communication between a leader and subordinate. To establish a relaxed atmosphere, you may offer the subordinate a seat or a cup of coffee. You may want to sit in a chair facing the subordinate since a desk can act as a barrier.

C-65. Some situations make an informal atmosphere inappropriate. For example, during counseling to correct substandard performance, you may direct the subordinate to remain standing while you remain seated behind a desk. This formal atmosphere, normally used to give specific guidance, reinforces the leader's rank, position in the chain of command, and authority.

CONDUCT THE COUNSELING SESSION

C-66. Be flexible when conducting a counseling session. Often counseling for a specific incident occurs spontaneously as leaders encounter subordinates in their daily activities. Such counseling can occur in the field, motor pool, barracks—wherever subordinates perform their duties. Good leaders take advantage of naturally occurring events to provide subordinates with feedback.

C-67. Even when you haven't prepared for formal counseling, you should address the four basic components of a counseling session. Their purpose is to guide effective counseling rather than mandate a series of rigid steps. Counseling sessions consist of—

- Opening the session.
- Discussing the issues.
- Developing the plan of action.
- Recording and closing the session.

Ideally, a counseling session results in a subordinate's commitment to a plan of action. Assessment of the plan of action (discussed below) becomes the starting point for follow-up counseling. (Figure C-7 is an example of a counseling session.)

Open the Session

C-68. In the session opening, state the purpose of the session and establish a subordinate-centered setting. Establish the preferred setting early in the session by inviting the subordinate to speak. The best way to open a counseling session is to clearly state its purpose. For example, an appropriate purpose statement might be: "The purpose of this counseling is to discuss your duty performance over the past month and to create a plan to enhance performance and attain performance goals." If

applicable, start the counseling session by reviewing the status of the previous plan of action.

C-69. You and the subordinate should attempt to develop a mutual understanding of the issues. You can best develop this by letting the subordinate do most of the talking. Use active listening; respond, and question without dominating the conversation. Aim to help the subordinate better understand the subject of the counseling, for example, duty performance, a problem situation and its impact, or potential areas for growth.

C-70. Both you and the subordinate should provide examples or cite specific observations to reduce the perception that either is unnecessarily biased or judgmental. However, when the issue is substandard performance, you should make clear how the performance didn't meet the standard. The conversation, which should be two-way, then addresses what the subordinate needs to do to meet the standard. It's important that you define the issue as substandard performance and don't allow the subordinate to define the issue as an unreasonable standard—unless you consider the standard negotiable or are willing to alter the conditions under which the subordinate must meet the standard.

Develop a Plan of Action

C-71. A plan of action identifies a method for achieving a desired result. It specifies what the subordinate must do to reach the goals set during the counseling session. The plan of action must be specific: it should show the subordinate how to modify or maintain his behavior. It should avoid vague intentions such as "Next month I want you to improve your land navigation skills." The plan must use concrete and direct terms. For example, you might say: "Next week you'll attend the map reading class with 1st Platoon. After the class, SGT Dixon will coach you through the land navigation course. He will help you develop your skill with the compass. I will observe you going through the course with SGT Dixon, and then I will talk to you again and determine where and if you still need additional training." A specific and achievable plan of action sets the stage for successful development.

Record and Close the Session

C-72. Although requirements to record counseling sessions vary, a leader always benefits by documenting the main points of a counseling session. Documentation serves as a reference to the agreed upon plan of action and the subordinate's accomplishments, improvements, personal preferences, or problems. A complete record of counseling aids in making recommendations for professional development, schools, promotions, and evaluation reports.

C-73. Additionally, Army regulations require written records of counseling for certain personnel actions, such as a barring a soldier from reenlisting, processing a soldier for administrative separation, or placing a soldier in the overweight program. When a

soldier faces involuntary separation, the leader must take special care to maintain accurate counseling records. Documentation of substandard actions conveys a strong corrective message to subordinates.

C-74. To close the session, summarize its key points and ask if the subordinate understands the plan of action. Invite the subordinate to review the plan of action and what's expected of you, the leader. With the subordinate, establish any follow-up measures necessary to support the successful implementation of the plan of action. These may include providing the subordinate with resources and time, periodically assessing the plan, and following through on referrals. Schedule any future meetings, at least tentatively, before dismissing the subordinate.

FOLLOW UP
Leader's Responsibilities

C-75. The counseling process doesn't end with the counseling session. It continues through implementation of the plan of action and evaluation of results. After counseling, you must support subordinates as they implement their plans of action. Support may include teaching, coaching, or providing time and resources. You must observe and assess this process and possibly modify the plan to meet its goals. Appropriate measures after counseling include follow-up counseling, making referrals, informing the chain of command, and taking corrective measures.

Assess the Plan of Action

C-76. The purpose of counseling is to develop subordinates who are better able to achieve personal, professional, and organizational goals. During the assessment, review the plan of action with the subordinate to determine if the desired results were achieved. You and the subordinate should determine the date for this assessment during the initial counseling session. The assessment of the plan of action provides useful information for future follow-up counseling sessions.

Open the Session

- Establish a relaxed environment. Explain to SFC Taylor that the more one discusses and understands Army values and leader attributes, skills, and actions, the easier it is to develop and incorporate them into an individual leadership style.
- State the purpose of the counseling session. Explain that the initial counseling is based on leader actions (what SFC Taylor needs to do to be a successful platoon sergeant) and not on professional developmental needs (what SFC Taylor needs to do to develop further as an NCO).
- Come to an agreement on the duty description, the meaning of each value and responsibility, and the standards for success and excellence for each value and responsibility. Explain that subsequent counseling will focus on SFC Taylor's

developmental needs as well as how well SFC Taylor is meeting the jointly agreed upon performance objectives. Instruct SFC Taylor to perform a self-assessment during the next quarter to identify his developmental needs.
- Ensure SFC Taylor knows the rating chain. Resolve any questions that SFC Taylor has about the job. Discuss the team relationship that exists between a platoon leader and a platoon sergeant and the importance of two-way communication between them.

Discuss the issue

- Jointly review the duty description on the NCOER, including the maintenance, training, and taking care of soldiers' responsibilities. Mention that the duty description can be revised as necessary. Highlight areas of special emphasis and appointed duties.
- Discuss the meaning of each value and responsibility on the NCOER. Discuss the values, attributes, skills, and actions outlined in FM 22-100. Ask open-ended questions to see if SFC Taylor can relate these items to his role as a platoon sergeant.
- Explain that even though the developmental tasks focus on developing leader actions, character development forms the basis for leadership development. Character and actions can't be viewed as separate; they're closely linked. In formulating the plan of action to accomplish major performance objectives, the proper values, attributes, and skills form the basis for the plan. As such, character development must be incorporated into the plan of action.

Assist in Developing a Plan of Action (During the Counseling Session)

- Ask SFC Taylor to identify actions that will facilitate the accomplishment of the major performance objectives. Categorize each action into one of the values or responsibilities listed on the NCOER.
- Discuss how each value and responsibility applies to the platoon sergeant position. Discuss specific examples of success and excellence in each value and responsibility block. Ask SFC Taylor for suggestions to make the goals more objective, specific, and measurable.
- Ensure that SFC Taylor has at least one example of a success or excellence bullet listed under each value and responsibility.
- Discuss SFC Taylor's promotion goals and ask him what he considers to be his strengths and weaknesses. Obtain copies of the last two master sergeant selection board results and match his goals and objectives to these.

Close the Session

- Check SFC Taylor's understanding of the duty description and performance objectives.
- Stress the importance of teamwork and two-way communication.
- Ensure SFC Taylor understands that you expect him to assist in your development as a platoon leader. This means that both of you have the role of teacher and coach.
- Remind SFC Taylor to perform a self-assessment during the next quarter.
- Set a tentative date during the next quarter for the routinely scheduled follow-up

counseling.

Notes on Strategy

- Facilitate answering any questions SFC Taylor may have.
- Expect SFC Taylor to be uncomfortable with the terms and the developmental process; respond in a way that encourages participation throughout the session.

Figure C-7. Example of a Counseling Session

SUMMARY

C-77. This appendix has discussed developmental counseling. Developmental counseling is subordinate-centered communication that outlines actions necessary for subordinates to achieve individual and organizational goals and objectives. It can be either event-oriented or focused on personal and professional development. Figure C-8 summarizes the major aspects of developmental counseling and the counseling process.

Leaders must demonstrate these qualities to counsel effectively:

- Respect for subordinates.
- Self and cultural awareness.
- Credibility.
- Empathy.

Leaders must possess these counseling skills:

- Active listening.
- Responding.
- Questioning.

Effective leaders avoid common counseling mistakes. Leaders should avoid the influence of—

- Personal bias.
- Rash judgments.
- Stereotyping.
- Losing emotional control.

The Counseling Process

1. **Identify the need for counseling.**

2. **Prepare for counseling.**

   - Select a suitable place.
   - Schedule the time.
   - Notify the subordinate well in advance.
   - Organize information.
   - Outline the components of the counseling session.
   - Plan counseling strategy.
   - Establish the right atmosphere.

3. **Conduct the counseling session.**

   - Open the session.
   - Discuss the issue.
   - Develop a plan of action (to include the leader's responsibilities).
   - Record and close the session.

• Inflexible counseling methods. • Improper follow-up.	4. **Follow up.** • Support plan of action implementation • Assess the plan of action.

Figure C-8. A Summary of Developmental Counseling

THE DEVELOPMENTAL COUNSELING FORM

C-78. The Developmental Counseling Form (DA Form 4856-E) is designed to help Army leaders conduct and record counseling sessions. Figure C-9 shows a completed DA Form 4856-E documenting the counseling of a young soldier with financial problems. While this is an example of a derogatory counseling, you can see that it is still developmental. Leaders must decide when counseling, additional training, rehabilitation, reassignment, or other developmental options have been exhausted. If the purpose of a counseling session is not developmental, refer to paragraphs C-36 and C-37. Figure C-10 shows a routine performance/professional growth counseling for a unit first sergeant. Figure C-11 shows a blank form with instructions on how to complete each block.

DEVELOPMENTAL COUNSELING FORM

For use of this form see FM 22-100

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: 5 USC 301, Departmental Regulations; 10 USC 3013, Secretary of the Army and E.O. 9397 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To assist leaders in conducting and recording counseling data pertaining to subordinates.
ROUTINE USES: For subordinate leader development IAW FM 22-100. Leaders should use this form as necessary.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure is voluntary.

PART I - ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Name (Last, First, MI)	Rank / Grade	Social Security No.	Date of Counseling
Lloyd, Andrew	*PFC*	*123-45-6789*	*28 March 1997*

Organization	Name and Title of Counselor
2nd Platoon, B Battery, 1 - 1 ADA Bn	*SGT Mark Levy, Squad Leader*

PART II - BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Purpose of Counseling: (Leader states the reason for the counseling, e.g. performance/professional or event-oriented counseling and includes the leader's facts and observations prior to the counseling):

The purpose of this counseling is to inform PFC Lloyd of his responsibility to manage his financial affairs and the potential consequences of poorly managing finances and to help PFC Lloyd develop a plan of action to resolve his financial problems.

Facts: The battery commander received notice of delinquent payment on PFC Lloyd's Deferred Payment Plan (DPP).

A payment of $86.00 is 45 days delinquent

PART III - SUMMARY OF COUNSELING
Complete this section during or immediately subsequent to counseling.

Key Points of Discussion:

PFC Lloyd, late payments on a DPP account reflect a lack of responsibility and poor managing of finances. You should know that the letter of lateness has been brought to the attention of the battery commander, the first sergeant, and the platoon sergeant. They're all questioning your ability to manage your personal affairs. I also remind you that promotions and awards are based more than on just performing MOS-related duties; soldiers must act professionally and responsibly in all areas. Per conversation with PFC Lloyd, the following information was obtained:

He didn't make the DPP payment due to a lack of funds in his checking account. His most recent long distance phone bill was over $220 due to calling his house concerning his grandmother's failing health. PFC Lloyd stated that he wanted to pay for the phone calls himself in order not to burden his parents with the expense of collect calls. He also stated that his calling had tapered down considerably and he expects this month's phone bill to be approximately $50. We made an appointment at ACS and ACS came up with the following information:

PFC Lloyd's monthly obligations: Car payment: $330
Car insurance: $138
Rent including utilities: $400
Other credit cards: $0
Total monthly obligations: $868.00
Monthly take-home pay: $1232.63

We discussed that with approximately $364 available for monthly living expenses, a phone bill in excess of $200 will severely affect PFC Lloyd's financial stability and can't continue. We discussed the need for PFC Lloyd to establish a savings account to help cover emergency expenses. PFC Lloyd agreed that his expensive phone bill and his inability to make the DPP payment is not responsible behavior. He confirmed that he wants to get his finances back on track and begin building a savings account.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS
This form will be destroyed upon: reassignment (other than rehabilitative transfers), separation at ETS, or retirement. For separation requirements and notification of loss of benefits/consequences, see local directives and AR 635-200.

DA FORM 4856-E, JUN 99 EDITION OF JUN 85 IS OBSOLETE

Figure C-9. Example of a Developmental Counseling Form—Event Counseling

Plan of Action: (Outlines actions that the subordinate will do after the counseling session to reach the agreed upon goals(s). The actions must be specific enough to modify or maintain the subordinate's behavior and include a specific time line for implementation and assessment (Part IV below)).

Based on our discussion, PFC Lloyd will be able to resume normal payment on his DPP account next month (assuming that his phone bill is approximately $50). PFC Lloyd agreed to contact the DPP office and provide a partial payment of $20 immediately. He agreed to exercise self-restraint and not make long distance calls as frequently. He decided that his goal is to make one ten-minute phone call every two weeks. He will write letters to express concern over his grandmother's condition and ask his parents to do the same to keep him informed. His long-term goal is to establish a savings account with a goal of contributing $50 a month.

PFC Lloyd also agreed to attend the check cashing class at ACS on 2, 9, and 16 April.

Assessment date: 27 June

Session Closing: (The leader summarizes the key points of the session and checks if the subordinate understands the plan of action. The subordinate agrees/disagrees and provides remarks if appropriate).

Individual counseled: I agree/~~disagree~~ with the information above

Individual counseled remarks:

Signature of Individual Counseled: *Andrew Lloyd* Date: *28 March 1997*

Leader Responsibilities: (Leader's responsibilities in implementing the plan of action).

PFC Lloyd will visit the DPP office to make an immediate partial payment of $20 and will give me a copy of the receipt as soon as the payment is made. PFC Lloyd will also provide me with a copy of the next month's phone bill and DPP payment receipt.
PFC Lloyd's finances will be a key topic of discussion at his next monthly counseling session.

Signature of Counselor: *Mark Levy* Date: *28 March 1997*

PART IV - ASSESSMENT OF THE PLAN OF ACTION

Assessment (Did the plan of action achieve the desired results? This section is completed by both the leader and the individual counseled and provides useful information for follow-up counseling):

Counselor: _____ Individual Counseled: _____ Date of Assessment: _____

Note: Both the counselor and the individual counseled should retain a record of the counseling.

DA FORM 4856-E (Reverse)

Figure C-9. Example of a Developmental Counseling Form—Event Counseling (Reverse)

DEVELOPMENTAL COUNSELING FORM

For use of this form see FM 22-100

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: 5 USC 301, Departmental Regulations; 10 USC 3013, Secretary of the Army and E.O. 9397 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To assist leaders in conducting and recording counseling data pertaining to subordinates.
ROUTINE USES: For subordinate leader development IAW FM 22-100. Leaders should use this form as necessary.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure is voluntary.

PART I - ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Name (Last, First, MI)	Rank / Grade	Social Security No.	Date of Counseling
McDonald, Stephen	*ISG*	*333-33-3333*	*13 March 1998*

Organization	Name and Title of Counselor
D Company, 3–95th IN	*CPT Peterson, Company Commander*

PART II - BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Purpose of Counseling: (Leader states the reason for the counseling, e.g. performance/professional or event-oriented counseling and includes the leader's facts and observations prior to the counseling):

- *To discuss duty performance for the period 19 Dec 97 to 11 March 1998.*
- *To discuss short-range professional growth goals/plan for next year.*
- *Talk about long-range professional growth (2-5 years) goals.*

PART III - SUMMARY OF COUNSELING
Complete this section during or immediately subsequent to counseling.

Key Points of Discussion:

- *Performance (sustain):*
- *Emphasized safety and knowledge of demolition, tactical proficiency on the Platoon Live Fire Exercises.*
- *Took charge of company defense during the last major field training exercise; outstanding integration and use of engineer, heavy weapons, and air defense artillery assets. Superb execution of defense preparations and execution.*
- *No dropped white cycle taskings.*
- *Good job coordinating with battalion adjutant on legal and personnel issues.*
- *Continue to take care of soldiers, keep the commander abreast of problems.*
- *Focused on subordinate NCO development; right man for the right job.*

Improve:

- *Get NCODPs on the calendar.*
- *Hold NCOs to standard on sergeants time training.*

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS
This form will be destroyed upon: reassignment (other than rehabilitative transfers), separation at ETS, or upon retirement. For separation requirements and notification of loss of benefits/consequences see local directives and AR 635-200.

DA FORM 4856-E, JUN 99 EDITION OF JUN 85 IS OBSOLETE

Figure C-10. Example of a Developmental Counseling Form—Performance/Professional Growth Counseling

Plan of Action: (Outlines actions that the subordinate will do after the counseling session to reach the agreed upon goals(s). The actions must be specific enough to modify or maintain the subordinate's behavior and include a specific time line for implementation and assessment (Part IV below)).

- *Developmental Plan (next year):*
- *Develop a yearlong plan for NCODPs; coordinate to place on the calendar and training schedules.*
- *Resume civilian education; correspondence courses.*
- *Develop a company soldier of the month competition.*
- *Assist the company XO in modularizing the supply room for quick, efficient load-outs.*
- *Put in place a program to develop Ranger School candidates.*

Long-range goals (2 to 5 years):

- *Earn bachelor's degree.*
- *Attend and graduate the Sergeant Majors Academy.*

Session Closing: (The leader summarizes the key points of the session and checks if the subordinate understands the plan of action. The subordinate agrees/disagrees and provides remarks if appropriate).

Individual counseled: I agree/~~disagree~~ with the information above

Individual counseled remarks:

Signature of Individual Counseled: 1SG McDonald Date: *13 March 1998*

Leader Responsibilities: (Leader's responsibilities in implementing the plan of action).

- *Coordinate with the 1SG on scheduling of NCODPs and soldier of the month boards.*
- *Have the XO meet with the 1SG on developing a plan for modularizing and improving the supply room.*
- *Provide time for Ranger candidate program.*

Signature of Counselor: *Mark Levy* Date: *28 March 1997*

PART IV - ASSESSMENT OF THE PLAN OF ACTION

Assessment (Did the plan of action achieve the desired results? This section is completed by both the leader and the individual counseled and provides useful information for follow-up counseling):

1SG McDonald has enrolled in an associates degree program at the University of Kentucky. The supply room received all green evaluations during the last command inspection. Five of seven Ranger applicants successfully completed Ranger School, exceeding the overall course completion rate of 39%. Monthly soldier of the month boards proved to be impractical because of the OPTEMPO; however, the company does now hold quarterly boards during the white cycle. Brigade command sergeant major commented favorably on the last company NCODP he attended and gave the instructor a brigade coin.

Counselor: *CPT Peterson* Individual Counseled: *1SG McDonald* Date of Assessment: *1 Aug 98*

Note: Both the counselor and the individual counseled should retain a record of the counseling.

DA FORM 4856-E (Reverse)

Figure C-10. Example of a Developmental Counseling Form—

Performance/Professional Growth Counseling (Reverse)

DEVELOPMENTAL COUNSELING FORM

For use of this form see FM 22-100

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: 5 USC 301, Departmental Regulations; 10 USC 3013, Secretary of the Army and E.O. 9397 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To assist leaders in conducting and recording counseling data pertaining to subordinates.
ROUTINE USES: For subordinate leader development IAW FM 22-100. Leaders should use this form as necessary.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure is voluntary.

PART I - ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Name (Last, First, MI)	Rank / Grade	Social Security No.	Date of Counseling
Organization		Name and Title of Counselor	

PART II - BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Purpose of Counseling: (Leader states the reason for the counseling, e.g. performance/professional or event-oriented counseling and includes the leader's facts and observations prior to the counseling):

See paragraph C-68, Open the Session

The leader should annotate pertinent, specific, and objective facts and observations made. If applicable, the leader and subordinate start the counseling session by reviewing the status of the previous plan of action.

PART III - SUMMARY OF COUNSELING
Complete this section during or immediately subsequent to counseling.

Key Points of Discussion:

See paragraphs C-69 and C-70, Discuss the Issues.

The leader and subordinate should attempt to develop a mutual understanding of the issues. Both the leader and the subordinate should provide examples or cite specific observations to reduce the perception that either is unnecessarily biased or judgmental.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS

This form will be destroyed upon: reassignment (other than rehabilitative transfers), separation at ETS, or upon retirement. For separation requirements and notification of loss of benefits/consequences see local directives and AR 635-200.

DA FORM 4856-E, JUN 99 EDITION OF JUN 85 IS OBSOLETE

Figure C-11. Guidelines on Completing a Developmental Counseling Form

Plan of Action: (Outlines actions that the subordinate will do after the counseling session to reach the agreed upon goals(s). The actions must be specific enough to modify or maintain the subordinate's behavior and include a specific time line for implementation and assessment (Part IV below)).

See paragraph C-71, Develop a Plan of Action

The plan of action specifies what the subordinate must do to reach the goals set during the counseling session. The plan of action must be specific and should contain the outline, guideline(s), and time line that the subordinate follows. A specific and achievable plan of action sets the stage for successful subordinate development.

Remember, event-oriented counseling with corrective training as part of the plan of action can't be tied to a specified time frame. Corrective training is complete once the subordinate attains the standard.

Session Closing: (The leader summarizes the key points of the session and checks if the subordinate understands the plan of action. The subordinate agrees/disagrees and provides remarks if appropriate).

Individual counseled: I agree/ disagree with the information above

Individual counseled remarks:

See paragraph C-72 through C-74, Close the Session

Signature of Individual Counseled:_____ Date: _____

Leader Responsibilities: (Leader's responsibilities in implementing the plan of action).

See paragraph C76, Leader's Responsibilities

To accomplish the plan of action, the leader must list the resources necessary and commit to providing them to the soldier.

Signature of Counselor: _____ Date:_____

PART IV - ASSESSMENT OF THE PLAN OF ACTION

Assessment (Did the plan of action achieve the desired results? This section is completed by both the leader and the individual counseled and provides useful information for follow-up counseling):

The assessment of the plan of action provides useful information for future follow-up counseling. This block should be completed prior to the start of a follow-up counseling session. During an event-oriented counseling session, the counseling session is not complete until this block is completed.

During performance/professional growth counseling, this block serves as the starting point for future counseling sessions. Leaders must remember to conduct this assessment based on resolution of the situation or the established time line discussed in the plan of action block above.

Counselor:_____ Individual Counseled:_____ Date of Assessment: _____

Note: Both the counselor and the individual counseled should retain a record of the counseling.

DA FORM 4856-E (Reverse)

Figure C-11. Guidelines on Completing a Developmental Counseling Form (Reverse)

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Appendix D

A Leader Plan of Action and the ECAS

D-1. By completing a set of tasks (shown in Figure D-1), leaders can improve, sustain, or reinforce a standard of performance within their organizations. Leaders may complete some or all of the sub-tasks shown in Figure D-1, depending on the situation.

D-2. A leader plan of action (developed in step 3) identifies specific leader actions necessary to achieve improvement. It is similar to the individual plan of action that Appendix C discusses.

Figure D-1. The Leader Plan of Action Development Process

D-3. Begin your plan of action by assessing your unit (Step 1). Observe, interact, and gather feedback from others; or conduct formal assessments of the workplace. Then analyze the information you gathered to identify what needs improvement (Step 2). Once you have identified what needs improvement, begin to develop courses of action to make the improvements.

D-4. In Step 3, you develop your plan of action. First, develop and consider several possible courses of action to correct the weaknesses you identified. Gather important information, assess the limitations and risks associated with the various courses,

identify available key personnel and resources, and verify facts and assumptions. Attempt to predict the outcome for each possible course of action. Based on your predictions, select several leader actions to deal with the problems.

D-5. Execute your plan of action (Step 4) by educating, training, or counseling your subordinates; instituting new policies or procedures; and revising or enforcing proper systems of rewards and punishment. Your organization moves towards excellence by improving substandard or weak areas and maintaining conditions that meet or exceed the standard. Finally, periodically reassesses your unit to identify new matters of concern or to evaluate the effectiveness of the leader actions.

D-6. You can use this process for many areas of interest within your organization. A case study demonstrating how to use an ECAS to prepare a leader plan of action follows. It includes a description of how one leader gathered information to complete the survey. (You can obtain the form used to conduct an ECAS through Training Support Centers by ordering GTA 22-6-1.)

PREPARATION OF AN ECAS

D-7. 2LT Christina Ortega has been a military police platoon leader for almost eight months. When she first came to the platoon, it was a well-trained, cohesive group. Within two months of her taking charge, she and her platoon deployed on a six-month rotation to support operations in Bosnia. The unit performed well, and she quickly earned a reputation as a leader with high standards for herself and her unit. Now redeployed, she must have her platoon ready in two months for a rotation at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). She realizes that within that time she must get the unit’s equipment ready for deployment, train her soldiers on different missions they will encounter at the CMTC, and provide them some much needed and deserved time off.

D-8. As 2LT Ortega reflects on her first eight months of leadership, she remembers how she took charge of the platoon. She spoke individually with the leaders in the platoon about her expectations and gathered information about her subordinates. She stayed up all night completing the leadership philosophy memorandum that she gave to every member of her platoon. After getting her feet on the ground and getting to know her soldiers, she assessed the platoon’s ethical climate using the ECAS. Her unit’s overall ECAS score was very good. She committed herself to maintaining that positive ethical climate by continuing the established policies and by monitoring the climate periodically.

D-9. Having completed a major deployment and received a recent influx of some new soldiers, 2LT Ortega decides to complete another ECAS. She heads to the unit motor pool to observe her soldiers preparing for the next day’s training exercise. The platoon is deploying to the local training area for the "best squad" competition prior to the ARTEP evaluation at the CMTC. "The best squad competition has really become a big

deal in the company," she thinks. "Squad rivalry is fierce, and the squad leaders seem to be looking for an edge so they can come out on top and win the weekend pass that goes to the winning squad."

D-10. She talks to as many of her soldiers as she can, paying particular attention to the newest members of the unit. One new soldier, a vehicle driver for SSG Smith, the 2nd Squad Leader, appears very nervous and anxious. During her conversation with the soldier, 2LT Ortega discovers some disturbing information.

D-11. The new soldier, PFC O'Brien, worries about his vehicle's maintenance and readiness for the next day. His squad leader has told him to "get the parts no matter what." PFC O'Brien says that he admires SSG Smith because he realizes that SSG Smith just wants to perform well and keep up the high standards of his previous driver. He recounts that SSG Smith has vowed to win the next day's land navigation competition. "SSG Smith even went so far as to say that he knows we'll win because he already knows the location of the points for the course. He saw them on the XO's desk last night and wrote them on his map."

D-12. 2LT Ortega thanks the soldier for talking honestly with her and immediately sets him straight on the proper and improper way to get repair parts. By the time she leaves, PFC O'Brien knows that 2LT Ortega has high standards and will not tolerate improper means of meeting them. Meanwhile, 2LT Ortega heads back toward the company headquarters to find the XO.

D-13. She finds the XO busily scribbling numbers and dates on pieces of paper. He is obviously involved and frantic. He looks up at her and manages a quick "Hi, Christina," before returning to his task. The battalion XO apparently did not like the way the unit status report (USR) portrayed the status of the maintenance in the battalion and refused to send that report forward. Not completely familiar with the USR, 2LT Ortega goes to the battalion motor officer to get some more information. After talking to a few more people in her platoon, 2LT Ortega completes the ECAS shown in Figure D-2.


CTA 22-6-1
ETHICAL CLIMATE
Ethical Climate Assessment Survey
An ethical climate is one in which our stated Army values are routinely articulated, supported, practiced and respected. The Ethical Climate of an organization is determined by a variety of factors, including the individual character of unit members, the policies and practices within the organization, the actions of unit leaders and environmental and external factors. Leaders should periodically assess their unit's ethical climate and take appropriate actions to maintain the high ethical standards expected of all Army organizations. This survey will assist you in making these assessments and in identifying the actions necessary to accomplish this vital leader function. FM 22-100, Army Leadership, provides specific leader actions necessary to sustain or improve your ethical climate, as necessary.
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION STATEMENT:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
References: FM 22-100
DISTRIBUTION: U.S. Army Training Support Centers (TSCs)
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OCTOBER 1997
INSTRUCTIONS
Answer the questions in this survey according to how you currently perceive your unit and your own leadership climate, NOT according to how you would prefer things to be or how you think they should be. This information is for your use (not your chain of command's) to determine if you need to take action to improve the Ethical Climate in your organization. Use the following scale for all questions in Sections I and III.
I. Individual Character - "Who are we?"
II. Unit Workplace Policies & Practices - "What do we do?"
III. Unit Leader Actions - "What I do?"
IV. Environmental/Mission Factors - "What surrounds us?"
ECAS Total Score (I + II + III + IV) 85

Figure D-2. Example of an Ethical Climate Assessment Survey

PREPARATION OF A LEADER PLAN OF ACTION

D-14. 2LT Ortega looks at her ECAS score and determines that she needs to take action to improve the ethical climate in her platoon. To help determine where she should begin, 2LT Ortega looks at the scores for each question. She knows that any question receiving a "1" or "2" must be addressed immediately in her plan of action. As 2LT Ortega reviews the rest of the scores for her unit, she identifies additional problems to correct. Furthermore, she decides to look at a few actions in which her unit excels and to describe ways to sustain the performance. As she continues to develop the leader plan of action, she looks at each subject she has identified. She next develops the plan shown in Figure D-3 to correct the deficiencies. At the bottom of the form, she lists at least two actions she plans to take to maintain the positive aspects of her platoon's ethical climate.

D-15. 2LT Ortega has already completed the first three steps (assess, analyze, and develop a plan of action) specified in Figure D-1. When she takes action to implement the plan she will have completed the process. She must then follow up to ensure her actions have the effects she intended.

Actions to *correct* negative aspects of the ethical climate in the organization

Problem: Dysfunctional competition/stress in the unit (the competition is causing some members of the unit to seek ways to gain an unfair advantage over others) [ECAS question # II. C., IV.A. & IV.C.]

Action:

- Postpone the platoon competition; focus on the readiness of equipment and soldier preparation rather than competition.
- Build some time in the long-range calendar to allow soldiers time to get away from work and relax.
- Focus on the group's accomplishment of the mission (unit excellence). Reward the platoon, not squads, for excellent performance. Reward teamwork.

Problem: Battalion XO "ordering" the changing of reports [IV B., D. & F.]

Action:

- Go see the company XO first and discuss what he should do.
- If the XO won't deal with it, see the commander myself to raise the issue.

Problem: Squad leader's unethical behavior [I.B. & II.A.]

Action:

- Reprimand the squad leader for getting the land navigation points unfairly.
- Counsel the squad leader on appropriate ways to give instructions and accomplish the mission without compromising values.

Problem: Unclear instructions given by the squad leader ("get the parts no matter what") [II.A.]

Action:

- Have the platoon sergeant give a class (NCODP) on proper guidelines for giving instructions and appropriate ethical considerations when asking subordinates to complete a task.
- Have the platoon sergeant counsel the squad leader(s) on the importance of using proper supply procedures.

Problem: Company XO "changing report" to meet battalion XO's needs [IV.B. & F.]

Action:

- Have an informal discussion with the company XO about correct reporting or see the company commander to raise the issue about the battalion XO.

Actions to *maintain* positive aspects of the ethical climate in the organization

Maintain: Continue to hold feedback (sensing) sessions and conduct ECAS assessments to maintain a feel for how the platoon is accomplishing its mission. [II.D. & G.; III.A. & B.]

Maintain: Continue to reward people who perform to high standards without compromising values. Punish those caught compromising them. [III.E. & F.]

Figure D-3. Example of an Ethical Climate Assessment Survey

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Appendix E

Character Development

E-1. Everyone who becomes part of America's Army, soldier or DA civilian, has character. On the day a person joins the Army, leaders begin building on that character. Army values emphasize the relationship between character and competence. Although competence is a fundamental attribute of Army leaders, character is even more critical. This appendix discusses the actions Army leaders take to develop their subordinates' character.

E-2. Army leaders are responsible for refining the character of soldiers and DA civilians. How does the Army as an institution ensure proper character development? What should leaders do to inculcate Army values in their subordinates?

E-3. Leaders teach Army values to every new member of the Army. Together with the leader attributes described in Chapter 2, Army values establish the foundation of leaders of character. Once members learn these values, their leaders ensure adherence. Adhering to the principles Army values embody is essential, for the Army cannot tolerate unethical behavior. Unethical behavior destroys morale and cohesion; it undermines the trust and confidence essential to teamwork and mission accomplishment.

E-4. Ethical conduct must reflect beliefs and convictions, not just fear of punishment. Over time, soldiers and DA civilians adhere to Army values because they want to live ethically and profess the values because they know it's right to do so. Once people believe and demonstrate Army values, they are persons of character. Ultimately, Army leaders are charged with the with the essential role of developing character in others. Figure E-1 shows the leader actions that support character development.



Figure E-1. Character Development

LEADERS TEACH VALUES; SUBORDINATES LEARN THE CULTURE

E-5. Army leaders must teach their subordinates moral principles, ethical theory, Army values, and leadership attributes. Through their leaders' programs, soldiers and DA civilians develop character through education, experience, and reflection. By educating their subordinates and setting the example, Army leaders enable their subordinates to make ethical decisions that in turn contribute to excellence. Subordinates gain deeper understanding from experiencing, observing, and reflecting on the aspects of Army leadership under the guidance of their leaders.

E-6. Inculcating Army values doesn't end with basic training. All Army leaders should seek to deepen subordinates' understanding of the ethical aspects of character through classes, informal discussions, one-on-one coaching, and formal developmental counseling. Army leaders can also improve their own understanding through study, reflection, and discussions with peers and superiors.

LEADERS REINFORCE VALUES; SUBORDINATES COMPLY

E-7. Leaders reinforce and discipline behavior to guide subordinates' development. To help subordinates live according to Army values, leaders enforce rules, policies, and regulations. Still, soldiers and DA civilians of character do more than merely comply with established institutional rules. Acting correctly but without complete understanding or sound motivation is not good enough in America's values-based Army. People of character behave correctly through correct understanding and personal desire. Understanding comes from training and self-development. Personal desire comes from a person's realization that Army values are worth adopting and living by and from that person's decision to do just that.

E-8. Character stems from a thorough understanding of Army values; however, this understanding must go beyond knowing the one-line definitions. Individuals must also know why Army values are important and how to apply them to everyday Army life. Leaders can promote Army values by setting the example themselves and pointing out other examples of Army values in both normal and exceptional activities. Army leaders can use unit histories and traditions, prominent individuals, and recent events to bring Army values to life and explain why adhering to them is important.

LEADERS SHAPE THE ETHICAL CLIMATE; SUBORDINATES INTERNALIZE ARMY VALUES

E-9. Doing the right thing is good. Doing the right thing for the right reason and with the right intention is better. People of character must possess the desire to act ethically in all situations. One of the Army leader's primary responsibilities is to maintain an ethical climate that supports development of such a character. When an organization's ethical climate nurtures ethical behavior, over time, people think, feel, and act ethically —they internalize the aspects of sound character.

E-10. Leaders should influence others' character development and foster correct actions through role modeling, teaching, and coaching. Army leaders seek to build a climate in which subordinates and organizations can reach their full potential. Together, these actions promote organizational excellence.

E-11. Army leaders can use the ECAS to assess ethical aspects of their own character and actions, the workplace, and the external environment. Once they have done their assessment, leaders prepare and carry out a plan of action. The plan of action focuses on solving ethical problems within the leaders' span of influence; leaders pass ethical problems they cannot change to higher headquarters.

E-12. Becoming a person of character and a leader of character is a career-long process involving both self-development and developmental counseling. While individuals are responsible for their own character development, leaders are responsible for encouraging, supporting, and assessing the efforts of their subordinates. Leaders of character can develop only through continual study, reflection, experience, and feedback.

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Appendix F

The Constitution of the United States

As a member of the Army, you have taken an oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic [and to] bear true faith and allegiance to the same." But what is this document that you have sworn to protect? In essence, the Constitution is a blueprint establishing the powers and responsibilities of the three branches of the United States government as well as the rights of American citizens. Especially important for the Army are those provisions in the Constitution that place fundamental military authority in Congress and the president. As part of that authority, Congress has the power to "provide for the common Defense," which includes the power to "raise and support Armies," and the president is the commander in chief of the armed forces. So the Constitution establishes the critical principle that America's military leaders are subordinate to the nation's civilian authorities. Given the importance of that concept to our system of government, this appendix contains a copy of the US Constitution. As you read it, you will see that, although the Constitution was written over 200 years ago, it remains relevant today for Army leaders and all Americans.

THE PREAMBLE

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

THE CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE I

Section 1

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Section 2

The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Section 3

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall choose their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States

is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

Section 4

The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.

Section 5

Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Section 6

The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and

returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

Section 7

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

Section 8

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marquee and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature

of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Section 9

The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

Section 10

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marquee and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

ARTICLE II
Section 1

The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner choose the President. But in choosing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall choose from them by Ballot the Vice President.

The Congress may determine the Time of choosing the Electors, and the Day on which

they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Section 2

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Section 3

He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Section 4

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

ARTICLE III
Section 1

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the Supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Section 2

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States, —between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

Section 3

Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

ARTICLE IV
Section 1

Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

Section 2

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

Section 3

New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the

Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

Section 4

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

ARTICLE V

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

ARTICLE VI

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial

Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as

a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

ARTICLE VII

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.

Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth. In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names,

G. WASHINGTON—President. And deputy from Virginia

Delaware

Geo: Read
Gunning Bedford jun
John Dickinson
Richard Bassett
Jaco: Broom

South Carolina

J. Rutledge
Charles Cotesworth

Pinckney

Charles Pinckney
Pierce Butler

Georgia

William Few
Abr Baldwin

New Hampshire

John Langdon
Nicholas

Maryland

James McHenry
Dan of St Thos.
Jenifer
Danl Carroll.

Virginia

John Blair—
James Madison Jr.

New York

Alexander Hamilton

New Jersey

Wil: Livingston
David Brearley
Wm. Paterson
Jona: Dayton

Pennsylvania

B Franklin
Thomas Mifflin
Robt Morris

North Carolina

Wm. Blount
Richd. Dobbs
Spaight
Hu Williamson

Massachusetts Nathaniel Gorham Rufus King **Connecticut** Wm: Saml. Johnson Roger Sherman	Geo. Clymer Thos. FitzSimons Jared Ingersoll James Wilson Gouv Morris **Attest** William Jackson Secretary	

THE PREAMBLE TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Congress of the United States begun and held at the City of New York, on Wednesday the fourth of March, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-nine.

The Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their adopting the Constitution expressed a desire in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government will best ensure the beneficent ends of its institution.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, two thirds of both Houses concurring that the following Articles be proposed to the Legislatures of the several states as Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, all or any of which articles, when ratified by three fourths of the said Legislatures to be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the said Constitution.

Articles in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, proposed by Congress and Ratified by the Legislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the original Constitution.

THE BILL OF RIGHTS

AMENDMENT I

> Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

AMENDMENT II

A well-regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

AMENDMENT III

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

AMENDMENT IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

AMENDMENT V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

AMENDMENT VII

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

AMENDMENT IX

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

AMENDMENT X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

AMENDMENTS 11 THROUGH 27

AMENDMENT XI

Passed by Congress March 4, 1794. Ratified February 7, 1795.

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

Note: *Article III, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by amendment 11.*

AMENDMENT XII

Passed by Congress December 9, 1803. Ratified June 15, 1804.

The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be

taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. [And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.]* The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

** Superseded by section 3 of the 20th amendment.*

Note: *A portion of Article II, section 1 of the Constitution was superseded by the 12th amendment.*

AMENDMENT XIII

Passed by Congress January 31, 1865. Ratified December 6, 1865.

Section 1

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Note: *A portion of Article IV, section 2, of the Constitution was superseded by the 13th amendment.*

AMENDMENT XIV

Passed by Congress June 13, 1866. Ratified July 9, 1868.

Section 1

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,* and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4

The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5

The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

** Changed by section 1 of the 26th amendment.*

Note: *Article I, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by section 2 of the 14th amendment.*

AMENDMENT XV

Passed by Congress February 26, 1869. Ratified February 3, 1870.

Section 1

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Section 2

The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XVI

Passed by Congress July 2, 1909. Ratified February 3, 1913.

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

Note: *Article I, section 9, of the Constitution was modified by amendment 16.*

AMENDMENT XVII

Passed by Congress May 13, 1912. Ratified April 8, 1913.

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualification requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.

This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

Note: *Article I, section 3, of the Constitution was modified by the 17th amendment.*

AMENDMENT XVIII

Passed by Congress December 18, 1917. Ratified January 16, 1919. Repealed by amendment 21.

Section 1

After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

Section 2

The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Section 3

This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

AMENDMENT XIX

Passed by Congress June 4, 1919. Ratified August 18, 1920.

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XX

Passed by Congress March 2, 1932. Ratified January 23, 1933.

Section 1

The terms of the President and the Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.

Section 2

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

Section 3

If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.

Section 4

The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.

Section 5

Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article.

Section 6

This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.

Note: *Article I, section 4, of the Constitution was modified by section 2 of this amendment. In addition, a portion of the 12th amendment was superseded by section 3.*

AMENDMENT XXI

Passed by Congress February 20, 1933. Ratified December 5, 1933.

Section 1

The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.

Section 2

The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

Section 3

This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

AMENDMENT XXII

Passed by Congress March 21, 1947. Ratified February 27, 1951.

Section 1

No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.

Section 2

This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven

years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.

AMENDMENT XXIII

Passed by Congress June 16, 1960. Ratified March 29, 1961.

Section 1

The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as Congress may direct:

A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.

Section 2

The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XXIV

Passed by Congress August 27, 1962. Ratified January 23, 1964.

Section 1

The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay poll tax or other tax.

Section 2

The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XXV

Passed by Congress July 6, 1965. Ratified February 10, 1967.

Section 1

In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice-President shall become President.

Section 2

Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

Section 3

Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

Section 4

Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

Note: *Article II, section 1, of the Constitution was affected by the 25th amendment.*

AMENDMENT XXVI

Passed by Congress March 23, 1971. Ratified July 1, 1971.

Section 1

The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.

Section 2

The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Note: *Amendment 14, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by section 1 of the 26th amendment.*

AMENDMENT XXVII

Originally proposed Sept. 25, 1789. Ratified May 7, 1992.

No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of representatives shall have intervened.

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and abbreviations used in this manual. AR 310-25, JP 1-02, and FM 101-5-1 define most standard Army and joint terms. AR 310-50 lists authorized abbreviations and brevity codes.

1LT	first lieutenant
2LT	second lieutenant
.50 cal	machine gun, caliber 50
5 USC	Title 5, United States Code
10 USC	Title 10, United States Code
AAR	after-action review
ACS	Army Community Service
ADM	admiral
AO	area of operations
APFT	Army Physical Fitness Test
BOSS	Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers
CCIR	commander’s critical information requirements
CINC	commander in chief of a combatant command
CMTC	Combat Maneuver Training Center

COL	colonel
comp.	compiler
CPL	corporal
CPT	captain
CSM	command sergeant major
CTC	combat training center
CW2	chief warrant officer, W-2
DA	Department of the Army
DA civilian	a civilian employee of the Department of the Army
DA Pam	Department of the Army Pamphlet
DCPDS	Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (the automated personnel system used to manage DA and DOD civilians)
D-Day	6 June 1944, the date of the Allied invasion of Normandy, France, during World War II
D-day	the execution date of any military operation
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTLMS	doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers
DPP	deferred payment plan
ECAS	ethical climate assessment survey
ed.	editor, edition
EFMB	Expert Field Medical Badge
EO	equal opportunity

ETO	European Theater of Operations (used during World War II)
EUCOM	United States European Command
FM	field manual
GA	General of the Army
GEN	general
GI	general issue (refers to equipment; sometimes used during World War II to refer to soldiers)
GTA	graphic training aid
HQ	headquarters
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
Humvee	phonetic spelling of the acronym HMMWV, high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle
IFOR	the NATO Implementation Force sent to Bosnia to implement the 1995 Dayton peace accords
IPR	in-process review
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP	Joint Publication
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JTF	joint task force
LDRSHIP	an aid for remembering Army values (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, personal courage)
LTC	lieutenant colonel
LTG	lieutenant general

MAJ	major
MDMP	military decision-making process
METL	mission essential task list
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, civil considerations (in tactics, the major factors considered during mission analysis)
MOS	military occupational specialty
MOUT	military operations on urbanized terrain
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NCODP	noncommissioned officer development program (used to designate either a unit program or training conducted as part of that program)
NCOER	noncommissioned officer evaluation report
NCOERS	Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Reporting System
OCOKA	observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (in tactics, the military aspects of terrain considered during a mission analysis)
OER	officer evaluation report
OERS	Officer Evaluation Reporting System
OPTEMPO	operational tempo
PMCS	preventive maintenance checks and services
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
PT	physical training
PVT	private

PW	prisoner of war
PX	post exchange
QM	quartermaster
R&R	rest and recuperation
ROE	rules of engagement
RPG	rocket propelled grenade (a man-portable, single-shot, antitank rocket)
SFC	sergeant first class
SGT	sergeant
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (the highest Allied headquarters in the ETO during World War II)
SIDPERS	Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
SJA	staff judge advocate
SOP	standing operating procedures
SSG	staff sergeant
TAPES	Total Army Performance Evaluation System (the system used to evaluate DA civilians' performance)
TLP	troop leading procedures
TOC	tactical operations center
TOW	tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (refers to the Army's heavy, antitank missile system)
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UN	United Nations

US	United States
USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
USC	United States Code
USR	unit status report (also called the "2715 report"; a report of unit personnel, equipment, training and overall readiness submitted monthly by active component units and quarterly by reserve component units)
vols.	volumes
WAAC	Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps
WO1	warrant officer
XO	Executive Officer

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The Army uses the World Wide Web to disseminate information. All major commands and schools maintain web pages. Since uniform resource locators (URLs) change from time to time, this bibliography does not list any. If you do not know the URL for an organization's web page, you can usually find it by accessing the page for the major command or installation the organization belongs to and looking for a link to the organization's page. The Center for Army Leadership maintains a page under the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command home page contains a link to Fort Leavenworth's home page. The library or learning center at your installation will provide you with free Internet access for official business. In addition, DA Pam 25-30 (available on CD-ROM) lists all Army publications and blank forms. Use it to find Army publications related to specific topics. The US Army Publishing Agency (USAPA) home page has a link to an online extract of DA Pam 25-30 which can link you to full-text copies of selected publications.

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NIGHT COMBAT



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FOREWORD

The material for this study was prepared for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by a group of former German generals and general staff officers. The principal author, former Brig. Gen. Alfred Toppe, and most of his associates served for extended periods on the Russian Front during World War II. Moreover, most of them held assignments involving troop training.

The reader is reminded that publications in the GERMAN REPORT SERIES were written by Germans from the German point of view, and that the procedures, tables of organization and equipment, combat doctrine, and staff methods of the German Army differed widely from those of the U.S. Army. It is interesting to note, however, that, in conformity with the German recommendations made in this study, our own programs are placing increasing emphasis on night combat training.

Final editing of this study was done in the Foreign Studies Branch, Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History. The draft translation of the original German text was first revised and then reorganized in the interest of brevity, clarity, and pertinence. In this process every effort was made to retain the point of view, the expressions, and even the prejudices of the authors.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The reader of the prewar German Army operations manual, upon reaching the chapter heading "Night Combat," found that the subject was covered very succinctly and somewhat superficially. The contents failed to reveal the tremendous importance that night combat and night movements were to assume in modern warfare.

During two world wars, night and other periods of poor visibility, such as fog and snowstorms or rainstorms, gradually came to be considered the ideal time for action. Interference from the air reduced fighting and paralyzed movements in daylight hours, with the result that the space between the front and the most remote corner of the rear areas was often empty and deserted. During the hours of darkness combat and movements resumed with new intensity. After a while the German soldier considered this mole-like existence as normal, but the conclusions that should have been drawn from these undeniable facts in setting up training schedules were completely inadequate.

In Russia more and more actions occurred at night. Once this was widely recognized during the later years of the war, much of the individual and unit training took place during darkness and other periods of poor visibility.

The farther the recruit is removed from nature, the more night training he must get. Once a soldier has learned how to move and fight at night, he will be all the more effective in daytime when good visibility facilitates his tasks.

The purpose of movements in darkness or obscurity is to conceal preparations and thereby achieve maximum surprise and effect. Another important consideration is that night combat keeps the casualty rate at a minimum. Both elements apply to any operation from the time of assembly until its conclusion, whether it is a small unit action or a strategic envelopment.

Movement and combat at night are inexpedient when a certain minimum amount of orientation is impossible because terrain conditions and the enemy situation are too uncertain, or when the moon or enemy action create conditions resembling daylight.

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Bright nights make it easier to conduct night operations, but they give the enemy more opportunity to

observe and interfere.

To overcome these difficulties, units accustomed to night fighting learned to apply certain practical lessons. Night movement and night combat require the most exacting preparation by officers and men, including detailed map and terrain study. Even for well-trained troops, poor visibility will cause delays that may result in a lowering of the over-all march performance or may involve loss of initiative and freedom of action. The larger the units, the greater the difficulties that will inevitably arise.

Careless night movement along roads and on the battlefield enables the enemy to take effective countermeasures. Depending on the enemy's potential and the ability of his leaders, the advantages friendly forces derive from operating in darkness may not only be cancelled out, the execution of the entire operation plan may be jeopardized by a complete stoppage of every movement, by a disruption of the chain of command, and by panic.

Before any night operation the responsible commanders must familiarize themselves with the theater of operations, become thoroughly acquainted with the enemy's matériel and his methods of employing them, and observe carefully his tactics in different situations. Possessing this knowledge, a field commander will be able to decide whether the principles of night combat should be applied rigidly or whether there may be some relaxation.

Under conditions as they exist in central and eastern Europe, troops must be capable of carrying out night marches in such a manner that their performance will not be greatly affected by observation and interference from the air. Once under way, movements in the combat zone must be completed according to schedule, even in the face of surprise enemy action. This may be achieved by breaking down units into small components, by camouflaging them, and by applying other protective measures.

The intended operations must achieve surprise, so that the enemy is not prepared f or counteraction. However, it must be assumed that during large-scale operations only the preparations and the initial engagements will take place under cover of darkness. To bring the fighting to a successful conclusion will require efficient interunit communication, a clear view of the situation and the terrain, and the exercise of firm leadership—demands that can be met only in daylight.

Night operations require the closest contact among ground units and among all components of services operating in a given theater.

Bombing and strafing missions against movements behind the enemy front may save lives and decide battles; the same thing is

true of day and night attacks on enemy aircraft and airfields, which facilitate movements behind one's own front and, in some instances, constitute a prerequisite for the execution of such movements without

severe casualties.

Night marches and night combat make greater demands on the troops than similar daytime operations. The responsible commanders must bear this in mind if reverses are to be avoided. Therefore, there must be some nights during which the troops may rest, because even relatively quiet sleep in daytime cannot replace rest at night. Through the use of excellent staff work and troop, discipline the number of full night rests can be reduced to a minimum, but they cannot be eliminated entirely.

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CHAPTER 2
PRINCIPLES OF NIGHT COMBAT

I. General

Night operations call for disciplined, cool, self-reliant troops. The mental strain involved in night combat is severe; it is easier to endure in periods of activity than during long spells of inactivity. This is why at night—even more so than by day—he who takes the initiative has the advantage. However, since orientation and co-ordination will become increasingly difficult, this initial advantage diminishes as the attack progresses.

Darkness is helpful in achieving surprise, and the attacker will derive additional advantages from the defender's inability to aim his fire effectively. To maintain control and intraunit contact and communication is difficult during the hours of darkness, and unit commanders must therefore prepare every detail of the operation plan with meticulous care. Any contingency, however farfetched, must be taken into consideration. Success of a night attack also depends on the resourcefulness and initiative of subordinate leaders and their ability to make independent decisions in line with the over-all plan. Furthermore, since frequent and accurate reporting is of great importance, the existence of a smoothly operating communication system is essential.

Every possible method of deception, camouflage, and concealment must be employed in night operations.

II. Physical and Psychological Factors

The effect of events taking place at night increases or decreases in proportion to the degree of darkness. Operations taking place during moonlight and starlit nights, especially across snow-covered terrain, may approximate daytime conditions. Very hazy, rainy, foggy, or overcast weather calls for reliance on the auditory rather than on the visual sense and makes increased demands upon physical stamina and mental balance.

The reaction pattern to night operations is not uniform. In general, men originating from rural areas adjust quickly and easily, whereas former city dwellers take a long time and encounter many difficulties in getting used to the peculiarities of night conditions. Darkness acts as a strong stimulus to the imagination and thus burdens the nervous system; a feeling of insecurity, which might eventually lead to panic, may be the

outcome. The sensitivity of eyes and ears differs between night and day, with the result that in darkness objects seem bigger and distances greater. The ears exaggerate sounds that would hardly be perceptible during the day.

Nights are normally used for resting, and for this reason fatigue and symptoms of exhaustion afflict those who have to stay awake. Unit commanders must bear in mind that uninterrupted night duty is more strenuous than similar daytime activities. Young men are not necessarily better equipped to overcome night fatigue than men belonging to older age groups. To a certain degree, however, everyone can readjust his senses and habits through continuous practice.

III. Exercise of Command

In a situation in which a daytime operation promises success, a resolute and bold commander will continue the action into the night. Determined pursuit of a weakened enemy may result in a major victory. Although mobile units are generally most suitable for launching a pursuit, foot infantry may be employed to great advantage, especially when the terrain and weather conditions reduce the mobility of motorized forces. A well-planned airborne operation, either independent of or in conjunction with ground operations, may be particularly effective in such a situation.

A commander whose air and armored power is manifestly inferior to the enemy's may score at night if his infantry is tough and has sufficient *élam.* In general, tactical movements in the proximity of enemy lines can be undertaken only under cover of darkness. In some instances it may be advisible to engage the enemy only at night, if daytime fighting would lead to heavy casualties.

Success of night operations depends primarily on careful planning, detailed preparation, simplicity of the operation order and tactical procedure, achievement of surprise, and the leaders' calmness and circumspection. Every officer who is to participate in a night operation must be initiated into the plan. The more thorough the daytime preparations, the more certain the success. Tactical maneuvers and the mechanical handling and servicing of weapons and equipment are slowed down and complicated by darkness. Proper condition and meticulous care of weapons and equipment are essential.

At night the example of leaders exercises a strong influence on the troops. It is imperative that the leaders share danger with their men and inspire them by their own courage and

determination. A reverse or defeat suffered at night has a more lasting effect on the troops' morale than one suffered during the day.

IV. Orientation

Night orientation is based on careful daytime reconnaissance, thorough study of maps—including

captured ones—and the knowledge of prominent landmarks and celestial bodies. To facilitate orientation one may use the prismatic compass, radio beam apparatus, line-of-site *[i.e., line of sight]* fire by mortars, illumination of enemy terrain, by artillery fire on inflammable targets, fires lighted behind one's own MLR, Very lights, parachute flares, searchlights, machine gun tracer fire, mortar salvos at prearranged orienting points, and specific night fire orientation tables.

V. Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance must be an uninterrupted effort; frequently the most useful information is gathered through night reconnaissance. During the hours of darkness friendly patrols are able to penetrate deep into enemy territory to points from which they can observe enemy movements during daytime.

In darkness reconnaissance patrols can usually determine only whether or not a specific area is occupied by the enemy. To gather more detailed information about the strength, composition, and weapons of the enemy forces, reconnaissance in force must be carried out by patrols that should return with prisoners of war.

As in daytime, patrols advance by bounds. During very dark nights, when the enemy is within close proximity of the friendly lines, reconnaissance and security activities may coincide.

Every effort should be made to carry out reconnaissance during daytime in order to obtain essential information for launching a night attack. The reconnaissance elements will then be able to guide the attack forces across the intermediate terrain at night.

Motorized patrols are generally unsuitable for battlefield reconnaissance because of the noise they make. If, however, motorized elements must be employed, they should be sufficiently strong to be capable of fighting their way back to friendly lines. Engineer detachments should accompany them on such missions.

Collecting information for use by the artillery at night is especially important and is the responsibility of the observation battalion. Evaluation of the elements of information should be performed at an evaluation center located near the artillery command post. When operations progress at a rapid pace, it will

rarely be possible to employ the entire observation battalion in properly surveyed positions.

Short-range communication intelligence operations performed by radio intercept and direction finding teams may be effective, particularly in a defensive situation or during a retrograde movement.

The closer the co-operation between all ground and air reconnaissance elements, the more accurate will be the commanders' estimate of the enemy situation.

VI. Security

At night, when troops are at rest, in combat, or on the move, security is closely related to reconnaissance. Precautions must be taken against surprise ground and air attacks, and against observation by the enemy. All units, even those in rear areas, must be highly security conscious.

A strong infantry point, marching 300 to 400 yards ahead of a reinforced combined arms battalion, will usually provide adequate security for a night movement. The distance between this advance guard and the main body depends primarily upon the degree of darkness and should in general not exceed 1,000 yards. Flank security elements should remain close to the moving column; their strength depends on the nature of the terrain. Motorized units should be preceded by advance detachments or picked advance guard units to which engineers should always be attached.

In a defensive situation the security elements should be as close to the enemy as possible so that approaching enemy forces can be detected at an early moment and appropriate measures to intercept them can be taken. The security detachments should be alert and observe the roads as well as the intermediate terrain. They must carry ample signal equipment. Patrols should be sent out to maintain contact between the security elements if the terrain is close and the enemy situation obscure. Securing communication centers and traffic arteries in rear areas is particularly important if there is danger of infiltration by enemy ground forces, paratroops, or partisans.

VII. Movements

In darkness, movements can be far better concealed from enemy ground and air observation than in daylight. The smooth execution of a movement depends upon careful road reconnaissance, easily identifiable road markings, efficient traffic regulation, and proper employment of engineer units.

If a movement that should be concealed from the enemy cannot possibly be completed during the hours of darkness, the responsible commander must decide whether it should start before dark and end before daybreak or begin after dusk and terminate in daylight. The decision will depend primarily upon the over-all plan.

During the night the average unit can march one and a quarter to two and a half miles an hour. Under favorable conditions infantry forces can cover greater distances at night than during the day, but night marches and movements are more strenuous. Marches along a wide front with full utilization of the entire road net are often more advantageous than marches in great depth along only a few roads. The best results are obtained if march schedules are rigidly adhered to and phase lines reached at the designated time. Since night movements require particularly careful supervision, light aircraft may be used for this purpose. Even in rear areas strict march discipline should be enforced. Headlights should either be

removed or given a coating of blue paint.

If the road net and time permit, night movements should be carried out in dispersed formation in depth so that only a few march elements ran be discovered and identified if the terrain is illuminated by enemy night reconnaissance planes.

During the approach to the enemy lines strict sound discipline must be observed. Phase lines must be designated for motorized vehicles, beyond which they are not allowed to proceed until ordered to do so. Harassing and interdictory fire from artillery, antiaircraft, and infantry weapons, as well as low-flying aircraft, can be employed to conceal the noise of motorized vehicles and thus deceive the enemy.

In the immediate proximity of the enemy all movements will have to be carried out in complete silence. Orders must be transmitted in a whisper; no other talking should be permitted. Weapons and equipment must be carried in such a way that they do not clatter. Wherever necessary, manpower will replace motor traction. The striking of matches, smoking, or any other use of light must be avoided. If contact with the enemy is expected, exposed parts of the soldier's body should be blackened. During the winter a white outer garment should be worn over the uniform.

VIII. Assembly

Proper assembly preparations must be made before launching a night attack against well-established enemy positions. If a major

offensive operation is planned, several nights will generally be needed for the approach, assembly, and execution of the attack, especially during summer when nights are short.

Assembly areas must be protected. If the attack is to be launched by fresh troops, units manning the MLR will be responsible for security during the assembly period. Tactical air support units, in particular fighter forces operating in conjunction with ground troops, will have to clear and secure the air over the approach routes and assembly areas. Antiaircraft defense must be organized before the start of night movements and before the ground troops arrive in the assembly areas.

In order not to reveal one's intentions prematurely, it is best to wait until the night immediately preceding the attack before moving the assault forces, the artillery, and the armored and motorized elements to their jump-off positions. Headquarters staffs, reconnaissance teams of the individual arms, and battery details should be moved up ahead of the main body of troops so that they can obtain in advance the data needed for the planning and execution of the attack.

The movement of large numbers of troops into an assembly area during a single night requires meticulous timing and rigid traffic regulation. It is advisable to control these movements by a special

staff having the authority to regulate the traffic and sufficient traffic control personnel at its disposal.

A dense communications network, including fully operational control points, should be established along the approach routes to guarantee the smooth flow of movements. Approach routes should be marked with luminous signs. Delays caused by broken down vehicles will be avoided if POL dumps and recovery elements are placed along the approach routes and if detour routes are designated in advance. Units that are not included in the first attack wave should be held in rear areas to prevent traffic congestion.

Assembly at night is inherently difficult and is not worth undertaking unless every means of camouflage and deception is used to prevent detection by enemy reconnaissance.

IX. Attack

Attempts to exploit a daytime success often lead to continuation of an attack at night. Surprise is especially effective in conducting limited-objective attacks in darkness. During a night attack the individual soldier's moral stamina is of particular importance. In many instances he will be engaged in hand-to-hand fighting.

The success of a night operation will depend upon meticulous and detailed preparations, including proper evaluation of reconnaissance reports; study of maps, including captured ones; terrain reconnaissance; familiarizing all officers and the maximum number of NCO's with terrain features in daytime and during the night-; reconnoitering and marking roads; carrying out road repairs and improvements with the assistance of engineer troops; preparing a fire plan for all supporting weapons; preparing a plan of maneuver; and establishing a communication network.

Surprise can be achieved by unexpected intervention of friendly forces at a point where there has been no previous contact, or by a variation in the direction and timing of the night attack if contact with the enemy has previously been established. In an effort to produce surprise the enemy should be lulled into a false sense of security by staging concentrations, by conducting deceptive movements behind the front accompanied by the noise of motor vehicles, etc. Other means of confusing the enemy before the start of an attack include unexpected variations in combat methods, deceptive and diversionary maneuvers, radio deception, and sudden concentrations fired by all weapons.

The timing of an attack depends on the over-all plan, strength and disposition of the attack forces, delays that may be encountered while assembling them and preparing all weapons for action, the strength of the enemy forces and their alertness, and, finally, visibility and weather conditions.

If the intent is to break through a well-established defense system in order to gain freedom of action, the attack should be timed to start a few hours before dawn. Against a well-prepared enemy such an attack will have a chance of success only if a complete penetration is achieved before daybreak, so that it can be

exploited during the early morning hours. On the other hand, since limited-objective attacks launched at night ought to be concluded by daybreak, it is best to start them during the early hours of the night. In general, night attacks directed against enemy flanks are particularly effective.

he assault columns should be developed early in the attack, but deployed as late as possible. They should be echeloned in depth along a narrow zone of action. By keeping closed up, the columns will be able to maintain contact. Infantry heavy weapons should be placed in the center of the march columns until the battalions arrive at the jump-off positions. It may be advisable to assign a few guns to the lead battalions; artillery observers should always accompany the forward elements. Self-propelled guns, assault guns, and tanks are more mobile, but make more noise than horse-drawn guns.

Unit commanders should be well forward; reserves and engineer elements ought to be within their reach. Radio silence should be imposed until the start of the attack; if this is not feasible, the assault forces, which must be amply provided with radio sets, must impose strict radio discipline.

There will be no need for artillery preparation if it is expected that the night attack will achieve complete surprise and that the enemy forces will disintegrate after the initial assault. Every effort must be made to move the assault forces as close to the objective as possible without firing a shot, even though this may lead to premature detection of the plan by the enemy. Absolute silence must be maintained during the approach. The preparatory fire will commence upon request by telephone or radio. Light signals betray the presence of troops and may lead to confusion among the friendly forces.

Protected by the preparatory fire, the assault forces will make their way to the jump-off positions. Then, while the artillery shifts to counterbattery fire or to adjacent enemy sectors, the assault forces will advance, supported by their own heavy weapons and guns firing from the line of departure. Forming small attack groups the assault forces will fight their way into the enemy lines, using bayonets and other close-combat weapons. The simultaneous appearance of tanks and assault guns, as well as the use of flame throwers, may have a great psychological impact on the enemy.

Depending on the situation and the scope of their mission, the assault forces must regroup for the continuation of the attack or prepare themselves for defense against counterthrusts immediately after reaching their designated objective. Uninterrupted communication with the heavy weapons and artillery is essential. The direct-support guns attached to the assault forces should remain under the same jurisdiction until daybreak.

The attack should be broken off without any hesitation if it bogs down within the enemy's defense system and if there is no prospect of concluding it successfully by additional fire support, a change in maneuvers, or other means. In that event it may be necessary to move the assault forces back to their jump-off positions. If this should not he feasible, the attack forces will have to organize themselves for defense in the terrain they have seized. To repeat the attack during the same night at the same point is not advisable.

In the event that the assault force is composed exclusively of armored units, then the tanks, armored engineers, and armored infantry must operate as a team and stay close together to lend mutual support. If the armored force is sufficiently strong, it is

advisable to divide it into two waves. The first one should consist of tanks to lead the attack in line formation, their hatches closed, their lights off, and their guns firing; the second should be composed of the main body of armored personnel carriers and antitank weapons, and should be echeloned in depth to facilitate the shifting of forces and the protection of the flanks. The armored engineers should stay close to the assault force commander so that they can remove mine fields and other obstacles in an emergency. By refueling at the last possible moment and assuring the replenishment of ammunition, the forces should be fortified against the moment of weakness that occurs immediately after the initial objective has been seized.

As soon as the assault forces have penetrated the enemy's defense system, strong formations that possess maximum mobility and have been held in readiness in the rear area must advance through the gap without delay. A local penetration achieved at night may easily transform a static situation into a fluid one during which motorized formations can obtain freedom of maneuver. The annihilation of hostile elements capable of offering continued resistance must be left to the reserves backing up the initial assault wave.

If visibility is good, tactical air formations can lend effective support to the ground forces by attacking hostile artillery positions, units on the move, and troop concentrations in rear areas. Since detailed planning and close co-ordination with the ground forces are essential, air liaison detachments equipped with adequate means of communication should be made available for this purpose.

The carefully planned commitment of parachute units in conjunction with ground operations may lead to decisive results by paralyzing the enemy's will to resist. To find suitable drop zones and establish intraunit contact after landing are the principal difficulties connected with the employment of airborne troops by night. On the other hand, darkness handicaps the defender in determining the scope of landings and in distinguishing between actual airdrops and deceptive measures, such as the dropping of dummies.

X. Pursuit

Night pursuit may lead to the complete rout of defeated enemy forces because the pursuing troops have a decisive psychological advantage over the badly shaken enemy. When pursuing defeated hostile forces at night, the attacker must not lose contact with

them or permit them to catch their breath. Silence is no longer of any importance.

The pursuing elements may be composed of all arms. Armored units with self-propelled guns and mounted infantry, as well as foot troops with a few artillery batteries or pieces and antitank and assault guns, may be employed for this purpose. Engineers should always accompany the pursuit units to remove obstacles and clear mines without delay.

Night pursuit through unfamiliar terrain will usually confine the attack forces to roads. The speediest and surest way to overcome strong enemy resistance is to turn off the road and envelop the hostile forces. Enveloping maneuvers should be attempted, but the pursuing forces must not be diverted from their far-reaching objective by their efforts to envelop or encircle the enemy elements they have overtaken.

The air force can be of great assistance on the condition that close air-ground co-operation is maintained. Bold, continuous bombing and strafing attacks against retreating hostile forces have a decidedly demoralizing effect on the enemy command and troops. The conduct of night pursuit can be greatly facilitated by illuminating the enemy's route of withdrawal and by indicating by radio the position of the pursuing spearheads.

XI. Defense

The strength of the defender's forces usually determines the defensive system he will adopt. Against an enemy who is capable of infiltrating the defender's MLR, a continuous front provides better protection than a system of strong points that save manpower but leave the security of the intermediate terrain to patrols.

The main battle position should be fortified as far back as the division command posts. Headquarters and service troops should be integrated into the defensive system.

The fire plan that governs the co-ordination of artillery with infantry heavy weapons and small arms must be established in conformance with existing fortifications. The plan for artillery fire by night will provide for interdiction fire, delivered automatically upon request of the outpost elements, on the strip of no man's land immediately in front of the forward trenches. The co-ordinates of certain areas within the main battle position must be determined in advance so that interdiction fire can be laid down immediately in the event that enemy forces succeed in penetrating the position. All weapons should deliver interdiction fire, and for this purpose the infantry heavy weapons must be integrated into the plan of artillery fire.

The fire plan will also include concentrations that will be fired by several batteries on specific terrain features which the enemy will have to occupy on his approach to the friendly lines. Moreover, the plan will provide for counterbattery fire based on air reconnaissance and ground observation, surprise fire

pinpointed on command posts, approach routes, and localities in the rear areas, as well as harassing fire.

At night, patrol activities must be increased and the troops at the outposts and in the MLR should be reinforced if sufficient manpower is available. The no man's land should be lit by flares and searchlights placed in flanking positions. The meaning of each type of light signal must be clearly established and explained to all concerned.

In an attempt to prevent the enemy from making use of ground and air reconnaissance information obtained during the day, daytime troop dispositions should be changed after dusk. Such preventive measures will also protect friendly forces against hostile artillery preparations preceding a night attack and will prevent the capture of the forward elements by enemy combat patrols and raids. At night a defensive position must present a completely different picture from that shown during daytime. The enemy forces attacking by night will thus be faced by an unexpected situation.

Whenever possible, counterthrusts against enemy penetrations should be carried out during the hours of darkness so that friendly forces can capitalize on familiarity with the positions they formerly occupied. A counterthrust against the enemy's vulnerable flank is usually preferable to a frontal attack.

In the event that local reserves are incapable of immediately restoring the situation by a counterthrust or if no forces are readily available for this purpose, it is preferable not to get too involved in fighting but rather to wait until the situation has been clarified and sizable reserves have been moved up. Then, after systematic preparation, the counterattack can be launched at dawn or even later. Too much haste may lead to failure.

Close-combat antitank detachments, positioned at advantageous points, can often inflict severe losses on enemy tanks that have broken through the MLR. Assault guns and tanks, held in readiness by the defender, add impetus to a counterattack by giving mobile support to the foot soldiers. The destruction of enemy tanks that have managed to break through the main battle position will usually have to be delayed until daybreak, when they can be taken care of by antitank and artillery pieces.

Whenever the defender recognizes the imminence of a major enemy offensive, he should adopt appropriate countermeasures for

the hours of darkness. The outpost area should be evacuated to prevent excessive casualties from preparatory fire. However much terrain the defender decides to abandon, he must not forget that his objective is possession of the MLR by the time the engagement is over.

XII. Retrograde Movements

The best time to withdraw from action is after a successful defense. Darkness facilitates disengagement

and may conceal a withdrawal from enemy observation and reconnaissance for a relatively long period.

Once a withdrawal is under way, the retiring forces must make every effort to put between themselves and the enemy the maximum distance in the shortest possible time. The hours of darkness must be used not only for the movement proper but also for occupying another position farther to the rear. All measures taken by the superior commander in charge of the withdrawal must facilitate smooth and rapid execution of the night movement.

To conceal the disengagement, a covering force should remain in contact with the enemy until the main body is already well on its way to the rear. The covering force is left in position with the mission of simulating normal night activity of the full garrison. An infantry division would leave a covering force composed of one or two rifle companies with heavy weapons support in each regimental sector. If possible, one roving gun should be left in each battery position. Normal radio traffic should be maintained so long as the covering force remains in contact with the enemy. Radio intelligence produces particularly valuable results during this phase of the fighting.

The covering force within each division sector should be placed under one commander who will also be responsible for the demolition of bridges after the last elements have crossed them.

When large bodies of troops are being withdrawn over long distances, it is advisable to leave only mobile troops in contact with the enemy. Their strength will be in proportion to the supplies available for their use. Ample provision of ammunition and fuel is essential. If tanks are to be included in the covering force, it must be remembered that any minor breakdown caused by mechanical failure may lead to the total loss of the vehicle. Adequate recovery equipment and sufficient engineer troops must be assigned to the covering force.

The following preparations should be made to guarantee the smooth withdrawal of the main body of troops:

a. All elements that can be spared, especially the service units, should be evacuated as early as possible. The ammunition and fuel supplies required for continued operations and for the march movement should be stored along the routes of withdrawal.

b. The withdrawing elements should be grouped into independent combat forces capable of fighting their way to the rear, if forced to do so.

c. Nonessential signal equipment should be dismantled and transferred to the new position in the rear. In any event, a reserve of signal equipment must be set aside before the start of the withdrawal.

d. A number of measures must be taken to avoid delays during the course of the withdrawal; these

include traffic regulation, establishment of a recovery service, reconnoitering, and marking roads and detours. All signs must be removed by the last unit passing through the area.

Antiaircraft units must protect the march columns against enemy air attacks. Combat aviation may assist the withdrawing ground forces by attacking the pursuing enemy troops, thus delaying their advance.

Intermediate covering positions should be established in suitable terrain to protect the withdrawing units against unexpected enemy attacks. By defending those positions the covering forces will permit the main body of troops to continue its withdrawal without interference. The covering detachments should be composed of infantry, artillery, antitank, and engineer troops. In some instances antiaircraft batteries may be attached to the covering detachments. Flank protection is essential if the enemy attempts to envelop the withdrawing forces from adjacent sectors or by using side roads, or if he tries to block the route of withdrawal. Reserves should be set aside to cover the flanks.

The superior commander must move to the rear as soon as the withdrawal from action has taken place without major incident. Aside from controlling the retrograde movement of troops and taking precautionary measures to protect the flanks, his principal preoccupation must be to organize the defense of the new position or to regroup his forces for a different assignment.

Any measure that might betray one's intention to withdraw, such as the burning of supplies and stored equipment, premature demolitions in rear areas, or increased vehicular traffic must be avoided.

XIII. Position Warfare

a. *Reconnaissance*. In position warfare the reconnaissance ele-

ments have the following missions:

(1) To capture prisoners by sending out combat patrols or intercepting enemy patrols;

(2) To obtain information on the intentions of the enemy forces by determining at which points they have cleared mines and cut gaps into the barbed wire obstacles; and

(3) To ascertain the strength and disposition of the enemy forces in the outpost area and their movements behind the lines—this information is needed for launching an attack on the enemy positions.

A reconnaissance in force will constitute the most effective means of clarifying an uncertain situation and obtaining information on the enemy's strength, the disposition of his artillery pieces, and the number of infantry heavy weapons at his disposal. This information will permit the superior commander to draw valid conclusions as to the enemy's intentions. In many instances the same purpose can be achieved by

deceptive measures designed to draw enemy fire, such as firing a concentration of all weapons on the enemy positions for only a few minutes.

Air reconnaissance over the enemy positions, battery emplacements, and over localities in the proximity of the front will provide information on changes in the enemy situation. Regular flights should be scheduled before dark and shortly after dawn for the purpose of photographing these areas. The aerial photographs, together with their evaluation, should be made available to the front-line commanders as soon as possible, since the latter can obtain a clear picture of the enemy situation only by collating air and ground reconnaissance information.

b. *Security*. During the night, outposts beyond the MLR should not be maintained at the same points as during daytime; frequent changes will prevent their becoming an easy prey for enemy patrols. Any kind of routine schedule in posting sentries at night should be avoided.

c. *Troop Disposition*. Only sentries and patrols equipped with small arms and a few light machine guns should occupy the outpost area. The bulk of the defense forces should be in the battle position. If an impending enemy attack is recognized in time, the outposts should be reinforced unless zone defense tactics are applied. In the event that the enemy makes a surprise attack, he ought to-be stopped at the MLR; contact with adjacent sectors should be re-established and a counterthrust initiated. The reserves are to be assembled near the company CP so that the company commander can lead the counterthrust, which should preferably be conducted against the flank of the enemy penetration.

d. *Measures to Prevent Infiltration*. Trip wires should be strung along the wire obstacles and at other points of the outpost area. These wires should be connected to an alarm system, including floodlights. Midget radar devices are superior to all others in uncovering infiltration attempts. Patrols must constantly cross the outpost area, and a dense communication network, extending to the outpost area, should be set up.

No listening posts should be positioned beyond the outpost area at night. Double sentries should be stationed at the outposts, and these should be in contact with one another. Machine guns and mortars emplaced in the outpost area should be firmly anchored to prevent the enemy from carrying them off.

e. *Combat Patrols*. Patrol activity serves the purpose of reconnoitering, capturing prisoners, and seizing strong points. These operations may be carried out in strength with intensive artillery preparation to eliminate resistance in the enemy outpost area or they may be staged without such preparation by weak forces that can be assembled without attracting the enemy's attention. While the combat patrol attempts to penetrate the enemy outpost area, the artillery should deliver counterbattery and interdiction fires, the latter to seal off from the rear that section of the enemy position under attack, thus preventing the arrival of reinforcements or the launching of a counterattack. Once the patrol has crossed the zone of hostile interdiction fire, the enemy artillery will usually have little effect because of its lack of flexibility in

darkness.

The members of the patrol must be well acquainted with terrain conditions and with every detail of their mission. The use of deception and diversionary measures may be indicated. Because of their greater effectiveness in close combat, the men should be equipped with light individual weapons and flame throwers rather than heavy weapons.

Patrols should adhere to a fixed timetable. Improper use of light signals usually leads to confusion that might jeopardize the success of the operation.

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CHAPTER 3
RUSSIAN NIGHT COMBAT METHODS

I. Characteristics and Training of the Russian Soldier

In World War II, as in preceding wars, the Russian soldier demonstrated that he was closer to nature than his west European counterpart. This was hardly surprising since most of the Russian soldiers were born and raised far from big cities. The civilian occupation of the typical Russian soldier was that of a farmer, lumberjack, or huntsman. From early childhood he had been used to covering long distances across difficult terrain, orienting himself by conspicuous features on the ground, by the stars, and often simply by following his natural instincts. The manifold dangers that were ever present in the wide-open Russian countryside were bound to sharpen his senses, particularly his sight and hearing. Even the city dwellers, most of whom had only recently been transplanted to the densely populated cities as part of the industrialization of the Soviet Union and the resulting concentration of labor masses, remained relatively close to nature. Being attuned to the vast open spaces and desolate steppes with which a large part of his country is covered, the Russian did not know the depressing loneliness and forlornness that often overwhelmed the German soldier. The Russian was accustomed to getting along with a minimum of comfort and equipment under climatic conditions that imposed severe hardship on the invader.

The Russian was able to move without a sound and orient himself in the darkness. On a night patrol he instinctively behaved like a huntsman who is careful to avoid making the slightest noise. During long night vigils the German sentries, on the other hand, often saw no harm in conversing or lighting a cigarette or pipe just to lessen their drowsiness. When reporting to a superior who was checking their post, they spoke in a loud voice without realizing that they often permitted the intently listening Russian who was hiding in the immediate vicinity to gather valuable information. When their not-too-keen ears picked up a suspicious sound. German sentries often fired Very pistols, thus giving away their position to the enemy. Since the Germans were in the habit of posting sentries at the same place night after night over periods of several weeks or even months, Russian agents who were watching the sentries perform their routine, duties were able to infiltrate the German lines without danger to themselves. In contrast to the stereotype way in which the Germans posted their guards at

night, the Russians changed the location of their posts constantly.

The Russian soldier performed particularly well as a night observer. Stern discipline and self-constraint enabled him to lie motionless for hours and observe the German troops at close range without being detected. He waited patiently for the most favorable opportunity to carry out his mission.

Russian junior officers were accustomed to act in accordance with rigid orders. Upon encountering unexpected resistance they were easily confused and, in the event of a surprise counterattack against the flank of their unit, often helpless.

In general, Russian night combat training was adapted to the terrain conditions and the characteristics of the average soldier. The exigencies of war led to an intensification of the training with emphasis on trickery, cunning, and deception rather than orthodox tactical doctrine and independent imaginative thinking.

II. Movements

Russian night movements were in many ways similar to those of the Germans, and the organization and composition of Russian march columns resembled the German pattern. Along wide roads two columns would move abreast. The Russian troops' familiarity with terrain conditions and the support they received from the civilian populace enabled them to undertake cross-country marches in terrain that was frequently considered impassable by their opponents. Both in the planning and the execution of night movements the Russian commanders were ruthless. The welfare and care of troops were of secondary importance, and whoever dropped out was left behind. This was particularly true during the Russian retrograde movements in 1941 and 1942.

Concentrations preparatory to major offensive operations always took place at night. Truck columns would haul the attack formations over long distances; the detrucking points were usually outside inhabited localities. The troops then marched on foot to the assembly areas—also at night—and immediately began to dig in. Armored and motorized infantry formations were brought up from the rear at the close of the assembly phase. In 1944, when the German power of resistance was deteriorating at a rapid pace, the Russians, apparently conscious of their numerical and material superiority, made little effort to conceal their night movements and permitted their motor vehicles to drive without dimming their lights.

In winter the Russians often used tanks to break roads through the snow. As soon as these roads froze solid they formed an excellent communications net behind the front. The following inci-

dent illustrates the Russian adeptness in moving over ice by night. During the winter of 1941-42 the southern wing of the German front was anchored on the north shore of the Sea of Azov at Taganrog. The south shore was still in Russian hands. By January the water had frozen so solid that troops could move across the ice. At night Russian units up to and even above battalion strength crossed the ice; they spent the day a few miles off shore lying motionless on the ice. As soon as darkness set in they proceeded to the shore and raided German billets and rear installations, then withdrew before daybreak. Even though the Russians suffered many casualties from frostbite, they continued their night raids as long as the water remained frozen.

III. Reconnaissance

When the Russian soldier was sent out on a reconnaissance mission, he was not confronted by any unusual problems. His natural cunning as well as his typically Slavic astuteness and cleverness stood him in good stead. That he was moving across his own territory and found ready support from the local populace were undoubtedly important but not decisive factors in helping him to achieve success.

The Russian command often combined ground reconnaissance missions with reconnaissance in force and occasionally with full-fledged night operations. The remarkable feature was the strength of the units that were always employed for night reconnaissance in force. At times units up to regimental strength carried out such missions, despite very heavy losses incurred by massing so many troops. The Russian field commanders continued to apply the same methods up to the end of the war, undoubtedly because the presence of such strong bodies of troops complicated the task of the considerably weaker German reconnaissance elements. Occasionally, the Russians added tanks to reconnaissance units, thus giving the infantry patrols support and protection. Along some sectors of the front horse cavalry was employed on night reconnaissance.

In some instances individual Russian reconnaissance patrols, led by capable and energetic officers, managed to slip through gaps or weakly held positions in the German front under cover of darkness. They either restricted their activities to obtaining information or expanded the scope of their mission by disrupting wire communications, laying mines, and carrying out commando-type raids on CP's.

In general the Russian reconnaissance methods were efficient and adapted to the conditions prevailing during the hours of dark-

ness. During fighting on the Kerch Peninsula in the winter of 1942 the Germans captured Russian soldiers who had spent two nights and one day in the immediate vicinity of the German positions and who had been able to obtain a wealth of information during that time. In another instance that occurred during the autumn of 1941, the advance guard of a German infantry division was attacked during the night in a large village where the reinforced battalion had stopped on the way to Kharkov. After the Russian attack had been beaten off, the German battalion commander found that a Russian rifle platoon had been left behind in the village after all other troops had withdrawn and that the men had concealed themselves in groups of two or three in the dunghills near the farm buildings. Their mission was to observe the Germans after their entry into the village and to communicate the information to their parent unit, which was hiding in a near-by woods with the intention of launching a surprise attack.

IV. Infiltration

Infiltration by small detachments, as well as by larger units up to an entire division, was probably the

most effective Russian method of night combat. It was effective at all times because the Russians were able to penetrate seemingly impassable terrain in an; kind of weather, all the more so when it was as poorly defended, as during the latter part of the campaign. Once the shortage of manpower had forced the German Army to resort to a system of defensive strong points rather than continuous lines, the Russians could employ their favorite night tactics to their greatest advantage. Time and again their troops slipped through a lightly held sector during the night and were securely established behind the German front by the next morning.

A good illustration of infiltration by night and its serious consequences was provided by a Russian infantry battalion in February 1942. The action occurred in the area north of Shala, about fifty miles southeast of Leningrad, and began during a snowstorm. Personnel of the Russian battalion moved on skis, pulling light and heavy infantry weapons on sleds. *(Map 2)*

In single file the troops traversed the Kovrigino swamp, just north of Konduya, during darkness and passed silently between two strong points of the 269th Infantry Division. Once established in the rear of the division, the Russians lay low during the day, but came to life night after night. They sowed mines along the routes of communication, attacked columns bringing up rations and ammunition, and assaulted command posts and heavy weapons positions. Every German detachment had to be on the

Map 2: The Region Around Shala

alert throughout the night, and every morning mine-clearing squads had to remove the mines planted during the previous night.

It was not too difficult to detect the activities of the Russians because their tracks were clearly visible in the snow. But the German troops were not equipped with skis and were, therefore, unable to pursue the Russians who disappeared in the vast, wooded, and uninhabited region in the daytime. At night the enemy force received ammunition, weapons, and rations by air

drop and continued its destructive activities on such a scale that counteraction became imperative. By an intensive German effort, the Russian battalion was gradually ferreted out and annihilated after a series of costly engagements.

For some weeks the communications of an entire division had been threatened and every night the Germans suffered casualties and losses of materiel. With men trained in night combat on skis, the division would have been able to eliminate the threat promptly.

During the following month the 269th Infantry Division was again subjected to extensive Russian infiltration. The division was still engaged in heavy defensive fighting in the Konduya area. The situation

grew so critical that the regimental command posts had to be set up in the MLR and the division CP, only some 1,000 yards to the rear, in a dense forest.

One morning at daybreak Markayevskaya, a village located about two miles behind the front along the only communication route, was suddenly attacked by approximately 600 Russians coming from the rear. The division trains and some elements of the signal battalion engaged the Russians in hand-to-hand fighting and, though the German forces suffered heavy casualties, they were able to restore the situation and thereby avert a complete disaster.

The presence of the Russian force had not been observed by any component of the German division, but it was assumed that the enemy battalion had effected a night crossing of the Markayevskaya swamp, considered impassable at the time. Thus there was a combination of elements, such as the cover of darkness, infiltration tactics, and difficult terrain, which the Russians exploited time and again.

By 1943 most sectors of the German front were easily penetrated by the Russians during the hours of darkness. Numerical weakness forced the German commanders to group their men in a system of strong points, while small detachments made periodic night patrols across the intermediate terrain. This German weakness was quickly noted by the alert opponents. At night they silently slipped through the gaps in the German defense system and quickly established themselves unless the Germans launched an immediate counterattack. A number of such penetrations generally resulted in the loss of the German position, since the understrength units were unable to defend themselves on both sides.

In August 1943 the XXXIX Panzer Corps, composed of the 18th Panzer Grenadier and 337th Infantry Divisions, was withdrawing according to plan from the area north of Dorogobuzh toward Smolensk. Some sixteen miles east of the confluence of the Dnepr and Vop Rivers, the corps had established a delaying position

against which the pursuing Russians exerted strong pressure. *(Map 3)*

Map 3 Russian Infiltration by Night

On 17 August the corps commander had to commit the last available reserves to hold off superior Russian forces. The 337th Division pulled out every last squad from those sectors that were not under attack and moved these troops to the Dorogobuzh-Smolensk road to prevent an enemy break-through. Along a swampy area situated some five miles south of the road, the division commander left only weak security detachments. Nothing unusual was observed during the night of 17-18 August.

On the morning of 18 August the Russian attacks against the 337th Division front slackened noticeably. However, at about 1200 an ammunition column that was setting up a dump approximately four miles

behind the front was fired on from a wooded area near by. During the early afternoon German reconnaissance elements reported that the western and northern edge of this woods was held by enemy forces of unknown strength. Since these Russian forces would be able to interfere with traffic along the Dorogobuzh-Smolensk road, the corps engineer battalion was given the mission of clearing the woods the next morning. In addition, the corps commander reinforced the troops guarding the Dnepr and Vop bridges south of Yartsevo.

During the night of 18-19 August the engineer battalion moved to the wooded area and assembled for an attack that was launched early the next morning. Upon entering the woods the battalion encountered no Russian troops. Obviously, the Russians had withdrawn.

On the morning of 20 August the German troops guarding the eastern approaches to the Vop bridge, about eight miles south of Yartsevo, reported that they were being attacked by superior enemy forces. The Russians were repelled with the assistance of service troops and personnel from corps headquarters. At the time it was assumed that the attack had been made by strong partisan forces who had previously been active in this area. Since the lines of communications between the Vop bridge and the 18th Panzer Grenadier Division had to be kept open, the corps assigned two engineer battalions and one infantry battalion the mission of cleaning out the intermediate wooded area. During the night of 20-21 August these units assembled f or an attack against the "partisans." While the preparations were under way, it was learned that shortly after nightfall the troops guarding the Dnepr bridge had been attacked by enemy forces, estimated at one to two companies and equipped with mortars and infantry heavy weapons. The raiders were repulsed by the strengthened guard.

On the morning of 21 August the three battalions began to comb the forest northeast of the Vop bridge. By good fortune they ran almost immediately against a Russian regimental headquarters, which they overpowered. Enemy resistance thereupon slackened and about 150 prisoners were captured, all belonging to a regiment that had infiltrated the German MLR four nights earlier.

Prisoner interrogation revealed that the entire regiment had infiltrated the German MLR south of the Smolensk road by night and had assembled in the woods four miles behind the 337th Division's lines. The mission of the Russian regiment was to cut the German lines of communications by capturing the Dnepr and Vop bridges and to support by an attack from the rear the frontal assault on the German lines that was scheduled for 22 August. On 18 August, when the regimental commander realized that the presence of his unit in the woods had been discovered by the Germans, he waited until darkness and led his regiment northward across the Dorogobuzh-Smolensk road. Upon reaching the south bank of the Dnepr he divided his force, leaving one battalion in the forest south of the river and crossing with the other on improvised floats. He spent the next day hiding in the forest northeast of the Vop bridge and let the supply trucks of the 18th Panzer Grenadier Division pass through without interference in order to escape detection by the Germans. During the night he assembled

his forces for the attack on the Vop bridge and, after its failure, he moved to the battalion on the south bank of the river and led it in the night attack on the Dnepr bridge.

Despite their failure to reach the designated objectives, the Russian forces demonstrated remarkable skill in infiltrating the German lines by night without being observed and in reassembling in the woods south of the highway. During the subsequent days the Russians moved quietly and withstood the temptation of making daylight attacks on near-by objectives, with the result that they escaped notice several nights in a row. Another notable feat was the night crossing of the Dnepr without the use of any bridging equipment.

Here, as in many other instances, most of the infiltrated Russians were annihilated, but not until they had caused much damage and confusion, and had tied down considerable German manpower. Along all sectors of the Russian front German units were plagued by constant infiltrations at night, which meant that troops at the front and in rear areas had to be especially alert during darkness.

V. Offensive Operations

Russian doctrine on the conduct of night attacks. underwent many changes during World War II, both with regard to the objective that was to be attained and the methods of execution. The performance of the Russian unit leaders improved gradually. Whereas at the beginning of the campaign Russian commanders often demonstrated a lack of initiative and resoluteness, they executed many very daring maneuvers toward the end of the war. During the initial phase of the campaign they often failed to exploit an opening, but their conduct of operations gradually improved so much that eventually they were able to score major victories, especially since German resistance was diminishing and the defense usually lacked depth.

In 1941, after the German offensive had ground to a halt, the Russians reorganized their units by the integration of thousands of insufficiently trained infantry replacements. The night attacks executed by these units often were not properly co-ordinated. Massed infantry, insufficiently supported by artillery, was hurled against the German lines, its sole objective being the seizure of the outpost area. At this time the Russian command followed the World War I pattern of massed night attacks that nearly always miscarried.

By 1942 the Russian. night combat methods had been improved on the basis of the lessons learned from experience. Tanks that

had been concealed during daytime suddenly made an appearance at dusk or in darkness. The probable reason for the employment of armor at night was that poor visibility protected the Russian tanks from the otherwise too accurate German antitank fire. In general, night attacks launched during this phase had

only limited objectives. During the preparatory stage of such attacks, the Russians proved very skilled and courageous in clearing German mines by hand. Even in deep snow and extreme cold they spent long nights searching for mines. When they found them, they often merely detached the fuses and then covered the mines with a layer of dirt or snow.

Russian commanders had no scruples about casualties when a mine field had to be cleared in a hurry. On 28 December 1942 on the Kerch Peninsula, for instance, a Russian penal battalion was driven across a particularly dense German mine field during the hours of darkness which preceded the attack. The casualties were very high, but several lanes were cleared for the follow-up units.

In another instance, occurring on the night of 1-2 December 1942 in the sector of the German Army Group Center, the Russian II Cavalry Corps with. three horse cavalry divisions attempted to exploit a three-mile daytime advance achieved by armored units twenty miles south of Rzhev. Making full use of the cover of darkness, the cavalry units sped across the snow in open formation, disregarding the losses inflicted by a few remaining German machine gunners and riflemen, and a weak artillery barrage. The Russians penetrated the German lines and, without exploiting their success, returned to their starting positions during the same night. Their objective was never known.

A few months later, in mid-August 1943, in the southern sector of the German front the Russians attacked with overwhelming forces and in the course of the day overran a weak, battle-weary German division. By nightfall the Russian infantry and armor stood about four miles behind the former German MLR within reach of a stream which, according to a map captured by the Germans, was their immediate objective. Contrary to their previous practice the Russians did not halt but immediately went on to exploit their success. During the same night, after crossing the river, they broke through the hastily organized German position, and by dawn Russian tanks stood far to the rear of the German lines. The Russian break-through could not be offset by countermeasures and led to decisive developments in this area. In this instance a bold Russian night attack could not be contained by the weak German defense.

By 1944 the Russians often continued during the hours of darkness a major offensive operation they had started in the early

morning hours. Armor always led the way. Even when carried out on a wide front, these attacks usually bogged down in the German battle position, although they occasionally penetrated up to the artillery emplacements. The slow progress of the attackers usually left the German commander sufficient time to move up reserves, which were able to restore the situation by the next morning. In the summer of that year the Russians introduced a new procedure. Before major offensives they would use deceptive and diversionary measures on a wide front. At the point of main effort they would commit infantry units supported by tanks in a night attack with limited objective. Evidently the intention was to soften up the German defense at night and to open gaps for the follow-up units. Heavy artillery preparations usually preceded the infantry assault. At the crack of dawn armored formations, held in reserve for the break-

through, went into action.

VI. Defensive Operations

The Russians were always prepared to defend themselves, even during the short lulls that occur during any offensive operation. Wherever they stopped, they dug in and vanished from sight. As a rule Russian defensive positions were organized in great depth and held by strong infantry forces. Cover and concealment were excellent. Dense wire entanglements and well-laid mine fields in conjunction with ceaseless night reconnaissance provided a high degree of security. A multitude of heavy weapons, multiple rocket projectors, flame throwers, and artillery pieces gave the defensive system a firm backbone. However, the Russians did have difficulty at night in effectively co-ordinating artillery fire and in neutralizing the German artillery by counterbattery fire. Apparently, they either lacked well-trained observation battalions and flash and sound-ranging batteries, or else they did not employ them effectively. Their flat-trajectory night fire on roads, crossroads, and prominent landmarks was often very accurate, probably as a result of highly developed meteorological observation and an accurate knowledge of climatic factors.

Counterattacks, most of them supported by tanks, were well prepared and executed with great assurance. At points where the Russians expected German armored thrusts they often set up antitank fronts interspersed with individual tanks.

On the whole, Russian defensive tactics lacked flexibility during the early stage of the campaign. The German experience of the last year of the war indicated, however, that the Russian command and troops had adopted the principal features of the more mobile and flexible German tactics.

An order, issued by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko in 1941 and captured by the Germans during their advance toward Moscow, encouraged the Russian troops to make more use of night fighting, close combat, and fighting in the extensive forests. These three types of combat, he stated, were the forte of the Russians and the weakness of the Germans, who placed too much reliance on their machines. At night and in the forests, he continued, mechanical equipment loses some of its effectiveness, and hand-to-hand fighting, for which the Russians have a traditional aptitude, comes into its own.

VII. Retrograde Movements

The only Russian strategic withdrawal occurred at the very beginning of the German campaign. During the initial phase of the retrograde movement the Russians executed consecutive night marches with two columns often marching abreast. After the initial shock of the German attack had worn off, the Russians began to fight a series of delaying actions. During the battles of encirclement that took place during this phase, the Russians in the pockets would abandon their heavy weapons, equipment, and supplies and, taking advantage of the hours of darkness, would attempt to break through the German ring. Masses of

infantry would hurl themselves against the German lines at what seemed to the Germans the most unfavorable points, that is to say, in open terrain, far away from any road or highway.

In carrying out retrograde movements at night Russian field commanders had no qualms about sacrificing rear guard units, which were often ordered to fight to the last man. In such emergencies the civilian populace was put to work digging antitank ditches, delaying positions, dummy fortifications, etc. The importance of mines in night combat operations was fully realized by the Russians from the very beginning of the campaign. Whereas the Russians employed armor during every phase of this retrograde movement, their air force intervened only rarely.

VIII. Partisan Warfare

Shortly after the start of the Russian campaign partisans began to harass the German rear areas, especially in the central and southern regions of Russia. Time and again German logistical plans were threatened by nightly partisan forays on supply installations, rail lines, and other important military objectives. Destruction in the rear areas was often as costly as losses at the front.

The effectiveness of night attacks by partisans was demonstrated by the experience of the 98th Infantry Division after its withdrawal across the Kerch Straits late in 1943. Behind the division front there was an extensive system of underground quarries near Adzhim-Ushkay, two miles northeast of Kerch, which were interconnected by long subterranean galleries. The partisans hidden in these quarries were well equipped, and they undoubtedly maintained contact with the Russian units across the straits.

Starting at dusk, partisans equipped with infantry heavy weapons emerged from their inaccessible hideouts to cut German supply lines, destroy signal installations, and attack weak German service units. At daybreak they disappeared without giving the German troops an opportunity to come to grips with them.

In this primitive country, with its many inaccessible hiding places, the Germans were at a loss to combat the partisans effectively because the latter were able to attack in small groups during the hours of darkness and then vanish. In view of his limited manpower the local commander was unable to cope with this persistent menace.

In the spring of 1944 the German V Corps was engaged in heavy defensive battles near the city of Kerch. At that time the corps' line of communications was subjected to frequent night attacks at points some sixty miles west of the front line. Partisan forces numbering 400 to 1,000 men made frequent night attacks on vehicles moving along the supply route Simferopol-KarasubazarFeodosiya, as well as on villages in the same area. The partisans were hiding in the inaccessible Yaila Mountains of the Southern Crimea, where they were supplied by nightly airdrops. As a countermeasure, the corps furnished armed escorts for vehicles moving in convoy, but this meant a considerable diversion of manpower for the hard-

pressed corps. No matter how vigorously German units combatted these and other partisan groups, there was no end to partisan night attacks behind the front and especially against rear installations. Darkness was the protector of the partisan, particularly in difficult terrain that the numerically weak German troops were often unable to comb.

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CHAPTER 4
GERMAN NIGHT COMBAT METHODS

I. Movements

In the course of the Russian campaign night movements became increasingly important in planning and executing operations, since the German field commanders realized that marching units needed the protection of darkness if excessive losses were to be avoided. However, night marches were often hampered by the dearth of good roads and by sudden changes in the weather, which often made the existing roads impassable in the midst of a movement.

Careful preparation of all night marches was imperative. This included detailed advance road reconnaissance, establishment of traffic control posts, employment of engineers to repair defective portions of the roads, availability of recovery and evacuation crews, use of luminous road markers, and good camouflage of the marching units. In composing his march serial each commander had to anticipate possible interference by enemy air and ground forces, including partisans.

During a night motor march each serial was assigned phase lines, which facilitated proper movement control. Headlights were removed or painted blue, while blackout lights were carried in the rear. Traffic control personnel and unit commanders down to the squad leaders were equipped with red and blue flashlights.

Radio silence was observed during the march; however, stations in the various nets were standing by. Field switchboards tied in with existing lines were used in rear areas. During bright nights liaison planes were employed to good advantage for traffic control.

When motorized elements marched toward the front, they had a tendency to delay dismounting as they approached the enemy. This was particularly true during the early part of the campaign. An effective countermeasure was the setting up of phase lines, where the men were ordered to detruck. When motorized or armored units moved to assembly areas close to the front, it was found expedient to cover the noise of their motors by firing artillery and heavy weapons in their vicinity. During these movements in close proximity to the front, it was desirable to bypass road junctions and villages, as they were the favorite targets of Russian artillery. It should be noted, however, that an extensive movement control organization was required to effect such bypassing during darkness.

II. Reconnaissance

The German troops needed various aids to perform their duties during darkness; most soldiers had to be conditioned to being outdoors at night because their senses had been dulled by city life. It was particularly difficult for them to find their way in the generally monotonous Russian countryside, which contained very few good reference points.

Among the expedients used by reconnaissance units were the firing of tracer ammunition and of star shells, dropping of flares from planes, and the intermittent employment of searchlights in pairs behind the front. There was little motorized or armored night reconnaissance because vehicles are heard a long way off and attract attention. However, in situations where night reconnaissance elements had to cover long distances, motorized reconnaissance forces were sent out. As they approached the enemy, they dismounted and continued on foot.

Artillery night reconnaissance was mainly a function of the sound and flash ranging sections of the corps artillery observation battalions. Firing data were computed with the aid of the meteorological section whenever immediate fire was to be delivered. During completely dark nights German observation battalions tried to use captive balloons for detailed reconnaissance over wide areas, but this procedure was applied successfully only on a few occasions.

III. Offensive Operations

German units carried out night attacks to exploit successes achieved in daytime, as a prelude to major offensive operations, to restore the situation where the enemy had achieved a local success, and to camouflage the execution of other operations, such as a retrograde movement.

The starting time for night attacks was set with due regard for the inherent difficulties of fighting in the dark. Action at night was always time consuming; yet, it was usually desirable to conclude any operation before daybreak. The unit commander had to consider these two factors and evaluate his own and the enemy situation before he decided to launch a night attack.

The terrain in Russia was rarely ideal for night attack. In many instances there was good cover for the approach, but the enemy-held territory usually did not afford good visibility, so that the opponent's preparations for defense could not be observed. Whenever there was danger of encountering strong, well-prepared enemy forces, night attacks had to be launched in a direction from which they were not expected.

The success of a night attack depended on careful preparation, proper timing, and selection of favorable terrain. Detailed evaluation of information gathered by air and ground reconnaissance, thorough analysis of captured maps, study of the terrain by the maximum number of officers, road reconnaissance and marking, and provisions for adequate supplies were some of the preparatory measures. Before issuing the

operation order the commander discussed his plan in detail and answered questions requiring clarification, so that every officer knew exactly what was expected of him and his men.

These careful preparations applied also to major attacks started before dawn and continued during daylight. Before such operations many nights were required to ready a large body of troops. Attacks scheduled to last but a single night were generally confined to a limited objective not too distant from the starting position. Even these relatively minor operations required thorough preparations to avoid enemy traps or other disagreeable surprises.

The following example shows how carefully LVI Panzer Corps prepared an attack during darkness in the area west of the Dnepr River in September 1941. The objective of the operation was Vyazma, about sixty miles to the east. The situation in the area had been static for several weeks with the 290th Infantry Division holding the front. *(Map 4)*

For the attack, which started on 2 October, three additional divisions were brought up from other areas-the 6th and 7th Panzer Divisions, and one armored infantry division. Improvement of the poor road net was begun as early as 20 September. Other preparations included the reinforcement of numerous bridges, aerial photography of enemy-held terrain, nuisance raids by a few planes to obscure the noise of traffic on the ground, and maintenance of traffic along the main north-south road to simulate normal supply activity.

On the night of D minus 3 the forward echelons of the two panzer divisions were moved to their assembly areas near the front, so that they could familiarize themselves with local conditions. This also gave the artillery units two days to determine their firing position and data, and to establish observation posts.

The next night the motorized infantry elements of the two panzer divisions were brought up to the area west of the major north-south road, where they detrucked. The vehicles were parked farther to the rear.

During the last night before the attack all assault troops were moved to the jump-off positions, where the forward echelons of their respective units awaited them. The 290th Infantry Division regrouped its forces for the impending attack, while the armored

Map 4: German Preparations for a Night Attack

infantry division was held back as corps reserve. At the same time the tanks and empty trucks of the two panzer divisions were moved up to the north-south road.

The operation itself started an hour after dawn and was successfully completed at H plus 30 hours when a bridgehead was firmly established east of the Dnepr near Cholm. No doubt the carefully camouflaged

night preparations of the corps during the preceding weeks were a major factor, for the Russian troops apparently had not anticipated an attack by an entire corps.

In another instance the Germans launched a night attack on a smaller scale in the sector southeast of Mogilev in January 1944. *(Map 5)* Defensive positions were held by the German 56th Infantry Division, whose front had been pushed back along a 1,000-yard stretch to a maximum depth of approximately 500 yards. In the middle of this salient the Russians had established a strong point that afforded good observation of the German front and rear area.

Map 5: German Surprise Attack by Night

On 10 January the German commander decided to launch a counterattack to wipe out the Russian salient. Reconnaissance had established that the Russian strong point contained at least one hundred men, equipped with six to eight heavy machine guns, several heavy mortars, and an antitank gun. In addition, it was known that the Russian position was heavily mined, so that it had to be attacked from the rear, where it was linked to the MLR by a communication trench. It was also realized that the German

force had to launch a surprise attack, since the Russian artillery, consisting of at least six batteries, would otherwise break up the attack. The best time for achieving surprises was during the hours of darkness.

The German night attack was to be carried out by an assault detachment composed of one officer and thirty-five men, and equipped with submachine guns and two flame throwers. A covering detachment of similar size was to follow the assault troops, cut the communication trench midway between the strong point and the Russian MLR, and protect the assault detachment against interference from the south. Reinforced infantry companies were to move to both shoulders of the Russian salient, ready to occupy the former German positions after the Russians evacuated. These two companies were to break up the expected Russian counterattack by flanking thrusts. Finally, as a deceptive measure the reinforced German artillery was to deliver intermittent fire on the strong point and on other parts of the Russian front for eight nights prior to the operation.

At 0230, 21 January, the assault detachment started to infiltrate from the flank of the salient, followed by the covering detachment. At 0320 a short artillery concentration was delivered on the strong point, followed by a feint from the west ten minutes later. At 0335 the assault detachment entered the strong point. Simultaneously, the entire German artillery shifted its fire to the southern part of the communication trench. Finally, at 0340 there was an air attack on the Russian division command post.

The operation was so successful that the assault detachment suffered only one casualty; heavier losses were sustained by the covering detachment. The success may be credited to the careful preparation of the assault on the Russian strong point. A relatively small and lightly armed force reached its objective and overwhelmed numerically superior elements because it achieved surprise by night. The Russian counterattack, launched about an hour after the loss of the position, was repulsed by the two German companies' thrusts into the flank of the Russian attack force.

IV. Defensive Operations

The Germans applied the same fundamental doctrines to defensive operations by day or night. Additional precautions taken during the hours of darkness included strengthening outposts, all of which were positioned as far forward as possible; moving local reserves close to the MLR; increasing reconnaissance activities to uncover enemy preparations for an attack; and employing search

lights and flares to light the terrain over which the attacking enemy had to advance.

Artillery and infantry heavy weapons played an important role on the defensive. Careful preparations for night fires had to be made in daytime, so that concentrations or counterbattery fire could be ordered during the night as soon as a worth-while target was detected. When sufficient ammunition was available, well-aimed artillery fire often forced the enemy to delay or cancel his planned attack, or at least to change its direction. Interrogation of prisoners revealed that accurate night fire had a particularly demoralizing effect on the Russians.

By massing overwhelming strength for night attacks the Russians frequently penetrated the German front positions, but the impetus of their attacks was usually lost as soon as they ran into infantry reserves that had been promptly moved up. The Germans therefore found it advisable to construct several positions in depth. In general the second line was 70 to 100 yards behind the MLR and was formed by a continuous trench with mortar and machine gun emplacements. About 700 yards to the rear were the heavy weapons, the company CP, and the company reserves. Barbed wire and mine fields protected the positions, and communication trenches connected the entire system. This disposition enabled the reserves to move up quickly to aid the forward elements or to seal off Russian penetrations. Mine fields were laid in front of the first and second lines, and a dense wire net connected the various positions with the CP.

When German manpower became depleted, continuous positions could no longer be maintained. The German forces relied instead on a system of widely separated strong points; however, Russian infiltration tactics were so effective that the Germans considered this defensive system merely an emergency improvisation, to be applied only when a continuous line could not be manned.

V. Retrograde Movements

Whenever possible German units were to take advantage of the hours of darkness to execute retrograde movements. Special pre, cautions against enveloping maneuvers and parallel pursuit were mandatory because the Russians with their uncanny ability to traverse seemingly impassable terrain usually pursued the withdrawing Germans relentlessly. One of the precautionary measures applied by the Germans was to occupy in advance all critical points behind the front line such as defiles, dominant hills, bridges, and road centers. Another measure was to organize all troops who could be spared at the front into independent combat forces that

could fight their way back if it became necessary. No more troops were to be left in contact with the enemy than could be adequately supplied: "Rather fewer men, and plenty of ammunition and gasoline" was the accepted maxim for organizing an effective covering force.

During large-scale retrograde movements, the Germans preferred to leave mobile units in contact with the enemy. Since minor technical defects were liable to lead to total loss, only tanks in perfect condition were to be employed to screen a withdrawal. The Germans also found it expedient to include in the covering force many maintenance and recovery crews as well as strong engineer units equipped to carry out extensive demolitions. Additional covering forces had to occupy the rear positions before the retrograde movement was initiated.

Having made preparations, a unit commander could evacuate the bulk of his troops to the rear under cover of darkness, while the covering force simulated normal activity at the front in order to conceal the withdrawal from the attacking Russians.

In the autumn of 1943, the 337th Infantry Division conducted a successful withdrawal in accordance with these principles. The operation started in the area north of Dorogobuzh and was to end with the occupation of the Panther position, which was under construction in the Dnepr bend east of Orsha. By the middle of September the 337th Division reached a point some twelve miles southwest of Smolensk, where for several days it repulsed attacks by superior enemy forces.

On the morning of 25 September the division received orders to break contact with the enemy, beginning at 2000 the following day, and to reach the Panther position by the morning of 28 September. Thus two nights and one day were available for a retrograde movement of about thirty-five miles. The following account covers only the first part of the withdrawal, from the morning of 25 September until the morning of 27 September, when an intermediate position was reached. *(Map 6)*

As soon as he received orders for the withdrawal, the division commander initiated the essential preparations. Reconnaissance detachments formed by division headquarters, the two infantry regiments, and the artillery battalion were given the mission of assigning sectors of the Panther position to each individual unit and of finding suitable terrain for an intermediate position where the pursuing Russian forces might be delayed west of Krasny. Advance detachments accompanying these elements were made

responsible for marking the routes of withdrawal and for controlling the movement of the different columns to their destinations.

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Map 6: German Night Withdrawal

During the night of 25-26 September most of the service elements of the division were moved behind the Panther position. Along the routes of withdrawal they established fuel and ammunition dumps to meet the requirements of the combat elements. Most of the signal communication equipment was also moved behind the Panther position; only essential wire lines were left at the front, while reserve equipment was placed in the vicinity of Krasny. The reconnaissance battalion was moved to the same area.

To assure a smooth flowing movement, traffic was strictly regulated and towing vehicles were placed at crucial points. The use of alternate routes was explored. A number of footbridges were constructed across a brook three miles behind the front. Simultaneously, preparations were made to blow up these footbridges and the two road bridges east and northeast of Krasny after the last German troops had crossed. The local inhabitants were moved to wooded areas away from the indicated routes of withdrawal to prevent their interfering with the troop movements. Past experience had shown that many civilians would attempt to elude the onrushing Soviet Army by joining the German units. Finally, to protect the operation against interference from the air, the division requested the assistance of an antiaircraft unit, and one flak battalion with five batteries was made available on 26 September.

The withdrawal began after dusk on 26 September, but did not

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take place entirely in accordance with the division's schedule. At H minus 30 minutes the commander was informed that the enemy had struck hard in the adjacent sector on the right. Accordingly, the reconnaissance battalion, reinforced by an 88-mm. battery, made a night march from Krasny southeastward to a bridge across the brook in the neighboring sector. The move was made to prevent a Russian flank thrust from the south. As an additional precaution reconnaissance detachments, composed of men from the division headquarters company and the division's military police detachment, were sent from Krasny to where the division boundary crossed roads leading south and southeast from there.

Starting at 2000 the main infantry and artillery components rapidly withdrew westward. Near the front only isolated Russian reconnaissance detachments were observed. Therefore, the division commander ordered his rear guard to withdraw ahead of schedule, at 2400.

The expected flanking thrusts from the south materialized at 2300, but, thanks to the timely measures taken, the Russians were held off at all points. Without interruption the division continued its movement

and by 1000, 27 September, reached the intermediate position.

This example illustrates not only lessons learned by the German Army but also several peculiarities of Russian night combat. The Russians were hesitant in launching frontal pursuit. In general they preferred to envelop or thrust into the flanks. Therefore, a Russian penetration usually implied a threat to the adjacent unit, rather than to the one originally under attack. Russian night attacks were generally carried out by infantry and armor without artillery support. Toward the end of the war the Russians made increasing use of their air force, whose bombing attacks were directed against vulnerable fixed targets.

Withdrawing German troops adapted themselves to these peculiarities by certain countermeasures. Once a night withdrawal was under way, it had to be completed without delay so that the troops would be ready to offer renewed resistance in the next position, The command echelon of a major unit had to move to the rear position at an early time so that the unit commander could make appropriate dispositions to counter any possible threat to his flanks. Strong flak units had to be attached to the withdrawing troops to protect them against air attack.

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CHAPTER 5
TRAINING

I. General

Since training is a prerequisite for success in battle, training programs must simultaneously utilize lessons from past experience and anticipate future developments, particularly in the field of technology. No matter how fundamental the changes in tactics and techniques, it will always be up to the individual soldier to do the actual fighting. For this purpose he must be trained and indoctrinated. The longer and more thorough the training, the more effective it will be. Training and educational programs must be so devised that they stimulate the soldier's initiative. Only on that basis will military planners be able to shape a powerful and flexible instrument that will be capable of withstanding the vicissitudes of war.

In night combat he who is conditioned to darkness will be at an advantage, and training must therefore strive to restore the soldier's native sensitivity, which has been dulled by city life. Against a potential opponent who has the innate characteristics of a tough, ruthless, and cunning night fighter, proper training is indispensable.

German field commanders with many years of practical experience advocate that up to 50 percent of all training be conducted at night, starting from the very first day of basic training. In their opinion it is unnecessary to devise a specific night training program. They advocate that the most important features on the weekly training schedule take place at night and that the lessons learned in daytime be repeated and driven home during the hours of darkness. By shifting part of the regular schedule from day to night, one may achieve the dual purpose of toughening the soldier and making him a night fighter.

The better a soldier knows the mechanics of his profession, the more self-confident he will be. The morning after a night problem should not necessarily be a rest period since trainees must get accustomed to hardship at an early stage. For instance, to simulate combat conditions a trainee returning from a night exercise should be given a short break, followed by field training until noon. Moreover, to toughen the trainee, field sports should be included in the schedule.

II. Individual Training

Individual training should begin by familiarizing the trainee with the peculiarities of the night. His eyes and ears must be conditioned to a variety of unaccustomed impressions. Since this conditioning process is gradual, it may be practical to start with lectures and demonstrations. Competitive exercises should be

initiated as early as possible since they arouse the trainee's interest in night combat. The recruit must learn that at best he can perceive only the outline of an object without any detail. Since he can observe better from below than from above, he must get down on the ground. Distances are difficult to estimate in the dark and the position of a distant light can, therefore, be easily misjudged. By lighting a flashlight, a match, or smoking a cigarette the soldier might betray his presence even to a rather distant foe.

Sounds are transmitted most clearly at night, and the trainee must learn to differentiate between ordinary noises and those that should arouse suspicion. By putting his ear to the ground he will often be able to hear noises that are otherwise inaudible. To familiarize the trainee with nighttime conditions, preliminary marksmanship and range firing exercises should be shifted to the hours of darkness at an early stage in the training. Cross-country night marches may occasionally be combined with practice alerts. Since a sudden drop in temperature during the night or unexpected ground fog during the early morning hours may affect the trainee's health, he must be taught to take appropriate precautions.

During the next stage of individual training the recruit should learn to orient himself by the stars, by prismatic compass, by tracer and various other types of signals, and by terrain features briefly observed during daylight. He must know how to move silently, both erect and prone, at first across familiar, then across unfamiliar terrain, taking every precaution not to attract the enemy's attention by the clatter of weapons or equipment. During daytime he must prepare heavy weapons positions for fire against potential night targets. In addition, his training should include practice in patrolling and close combat at night, use of pyrotechnic signals, performance of sentry duty, attacks on enemy outposts, employment of intrenching tools without attracting attention, messenger duty, etc.

In peacetime, individual training is followed by unit training beginning at squad level. In the wartime training of replacements, one may discard this systematic program and use a mixed schedule if the need for additional manpower is urgent and if experienced, outstanding instructors are available. Such a mixed program consists of alternating individual with unit training by scheduling,

for instance, two days of individual training, followed by one day of squad and one day of platoon training, and reverting to one day of individual training, etc. The objective in setting up such a schedule is to obtain effective teamwork at the earliest possible moment. The attached tentative training charts, based on the practical experience of a German training instructor for armored units, contain suggestions along these lines. (Appendices I-VII) The disadvantage inherent in this type of program is that both the instructor and the trainee may be overtaxed by such a crowded schedule. Careful supervision of the training activities is therefore indicated.

III. Weapons Training

A soldier's familiarity with his weapons may be a decisive factor in night combat. To achieve complete mastery in the manipulation of weapons and equipment, the trainee must practice all postures-first while

in camp, then under simulated combat conditions, and finally in the dark and blindfolded. The last type of individual training can be given only in the field, and its objective is to perfect the trainee's skill until he qualifies for unit training. Each arm of the service will proceed according to established procedures.

IV. Unit Training

Squad training should emphasize firing practice at dusk, in the dark, by moonlight, and in artificial light. Firing practice should frequently be combined with an extended exercise, such as a strenuous march or reconnaissance problem, during which the unit should switch to extended formation after dusk. Only thus will the trainee get accustomed to the idea that he must be able to fight even after great physical exertion. Special importance should be attached to firing practice as part of defense in twilight and moonlight in order to condition the trainee to enemy attacks and give him confidence in his unit's ability to defend itself during the various stages of darkness. Additional subjects of instruction are night patrolling and reconnaissance, combat patrol missions, teamwork in firing heavy weapons, execution of technical missions normally assigned to engineers, close combat against tanks from foxholes, first aid in darkness, protection against frostbite, etc.

Advanced unit training embraces all types of combat, with emphasis on combined arms operations. Starting at platoon level this training phase culminates in large-scale combined arms maneuvers. The lessons learned by the individual will now find their

practical application in the field. Passing through the execution of different phases of night operations, the training of the unit progresses to uninterrupted day and night exercises which emphasize various types of combat in darkness.

The combined arms maneuvers should feature co-operation between armored, tactical air, and airborne units. The training for graduate officers of advanced staff schools should stress planning of combined arms operations and exercise of command by night.

The ideal night fighter is a self-reliant, fully integrated soldier commanded by a cool, resourceful, and thoughtful leader who inspires confidence and determination. Only if training can produce such men will an army have a chance of success against an adversary who not only is unhampered by darkness but even seems to thrive on it.

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APPENDIX I

EIGHT WEEK NIGHT TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR TANK COMPANY

Note. All training to be conducted during hours of darkness, unless otherwise indicated.

First week

Participants	Weapons training	Firing practice	Combat training
Entire company Note. Specialized trainingfor tank and truck drivers and radio operators is not Included In this unit training schedule.	Looking and loading ofweapons; preliminarymarksmanship on transition range.		Observation and sound detection exercises; night orientation by themoon, stars, compass, and prominentlandmarks; terrain appreciation andutilization; ranger tactics; estimatingdistances; concealment and entrenching in the dark.

Second week

Participants	Weapons training	Firing practice	Combat training
Entire company	Automatic rifle and ma-chine gun.	First rifle practice under searchlights.	Orienting exercise Including practiceunder Very signal lights and unob-served approach to target; vision exercise; judging distances by soundand eight; estimating velocity; terrain appreciation.
Tank gunners	Turret weapons opera-tion (machine gun andtank gun).		

Third week

Participants	Weapons training	Firing practice	Combat training
Entire company	Machine gun	Second rifle practice under searchlights.	Close-in antitank combat.
Tank gunners	Turret weapons operation		Tank, weapons, and equipment inspection and preparation for action.
Tank radio operators	Machine gun		
Tank drivers	Pistol.		
Truck drivers	Rifle and/or submachinegun.		

Fourth week

Participants	Weapons training	Firing practice	Combat training
Entire company	Machine gun	Machine gun praytice under search-lights.	
Tank gunners	Turret operation	Aiming practice with stationary andmoving targets;turret machinegun practice.	Target Identification and designation;Identification of enemy tanks undervarying conditions of visibility.
Tank radio operators	Machine gun	Bow machine gun.	
Tack drivers	Pistol	Pistol.	
Truck drivers	Carbine and machine gun.	Rifle.	

Fifth week

Participants	Firing practice	Combat training
Entire company	Machine gun	Outguard duty; security patrolling; sentry duty;relieving sentries; defense against raids; patrol missions.
Tank crews (including radiooperators).	Turret and bow machineguns.	Night march; road reconnaissance; road marking; moving into an assembly area and protecting same.

Sixth week

Participants	Firing practice	Combat training
Entire company.		Close combat; establishing contact; defenseagainst raids; reconnaissance missions; close-In antitank combat.
Tank crews	First pistol exercise	Driving by directional gyro and compass; armored security patrols; protective measuresagainst mines and antitank guns; defendingdisabled tanks against partisans and close-in antitank weapons.

Seventh week

Participants	Firing practice	Combat training
Entire company.		Night exercise; security and defense againstInfantry and tank attacks; close combat Intowns and forests.
Tank crews.	General firing practice. including tank gun; Second pistol exercise.	Counterattack (Including regrouping and security until armored infantry elements have organized themselves for defense In newly taken positions); defensive and offensive fighting against tanks and antitank weapons.

Eighth Week

Participants	Firing practice	Combat training
Entire company	Grenade throwing exercise.	Night maneuver emphasising defense of strongpoints.
Tank crews	Tank gun firing practice.	Extended problem with night-day-night march(road and cross country); regrouping of pla-toons for counterattack at night; combatagainst tanks, antitank weapons, and artillery, Immediately followed by defense against tank-supported infantry counterattack.

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APPENDIX II

TWELVE WEEK NIGHT TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR ARMORED INFANTRY TROOPS

Note. Close combat training should be given first individually, then squad against squad, and should be based on small unit actions involving antipartisan warfare, combat patrols, and counterattacks. Individual training should be conducted in slow motion under supervision.

First week

Weapons Training	Firing practice	Combat training
Locking and loading of weapons; preliminary marksmanship on transition range.		Observation and sound detection exercises; orientationby the moon, stars, compass, and landmarks; terrainappreciation and utilisation; ranger tactics; estimat- ing distances; concealment and excavation In thedark.

Second week

Weapons Training	Firing practice	Combat training
Individual weapons training; lockingand loading; setting up firing posi.tions; aiming at light and muzzleflashwader varying conditions of visibility;emplacing weapons for defense; andpreparing machine gun for action.		Setting up and securing bivouac; unobserved approachto same by alternating squads; night movement;camouflage; second exercise in estimating distances;patrol training; competitive squad exercises; creepIng and crawling; suppression of noises made byequipment; utilisation of terrain under differentlight conditions during the hours of darkness; changeIn concealment and means of orientation at dawn;security of bivouac area at dawn combined withsquad patrol exercises.

Third week

Weapons Training	Firing practice	Combat training
Individual weapons training; rifle andsubmachine gun marksmanship during darkness; aiming weapons atmuzzle flashes and by direction ofsounds.	Night firing	Noiseless removal of obstructions; movement Intoenemy lines; hand-to-hand combat to Include jiu-jitsu, bayonet training, lassoing, clubbing, etc.;approach and withdrawal marches simulating com-bat conditions.

Fourth week

Weapons Training	Firing practice	Combat training
Grenade throwing with practice grenades.	Live grenades (emphasis on precision and long-range throwing).	Deployment from moving columns; transmission ofmessages; maintenance of contact; security patrols; penetration of a position involving hand-to-hand fighting; outflanking a position; defense against counterattack; pursuit; shifting to the defensive;cooperation with supporting weapons; prepared attack at dawn; cross-country march; reinforced point security; orienting and repelling enemy counterattacks; all-around security; employment of heavy weapons; noiseless clearance of obstacles; motorized reconnaissance.

Specialized training, third to eighth week

The entire specialized training program for armored personnel carrier, heavy machine gun, Infantry cannon, mortar and bazooka crews and drivers included In the 8•week schedule must be repeated at night and Incorporated In the light weapons squad training to perfect combined arms teamwork. During firing practice the light weapons squad should, If possible, be placed In such a way that the heavy weapons can fire overhead, even at night, safety considerations permitting.

Fifth week

Firing practice	Combat training
Night firing with small arms and heavy weapons.	Construction of entrenchments; use of entrenching tools; preparation for defense; construction of obstacles; sentry dutyand conduct In position; fire fight; co-operation with heavyweapons in defense; relief and evacuation of a position duringdarkness as a result of an enemy attack; enemy penetration and counterattack; close-combat training; use of armored personnel carriers; approach and return of patrols; night marches; forcedmarches under simulated air attack; establishment of tent camp; precautions against noises, lights at night; retrograde movement under heavy enemy pressure, involving formation of covering force.

Sixth week

Firing practice	Combat training

Night firing; hasty snap- shot firing with rifle, pistol, and submachinegun.	Forest fighting; fighting in inhabited localities; fighting against partisans; night attack against airborne troops; employment of armored personnel carriers and heavy weapons; teamwork with tanks at night; fighting against tanks at night with antitank close-combat weapons; at dawn-preparations for river crossing,crossing on pneumatic floats, establishment of a bridgehead, and defense of the bridgehead.

Seventh week

Firing practice	**Combat training**
Night firing; hasty and snapshot firing with automatic rifle; firing from hip with machinegun.	Combat patrol training; infiltration and raids; hand-to-hand fighting; overpowering garrison occupying a trench; posting of rearguards; overcoming march obstacles, such as mine fields and terrain contamination; attack by infiltrating an enemy position; preparation for defense; dawn attack against MLR.

Eigth week

Firing practice	**Combat training**
	24 hour company problem to Include: daytime assembly; attack. penetration; switch to defensive, and entrenchment; night construction of defensive positions, teamwork with heavy weapons, night supply operations, relief, repelling attack, sealing off penetration, and counterattack; dawn attack with armored personnel carriers and tanks from prepared positlons.

Advanced training, ninth to twelfth week

Repetition of all Important phases and elimination of all deficiencies. Particular emphasis should be placed on squad and platoon firing practice at night, in coordination with heavy weapons and If possible with tanks. Penetration Into prepared positions should be practiced with live ammunition and hand grenades. Night attack by combat patrols should be staged repeatedly with live ammunition. Close antitank combat should be practiced until completely mastered.

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APPENDIX III

EIGHT WEEK NIGHT TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR ANTITANK ELEMENTS

First week

Weapons training	Communication training	Combat training
Looking and loading; aiming and target drill.		Observation and sound detection exercises; night orientation by the moon, stars, compass and prominent terrain features; terrain appreciation and utilisation; ranger tactics; estimating distances; concealment; operation with other arms.

Second week

Weapons training	Communication training	Combat training
Pistol and submachine gun practice (stripping and assembling; lookingand loading); machine gun practice (stripping and assembling, changingbarrel and bolt mechanism); 75-mm.self-propelled antitank gun (strippingand assembling breech and movement mechanism); gun aiming practice.	Servicing of radio equipment; marsags reception; communication at night.	Estimating distances; target reoognition; target designation under varying conditions of visibility; use of entrenching tools; camouflage; Cooperation with other arms.

Third week

Weapons training	Communication training	Combat training
Pistol and submachine gun (looking and loading; unloading); machine gun (locking and loading, unloading, changing barrel and bolt mechanism, moving into position); 75-mm. gun (stripping and assembling breech and movement mechanisms, Immediate action); antitank gun firing practice; maintenance, care, and cleaning,	Sending and receiving messages; types of communications; transmission of clear text messages.	Infantry basic training: security during rest periods; conduct of reoonnaissance patrols; transmission of messages. Antitank training: march, halt, security measures, reconnoitering a suitable emplacement, preparing and maintaining an emplacement.

Fourth week

Weapons training	Communication training	Combat training

Pistol and submachine gun training; machine gun training (Immediate action); 75-mm. gun training; exercise for anti- tank guns with coaxially, mounted machine gun; turret practice; aiming under varying conditions of visibility; assistant gunners training, boresighting.	Radio training- connecting of the equipment components, tuning.	Infantry basic training: reconnaissance patrols; reporting; use of the prismatic compass; entrenchment. Antitank training: destruction of stationary tanks (demolition and incendiary charges); cooperation with other arms; tank destroyer training to Include: moving Into assembly area, reconnaissance of jump-off position.

Fifth week

Weapons training	**Communication training**	**Combat training**
Repetition of preceding week's schedule plus firing practice; turret exercises; aiming practices with artificial lighting; Instruction in mines; handling of ammunition; antiaircraft defense.		Relief at night; conduct during phosphor-shell barrage.

Sixth week

Weapons training	**Communication training**	**Combat training**
Firing practice; exercise with antitank and coaxially mounted machine gun.	Types of communications; transmission of messages; tuning; changes in frequency.	Antitank training; cooperation with attached infantry platoons; fire fights during darkness; pitching grenades from anti-tank gun; unexpected missions.

Seventh week

Weapons training	**Communication training**	**Combat training**
Repetition of previous week's training	Repairing minor defects.	Infantry basic training: setting up tent, construction of huts and temporary shelters. Antitank training: duties in assembly area and jump-off position. duties involving traffic control, night recovery of damaged antitank gun, and night supply.

Eighth week

Weapons training	**Communication training**	**Combat training**

Repetition of previous week's training; combined firing practice and specialized training.	Repetition of signal training.	Antitank training: problems Involving approach march, reconnoitering of an assembly area, reconnoitering of and concentration In a jump-off position; move to alternate position, briefing of forward observers, relief and supply, operations,teamwork with supporting armored Infantry platoon and assault unite duringsimulated elimination of an enemy penetration by counterattack at dawn (anti-tank company supporting armored Infantry battallon).

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APPENDIX IV

TEN WEEK TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR CLOSE COMBAT AT NIGHT

First week

Participants	Night firing practice under simulated combat conditions	Combat training at night
	See Appendices I and II	

Second week

Participants	Night firing practice under simulated combat conditions	Combat training at night
Entire armored reconnaissance unit.	Hand grenade precision and combat throwing; sniper training; hasty firing and firing from hip with immediate follow-up.	Overpowering sentries with and without weapons; defense against bayonet, dagger, rifle butt, shovel thrusts; jiu-jitsu; close antitank combat.
Scouts.		Outpost training; patrol leader training.

Third week

Participants	Night firing practice under simulated combat conditions	Combat training at night
Entire unit.	Sniper training; firing light machine gun while moving; hasty firing and firing from hip at moving targets.	Holds used in hand-to-hand fighting; penetration into position involving close combat.
Scouts.		Eliminating a strong point; cover and concealment; creeping and crawling; construction and removal of hasty obstacles.
Patrols.		Dismounted reconnaissance and fighting; construction and removal of hasty obstacles.

Fourth week

Participants	Night firing practice under simulated combat conditions	Combat training at night
Entire unit.	Sniper training; hand grenade throwing in wooded areas.	Surprise assault in wooded areas.
Scouts.	Hasty firing with pistol and submachine gun.	Three-day field exercise at platoon level; applying all previously learned subjects.

Patrols.	Pistol and submachine gun firing; firing from reconnaissance vehicles.	Night orientation.

Fifth week

Participants	**Night firing practice under simulated combat conditions**	**Combat training at night**
Entire unit.		Reconnaissance patrol; holds used in hand-to-hand fighting; close antitank combat.
Scouts.	Sniper training; light machine gun firing from hip at moving targets.	Combat patrols.
75-mm. gun crews.		Cover and concealment; observation exercises from vehicles; defense against enemyclose combat antitank teams.
Patrols.		Disengagement from enemy with rearguard action; defense against enemy antitank teams.

Sixth week

Participants	**Night firing practice under simulated combat conditions**	**Combat training at night**
Scouts.	Pistol and submachine gun firing; hasty firing and firing from hip with rifle or carbine; firing light machine gun while moving; bayonet training.	House-to-house fighting; combat within a building; raids.
Patrols.	Machine gun practice.	Reconnaissance in forests and inhabited localities.

Seventh week

Participants	**Night firing practice under simulated combat conditions**	**Combat training at night**
Entire unit.	Sniper training; firing at direction of sound, sources of light, muzzle flashes, and poorly illuminated targets.	Close antitank combat.
Scouts.	Advanced defensive firing practice by scout car crews.	
75-mm. gun crews.	Fire fight against enemy surprise attack; advanced combat firing practice at moving targets.	

Eighth week

Participants	Night firing practice under simulated combat conditions	Combat training at night
Entire unit.	Continuous 7-day combat exercise (including night bivouac) of a combined armoredreconnaissance company. One third of the combat exercise must take place duringthe hours of darkness. The following problems should be included: counterthrustsagainst an enemy penetration Involving hand-to-hand fighting; mounted and dis-mounted reconnaissance; limited objective attack at duck; forest fighting; house-to-house combat; combat patrols; demolitions; attack by an armored reconnaissanceplatoon with 75-mm. gun and 80-mm mortar support, involving penetration into enemy position and close combat with live ammunition.	

Ninth week

Participants	Night firing practice under simulated combat conditions	Combat training at night
Scouts.		Feint attack by dismounted armoredreconnaissance platoon, using varioustricks against a powerful enemy; penetration into enemy position and close combat.
Patrols.		Rear guard action by reinforced armored reconnaissance patrols.

Tenth week

Participants	Night firing practice under simulated combat conditions	Combat training at night
Scouts.		Forest fighting and combat In inhabited localities by scout car section; surpriseraid on river crossing sites; use of light signals and other devices.
Patrols.		Rear guard action by armored reconnaissance patrols; use of light signals, etc.

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APPENDIX V
FIGHT WEEK NIGHT TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR ORGANIC ENGINEER ELEMENTS WITHIN THE TANK OR SELF-PROPELLED ANTITANK GUN BATTALION

First week

See Appendices I and II.

Second week

1. Intensified weapons training; target practice with varying degrees of visibility; aiming and firing in combat.

2. Reconnaissance patrol training involving ranger tactics against a simulated enemy; using Prominent land marks for orientation; visual exercises, estimating distances; cover and concealment.

3. Demolition training, including preparation and placing of charges; use of different types of fuzes; connecting wires: and preparing various types of charges.

Third week

1 . Close combat course.

2. Building and camouflaging simple fortifications and setting up barbed wire obstacles.

3. Laying and clearing open and concealed single mines.

4. Moving into an assembly area and securing same; use of hasty obstacles.

6. Reconnoitering roads, detours, resting and assembly areas; methods of marking such areas and controlling traffic.

Fourth week

1. Reconnoitering river-crossing sites and using pneumatic floats to move a combat patrol across a river.

2. Patrolling in forests and across terrain offering poor visibility; methods of breaching mine fields; reporting.

3. Road repair work on the battlefield; crossing swampy terrain, ground pitted with shell craters. sandy stretches, and antitank ditches.

4. Close antitank combat.

Fifth week

1. Disengagement, including preparation of demolitions and mine obstacles.

2. Repelling surprise raids; close combat training.

3. Outpost duties, including security patrolling, sentry duty, and relief.

4. Reconnoitering bridge sites and construction of single-span stringer bridges; construction of approach and exit facilities.

5. Knots and ties.

Sixth week

1. Squad in attack, subsequently switching to the defense, including crossing and building of obstacles and light field fortifications.

2. Practice alerts; operations against enemy airborne troops, including reconnaissance of blocking positions.

3. Combat in wooded areas; combat patrols utilizing engineer equipment; reconnaissance, construction, and crossing of fords.

Seventh week

1. Exercise with vehicles, including loading, motor march, fire fight from and near vehicles.

2. Guarding a defile and repelling an attack in hand-to-hand fighting, including close antitank combat.

3. Combat in inhabitated localities, with emphasis on engineer combat patrol tactics, removal and construction of obstacles.

4. Establishment and defense of strong points.

Eighth week

1. Attack on barriers, including surprise raid and capture of a bridge, and removal of explosive charges.

2. Reconnaissance of bridges and testing their load capacity; reinforcing and widening narrow bridges, repairing damaged bridges.

3. Continuous night-day-night exercise with elements of a tank or antitank sun battalion. including employment of the engineer Platoon for reconnaissance and engineer missions.

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APPENDIX VI
EIGHT WEEK TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR ORGANIC ENGINEER ELEMENTS WITHIN THE ARMORED INFANTRY REGIMENT

Note. Supplement night training schedule for armored infantry troops (App. II) with specialized training program outlined in this schedule.

First week

See Appendix II.

Second week

First exercise: Preparation of cord fuzes; preparing charges for demolitions and for use by combat patrols; knots and ties.

Second exercise: Using pneumatic floats to move combat patrols across a river without making any noise.

Third week

First exercise: Types of charges; preparing charges and fuzes.

Second exercise: Reconnoitering and marking roads; traffic control; testing tonnage capacity of a bridge.

Fourth week

First exercise. Handling antitank and antipersonnel mines; laying and clearing open and concealed mines; constructing barbed-wire obstacles; repairing damaged wire obstacles and closing gaps without delay.

Second exercise: Detection and removal of mines; breaching barbed-wire obstacles.

Third exercise: Planting hasty mine obstacles; constructing road blocks without charges or mines.

Fifth week

First exercise: Constructing platforms for tree snipers and observers.

Second exercise: Detecting and removing demolition charges attached to bridges.

Third exercise: Approach march; crossing difficult terrain (shell craters, swampy terrain, sandy stretches, antitank ditches); preparing organic vehicles to cross same. Retrograde movement; planting mine barriers and preparing mine records.

Sixth week

First exercise: Combat patrol action during which engineer combat equipment is employed; construction of road blocks and barricades; preparing and placing hidden small charges.

Second exercise: Hasty mine laying and clearing exercises.

Third exercise: Reconnoitering crossing and bridge sites; reconnoitering, constructing, and crossing fords; building, equipping, and operating a 4-ton pneumatic-float ferry; construction of footbridges.

Seventh week

First exercise: Attaching demolition charges to small bridges and other objects.

Second exercise: Clearing lanes through mine fields.

Third exercise: Breaching different types of obstacles.

Eighth week

Construction of short emergency bridges; repairing damaged parts of a bridge; reinforcing bridges; building approaches and exits; construction of an 8.5-ton duckboard treadway bridge.

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APPENDIX VII
EIGHT WEEK NIGHT TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR THE ENGINEER PLATOON OF AN ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION

Note. Supplement night training schedule for close combat by night (App. IV) with specialized training program as outlined in this schedule.

First week

See Appendix II.

Second week

1. Strengthening defensive positions by building field fortifications and constructing barbed-wire obstacles.

2. Knots and ties.

Third week

1. Handling different types of detonators; preparing and placing charges, fuzes, and connecting wires.

2. Combat patrol action during which engineer equipment is employed.

3. Preparation and removal of obstacles with and without explosives.

4. Proper use of pneumatic floats and emergency river crossing equipment.

Fourth week

1. Laying and clearing open and concealed mines.

2. Clearing individual mines and lanes through mine fields.

3. Engineer reconnaissance of roads and detours, methods of marking same and guiding troops to their assembly areas.

4. Combat in inhabited localities utilizing engineer equipment: construction and removal of barriers; planting booby traps.

Fifth week

1. Reconnoitering river crossing sites: ferrying motorcycles and heavy weapons on pneumatic floats; building and operating 4-ton pneumatic float ferries: construction of landing stages.

2. Road repair work; crossing of swampy and sandy stretches. terrain pitted with shell craters, and antitank ditches.

3. Constructing platforms for tree snipers and observers.

4. Forest fighting, including preparation and removal of abatis; planting hidden small charges.

Sixth week

1. Construction and camouflage of defensive positions and weapons emplacements for an armored reconnaissance battalion.

2. Attack on and defense of blocking positions.

3. Testing load capacity of bridges.

4. Reconnoitering bridge sites; construction of short bridges: construction of approach and exit facilities: marking roads and controlling traffic near bridge sites.

Seventh week

1. Demolition of small structures with and without explosive charges.

2. Reinforcing and widening narrow bridges; repairing damaged bridges.

3. Reconnoitering, building, and crossing fords.

4. Construction of footbridges and hasty bridges under combat conditions.

Eighth week

Participation in a 7-day combat exercise of a combined armored reconnaissance company with practical application of training subject matter.

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GENERAL REFERENCE MAP

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


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Map 2



THE REGION AROUND SHALA

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Map 5

RUSSIAN INFILTRATION BY NIGHT
(17-21 August 1943)

GERMAN MLR

RUSSIAN THRUSTS

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Map 4



GERMAN PREPARATIONS FOR A NIGHT ATTACK

(30 September-2 October 1941)

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

GERMAN SURPRISE ATTACK BY NIGHT

(21 January 1944)

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Map 6

GERMAN NIGHT WITHDRAWAL
(25-27 September 1943)



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MCDP 1-3

Tactics

U.S. Marine Corps

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FOREWORD

This publication is about winning in combat. Winning requires many things: excellence in techniques, an appreciation of the enemy, exemplary leadership, battlefield judgment, and focused combat power. Yet these factors by themselves do not ensure success in battle. Many armies, both winners and losers, have possessed many or all of these attributes. When we examine closely the differences between victor and vanquished, we draw one conclusion. Success went to the ar- mies whose leaders, senior and junior, could best focus their efforts—their skills and their resources—toward a decisive end. Their success arose not merely from excellence in techniques, procedures, and material but from their leaders' abilities to uniquely and effectively combine them. Winning in combat depends upon tactical leaders who can think creatively and act decisively.

This book pertains equally to all Marine leaders, whether their duties entail combat service support, combat support, or combat arms. It applies to the Marine air-ground task force commander as well as the squadron commander and the fire team leader. All Marines face tactical decisions in battle

regardless of their roles. Tactical leaders must develop and hone their warfighting skills through study and practice. This publication serves as a guide for that professional development. It addresses the theory of tactics and its application in a chaotic and uncertain environment.

The concepts and ideas within this publication are battle-tested. Throughout our history, one of the most important reasons for the success of the United States Marine Corps has been the military skill of our leaders at every level of command. Through their tactical skill and battlefield judgment, our commanders achieved tactical and operational advantage at the decisive time and place.

This publication is a revision of Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-3, *Tactics*, of 1991 and supersedes it. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-3 fully retains the spirit, scope, and basic concepts of its predecessor. MCDP 1-3 further develops and refines some of those concepts; in particular, a new chapter has been added on exploiting success and finishing, and some of the original material has been reorganized and expanded.

Tactics is in consonance with MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, and the other Marine warfighting publications. Presuming an understanding of maneuver warfare, MCDP 1-3 applies it specifically to the tactical level of war. Like MCDP 1, it is not prescriptive but descriptive, providing guidance in the form of

concepts and ideas. This publication establishes the Marine Corps' philosophy for waging and winning battles.

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Tactics

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Chapter 1

Understanding Tactics

"In tactics, the most important thing is not whether you go left or right, but why you go left or right."[1]

—A. M. Gray

"There is only one principle of war and that's this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him the most, when he ain't looking."[2]

—Sir William Slim

This book is about winning in combat. Winning requires a thorough understanding and knowledge of tactics. But what is tactics?

AN ART AND A SCIENCE

Tactics is "the art and science of winning engagements and battles. It includes the use of firepower and maneuver, the integration of different arms and the immediate exploitation of success to defeat the enemy,"[3] as well as the sustainment of forces during combat. It also "includes the *technical* application of combat power, which consists of those techniques and procedures for accomplishing specific tasks *within* a tactical action."[4] This description is from Marine Corps doctrine and reflects our approach to tactics. What does it tell us?

Tactics refers to the concepts and methods we use to accomplish a particular objective in either combat or military operations other than war. In war, tactics is the application of combat power to defeat the enemy in engagements and battles. Combat power is the total destructive force we can bring to bear against the enemy; it is a unique product of a variety of physical, moral, and mental factors.[5] Tactics results in the actions and counteractions between opposing forces. It includes the use of maneuver, supported by the application and coordination of fires, to gain advantage in order to defeat the enemy.

In military operations other than war, tactics may be the schemes and methods by which we perform other missions, such as to control a crowd or to provide a secure environment for the delivery of food, medicine, or supplies to a nation or people in need.

As stated in the definition, tactics is a combination of art and science to gain victory over the enemy. The art of tactics lies in how we creatively form and apply military force in a given situation. It involves the creation, positioning, and maneuver of combat power. When do we flank the enemy, and when do we ambush him? When do we attack, and when do we infiltrate? How do we use speed and momentum to achieve a decisive advantage? This creativity is a developed capacity, acquired through education, practice, and experi- ence.

The science of tactics lies in the technical application of combat power. It includes mastering the techniques and procedures that contribute to the development of warfighting skills such as marksmanship, navigation, gunnery, and close air support. The execution of these techniques and procedures must become second nature for us; this requires intensive and continuous training. Without mastery of basic warfighting skills, artistry and creativity in their application are impossible.

Now that we have examined the art and science of tactics, let us look at how we use tactics to complement strategy and campaigning. Strategy and campaigning bring our forces to a particular place at a particular time. We use tactics to win in combat. A war typically involves many individual engagements that form a continuous fabric of activity. Sometimes a cluster of engagements flows together to make up a battle that may last for hours, days, or even several weeks. Tactical competence is indispensable to victory in such engagements and battles. Leaders at the operational and strategic levels use tactical victories to bring about success in the campaign and, ultimately, in the war as a whole.

In combat, our objective is victory. Sometimes this involves the complete destruction of the enemy's forces; at other times achieving victory may be possible by attacking the enemy's will to fight. The Marine Corps must be equally prepared to win during both situations—those in which the enemy forces must be completely destroyed (as during World War II), and those in which the complete destruction of the enemy's forces may not be necessary or even desirable. As the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division in Des-ert Storm, stated, "Our focus was not on destroying everything. Our focus was on the Iraqi mind and getting behind [it]."[6] He knew that the path to victory did not lie in the total destruction of the Iraqi forces, but in undermining their will to fight.

THE ENVIRONMENT

The tactical arena is a dynamic, ever-changing environment. The complexity of this environment makes combat chaotic and unpredictable. As an example of confusion and chaos on the battlefield, consider the amphibious assault on the island of Tarawa in November 1943.

During the assault, the combination of high casualties, lack of effective communications, and disruption of the 2d and 8th Marine Regiments' landings on the assault beaches led to a chaotic and nearly disastrous situation for the 2d Marine Division. Units were decimated under heavy fire. Surviving Marines huddled together under a coconut log sea wall in intermingled units without effective communications. Landing craft carrying reinforcements and supplies could not make it over a coral reef to the landing beaches. Only through daring leadership, initiative, and teamwork were Marines able to get off the beach and annihilate the defending Japanese force.[7]

The violence of combat only increases the level of confusion and chaos. Robert Sherrod, a *Time* and *Life* correspondent at Iwo Jima, gave testimony to this chaos in what he called "war at its worst":

> The first night on Iwo Jima can only be described as a nightmare in hell. . . . About the beach in the morning lay the

> dead. They had died with the greatest possible violence. Nowhere in the Pacific have I seen such badly mangled bodies. Many were cut squarely in half. Legs and arms lay fifty feet from any body.[8]

Battle is the collision of opposing forces—animate, interactive, and unpredictable in behavior. Performance varies from week to week, day to day, and even hour to hour as a unit interacts with its environment and the enemy.

Military forces are complex systems consisting of individuals and equipment. They interact internally and externally in seemingly chaotic ways. As Clausewitz wrote, "A battalion is made up of individuals, the least important of whom may chance to delay things or . . . make them go wrong."[9] As Marines, we believe the actions of single individuals can have great impact in combat and can also make things go right. For example, Sergeant John Basilone as a machine gunner at Guadalcanal contributed "in large measure to the virtual annihilation of a Japanese regiment."[10] He steadfastly manned his position in the face of repeated wave-type assaults and was instrumental in breaking the enemy's ability to press the attack, forcing them to retreat without achieving their goals.

Battle is also influenced by a variety of external conditions—directions and missions established by authorities, terrain, weather, attitudes of the civilian populace—that often cannot be foreseen. The outcome of combat can only be anticipated in terms of probabilities.

Technology also affects the tactical environment—but not always as anticipated. Technology may reduce uncertainty, and it also may increase it. The Spartans, organized into phalanxes, attacked in close formation, making it easy to see and control one's forces. Today, tactical formations are less well-defined as distances between elements have increased, complicating command and control. Increased weapons lethality, communications range, and tactical mobility cause us to disperse forces over greater distances. War is more fluid as a result of technology. While the machine gun bogged down warfare in World War I, tactical innovations like the tank, the airplane, and the aircraft carrier made warfare more rapid and free-flowing in World War II.

Future battle is likely to become even more chaotic. Although combat in Operation Desert Storm was between fairly well-defined forces in a well-defined space, the forces and operating areas in Vietnam, Somalia, and Grenada were far less well-defined. Enemy units were dispersed and often hidden within the civilian population, making them hard to detect and harder to target. They converged at a time and place of their choosing. Future opponents may choose to fight in this manner to offset our overwhelming superiority in fire- power.

This chaotic environment also brings opportunity. Clausewitz wrote about combat, "No other human activity is so continuously . . . bound up with chance."[11] The challenge is

to recognize opportunity when it occurs in the midst of chaos and uncertainty and to seize it to obtain a clear, unambiguous victory. When viewed through time, even the most chaotic of systems may reveal recurring patterns that may then be exploited. The experienced tactician will look for these recurring patterns that can be exploited to advantage.

HOW WE VIEW COMBAT AND HOW WE FIGHT

How we view the combat environment in large part determines how we operate in it. There are two competing views of combat. Some see it in simple terms as if the battle and the environment represent a closed mechanical system. This "deterministic" view argues that combat is predictable. Among the advocates of this view are military theorists who seek prescriptive rules for battle and analysts who predict battle outcomes based upon force ratios. The other view is that combat is chaotic and uncertain. In this "probabilistic" view, battle is seen as a complex phenomenon in which participants interact with one another and respond and adapt to their environment. The probabilistic viewpoint sees combat as unpredictable. The distinctions between these two views of combat are im-portant. They drive the choices commanders make in combat.

The deterministic view of combat often leads to centralized control. It can be a recipe for micromanagement stifling the initiative subordinates need to deal with combat's inevitable uncertainties. Overly prescriptive orders and plans inhibit a unit's ability to cope with uncertainty and change. Eventually, the unit, inflexible and unable to adapt, may be overwhelmed by events.

The probabilistic view of combat recognizes that the complexity and uncertainty of war leads to a more decentralized approach to control. We place greater trust in subordinates to achieve a desired result. Through use of mission orders and commander's intent, subordinates are able to handle unforeseen situations and exploit opportunities that arise.

Marine Corps tactics are based on the probabilistic view of combat. We must be able to cope with uncertainty and operate in an ever-changing combat environment. We must be flexible and responsive to changes in the situation. There are no fixed rules that can be applied automatically, and every situation is different. As one tactics manual put it more than half a century ago: "The leader who frantically strives to remember what someone else did in some slightly similar situation has already set his feet on a well-traveled road to ruin."[12]

Leaders must remember that there are no fixed rules and no precise checklists, but there are bounds. That is why successful leaders study, train, and exercise their minds to improve tactical proficiency. We study examples of successes and failures

not to emulate someone else's scheme, but to increase our own tactical understanding and competence.

MARINE CORPS TACTICS

The successful execution of Marine Corps tactics hinges on the thoughtful application of a number of tactical concepts so as to achieve success on the battlefield. Key among these concepts are *achieving a decision*, *gaining advantage*, *being faster*, *adapting*, *cooperating*, and *exploiting success*. Each of these concepts is discussed in detail later in this publication. Creative and practical employment of these ideas throughout the planning and execution of tactics leads to success. These concepts are not stand-alone ideas but are to be combined so as to achieve an effect that is greater than their separate sum. Part of the art and science of tactics lies in knowing where and when to apply these concepts and which combinations to use to achieve the desired effect.

The number and definition of these concepts are not fixed, and their order of presentation does not indicate their value. Marines may find in their studies new or slightly different ideas that may be just as important. These ideas are presented in this publication so that readers will think about how to achieve success on the battlefield. These concepts help to provide a

framework for developing a tactical mindset that has long been a hallmark of Marine leaders, from corporal through general.

CONCLUSION

Tactical excellence is the hallmark of a Marine Corps leader. We fight and win in combat through our mastery of both the art and the science of tactics. The art of tactics involves the creative and innovative use of maneuver warfare concepts, while the science of tactics requires skill in basic warfighting techniques and procedures. It is our responsibility as Marine leaders to work continuously to develop our own tactical proficiency and that of our Marines. Understanding the concepts presented in this publication provides a foundation for that development.

Chapter 2

Achieving a Decision

"It follows, then, that the leader who would become a competent tactician must first close his mind to the alluring formulae that well-meaning people offer in the name of victory. To master his difficult art he must learn to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these."[1]

—Infantry in Battle

"We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness, against which we will direct all available combat power. And when the decisive *opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion."*[2]

—FMFM 1, *Warfighting*

Tactics is the employment of units in combat. The objective of tactics is to achieve military success through a decision in battle. Using tactical actions to achieve a decision is central to Marine Corps tactics.

In the past, military forces have often won only incremental gains when they sought victory—taking a hill here or a town there, pushing the front forward a few kilometers, or adding to the body count. Sometimes these incremental gains were the result of a competent enemy or the chaotic nature of war. Many times, however, commanders sought incremental gains as a means to achieve victory. This incrementalist view sees war as a slow, cumulative process and is best exemplified by the grinding attrition tactics seen on the Western Front in World War I. There the opponents were more or less evenly matched, and their tactics resulted in indecisive action. In Vietnam, where the opposing forces were quite dissimilar in their military capabilities, the incremental approach led to the U.S.'s overreliance on firepower and body counts. This, in turn, led to the conduct of military operations that were often irrelevant to the outcome of the war, even though a comparison of casualty ratios appeared favorable.

Therefore, the Marine Corps has embraced a more flexible, imaginative, and effective way to wage war: maneuver warfare. Marine success with this approach has been demonstrated in places like Grenada and the Persian Gulf. In contrast to tactics based on incremental attrition, tactics in maneuver warfare always aims at decisive action.

This does not mean, however, that combat should be viewed as a bloodless ballet of movement. Combat, especially at the tactical level of war, will be characterized by tough, brutal, and desperate engagements. We must remember that war is a violent clash of two opposing wills in which each side is trying to wrest advantage from the other. Our future enemies may not allow us to gain, maintain, or employ technological or numerical superiority. The future battle may be bloody and tough, and that makes it vitally important that Marine leaders strive to develop tactical proficiency.

What do we mean by achieving a decision? Take a moment to compare these two historical examples.

ANZIO: A MODEL OF TACTICAL INDECISIVENESS

In late 1943, the Allies were searching for a way to alleviate the stalemate in Italy. The campaign had stalled around the Cassino front and resembled the trench warfare of World War I. In order to keep the pressure on the Germans, bypass the stubborn German defenses at Cassino, and capture Rome, a bold operation was envisioned. The U.S. Army's 3d Division and the British Army's 1st Division would make an amphibious landing at Anzio, about 35 miles south of Rome. (See figure.)


Indecisiveness: Anzio, 1944. THE OPPORTUNITY
Allied Front Line
Gustav Line
Enemy Assault Units
0
15
30
Miles
Adriatic Sea
Pescara
Ortona
XXX
LXXVI
XXX
5
XX
305 (+)
Group Hauk
XXX
13
Rome
XXX
Prcht
Highway No 5
Highway No 6
XXX
XIV
XXX
FEC
Cassino
Highway No 7
Anzio
Nettuno
XXX
II
XXX
10
N
XXX
VI
Tyrrhenian Sea
Naples

The Allies achieved complete surprise by landing at Anzio on January 22, 1944. Under the command of the U.S. Army's Major General Lucas, the Americans and British quickly established a beachhead and rapidly advanced 3 miles inland by midmorning against light German resistance. With the majority of their forces concentrated farther south around Cassino, the Germans could not possibly reinforce the Anzio beachhead until January 23d or 24th. If the Allies pressed their advantage, the road to Rome lay virtually undefended. The seizure of Rome would have had the effect of isolating the German defenders in the south and firmly establishing Allied control over Italy.

Yet General Lucas delayed. Concerned about being overextended and wanting to build up his logistics ashore, Lucas failed to press his initial advantage of surprise and allowed the Germans to reinforce the Anzio area. Not until January 29th did Lucas feel strong enough to make an offensive bid, but by that time it was too late. The Germans had arrived in force and had seized the dominating high ground in the beachhead area. Not only was the Allied offensive at Anzio stalled, but the Germans had seized the initiative and quickly threatened to drive the Americans and British back into the sea (see figure).

As a result, the Allies did not complete the reduction of the German defenses in southern Italy and capture Rome until



several months later. General Lucas lost a tremendous opportunity to exploit an initial success and gain a decisive result.[3]

CANNAE: A CLEAR TACTICAL DECISION ACHIEVED

On August 2, 216 B.C., the Carthaginian general Hannibal fought the Roman army under the command of Terentius Varro near the city of Cannae in southern Italy. Hannibal based his tactics on the specific characteristics of both forces and on the aggressive personality of the Roman commander.

As dawn broke, Hannibal drew up his force of 50,000 veterans with his left flank anchored on the Aufidus river, secured from envelopment by the more numerous Romans. His center contained only a thin line of infantry. His main force was concentrated on the flanks. His left and right wings each contained deep phalanxes of heavy infantry. Eight thousand cavalry tied the left of his line to the river. Two thousand cavalry protected his open right flank. Eight thousand men guarded his camp in the rear.

Varro and more than 80,000 Romans accepted the challenge. Seeing the well-protected Carthaginian flanks, Varro dismissed any attempt to envelop. He decided to crush his opponent by sheer weight of numbers. He placed 65,000 men in his center; 2,400 cavalry on his right; and 4,800 cavalry on his left and sent 11,000 men to attack the Carthaginian camp.

Following preliminary skirmishes, Hannibal moved his light center line forward into a salient against the Roman center. (See A in figure.) Then, his heavy cavalry on the left crushed


Decisiveness: Cannae, 216 BC
Roman cavalry destroyed
Roman forces advance.
Carthaginian cavalry's route
Roman allies' cavalry
Carthaginians withdraw as planned.
A
Aufidus River
Allies' cavalry flees.
Numidian pursuit
Carthaginian cavalry attacks Roman rear.
B
Aufidus River

the opposing Roman cavalry and swung completely around the Roman rear to attack the Roman cavalry on the other flank. The Roman cavalry fled the field.

The Carthaginian heavy cavalry then turned back to assault the rear of the dense Roman infantry who had pressed back Hannibal's thin center line. At the same time, Hannibal wheeled his right and left wings into the flanks of the Roman center. The Romans were boxed in, unable to maneuver or use their weapons effectively. (See B in figure on page 21.) Between 50,000 and 60,000 Romans died that day as Varro's army was destroyed.

UNDERSTANDING DECISIVENESS

What do these examples tell us about achieving a decision?

First, achieving a decision is *important*. An indecisive battle wastes the lives of those who fight and die in it. It wastes the efforts of those who survive as well. All the costs—the deaths, the wounds, the sweat and effort, the equipment destroyed or used up, the supplies expended—are suffered for little gain. Such battles have no meaning except for the comparative losses and perhaps an incremental gain for one side or the other.

Second, achieving a decision is *not easy*. History is litter- ed with indecisive battles. Sometimes it was enemy skill and determination that prevented even a victorious commander from achieving the decision he sought. In other cases, commanders fought a battle without envisioning a larger result for their actions. Sometimes, even with a vision of making the battle decisive, they could not achieve their goals due to the chaos and friction that is the nature of war and makes decisive victory so difficult.

That leads to the third lesson our examples point out. To be decisive, a battle or an engagement *must lead to a result beyond itself*. Within a battle, an action that is decisive must lead directly to winning in the campaign or war as a whole. *For the battle to be decisive, it must lead directly to a larger success in the war as a whole*.

On the other hand, we must not seek decisiveness for its own sake. We do not, after all, seek a decision if it is likely to be against us. We seek to ensure—insofar as this is possible, given the inherent uncertainties of war—that the battle will go our way. We have stacked the deck in our favor before the cards are laid on the table. Otherwise, to seek decisive battle is an irresponsible gamble.

When we seek battle, we must seek victory: accomplishment of the assigned mission that leads to further significant gains for the force as a whole. At Anzio, the Allied aim was to break the stalemate in the south, opening up a southern front

that would force Germany to move additional forces from the defense of Normandy. This weakening of the Normandy defenses would support our planned invasion of France later that same year. At Cannae, Carthage won one round in its long contention with Rome for the domination of the Mediterranean. These tactical battles were planned for their overall operational and strategic effect. The consequences of a tactical engagement should lead to achieving operational and strategic goals.

MILITARY JUDGMENT

Once we understand what is meant by the term decisive and why it is important to seek a decision, a question naturally arises: How do we do it?

There is no easy answer to that question; each battle will have its own unique answers. As with so much in warfare, it depends on the situation. No formula, process, acronym, or buzzword can provide the answer. Rather, the answer is in military judgment, in the ability of the commander to understand the battlefield and act decisively. Military judgment is a developed skill that is honed by the wisdom gained through experience. Combined with situational awareness, military judgment allows us to identify emerging patterns, discern critical vulnerabilities, and concentrate combat power.

Understanding the Situation

The first requirement of a commander is to understand the situation. The successful tactician studies the situation to develop in his mind a clear picture of what is happening, how it got that way, and how it might further develop. Consid- ering the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available (METT-T), the commander must think through all actions, determine the desired result, and ascertain the means to achieve that result. Part of the commander's thinking should also include assuming the role of the enemy, considering what the enemy's best course of action may be, and deciding how to defeat it. Thinking through these elements helps the commander develop increased situational awareness.

Based on this understanding of the situation, the commander can begin to form a mental image of how the battle might be fought. Central to the commander's thinking must be the question, "In this situation, what efforts will be decisive?" The commander asks this question not just once, but repeatedly as the battle progresses. The commander must also address possible outcomes and the new situations that will result from those possibilities. As the situation changes, so will the solution and the actions that derive from it.

For every situation, the leader must decide which of the countless and often confusing pieces of information are important and reliable. The leader must determine what the enemy is trying to do and how to counter his efforts. The leader's skill is

essentially one of *pattern recognition*, the ability, after seeing only a few pieces of the puzzle, to fill in the rest of the picture correctly. Pattern recognition is the ability to understand the true significance and dynamics of a situation with limited information. Pattern recognition is a key skill for success on the battlefield.

Tactics requires leaders to make decisions. A leader must make decisions in a constantly changing environment of friction, uncertainty, and danger. Making effective decisions and acting on those decisions faster than the enemy is a crucial element of Marine Corps tactics.

Sometimes there may be time to analyze situations deliberately and to consider multiple options. Comparing several options and selecting the best one is known as analytical decisionmaking. When time allows a commander to apply analytical decisionmaking—usually before an engagement or battle begins—the commander should make the most of it.

Once engaged, however, the commander finds time is short and the need for speed paramount. In some cases, speeding up the analytical decisionmaking process may be sufficient; however, in most cases intuitive decisionmaking is needed to generate and maintain tempo. Intuitive decisionmaking relies on a commander's intuitive ability to recognize the key elements of a particular problem and arrive at the proper decision without having to compare multiple options. Intuition is not some

mysterious quality. Rather, it is a developed skill, firmly grounded in experience, and one that can be further developed through education and practice. It is not without some risk, however, and leaders should use the decisionmaking style that works for them.

Leaders with strong situational awareness and broad experience can act quickly because they have an intuitive understanding of the situation, know what needs to be done, and know what can be done. This insight has often been called *coup d'oeil* (pronounced koo dwee), a French term meaning literally "stroke of the eye." It has also been called "tactical sense."

Union Army Brigadier General John Buford's approach to the battle of Gettysburg offers a good example of understanding the battle so that it leads to a decision. Arriving at Gettysburg with a division of cavalry on the morning of June 30, 1863, Buford saw Confederate forces approaching from the northwest. With the bulk of the Union forces still some miles away, Buford was able to conceptualize the coming battle in his mind. From his position on a hill outside town, he could see that early seizure of the high ground west of Gettysburg was critical to giving the Army of the Potomac time to mass its forces. Occupation of this high ground would also preserve the tactical advantage of the high ground to Buford's rear for the Union Army once they arrived on the battlefield. Buford also knew that if the Confederates were allowed to mass their forces


Visualizing the Battle: Gettysburg, 1863
Oak Hill
Carlisle Road
Mummasburg Road
UNFINISHED R.R.
Cashtown Road
HETH
Willoughby Run
BUFORD
McPherson's Woods
GETTYSBURG
York Pike
N
Hagerstown Road
Seminary Ridge
Rock Creek
Culp's Hill
Cemetery Hill
REYNOLDS
Cemetery Ridge
Taneytown Road
Baltimore Pike
Emmitsburg Road
0 500 1000
Yards

first around the high ground to the south and west, Lee would have the advantage over the arriving Union forces. (See figure.)

Quickly spreading out one brigade west of town along McPherson Ridge, General Buford settled in to defend Gettysburg until the arrival of Union reinforcements. On July 1st, the following day, he held his ground against a division of Confederate infantry supported by artillery until General John Reynolds' Second Corps came up and reinforced the line. General Buford's ability to foresee the coming battle, take quick action in the disposition of his forces, and hold the high ground until reinforced was one of the decisive actions that defeated the Army of Northern Virginia at the battle of Get- tysburg.[4] Buford's actions at Gettysburg demonstrated an exceptional ability to grasp the essence of a tactical situation through the skills of pattern recognition and intuitive deci- sionmaking.

Acting Decisively

Our ability to understand the situation is useless if we are not prepared to act decisively. When the opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion. The keys to this effort are identifying enemy critical vulnerabilities, shaping the operating area to our advantage, designating a main effort to focus our combat power, and acting in a bold and ruthless manner.

Critical Vulnerabilities. For battlefield success, it is not enough to generate superior combat power. We must focus that combat power. We must concentrate our efforts on a *critical vulnerability*, that is, a vulnerability which permits us to destroy some capability without which the enemy cannot function effectively.

Seeking the enemy's vulnerabilities means striking with our strength against his weakness (rather than his strength) and at a time when the enemy is not prepared. This is where we can often cause the greatest damage at the lowest cost to ourselves. In practical terms, this often means avoiding his front, where his attention is focused, and striking his flanks and rear, where he does not expect us.

Just because a target is vulnerable does not, however, mean that it is worth attacking. We must direct our resources and strike at those capabilities that are *critical* to the enemy's ability to function—to defend, attack, or sustain himself, or to command his forces. We must focus our efforts on those critical vulnerabilities that will bend the enemy to our will most quickly.

At the lower tactical level, this may mean using fire and maneuver to take out a machine gun position that is the backbone of an enemy defense. It may mean using a gap in the enemy's fields of fire that allows us to get into the rear of his position. It may mean exploiting the enemy's lack of air defenses by calling in close air support. It may mean taking advantage of an

enemy's lack of mobility by rapidly overrun- ning a key position faster than he can respond. It may mean interdicting enemy resupply routes when his supplies are running short. It may mean exploiting a lack of long-range weapons by employing standoff tactics. Whatever we determine the enemy's critical vulnerability to be, we must be prepared to rapidly take advantage of it.

There is no formula for determining critical vulnerabilities. Each situation is different. Critical vulnerabilities will rarely be obvious. This is one of the things that make mastery of tactics so difficult and one reason that so few actions achieve a decisive outcome. Identifying critical vulnerabilities is an important prerequisite to achieving a decision.

Shaping the Operating Area. Once we have developed an understanding of the situation and have determined enemy critical vulnerabilities to attack, we try to shape the operating area to our advantage. Shaping includes both lethal and nonlethal activities such as planning fires to fix the enemy, using an axis of advance to facilitate movement, designating objectives to focus our combat power, or using deceptive measures to reinforce enemy expectations. Shaping activities can make the enemy vulnerable to attack, impede or divert his attempts to maneuver, facilitate the maneuver of friendly forces, and otherwise dictate the time and place for decisive battle. Shaping forces the enemy to adopt courses of action favorable to us. We attempt to shape events in a way that allows us several options, so that by the time the moment for decisive action arrives, we

have not restricted ourselves to only one course of action. Through shaping we gain the initiative, preserve momentum, and control the tempo of combat.

Main Effort. The main effort is a central maneuver warfare concept: concentrating efforts on achieving objectives that lead to victory. Of all the actions going on within our command, we recognize one as the most critical to success at that moment. The unit assigned responsibility for accomplishing this key mission is designated as the main effort—the focal point upon which converges the combat power of the force.

The main effort receives priority for support of any kind. It must be clear to all other units in the command that they must support that unit in the accomplishment of its mission. The main effort becomes a harmonizing force for a subordinate's initiative. Faced with a decision, we ask ourselves: *How can I best support the main effort?*

Some actions may support the main effort indirectly. For example, a commander may use other forces to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main effort. Marine forces used this concept extensively in conducting a series of combined arms raids prior to the ground offensive in Operation Desert Storm. The raids were to confuse the Iraqis as to the true position and intention of Allied forces. "The raid force appeared in the middle of the night and fired from positions the enemy had every right to believe were unoccupied."[5]

Use of a main effort implies the use of *economy of force.* This term does *not* mean that we use as little force as we think we can get away with. Rather, it means that we must not fail to make effective use of all of the assets available to us. Forces not in a position to directly support the main effort should be used to indirectly support it. Such forces might be used to distract the enemy or to tie down enemy forces that might otherwise reinforce the threatened point. Uncommitted forces can be used in this effort by maneuvering them in feints and demonstrations that keep the enemy off balance.

While a commander always designates a main effort, it may shift during the course of a battle as events unfold. Because events and the enemy are unpredictable, few battles flow exactly as the commander has planned. As a result, the commander must make adjustments. One way is by redesignating the main effort. For example, if Company A is desig- nated as the main effort but runs into heavy enemy resistance while the adjacent Company B makes a breakthrough that exploits a critical vulnerability, the battalion commander may designate Company B as the main effort. This new designation of Company B as the main effort must not, however, be merely nominal. It means that the combat power which was supporting Company A now shifts to support Company B.

Identifying the main effort is the principal and most important answer to the question, “How do we achieve a decision?”

Boldness and Ruthlessness. Forcing a successful decision requires the commander to be bold and ruthless. Boldness refers to daring and aggressiveness in behavior. It is one of the basic requirements for achieving clear-cut outcomes: In order to try for victory, we must *dare* to try for victory. We must have a desire to "win big," even if we realize that in many situations the conditions for victory may not yet be present. Ruthlessness refers to pursuing the established goal mercilessly and single-mindedly. This is doubly important once we gain an advantage. Once we have an advantage, we should exploit it to the fullest. We should not ease up, but instead increase the pressure. Victory in combat is rarely the product of the initial plan, but rather of ruthlessly exploiting any advantage, no matter how small, until it succeeds.

Boldness and ruthlessness must be accompanied by strong leadership and tempered by sound judgment. Without these qualities, boldness can become recklessness, and ruthlessness can be distorted into cruelty.

CONCLUSION

As Marine leaders, whether of fire teams or of a Marine expeditionary force, we are responsible for achieving success. In combat, the success we seek is victory—not merely a partial or

marginal outcome that forestalls the final reckoning, but a victory that settles the issue in our favor.

To be victorious, we must work ceaselessly in peacetime to develop in ourselves a talent for military judgment—the ability to understand a situation and act decisively. Military judgment results from the wisdom gained from experience. It allows us to identify patterns of activity and to concentrate our efforts against a critical vulnerability that will bend the enemy to our will. We must sharpen our ability to make decisions intuitively based on our understanding of the situation.

Chapter 3

Gaining Advantage

"In war the power to use two fists is an inestimable asset. To feint with one fist and strike with the other yields an advantage, but a still greater advantage lies in being able to interchange them—to convert the feint into the real blow if the opponent uncovers himself."[1]

—B. H. Liddell Hart

"The challenge is to identify and adopt a concept of warfighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war and the realities of the modern battlefield. What exactly does this require? It requires a concept of warfighting that will function effectively in an uncertain, chaotic, and fluid environment—in fact, one that will exploit these conditions to advantage."[2]

—FMFM 1, *Warfighting*

A basic principle of martial arts is to use the opponent's strength and momentum against him to gain more leverage than one's own muscles alone can generate, thereby gaining an advantage. The same concept applies to tactics. We strive to gain an advantage over our adversary by exploiting every aspect of a situation to help us to achieve victory, not by overpowering him with our own strength. This chapter will discuss several different ways of generating leverage to gain advantage over the enemy.

Consider the American Indian ambush technique. A small number of warriors would draw a superior force of pursuing cavalry into a canyon or similar close terrain. There a larger force of warriors, lying in wait, would quickly surround and ambush the soldiers, who thought they had been pursuing a retreating enemy. By exploiting the cavalry's initial advantages of strength and momentum, the American Indians were able to seize the initiative and gain the advantage through the use of this classic ambush method.

COMBINED ARMS

The use of combined arms is a key means of gaining advantage. It is based on the idea of presenting the enemy not merely with a problem, but with a *dilemma*—a no-win sit-uation. We combine supporting arms, organic fires, and maneuver in such

a way that any action the enemy takes to avoid one threat makes him more vulnerable to another.[3] For example, an entrenched enemy should discover that if he stays hunkered down in fighting holes, Marine artillery and air will blast him out. If he comes out to attack, Marine infantry will cut him down. If he tries to retreat, Marine armor and airpower will pursue him to his destruction. *That* is combined arms.

A good example of the use of combined arms at the squad level would be the squad leader positioning squad automatic weapons and grenade launchers to provide support by fire while infantrymen with rifles assault the position. The firepower from the automatic weapons keeps the enemy in their fighting holes while grenades make those holes untenable. These supporting fires keep the enemy from reacting effectively to our maneuvering infantry force. The enemy forces are placed in a no-win situation.

Modern tactics is combined arms tactics. That is, it combines the effects of various arms—infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation—to achieve the greatest possible effect against the enemy. Artillery and infantry, for example, are normally employed together because of their mutually reinforcing capabilities—the infantry provides close support to the artillery, protecting them from dismounted threats, while the artillery provides the infantry with timely, close, accurate, and continuous fire support. The strengths of the arms complement and reinforce each other. At the same time, the weaknesses and

vulnerabilities of each arm are protected or offset by the capabilities of the other.

While a division commander in 1941, General Patton had the following comments regarding combined arms:

> There is still a tendency in each separate unit . . . to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire . . . . That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get harmony in music each instrument must support the others. To get harmony in battle, each weap- on must support the other. Team play wins.[4]

The Marine air-ground task force is a perfect example of a balanced combined arms team. Combined arms tactics is standard practice and second nature for all Marines.

MANEUVER

Maneuver provides us a means to gain an advantage over the enemy. In too many battles, one or both sides have sought to gain advantage in combat through firepower and attrition. In World War I, one side would rush across no-man's-land under murderous fire and attempt to push an opponent off desired

terrain. If the attack succeeded—and few did—the evicted forces counterattacked in the same manner, usually reoccupying the same terrain they had before. These battles were firepower and attrition contests, and the advantage lay with the side that had the most personnel and equipment to expend. The cost in casualties and equipment was high and often produced no decisive results. We want to avoid this type of engagement.

Traditionally, maneuver has meant moving in a way that gains positional advantage. For example, we may maneuver by enveloping an exposed enemy flank or by denying the enemy terrain critical to his goals. We may maneuver by threatening the enemy's lines of communications and forcing him to withdraw. We may maneuver by seizing a position which allows us to bring effective fire to bear against the enemy but which protects us against enemy fires. We may maneuver in other dimensions as well. For instance, we may also maneuver in time by increasing relative speed and operating at a faster tempo than the enemy. Normally we maneuver both in time and space to gain advantage and, ultimately, victory at the least possible cost.

EXPLOITING THE ENVIRONMENT

The use of the environment offers tremendous opportunities to gain advantage over the enemy. We must understand the characteristics of any environment where we may have to operate:

jungle, desert, mountain, arctic, riverine, or urban. More importantly, we must understand how the effects of terrain, weather, and periods of darkness or reduced visibility impact on our own and our adversary's ability to fight.

Terrain

Our objective is to employ tactics that makes terrain an advantage to us and a disadvantage to our opponent. Terrain impacts on our maneuver and influences our tactical disposi- tions. We must understand terrain and comprehend its effects, as it may limit our movement, reduce our visibility, or restrict our fires. We must understand what effects it has on the enemy and on his abilities to detect or engage us. We must be aware that the enemy also seeks advantage from terrain. We must understand that terrain shapes the enemy's maneuver and dispositions as well as our own.

Lieutenant Harrol Kiser of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, knew how to use terrain to gain an advantage. In November 1950, his company was ordered to seize a key piece of terrain at Toktong Pass during the march out of the Chosin Reservoir area. Lieutenant Kiser had only 20 Marines left in his platoon, and the pass was heavily defended by the Chinese. Using a flanking ridgeline to conceal his approach, Lieutenant Kiser skillfully enveloped the enemy from the rear and quickly routed the Chinese out of their well-entrenched position.[5] Today, as in Korea, the intelligent use of terrain has become a standard practice for Marines.

Weather

Adverse weather—cold, heat, rain—impedes combat operations. The military unit that is best prepared to operate in these conditions will gain an advantage over its opponent. During the breakout from Chosin Reservoir in November 1950, Marines demonstrated time and time again the ability to use harsh weather to their advantage over a determined enemy. The assault of Able Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, on Hill 1081 in a blinding snowstorm is such an example. Despite visibility of only 25 yards, the company was able to coordinate a combined arms attack and envelop this key piece of terrain that blocked the breakout of the 1st Marine Regiment. Using a snowstorm to mask its movement, Able Company surprised and annihilated the Chinese defenders, thereby opening a route for the rest of the division.[6]

If we are to use weather to our advantage, we must train and prepare rigorously to operate in all climatic conditions. We must be able to operate our equipment and employ our weapons effectively in hot, cold, or wet environments—literally in every clime and place.

Periods of Darkness or Reduced Visibility

Units that can operate effectively during hours of darkness or periods of reduced visibility often gain significant advantage over their opponent. Reduced visibility can make the simplest of tasks difficult to accomplish. This obvious disadvantage can be turned on its head and used to our advantage by a

commander whose forces are trained, equipped, able, and willing to operate at night. Night operations can produce great gains against a force that cannot or will not operate at night. Operating during periods of reduced visibility creates tempo by adding another 10 to 12 hours to the day for fighting. The psychological impact of night fighting is also great and can produce significant rewards.

A good example of the tactical impact of night attacks is found in the battle for Okinawa during World War II. Marine forces were essentially stalemated by the presence of a strong Japanese defensive line in the coral ridges of southern Okinawa. After days of ineffective attacks by the 7th Marine Regiment, the regimental commander elected to attack under cover of darkness. At 0330 on 12 June 1945, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 7th Marines advanced, using a road that intersected the ridge as a guide. Colonel Edward W. Snedecker, Commanding Officer of the 7th Marines at the time, noted:

> . . . two companies, one from each [of] the 1st and 2d Battalions, got across the valley during the night into position [on the ridge]. Early in the morning when the Japanese came out to cook breakfast, they found a little bit of a surprise . . . [for] them.[7]

The Japanese defenders were not used to U.S. forces attacking at night. The use of darkness allowed Marines to occupy positions along the crest of Kunishi Ridge literally without firing a shot. From these positions, the Marines dislodged the

enemy from their entrenched positions and moved onward until the Japanese defenders were annihilated.[8]

COMPLEMENTARY FORCES

Complementary forces—the idea of fix-and-flank—are an important way of gaining advantage. The idea behind complementary forces is to use our forces as a nutcracker. We seek to crush the enemy between two or more actions. Consider the case of an enemy rifleman firing from behind a tree. If one Marine fires from the front, the enemy rifleman is protected by the tree. If the Marine maneuvers and attempts to fire from behind, the enemy rifleman merely moves to the other side of the tree to maintain his protection. However, two Marines can place our opponent in a dilemma. One can fire from the front while the other sneaks around and fires at the enemy from the flank or rear. The opponent is now vulnerable to one or the other of the two Marines. He cannot use the tree for protection against both.

The same idea applies in air-to-air tactics. Upon detecting enemy aircraft, a flight of fighters splits into two or more elements beyond air-to-air missile range. They approach the enemy aircraft from multiple directions and varying altitudes. No matter how the enemy aircraft moves—dives, climbs, turns, or twists—it is exposed.

Sun Tzu described this concept as the *cheng* and the *ch'i*.[9] The *cheng* is the more direct, obvious action. It fixes the enemy. The *ch'i* is the unexpected or extraordinary action. It is the bid for a decision, or, as we call it today, the main effort. These two actions work together against the enemy. The two actions are inseparable and can be interchangeable in battle; the *cheng* may become the *ch'i*. The concept is basic, but it can be implemented in a variety of combinations limited only by our imagination.

SURPRISE

Achieving surprise can greatly increase leverage. In fact, surprise can often prove decisive. We try to achieve surprise through deception, stealth, and ambiguity.

"War is based on deception,"[10] stated Sun Tzu. We use deception to mislead our opponents with regard to our real intentions and capabilities. By employing deception, we try to cause our opponents to act in ways that will eventually prove prejudicial for them. We may use deception to mislead the enemy as to the time and location of our pending attack. We may use deception to create the impression that our forces are larger than they really are. We hope the enemy will realize this deception only when it is too late for them to react.

Marines have often relied on deception to mislead the enemy in regard to the location of amphibious landings. Marines used deception to create the illusion of force where there was none in Operation Desert Storm. Lieutenant General Boomer stated the situation which necessitated an extensive deception operation: "We're taking on 11 Iraqi divisions with two Marine divisions. Our force ratios are horrible. We don't want him to know that. . . ."[11] The Marines created Task Force Troy: 460 Marines imitated the activities of a 16,000-man division using loudspeakers, dummy tanks and artillery, and helicopters conducting simulated resupply.

Surprise can be generated through stealth. Stealth is used to advantage when maneuvering against an enemy. It provides less chance of detection by the enemy, leaving him vulnerable to surprise action for which he may be unprepared. Marines may also employ stealth by lying in wait for an approaching enemy—an ambush. The ambush is perhaps the most effective means of surprising opponents, especially at the lower tactical level where surprise through stealth is easiest to achieve.

We can also achieve surprise through ambiguity. It is usually difficult to conceal all our movements from the enemy, but we can sometimes confuse him as to the meaning of what he sees. Sun Tzu said:

> The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great

> many places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few.[12]

Ambiguity was central to the tactics of the World War II German *blitzkrieg*. An attack in *blitzkrieg* involved multiple thrusts with reinforcements following whichever thrusts were most successful. The multitude of thrusts created paralyzing uncertainty because the opponent could not determine which constituted the real attack. There was nothing secret about the German attack, but it was ambiguous on a massive scale.

TRAPPING THE ENEMY

Modern tactics is based not on pushing the enemy, but on trapping him—another excellent way of gaining advantage. Trapping is the desired result of the application of combined arms, fire and maneuver, or complementary forces tactics.

Why do we want to trap the enemy instead of just push him? A pushing contest is seldom decisive. The side that is pushed out comes back the next day still full of fight. We have to fight him again and again. Unfortunately, in Vietnam, many of our battles were pushing battles. We were always able to push the enemy off the ground he held and to inflict casualties on him. He just withdrew, regrouped, replaced his losses, and came

back to fight us again. The result was a series of indecisive actions and a seemingly endless war.

However, if we can trap our enemy, we have a better opportunity to win decisively. Many of history's decisive battles have been trapping actions. Recall how the Roman legions were trapped at Cannae or the German divisions at Stalingrad? Trapping gains advantage by disrupting the enemy's mental process while he attempts to think through the dilemma we have placed him in. Trapping allows us to gain and maintain the initiative as the enemy is forced to react to our actions. It can also temporarily undermine the enemy's will to resist when he is at his weakest—while we continue to press the attack and our initiative.

A good example of trapping from the Vietnam conflict occurred during Operation Dewey Canyon. (See figure.) North Vietnamese activity along the Laotian-South Vietnamese border increased dramatically in early January 1969. Large enemy convoys, including armored vehicles, regularly traveled from Laos into South Vietnam, threatening friendly units. Colonel Robert H. Barrow and his 9th Marines responded with Operation Dewey Canyon.

The three battalions of the 9th Regiment crossed the Da Krong River on February 11th and 12th. The Third and First Battalions moved south-southeast through the mountainous terrain toward Laos. Second Battalion, to the west, swung south-southwest, turning east astride the south Vietnam-Laos



border. The North Vietnamese forces moving along Route 922 from Laos into the A Shau Valley were trapped between the three battalions. The North Vietnamese were mauled as a

result. Their equipment losses were staggering. More importantly, Operation Dewey Canyon destroyed a North Vietnamese base area and so disrupted their logistics that it forced them to abandon their planned spring offensive in I Corps' area.[13]

DEVELOPING AN AMBUSH MENTALITY

Perhaps the most common tactical tool for gaining advantage is the ambush. All Marines are familiar with an ambush as a type of combat patrol.[14] In maneuver warfare, ambush takes on a much broader meaning, and the *development of the ambush mentality* is integral to maneuver warfare tactics.

The ambush mentality is probably not new to most of us. We may have employed the ambush mentality in sports. In football, the trap block is an ambush. A player pulls an offensive lineman off the line, leaving a hole. When a defender comes through the hole, another lineman suddenly blocks him from the side, usually knocking him down. The players have blind-sided him. That is the ambush mentality.

In basketball, setting up a pick is an ambush. As one teammate drives to the basket, another steps into the defender's path from behind, blocks the path, stops the defense, and

momentarily clears the lane to the basket for the other teammate. Again, that is the ambush mentality.

In combat, we move our reinforced squad into position along a well-traveled trail. We position flank security to protect ourselves and give identification and warning of enemy movements down the trail. We position our weapons so as to concentrate our fires into a "kill zone" and to seal off exits, forcing the enemy to remain subject to our fires. The squad waits in position until signaled when they immediately respond with concentrated, sustained fires on enemy forces trapped in the kill zone. The enemy, surprised into inaction, unsure of what to do or where to move, is annihilated. Fires are maintained until all the enemy are killed or until signaled to stop. That is the ambush mentality.

The ambush mentality tries to turn every situation into an ambush. In this broader context, an ambush has several distinct features.

First, in an ambush we try to *surprise the enemy*. Think of a patrol that we ambush. Our enemies are walking through the woods when suddenly, out of nowhere, they are under fire from multiple directions. They are taking heavy casualties. The psychological impact of surprise may paralyze their thoughts and actions, leaving them incapable of reacting effectively. To have an ambush mentality means we always try to surprise the enemy, to do the unexpected. Surprise is the rule rather than the exception.

Second, we want to *draw our enemy unknowingly into a trap*. This will often involve deceiving him. We make one course of action appear inviting. When he takes that course of action, we are waiting for him.

Third, an ambush is *invisible*. If the ambush is not invisible, it ceases to be an ambush and instead becomes a target for the enemy. Whether we are defending or attacking, the enemy must not detect us until it is too late for him to react. Surprise often depends upon invisibility. That invisibility may be provided through stealth in movement or in focusing the enemy's attention elsewhere to allow our forces to maneuver without detection.

The reverse slope defense is an example of using invisibility to spring an ambush. The enemy does not know we are there until he comes over the crest of a hill and is hit by our fires. His vehicles are hit on their soft underbellies. His troops are fully exposed to our weapons. Because he could not see us until the last moment, he could not call in artillery fire on our position. The reverse slope not only protects us from his direct fire; it protects us from his observation and thus his indirect fire. That is part of the ambush mentality: *Do not let yourself be seen*.

Fourth, in an ambush we want to *shock the enemy*. Instead of taking him under fire gradually with a few weapons at long range, we wait until he is within easy range of every weapon. We then open up suddenly, all at once, with everything we

have. He is paralyzed by the shock. He cannot react. Everything was going fine, and suddenly he is in a firestorm with people falling all around him. Often he will panic, making his problem worse as he reacts rather than acts.

Combined arms may be used to ambush the enemy. Artillery raids that reach deeper into his vital areas than expected can produce that same desired shock effect as a ground-based ambush. We place him in a dilemma as he attempts to move from the effects of artillery and goes right into an attack by air.

Finally, in the ambush mentality, we *always focus on the enemy*. The purpose of an ambush is not to hold a piece of terrain. It is to destroy the enemy. We use terrain to effect the ambush, but terrain itself is not what we are fighting for.

ASYMMETRY

Fighting asymmetrically means gaining advantage through imbalance, applying strength against an enemy weakness. Fighting asymmetrically means using dissimilar techniques and capabilities to maximize our own strengths while exploiting enemy weaknesses. Fighting asymmetrically means fighting the enemy on our terms rather than on his. By fighting asymmetrically, we do not have to be numerically superior to defeat the enemy. We only have to be able to exploit his vulnerabilities.

For example, using tanks to fight enemy tanks, infantry to fight enemy infantry, and air to fight enemy air is symmetrical. Using attack helicopters to fight enemy tanks and close air support against enemy infantry are examples of fighting asymmetrically. In these examples, we gain the advantage of the greater speed and mobility of the aircraft relative to the enemy. Ambushing tanks with attack helicopters in terrain which hampers tank maneuver provides even more effect and generates even more advantage.

CONCLUSION

Combat is a test of wills where the object is to win. One way to win is to gain and exploit every possible advantage. This means using maneuver and surprise whenever possible. It means employing complementary forces and combined arms. It means exploiting the terrain, weather, and times of darkness to our advantage. It means trapping our enemy by ambush or by some other means. It means fighting asym- metrically to gain added advantage. This is what Sun Tzu meant when he wrote: "Therefore a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates."[15]

Chapter 4

Being Faster

"Hit quickly, hit hard and keep right on hitting. Give the enemy no rest, no opportunity to consolidate his forces and hit back at you."[1]

—Holland M. Smith

"For the infantryman to be truly effective . . . he will have to be as light of foot as he is quick of thought. . . . Mobility is needed most of all in the clash of arms. Swift and agile movement plus rapidity and intelligent tactical flexibility are its true essentials."[2]

—John A. English

Usually, to think of weapons means to think of a personal rifle or pistol; the unit's machine guns and mortars; or the aircraft's missiles, bombs, or guns. A logistician may realize that weapons include trucks, bulldozers, and excavators. Some Marines overlook one of their most powerful weapons, one that creates advantage for infantrymen, aviators, and logisticians equally. That weapon is speed.

SPEED IN COMBAT

How is speed a weapon? Think of sports again: The breakaway in hockey uses speed as a weapon. By rapidly passing the puck down the ice, one team denies the other the chance to set up a defense. Speed circumvents their opponent's ability to respond in an organized manner. The fastbreak in basketball seeks the same result. In two or three passes, the ball is downcourt and the basket scored, all before the opposition can re- act.

The results of speed often reach beyond the immediate goal. How many times have we seen a team score on a fastbreak, steal the ball as it comes inbounds, and immediately score again, and even a third time? Unable to regain their composure, the victims of the fastbreak become the victims of a rally. The victims lose confidence. Passes go astray; signals become crossed; tempers flare; arguments ensue. The rally becomes a

rout. The beleaguered players see certain defeat. They virtually give up while still on the court.

The same thing can happen in combat. The battalion or fighter aircraft or logistics train that can consistently move and act faster than its enemy has a powerful advantage.

In June of 1943, during the battle of Saipan, the aggressive, hard-hitting tactics of General Holland Smith proved to be singularly successful in defeating the Japanese defenders. General Smith's tactical plan for Saipan called for applying "unremitting pressure on the enemy and . . . bypassing strong points of resistance for mopping up by reserve elements in order to press the attack to better ground."[3] Long indoctrinated with the value of speed in amphibious operations, General Smith's bypassing tactics placed the Japanese remaining in their fixed defenses at an extreme tactical disadvantage. These tactics proved very effective in isolating and reducing the Japanese defense. General Smith's use of speed served as a force multiplier, and it also reduced Marine casualties.

The British Royal Air Force bested the Germans during the Battle of Britain in World War II in part because they were able to speedily recover their downed pilots, return them to base, place them in new aircraft, and have them fighting again in the afternoon. Downed German pilots were less easily recovered, and the Luftwaffe had fewer of the long-range air- craft required for replacement. Eventually, pilot and aircraft losses forced the Germans to end daylight bombing and resort strictly to relatively ineffective night attacks.

Great leaders have repeatedly stated the value of speed in combat. Napoleon said, "I may lose a battle, but I shall never lose a minute."[4] Nathan Bedford Forrest told the secret of his many victories: "Get there first with the most men."[5] General Patton said in 1943, "When the great day of battle comes remember your training and remember above all else that speed and violence of attack are the sure road to success."[6] History's great commanders differed in many ways, but one thing they shared was a sense of the importance of speed.

In Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, the Marines of Battalion Landing Team 2/8, moved fast, as their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ray Smith, had trained them to do. When they captured the operations officer of the Grenadian army, he said to them, "You appeared so swiftly in so many places where we didn't expect you that it was clear that resistance was hopeless, so I recommended to my superiors that we lay down our arms and go into hiding."[7] That is what speed used as a weapon can do for you.

WHAT IS SPEED?

"What is speed?" would seem to have a simple answer: speed is going fast. This is speed as we think of it when driving a car—more miles per hour.

That is part of the answer in tactics as well. We use speed to gain the initiative and advantage over the enemy. For example, when a tank battalion attacks, it goes over the ground as fast as it can. General Balck was asked whether the Russian tanks ever used terrain in their attacks against him in World War II. He replied that they had used terrain on occasion, but that they more often used speed. The questioner followed up: "Which was harder to defend against?" Balck answered, "Speed."[8]

Physical speed, moving more miles per hour, is a powerful weapon in itself. On our approach to the enemy, speed in movement reduces his reaction time. When we are going through him or around him, it changes the situation faster than he can react. Once we are past him, it makes his reaction irrelevant. In all three cases, speed impacts on the enemy, especially his mind, causing fear, indecision, and helplessness. Remember, attacking the enemy's mind is a central tenet of maneuver warfare.

SPEED AND TIME

In a military sense, there is more to speed than simply going fast, and there is a vital difference between acting rapidly and acting recklessly. With time we must always consider the closely related factor of timing. Speed and time are closely related. In fact, speed is defined in terms of time: miles or

kilometers per hour. In tactics, what this means is that time is always of the utmost importance. Time that cannot be spent in action must be spent thinking about how to act effectively.

Even when we are engaged with the enemy, we are not always moving fast. Some of the time we are not moving at all. Nonetheless, every moment is still of the utmost importance even when we are sitting still. A battalion staff that takes a day to plan an action is obviously slower than one that takes an hour. A tank battalion that takes 3 hours to refuel is slower than one that takes 2 hours, just as one that must refuel every hundred miles is slower than one that must refuel every two hundred. A company that sits down to eat once it has taken its objective is slower than one that immediately presses on into the enemy's depth. A fighter squadron that can fly only three sorties per aircraft per day is slower, in terms of effect on the enemy, than one that flies six. A maintenance repair team that takes 2 days to fix a damaged vehicle and get it back into action is slower, in terms of effect on the enemy, than one that can do it overnight.

Making maximum use of every hour and every minute is as important to speed in combat as simply going fast when we are moving. It is important to every member of a military force whether serving on staffs or in units—aviation, combat service support, ground combat, everyone. A good tactician has a constant sense of urgency. We feel guilty if we are idle. We never waste time, and we are never content with the pace at which events are happening. We are always saying to ourselves and

to others, "Faster! Faster!" We know that if speed is a weapon, so is time.

TIMING

We employ speed and use time to create tempo. Tempo is not merely a matter of acting fastest or at the earliest opportunity. It is also a matter of timing—acting at the right time.

Timing requires an appreciation for the rhythm of combat so we can exploit that rhythm to our advantage. It is physically impossible to operate always at peak tempo. Even though we can extend operating cycles through the economical use of resources, we cannot operate at top speed indefinitely. We must rest our people and replenish our supplies. The test of skill is to be able to generate and maintain a fast pace when the situation calls for it and to recover when it will not hurt us.

Timing means knowing when to act and, equally important, when *not* to act. Although speed is an important tactical weapon, there are situations in which it is better to bide our time. If our concept of operations involves a diversion, we need to allow time for the diversion to take effect. If we have laid an ambush for the enemy, we need to give the enemy time to fall fully into the trap. If a situation is still forming, we may want

to develop it further before we commit to a course of action. For example, an error commonly made by defenders is counter-attacking too soon so that the enemy is merely pushed back rather than cut off, encircled, and destroyed. Decisive action is our goal, and it must be timed to occur at the proper moment. There are times to act, and there are other times to set the stage and wait.

A benefit from a decision not to act is that it saves precious resources and energy for later commitment. Some leaders dissipate their units' energy on constant, unprioritized activity. Not all activities support the mission. A unit's energy is not easily replenished and should be treated as a precious resource to be expended only towards decisive goals.

RELATIVE SPEED

Going fast and making efficient use of time are both parts of the answer to the question, "What is speed?" However, something else must be considered: the enemy. As with all things in war, speed is relative. Speed is meaningful militarily only if we are acting *faster than the enemy*. We can do that either by slowing the enemy or by increasing our own speed.

In the battle for the Falkland Islands in 1982, the British Army moved slowly. The terrain was difficult, the weather was abominable, and much of the material had to be moved on men's backs, all of which slowed down the British. Nevertheless, the British still had the advantage in speed because they moved faster than the Argentines who, once they had made their initial dispositions, essentially did not move. That superiority in relative speed allowed the British to maintain the initiative throughout the campaign.

CONTINUING SPEED

To be consistent, superiority in relative speed *must continue over time*. It is not enough to move faster than the enemy only now and then because when we are not moving faster, the advantage, the initiative, passes to him. Most forces can manage an intermittent burst of speed but must then halt for a considerable period to recover between bursts. During that halt, they are likely to lose their advantage. We realize that we cannot operate at full speed indefinitely, and the challenge is to be consistently faster than the enemy.

One way to sustain speed is to use the effects of combined arms. When the infantry or mounted troops must break contact temporarily to maneuver, resupply, or recover, air or artillery can keep the pressure on. Maneuver cannot be sus- tained indefinitely, but the momentum can be maintained through skillful planning of combined arms effects, keeping the enemy always at a disadvantage.

Here the speed of logistics becomes critical. Although physical exhaustion is a factor, halts often are driven by logistics: ground or aviation units must stop for equipment repair, maintenance, and resupply. Supporting forces can minimize loss of speed if they can deliver the supplies and perform the maintenance quickly. Thus, they enable combat units to move before the enemy gains the initiative.

SPEED AND CHANGE

In order to act consistently faster than the enemy, it is necessary to do more than move quickly. It is also necessary to make *rapid transitions* from one action to another. While there are many types of transitions in combat, the important thing to remember is that transitions produce friction. Reduction of friction minimizes the loss of tempo that the friction generates at the point of transition. A unit that can make transitions faster and more smoothly than another can be said to have greater relative speed.

In the 18th century, the importance of fast transitions (sometimes called agility) was displayed when shifting from column formation into line. If an army could not rapidly de- ploy into line and consequently was engaged while still in column, it was often beaten. Much drill was devoted to practicing this difficult transition so that it could be accomplished rapidly in combat. Today we develop proficiencies in battle drills and immediate-action drills that allow units to rapidly transition from one formation to another without pausing.

It is important to be able to effect rapid changes in organization as well. Being quick to effect required changes in task organization based on a rapidly changing battle situation increases agility and decreases reaction times. Battle drills and rehearsals can be conducted to smooth out procedures for changing organization rapidly. The faster these transitions can be made, the more effective the force becomes.

The place in time and space where transitions occur can be called a *friction point*. Friction points commonly encountered in tactics include movement from an assembly area to attack; from patrol movement formation to ambush posture; from defensive posture to attack; from one maneuver to another, and so forth. The transition involves simply positional changes and drills, but also changes of attitude in the minds of Marines. We must shift our mental focus from one movement to another.

A modern example of the importance of fast transitions comes from aerial combat. In the Korean War, American

aviators achieved a high kill ratio of about 10:1 over their North Korean and Chinese opponents. At first glance, this is somewhat surprising. The main enemy fighter, the MiG-15, was superior to the American F-86 in a number of key respects. It could climb and accelerate faster, and it had a better sustained turn rate. The F-86, however, was superior to the MiG in two critical, though less obvious, respects. First, because it had high-powered hydraulic controls, the F-86 could shift from one maneuver to another faster than the MiG. Second, because of its bubble canopy, the F-86 pilot had better visibility. The F-86's better field of view provided better situational awareness and also contributed to fast transitions because it allowed its pilot to understand changing situations more quickly.

American pilots developed new tactics based on these two advantages. When they engaged the MiGs, they sought to put them through a series of maneuvers. The F-86's faster transitions between maneuvers gave it a time advantage that the pilot transformed into a position advantage. Often, when the MiG pilots realized what was happening, they panicked—and thereby made the American pilot's job all the easier.

These tactics illustrate the way fast transitions contribute to overall speed and to a time advantage. The importance of time and speed in a broader sense has been brought out in the work of John Boyd. A former colonel in the U.S. Air Force, Boyd studied a wide variety of historic battles, campaigns, and wars. He noted that where numerically inferior forces had defeated

their opponents, they often did so by presenting the other side with a sudden, unexpected change or a series of changes. The superior forces fell victim because they could not adjust to the changes in a timely manner. Generally, defeat came at relatively small cost to the victor.[9]

This research led to the Boyd theory, which states that conflict may be viewed as time-competitive cycles of observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA). First, each party to a conflict enters the fray by observing himself, his surroundings, his enemy. In tactics, this equates to adoption of a hunting instinct: searching; actively looking; hunting for the enemy; and seeing what he is doing or is about to do. It also includes anticipating the enemy's next moves—getting inside his mind.

Second, based upon those observations, the combatant orients to the situation, that is, produces a mental image of the situation and gains situational awareness. This awareness becomes the foundation on which to erect a plan. Generally, the better the orientation, the better the plan.

Next, based upon this orientation, the combatant decides upon a course of action. The decision is developed into a plan that can be disseminated among subordinates for their planning and execution.

Last, the combatant acts, or puts the decision into effect. In tactics this is the execution phase where the decision, or plan, is implemented. Since this action has changed the situation, the

combatant again observes, beginning the cycle anew. Boyd's cycle is also known as the OODA loop.

The Boyd theory helps to define the word "maneuver." It means being consistently faster than our opponent. As our enemy observes and orients on our initial action, we must be observing, orienting, deciding, and acting upon our second action. As we enact our third, fourth, and fifth move, the time gap between our actions and our enemy's reactions increasingly widens. Our enemy falls behind in a panicked game of catch up. As he tries to respond to our penetration, we attack his reserves and his command and control. As he counterattacks with his mobile reserve, we bypass with helicopterborne forces. Everything he does is too late.

Thus, the military answer to the question "What is speed?" is not simple. Nonetheless, it is central to every aspect of tactics. As General George Patton said, "In small operations, as in large, speed is the essential element of success."[10]

We should also exercise caution so as not to confuse speed with haste. General Patton made this observation:

> Haste and Speed: There is a great difference between these two words. Haste exists when troops are committed without proper reconnaissance, without the arrangement for proper supporting fire, and before every available man has been brought up. The result of such an attack will be to get the troops into action early, but to complete the action very slowly.

> Speed is acquired by making the necessary reconnaissance, providing the proper artillery [support], . . . bringing up every [available] man, and then launching the attack with a predetermined plan so that the time under fire will be reduced to the minimum.[11]

BECOMING FASTER

Now we see clearly the importance of speed. We want to be fast. How do we do it?

We start by recognizing the importance of time. As leaders of Marines, we have a responsibility to make things happen fast. Our sense of the importance of time, of urgency, must direct our actions. We must work to create and build that sense within ourselves.

Once we have it, there are a number of things we can do to increase speed. First, we can *keep everything simple*. Simplicity promotes speed; complexity slows things down. Simplicity should be central to our plans, our staffs (large staffs may be one of war's greatest consumers of time), our command and control, and our own actions.

Second, speed is increased through *decentralization*. Decentralization is an important concept in the execution of maneuver warfare. How do we achieve decentralization, while still

retaining control? We use two main tools that provide the required control of the effort and the decentralization of its execution. These tools are mission tactics and commander's intent.

Mission tactics is the assignment of a mission to a subordinate without specifying how the mission must be accomplished. It is a key tenet of maneuver warfare. In mission tactics, the higher commander describes the mission and explains its purpose. The subordinate commander determines the tactics needed to accomplish the task based on the mission and the higher commander's intent. In this way, each leader can act quickly as the situation changes without passing information up the chain of command and waiting for orders to come back down. Speed is greatly increased by this decentralization process. According to John A. English in his work *On Infantry*, decentralization has been one of the most significant features of modern war. English wrote: "In the confused and often chaotic battlefield environment of today, only the smallest groups are likely to keep together, particularly during critical moments."[12] In such circumstances, individuals rally around their leader who, armed with knowledge of the purpose or intent behind their task, can lead them toward success.

The *commander's intent* provides the overall purpose for accomplishing the task assigned through mission tactics. Although the situation may change, subordinates who clearly understand the purpose and act to accomplish that purpose can adapt to changing circumstances on their own without risking diffusion of effort or loss of tempo. Subordinate commanders

will be able to carry on this mission on their own initiative and through lateral coordination with other subunits, rather than running every decision through the higher commander for approval.

A third way to become faster is through *experience*. Experience breeds speed. Experience gives units advantages over other less experienced units. This is why veteran units are usually much faster than green, untried units. If we are familiar with a situation or at least know generally what to expect, we can think, act, and move faster. In peacetime, our Marines are not likely to be combat veterans. Still, we can give them experience through tactical decision games, sand table exercises, war games, field exercises, and rehearsals. These and other forms of training help to reduce the stress and confusion of combat.

Another way in which experience helps us become faster is through the use of *implicit communications*. Implicit communications are mutual understandings that require little or no actual talking or writing. For example, two company commanders know each other well. They think alike because their battalion commander has established standing operating procedures and has schooled subordinate commanders in an approach to war. Thus, the commander of Company B does not need to talk with the commander of Company C very often in action because each knows from common past experiences and from daily observations how the other is likely to react in many different situations. If B Company's commander creates an

opportunity, C Company's commander will take advantage of it. *That* is implicit communication. It is faster and more reliable than explicit communication (trying to pass words or messages back and forth over radios or telephones).

Of course, implicit communications must be developed over time. This requires actions that strengthen unit cohesion and mutual trust. This requires keeping people together in their units and stable in their assignments. It implies keeping good teams together. It means developing a band of brothers in our units, as Admiral Horatio Nelson did. He spent many evenings with his captains gathered in the cabin of his flagship talking over tactics, ways they might fight different engagements, how they would defeat this or that opponent. From those evenings came a shared way of thinking so strong that, at Trafalgar, Nelson needed only to signal "England expects every man will do his duty," and "Close action."[13] Sometimes words have meaning beyond the normally obvious meaning because of shared experiences and understanding.

Another way speed gains from experience is in the development of *lateral communication,* or coordination. If all communication is up and down the chain of command, action will move slowly. If commanders and leaders at every level communicate laterally—if we, as leaders, talk directly to other leaders—action moves much faster. Lateral communication is not a natural consequence of mission orders. It must be practiced in training. It results from the confidence of the higher commander who through past experiences has found that

subordinates can exercise initiative based on the assigned mission and the commander's stated intent.

A good example of lateral communication comes from aviation. In the air, the pilots of a flight of aircraft communicate laterally as a matter of course. A pilot who needs to talk to another does so. A message need not go through the mission commander and then be relayed to the other pilot. Events would quickly outpace communication if pilots tried to talk that way. The same procedures may be employed by ground combat and logistics units as well.

A fourth way to become faster is by the commander's *positioning* himself at the point of friction. This position may be with the main effort, with a supporting effort, or in the rear. A commander who is forward can instantly influence the battle as the situation develops. For the same reason, a commander may choose a position at a crucial crossroad during a night movement, or where a unit is pushing supplies forward, or where a counterattack force in the defense may be sited. The key is to be where we can best influence the actions of our units. As Marines, we believe in leading from the front since that is where most friction points occur, but they may occur elsewhere. We must choose our positions accordingly.

Throughout World War II and his entire career, Lieutenant General Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller believed that Marines had to lead from where the fighting was. "This Command Post business will ruin the American Army and Marines if it isn't watched,"[14] he said while he was the commanding officer of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, at Guadalcanal. As a battalion commander, Puller usually positioned himself directly behind the point element of his battalion and his headquarters element directly behind the lead company so that he could best influence the actions of his unit. From this location, he was able to impose his will and personally affect the outcome of the engagement. Depending on the situation, he could also be found at other points on the march or on his perimeter. His idea was to be where he could best influence the action.

Finally, it is important not only to be faster, but to maintain that speed through time. This endurance is made possible through *physical and mental fitness*. Physical fitness develops not only the speed, energy, and agility to move faster, but it also develops the endurance to maintain that speed for longer durations. With endurance, we not only outpace the enemy but maintain a higher tempo longer than he can. Mental fitness builds the ability to concentrate for longer periods of time and to penetrate below the surface of a problem. For this reason, fitness plays an important part in the life of every Marine. Patton once said "High physical condition is vital to victory."[15]

CONCLUSION

We must be faster than our opponent. This means we must move fast, but, more importantly, we must act faster than our enemy. The aim is to tailor our tactics so that we can act faster than the enemy force can react. Our ability to plan, decide, and execute faster than our enemy creates advantage that we can exploit. We have just discussed ways to improve our speed. Readers of this publication may think of additional ways to be fast. When you find one that works, tell your fellow Marines about it so they can use it too. Anything that works to make you faster is good even if it is not yet in the books.

Chapter 5

Adapting

"Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after they occur."[1]

—Giulio Douhet

"In any problem where an opposing force exists, and cannot be regulated, one must foresee and provide for alternative courses. Adaptability is the law which governs survival in war as in life—war being but a concentrated form of the human struggle against environment."[2]

—B. H. Liddell Hart

The modern battlefield is characterized by friction, uncertainty, disorder, and rapid change. Each situation is a unique combination of shifting factors that cannot be controlled with precision or certainty. This chapter discusses ways to think about adapting or modifying our decisions based on changed circumstances or sudden opportunities. A tactically proficient leader must be able to adapt actions to each situation.

The OODA loop discussed in chapter 4 essentially describes the process of adaptation—we observe the situation, orient to it, decide what to do, and act. The antagonist who can consistently adapt more quickly to the situation will have a significant advantage. Adaptability is thus an important part of Marine Corps tactics. In essence, adaptability means shortening the time it takes to adjust to each new situation.

There are two basic ways to adapt. Sometimes we have enough situational awareness to understand a situation in advance and take preparatory action. This is *anticipation*. At other times we have to adapt to the situation on the spur of the moment without time for preparation. This is *improvisation*. To be fully adaptable, we must be able to do both.

ANTICIPATION

The first basic way to adapt is to anticipate, by which we mean to introduce new methods, schemes, or techniques *for future use*. In order to anticipate, we must be able to forecast future actions, at least to some extent. Our forecasts are usually based on past experiences. Often a forecast involves considering what we learned through trial and error in training, exercises, or actual combat. An excellent example of anticipation is the Marine Corps' development of amphibious warfare techniques at Quantico during the 1920s and 1930s. These techniques proved to be essential to success in World War II, both in the Pacific and in Europe.

All planning at all echelons is a form of anticipatory adaptation—adapting our actions in advance. Another important tool for tactical adaptation is the use of immediate-action drills or standing operating procedures. These are practiced, predesigned, generic actions which cover common situations. Having a collection of these tools at our disposal allows us to react immediately *in a coordinated way* to a broad variety of tactical situations. Immediate-action drills do not replace the need for tactical judgment; they merely provide a way to seize initiative in the early stages of a developing situation until we can take more considered action. They provide the basis for adaptation.

IMPROVISATION

The second basic way to adapt is to improvise, to adjust to a situation *on the spur of the moment without any preparation*. Like anticipation, improvisation is key to maneuver warfare. Improvisation requires creative, intelligent, and experienced leaders who have an intuitive appreciation for what will work and what will not.

Improvisation is of critical importance to increasing speed. It requires commanders who have a strong situational awareness and a firm understanding of their senior commander's intent so that they can adjust their own actions in accordance with the higher commander's desires. Often we will find ourselves in a situation where our organic resources—weapons, vehicles, and so on—are not adequate to keep us moving fast. In France in 1940, German General Heinz Guderian put some of his infantry in commandeered French buses. On Grenada, when Army Rangers needed vehicles, they took East German trucks belonging to the Grenadian army. Sound unorthodox? There is nothing "orthodox" about failure due to an inability to adapt.

For instance, take the situation in which Marines of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, found themselves in the battle of Hue City, Republic of Vietnam, in February 1968. One of

their first objectives was to retake the city's Treasury building, which was heavily defended by the North Vietnamese. Prior to the assault, the Marines were disappointed to see that their mortar fire was having little effect on the building or its defenders. Then the battalion executive officer found some U.S. tear gas canisters and dispensers in the Military Assistance compound they had reoccupied. Realizing the North Vietnamese lacked gas masks, the Marines proceeded to lob the tear gas canisters into the Treasury building. As a result of the executive officer's quick thinking and adaptation, the North Vietnamese quickly vacated the building, and the Marines secured the objective with minimal casualties.[3]

FLEXIBLE PLANS

We have several techniques to help us develop adaptability. One of these is to make flexible plans. Flexible plans can enhance adaptability by establishing a course of action that provides for multiple options. For example, a blocking position that covers two avenues of approach from the same location instead of only one provides the flexibility to adapt to an enemy coming through either avenue.

We can increase our flexibility by providing *branches* for current and future operations. Branches are options (e.g., changing dispositions, orientation, strength, movement, or

accepting or declining battle) to deal with changing conditions on the battlefield that may affect the plan.[4]

Flexibility can also be increased by providing *sequels* for current and future operations. Sequels are courses of action to follow probable battle or engagement outcomes; victory, defeat, or stalemate.[5]

The value of branches and sequels is that they prepare us for several different actions. We should keep the number of branches and sequels to a relative few. We should not try to develop so many branches and sequels that we cannot adequately plan, train, or prepare for any of them. The skillful, well-thought-out use of branches and sequels becomes an important means of anticipating future courses of action. This anticipation helps accelerate the decision cycle and therefore increases tempo.

Flexible plans avoid unnecessary detail that not only consumes time in their development but has a tendency to restrict subordinates' latitude. Instead, flexible plans lay out what needs to be accomplished but leave the manner of accomplishment to subordinates. This allows the subordinates the flexibility to deal with a broader range of circumstances.

Flexible plans are plans that can be easily changed. Plans that require coordination are said to be "coupled." If all the parts of a plan are too tightly coupled, the plan is harder to change because changing any one part of the plan means

changing all the other parts. Instead, we should try to develop modular, loosely coupled plans. Then if we change or modify any one part of the plan, it does not directly affect all the other parts.[6]

Finally, flexible plans should be simple plans. Simple plans are easier to adapt to the rapidly changing, complex, and fluid situations that we experience in combat.

DECENTRALIZATION

Another excellent way to improve adaptability is to decentralize decisionmaking authority as much as each situation allows. This means that commanders on the scene and closest to the events have the latitude to deal with the situation as required *on their own authority*—but always in accordance with the higher commander's intent. This decentralization speeds up reaction time: we do not have to wait for information to flow up to a higher commander and orders to flow back down. It increases the responsiveness of the organization, which in turn increases adaptability. Decentralizing control through the use of mission orders is one of the tools we use to maximize our ability to adapt.

Confidence in the abilities of subordinates plays an important part in decentralization. Leaders who have confidence in

the capabilities of their subordinates will feel more comfortable in granting them greater latitude in accomplishing tasks. It fosters a climate where senior leaders know that their intent will be carried out. This was particularly true for the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, during Operation Desert Storm. As the battalion began breaching operations for the advance of the 1st Marine Division across the first two Iraqi mine belts, Marines were suddenly overwhelmed with " 'hundreds upon hundreds of Iraqis sporting white flags' "[7] who were trying to surrender. The number was so great that it threatened to stop the Marine advance. However, the battalion commander immediately recognized the situation, judged that the Iraqis were harmless, and instructed the battalion not to stop to accept their surrender. "It was precisely the . . . type of local situation that [the division commander] wanted his commanders to recognize and use their own initiative to correct."[8] Here the commanding officer who was closest to the situation and who understood the division commander's intent not to lose the momentum of the advance adapted to the situation. This adaptation resulted in a rapid breach of Iraqi defenses.

CONCLUSION

Successful warfare is filled with examples of leaders adapt- ing to changing situations. We must start to learn how to adapt

now during our training. Leaders should value and encourage innovative thinking. Moreover, they should expect creative thinking from their subordinates because it creates new opportunities.

For adaptation to be effective, commanders must readily exploit the opportunities uncovered by subordinates. Commanders cannot remain tied to plans that blind them to fleeting opportunities. While making the best possible preparations, they must welcome and take advantage of unforeseen opportunities.

Chapter 6

Cooperating

"Unity of command (effort) is coordinated action toward a common goal; it is cooperation. It is working together by all commanders toward the accomplishment of a common mission, which is imperative for complete and final success. Commanders must develop in their staffs and subordinates the desire to cooperate, not only among themselves but with other elements of the command."[1]

—NAVMC 7386, *Tactical Principles*

"The first element of command and control is people*—people who gather information, make decisions, take action, communicate, and cooperate with one another in the accomplishment of a common goal."*[2]

—MCDP 6, *Command and Control*

Everything that we have to do in tactics—gaining advantage and, above all, achieving a decisive result—needs a team effort. If efforts are not in harmony, results may be indecisive. For example, if the aviation combat element's actions are not harmonized with those of the ground combat element, they are unlikely to have a decisive effect. If artillery support is not well coordinated with an infantry attack, combined arms synergy will not be achieved, and the attack may fail. However, achieving this team effort is easier said than done. It requires rapidly maneuvering forces, often widely dispersed, to work together under the most adverse conditions.

CONTROL IN COMBAT

Because war is characterized by chaos, uncertainty, and rapid change, control quickly breaks down. It is probably a mistake to speak of control in combat. MCDP 6 states that "given the nature of war, it is a delusion to think that we can be in control with any sort of certitude or precision."[3] As anyone who has experienced combat will undoubtedly agree, it is impos- sible to control everything. Attempts to impose control also can easily undermine the initiative upon which Marine Corps tactics depends. Marines can become hesitant; they may feel they must wait for orders before acting. We are not likely to move faster or gain leverage over a competent opponent unless Marines at every level exercise initiative.

The dilemma, then, is this: How do we achieve the goal of working together in harmony while exercising a more decentralized type of control?

COOPERATION

The beginning of the answer lies in *cooperation*. We define cooperation as the union of self-discipline and initiative in pursuit of a common goal. Cooperation can be viewed as a component of control.

Control can generally be divided into two types: centralized and decentralized. Centralized control tends to be in one direction and works from the top down: someone at a higher level determines what subordinates will and will not do. Centralized control makes us conform to higher dictates because only one person does the thinking for the organization—the person in control.

In contrast, decentralized control works from the bottom up. Command is the exercise of authority and guidance, and control is felt as feedback about the effects of the action taken because thinking is required at all levels. (See figure.) This feedback allows the commander to adapt to changing circumstances and to command subsequent action. Cooperation is

required in decentralized control. Subordinates work together laterally and from the bottom up to accomplish tasks that fulfill the commander's intent. Cooperation means we take the initiative to help those around us accomplish our shared mis- sion.[4]

Cooperation is essential to Marine Corps tactics. The flight leader and wingman work on the basis of cooperation. These pilots cooperate with the infantry they support. Two infantry units, fighting side by side, cooperate. A mobile combat service



A typical view of command and control – command and control seen as unidirectional.

Command and control viewed as reciprocal influence – command as initiation of action and control as feedback.

Two views of the relationship between command and control.

support detachment and the mechanized force it supports cooperate. We all work together far more effectively when we communicate laterally than when we communicate only through higher headquarters and respond only to centralized direction. As an ancillary benefit, we relieve our overloaded communications networks.

The history of tactics is filled with examples where cooperation made the difference—and control could not. One such example occurred during an Iraqi counterattack in Operation Desert Storm. Black smoke from burning oil wells turned the day into night. A UH-1N Huey pilot used his night vision equipment to lead flights of AH-1W Cobras through near-zero visibility to attack Iraqi armored vehicles. The specially equipped Huey designated targets so that the Cobras could engage them at near pointblank range with antiarmor Hellfire missiles. For nearly 10 hours, the Huey pilot led flight after flight into the pitched battle, earning the Navy Cross for heroism.[5]

The pilots worked together to destroy targets the Huey could not engage and the Cobra could not see. This example shows what cooperation can accomplish.

DISCIPLINE

Cooperation can harmonize efforts and get everyone to work together without the centralized control that undermines initiative. However, it raises a more fundamental question: How do we prepare people to cooperate when the going gets tough?

The answer is discipline. "There is only one kind of discipline—PERFECT DISCIPLINE. If you do not enforce and maintain discipline, you are potential murderers."[6] In the face of adversity and difficulty, discipline enables individuals to pursue what is best for those around them, their unit, and the Marine Corps. Individuals and units might have the desire, but without discipline they will be unable to accomplish the most difficult tasks in combat—operating faster than the enemy, gaining advantage, generating decisive force, and achieving decisive results.

In combat, instant obedience to orders is crucial. Orders may not be popular, but there comes a point where they must be carried out without question. Discipline is a result of training. In training for war, discipline should be firm, but fair. The Marine Corps is known as a highly disciplined fighting force. Discipline is one of the strengths that make Marines equally effective assaulting a beach, conducting a noncom-batant evacuation operation, fighting a fire, or guarding our embassies. Nonetheless, discipline is founded not only on obedience but also on a sense of duty.

The discipline needed for cooperation comes from two sources: imposed discipline and self-discipline. The first source, imposed discipline, is more often associated with the term "military discipline." Imposed discipline, typified by the Prussian approach, is characterized by instant obedience to orders. External in nature, it ensures compliance with established procedures, rules, or guidance and direction from above. It is a means to achieve efficiency in accomplishment of routine duties or drills. In its most extreme form, it can be rigid, paralyzing, and destructive of initiative. Imposed discipline also may make units vulnerable to the effects of chaos and uncertainty and unable to cooperate with one another.

Self-discipline is an internal force that morally obligates all Marines to do what they know is right—in this case, to cooperate with every other Marine in the pursuit of a common goal. The obligation is internal in each individual; it is something he or she feels powerfully about. Coupled with a sense of camaraderie and esprit de corps, it pulls from within and causes Marines to do everything they can for fellow Marines. At the unit level, this force can be felt as morale. "No system of tactics can lead to victory when the morale of an army is bad."[7]

Self-discipline can be seen in successful athletic teams as well as military units. Team players instinctively back up their teammates. In baseball, the outfielders cover each other on flyballs. In hockey, rarely does only one player rush the goal. In football, offensive linemen do not stand by idly on a pass play

if no defensive player faces them. They block the first defender they can find. Members of squads and fire teams also work together as teams to accomplish tasks and take care of each other. This cooperation among teammates cannot be enforced by a coach or leader. It depends upon the self-discipline of the individuals.

Marine discipline is the self-discipline of a successful team, not just the imposed discipline of the army of Frederick the Great. For Marines, military discipline means accepting personal responsibility. Self-discipline will not allow us to shirk responsibility or blame others. A discipline failure—often a failure to act—is a personal failure.

Our form of discipline is also *absolute*. There is no time off. Someone else may be in charge, but that does not absolve us from the responsibility to do everything we can to achieve the common goal. It does not reduce our responsibility to cooperate with fellow Marines in our unit and beyond.

This discipline is a mindset, *a way of thinking and behaving*. It runs through everything that we do. It is as much a part of garrison life as of combat. We also carry this sense of personal responsibility and duty to contribute into our private lives. We see it whenever off-duty Marines take the initiative to help at the scene of an accident, act as leaders in their communities, or in other ways do more than their share. They do so because of something inward, not because they are compelled

by control. That something is self-discipline, and it is not limited to one aspect of life.

CONCLUSION

Modern tactics relies on cooperation. Cooperation, in turn, depends on discipline. Discipline consists of both imposed discipline and self-discipline. As leaders of Marines, we must create a climate in which self-discipline and a high level of initiative can flourish within the boundaries of military discipline. This climate depends on us. Words are easy; anyone can give an occasional pep talk on the merits of self-discipline. Marines judge actions, not words, and respond positively to leadership by example. If the leader creates a climate where perfect discipline is expected and demonstrated, cooperation will follow.

Chapter 7

Exploiting Success and Finishing

"Do not delay in the attack. When the foe has been split off and cut down, pursue him immediately and give him no time to assemble or form up . . . spare nothing. Without regard for difficulties, pursue the enemy day and night until he has been annihilated."[1]

—Field Marshal Prince Aleksandr V. Suvorov

"Pursue the last man to the Adda and throw the remains into the river."[2]

—Field Marshal Prince Aleksandr V. Suvorov

"When we have incurred the risk of a battle, we should know how to profit by the victory, and not merely content ourselves, according to custom, with possession of the field."[3]

—Maurice de Saxe

It is not enough merely to gain advantage. The enemy will not surrender simply because he is placed at a disadvantage. The successful leader exploits any advantage aggressively and ruthlessly not once but repeatedly until the opportunity arises for a finishing stroke. We must always be on the lookout for such opportunities—whether we create them ourselves or they arise in the flow of action—and when we perceive an opportunity to be decisive, we must seize it.

The application of Marine Corps tactics does not mean that we expect to win effortlessly or bloodlessly or that we expect the enemy to collapse just because we outmaneuver him. It means we look for and make the most of every advantage and apply the decisive stroke when the opportunity presents itself.

BUILDING ON ADVANTAGE

Once we have gained an advantage, we exploit it. We use it to create new opportunities. We then exploit those opportunities to create others, shaping the flow of action to our advantage. The advantages do not necessarily have to be large; even small favoring circumstances exploited repeatedly and aggressively can quickly multiply into decisive advantages. Like the chess grandmaster, we must think ahead to our next move and the one beyond it: *How am I going to use this advantage to create another one?* For example, in an attack by penetration, once

we have created one advantage by punching through the enemy's position and getting into his rear, we create another by pouring forces through the gap, generating the "expanding torrent" that Liddell Hart wrote about.[4]

Rommel recounts how exploiting each advantage in the battle for Kuk in the Carpathian mountains during World War I led to another opportunity. As his detachment exploited each situation and moved farther behind the enemy lines, it generated more surprise and advantage. During this action, Rommel's detachment captured thousands of enemy soldiers with very little fighting, due largely to his unwillingness to lose momentum. One success led directly to another opportunity, which he immediately seized.[5]

After the battle for Tarawa in November 1943, Major Henry Crowe, Commanding Officer of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, was asked why he thought the Japanese had been defeated so quickly once the Marines were established ashore. He remarked that it was due to the constant pressure of naval gunfire, bombs, and mortars. The Marines used their advantage in supporting arms to create opportunities for success.[6]

CONSOLIDATION, EXPLOITATION, AND PURSUIT

Once we have created leverage, how do we take advantage of it? A decisive result or victory rarely stems from the initial

action, no matter how successful. More often, victories are the result of aggressively exploiting some relative advantage until one becomes decisive and the action turns into a rout. Casualty rates historically tend to remain relatively constant and often fairly even until one side or the other tries to flee. Only then do significantly asymmetrical casualty rates commonly occur. This exploitation of the enemy's bad situation can yield surprisingly great results.

We can take several specific types of actions to exploit opportunities we have created or discovered. The first way we can exploit success is by *consolidation*—as when we consolidate our forces after seizing a position we intend to hold against the enemy.[7] Here our aims are limited to protecting what we have already gained. We must realize that by consolidating, rather than continuing to force the issue, we may be surrendering the initiative. There may be any number of reasons for choosing this course. Perhaps we lack the strength to continue to advance. Our new gain may be of critical importance, and the risk of losing it outweighs the advantages of any further gains. Perhaps the new gain by itself grants a significant advantage. For instance, a position that provides excellent fires or threatens the enemy's lines of communications may put the enemy in an untenable position. Perhaps the new gain compels the enemy to meet us on our terms—for example, we seize a critical piece of terrain with strong defensive qualities, forcing the enemy to attack on unfavorable terms.

The second way to pursue an advantage is through *exploitation*, an offensive tactic that is designed to disorganize the

enemy in depth.[8] Exploitation usually follows a successful attack that has created or exposed some enemy vulnerability. For example, an attack that has torn a gap in enemy defenses allows us to attack vital enemy rear areas. The object of exploitation is not to destroy the combat forces directly opposing us, even though they may be weakened. Instead, the object is to disrupt the entire enemy system by attacking important activities and functions.

For example, during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the Army's Tiger Brigade was employed by the 2d Marine Division as an exploitation force during the division's final attack. The brigade had the advantage over the Iraqis in speed, firepower, and night combat capabilities. With these advantages the Tiger Brigade sliced deep into the rear of the Iraqi III Corps and sealed off the vital highway intersections north of Al Jahra. The result was a total disruption of the Iraqi organized defense.[9]

The third way to exploit advantage is through *pursuit*. A pursuit is an offensive tactic designed to catch or cut off a hostile force that has lost cohesion and is attempting to escape in order to destroy it.[10] If the intent is to bring about the final destruction or capture of the enemy's forces, then pursuit should be pushed with the utmost vigor. It is here that operations turn into routs, and overwhelming victories often occur.

General Grant's pursuit of General Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia from Petersburg to Appomattox in April

1865 is a classic example of a pursuit. Here Grant pushed his forces to their limits in order to prevent Lee's escape. This ultimately led to the capture and surrender of Lee's forces.[11]

The Confederate Army's Lieutenant General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson summed up pursuit when he said, "Strike the enemy and overcome him, never give up the pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow; for an enemy routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can be destroyed by half their number."[12]

FINISHING THE ENEMY

Ultimately, we want to cultivate opportunities into a decisive advantage. Once we do, we make the most of it. Marine Corps tactics calls for leaders who are "strong finishers." We must have a strong desire to "go for the jugular." We must be constantly trying to find or to create the opportunity to deliver the decisive blow. At the same time, we must not be premature in our actions. We must not make the decisive move before the conditions are right.

This ability to finish the enemy once and for all derives first from possessing an aggressive mentality. Second, it stems from an understanding of the commander's intent. Third, it stems from a keen situational awareness that helps us recognize

opportunities when they present themselves and understand when the conditions are right for action.

USE OF THE RESERVE IN COMBAT

The reserve is an important tool for exploiting success. The reserve is a part of the commander's combat power initially withheld from action in order to influence future action.[13] The reason to create and maintain a reserve is to provide flexibility to deal with the uncertainty, chance, and disorder of war. The reserve is thus a valuable tool for maintaining adaptability. In general, the more uncertain the situation, the larger should be the reserve. Napoleon once said that "War is composed of nothing but accidents, and . . . a general should never lose sight of everything to enable him to profit from [those] accidents."[14] These accidents take the form of opportunities and crises. The reserve is a key tactical tool for dealing with both.

The commander should have a purpose in mind for the reserve's employment and design it to fulfill that purpose. To truly exploit success may warrant assignment of the commander's best subordinate unit or a preponderance of combat power or mobility assets to the reserve. Those commanders who properly organize, task, and equip their reserves are usually the ones with the capability to finish the enemy when the opportunity arises.

Winston Churchill recognized the value of a reserve when he wrote: "It is in the use and withholding of their reserves that the great Commanders have generally excelled. After all, when once the last reserve has been thrown in, the Commander's part is played . . . . The event must be left to pluck and to the fighting troops."[15]

A strong reserve is also a way to retain the initiative. If an advance slows, the reserve can increase the momentum. If an advance picks up speed, the commitment of the reserve can create a rout. We may use the reserve to expand or exploit gaps or penetrations. We may commit the reserve to attack in a different direction, thus exploiting opportunities for success instead of reinforcing failure. Without a strong reserve, even the most promising opportunities can be lost.

A classic example of the use of the reserve is the battle for Tarawa. With the 2d and 8th Marine Regiments held up on the assault beaches, General Julian Smith decided to land the 6th Marine Regiment, the division reserve, to break the stalemate. The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, which was task-or- ganized as part of the division reserve, landed on the western end of the island, passed through 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and from the flank conducted a swift and violent assault of the Japanese fortifications across the island. Within 48 hours, the Japanese forces were annihilated and the island secured. General Smith's use of his reserve to exploit success and finish the enemy was the key to victory at Tarawa.[16] (See figure.)

Sometimes we must employ the reserve to deal with some crisis, rendering it temporarily unavailable for commitment elsewhere. In such instances, a reserve should be reconstituted as rapidly as possible. We should look for the opportunity to employ the reserve to reinforce success. However we may employ the reserve, we should always think of it as the tool for clinching the victory. In this respect, Marshal Foch wrote that "the reserve is a *club*, prepared, organized, reserved, carefully maintained with a view to carrying out the one act of battle

Use of the Reserve: Tarawa, 1943



The Attack on Betio Island, indicating the Marine lines at 1800, November 21, 1943

from which a result is expected—the deci- sive attack."[17] It is generally through offensive action, even in the defense, that we achieve decisive results. Since the reserve represents our bid to achieve a favorable decision or to prevent an unfavorable one, it often becomes the main effort once committed and should be supported by all the other elements of the force.

Along with the tangible assets used as a reserve, the prudent commander must also be aware of, and plan for, the intangible factors that impact on combat power and its sustainment. Intangible factors include fatigue, leadership quality, proficiency, morale, teamwork, and equipment maintenance. We build reserves also by reserving aviation sortie rates or numbers, withholding unique or low-density munitions, or holding critical supplies such as fuel or petroleum, oils, and lubricants for a specific goal. We consider these intangible factors when creating and tasking the reserve, as we do in all assignments of tasks.

These concepts apply not only to units initially designated as the reserve but also to any unit, since any unit can be shifted or recommitted as the reserve. Thus a commander must always be mentally prepared to redesignate roles of units and to create and use reserves as the situation requires.[18]

CONCLUSION

Most decisive victories do not result from the initial action, but from quickly and aggressively exploiting the opportuni- ties created by that action. We may find any number of ways to exploit tactical opportunity, but they all have the same object—to increase leverage until we have the final opportunity to decide the issue once and for all in our favor. A goal in Marine Corps tactics is not merely to gain advantage but to boldly and ruthlessly exploit that advantage to achieve final victory.

Chapter 8

Making It Happen

"Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pool and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by thought practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex."[1]

—T. E. Lawrence

"It cannot be too often repeated that in modern war, and especially in modern naval war, the chief factor in achieving triumph is what has been done in the way of thorough preparation and training before the beginning of war."[2]

—Theodore Roosevelt

Reading and understanding the ideas in this publication are the initial steps on the road to tactical excellence. The primary way a Marine leader becomes an able tactician is through training and education, both of which are firmly rooted in doctrine. Doctrine establishes the philosophy and practical framework for how we fight. Education develops the understanding, creativity, military judgment, and the background essential for effective battlefield leadership. Training follows doctrine and develops the tactical and technical proficiency that underlies all successful military action. Individual and group exercises serve to integrate training and education, producing a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. The lessons learned from training and operational experience then modify doctrine.

DOCTRINE

Doctrine establishes the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war and how we practice our profession.[3] Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and our way of fighting, a philosophy for leading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism, and a common language. Doctrinal development benefits from our collective experience and distills its lessons to further education and training.

Our doctrine within the Marine Corps begins with the philosophy contained in MCDP 1, *Warfighting.* This philosophy underlies publications in the Marine Corps Warfighting Publications series that contain tactics, techniques, and procedures for specific functions. This body of thought helps form Marine tacticians through its implementation in education and training. (See figure.)



The doctrinal development cycle.

EDUCATION

While combat provides the most instructive lessons on decisionmaking, tactical leaders cannot wait for war to begin their

education. We must be competent in our profession before our skills are called upon. The lives of our Marines depend on it.

Our education in tactics must develop three qualities within all tactical leaders. The first quality is *creative ability*. Tactical leaders must be encouraged to devise and pursue unique approaches to military problems. No rules govern ingenuity. The line separating boldness from foolhardiness is drawn by the hand of practical experience. That said, an education in tactics must possess an element of rigor. Too often, tactical discussions lack an in-depth analysis of cause and effect. The tactically proficient leader must learn how to analyze solutions to tactical problems. Lacking such a rigorous analysis, the tactician will not learn from experience nor exercise creative ability.

The second quality is *military judgment*, which includes the skills for gaining situational awareness and acting decisively. The tactician must readily recognize the critical factors in any situation—enemy capabilities, weather, terrain characteristics, and the condition of our own forces, to mention just a few. Marine leaders must be able to cut to the heart of a situation by identifying its important elements, developing a sound plan, and making clear decisions. Our educational approach should emphasize the ability to understand the mission, issue a clear intent, and determine the main effort.

The third quality is *moral courage*. Moral courage is the ability to make and carry out the decision regardless of personal cost. It is different from—and rarer than—physical courage. The cost of physical courage may be injury or death, whereas the cost of moral courage may be the loss of friends, popularity, prestige, or career opportunities. The burden of conflicting responsibilities in combat—responsibility for the lives of subordinates, support for peers, loyalty to superiors, duty to the Nation—can be heavy. Our educational efforts should lead potential leaders to work through the proper resolution of such conflicts in peacetime. Leaders often need to make morally correct decisions in combat, but there will rarely be time for deep moral or ethical contemplation on the battlefield.

An effective leader willingly takes on the risks which come with military responsibilities. In that light, the greatest failing of a leader is a failure to lead. Two steadfast rules apply. First, in situations clearly requiring independent decisions, a leader has the solemn duty to make them. Whether the subsequent action succeeds or fails, the leader has made an honorable effort. The broad exercise of initiative by all Marines will likely carry the battle in spite of individual errors. Second, inaction and omission based on a failure of moral courage are much worse than any judgment error reflecting a sincere effort to act. Errors resulting from such moral failings lead not only to tactical setbacks but to the breakdown of faith in the chain of command. Proper training, education, and concerned leadership are

the keys to instilling the qualities of creative ability, military judgment, and moral courage in the minds of all Marines.

TRAINING

Good tactics depend upon sound technical skills. These are the techniques and procedures which enable us to move, shoot, and communicate. We achieve technical competence through training. We build skills through repetition. Training also instills confidence in weapons and equipment. It develops the specialized skills essential to functioning in combat.

One of the ultimate aims of training is speed. Essential to speed is the requirement for accuracy. Speed without accuracy may be counterproductive and causes more damage than inaction. Whether Marines compute firing data, practice rifle marksmanship or weapons gunnery, rearm and refuel aircraft, repair vehicles, stock or transport supplies, or communicate information, the speed and accuracy of their actions determine the tempo of the overall force. Training develops the proficiency which enables this effective combination of speed and accuracy.

Small-unit training should focus on proficiency in such techniques and procedures as immediate-action drills, battle drills, and unit standing operating procedures. Practicing to reach

technical proficiency applies to all types of units, whether a section of aircraft executing air combat maneuvers, a maintenance contact team repairing a vehicle under fire, an artillery gun team conducting displacement drills, or a rifle squad conducting an in-stride breach of an obstacle. We develop and refine these measures so that units gain and maintain the speed and accuracy essential for success in battle.

Staffs, like units and individual leaders, must train to increase speed and accuracy. Staffs increase speed by accomplishing three things: first, by obtaining and organizing information to help the commander and themselves understand the situation; second, by understanding the commander's decision and coordinating efforts to focus combat power to achieve the commander's goal; and third, by monitoring events, maintaining situational awareness, and anticipating and adapting to changes. As staffs train, they increase accuracy by becoming more proficient both in their respective areas and in functioning as a team.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel knew the value of speed and accuracy for his staff when he wrote:

> A commander must accustom his staff to a high tempo from the outset, and continuously keep them up to it. If he once allows himself to be satisfied with norms, or anything less than an all-out effort, he gives up the race from the starting post, and will sooner or later be taught a bitter lesson.[4]

The speed and efficiency of a unit depend not only on the technical proficiency of its individual members but also in large part upon its cohesiveness. Such cohesion requires both personnel stability and solid leadership.

Training should also prepare Marines for the uniquely physical nature of combat. Living and caring for themselves in a spartan environment, confronting the natural elements, and experiencing the discomfort of being hungry, thirsty, and tired are as essential in preparing for combat duty as any skills training. The point is not to train individuals on how to be miserable, but rather on how to be effective when miserable or exhausted.

Likewise, training should enable us to take appropriate action in any environment and at any time. This readiness includes operating during inclement weather and periods of limited visibility. We must make terrain, weather, and darkness our allies if we are to gain advantage and deliver decisive force at a time and place of our choosing. We can neither anticipate nor appreciate the inherent friction that these natural factors produce unless we experience them.[5]

TRAINING AND EDUCATIONAL METHODS

There is no single "best" approach to developing tactical proficiency. However, any approach should be adaptable to all echelons and to all grades. The environment should be one that

is challenging and conducive to creative thinking. Like all preparation for war, training should reflect the rigors of that environment. The following examples may provide some tools for developing tactical proficiency in Marines.

Professional Reading and Historical Study

Because of the relative infrequency of actual combat experiences in most military leaders' careers, Marines must seek to expand their understanding through other, less direct means. The study of military history is critical to developing judgment and insight. It enables us to see how successful commanders have thought through—and fought through—the situations they faced. Not many people can do it instinctively—few possess the rare native ability to think militarily. Even those few can enhance their abilities through study and practice.

Historical studies provide the most readily available source of indirect experience in our profession. These studies describe the leadership considerations, the horrors of war, the sacrifices endured, the commitment involved, the resources required, and much more. These studies include biographies and autobiographies of military figures, books on specific battles, wars, and military institutions, unit histories, after-action reports, films, and documentaries. Group discussions help to expand the insights into leadership and battle that we have gained through individual study.

Professional readings and study are not solely the responsibility of military schools. Individuals cannot afford to wait for attendance at a military school to begin a course of self-directed study. Military professionalism demands that individuals and units find time to increase their professional knowledge through professional reading, professional military education classes, and individual study.

Tactical Exercises

Tactical success evolves from the synthesis of training and education—*the creative application of technical skills based on sound judgment*. Exercises enable leaders to practice decisionmaking and individuals, staffs, and units to practice and perfect collective skills. Exercises also serve to test and improve tactics, techniques, and procedures, immediate actions, battle drills, and combat standing operating procedures.

An exercise should serve as a unit's internal assessment of the quality of its training and education, not as grading criteria for higher commands. The conclusions should aim to note shortfalls so as to address them through future instruction and not to penalize poor performance. A unit will never be fully trained. There will always be room for improvement.

Exercises also test the ability of units to sustain tempo for an extended period of time. Since victory is rarely the product of single actions, the ability to operate and sustain combat effectiveness over time is important. Knowing when hostilities

will cease is a convenience denied the combat Marine. Equipment must be maintained, and people must be sustained with adequate rest, nourishment, and hygiene until they accomplish their mission.

Tactical exercises can range from field exercises to command post exercises to tactical exercises without troops. Field exercises, conducted by units of any size, involve all unit personnel working together to learn, test, and refine their collective battlefield tasks. Such exercises can be general in nature, or they can be detailed rehearsals for specific upcoming missions.

Command post exercises are largely limited to commanders and their staffs. Their purpose is to familiarize staffs with their commanders' personal preferences and operating styles as well as to exercise staff techniques and procedures and to review particular contingency plans.

Tactical exercises without troops provide tactical leaders opportunities to exercise judgment while permitting other unit elements to conduct training and education of their own. There are two approaches to conducting them.

The first method provides a leader an opportunity to evaluate a subordinate's ability to perform in a given scenario. This method places students in an area of operations and provides a situation upon which to plan and execute a task—for example, "Establish a reverse slope defense." The aim here is to exercise

tactical proficiency in the siting of weapons and the use of terrain.

The second method also places students in an area of operations and provides a situation but gives them a mission order—for example, "Prevent enemy movement north of Route 348." The aim here is to exercise judgment. After walking the ground, the students must first decide whether to defend or attack, supporting their conclusions with reasoning. The reasoning is then discussed and criticized. This approach encourages students to demonstrate ingenuity and initiative. They have free rein to employ their resources as they see fit to achieve the desired results.[6]

Wargaming

Wargames can be a valuable tool for understanding the many factors that influence a leader's decisions. Morale, enemy and friendly situations, the higher commander's intentions, firepower, mobility, and terrain are only a few of the decision factors included in the play of wargames. In all these simulations, from the sand table to a commercial board game to a computerized simulation, routine should be avoided. The less familiar the environment, the more creativity the student must display.

Sand table exercises, tactical decision games, and map exercises present students with a general situation, mission orders, and a minimum of information on enemy and friendly forces. Sand table exercises are especially suited to novice tacticians. They present the terrain in three-dimensional array, whereas a

map requires interpretation. Both map and sand table exercises enable students to conceptualize the battle, deliver their decisions, and issue orders to subordinates. Afterwards, students discuss their decisions and are critiqued. The discussion should focus on making a decision in the absence of perfect information or complete intelligence.

Terrain Walks

Terrain walks introduce the realities of terrain, vegetation, and weather. Terrain walks can be conducted in at least two ways.

The first method provides students with an area of operations, a general situation (usually depicted on a map), and a mission. As in sand table and map exercises, students describe their view of the battle. Choosing one plan, the group then begins to walk the terrain according to the plan. The group will then encounter unanticipated terrain and obstacles, while the instructors introduce enemy actions into the play of the problem. In this way, students must contend with the disparity between actual terrain and vegetation and maps as well as the chaos and uncertainty generated by enemy actions that invariably occur in real-world operations.

The second method involves the firsthand study of historic battlefields. We gain a special vantage on battle by walking the ground and seeing the battlefield from the perspective of both commanders. We gain a new appreciation for an historical commander's blunders. Often such blunders seem incomprehensible—until we see the ground. Only then can we

realistically consider alternative courses of action that the commander might have pursued.[7]

Competition

Exercises should provide realism. The means to achieve tactical realism are competitive free-play or force-on-force exercises. Whenever possible, unit training should be conducted in a free-play scenario. This approach can be used by all leaders to develop their subordinates. It affords both leaders and unit members the opportunity to apply their skills and knowledge against an active threat.

Free-play exercises are adaptable to all tactical scenarios and beneficial to all echelons. Whether it is fire teams scouting against fire teams, sections of aircraft dueling in the sky, or companies, battalions, squadrons, and Marine air-ground task forces operating against one another, both leaders and individual Marines benefit. Leaders form and execute their decisions against an opposing force as individual Marines employ their skills against an active enemy. Through free-play exercises, Marines learn to fight as an organization and to deal with a realistically challenging foe.[8]

Critiques

A key attribute of decisionmakers is their ability to reach decisions with *clear reasoning*. Critiques elicit this reasoning process. Any tactical decision game or tactical exercise should culminate with a critique.

The standard approach for conducting critiques should promote initiative. Since every tactical situation is unique and since no training situation can encompass more than a small fraction of the peculiarities of a real tactical situation, there can be no ideal or school solution. Critiques should focus on the students' rationale for doing what they did. What factors did a student consider, or not consider, in making an estimate of the situation? Were the decisions the student made consistent with this estimate? Were the actions ordered tactically sound? Did they have a reasonable chance of achieving success? How well were the orders communicated to subordinates? These questions should form the basis for critiques. The purpose is to broaden a leader's analytical powers, experience level, and base of knowledge, thereby increasing the student's creative ability to devise sound, innovative solutions to difficult problems.

Critiques should be open-minded and understanding, rather than rigid and harsh. Mistakes are essential to the learning process and should always be cast in a positive light. The focus should not be on whether a leader did well or poorly, but rather on the progress achieved in overall development. We must aim to provide the best climate to grow leaders. Dam- aging a leader's self-esteem, especially in public, therefore should be strictly avoided. A leader's self-confidence is the wellspring from which flows the willingness to assume responsibility and exercise initiative.[9]

CONCLUSION

In this publication, we have explored themes that help us to understand the fundamentals and to master the art and science of tactics. From the study of our warfighting philosophy, we have gained an appreciation for the requirement to be decisive in battle. To accomplish this, we must clearly visualize the battlespace through gained situational awareness, recognize patterns, and make decisions intuitively. We have also discussed ways we can gain advantage over the enemy and force him to bend to our will. We also explored how to be faster in relation to the enemy, to adapt to changing conditions, to cooperate for success, to exploit success, and to finish the enemy. Finally, we discussed how we can begin to act on these ideas during our training for combat. The ideas presented in this publication have implications far beyond battlefield tactics and the doctrinal way we think about warfare. They also influence the way we organize—using task organization and flexible command and control relationships—and the way we equip ourselves for combat.

Waging war in maneuver warfare style demands a professional body of officers and Marines schooled in its science and art. When asked why the Marines were so successful in Operation Desert Storm, General Boomer replied:

> The thing that made the big difference on the battlefield is that we had thousands and thousands of individual Marines constantly taking the initiative. The young lance corporal

> would take a look, see something 75 or 100 meters out in front that needed to be done, and go out and do it without being told. As I read through [the] award citations from Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this theme reappears, time and time again. That aggressive spirit comes from being well-trained, and confident in your professional knowledge.[10]

Everything we do in peacetime should prepare us for combat. Our preparation for combat depends upon training and education that develop the action and thought essential to battle.

Understanding Tactics

1. Statement by Gen A. M. Gray, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, during a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the groundbreaking for the Marine Corps Research Center, June 20, 1997.

2. Sir William Slim, *Defeat into Victory* (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1956) pp. 550-551.

3. MCDP 1, *Warfighting* (June 1997) p. 30. MCDP 1's definition differs from that given in Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*: "**tactics**—1. The employment of units in combat. 2. The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potentialities."

4. Ibid., p. 3.

5. **Combat power**: "The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation, can apply against the opponent at a given time." (Joint Pub 1-02)

6. LtCol G. I. Wilson, "The Gulf War, Maneuver Warfare, and the Operational Art," *Marine Corps Gazette* (June 1991) pp. 23–24.

7. This example was taken from Joseph H. Alexander, *Utmost Savagery; The Three Days of Tarawa* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995).

8. Bill D. Ross, *Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor* (NY: Vanguard Press, 1985) pp. 79–80.

9. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 119.

10. *Medal of Honor Recipients 1863–1973* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973) p. 492.

11. Clausewitz, p. 85.

12. *Infantry in Battle* (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, Incorporated, 1939) p.1.

Achieving a Decision

1. *Infantry in Battle*, p. 1.

2. FMFM 1, *Warfighting* (March 1989) p. 61.

3. Martin Blumenson, *Anzio: The Gamble That Failed* (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963).

4. Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative* (NY: Random House, 1963) pp. 467–468.

5. Maj Charles D. Melson, Evelyn A. Englander, Capt David A. Dawson, comps., *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (Washington, D.C.:

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1992) p. 181. Also see pages 173–182 of the same publication and LtCol Charles H. Cureton, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993) pp. 26–27.

Gaining Advantage

1. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, Retired, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966) p. 321.

2. FMFM 1, p. 57.

3. **Combined arms:** "The tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by a force to integrate firepower and mobility to produce a desired effect upon the enemy." FMFRP 0-14, *Marine Corps Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (January 1994).

4. Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers*, vol. 2 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974) pp. 39–40.

5. Andrew Geer, *The New Breed* (NY: Harper & Brothers, 1952) p. 339.

6. Ibid., pp. 365–366.

7. Joe Douglas Dodd, "Night Attack on Kunishi Ridge," *Marine Corps Gazette* (April 1985) p. 43.

8. Ibid., pp. 42–44.

9. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (NY: Oxford University Press, 1963) p. 91.

10. Ibid., p. 106.

11. Maj Robert R. Parker, Jr., "Deception: The Missing Tool," *Marine Corps Gazette* (May 1992) p. 97.

12. Sun Tzu, p. 98.

13. *The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1985) pp. 173–181.

14. FMFM 6-7, *Scouting and Patrolling for Infantry Units* (January 1989) p. 2-1.

15. Sun Tzu, p. 93.

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1. Heinl, p. 220.

2. John A. English, *On Infantry* (NY: Praeger, 1984) p. 223.

3. Jeter A. Isley and Philip A. Crowl, *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951) p. 338.

4. Peter G. Tsouras, *Warrior's Words: A Quotation Book: From Sesostris III to Schwarzkopf, 1871 B.C. to A.D. 1991* (London: Cassell Arms and Armour, 1992), p. 434.

5. Heinl, p. 63.

6. "Command," *Time* (January 25, 1943) p. 61.

7. Col Ray Smith, USMC, telephone interview by Capt S. R. Shoemaker, USMC, 12 March 1991, Washington, D.C..

8. Gen Hermann Balck, interview by William S. Lind, 6 June 1980, Washington, D.C..

9. William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985) pp. 5–6.

10. Gen George S. Patton, Jr., *War As I Knew It* (NY: Bantam Books, Inc., 1979) p. 323.

11. Ibid., pp. 330–331.

12. English, p. 217.

13. Capt A. T. Mahan, USN, *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1899) p. 730.

14. FMFRP 12-110, *Fighting on Guadalcanal* (September 1991) p. 33.

15. Patton, p. 376.

Adapting

1. Tsouras, p. 21.

2. Ibid., p. 21.

3. Keith William Nolan, *Battle for Hue* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983) pp. 51–52.

4. **Branch**: "A contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions as determined during the wargaming process." MCRP 5-2A, *Operational Terms and Graphics* (June 1997).

5. **Sequel**: "Major operations that follow the current major operation. Plans for these are based on the possible outcomes (victory, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation." (MCRP 5-2A).

6. See MCDP 5, *Planning*, for a more complete discussion of modular plans.

7. Cureton, p. 77.

8. Ibid, p. 77.

Cooperating

1. NAVMC 7386, *Tactical Principles* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Schools, 1955) p. 7–8.

2. MCDP 6, *Command and Control* (October 1996) p. 48.

3. Ibid., p. 43.

4. Ibid., pp. 39–41.

5. Melson, Englander, and Dawson, comps., p. 140.

6. Patton, p. 376.

7. Heinl, p. 196.

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1. Tsouras, p. 349.

2. Ibid., p. 349.

3. Heinl, p. 109.

4. Capt B. H. Liddell Hart, "The 'Man-in-the-Dark' Theory of Infantry Tactics and the 'Expanding Torrent' System of Attack," *Journal of the R.U.S.I.* (February 1921) p. 13.

5. Erwin Rommel, *Attacks* (Vienna, VA: Athena Press, 1979) pp. 235–250.

6. FMFRP 12-90, *Second Marine Division Report on Gilbert Islands—Tarawa Operation* (September 1991) p. 51.

7. **Consolidation of position**: "Organizing and strengthening a newly captured position so that it can be used against the enemy." (Joint Pub 1-02)

8. **Exploitation**: "An offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth." (Joint Pub 1-02)

9. Col Charles J. Quilter, II, *U.S. Marine Corps in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993) p. 99.

10. **Pursuit**: "An offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it." (Joint Pub 1-02)

11. Bruce Catton, *This Hallowed Ground: The Story of the Union Side of the Civil War* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956) p. 384.

12. Heinl, p. 259.

13. **Reserve**: "Portion of a body of troops which is kept to the rear, or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement, available for a decisive moment." **Tactical reserve**: "A part of a force, held under the control of the commander as a maneuvering force to influence future action." (Joint Pub 1-02)

14. Brig Gen Thomas R. Phillips, U.S. Army, ed., "Military Maxims of Napoleon," in *Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics* (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1940) p. 436.

15. Heinl, p. 275.

16. This example was taken from Martin Russ, *Line of Departure: TARAWA* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975).

17. Heinl, p. 274.

18. Much of the material in this section is based on Capt John F. Schmitt's article, "The Use of the Reserve in Combat," *Marine Corps Gazette* (March 1990) pp. 63–69.

Making It Happen

1. T. E. Lawrence, "The Science of Guerrilla Warfare," introduction to "Guerrilla Warfare," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 13th ed. (NY: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1926).

2. Heinl, p. 329.

3. **Doctrine**: "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application." (Joint Pub 1-02)

4. As attributed to Erwin Rommel by Heinl, p. 60.

5. For more detailed information on the establishment of unit training programs, see MCRP 3-0A, *Unit Training Management Guide* (November 1996).

6. For more detailed readings on the subject of designing and executing training exercises, see MCRP 3-0B, *How to Conduct Training* (November 1996).

7. William Glenn Robertson, *The Staff Ride* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987) provides an excellent description of the use of terrain walks. See also *Staff Ride Handbook* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 1996).

8. This section reflects the emphasis found in MCDP 1, *Warfighting,* regarding the requirement to simulate the "clash of opposing wills" found in combat by conducting free-play exercises.

9. The subject of how to conduct critiques and hold after-action reviews is covered in detail in both MCRP 3-0A and MCRP 3-0B.

10. Melson, Englander, and Dawson, comps., p. 94.

MCDP 1

Warfighting

U.S. Marine Corps

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

20 June 1997

FOREWORD

Since Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, *Warfighting*, was first published in 1989, it has had a significant impact both inside and outside the Marine Corps. That manual has changed the way Marines think about warfare. It has caused energetic debate and has been translated into several foreign languages, issued by foreign militaries, and published commercially. It has strongly influenced the development of doctrine by our sister Services. Our current naval doctrine is based on the tenets of maneuver warfare as described in that publication. Current and emerging concepts such as operational maneuver from the sea derive their doctrinal foundation from the philosophy contained in *Warfighting*. Our philosophy of warfighting, as described in the manual, is in consonance with joint doctrine, contributing to our ability to operate harmoniously with the other Services.

That said, I believe *Warfighting* can and should be improved. Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare. Doctrine must continue to evolve based on growing experience, advancements

in theory, and the changing face of war itself. It is in this spirit that *Warfighting* has been revised, and this publication, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual 1. I have several goals for this revision. One goal is to enhance the description of the nature of war—for example, to emphasize war's complexity and unpredictability and to widen the definition of war to account for modern conflict's expanding forms. Another goal is to clarify the descriptions of styles of warfare. A third goal is to clarify and refine important maneuver warfare concepts such as commander's intent, main effort, and critical vulnerability. It is my intent to do this while retaining the spirit, style, and essential message of the original.

Very simply, this publication describes the philosophy which distinguishes the U.S. Marine Corps. The thoughts contained here are not merely guidance for action in combat but a way of thinking. This publication provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight. This book contains no specific techniques or procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and values. It requires judgment in application.

Warfighting is not meant as a reference manual; it is designed to be read from cover to cover. Its four chapters have a natural progression. Chapter 1 describes our understanding of the characteristics, problems, and demands of war. Chapter 2 derives a theory about war from that understanding. This theory in turn provides the foundation for how we prepare for war and how we wage war, chapters 3 and 4, respectively.

Experience has shown that the warfighting philosophy described on these pages applies far beyond the officer corps. I expect all Marines—enlisted and commissioned—to read this book, understand it, and act upon it. As General A. M. Gray stated in his foreword to the original in 1989, this publication describes a philosophy for action that, in war, in crisis, and in peace, dictates our approach to duty.

C. C. KRULAK
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

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Throughout this publication, masculine nouns and pronouns are used for the sake of simplicity. Except where otherwise noted, these nouns and pronouns apply to either gender.

PREFACE

Eight years ago the Marine Corps published the first edition of *Warfighting*. Our intent was to describe my philosophy on warfighting, establish it as Marine Corps doctrine, and present it in an easy-to-read format. In the foreword to that manual, I charged every officer to read and reread the text, to understand it, and to take its message to heart. We have succeeded. *Warfighting* has stimulated discussion and debate from classrooms to wardrooms, training areas to combat zones. The philosophy contained in this publication has influenced our approach to every task we have undertaken.

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 stated, “War is both timeless and ever changing. While the basic nature of war is constant, the means and methods we use evolve continuously.” Like war itself, our approach to warfighting must evolve. If we cease to refine, expand, and improve our profession, we risk becoming outdated, stagnant, and defeated. Marine Corps Doctrinal

Publication 1 refines and expands our philosophy on warfighting, taking into account new thinking about the nature of war and the understanding gained through participation in extensive operations over the past decade. Read it, study it, take it to heart.

Semper Fidelis,

A. M. GRAY
General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
29th Commandant of the Marine Corps

Warfighting

Chapter 1.The Nature of War
War Defined—Friction—Uncertainty—Fluidity—Disorder—Complexity—The Human Dimension—Violence and Danger—Physical, Moral, and Mental Forces—The Evolution of War—The Science, Art, and Dynamic of War—Conclusion

Chapter 2.The Theory of War
War As an Act of Policy—Means in War—The Spectrum of Conflict—Levels of War—Initiative and Response—Styles of Warfare—Combat Power—Speed and Focus—Surprise and Boldness—Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities—Creating and Exploiting Opportunity—Conclusion

Chapter 3.Preparing for War
Force Planning—Organization—Doctrine—Professionalism—Training—Professional Military Education—Personnel Management—Equipping—Conclusion

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Chapter 4.The Conduct of War

The Challenge—Maneuver Warfare—Orienting on the Enemy—Philosophy of Command—Shaping the Action—Decisionmaking—Mission Tactics—Commander's Intent—Main Effort—Surfaces and Gaps—Combined Arms—Conclusion

Chapter 1

The Nature of War

"Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war."[1]

—Carl von Clausewitz

"In war the chief incalculable is the human will."[2]

—B. H. Liddell Hart

"Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held."[3]

—A. A. Vandegrift

To understand the Marine Corps' philosophy of warfighting, we first need an appreciation for the nature of war itself—its moral, mental, and physical characteristics and demands. A common view of war among Marines is a necessary base for the development of a cohesive doctrine because our approach to the conduct of war derives from our understanding of the nature of war.

WAR DEFINED

War is a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force. These groups have traditionally been established nation-states, but they may also include any nonstate group—such as an international coalition or a faction within or outside of an existing state—with its own political interests and the ability to generate organized violence on a scale sufficient to have significant political consequences.

The essence of war is a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other. War is fundamentally an interactive social process. Clausewitz called it a *Zweikampf* (literally a "two-struggle") and suggested the image of a pair of wrestlers locked in a hold, each exerting force and counterforce to try to throw the other.[4] War is thus a process of continuous mutual

adaptation, of give and take, move and countermove. It is critical to keep in mind that the enemy is not an inanimate object to be acted upon but an independent and animate force with its own objectives and plans. While we try to impose our will on the enemy, he resists us and seeks to impose his own will on us. Appreciating this dynamic interplay between opposing human wills is essential to understanding the fundamental nature of war.

The object in war is to impose our will on our enemy. The means to this end is the organized application or threat of violence by military force. The target of that violence may be limited to hostile combatant forces, or it may extend to the enemy population at large. War may range from intense clashes between large military forces—sometimes backed by an official declaration of war—to subtler, unconventional hostilities that barely reach the threshold of violence.

Total war and perfect peace rarely exist in practice. Instead, they are extremes between which exist the relations among most political groups. This range includes routine economic competition, more or less permanent political or ideological tension, and occasional crises among groups. The decision to resort to the use of military force of some kind may arise at any point within these extremes, even during periods of relative peace. On one end of the spectrum, military force may be used simply to maintain or restore order in civil disturbances or disaster relief operations. At the other extreme, force may be used

to completely overturn the existing order within a society or between two or more societies. Some cultures consider it a moral imperative to go to war only as a last resort when all peaceful means to settle disagreements have failed. Others have no such hesitancy to resort to military force to achieve their aims.

FRICTION

Portrayed as a clash between two opposing wills, war appears a simple enterprise. In practice, the conduct of war becomes extremely difficult because of the countless factors that impinge on it. These factors collectively have been called *friction*, which Clausewitz described as "the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult."[5] Friction is the force that resists all action and saps energy. It makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible.

The very essence of war as a clash between opposed wills creates friction. In this dynamic environment of interacting forces, friction abounds.

Friction may be mental, as in indecision over a course of action. It may be physical, as in effective enemy fire or a terrain obstacle that must be overcome. Friction may be external, imposed by enemy action, the terrain, weather, or mere chance.

Friction may be self-induced, caused by such factors as lack of a clearly defined goal, lack of coordination, unclear or complicated plans, complex task organizations or command relationships, or complicated technologies. Whatever form it takes, because war is a human enterprise, friction will always have a psychological as well as a physical impact.

While we should attempt to minimize self-induced friction, the greater requirement is *to fight effectively* despite the existence of friction. One essential means to overcome friction is the will; we prevail over friction through persistent strength of mind and spirit. While striving ourselves to overcome the effects of friction, we must attempt at the same time to raise our enemy's friction to a level that weakens his ability to fight.

We can readily identify countless examples of friction, but until we have experienced it ourselves, we cannot hope to appreciate it fully. Only through experience can we come to appreciate the force of will necessary to overcome friction and to develop a realistic appreciation for what is possible in war and what is not. While training should attempt to approximate the conditions of war, we must realize it can never fully duplicate the level of friction of real combat.

UNCERTAINTY

Another attribute of war is uncertainty. We might argue that uncertainty is just one of many sources of friction, but because it is such a pervasive trait of war, we will treat it singly. All actions in war take place in an atmosphere of uncertainty, or the "fog of war." Uncertainty pervades battle in the form of unknowns about the enemy, about the environment, and even about the friendly situation. While we try to reduce these unknowns by gathering information, we must realize that we cannot eliminate them—or even come close. The very nature of war makes certainty impossible; all actions in war will be based on incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.

War is intrinsically unpredictable. At best, we can hope to determine possibilities and probabilities. This implies a certain standard of military judgment: What is possible and what is not? What is probable and what is not? By judging probability, we make an estimate of our enemy's designs and act accordingly. Having said this, we realize that it is precisely those actions that seem improbable that often have the greatest impact on the outcome of war.

Because we can never eliminate uncertainty, we must learn to fight effectively despite it. We can do this by developing simple, flexible plans; planning for likely contingencies; developing standing operating procedures; and fostering initiative among subordinates.

One important source of uncertainty is a property known as *nonlinearity*. Here the term does not refer to formations on the battlefield but describes systems in which causes and effects are disproportionate. Minor incidents or actions can have decisive effects. Outcomes of battles can hinge on the actions of a few individuals, and as Clausewitz observed, "issues can be decided by chances and incidents so minute as to figure in histories simply as anecdotes."[6]

By its nature, uncertainty invariably involves the estimation and acceptance of risk. Risk is inherent in war and is involved in every mission. Risk is equally common to action and inaction. Risk may be related to gain; greater potential gain often requires greater risk. The practice of concentrating combat power toward the main effort necessitates the willingness to accept prudent risk elsewhere. However, we should clearly understand that the acceptance of risk does not equate to the imprudent willingness to gamble the entire likelihood of success on a single improbable event.

Part of uncertainty is the ungovernable element of chance. Chance is a universal characteristic of war and a continuous

source of friction. Chance consists of turns of events that cannot reasonably be foreseen and over which we and our enemy have no control. The constant potential for chance to influence outcomes in war, combined with the inability to prevent chance from impacting on plans and actions, creates psychological friction. However, we should remember that chance favors neither belligerent exclusively. Consequently, we must view chance not only as a threat but also as an opportunity which we must be ever ready to exploit.

FLUIDITY

Like friction and uncertainty, fluidity is an inherent attribute of war. Each episode in war is the temporary result of a unique combination of circumstances, presenting a unique set of problems and requiring an original solution. Nevertheless, no episode can be viewed in isolation. Rather, each episode merges with those that precede and follow it—shaped by the former and shaping the conditions of the latter—creating a continuous, fluctuating flow of activity replete with fleeting opportunities and unforeseen events. Since war is a fluid phenomenon, its conduct requires flexibility of thought. Success depends in large part on the ability to adapt—to proactively shape changing events to our advantage as well as to react quickly to constantly changing conditions.

It is physically impossible to sustain a high tempo of activity indefinitely, although clearly there will be times when it is advantageous to push men and equipment to the limit. The tempo of war will fluctuate from periods of intense combat to periods in which activity is limited to information gathering, replenishment, or redeployment. Darkness and weather can influence the tempo of war but need not halt it. A competitive rhythm will develop between the opposing wills with each belligerent trying to influence and exploit tempo and the continuous flow of events to suit his purposes.

Military forces will mass to concentrate combat power against the enemy. However, this massing will also make them vulnerable to the effects of enemy fires, and they will find it necessary to disperse. Another competitive rhythm will develop—disperse, concentrate, disperse again—as each belligerent tries to concentrate combat power temporarily while limiting the vulnerability to enemy combat power.

DISORDER

In an environment of friction, uncertainty, and fluidity, war gravitates naturally toward disorder. Like the other attributes of war, disorder is an inherent characteristic of war; we can never eliminate it. In the heat of battle, plans will go awry,

instructions and information will be unclear and misinterpreted, communications will fail, and mistakes and unforeseen events will be commonplace. It is precisely this natural disorder which creates the conditions ripe for exploitation by an opportunistic will.

Each encounter in war will usually tend to grow increasingly disordered over time. As the situation changes continuously, we are forced to improvise again and again until finally our actions have little, if any, resemblance to the original scheme.

By historical standards, the modern battlefield is particularly disorderly. While past battlefields could be described by linear formations and uninterrupted linear fronts, we cannot think of today's battlefield in linear terms. The range and lethality of modern weapons have increased dispersion between units. In spite of communications technology, this dispersion strains the limits of positive control. The natural result of dispersion is unoccupied areas, gaps, and exposed flanks which can and will be exploited, blurring the distinction between front and rear and friendly- and enemy-controlled areas.

The occurrences of war will not unfold like clockwork. We cannot hope to impose precise, positive control over events. The best we can hope for is to impose a general framework of order on the disorder, to influence the general flow of action rather than to try to control each event.

If we are to win, we must be able to operate in a disorderly environment. In fact, we must not only be able to fight effectively in the face of disorder, we should seek to generate disorder and use it as a weapon against our opponent.

COMPLEXITY

War is a complex phenomenon. We have described war as essentially a clash between opposed wills. In reality, each belligerent is not a single, homogeneous will guided by a single intelligence. Instead, each belligerent is a complex system consisting of numerous individual parts. A division comprises regiments, a regiment comprises battalions, and so on all the way down to fire teams which are composed of individual Marines. Each element is part of a larger whole and must cooperate with other elements for the accomplishment of the common goal. At the same time, each has its own mission and must adapt to its own situation. Each must deal with friction, uncertainty, and disorder at its own level, and each may create friction, uncertainty, and disorder for others, friendly as well as enemy.

As a result, war is not governed by the actions or decisions of a single individual in any one place but emerges from the collective behavior of all the individual parts in the system interacting locally in response to local conditions and

incomplete information. A military action is not the monolithic execution of a single decision by a single entity but necessarily involves near-countless independent but interrelated decisions and actions being taken simultaneously throughout the organization. Efforts to fully centralize military operations and to exert complete control by a single decisionmaker are inconsistent with the intrinsically complex and distributed nature of war.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION

Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central in war. It is the human dimension which infuses war with its intangible moral factors. War is shaped by human nature and is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities which characterize human behavior. Since war is an act of violence based on irreconcilable disagreement, it will invariably inflame and be shaped by human emotions.

War is an extreme trial of moral and physical strength and stamina. Any view of the nature of war would hardly be accurate or complete without consideration of the effects of danger, fear, exhaustion, and privation on those who must do the fighting.[7] However, these effects vary greatly from case to case. Individuals and peoples react differently to the stress of

war; an act that may break the will of one enemy may only serve to stiffen the resolve of another. Human will, instilled through leadership, is the driving force of all action in war.

No degree of technological development or scientific calculation will diminish the human dimension in war. Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons, and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is therefore inherently flawed.

VIOLENCE AND DANGER

War is among the greatest horrors known to humanity; it should never be romanticized. The means of war is force, applied in the form of organized violence. It is through the use of violence, or the credible threat of violence, that we compel our enemy to do our will. Violence is an essential element of war, and its immediate result is bloodshed, destruction, and suffering. While the magnitude of violence may vary with the object and means of war, the violent essence of war will never change.[8] Any study of war that neglects this basic truth is misleading and incomplete.

Since war is a violent enterprise, danger is ever present. Since war is a human phenomenon, fear, the human reaction to danger, has a significant impact on the conduct of war.

Everybody feels fear. Fear contributes to the corrosion of will. Leaders must foster the courage to overcome fear, both individually and within the unit. Courage is not the absence of fear; rather, it is the strength to overcome fear.[9]

Leaders must study fear, understand it, and be prepared to cope with it. Courage and fear are often situational rather than uniform, meaning that people experience them differently at different times and in different situations. Like fear, courage takes many forms, from a stoic courage born of reasoned calculation to a fierce courage born of heightened emotion. Experience under fire generally increases confidence, as can realistic training by lessening the mystique of combat. Strong leadership which earns the respect and trust of subordinates can limit the effects of fear. Leaders should develop unit cohesion and esprit and the self-confidence of individuals within the unit. In this environment, a Marine's unwillingness to violate the respect and trust of peers can overcome personal fear.

PHYSICAL, MORAL, AND MENTAL FORCES

War is characterized by the interaction of physical, moral, and mental forces. The physical characteristics of war are generally easily seen, understood, and measured: equipment capabilities,

supplies, physical objectives seized, force ratios, losses of matériel or life, terrain lost or gained, prisoners or matériel captured. The moral characteristics are less tangible. (The term "moral" as used here is not restricted to ethics, although ethics are certainly included, but pertains to those forces of a psychological rather than tangible nature.)[10] Moral forces are difficult to grasp and impossible to quantify. We cannot easily gauge forces like national and military resolve, national or individual conscience, emotion, fear, courage, morale, leadership, or esprit. War also involves a significant mental, or intellectual, component. Mental forces provide the ability to grasp complex battlefield situations; to make effective estimates, calculations, and decisions; to devise tactics and strategies; and to develop plans.

Although material factors are more easily quantified, the moral and mental forces exert a greater influence on the nature and outcome of war.[11] This is not to lessen the importance of physical forces, for the physical forces in war can have a significant impact on the others. For example, the greatest effect of fires is generally not the amount of physical destruction they cause, but the effect of that physical destruction on the enemy's moral strength.

Because it is difficult to come to grips with moral and mental forces, it is tempting to exclude them from our study of war. However, any doctrine or theory of war that neglects these factors ignores the greater part of the nature of war.

THE EVOLUTION OF WAR

War is both timeless and ever changing. While the basic nature of war is constant, the means and methods we use evolve continuously. Changes may be gradual in some cases and drastic in others. Drastic changes in war are the result of developments that dramatically upset the equilibrium of war such as the rifled bore, mass conscription, and the railroad.

One major catalyst of change is the advancement of technology. As the hardware of war improves through technolo- gical development, so must the tactical, operational, and strategic usage adapt to its improved capabilities both to maximize our own capabilities and to counteract our ene- my's.

It is important to understand which aspects of war are likely to change and which are not. We must stay abreast of the process of change for the belligerent who first exploits a development in the art and science of war gains a significant

advantage. If we are ignorant of the changing face of war, we will find ourselves unequal to its challenges.

THE SCIENCE, ART, AND DYNAMIC OF WAR

Various aspects of war fall principally in the realm of science, which is the methodical application of the empirical laws of nature. The science of war includes those activities directly subject to the laws of ballistics, mechanics, and like disciplines; for example, the application of fires, the effects of weapons, and the rates and methods of movement and resupply. However, science does not describe the whole phenomenon.

An even greater part of the conduct of war falls under the realm of art, which is the employment of creative or intuitive skills. Art includes the creative, situational application of scientific knowledge through judgment and experience, and so the art of war subsumes the science of war. The art of war requires the intuitive ability to grasp the essence of a unique military situation and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. It involves conceiving strategies and tactics and developing plans of action to suit a given situation. This still does not describe the whole phenomenon. Owing to the va- garies of human behavior and the countless other intangible factors which influence war, there is far more to its conduct than can be explained by art and science. Art and science stop short of explaining the fundamental dynamic of war.

As we have said, war is a social phenomenon. Its essential dynamic is the dynamic of competitive human interaction rather than the dynamic of art or science. Human beings interact with each other in ways that are fundamentally different from the way a scientist works with chemicals or formulas or the way an artist works with paints or musical notes. It is because of this dynamic of human interaction that fortitude, perseverance, boldness, esprit, and other traits not explainable by art or science are so essential in war. *We thus conclude that the conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of human competition requiring both the knowledge of science and the creativity of art but driven ultimately by the power of human will.*

CONCLUSION

At first glance, war seems a simple clash of interests. On closer examination, it reveals its complexity and takes shape as one of the most demanding and trying of human endeavors. War is an extreme test of will. Friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and danger are its essential features. War displays broad patterns that can be represented as probabilities, yet it remains fundamentally unpredictable. Each episode is the unique product of myriad moral, mental, and physical forces.

Individual causes and their effects can rarely be isolated. Minor actions and random incidents can have disproportionately large—even decisive—effects. While dependent on the laws of science and the intuition and creativity of art, war takes its fundamental character from the dynamic of human interaction.

Chapter 2

The Theory of War

"The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes."[1]

—Carl von Clausewitz

"Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in the attack. One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant."[2]

—Sun Tzu

"Battles are won by slaughter and manoeuver. The greater the general, the more he contributes in manoeuver, the less he demands in slaughter."[3]

—Winston Churchill

Having arrived at a common view of the nature of war, we proceed to develop from it a theory of war. Our theory of war will in turn be the foundation for the way we prepare for and wage war.

WAR AS AN ACT OF POLICY

War is an extension of both policy and politics with the addition of military force.[4] Policy and politics are related but not synonymous, and it is important to understand war in both contexts. Politics refers to the distribution of power through dynamic interaction, both cooperative and competitive, while policy refers to the conscious objectives established within the political process. The policy aims that are the motive for any group in war should also be the foremost determinants of its conduct. The single most important thought to understand about our theory is that war *must serve policy*.

As the policy aims of war may vary from resistance against aggression to the unconditional surrender of an enemy government, so should the application of violence vary in accordance with those aims. Of course, we may also have to adjust our policy objectives to accommodate our chosen means. This means that we must not establish goals outside our capabilities. It is important to recognize that many political problems cannot be solved by military means. Some can, but rarely as

anticipated. War tends to take its own course as it unfolds. We should recognize that war is not an inanimate instrument, but an animate force which may likely have unintended consequences that may change the political situation.

To say that war is an extension of politics and policy is not to say that war is strictly a political phenomenon: It also contains social, cultural, psychological, and other elements. These can also exert a strong influence on the conduct of war as well as on war's usefulness for solving political problems.

When the policy motive of war is extreme, such as the destruction of an enemy government, then war's natural military tendency toward destruction will coincide with the political aim, and there will tend to be few political restrictions on the military conduct of war. On the other hand, the more limited the policy motive, the more the military tendency toward destruction may be at variance with that motive, and the more likely political considerations will restrict the application of military force.[5] Commanders must recognize that since military action must serve policy, these political restrictions on military action may be perfectly correct. At the same time, military leaders have a responsibility to advise the political leadership when the limitations imposed on military action jeopardize the military's ability to accomplish its assigned mission.

There are two ways to use military force to impose our will on an enemy. The first is to make the enemy helpless to resist

us by physically destroying his military capabilities. The aim is the elimination, permanent or temporary, of the enemy's military power. This has historically been called a *strategy of annihilation*, although it does not necessarily require the physical annihilation of all military forces. Instead, it requires the enemy's incapacitation as a viable military threat, and thus can also be called a *strategy of incapacitation*.[6] We use force in this way when we seek an unlimited political objective, such as the overthrow of the enemy leadership. We may also use this strategy in pursuit of more limited political objectives if we believe the enemy will continue to resist as long as any means to do so remain.

The second approach is to convince the enemy that accepting our terms will be less painful than continuing to resist. This is a *strategy of erosion*, using military force to erode the enemy leadership's will.[7] In such a strategy, we use military force to raise the costs of resistance higher than the enemy is willing to pay. We use force in this manner in pursuit of limited political goals that we believe the enemy leadership will ultimately be willing to accept.

MEANS IN WAR

At the highest level, war involves the use of all the elements of power that one political group can bring to bear against

another. These include, for example, economic, diplomatic, military, and psychological forces. Our primary concern is with the use of *military force*. Nevertheless, while we focus on the use of military force, we must not consider it in isolation from the other elements of national power. The use of military force may take any number of forms from the mere deployment of forces as a demonstration of resolve to the enforcement of a negotiated truce to general warfare with sophisticated weaponry.

THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Conflict can take a wide range of forms constituting a spectrum which reflects the magnitude of violence involved. At one end of the spectrum are those actions referred to as military operations other than war in which the application of military power is usually restrained and selective. Military operations other than war encompass the use of a broad range of military capabilities to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support civil authorities. At the other end of the spectrum is general war, a large-scale, sustained combat operation such as global conflict between major powers. Where on the spectrum to place a particular conflict depends on several factors. Among them are policy objectives, available military means, national will, and density of fighting forces or combat power on the battlefield. In general, the greater this

density, the more intense the conflict. Each conflict is not uniformly intense. As a result, we may witness relatively intense actions within a military operation other than war or relatively quiet sectors or phases in a major regional conflict or general war.

Military operations other than war and small wars are more probable than a major regional conflict or general war. Many political groups simply do not possess the military means to wage war at the high end of the spectrum. Many who fight a technologically or numerically superior enemy may choose to fight in a way that does not justify the enemy's full use of that superiority. Unless actual survival is at stake, political groups are generally unwilling to accept the risks associated with general war. However, a conflict's intensity may change over time. Belligerents may escalate the level of violence if the original means do not achieve the desired results. Similarly, wars may actually de-escalate over time; for example, after an initial pulse of intense violence, the belligerents may continue to fight on a lesser level, unable to sustain the initial level of intensity.

The Marine Corps, as the nation's force-in-readiness, must have the versatility and flexibility to deal with a situation at any intensity across the entire spectrum of conflict. This is a greater challenge than it may appear: Military operations other than war and small wars are not simply lesser forms of general war. A modern military force capable of waging a war against a large conventional force may find itself

ill-prepared for a "small" war against a lightly equipped guerrilla force.

LEVELS OF WAR

Activities in war take place at several interrelated levels which form a hierarchy. These levels are the strategic, operational, and tactical. (See figure 1.)

The highest level is the *strategic* level.[8] Activities at the strategic level focus directly on policy objectives. Strategy applies to peace as well as war. We distinguish between *national strategy*, which coordinates and focuses all the elements of national power to attain the policy objectives,[9] and *military strategy*, which is the application of military force to secure the policy objectives.[10] Military strategy thus is subordinate to national strategy. Military strategy can be thought of as the art of winning wars and securing peace. Strategy involves establishing goals, assigning forces, providing assets, and imposing conditions on the use of force in theaters of war. Strategy derived from political and policy objectives must be clearly understood to be the sole authoritative basis for all operations.

The lowest level is the *tactical* level.[11] Tactics refers to the concepts and methods used to accomplish a particular mission



Figure 1. The Levels of War.

in either combat or other military operations. In war, tactics focuses on the application of combat power to defeat an enemy force in combat at a particular time and place. In noncombat situations, tactics may include the schemes and methods by which we perform other missions, such as enforcing order and maintaining security during peacekeeping op- erations. We normally think of tactics in terms of combat, and

in this context tactics can be thought of as the art and science of winning engagements and battles. It includes the use of firepower and maneuver, the integration of different arms, and the immediate exploitation of success to defeat the enemy. Included within the tactical level of war is the performance of combat service support functions such as resupply or maintenance. The tactical level also includes the *technical* application of combat power, which consists of those techniques and procedures for accomplishing specific tasks *within* a tactical action. These include the call for fire, techniques of fire, the operation of weapons and equipment, and tactical movement techniques. There is a certain overlap between tactics and techniques. We make the point only to draw the distinction between tactics, which requires judgment and creativity, and techniques and procedures, which generally involves repetitive routine.

The *operational* level of war links the strategic and tactical levels. It is the use of tactical results to attain strategic objectives.[12] The operational level includes deciding when, where, and under what conditions to engage the enemy in battle—and when, where, and under what conditions to *refuse* battle in support of higher aims. Actions at this level imply a broader dimension of time and space than actions at the tactical level. As strategy deals with winning wars and tactics with winning battles and engagements, the operational level of war is the art and science of winning campaigns. Its means are tactical results, and its ends are the established strategic objectives.

The distinctions between levels of war are rarely clearly delineated in practice. They are to some extent only a matter of scope and scale. Usually there is some amount of overlap as a single commander may have responsibilities at more than one level. As shown in figure 1, the overlap may be slight. This will likely be the case in large-scale, conventional conflicts involving large military formations and multiple theaters. In such cases, there are fairly distinct strategic, operational, and tactical domains, and most commanders will find their activities focused at one level or another. However, in other cases, the levels of war may compress so that there is significant overlap, as shown in figure 2. Especially in either a nuclear war or a military operation other than war, a single commander may operate at two or even three levels simultaneously. In a nuclear war, strategic decisions about the direction of the war and tactical decisions about the employment

Figure 2. The Levels of War Compressed.

of weapons are essentially one and the same. In a military operation other than war, even a small-unit leader, for example, may find that "tactical" actions have direct strategic implications.

INITIATIVE AND RESPONSE

All actions in war, regardless of the level, are based upon either taking the *initiative* or reacting in *response* to the opponent. By taking the initiative, we dictate the terms of the conflict and force the enemy to meet us on our terms. The initiative allows us to pursue some positive aim even if only to preempt an enemy initiative. It is through the initiative that we seek to impose our will on the enemy. The initiative is clearly the preferred form of action because only through the initiative can we ultimately impose our will on the enemy. At least one party to a conflict must take the initiative for without the desire to impose upon the other, there would be no conflict. The second party to a conflict must respond for without the desire to resist, there again would be no conflict. If we cannot take the initiative and the enemy does, we are compelled to respond in order to counteract the enemy's attempts. The response generally has a negative aim, that of negating—blocking or counterattacking—the enemy's inten- tions. Like a counterpunch in boxing, the response often has as its object seizing the initiative from the opponent.

The flux of war is a product of the continuous interaction between initiative and response. We can imagine a conflict in which both belligerents try to take the initiative simultaneously—as in a meeting engagement, for example. After the initial clash, one of them will gain the upper hand, and the other will be compelled to respond—at least until able to wrestle the initiative away from the other. Actions in war more or less reflect the constant imperative to seize and maintain the initiative.

This discussion leads to a related pair of concepts: the *offense* and *defense*. The offense contributes *striking power*. We normally associate the offense with initiative: The most obvious way to seize and maintain the initiative is to strike first and keep striking. The defense, on the other hand, contributes *resisting power*, the ability to preserve and protect ourselves. The defense generally has a negative aim, that of resisting the enemy's will.

The defense tends to be the more efficient form of warfare—meaning that it tends to expend less energy—which is not the same as saying the defense is inherently the stronger form of warfare. The relative advantages and disadvantages of offense and defense are situationally dependent. Because we typically think of the defense as waiting for the enemy to strike, we often associate the defense with response rather than initiative. This is not necessarily true. We do not necessarily assume the defensive only out of weakness. For example, the defense may confer the initiative if the enemy is

compelled to attack into the strength of our defense. Under such conditions, we may have the positive aim of destroying the enemy. Similarly, a defender waiting in ambush may have the initiative if the enemy can be brought into the trap. The defense may be another way of striking at the enemy.

While opposing forms, the offense and defense are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they cannot exist separately. For example, the defense cannot be purely passive resistance. An effective defense must assume an offensive character, striking at the moment of the enemy's greatest vulnerability. As Clausewitz wrote, the defense is "not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows."[13] The truly decisive element of the defense is the counterattack. Thus, the offense is an integral component of the concept of the defense.

Similarly, the defense is an essential component of the offense. The offense cannot sustain itself indefinitely. At some times and places, it becomes necessary to halt the offense to replenish, and the defense automatically takes over. Furthermore, the requirement to concentrate forces for the offensive often necessitates assuming the defensive elsewhere. Therefore, out of necessity, we must include defensive considerations as part of our concept of the offense.

This brings us to the concept of the *culminating point*,[14] without which our understanding of the relationship between the offense and defense would be incomplete. Not only can

the offense not sustain itself indefinitely, but also it generally grows weaker as it advances. Certain moral factors, such as morale or boldness, may increase with a successful attack, but these very often cannot compensate for the physical losses involved in sustaining an advance in the face of resistance. We advance at a cost in lives, fuel, ammunition, and physical and sometimes moral strength, and so the attack becomes weaker over time. Enemy resistance, of course, is a major factor in the dissipation of strength. Eventually, we reach the culminating point at which we can no longer sustain the attack and must revert to the defense. It is precisely at this point that the defensive element of the offense is most vulnerable to the offensive element of the defense, the counterattack.

We conclude that there exists no clear division between the offense and defense. Our theory of war should not attempt to impose one artificially. The offense and defense exist simultaneously as necessary components of each other, and the transition from one to the other is fluid and continuous.

These relationships between initiative and response, offense and defense, exist simultaneously at the various levels of war. We may seize the initiative locally as part of a larger response—in a limited counterattack, for example. Likewise, we may employ a tactical defense as part of an offensive campaign, availing ourselves of the advantages of the defense tactically while pursuing an operational offensive aim.

STYLES OF WARFARE

Styles in warfare can be described by their place on a spectrum of attrition and maneuver.[15] Warfare by attrition pursues victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy's material assets by superior firepower. It is a direct approach to the conduct of war that sees war as a straightforward test of strength and a matter principally of force ratios. An enemy is seen as a collection of targets to be engaged and destroyed systematically. Enemy concentrations are sought out as the most worthwhile targets. The logical conclusion of attrition warfare is the eventual physical destruction of the enemy's entire arsenal, although the expectation is that the enemy will surrender or disengage before this happens out of unwillingness to bear the rising cost. The focus is on the efficient application of fires, leading to a highly proceduralized approach to war. Technical proficiency—especially in weapons employment—matters more than cunning or creativity.

Attrition warfare may recognize maneuver as an important component but sees its purpose as merely to allow us to bring our fires more efficiently to bear on the enemy. The attritionist tends to gauge progress in quantitative terms: battle damage assessments, "body counts," and terrain captured. Results are generally proportionate to efforts; greater expenditures net greater results—that is, greater attrition. The desire for volume and accuracy of fire tends to lead toward centralized control, just as the emphasis on efficiency tends to lead to an

inward focus on procedures and techniques. Success depends on an overall superiority in attritional capacity—that is, the ability to inflict *and* absorb attrition. The greatest necessity for success is numerical and material superiority. At the national level, war becomes as much an industrial as a military problem. Historically, nations and militaries that perceived they were numerically and technologically superior have often adopted warfare by attrition.

Pure attrition warfare does not exist in practice, but examples of warfare with a high attrition content are plentiful: the operations of both sides on the Western Front of the First World War; the French defensive tactics and operations against the Germans in May 1940; the Allied campaign in Italy in 1943-1944; Eisenhower's broad-front offensive in Europe after Normandy in 1944; U.S. operations in Korea after 1950; and most U.S. operations in the Vietnam War.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is warfare by maneuver which stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on. Rather than pursuing the cumulative destruction of every component in the enemy arsenal, the goal is to attack the enemy "system"—to incapacitate the enemy *systemically*. Enemy components may remain untouched but cannot function as part of a cohesive whole. Rather than being viewed as desirable targets, enemy concentrations are generally avoided as enemy strengths. Instead of attacking enemy strength, the goal is the application of our strength against selected enemy

weakness in order to maximize *advantage*. This tack requires the ability to identify and exploit such weakness. Success depends not so much on the efficient performance of procedures and techniques, but on understanding the specific characteristics of the enemy system. Maneuver relies on speed and surprise for without either we cannot concentrate strength against enemy weakness. Tempo is itself a weapon—often the most important. Success by maneuver—unlike attrition—is often disproportionate to the effort made. However, for exactly the same reasons, maneuver incompetently applied carries with it a greater chance for catastrophic failure. With attrition, potential losses tend to be proportionate to risks incurred.

Firepower and attrition are essential elements of warfare by maneuver. In fact, at the critical point, where strength has been focused against enemy vulnerability, attrition may be extreme and may involve the outright annihilation of enemy elements. Nonetheless, the object of such local attrition is not merely to contribute incrementally to the overall wearing down of the entire enemy force, but to eliminate a key element which incapacitates the enemy systemically.

Like attrition warfare, maneuver warfare does not exist in its theoretically pure form. Examples of warfare with a high enough maneuver content that they can be considered maneuver warfare include Allenby's decisive campaign against the Turks in Palestine in 1918; German *Blitzkrieg* operations of 1939-1941, most notably the invasion of France in 1940; the

failed Allied landing at Anzio in 1944, which was an effort to avoid the attrition battles of the Italian theater; Patton's breakout from the Normandy beachhead in late 1944; MacArthur's Inchon campaign in 1950; and III Marine Amphibious Force's combined action program in Vietnam which attacked the Viet Cong by eliminating their essential popular support base through the pacification of rural villages.

All warfare involves both maneuver and attrition in some mix. The predominant style depends on a variety of factors, not least of which are our own capabilities and the nature of the enemy. Marine Corps doctrine today is based principally on warfare by maneuver, as we will see in the fourth chapter, "The Conduct of War."

COMBAT POWER

Combat power is the total destructive force we can bring to bear on our enemy at a given time.[16] Some factors in combat power are quite tangible and easily measured such as superior numbers, which Clausewitz called "the most common element in victory."[17] Some may be less easily measured such as the effects of maneuver, tempo, or surprise; the advantages conferred by geography or climate; the relative strengths of the offense and defense; or the relative merits of striking the enemy in the front, flanks, or rear. Some may be wholly

intangible such as morale, fighting spirit, perseverance, or the effects of leadership.

It is not our intent to try to list or categorize all the various components of combat power, to index their relative values, or to describe their combinations and variations; each combination is unique and temporary. Nor is it even desirable to be able to do so, since this would lead us to a formulaic approach to war. Our intent is merely to make the point that combat power is the situationally dependent and unique product of a variety of physical, moral, and mental factors.

SPEED AND FOCUS

Of all the consistent patterns we can discern in war, there are two concepts of universal significance in generating combat power: *speed* and *focus*.

Speed is rapidity of action. It applies to both time and space. Speed over time is tempo—the consistent ability to operate quickly.[18] Speed over distance, or space, is the ability to move rapidly. Both forms are genuine sources of combat power. In other words, *speed is a weapon*. In war, it is relative speed that matters rather than absolute speed. Superior speed allows us to seize the initiative and dictate the terms of

action, forcing the enemy to react to us. Speed provides security. It is a prerequisite for maneuver and for surprise. Moreover, speed is necessary in order to concentrate superior strength at the decisive time and place.

Since it is relative speed that matters, it follows that we should take all measures to improve our own speed while degrading our enemy's. However, experience shows that we cannot sustain a high rate of speed indefinitely. As a result, a pattern develops: fast, slow, fast again. A competitive rhythm develops in combat with each belligerent trying to generate speed when it is advantageous.

Focus is the convergence of *effects* in time and space on some objective. It is the generation of superior combat power at a particular time and place. Focus may achieve decisive local superiority for a numerically inferior force. The willingness to focus at the decisive place and time necessitates strict economy and the acceptance of risk elsewhere and at other times. To devote means to unnecessary efforts or excessive means to necessary secondary efforts violates the principle of focus and is counterproductive to the true objective. Focus applies not only to the conduct of war but also to the preparation for war.

Since war is fluid and opportunities are fleeting, focus applies to time as well as to space. We must focus effects not only at the decisive location but also at the decisive moment.

We achieve focus through cooperation toward the accomplishment of the common purpose. This applies to all elements of the force, and involves the coordination of ground combat, aviation, and combat service support elements.

The combination of speed and focus adds "punch" or "shock effect" to our actions. It follows that we should strike with the greatest possible combination of speed and focus.

SURPRISE AND BOLDNESS

Two additional concepts are particularly useful in generating combat power: *surprise* and *boldness*.

By surprise we mean a state of disorientation resulting from an unexpected event that degrades the enemy's ability to resist. We achieve surprise by striking the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared. It is not essential that we take the enemy unaware, but only that awareness came too late to react effectively. The desire for surprise is "more or less basic to all operations, for without it superiority at the decisive point is hardly conceivable."[19] While a necessary precondition of superiority, surprise is also a genuine source of combat power in its own right because of its psychological effect. Surprise can decisively affect the outcome of combat far beyond the physical means at hand.

The advantage gained by surprise depends on the degree of disorientation and the enemy's ability to adjust and recover. Surprise, if sufficiently harsh, can lead to shock, the total, if temporary, inability to react. Surprise is based on speed, stealth, ambiguity, and deception. It often means doing the more difficult thing—taking a circuitous direction of attack, for example—in the hope that the enemy will not expect it. In fact, this is the genesis of maneuver—to circumvent the enemy's strength to strike at a weakness.

While the element of surprise is often of decisive importance, we must realize that it is difficult to achieve and easy to lose. Its advantages are only temporary and must be quickly exploited. Friction, a dominant attribute of war, is the constant enemy of surprise. We must also recognize that while surprise is always desirable, the ability to achieve it does not depend solely on our own efforts. Surprise is not what we *do*; it is the enemy's *reaction* to what we do. It depends at least as much on our enemy's susceptibility to surprise—his expectations and preparedness. Our ability to achieve surprise thus rests on our ability to appreciate and then exploit our enemy's expectations. Therefore, while surprise can be decisive, it is risky to depend on it alone for the margin of victory.

There are three basic ways to go about achieving surprise. The first is through *deception*—to convince the enemy we are going to do something other than what we are really going to do in order to induce him to act in a manner prejudicial to his

own interests. The intent is to give the enemy a clear picture of the situation, but the wrong picture. The second way is through *ambiguity*—to act in such a way that the enemy does not know what to expect. Because he does not know what to expect, he must prepare for numerous possibilities and cannot prepare adequately for any one. The third is through *stealth*— to deny the enemy any knowledge of impending action. The enemy is not deceived or confused as to our intentions but is completely ignorant of them. Of the three, deception generally offers the greatest effects but is most difficult to achieve.

Boldness is a source of combat power in much the same way that surprise is. Boldness is the characteristic of unhes- itatingly exploiting the natural uncertainty of war to pursue major results rather than marginal ones. According to Clausewitz, boldness "must be granted a certain power over and above successful calculations involving space, time, and magnitude of forces, for wherever it is superior, it will take advantage of its opponent's weakness. In other words, it is a genuinely creative force."[20] Boldness is superior to timidity in every instance although boldness does not always equate to immediate aggressive action. A nervy, calculating patience that allows the enemy to commit himself irrevocably before we strike him can also be a form of boldness. Boldness is based on strong situation awareness: We weigh the situation, then act. In other words, boldness must be tempered with judgment lest it border on recklessness.

There is a close connection between surprise and boldness. The willingness to accept risks often necessary to achieve surprise reflects boldness. Likewise, boldness contributes to achieving surprise. After we weigh the situation, to take half measures diminishes the effects of surprise.

CENTERS OF GRAVITY AND CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES

It is not enough simply to generate superior combat power. We can easily conceive of superior combat power dissipated over several unrelated efforts or concentrated on some inconsequential object. To win, we must focus combat power toward a decisive aim. There are two related concepts that help us to think about this: *centers of gravity* and *critical vulnerabilities*.

Each belligerent is not a unitary force, but a complex system consisting of numerous physical, moral, and mental components as well as the relationships among them. The combination of these factors determines each belligerent's unique character. Some of these factors are more important than others. Some may contribute only marginally to the belligerent's power, and their loss would not cause significant damage. Others may be fundamental sources of capability.

We ask ourselves: *Which factors are critical to the enemy? Which can the enemy not do without? Which, if eliminated, will bend him most quickly to our will?* These are *centers of gravity*.[21] Depending on the situation, centers of gravity may be intangible characteristics such as resolve or morale. They may be capabilities such as armored forces or aviation strength. They may be localities such as a critical piece of terrain that anchors an entire defensive system. They may be the relationship between two or more components of the system such as the cooperation between two arms, the relations in an alliance, or the junction of two forces. In short, centers of gravity are any important sources of strength. If they are friendly centers of gravity, we want to protect them, and if they are enemy centers of gravity, we want to take them away.

We want to attack the source of enemy strength, but we do not want to attack directly into that strength. We obviously stand a better chance of success by concentrating our strength against some relative enemy weakness. So we also ask ourselves: *Where is the enemy vulnerable?* In battlefield terms, this means that we should generally avoid his front, where his attention is focused and he is strongest, and seek out his flanks and rear, where he does not expect us and where we can also cause the greatest psychological damage. We should also strike at a moment in time when he is vulnerable.

Of all the vulnerabilities we might choose to exploit, some are more critical to the enemy than others. Some may contribute significantly to the enemy's downfall while others may lead only to minimal gains. Therefore, we should focus our efforts against a *critical vulnerability*, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy's ability to resist us.

We should try to understand the enemy system in terms of a relatively few centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities because this allows us to focus our own efforts. The more we can narrow it down, the more easily we can focus. However, we should recognize that most enemy systems will not have a single center of gravity on which everything else depends, or if they do, that center of gravity will be well protected. It will often be necessary to attack several lesser centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities simultaneously or in sequence to have the desired effect.

Center of gravity and critical vulnerability are complementary concepts. The former looks at the problem of how to attack the enemy system from the perspective of seeking a source of strength, the latter from the perspective of seeking weakness. A critical vulnerability is a pathway to attacking a center of gravity. Both have the same underlying purpose: to target our actions in such a way as to have the greatest effect on the enemy.

CREATING AND EXPLOITING OPPORTUNITY

This discussion leads us to a corollary thought: the importance of creating and exploiting opportunity. In all cases, the commander must be prepared to react to the unexpected and to exploit opportunities created by conditions which develop from the initial action. When identification of enemy critical vulnerabilities is particularly difficult, the commander may have no choice but to exploit any and all vulnerabilities until action uncovers a decisive opportunity. As the opposing wills interact, they create various fleeting opportunities for either foe. Such opportunities are often born of the fog and friction that is natural in war. They may be the result of our own actions, enemy mistakes, or even chance. By exploiting opportunities, we create in increasing numbers more opportunities for exploitation. It is often the ability and the willingness to ruthlessly exploit these opportunities that generate decisive results. The ability to take advantage of opportunity is a function of speed, flexibility, boldness, and initiative.

CONCLUSION

The theory of war we have described provides the foundation for the discussion of the conduct of war in the final chapter. All acts of war are political acts, and so the conduct of war must be made to support the aims of policy. War takes place

at several levels simultaneously, from the strategic direction of the overall war effort to the tactical application of combat power in battle. At the highest level, war involves the use of all the elements of political power, of which military force is just one. Action in war, at all levels, is the result of the interplay between initiative and response with the object being to seize and maintain the initiative. All warfare is based on concepts such as speed, focus, surprise, and boldness. Success in war depends on the ability to direct our efforts against criti- cal vulnerabilities or centers of gravity and to recognize and exploit fleeting opportunities. As we will discuss, the warfighting doctrine we derive from our theory is one based on maneuver.

Chapter 3

Preparing for War

"The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision born of thought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are governed by the will. The will is rooted in character, and for the man of action character is of more critical importance than intellect. Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous."[1]

—Hans von Seeckt

"It is not enough that the troops be skilled infantry men or artillery men of high morale: they must be skilled water men and jungle men who know it can be done—Marines with Marine training."[2]

—Earl H. Ellis

During times of peace, the most important task of any military is to prepare for war. Through its preparedness, a military provides deterrence against potential aggressors. As the nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps must maintain itself for immediate employment in "any clime and place" and in any type of conflict. All peacetime activities should focus on achieving combat readiness. This implies a high level of training, flexibility in organization and equipment, professional leadership, and a cohesive doctrine.

FORCE PLANNING

Force planning is planning that is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities.[3] Planning plays as important a role in the preparation for war as it does in the conduct of war. The key to any plan is a clearly defined objective, in this case a required level of readiness.

The Marine Corps' force planning is concept-based. That is, all force planning derives from a common set of concepts which describe how Marine Corps forces will operate and perform certain key functions. These concepts describe the types of missions Marine forces are likely to be required to perform and how they might accomplish those missions. These concepts

provide the basis for identifying required ca- pabilities and implementing coordinated programs to develop those capabilities.

Based on this common set of concepts, force planning integrates all the efforts of the peacetime Marine Corps, including training, education, doctrine, organization, personnel management, and equipment acquisition. Unity of effort is as important during the preparation for war as it is during the conduct of war. This systematic process of identifying the objective and planning a course to obtain it applies to all areas and levels of preparations.

ORGANIZATION

The operating forces must be organized to provide forward deployed or rapidly deployable forces capable of conducting expeditionary operations in any environment. This means that in addition to maintaining their unique amphibious capability, the operating forces must maintain the capability to deploy by whatever means is appropriate to the situation.

The active operating forces must be capable of responding immediately to most types of crisis and conflict. Many sustained missions will require augmentation from the Reserve establishment.

For operations and training, Marine forces will be formed into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). MAGTFs are task organizations consisting of ground, aviation, combat service support, and command elements. They have no standard structure, but rather are constituted as appropriate for the specific situation. The MAGTF provides a single commander a combined arms force that can be tailored to the situation faced. As the situation changes, it may of course be necessary to restructure the MAGTF.

Operating forces should be organized for warfighting and then adapted for peacetime rather than vice versa. Tables of organization should reflect the two central requirements of *deployability* and the *ability to task-organize according to specific situations*. Units should be organized according to type only to the extent dictated by training, administrative, and logistic requirements.

Commanders should establish habitual relationships between supported and supporting units to develop operational familiarity among those units. This does not preclude nonstandard relationships when required by the situation.

DOCTRINE

Doctrine is a teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature and theory to its

preparation and conduct.[4] Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting. It also provides a philosophy for leading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism, and a common language. In short, it establishes the way we practice our profession. In this manner, doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding.

Marine Corps doctrine is made official by the Commandant and is established in this publication. Our doctrine does not consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations so much as it sets forth general guidance that requires judgment in application. Therefore, while authoritative, doctrine is not prescriptive.

PROFESSIONALISM

Marine Corps doctrine demands professional competence among its leaders. *As military professionals charged with the defense of the Nation, Marine leaders must be true experts in the conduct of war*. They must be individuals both of action and of intellect, skilled at "getting things done" while at the same time conversant in the military art. Resolute and self-reliant in their decisions, they must also be energetic and insistent in execution.[5]

The military profession is a thinking profession. Every Marine is expected to be a student of the art and science of war. Officers especially are expected to have a solid foundation in military theory and a knowledge of military history and the timeless lessons to be gained from it.

Leaders must have a strong sense of the great responsibility of their office; the resources they will expend in war are human lives.

The Marine Corps' style of warfare requires intelligent leaders with a penchant for boldness and initiative down to the lowest levels. Boldness is an essential moral trait in a leader for it generates combat power beyond the physical means at hand. Initiative, the willingness to act on one's own judgment, is a prerequisite for boldness. These traits carried to excess can lead to rashness, but we must realize that errors by junior leaders stemming from overboldness are a necessary part of learning.[6] We should deal with such errors leniently; there must be no "zero defects" mentality. Abolishing "zero defects" means that we do not stifle boldness or initiative through the threat of punishment. It does not mean that commanders do not counsel subordinates on mistakes; constructive criticism is an important element in learning. Nor does it give subordinates free license to act stupidly or recklessly.

Not only must we not stifle boldness or initiative, but we must continue to encourage both traits *in spite of mistakes*. On the other hand, we should deal severely with errors of inaction

or timidity. We will not accept lack of orders as justification for inaction; it is each Marine's *duty* to take initiative as the situation demands. We must not tolerate the avoidance of responsibility or necessary risk.

Consequently, trust is an essential trait among leaders—trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and support of their seniors. Trust must be earned, and actions which undermine trust must meet with strict censure. Trust is a product of confidence and familiarity. Confidence among comrades results from demonstrated professional skill. Familiarity results from shared experience and a common professional philosophy.

Relations among all leaders—from corporal to general—should be based on honesty and frankness regardless of disparity between grades. Until a commander has reached and stated a decision, subordinates should consider it their duty to provide honest, professional opinions even though these may be in disagreement with the senior's opinions. However, once the decision has been reached, juniors then must support it as if it were their own. Seniors must encourage candor among subordinates and must not hide behind their grade insignia. Ready compliance for the purpose of personal advance- ment—the behavior of "yes-men"—will not be tolerated.

TRAINING

The purpose of all training is to develop forces that can win in combat. Training is the key to combat effectiveness and therefore is the main effort of a peacetime military. However, training should not stop with the commencement of war; training must continue during war to adapt to the lessons of combat.

All officers and enlisted Marines undergo similar entry-level training which is, in effect, a socialization process. This training provides all Marines a common experience, a proud heritage, a set of values, and a common bond of comradeship. It is the essential first step in the making of a Marine.

Basic individual skills are an essential foundation for combat effectiveness and must receive heavy emphasis. All Marines, regardless of occupational specialty, will be trained in basic combat skills. At the same time, unit skills are extremely important. They are not simply an accumulation of individual skills; adequacy in individual skills does not automatically mean unit skills are satisfactory.

Commanders at each echelon must allot subordinates sufficient time and freedom to conduct the training necessary to achieve proficiency at their levels. They must ensure that

higher-level demands do not deny subordinates adequate opportunities for autonomous unit training.

In order to develop initiative among junior leaders, the conduct of training—like combat—should be decentralized. Senior commanders influence training by establishing goals and standards, communicating the intent of training, and establishing a main effort for training. As a rule, they should refrain from dictating how the training will be accomplished.

Training programs should reflect practical, challenging, and progressive goals beginning with individual and small-unit skills and culminating in a fully combined arms MAGTF. In general, the organization for combat should also be the organization for training. That is, units, including MAGTFs, should train with the full complement of assigned, reinforcing, and supporting forces they require in combat.

Collective training consists of drills and exercises. Drills are a form of small-unit training which stress proficiency by progressive repetition of tasks. Drills are an effective method for developing standardized techniques and procedures that must be performed repeatedly without variation to ensure speed and coordination. Examples are gun drills, preflight preparations, or immediate actions. In contrast, exercises are designed to train units and individuals in tactics under simulated combat conditions. Exercises should approximate the conditions of war as much as possible; that is, they should introduce friction in the form of uncertainty, stress, disorder, and opposing wills.

This last characteristic is most important; only in opposed, free-play exercises can we practice the art of war. Dictated or "canned" scenarios eliminate the element of independent, opposing wills that is the essence of war.

Critiques are an important part of training because critical self-analysis, even after success, is essential to improvement. Their purpose is to draw out the lessons of training. As a result, we should conduct critiques immediately after completing training, before memory of the events has faded. Critiques should be held in an atmosphere of open and frank dialogue in which all hands are encouraged to contribute. We learn as much from mistakes as from things done well, so we must be willing to admit mistakes and discuss them. Of course, a subordinate's willingness to admit mistakes depends on the commander's willingness to tolerate them. Because we recognize that no two situations in war are the same, our critiques should focus not so much on the actions we took as on why we took those actions and why they brought the results they did.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Professional military education is designed to develop creative, thinking leaders. From the initial stages of leadership training, a leader's career should be viewed as a continuous, progressive

process of development. At each stage, a Marine should be preparing for the subsequent stage.

The early stages of a leader's career are, in effect, an apprenticeship. While receiving a foundation in theory and concepts that will serve them throughout their careers, leaders focus on understanding the requirements and learning and applying the procedures and techniques associated with a particular field. This is when they learn their trades as aviators, infantrymen, artillerymen, or logisticians. As they progress, leaders should strive to master their respective fields and to understand the interrelationship of the techniques and procedures within the field. A Marine's goal at this stage is to become an expert in the tactical level of war.

As an officer continues to develop, mastery should encompass a broader range of subjects and should extend to the operational level of war. At this stage, an officer should not only be an expert in tactics and techniques but should also understand combined arms, amphibious warfare, and expeditionary operations. At the senior levels, an officer should be fully capable of articulating, applying, and integrating MAGTF warfighting capabilities in a joint and multinational environment and should be an expert in the art of war at all levels.

The responsibility for implementing professional military education in the Marine Corps is three-tiered: It resides not only with the education establishment, but also with the commander and the individual.

The education establishment consists of those schools— administered by the Marine Corps, subordinate commands, or outside agencies—established to provide formal education in the art and science of war. All professional schools, particularly officer schools, should focus on developing a talent for military judgment, not on imparting knowledge through rote learning. Study conducted by the education establishment can neither provide complete career preparation for an individual nor reach all individuals. Rather, it builds upon the base provided by commanders and by individual study.

All commanders should consider the professional development of their subordinates a principal responsibility of command. Commanders should foster a personal teacher-student relationship with their subordinates. Commanders are expected to conduct a continuing professional education program for their subordinates that includes developing military judgment and decisionmaking and teaches general professional subjects and specific technical subjects pertinent to occupational specialties. Useful tools for general professional development include supervised reading programs, map exer- cises, war games, battle studies, and terrain studies. *Commanders should see the development of their subordinates as a direct reflection on themselves.*

Finally, every Marine has an individual responsibility to study the profession of arms. A leader without either interest in or knowledge of the history and theory of warfare—the intel-

lectual content of the military profession—is a leader in appearance only. Self-directed study in the art and science of war is at least equal in importance to maintaining physical condition and should receive at least equal time. This is particularly true among officers; after all, the mind is an officer's principal weapon.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Since war is at base a human enterprise, effective personnel management is important to success. This is especially true for a doctrine of maneuver warfare, which places a premium on individual judgment and action. We should recognize that all Marines of a given grade and occupational specialty are not interchangeable and should assign people to billets based on specific ability and temperament. This includes recognizing those who are best suited to command assignments and those who are best suited to staff assignments—without penalizing one or the other by so recognizing.

The personnel management system should seek to achieve personnel stability within units and staffs as a means of fostering cohesion, teamwork, and implicit understanding. We recognize that casualties in war will take a toll on personnel stability, but the greater stability a unit has initially, the better it will absorb those casualties and incorporate replacements.

Finally, promotion and advancement policy should reward the willingness to accept responsibility and exercise initiative.

EQUIPPING

Equipment should be easy to operate and maintain, reliable, and interoperable with other equipment. It should require minimal specialized operator training. Further, equipment should be designed so that its use is consistent with established doctrine and tactics. A primary consideration is strategic and tactical lift—the Marine Corps' reliance on shipping for strategic mobility and on landing craft, helicopters, and vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft for tactical mobility from ship to shore and during operations ashore. Another key consideration is employability and supportability in undeveloped theaters with limited supporting infrastructure—where Marine Corps units can frequently expect to operate.

In order to minimize research and development costs and fielding time, the Marine Corps will exploit existing capabilities—"off-the-shelf" technology—to the greatest extent possible.

Acquisition should be a complementary, two-way process based on established operating and functional concepts. Especially for the long term, the process must identify combat requirements and develop equipment to satisfy these require-

ments. Where possible, we should base these requirements on an analysis of likely enemy vulnerabilities and should develop equipment to exploit those vulnerabilities. At the same time, the process should not overlook existing equipment of obvious usefulness.

Equipment is useful only if it increases combat effectiveness. Any piece of equipment requires support: operator training, maintenance, power sources or fuel, and transport. The anticipated enhancement of capabilities must justify these support requirements and the employment of the equipment must take these requirements into account.

The acquisition effort should balance the need for specialization with the need for utility in a broad range of environments. Increasing the capabilities of equipment generally requires developing increasingly specialized equipment. Increasingly specialized equipment tends to be increasingly vulnerable to countermeasures. One solution to this problem is not to develop a single family of equipment, but to maintain variety in equipment types.

As much as possible, employment techniques and procedures should be developed concurrently with equipment to minimize delays between the fielding of the equipment and its usefulness to the operating forces. For the same reason, initial operator training should also precede equipment fielding.

There are two dangers with respect to equipment: the overreliance on technology and the failure to make the most of technological capabilities. Technology can enhance the ways and means of war by improving humanity's ability to wage it, but technology cannot and should not attempt to eliminate humanity from the process of waging war. Better equipment is not the cure for all ills; doctrinal and tactical solutions to combat deficiencies must also be sought. Any advantages gained by technological advancement are only temporary for someone will always find a countermeasure, tactical or itself technological, which will lessen the impact of the technology. Additionally, we must not become so dependent on equipment that we can no longer function effectively when the equipment becomes inoperable. Finally, we must exercise discipline in the use of technology. Advanced information technology especially can tempt us to try to maintain precise, positive control over subordinates, which is incompatible with the Marine Corps philosophy of command.

CONCLUSION

There are two basic military functions: waging war and preparing for war. Any military activities that do not contribute to the conduct of a present war are justifiable only if they contribute to preparedness for a possible future one. Clearly, we cannot afford to separate conduct and preparation. They must be inti-

mately related because failure in preparation leads to disaster on the battlefield.

Chapter 4

The Conduct of War

"Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness."[1]

—Sun Tzu

"Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions."[2]

—Sun Tzu

"Many years ago, as a cadet hoping some day to be an officer, I was poring over the 'Principles of War,' listed in the old Field Service Regulations, when the Sergeant-Major came up to me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. 'Don't bother your head about all them things, me lad,' he said. 'There's only one principle of war and that's this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain't lookin'!'"[3]

—Sir William Slim

The sole justification for the United States Marine Corps is to secure or protect national policy objectives by military force when peaceful means alone cannot. How the Marine Corps proposes to accomplish this mission is the product of our understanding of the nature and the theory of war and must be the guiding force behind our preparation for war.

THE CHALLENGE

The challenge is to develop a concept of warfighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war and the realities of the modern battlefield. What exactly does this require? It requires a concept of warfighting that will help us function effectively in an uncertain, chaotic, and fluid environment—in fact, one with which we can exploit these conditions to our advantage. It requires a concept with which we can sense and use the time-competitive rhythm of war to generate and exploit superior tempo. It requires a concept that is consistently effective across the full spectrum of conflict because we cannot attempt to change our basic doctrine from situation to situation and expect to be proficient. It requires a concept with which we can recognize and exploit the fleeting opportunities that naturally occur in war. It requires a concept that takes into account the moral and mental as well as the physical forces of war because we have already concluded that these form the greater part of war. It requires a concept with which we can succeed against a numerically superior foe because we cannot

presume a numerical advantage either locally or overall. Especially in expeditionary situations in which public support for military action may be tepid and short-lived, it requires a concept with which we can win quickly against a larger foe on his home soil with minimal casualties and limited external support.

MANEUVER WARFARE

The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. In order to fully appreciate what we mean by *maneuver*, we need to clarify the term. The traditional understanding of maneuver is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver in space to gain a positional advantage.[4] However, in order to maximize the usefulness of maneuver, we must consider maneuver in other dimensions as well. The essence of maneuver is taking action to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy as a means of accomplishing our objectives as effectively as possible. That advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial. Especially important is maneuver *in time*—we generate a faster operating tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage. It is through maneuver in all dimensions that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.

Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.

Rather than wearing down an enemy's defenses, maneuver warfare attempts to bypass these defenses in order to *penetrate* the enemy system and tear it apart. The aim is to render the enemy incapable of resisting effectively by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole—rather than to destroy him physically through the incremental attrition of each of his components, which is generally more costly and time-con- suming. Ideally, the components of his physical strength that remain are irrelevant because we have disrupted his ability to use them effectively. Even if an outmaneuvered enemy continues to fight as individuals or small units, we can destroy the remnants with relative ease because we have eliminated his ability to fight effectively as a force.

This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On the contrary, firepower is central to maneuver warfare. Nor do we mean to imply that we will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We will concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes. Engaged in combat, we can rarely go wrong if we aggressively

pursue the destruction of enemy forces. In fact, maneuver warfare often involves extremely high attrition of selected enemy forces where we have focused combat power against critical enemy weakness. Nonetheless, the aim of such attrition is not merely to reduce incrementally the enemy's physical strength. Rather, it is to contribute to the enemy's systemic disruption. The greatest effect of firepower is gen- erally not physical destruction—the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly—but the disruption it causes.

If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the cohesion of the enemy system, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which the enemy cannot function. By our actions, we seek to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and more quickly than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy must be made to see the situation not only as deteriorating, but deteriorating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.

Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for *speed* to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. We seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late—until eventually he is overcome by events.

Also inherent is the need to *focus* our efforts in order to maximize effect. In combat this includes violence and shock effect, again not so much as a source of physical attrition, but as

a source of disruption. We concentrate strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and in ways in which it will cause the greatest damage to our enemy's ability to fight. Once gained or found, any advantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly. We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness against which we will direct all available combat power. When the *decisive* opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion.

An important weapon in our arsenal is *surprise*, the combat value of which we have already recognized. By studying our enemy, we will attempt to appreciate his perceptions. Through deception we will try to shape the enemy's expectations. Then we will exploit those expectations by striking at an unexpected time and place. In order to appear unpredictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibit imagination and initiative. In order to appear ambiguous and threatening, we should operate on axes that offer numerous courses of action, keeping the enemy unclear as to which we will choose.

Besides traits such as endurance and courage that all warfare demands, maneuver warfare puts a premium on certain particular human skills and traits. It requires the temperament to cope with uncertainty. It requires flexibility of mind to deal with fluid and disorderly situations. It requires a certain independence of mind, a willingness to act with initiative and boldness, an exploitive mindset that takes full advantage of every

opportunity, and the moral courage to accept responsibility for this type of behavior. It is important that this last set of traits be guided by self-discipline and loyalty to the objectives of seniors. Finally, maneuver warfare requires the ability to think above our own level and to act at our level in a way that is in consonance with the requirements of the larger situation.

ORIENTING ON THE ENEMY

Orienting on the enemy is fundamental to maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare attacks the enemy "system." The enemy system is whatever constitutes the entity confronting us within our particular sphere. For a pilot, it might be the combination of air defense radars, surface-to-air missiles, and enemy aircraft that must be penetrated to reach the target. For a rifle company commander, it might be the mutually supporting defensive positions, protected by obstacles and supported by crew-served weapons, on the next terrain feature. For an electronic warfare specialist, it might be the enemy's command and control networks. For a Marine expeditionary force commander, it might be all the major combat formations within an area of operations as well as their supporting command and control, logistics, and intelligence organizations.

We should try to understand the unique characteristics that make the enemy system function so that we can penetrate the

system, tear it apart, and, if necessary, destroy the isolated components. We should seek to identify and attack critical vulnerabilities and those centers of gravity without which the enemy cannot function effectively. This means focusing outward on the particular characteristics of the enemy rather than inward on the mechanical execution of predetermined procedures.

If the enemy system, for example, is a fortified defensive works, penetrating the system may mean an infiltration or a violent attack on a narrow frontage at a weak spot to physically rupture the defense, after which we can envelop the enemy positions or roll them up laterally from within. In this way we defeat the logic of the system rather than frontally overwhelming each position.

We should try to "get inside" the enemy's thought processes and see the enemy as he sees himself so that we can set him up for defeat. It is essential that we understand the enemy on his own terms. We should not assume that every enemy thinks as we do, fights as we do, or has the same values or objectives.

PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND

It is essential that our philosophy of command support the way we fight. First and foremost, *in order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command and control must*

be decentralized. That is, subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding of their senior's intent, rather than passing information up the chain of command and waiting for the decision to be passed down. Further, a competent subordinate commander who is at the point of decision will naturally better appreciate the true situation than a senior commander some distance removed. Individual initiative and responsibility are of paramount importance. The principal means by which we implement decentralized command and control is through the use of mission tactics, which we will discuss in detail later.

Second, since we have concluded that war is a human enterprise and no amount of technology can reduce the human dimension, our philosophy of command must be based on human characteristics rather than on equipment or procedures. Communications equipment and command and staff procedures can enhance our ability to command, but they must not be used to lessen the human element of command. Our philosophy must not only accommodate but must exploit human traits such as boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, and imagination.

Our philosophy of command must also exploit the human ability to communicate *implicitly*.[5] We believe that *implicit communication*—to communicate through *mutual understanding*, using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases or even *anticipating* each other's thoughts—is a faster, more effective way to communicate than through the use of detailed, explicit instructions. We develop this ability through familiar-

ity and trust, which are based on a shared philosophy and shared experience.

This concept has several practical implications. First, we should establish long-term working relationships to develop the necessary familiarity and trust. Second, key people—"actuals"—should talk directly to one another when possible, rather than through communicators or messengers. Third, we should communicate orally when possible, because we communicate also in *how* we talk—our inflections and tone of voice. Fourth, we should communicate in person when possible because we communicate also through our gestures and bearing.

Commanders should command from where they can best influence the action, normally well forward. This allows them to see and sense firsthand the ebb and flow of combat, to gain an intuitive appreciation for the situation that they cannot obtain from reports. It allows them to exert personal influence at decisive points during the action. It also allows them to locate themselves closer to the events that will influence the situation so that they can observe them directly and circumvent the delays and inaccuracies that result from passing information up and down the chain of command. Finally, we recognize the importance of personal leadership. Only by their physical presence—by demonstrating the willingness to share danger and privation—can commanders fully gain the trust and confidence of subordinates. *We must remember that command from the front should not equate to oversupervision of subordinates.* At the same time, it is important to balance the need for forward

command with the need for keeping apprised of the overall situation, which is often best done from a central location such as a combat operation center. Commanders cannot become so focused on one aspect of the situation that they lose overall situational awareness.

As part of our philosophy of command, we must recognize that war is inherently disorderly, uncertain, dynamic, and dominated by friction. Moreover, maneuver warfare, with its emphasis on speed and initiative, is by nature a particularly disorderly style of war. The conditions ripe for exploitation are normally also very disorderly. For commanders to try to gain certainty as a basis for actions, maintain positive control of events at all times, or dictate events to fit their plans is to deny the nature of war. We must therefore be prepared to cope—even better, to *thrive*—in an environment of chaos, uncertainty, constant change, and friction. If we can come to terms with those conditions and thereby limit their debili- tating effects, we can use them as a weapon against a foe who does not cope as well.

In practical terms, this means that we must not strive for certainty before we act, for in so doing we will surrender the initiative and pass up opportunities. We must not try to maintain excessive control over subordinates since this will necessarily slow our tempo and inhibit initiative. We must not attempt to impose precise order on the events of combat since this leads to a formularistic approach to war. We must be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances and exploit opportu-

nities as they arise, rather than adhering insistently to predetermined plans that have outlived their usefulness.

There are several points worth remembering about our command philosophy. First, while it is based on our warfighting style, this does not mean it applies only during war. We must put it into practice during the preparation for war as well. We cannot rightly expect our subordinates to exercise boldness and initiative in the field when they are accustomed to being oversupervised in garrison. Whether the mission is training, procuring equipment, administration, or police call, this philosophy should apply.

Next, our philosophy requires competent leadership at all levels. A centralized system theoretically needs only one competent person, the senior commander, who is the sole authority. A decentralized system requires leaders at all levels to demonstrate sound and timely judgment. Initiative be- comes an essential condition of competence among commanders.

Our philosophy also requires familiarity among comrades because only through a shared understanding can we develop the implicit communication necessary for unity of effort. Perhaps most important, our philosophy demands confidence among seniors and subordinates.

SHAPING THE ACTION

Since our goal is not merely the cumulative attrition of enemy strength, we must have some larger scheme for how we expect to achieve victory. That is, before anything else, we must conceive how we intend to win.

The first requirement is to establish what we want to accomplish, why, and how. Without a clearly identified concept and intent, the necessary unity of effort is inconceivable. We must identify those *critical* enemy vulnerabilities that we believe will lead most directly to undermining the enemy's centers of gravity and the accomplishment of our mission. Having done this, we can then begin to act so as to shape the campaign, operation, battle, or engagement to our advantage in both time and space. Similarly, we must try to see ourselves through our enemy's eyes in order to identify our own vulnerabilities that he may attack and to anticipate what he will try to do so that we can counteract him. Ideally, when the moment of engagement arrives, the issue will have already been resolved: Through our influencing of the events leading up to the encounter, we have so shaped the conditions of war that the result is a matter of course. We have shaped the action decisively to our advantage.

To influence the action to our advantage, we must project our thoughts forward in time and space. We frequently do this through planning. This does not mean that we establish a de-

tailed timetable of events. We have already concluded that war is inherently disorderly, and we cannot expect to dictate its terms with any sort of precision. Rather, we attempt to shape the general conditions of war. This shaping consists of lethal and nonlethal actions that span the spectrum from direct attack to psychological operations, from electronic warfare to the stockpiling of critical supplies for future operations. Shaping activities may render the enemy vulnerable to attack, facilitate maneuver of friendly forces, and dictate the time and place for decisive battle. Examples include canalizing enemy movement in a desired direction, blocking or delaying enemy reinforcements so that we can fight a fragmented enemy force, or shaping enemy expectations through deception so that we can exploit those expectations. We can attack a specific enemy capability to allow us to maximize a capability of our own such as launching an operation to destroy the enemy's air defenses so that we can maximize the use of our own aviation.

Through shaping, commanders gain the initiative, preserve momentum, and control the tempo of operations. We should also try to shape events in a way that allows us several options so that by the time the moment for decisive operations arrives, we have not restricted ourselves to only one course of action.

The further ahead we think, the less our actual influence can be. Therefore, the further ahead we consider, the less precision we should attempt to impose. Looking ahead thus becomes less a matter of direct influence and more a matter of laying the groundwork for possible future actions. As events approach

and our ability to influence them grows, we have already developed an appreciation for the situation and how we want to shape it.[6]

The higher our echelon of command, the greater is our sphere of influence and the further ahead in time and space we must seek to shape the action. Senior commanders developing and pursuing military strategy look ahead weeks, months, or more, and their areas of influence and interest will encompass entire theaters. Junior commanders fighting the battles and engagements at hand are concerned with the coming hours, even minutes, and the immediate field of battle. Regardless of the sphere in which we operate, it is essential to have some vision of the result we want and how we intend to shape the action in time and space to achieve it.

DECISIONMAKING

Decisionmaking is essential to the conduct of war since all actions are the result of decisions or of nondecisions. If we fail to make a decision out of lack of will, we have willingly surrendered the initiative to our foe. If we consciously postpone taking action for some reason, that is a decision. Thus, as a basis for action, any decision is generally better than no decision.

Since war is a conflict between opposing wills, we cannot make decisions in a vacuum. We must make our decisions in

light of the enemy's anticipated reactions and counteractions, recognizing that while we are trying to impose our will on the enemy, he is trying to do the same to us.

Time is a critical factor in effective decisionmaking—often the most important factor. A key part of effective decisionmaking is realizing how much decision time is available and making the most of that time. In general, whoever can make and implement decisions consistently faster gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage. Decisionmaking in execution thus becomes a time-competitive process, and timeliness of decisions becomes essential to generating tempo. Timely decisions demand rapid thinking with consideration limited to essential factors. In such situations, we should spare no effort to accelerate our decisionmaking ability. That said, we should also recognize those situations in which time is not a limiting factor—such as deliberate planning situations—and should not rush our decisions unnecessarily.

A military decision is not merely a mathematical computation. Decisionmaking requires both the situational awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. These abilities are the products of experience, education, and intelligence.

Decisionmaking may be an intuitive process based on experience. This will likely be the case at lower levels and in fluid, uncertain situations. Alternatively, decisionmaking may be a more analytical process based on comparing several options.

This will more likely be the case at higher levels or in deliberate planning situations.

We should base our decisions on *awareness* rather than on mechanical *habit*. That is, we act on a keen appreciation for the essential factors that make each situation unique instead of from conditioned response. We must have the moral courage to make tough decisions in the face of uncertainty—and to accept full responsibility for those decisions—when the natural inclination would be to postpone the decision pending more complete information. To delay action in an emergency because of incomplete information shows a lack of moral courage. We do not want to make rash decisions, but we must not squander opportunities while trying to gain more information.

Finally, since all decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty and since every situation is unique, there is no perfect solution to any battlefield problem. Therefore, we should not agonize over one. The essence of the problem is to select a promising course of action with an acceptable degree of risk and to do it more quickly than our foe. In this respect, "a good plan violently executed *now* is better than a perfect plan executed next week."[7]

MISSION TACTICS

One key way we put maneuver warfare into practice is through the use of *mission tactics*. Mission tactics is just as the name implies: the tactics of assigning a subordinate mission without specifying how the mission must be accom- plished.[8] We leave the manner of accomplishing the mission to the subordinate, thereby allowing the freedom—and establishing the duty—for the subordinate to take whatever steps deemed necessary based on the situation. Mission tactics relies on a subordinate's exercise of initiative framed by proper guidance and understanding.

Mission tactics benefits the senior commander by freeing time to focus on higher-level concerns rather than the details of subordinate execution. The senior prescribes the method of execution only to the degree that is essential for coordination. The senior intervenes in a subordinate's execution only by exception. It is this freedom for initiative that permits the high tempo of operations that we desire. Uninhibited by excessive restrictions from above, subordinates can adapt their actions to the changing situation. They inform the commander of what they have done, but they do not wait for permission.

Mission tactics serves as a contract between senior and subordinate. The senior agrees to provide subordinates with the support necessary to help them accomplish their mis- sions but without unnecessarily prescribing their actions. The senior is obligated to provide the guidance that allows subor- dinates to

exercise proper judgment and initiative. The subor- dinate is obligated to act in conformity with the intent of the senior. The subordinate agrees to act responsibly and loyally and not to exceed the proper limits of authority. Mission tactics requires subordinates to act with "topsight"—a grasp of how their actions fit into the larger situation.[9] In other words, subordinates must always think above their own levels in order to contribute to the accomplishment of the higher mission.

It is obvious that we cannot allow decentralized initiative without some means of providing unity, or focus, to the various efforts. To do so would be to dissipate our strength. We seek unity not principally through imposed control, but through *harmonious* initiative and lateral coordination within the context provided by guidance from above.

COMMANDER'S INTENT

We achieve this harmonious initiative in large part through the use of the commander's *intent*, a device designed to help subordinates understand the larger context of their actions. The purpose of providing intent is to allow subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative—to depart from the original plan when the unforeseen occurs—in a way that is consistent with higher commanders' aims.

There are two parts to any *mission*: the task to be accomplished and the reason or intent behind it.[10] The intent is thus a

part of every mission. The task describes the action to be taken while the intent describes the *purpose* of the action. The task denotes *what* is to be done, and sometimes *when* and *where*; the intent explains *why*. Of the two, the intent is predominant. While a situation may change, making the task obsolete, the intent is more lasting and continues to guide our actions. Understanding the intent of our commander allows us to exercise initiative in harmony with the commander's desires.

The intent for a unit is established by the commander assigning that unit's mission—usually the next higher commander, although not always. A commander normally provides intent as part of the mission statement assigned to a subordinate. A subordinate commander who is not given a clear purpose for the assigned mission should ask for one. Based on the mission, the commander then develops a concept of operations, which explains *how* the unit will accomplish the mission, and assigns missions to subordinates. Each subordinate mission statement includes an intent for that subordinate. The intent provided to each subordinate should contribute to the accomplishment of the intent a commander has received from above. This top-down flow of intent provides consistency and continuity to our actions and establishes the context that is essential for the proper bottom-up exercise of initiative.

It is often possible to capture intent in a simple ". . . in order to . . ." phrase following the assigned task. To maintain our focus on the enemy, we can often express intent in terms of the enemy. For example: "Control the bridge in order to prevent

the enemy from escaping across the river." Sometimes it may be necessary to provide amplifying guidance in addition to an ". . . in order to . . ." statement. In any event, a commander's statement of intent should be brief and compelling—the more concise, the better. A subordinate should be ever conscious of a senior's intent so that it guides every decision. An intent that is involved or complicated will fail to accomplish this purpose.

A clear expression and understanding of intent is essential to unity of effort. The burden of understanding falls on senior and subordinate alike. The seniors must make their purposes perfectly clear but in a way that does not inhibit initiative. Subordinates must have a clear understanding of what their commander expects. Further, they should understand the intent of the commander at least two levels up.

MAIN EFFORT

Another important tool for providing unity is the *main ef- fort*. Of all the actions going on within our command, we recognize one as the most critical to success at that moment. The *unit* assigned responsibility for accomplishing this key mission is designated as the main effort—the focal point upon which converges the combat power of the force. The main effort receives priority for support of any kind. It becomes clear to all other units in the command that they must support that unit in

the accomplishment of its mission. Like the commander's intent, the main effort becomes a harmonizing force for subordinate initiative. Faced with a decision, we ask ourselves: *How can I best support the main effort?*

We cannot take lightly the decision of which unit we designate as the main effort. In effect, we have decided: *This is how I will achieve a decision; everything else is secondary.* We carefully design the operation so that success by the main effort ensures the success of the entire mission. Since the main effort represents our primary bid for victory, we must direct it at that object which will have the most significant effect on the enemy and which holds the best opportunity of success. The main effort involves a physical and moral commitment, although not an irretrievable one. It forces us to concentrate decisive combat power just as it forces us to accept risk. Thus, we direct our main effort against a center of gravity through a critical enemy vulnerability, exercising strict economy elsewhere.

Each commander should establish a main effort for each operation. As the situation changes, the commander may shift the main effort, redirecting the weight of combat power in support of the unit that is now most critical to success. In general, when shifting the main effort, we seek to exploit success rather than reinforce failure.

SURFACES AND GAPS

Put simply, surfaces are hard spots—enemy strengths—and gaps are soft spots—enemy weaknesses. We avoid enemy strength and focus our efforts against enemy weakness with the object of penetrating the enemy system since pitting strength against weakness reduces casualties and is more likely to yield decisive results. Whenever possible, we exploit existing gaps. Failing that, we create gaps.

Gaps may in fact be physical gaps in the enemy's dispositions, but they may also be any weakness in time, space, or capability: a moment in time when the enemy is overexposed and vulnerable, a seam in an air defense umbrella, an infantry unit caught unprepared in open terrain, or a boundary between two units.

Similarly, a surface may be an actual strongpoint, or it may be any enemy strength: a moment when the enemy has just replenished and consolidated a position or a technological superiority of a particular weapons system or capability.

An appreciation for surfaces and gaps requires a certain amount of judgment. What is a surface in one case may be a gap in another. For example, a forest which is a surface to an armored unit because it restricts vehicle movement can be a gap to an infantry unit which can infiltrate through it. Further-

more, we can expect the enemy to disguise his dispositions in order to lure us against a surface that appears to be a gap.

Due to the fluid nature of war, gaps will rarely be permanent and will usually be fleeting. To exploit them demands flexibility and speed. We must actively seek out gaps by continuous and aggressive reconnaissance. Once we locate them, we must exploit them by funneling our forces through rapidly. For example, if our main effort has struck a surface but another unit has located a gap, we designate the second unit as the main effort and redirect our combat power in support of it. In this manner, we "pull" combat power through gaps from the front rather than "pushing" it through from the rear.[11] Commanders must rely on the initiative of subordinates to locate gaps and must have the flexibility to respond quick- ly to opportunities rather than blindly follow predetermined schemes.

COMBINED ARMS

In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available resources to best advantage. To do so, we must follow a doctrine of combined arms. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a dilemma—a no-win situation.

We accomplish combined arms through the tactics and techniques we use at the lower levels and through task organization at higher levels. In so doing, we take advantage of the complementary characteristics of different types of units and enhance our mobility and firepower. We use each arm for missions that no other arm can perform as well; for example, we assign aviation a task that cannot be performed equally well by artillery. An example of the concept of combined arms at the very lowest level is the complementary use of the automatic weapon and grenade launcher within a fire team. We pin an enemy down with the high-volume, direct fire of the automatic weapon, making him a vulnerable target for the grenade launcher. If he moves to escape the impact of the grenades, we engage him with the automatic weapon.

We can expand the example to the MAGTF level: We use assault support aircraft to quickly concentrate superior ground forces for a breakthrough. We use artillery and close air support to support the infantry penetration, and we use deep air support to interdict enemy reinforcements that move to contain the penetration. Targets which cannot be effectively suppressed by artillery are engaged by close air support. In order to defend against the infantry attack, the enemy must make himself vulnerable to the supporting arms. If he seeks cover from the supporting arms, our infantry can maneuver against him. In order to block our penetration, the enemy must reinforce quickly with his reserve. However, in order to avoid our deep air support, he must stay off the roads, which means he can only move slowly.

If he moves slowly, he cannot reinforce in time to prevent our breakthrough. We have put him in a dilemma.

CONCLUSION

We have discussed the aim and characteristics of maneuver warfare. We have discussed the philosophy of command necessary to support this style of warfare. We have discussed some of the tactics of maneuver warfare. By this time, it should be clear that maneuver warfare exists not so much in the specific methods used—we do not believe in a formularistic approach to war—but in the mind of the Marine. In this regard, maneuver warfare, like combined arms, applies equally to the Marine expeditionary force commander and the fire team leader. It applies regardless of the nature of the con- flict, whether amphibious operations or sustained operations ashore, of low or high intensity, against guerrilla or mechanized foe, in desert or jungle.

Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in and about war that should shape our every action. It is a state of mind born of a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism. It is a state of mind bent on shattering the enemy morally and physically by paralyzing and confounding him, by avoiding his strength, by quickly and aggressively exploiting his vulnerabilities, and by striking him in the way that will hurt him most. In

short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves—a philosophy for "fighting smart."

The Nature of War

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 119. This unfinished classic is arguably the definitive treatment of the nature and theory of war. All Marine officers should consider this book essential reading.

2. B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: New American Library, 1974) p. 323.

3. A. A. Vandegrift, "*Battle Doctrine for Front Line Leaders*," (Third Marine Division, 1944) p. 7.

4. "War is nothing but a duel [*Zweikampf*, literally 'two-struggle'] on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his *immediate* aim is to *throw* his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance." Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 75. See also Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security* (Winter 1992/1993) pp. 66–67.

5. Clausewitz, p. 121.

6. Ibid., p. 595.

7. For a first-hand description of human experience and reaction in war, read Guy Sajer's *The Forgotten Soldier* (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co., 1988), a powerful account of the author's experience as a German infantryman on the eastern front during the Second World War.

8. "Kind-hearted people might, of course, think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst . . .

"This is how the matter must be seen. It would be futile—even wrong—to try to shut one's eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality." Clausewitz, pp. 75–76.

9. For an insightful study of the reaction of men to combat, see S. L. A. Marshall's *Men Against Fire* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1961). Despite criticism of his research methods, Marshall's insights on this point remain valuable.

10. *The American Heritage Dictionary* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1983).

11. In his often-quoted maxim, Napoleon assigned an actual ratio: "In war, the moral is to the material as three to one." Peter G. Tsouras, *Warrior's Words: A Dictionary of Military Quotations* (London: Cassell, 1992) p. 266.

The Theory of War

1. Clausewitz, p. 87.

2. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. S. B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) p. 85. Like *On War, The Art of War* should be on every Marine officer's list of essential reading. Short and simple to read, *The Art of War* is every bit as valuable today as when it was written about 400 B.C..

3. Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923) p. 5. The passage continues: "Nearly all battles which are regarded as masterpieces of the military art, from which have been derived the foundation of states and the fame of commanders, have been battles of manoeuvre in which the enemy has found himself defeated by some novel expedient or device, some queer, swift, unexpected thrust or stratagem. In many battles the losses of the victors have been small. There is required for the composition of a great commander not only massive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination, but also an element of legerdemain, an original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten. It is because military leaders are credited with gifts of this order which enable them to ensure victory and save slaughter that their profession is held in such high honour . . .

"There are many kinds of manoeuvre in war, some only of which take place upon the battlefield. There are manouevres far to the flank or rear. There are manoeuvres in time, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all of which are removed from the battlefield, but react often decisively upon it, and the object of all is to find easier ways, other than sheer slaughter, of achieving the main purpose."

4. Clausewitz, pp. 69 and 87. It is important to recognize that military force does not replace the other elements of national power but supplements them. Clausewitz' most complete expression of this famous idea is found on page 605: "We maintain . . . that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different."

5. Ibid., pp. 87–88.

6. The term *annihilation* implies for many the absolute physical destruction of all the enemy's troops and equipment. This is rarely achieved and seldom necessary. Incapacitation, on the other hand, is literally what we mean to convey: the destruction of the enemy's military capacity to resist. See Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History*, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., especially vol. 4, chap. IV (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975–1985).

7. *Strategy of erosion* is known as *strategy of attrition* in classical military theory. The concepts are the same. We use the term erosion to avoid confusion with the tactical concept of attrition warfare. See Delbrück, especially vol. 4, chap. IV.

8. **Strategic level of war:** "The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multina-

tional military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans." (Joint Pub 1-02)

9. **National strategy**, also referred to as grand strategy: "The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives." (Joint Pub 1-02)

10. **Military strategy:** "The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force." (Joint Pub 1-02)

11. **Tactical level of war:** "The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives." (Joint Pub 1-02)

12. **Operational level of war:** "The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative

support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives." (Joint Pub 1-02)

13. Clausewitz, p. 357.

14. Ibid., p. 528.

15. For an excellent discussion of the attrition-maneuver spectrum and additional historical examples of attrition and maneuver, see Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987) pp. 91–112.

16. **Combat power:** "The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation, can apply against the opponent at a given time." (Joint Pub 1-02)

17. Clausewitz, p. 194.

18. Tempo is often associated with a mental process known variously as the "decision cycle," "OODA loop," or "Boyd cycle" after John Boyd who pioneered the concept in his lecture, "The Patterns of Conflict." Boyd identified a four-step mental process: observation, orientation, decision, and action. Boyd theorized that each party to a conflict first observes the situation. On the basis of the observation, he orients; that is, he makes an estimate of the situation. On the basis of the orientation, he makes a decision. Finally, he implements the decision—he acts. Because his action has created a new situation, the process begins anew. Boyd argued that

the party who consistently completes the cycle faster gains an advantage that increases with each cycle. His enemy's reactions become increasingly slower by comparison and therefore less effective until, finally, he is overcome by events. "A Discourse on Winning and Losing: The Patterns of Conflict," unpublished lecture notes and diagrams, August 1987.

19. Clausewitz, p. 198.

20. Ibid, p. 190.

21. See Clausewitz, pp. 485 and 595–596. **Centers of gravity:** "Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." (Joint Pub 1-02)

Preparing for War

1. Hans von Seeckt, *Thoughts of a Soldier*, trans. G. Waterhouse (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1930) p. 123.

2. FMFRP 12-46, *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* (August, 1992) p. 41. FMFRP 12-46 is a historical reprint of Operation Plan 712 written by Maj Earl H. Ellis in 1921.

3. **Force planning:** "Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of

Defense to the Military Departments and Services." (Joint Pub 1-02)

4. **Doctrine:** "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application." (Joint Pub 1-02)

5. Field Manual 100-5, *Tentative Field Service Regulations: Operations,* published by the War Department (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939) p. 31.

6. "In a commander a bold act may prove to be a blunder. Nevertheless it is a laudable error, not to be regarded on the same footing as others. Happy the army where ill-timed boldness occurs frequently; it is a luxuriant weed, but indicates the richness of the soil. Even foolhardiness—that is, boldness without object—is not to be despised: basically it stems from daring, which in this case has erupted with a passion unrestrained by thought. Only when boldness rebels against obedience, when it defiantly ignores an exressed command, must it be treated as a dangerous offense; then it must be prevented, not for its innate qualities, but because an order has been disobeyed, and in war obedience is of cardinal importance." Clausewitz, pp. 190–191.

The Conduct of War

1. Sun Tzu, p. 101.

2. Ibid., p. 134.

3. Sir William Slim, *Defeat into Victory* (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd, 1956) pp. 550–551.

4. **Maneuver:** "Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission." (Joint Pub 1-02)

5. Boyd introduces the idea of implicit communication as a command tool in "A Discourse on Winning and Losing: An Organic Design for Command and Control."

6. Hence the terms *area of influence* and *area of interest*. **Area of influence:** "A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control." **Area of interest:** "That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission." (Joint Pub 1-02)

7. George S. Patton, Jr., *War As I Knew It* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1979) p. 354.

8. In the context of command and control, also called *mission command and control*. Mission tactics involves the use of *mission-type orders*. **Mission-type order:** "Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished." (Joint Pub 1-02)

9. David Hillel Gelernter, *Mirror Worlds, or, The Day Software Puts the Universe in a Shoebox: How It Will Happen and What It Will Mean* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) pp. 51–53. If "*insight* is the illumination to be achieved by penetrating inner depths, *topsight* is what comes from a far-overhead vantage point, from a bird's eye view that reveals *the whole*—the big picture; how the parts fit together."

10. **Mission:** "The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor." (Joint Pub 1-02)

11. Hence the terms *reconnaissance pull* and *command push*, respectively. See William S. Lind's *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985) pp. 18–19.